LITERATURE

LITERATURESee the references on the scope and methods of ethics at the end of ch. i. of Part I., and also, Sorley,Ethics of Naturalism, ch. i., and hisRecent Tendencies in Ethics; Fite,An Introductory Study of Ethics, ch. ii.; Bowne,Principles of Ethics, ch. i.; Seth,Ethical Principles, ch. i.; Martineau,Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. I., Introduction; Hensel,Problems of Ethics, in Vol. I. of St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science.

See the references on the scope and methods of ethics at the end of ch. i. of Part I., and also, Sorley,Ethics of Naturalism, ch. i., and hisRecent Tendencies in Ethics; Fite,An Introductory Study of Ethics, ch. ii.; Bowne,Principles of Ethics, ch. i.; Seth,Ethical Principles, ch. i.; Martineau,Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. I., Introduction; Hensel,Problems of Ethics, in Vol. I. of St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science.

FOOTNOTES:[107]On thepracticalside, this was always, as we have seen, the prominent problem of Hebrew thought. But we are concerned here with the statement of the problem by Plato and Aristotle from the theoretical side.[108]The Ten Commandments, divided and subdivided into all their conceivable applications, and brought home through the confessional, were the specific basis.[109]The idealistic philosophic movement beginning with Kant is in many important respects the outgrowth of the earlierNaturrechtof the moral philosophers from Grotius on.

[107]On thepracticalside, this was always, as we have seen, the prominent problem of Hebrew thought. But we are concerned here with the statement of the problem by Plato and Aristotle from the theoretical side.

[108]The Ten Commandments, divided and subdivided into all their conceivable applications, and brought home through the confessional, were the specific basis.

[109]The idealistic philosophic movement beginning with Kant is in many important respects the outgrowth of the earlierNaturrechtof the moral philosophers from Grotius on.

Problems and Theories.—We were concerned in the last chapter with the typicalproblemsof moral theory. But it was evident that theories themselves developed and altered as now this, now that, problem was uppermost. To regard the question of how to know the good as the central problem of moral inquiry is already to have one type of theory; to consider the fundamental problem to be either the subordination or the satisfaction of desire is to have other types. A classification of types of theory is rendered difficult, a thoroughly satisfactory classification almost impossible, by the fact that the problems arrange themselves about separate principles leading to cross-divisions. All that we may expect to do is somewhat arbitrarily to select that principle which seems most likely to be useful in conducting inquiry.

(1) Teleological and Jural.—One of the fundamental divisions arises from taking either Value or Duty, Good or Right, as the fundamental idea. Ethics of the first type is concerned above all withends; hence it is frequently calledteleologicaltheory (Greek τέλος, end). To the other type of theory, obligations, imperatives, commands, law, and authority, are the controlling ideas. By this emphasis, arise thejuraltheories (Latin,jus, law). At some point, of course, each theory has to deal with the factor emphasized by its rival. If we start with Law as central, the good resides in these acts which conform toits obligations. The good is obedience to law, submission to its moral authority. If we start from the Good, laws, rules, are concerned with the means of defining or achieving it.

(2) Individual and Institutional.—This fundamental division is at once cut across by another, arising from emphasizing the problem of the individual and the social. This problem may become so urgent as to force into the background the conflict between teleological and jural theories, while in any case it complicates and subdivides them. We have individualistic and institutional types of theory. Consider, for example, the following representative quotations: "No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirablestate of feelingcalled by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time,to some being or beings, is an element of the conception";[110]and again,[110]"the good is universally the pleasurable." And while the emphasis is here upon the good, the desirable, the same type of statement,as respects emphasis upon the individual, may be made from the side of duty. For example, "it is the very essence of moral duty to be imposed by a man on himself."[111]Contrast both of these statements with the following: "What a man ought to do, or what duties he should fulfill in order to be virtuous, is in an ethical community not hard to say. He has to do nothing except what is presented, expressed, and recognized in his established relations."[112]"The individual has his truth, real existence, and ethical status only in being a member of the State. His particular satisfactions, activities, and way of life have in this authenticated, substantive principle, their origin andresult."[113]And in another connection: "The striving for a morality of one's own is futile and by its very nature impossible of attainment. In respect to morality the saying of one of the wisest men of antiquity is the true one. To be moral is to live in accord with the moral tradition of one's country."[114]Here both the good and the law of the individual are placed on a strictly institutional basis.

(3) Empirical and Intuitional.—Another cross-division arises from consideration of the method of ascertaining and determining the nature of moral distinctions: the method of knowledge. From this standpoint, the distinction of ethical theories into theempirical(ἐμπειριϰός) and theintuitional(Latin,intueor, to look at or upon) represents their most fundamental cleavage. One view makes knowledge of the good and the right dependent upon recollection of prior experiences and their conditions and effects. The other view makes it an immediate apprehension of the quality of an act or motive, a trait so intrinsic and characteristic it cannot escape being seen. While in general the empirical school has laid stress upon the consequences, the consequences to be searched for were considered as either individual or social. Some, like Hobbes, have held that it was directed upon law; to knowledge of the commands of the state. And similarly the direct perception or intuition of moral quality was by some thought to apply to recognition of differences of value, and by others to acknowledgment of law and authority, which again might be divine, social, or personal. This division cleaves straight across our other bases of classification. To describe a theory definitely, it would then be necessary to state just where it stood with reference to each possible combination or permutation of elements of all three divisions. Moreover, there are theorieswhich attempt to find a deeper principle which will bridge the gulf between the two opposites.

Complexity of Subject-matter and Voluntary Activity.—This brief survey should at least warn us of the complexity of the attempt to discriminate types of theory, and put us on our guard against undue simplification. It may also serve to remind us that various types of theory are not arbitrary personal devices and constructions, but arise because, in the complexity of the subject-matter, one element or another is especially emphasized, and the other elements arranged in different perspectives. As a rule, all the elements are recognized in some form or other by all theories; but they are differently placed and accounted for. In any case, it is voluntary activity with which we are concerned. The problem of analyzing voluntary activity into its proper elements, and rightly arranging them, must coincide finally with the problem of the relation of good and law of control to each other, with the problem of the nature of moral knowledge, and with that of the relation of the individual and social aspects of conduct.

The What and How of Activity.—Starting from the side of the voluntary act, we find in it one distinction which when forced into an extreme separation throws light upon all three divisions in theory which have been noted. This is the relation between desire and deliberation as mental or private, and the deed, the doing, as overt and public. Is there any intrinsic moral connection between thementaland theovertin activity? We may analyze an act which has been accomplished into two factors, one of which is said to exist within the agent's own consciousness; while the other, the external execution, carries the mental into operation, affects the world, and is appreciable by others.Now on the face of the matter, these two things, while capable of intellectual discrimination, are incapable of real separation. The "mental" side, the desire and the deliberation, is for the sake of determining what shall bedone; the overt side is for the sake of making real certain precedent mental processes, which are partial and inadequate till carried into effect, and which occur for the sake of that effect. The "inner" and "outer" are really only the "how" and the "what" of activity, neither being real or significant apart from the other. (Seeante, p. 6).

Separation into Attitude and Consequences.—But under the strain of various theories, this organic unity has been denied; the inner and the outer side of activity have been severed from one another. When thus divided, the "inner" side is connected exclusively with the will, the disposition, the character of the person; the "outer" side is connected wholly with the consequences which flow from it, the changes it brings about. Theories will then vary radically according as the so-called inner or the so-called outer is selected as the bearer and carrier of moral distinctions. One theory will locate the moral quality of an act in thatfromwhich it issues; the other in thatintowhich it issues.

The following quotations put the contrast in a nutshell, though unfortunately the exact meaning of the second is not very apparent apart from its context.

"A motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner. Now pleasure is in itself a good; nay, even setting aside immunity from pain, the only good.... It follows, therefore, immediately and incontestably that there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one. If motives are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects" (Bentham,Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. x., §2). Over against this, place the following from Kant: "Pure reason is practical of itself alone, and gives to man a universal law which we call the Moral Law.... If this law determines the will directly [without anyreference to objects and to pleasure or pain] the action conformed to it is good in itself; a will whose principle always conforms to this law is good absolutely in every respect and is the supreme condition of all good."

If now we recur to the distinction between the "what" and the "how" of action in the light of these quotations, we get a striking result. "What" one does is to pay money, or speak words, or strike blows, and so on. The "how" of this action is the spirit, the temper in which it is done. One pays money with a hope of getting it back, or to avoid arrest for fraud, or because one wishes to discharge an obligation; one strikes in anger, or in self-defense, or in love of country, and so on. Now the view of Bentham says in effect that the "what" is significant, and that the "what" consists ultimately only of the pleasures it produces; the "how" is unimportant save as it incidentally affects resulting feelings. The view of Kant is that the moral core of every act is in its "how," that is in its spirit, its actuating motive; and that the law of reason is the only right motive.Whatis aimed at is a secondary and (except as determined by the inner spirit, the "how" of the action) an irrelevant matter. In short the separation of the mental and the overt aspects of an act has led to an equally complete separation of its initial spirit and motive from its final content and consequence. And in this separation, one type of theory, illustrated by Kant, takes its stand on the actuating source of the act; the other, that of Bentham, on its outcome. For convenience, we shall frequently refer to these types of theories as respectively the "attitude" and the "content"; the formal and the material; the disposition and the consequences theory. The fundamental thing is thatboththeories separate character and conduct, disposition and behavior; which of the two is most emphasized being a secondary matter.

Different Ways of Emphasizing Results.—There are, however, different forms of the consequences or "content"theory—as we shall, for convenience, term it. Some writers, like Spencer as quoted, say the only consequences that are good are simply pleasures, and that pleasures differ only inintensity, being alike in everything but degree. Others say, pleasure is the good, but pleasures differ in quality as well as intensity and that a certainkindof pleasure is the morally good. Others say that natural satisfaction is not found in any one pleasure, or in any number of them, but in a more permanent mood of experience, which is termedhappiness. Happiness is different from a pleasure or from a collection of pleasures, in being an abiding consequence or result, which is not destroyed even by the presence of pains (while a pain ejects a pleasure). The pleasure view is called Hedonism; the happiness view, Eudaimonism.[115]

Different Forms of the "Attitude" Theory.—The opposite school of theory holds that the peculiar character of "moral" good is precisely that it isnotfound in consequences of action. In this negative feature of the definition many different writers agree; there is less harmony in the positive statement of just what the moral good is. It is an attribute or disposition of character, or the self, not a trait of results experienced, and in general such an attribute is calledVirtue. But there are as many differences of opinion as to what constitutes virtue as there are on the other side as to what pleasure and happiness are. In one view, it merges, in its outcome at least, very closely with one form of eudaimonism. If happiness be defined as the fulfillment of satisfaction of the characteristic functions of a human being, while a certain function, that of reason, is regarded asthecharacteristic human trait whose exercise isthevirtueor supreme excellence, it becomes impossible to maintain any sharp line of distinction. Kant, however, attempted to cut under this union of happiness and virtue, which under the form ofperfectionismhas been attempted by many writers, by raising the question ofmotivation. Why does the person aim at perfection? Is it for the sake of the resulting happiness? Then we have only Hedonism. Is it because the moral law, the law of reason, requires it? Then we have law morally deeper than the end aimed at.

We may now consider the bearing of this discussion upon theories of moral knowledge and (2) of moral authority.[116]

I. Characteristic Theories of Moral Knowledge.—(1) Those who set chief store by the goods naturally experienced, find that past experiences supply all the data required for moral knowledge. Pleasures and pains, satisfactions and miseries, are recurrent familiar experiences. All we have to do is to note them and their occasions (or, put the other way, to observe the tendency of some of our impulses and acts to bring pleasure as a consequence, of others to effect misery), and to make up our ends and aims accordingly. As a theory of moral knowledge, Hedonism is thus almost always allied withempiricism, understanding by empiricism the theory that particular past experiences furnish the method of all ideas and beliefs.

(2) The theory that the good is some type of virtuous character requires a special organ to give moral knowledge. Virtue is none the less the Good, even when it is not attained, when it is not experienced, that is, as we experience a pleasure. In any case, it is not good because it is experienced, but because itisvirtue. Thus the "attitude" theory tends to connect itself with some form of Intuitionalism, Rationalism, or Transcendentalism, all of these terms meaning that there is something in knowledge going beyond the particular experiences. Intuitionalism holds there is a certain special faculty which reveals truths beyond the scope of experience; Rationalism, that beside the particular elements of experience there are universal and necessary conceptions which regulate it; Transcendentalism, that within experience there is a factor derived from a source transcending experience.[117]

II. Characteristic Theories of Moral Control.—The result school tends to view authority, control, law, obligation from the standpoint ofmeans to an end; the moralistic, or virtue, school to regard the idea oflawas more fundamental than that of the good. From the first standpoint, the authority of a given rule lies in its power to regulate desires so that after all pleasures—or a maximum of them, and a minimum of pains—may be had. At bottom, it is a principle of expediency, of practical wisdom, of adjustment of means to end. Thus Hume said: "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions"—that is, the principles and rules made known by reason are, at last, only instruments for securing the fullest satisfaction of desires. But according to the point of view of the other school, no satisfaction isreally(i.e., morally) good unless it is acquired in accordance with a law existing independently of pleasurable satisfaction. Thus the good depends upon the law, not the law upon the desirable end.

The Opposition in Ordinary Life.—To some extent, similar oppositions are latent in our ordinary moral convictions, without regard to theory. Indeed, we tend, atdifferent times, to pass from one point of view to the other, without being aware of it. Thus, as against the identification of goodness with amereattitude of will; we say, "It is not enough for a man to be good; he must be good for something." It is not enough to mean well; one must mean to do well; to excuse a man by saying "hemeanswell," conveys a shade of depreciation. "Hell is paved with good intentions." Good "resolutions," in general, are ridiculed as not modifying overt action. A tree is to be judged by its fruits. "Faith without works is dead." A man is said "to be too good for this world" when his motives are not effective. Sometimes we say, "So and so is agoodman," meaning to say that that is about all that can be said for him—he does not count, or amount to anything, practically. The objection to identifying goodness with inefficiency also tends to render suspected a theory which seems to lead logically to such identification. More positively we dwell upon goodness as involvingservice; "love is the fulfilling of the law," and while love is a trait of character, it is one which takes immediate action in order to bring about certain definite consequences. We call a man Pharisaical who cherishes his own good character as an end distinct from the common good for which it may be serviceable.

On the other hand, indicating the supremacy of the voluntary attitude over consequences, we have, "What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" "What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own life?" "Let us do evil that good may come, whose damnation is just." The deep-seated objection to the maxim that the end justifies the means is hard to account for, except upon the basis that it is possible to attain ends otherwise worthy and desirable at the expense of conduct which is immoral. Again, compare Shakspere's "There's nothing right or wrong, but thinking makes it so" with the Biblical "As a man thinketh in his heart,so is he." And finally we have such sayings as, "Take the will for the deed"; "His heart is in the right place";Pereat mundus, fiat justitia.

Passing from this popular aspect of the matter, we find the following grounds for the "content" theory:

1. It Makes Morality Really Important.—Would there be any use or sense in moral acts if they did not tend to promote welfare, individual and social? If theft uniformly resulted in great happiness and security of life, if truth-telling introduced confusion and inefficiency into men's relations, would we not consider the first a virtue, and the latter a vice?[118]So far as the identification of goodness with mere motive (apart from results effected by acts) reduces morality to nullity, there seems to be furnished areductio ad absurdumof the theory that results are not the decisive thing.

(2) It Makes Morality a Definite, Concrete Thing.—Morality is found in consequences; and consequences are definite, observable facts which the individual can be made responsible for noting and for employing in the direction of his further behavior. The theory gives morality an objective, a tangible guarantee and sanction. Moreover, results are something objective, common to different individuals because outside them all. But the doctrine that goodness consists in motives formed by and within the individual without reference to obvious, overt results, makes goodness something vague or else whimsical and arbitrary. The latter view makes virtue either something unattainable, or else attained by merely cultivating certain internal states having no outward results at all, or even results that are socially harmful. It encourages fanaticism, moral crankiness, moral isolation or pride; obstinate persistence in a bad course in spite of its demonstrableevil results. It makes morality non-progressive, since by its assumption no amount of experience of consequences can throw any light upon essential moral elements.

(3) The Content Theory Not Only Puts Morality Itself upon a Basis of Facts, but Also Puts the Theory of Morality upon a Solid Basis.—We know what we mean by goodness and evil when we discuss them in terms of results achieved or missed, and can therefore discuss them intelligibly. We can formulate concrete ends and lay down rules for their attainment. Thus there can be a science of morals just as there can be a science of any body of observable facts having a common principle. But if morality depends upon purely subjective, personal motives, no objective observation and common interpretation are possible. We are thrown back upon the capricious individualipse dixit, which by this theory is made final. Ethical theory is rendered impossible. Thus Bentham, who brings these charges (and others) against the "virtue" theory of goodness, says at the close of the preface to hisPrinciples of Morals and Legislation(ed. of 1823):

"Truths that form the basis of political and moral science are not to be discovered but by investigations as severe as mathematical ones, and beyond all comparison more intricate and extensive.... They are not to be forced into detached and general propositions, unincumbered with explanations and exceptions. They will not compress themselves into epigrams. They recoil from the tongue and the pen of the declaimer. They flourish not in the same soil with sentiment. They grow among thorns; and are not to be plucked, like daisies, by infants as they run.... There is noKing's Road... to legislative, any more than to mathematical science."[119]

Arguments not unlike, however, may be adduced in favor of the attitude theory.

1. It, and It Alone, Places Morality in the High and Authoritative Place Which by Right Characterizes It.—Morality is not just a means of reaching other ends; it is an end in itself. To reduce virtue to a tool or instrumentality for securing pleasure is to prostitute and destroy it. Unsophisticated common sense is shocked at putting morality upon the same level with prudence, policy, and expediency. Morality is morality, just because it possesses an absolute authoritativeness which they lack.

2. The Morally Good Must be Within the Power of the Individual to Achieve.—The amount of pleasure and pain the individual experiences, his share of satisfaction, depends upon outward circumstances which are beyond his control, and which accordingly have no moral significance. Only the beginning, the willing, of an act lies with the man; its conclusion, its outcome in the way of consequences, lies with the gods. Accident, misfortune, unfavorable circumstance, may shut the individual within a life of sickness, misery, and discomfort. They may deprive him of external goods; but they cannot modify the moral good, for that resides in the attitude with which one faces these conditions and results. Conditions hostile to prosperity may be only the means of calling forth virtues of bravery, patience, and amiability. Only consequences within character itself, the tendency of an act to form a habit or to cultivate a disposition, are really of moral significance.

3. Motives Furnish a Settled and Workable Criterion by Which to Measure the Rightness or Wrongness of Specific Acts.—Consequences are indefinitely varied; they are too much at the mercy of the unforeseen to serve as basis of measurement. One and the same act may turn out in a hundred different ways according to accidental circumstances. If the individual had to calculate consequences before entering upon action, he would engage in trying to solve a problem where each new term introduced more factors. No conclusion would ever be reached; or, if reached, would be so uncertain that the agent would be paralyzed by doubt. But since the motives are within the person's own breast, the problem of knowing the right is comparatively simple: the data for the judgment are always at hand and always accessible to the one who sincerely wishes to know the right.

Conclusion.—The fact that common life recognizes, under certain conditions, both theories as correct, and that substantially the same claims may be made for both, suggests that the controversy depends upon some underlying misapprehension. Their common error, as we shall attempt to show in the sequel, lies in trying to split a voluntary act which is single and entire into two unrelated parts, the one termed "inner," the other, "outer"; the one called "motive," the other, "end." A voluntary act is always a disposition, or habit of the agentpassing into an overt act, which, so far as it can, produces certain consequences. A "mere" motive which does not do anything, which makes nothing different, is not a genuine motive at all, and hence is not a voluntary act. On the other hand, consequences which are not intended, whichare not personally wanted and chosen and striven for, are no part of a voluntary act.Neither the inner apart from the outer, nor the outer apart from the inner, has any voluntary or moral quality at all. The former is mere passing sentimentality or reverie; the latter is mere accident or luck.

Tendency of Each Theory to Pass into the Other.—Hence each theory, realizing its own onesidedness, tends inevitably to make concessions, and to borrow factors from its competitor, and thus insensibly to bridge the gap between them. Consequences are emphasized, but onlyforeseenconsequences; while toforeseeis a mental act whose exercise depends upon character. It is disposition, interest, which leads an agent to estimate the consequences at their true worth; thus an upholder of the "content" theory ends by falling back upon theattitudetaken in forecasting and weighing results. In like fashion, the representative of the motive theory dwells upon the tendency of the motive to bring about certain effects. The man with a truly benevolent disposition is not the one who indulges in indiscriminate charity, but the one who considers the effect of his gift upon its recipient and upon society. While lauding the motive as the sole bearer of moral worth, the motive is regarded as a force working towards the production of certainresults. When the "content" theory recognizes disposition as an inherent factor in bringing about consequences, and the "attitude" theory views motives as forces tending to effect consequences, an approximation of each to the other has taken place which almost cancels the original opposition. It is realized that a complete view of the place of motive in a voluntary act will conceive motive as a motor force; as inspiring to action which will inevitably produce certain results unless this is prevented by superior external force. It is also realized that onlythoseconsequences are any part of voluntary behavior which are so congenial to character as to appeal to it as good and stir it to effort to realize them.We may begin the analysis of a voluntary act at whichever end we please, but we are always carried to the other end in order to complete the analysis.The so-called distinction between the "inner" and "outer" parts of an act is in reality a distinction between theearlierand thelaterperiod of its development.

In the following chapter we shall enter upon a direct discussion of the relation of conduct and character to one another; we shall then apply the results of the discussion, in successive chapters, to the problems already raised: The Nature of Good; of Knowledge; of Moral Authority; The Relation of the Self to Others and Society; The Characteristics of the Virtuous Self.

LITERATUREMany of the references in ch. xi. trench upon this ground. Compare, also, Lecky,History of European Morals, Vol. I., pp. 1-2, and 122-130; Sidgwick,Methods of Ethics, pp. 6-11, 77-88 and 494-507; Wundt,Ethics, Vol. II., ch. iv.; Mackenzie,Manual of Ethics, Book II., ch. ii.; Murray,Introduction to Ethics, p. 143; Paulsen,System of Ethics, Introduction, and Book II., ch. i.

Many of the references in ch. xi. trench upon this ground. Compare, also, Lecky,History of European Morals, Vol. I., pp. 1-2, and 122-130; Sidgwick,Methods of Ethics, pp. 6-11, 77-88 and 494-507; Wundt,Ethics, Vol. II., ch. iv.; Mackenzie,Manual of Ethics, Book II., ch. ii.; Murray,Introduction to Ethics, p. 143; Paulsen,System of Ethics, Introduction, and Book II., ch. i.

FOOTNOTES:[110]Spencer,Principles of Ethics, Vol. I., p. 46, and p. 30. (Italics not in original.)[111]Green,Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 354.[112]Hegel'sPhilosophy of Right, translated by Dyde, Part III., 150 (p. 159).[113]Hegel'sPhilosophy of Right, translated by Dyde, Part III., 258 (p. 241).[114]Werke, Book I., 389.[115]The Greek words ἡδονή, pleasure, and εὐδαιμονία, happiness. The latter conception is due chiefly to Aristotle. Happiness is, however, a good translation only when taken very vaguely. The Greek term has a peculiar origin which influenced its meaning.[116]The differences as regards self and society will be considered in later chapters.[117]For similar reasons, the "content" theories tend to ally themselves with the positive sciences; the "attitude" theories with philosophy as distinct from sciences.[118]"Suppose that picking a man's pocket excited in him joyful emotions, by brightening his prospects, would theft be counted among crimes?"—Spencer.[119]Mill in hisAutobiographyhas given a striking account of how this phase of Utilitarianism appealed to him. (See pp. 65-67 of London edition of 1874; see also hisDissertations and Discussions, Vol. I., Essay on Bentham, especially pp. 339 and ff.) Bentham "introduced into morals and politics those habits of thought, and modes of investigation, which are essential to the idea of science; and the absence of which made these departments of inquiry, as physics had been before Bacon, a field of interminable discussion, leading to no result. It was not hisopinions, in short, but hismethod, that constituted the novelty and value of what he did.... Bentham's method may be shortly described as the method ofdetail.... Error lurks in generalities."Mill finally says: "He has thus, it is not too much to say, for the first time introduced precision of thought in moral and political philosophy. Instead of taking up their opinions by intuition, or by ratiocination from premises adopted on a mere rough view, and couched in language so vague that it is impossible to say exactly whether they are true or false, philosophers are now forced to understand one another, to break down the generality of their propositions, and join a precise issue in every dispute. This is nothing less than a revolution in philosophy." In view of the character of the larger amount of discussions in moral and political philosophy still current, Mill perhaps took a too optimistic view of the extent to which this "revolution" had been accomplished.

[110]Spencer,Principles of Ethics, Vol. I., p. 46, and p. 30. (Italics not in original.)

[111]Green,Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 354.

[112]Hegel'sPhilosophy of Right, translated by Dyde, Part III., 150 (p. 159).

[113]Hegel'sPhilosophy of Right, translated by Dyde, Part III., 258 (p. 241).

[114]Werke, Book I., 389.

[115]The Greek words ἡδονή, pleasure, and εὐδαιμονία, happiness. The latter conception is due chiefly to Aristotle. Happiness is, however, a good translation only when taken very vaguely. The Greek term has a peculiar origin which influenced its meaning.

[116]The differences as regards self and society will be considered in later chapters.

[117]For similar reasons, the "content" theories tend to ally themselves with the positive sciences; the "attitude" theories with philosophy as distinct from sciences.

[118]"Suppose that picking a man's pocket excited in him joyful emotions, by brightening his prospects, would theft be counted among crimes?"—Spencer.

[119]Mill in hisAutobiographyhas given a striking account of how this phase of Utilitarianism appealed to him. (See pp. 65-67 of London edition of 1874; see also hisDissertations and Discussions, Vol. I., Essay on Bentham, especially pp. 339 and ff.) Bentham "introduced into morals and politics those habits of thought, and modes of investigation, which are essential to the idea of science; and the absence of which made these departments of inquiry, as physics had been before Bacon, a field of interminable discussion, leading to no result. It was not hisopinions, in short, but hismethod, that constituted the novelty and value of what he did.... Bentham's method may be shortly described as the method ofdetail.... Error lurks in generalities."Mill finally says: "He has thus, it is not too much to say, for the first time introduced precision of thought in moral and political philosophy. Instead of taking up their opinions by intuition, or by ratiocination from premises adopted on a mere rough view, and couched in language so vague that it is impossible to say exactly whether they are true or false, philosophers are now forced to understand one another, to break down the generality of their propositions, and join a precise issue in every dispute. This is nothing less than a revolution in philosophy." In view of the character of the larger amount of discussions in moral and political philosophy still current, Mill perhaps took a too optimistic view of the extent to which this "revolution" had been accomplished.

Mill finally says: "He has thus, it is not too much to say, for the first time introduced precision of thought in moral and political philosophy. Instead of taking up their opinions by intuition, or by ratiocination from premises adopted on a mere rough view, and couched in language so vague that it is impossible to say exactly whether they are true or false, philosophers are now forced to understand one another, to break down the generality of their propositions, and join a precise issue in every dispute. This is nothing less than a revolution in philosophy." In view of the character of the larger amount of discussions in moral and political philosophy still current, Mill perhaps took a too optimistic view of the extent to which this "revolution" had been accomplished.

Problem of Chapter.—We have endeavored in the preceding chapters (1) to identify the sort of situation in which the ideas of good and evil, right and wrong, in their moral sense, are employed; (2) to set forth the typical problems that arise in the analysis of this situation; and (3) to name and describe briefly the types of theory which have developed in the course of the history of the problems. We have now to return to the moral situation as described, and enter upon an independent analysis of it. We shall commence this analysis, as was indicated in the last chapter, by considering the question of the relation of attitude and consequences to each other in voluntary activity,—not that this is the only way to approach the problem, but that it is the way which brings out most clearly the points at issue among types of moral theory which since the early part of the nineteenth century have had the chief currency and influence. Accordingly the discussion will be introduced by a statement of the two most extreme doctrines that separate the "inner" and the "outer," the "psychical" and the "overt" aspects of activity:viz., the Kantian, exclusively emphasizing the "how," the spirit, and motive of conduct; the Utilitarian, dwelling exclusively upon its "what," its effects and consequences. Our positive problem is, of course, by means of arraying these two extreme views against each other, to arrive at a statement of the mutual relations of attitude and act, motive and consequence, character and conduct.

We shall begin with Kant as a representative of the attitude theory.

Kant says:

"Nothing can possibly be conceived, in the world or out of it, which can be called Good without qualification, except a Good Will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance as qualities of temperament are individually good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous, if the will which is to make use of them and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health ... inspire pride and often presumption if there is not a Good Will to correct the influence of these on the mind. Moderation of the affections and passions, self-control and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification ... for without the principles of a good will they may become extremely bad. The coolness of a villain makes him both more dangerous and more abominable" (Kant:Theory of Ethics, tr. by Abbott, pp. 9-10).

Element of Truth in Statement.—There can be no doubt that in some respects these ideas of Kant meet a welcome in our ordinary convictions. Gifts of fortune, talents of mind, qualities of temperament, are regarded as desirable, as good, but we qualify the concession. We say they are good, if a good use is made of them; but that, administered by a bad character, they add to power for evil. Moreover, Kant's statement of theintrinsicgoodness of the Good Will, "A jewel which shines by its own light" (Ibid., p. 10), awakens ready response in us. Some goods we regard as means and conditions—health, wealth, business, and professional success. They affordmoral opportunities and agencies, but need not possess moral value in and of themselves; when they become parts, as they may, of a moral good, it is because of their place and context. Personality, character, has a dignity of its own, which forbids that it be considered a simple means for the acquisition of other goods. The man who makes his good character a simple tool for securing political preferment, is, we should say, prostituting and so destroying his own goodness.

Ambiguity of Statement.—The statement made by Kant, however, is ambiguous and open to opposed interpretations. The notion that the Good Will is good in and of itself may be interpreted in two different ways: (i) We may hold, for example, that honesty is good as a trait of will because it tends inevitably to secure a desirable relationship among men; it removes obstructions between persons and keeps the ways of action clear and open. Every man can count upon straightforward action when all act from honesty; it secures for each singleness of aim and concentration of energy. (ii) But we may also mean that honesty is absolutely good as a trait of character just in and by itself, quite apart from any influence this trait of character has in securing and promoting desirable ends. In one case, we emphasize its goodness because it arranges for and tends towards certain results; in the other case, we ignore the factor of tendency toward results.

Kant's Interpretation of Goodness of Will is Formal.—Kant's further treatment leaves us in no doubt in which of these two senses he uses the term Good Will. He goes on (Ibid., p. 10):

"A Good Will is good, not because of what it performs or effects,not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself.... Even if it should happen that, owing to the special disfavor of fortune, or the niggardly provision ofa stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the Good Will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the assuming of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its fruitfulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor take away anything from this value."

And again he says:

"An action ... derives its moral worth not from thepurposewhich is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined and therefore depends ... merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to anyobject of desire.... The purposes which we may have in view in our actions or their effect regarded as ends and springs of will cannot give the actions an unconditional or moral worth.... It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the Will, without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action" (Ibid., p. 16).

Relation of Endeavor and Achievement to Will.—Here, also, we find a certain agreement with our every-day moral experience. It is undoubtedly true that in many cases we ascribe moral worth or goodness to acts without reference to the results actually attained by them; a man who tries to rescue a drowning child is not judged only on the basis of success. If he is prevented, because he is crippled, or because the current is too rapid for him, we do not refuse hearty moral approbation. We do not judge the goodness of the act or of the agent from the standpoint of its attained result, which here is failure. We regard the man as good because he proposed to himself a worthy end or aim, the rescue of another, even at the risk of harm to himself. We should agree with Kant in saying that the moral worth does not depend on therealizationof the object of desire. But we should regard the worth of the man to consist precisely in the fact that, so far as he was concerned, heaimed at a good result. We do not rule out purpose, but we approve becausethe purpose was good. By will we mean tendencies, desires, and habits operating to realize results regarded as desirable. Will is not thesolecondition of reaching a result—that is, of making the aim an actual fact. Circumstances need to coöperate to insure a successful issue; and if these fail, the best will in the world cannot secure the transformation of desire for an end into that end. We know that sometimes it is only by accident that the desirable end is not effected, but we also know that without the proper disposition it is only by accident that the resultsareachieved. Moreover, we know that our own attitude is not only an important condition of securing the results, but that it is the only conditionconstantlyunder our control. What we mean by calling it "ours" is precisely that it is that condition whose operation lies with us. Accordingly, it is the key and clue to the results, so far as they concern us. So far, given desire and endeavor, achievement is not necessary to volition.

"Meaning Well."—On the other hand, can a man justify himself on the ground that he "means well," if the "meaning well" does notregulate the overt actsthat he performs, and hence the consequences that proceed from them? Are we not justified in suspecting a person's good faith when his good intentions uniformly bring suffering to others? If we do not question his good faith, do we not regard him as needing moral enlightenment, and a change of disposition? We distinguish in our judgments of good between the fanatic and the thoroughly selfish man, but we do not carry this distinction to the point of approving the fanatic; of saying, "Let him alone; he means well, he has a good will, he is actuated by a sense of duty." On the contrary, we condemn his aims; and in so far we censure him for willingly entertaining ans approving them. We may, indeed, approve of his character with respect to its sincerity, singleness of aim, and its thoroughness of effort, for such things,taken by themselves, orin the abstract, are good traits of character. We esteem them highly, however, just because they have so much to do with results; they are,par excellence, executive traits. But we do not approve of the man's whole character in approving these traits. There is something the matter with the man in whom good traits are put to a bad use. It is not true in such cases that we approve theagentbut condemn hisacts. We approve certain phases of conduct, and in so far regard the doer as praiseworthy; we condemn other features of acts, and in so far disapprove him.[120]

Overt Action Proves Will.—Again, under what circumstances do we actually "take the will for the deed"? When do we assume that so far as the will was concerned it did aim at the result and aimed at it thoroughly, without evasion and without reservation? Only when there issomeaction which testifies to the real presence of the motive and aim.[121]The man, in our earlier instance, must have made some effort to save the drowning child to justify either us or himself in believing that hemeantto do it; that he had the right intent. The individual who habitually justifies himself (either to others or to himself) by insisting upon the rightness of his motives, lays himself open to a charge of self-deception, if not of deliberate hypocrisy, if there are no outward evidences of effort towards the realization of his pretended motive. A habitually careless child, when blamed for some disorder or disturbance, seeks to excuse himself by saying he "didn't mean to": i.e., he had no intention or aim; the results did not flow morally from him. We often reply, in effect, "that is just the trouble; you didn't mean atall; you ought to have meantnotto do this." In other words, if you had thought about what you were doing you would not have done this and would not have brought about the undesirable results. With adults there is such a thing as culpable carelessness and blameworthy negligence. So far as the individual's conscious will was concerned, everything he deliberately intended may have been entirely praiseworthy; but we blame him because his character was such that the end appropriate to the circumstances did not occur to him. We do not disapprove when the failure to think of the right purpose is due to inexperience or to lack of intellectual development; but we do blame when the man does not employ his attained experience and intellectual capacity. Given these factors, if the right end is not thought of or is quickly dismissed, indisposition is the only remaining explanation. These two facts, that we require effort or evidence of sincerity of good will and that the character is disapproved fornotentertaining certain aims, are sufficient to prove that we do not identify will and motive with something which has nothing to do with "aptness for attaining ends." Will or charactermeans intelligent forethought of ends and resolute endeavor to achieve them. It cannot be conceived apart fromendspurposed and desired.

Emphasis of Utilitarians upon Ends.—We are brought to the opposite type of moral theory, the utilitarian, which finds moral quality to reside in consequences, that is to say, in the ends achieved. To the utilitarians, motive means simply certain states of consciousness which happen to be uppermost in a man's mind as he acts. Not this subjective feeling existing only in the inner consciousness, but the external outcome, the objective change whichis made in the common world, is what counts. If we can get the act done which produces the right sort of changes, which brings the right kind of result to the various persons concerned, it is irrelevant and misleading to bother with the private emotional state of the doer's mind. Murder would be none the less murder even if the consciousness of the killer were filled with the most maudlin sentiments of general philanthropy; the rescue of a drowning man would be none the less approvable even if we happened to know that the consciousness of the rescuer were irritable and grumpy while he was performing the deed. Acts, not feelings, count, and acts mean changes actually effected.[122]

Distinction of Intention from Motive.—The utilitarians make their point by distinguishing between intention and motive, attributing moral value exclusively to the former. According to them, intention iswhata man means to do; motive is the personal frame of mind which indicateswhyhe means to do it. Intention is the concrete aim, or purpose; the results which are foreseen and wanted. Motive is the state of mind which renders these consequences, rather than others, interesting and attractive. The following quotations are typical. Bentham says concerning motives:

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