The Project Gutenberg eBook ofEthicsThis ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online atwww.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.Title: EthicsAuthor: John DeweyJames Hayden TuftsRelease date: April 28, 2012 [eBook #39551]Language: EnglishCredits: E-text prepared by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Internet Archive (http://www.archive.org)*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ETHICS ***
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online atwww.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
Title: EthicsAuthor: John DeweyJames Hayden TuftsRelease date: April 28, 2012 [eBook #39551]Language: EnglishCredits: E-text prepared by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Internet Archive (http://www.archive.org)
Title: Ethics
Author: John DeweyJames Hayden Tufts
Author: John Dewey
James Hayden Tufts
Release date: April 28, 2012 [eBook #39551]
Language: English
Credits: E-text prepared by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Internet Archive (http://www.archive.org)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ETHICS ***
AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES
Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago
NEW YORKHENRY HOLT AND COMPANYLondon: GEORGE BELL AND SONS1909
Copyright, 1908,byHENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
The significance of this text in Ethics lies in its effort to awaken a vital conviction of the genuine reality of moral problems and the value of reflective thought in dealing with them. To this purpose are subordinated the presentation in Part I. of historic material; the discussion in Part II. of the different types of theoretical interpretation, and the consideration, in Part III., of some typical social and economic problems which characterize the present.
Experience shows that the student of morals has difficulty in getting the field objectively and definitely before him so that its problems strike him as real problems. Conduct is so intimate that it is not easy to analyze. It is so important that to a large extent the perspective for regarding it has been unconsciously fixed by early training. The historical method of approach has proved in the classroom experience of the authors an effective method of meeting these difficulties. To follow the moral life through typical epochs of its development enables students to realize what is involved in their own habitual standpoints; it also presents a concrete body of subject-matter which serves as material of analysis and discussion.
The classic conceptions of moral theory are of remarkable importance in illuminating the obscure places of the moral life and in giving the student clues which will enable him to explore it for himself. But there is always danger of either dogmatism or a sense of unreality when students are introduced abruptly to the theoretical ideas. Instead of serving as tools for understanding themoral facts, the ideas are likely to become substitutes for the facts. When they are proffered ready-made, their theoretical acuteness and cleverness may be admired, but their practical soundness and applicability are suspected. The historical introduction permits the student to be present, as it were, at the social situations in which the intellectual instruments were forged. He appreciates their relevancy to the conditions which provoked them, and he is encouraged to try them on simple problems before attempting the complex problems of the present. By assisting in their gradual development he gains confidence in the ideas and in his power to use them.
In the second part, devoted more specifically to the analysis and criticism of the leading conceptions of moral theory, the aim accordingly has not been to instill the notions of a school nor to inculcate a ready-made system, but to show the development of theories out of the problems and experience of every-day conduct, and to suggest how these theories may be fruitfully applied in practical exigencies. Aspects of the moral life have been so thoroughly examined that it is possible to present certain principles in the confidence that they will meet general acceptance. Rationalism and hedonism, for example, have contributed toward a scientific statement of the elements of conduct, even though they have failed as self-inclosed and final systems. After the discussions of Kant and Mill, Sidgwick and Green, Martineau and Spencer, it is possible to affirm that there is a place in the moral life for reason and a place for happiness,—a place for duty and a place for valuation. Theories are treated not as incompatible rival systems which must be accepted or rejecteden bloc, but as more or less adequate methods of surveying the problems of conduct. This mode of approach facilitates the scientific estimation and determination of the part played by various factors in the complexity of moral life. The student is put in a position to judge the problems ofconduct for himself. This emancipation and enlightenment of individual judgment is the chief aim of the theoretical portion.
In a considerable part of the field, particularly in the political and economic portions of Part III., no definitive treatment is as yet possible. Nevertheless, it is highly desirable to introduce the student to the examination of these unsettled questions. When the whole civilized world is giving its energies to the meaning and value of justice and democracy, it is intolerably academic that those interested in ethics should have to be content with conceptions already worked out, which therefore relate to what is least doubtful in conduct rather than to questions now urgent. Moreover, the advantages of considering theory and practice in direct relation to each other are mutual. On the one hand, as against thea prioriclaims of both individualism and socialism, the need of the hour seems to us to be the application of methods of more deliberate analysis and experiment. The extreme conservative may deprecate any scrutiny of the present order; the ardent radical may be impatient of the critical and seemingly tardy processes of the investigator; but those who have considered well the conquest which man is making of the world of nature cannot forbear the conviction that the cruder method of trial and error and the time-honored method of prejudice and partisan controversy need not longer completely dominate the regulation of the life of society. They hope for a larger application of the scientific method to the problems of human welfare and progress. Conversely, a science which takes part in the actual work of promoting moral order and moral progress must receive a valuable reflex influence of stimulus and of test. To consider morality in the making as well as to dwell upon values already established should make the science more vital. And whatever the effect upon the subject-matter, the student can hardly appreciate the full forceof his materials and methods as long as they are kept aloof from the questions which are occupying the minds of his contemporaries.
Teachers who are limited in time will doubtless prefer to make their own selections of material, but the following suggestions present one possible line of choice. In Part I., of the three chapters dealing with the Hebrew, Greek, and modern developments, any one may be taken as furnishing an illustration of the method; and certain portions of Chapter IX. may be found more detailed in analysis than is necessary for the beginner. In Part II., Chapters XI.-XII. may be omitted without losing the thread of the argument. In Part III., any one of the specific topics—viz., the political state, the economic order, the family—may be considered apart from the others. Some teachers may prefer to take Parts in their entirety. In this case, any two may be chosen.
As to the respective shares of the work for which the authors are severally responsible, while each has contributed suggestions and criticisms to the work of the other in sufficient degree to make the book throughout a joint work, Part I. has been written by Mr. Tufts, Part II. by Mr. Dewey, and in Part III., Chapters XX. and XXI. are by Mr. Dewey, Chapters XXII.-XXVI. by Mr. Tufts.
It need scarcely be said that no attempt has been made in the bibliographies to be exhaustive. When the dates of publication of the work cited are given, the plan has been in general to give, in the case of current literature, the date of the latest edition, and in the case of some classical treatises the date of original publication.
In conclusion, the authors desire to express their indebtedness to their colleagues and friends Dr. Wright, Mr. Talbert, and Mr. Eastman, who have aided in the reading of the proof and with other suggestions.
CHAPTERPAGEI.Introduction1§ 1.Definition and Method:—Ethical and moral, specific problem,1; importance of genetic study,3. § 2.Criterion of the moral:—The moral in cross section, the "what" and the "how,"5; the moral as growth,8. § 3.Divisions of the treatment,13.PART IThe Beginnings and Growth of MoralityII.Early Group Life17§ 1.Typical facts of group life:—Primitive unity and solidarity,17. § 2.Kinship and household groups:—The kinship group,21; the family or household group,23. § 3.Kinship and family groups as economic and industrial units:—The land and the group,24; movable goods,25. § 4.Kinship and family groups as political bodies:—Their control over the individual,26; rights and responsibility,27. § 5.The kinship or household as a religious unit:—Totem groups,30; ancestral religion,31. § 6.Age and sex groups,32. § 7.Moral significance of the group,34.III.The Rationalizing and Socializing Agencies in Early Society37§ 1.Three levels of conduct:—Conduct as instinctive and governed by primal needs, regulated by society's standards, and by personal standards,37. § 2.Rationalizing agencies:Work,40; arts and crafts,41; war,42. § 3.Socializing agencies:—Coöperation,42; art,45. § 4.Family life as idealizing and socializing agency,47. § 5.Moral interpretation of this first level,49.IV.Group Morality—Customs or Mores51§ 1.Meaning, authority, and origin of customs,51. § 2.Means of enforcing custom:—Public approval, taboos, rituals, force,54. § 3.Conditions which render group control conscious:—Educational customs,57; law and justice,59; danger or crisis,64. § 4.Values and defects of customary morality:—Standards, motives, content, organization of character,68.V.From Custom to Conscience; from Group Morality to Personal Morality73§ 1.Contrast and collision,73. § 2.Sociological agencies in the transition:—Economic forces,76; science and the arts,78; military forces,80; religious forces,81. § 3.Psychological agencies:—Sex,81; private property,83; struggles for mastery and liberty,84; honor and esteem,85. § 4.Positive reconstruction,89.VI.The Hebrew Moral Development91§ 1.General character and determining principles:—The Hebrew and the Greek,91; Political and economic factors,92. § 2.Religious agencies:—Covenant,94; personal law-giver,95; cultus,97; prophets,99; the kingdom,100. § 3.Moral conceptions attained:—Righteousness and sin,102; responsibility,104; purity of motive,105; the ideal of "life,"107; the social ideal,108.VII.The Moral Development of the Greeks111§ 1.The fundamental notes:—Convention versus nature,111; measure,112; good and just,113. § 2.Intellectual forces of individualism:—The scientific spirit,114. § 3.Commercial and political individualism:—Class interests,119; why obey laws?122. § 4.Individualism and ethical theory:—The question formulated,124; individualistic theories,126. § 5.The deeper view of nature and the good, of the individual and the social order:—Aristotle on the natural,127; Plato's ideal state,129; passion or reason,131; eudæmonism and the mean,134; man and the cosmos,135. § 6.The conception of the ideal:—Contrast with the actual,136; ethical significance,138. § 7.The conception of the self, of character and responsibility:—The poets,138; Plato and the Stoics,140.VIII.The Modern Period142§ 1.The mediæval ideals:—Groups and class ideals,143; the church ideal,145. § 2.Main lines of modern development,147. § 3.The old and new in the beginnings of individualism,149. § 4.Individualism in the progress of liberty and democracy:—Rights,151. § 5.Individualism as affected by the development of industry, commerce, and art:—Increasing power and interests,153; distribution of goods,157; industrial revolution raises new problems,159. § 6.The individual and the development of intelligence:—The Renaissance,163; the Enlightenment,165; the present significance of scientific method,167.IX.A General Comparison of Customary and Reflective Morality171§ 1.Elements of agreement and continuity:—Régime of custom,172; persistence of group morality,173; origin ofethical terms,175. § 2.Elements of contrast:—Differentiation of the moral,177; observingversusreflecting,178; the higher law,181; deepening of meaning,182. § 3.Opposition between individual and social aims and standards:—Withdrawal from the social order,184; individual emancipation,186. § 4.Effects upon the individual character:—Increased possibilities of evil as well as of good,187. § 5.Moral differentiation and the social order:—Effects on the family,193; on industry and government,194; on religion,195; general relation of religion to morality,197.PART IITheory of the Moral LifeX.The Moral Situation201Distinguishing marks of the moral situation,201; Traits of voluntary activity,202; The good and bad in non-voluntary behavior,203; Indifferent voluntary conduct,205; The moral is introduced when ends have conflicting values,207; Selection then depends upon, and influences, the nature of the self,209.XI.Problems of Moral Theory212Theory grows from practical problems,212; Three typical problems of reflective practice,213; Corresponding problems of theory,214; Their historical sequence,215; Growth of individualism,220; The two types of individualism,221.XII.Types of Moral Theory224§ 1.Typical divisions of theories:—Teleological and jural,224; individual and institutional,225; empirical and intuitional,226. § 2.Division of voluntary activity into Inner and Outer:—The "how" and the "what,"227; attitude and consequences,228; different types of each theory,229; bearing of each theory upon problems of knowledge and of control,231. § 3.General interpretation of these theories:—Ordinary view of disposition and of consequences,232; advantages claimed for emphasis upon consequences,234; for emphasis upon disposition or attitude,236; necessity of reconciliation of these theories,237.XIII.Conduct and Character240Problem of their relation,240. § 1.The good will of Kant:—Emphasis upon motive,241; motive with or without consequences,242; necessity of effort,243; overt action required to prove motive,245. § 2.The "Intention" of the Utilitarians:—Emphasis upon consequences,246; distinction of intention from motive,247; they are really identical,248; motive as blind and as intelligent,249; practical importanceof insistence upon consequences,251; foresight of consequences depends upon motive,252. § 3.Conduct and character:—The nature of disposition,254; partial and complete intention,256; complexity of motives,257. § 4.Morality of acts and of agents:—Subjective and objective morality,259; the doer and his deed,260; summary,261.XIV.Happiness and Conduct: The Good and Desire263Residence and nature of goodness,263; happiness as the good,264; love of happiness as the evil,265; ambiguity in conception of happiness,266. § 1.The Object of Desire:—Is it pleasure?269; desire presupposes instinctive appetites,270; and objects of thought,271; happiness and desire,272; need for standard,274. § 2.The Conception of Happiness as a Standard:—Utilitarian method,275; Difficulty of measuring pleasure,276; character determines the value of a pleasure,277; Mill's introduction of quality of pleasure,279. § 3.The constitution of happiness:—Pleasures depend upon objects,281; they are qualitative,282; they vary with disposition,283; happiness as the moral good,284.XV.Happiness and Social Ends286Utilitarianism aims at social welfare,286; value as a theory of social reform,287; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic theory of motive,289; Bentham's method of reconciling personal and general happiness,291; Mill's method,293; sympathy and the social self,298; the distinctively moral interest,300; equation of virtue and happiness,301; moral democracy,303.XVI.The Place of Reason in the Moral Life: Moral Knowledge306§ 1.Problem of reason and desire:—Nature of a reasonable act,306; theories about moral knowledge,307. § 2.Kant's theory of practical reason:—Traits of morality,309; reason asa prioriand formal,310; true meaning of generalization,313; the general and the social,314. § 3.Moral sense intuitionalism:—Function of reason,317; habit and sense,319; invalid intuitions,321; deliberation and intuition,322; the good man's judgment,324. § 4.The place of general rules:—Their value,325; casuistry,326; and its dangers,327; secondary ends of utilitarianism,329; empirical rules and customs,330; distinction of rules and principles,333; sympathy and reasonableness,334.XVII.The Place of Duty in the Moral Life: Subjection to Authority337Conflict of the rational with the attractive end,337. § 1.The subjection of desire to law,339; cause of conflict of desire and thought,342; demand for transformation of desire,343; social character of duties,345; the social self is the "universal" self,346. § 2.Kantian theory:—Accord withduty versus from duty,346; the two-fold self of Kant,347; criticism of Kant,348; emphasis falls practically on political authority,351; "Duty for duty's sake,"351. § 3.The Utilitarian theory of duty:—The hedonistic problem,353; Moral sanctions,354; they are too external,355; Bain's account,356; Spencer's account,358; such views set up a fictitious non-social self,361. § 3.Final statement:—Growth requires disagreeable readjustments,362.XVIII.The Place of the Self in the Moral Life364Problems regarding the self,364. § 1.The doctrine of self-denial:—Explanation of its origin,365; four objections to doctrine,366. § 2.Self-assertion:—Ethical dualism,369; "naturalistic" ethics,369; false biological basis,371; misinterprets nature of efficiency,373. § 3.Self-love and benevolence; or egoism and altruism:—The "crux" of ethical speculation,375; are all motives selfish?376; ambiguity of term selfish,377; are results selfish?379; self-preservation,380; rational regard for self,382; regard for others,384; the existence of "other-regarding" impulses,385; altruism may be immoral,387; social justice necessary to moral altruism,389. § 4.The good as self-realization:—Self-realization an ambiguous idea,391; true and false consideration of the self,393; equation of personal and general happiness,395.XIX.The Virtues399Introductory—virtue defined,399; natural ability and virtue,400; evolution of virtues,401; responsibility for moral judgment,402; futility of cataloguing virtues,402; their cardinal aspects,403. § 1.Temperance:—Greek, Roman, and Christian conceptions,405; negative and positive aspects,407; pleasure and excitement,408. § 2.Courage or persistent vigor:—Dislike of the disagreeable,410; "dimensions" of courage,411; optimism and pessimism,412. § 3.Justice:—Three meanings of,414; justice and love,415; justice and punishment,416. § 4.Wisdom or conscientiousness:—Importance of intelligent interest,418; Greek and modern ideas of moral wisdom,419; ideals and thoughtfulness,420; ideals and progress,422.PART IIIThe World of ActionXX.Social Organization and the Individual427Object of discussion,427. § 1.Growth of individuality through social organizations:—Emancipation from custom,428; double movement towards individuality and complex associations,429; morality and legality,432; two-fold contribution of social environment to individual morality,433;moral value of the state,434. § 2.Responsibility and freedom:—Liability,436; freedom as exemption and as power,437; legal and moral freedom,438. § 3.Rights and obligations:—Their definition,439; they are correlative,440; physical rights,442; limitations put upon them by war and punishment,443; by poverty,444; mental rights,445; limitations to freedom of thought and expression,446; education,448.XXI.Civil Society and the Political State451§ 1.Civil rights and obligations:—Their definition,451; their classes,452; significance of established remedies for wrongs,454. § 2.Development of civil rights:—Contrast with savage age justice,456; social harm versus metaphysical evil,457; recognition of accident and intent,459; of character and circumstances,460; of mental incapacity,462; significance of negligence and carelessness,464; conflict of substantial and technical justice,465; relations of the legal and moral,467; reform of criminal procedure necessary,468; also of punitive methods,470; and of civil administration,471. § 3.Political rights and obligations:—Significance of the state,473; distrust of government,474; indifference to politics,476; political corruption,477; reform of partisan machinery,478; of governmental machinery,479; constructive social legislation,480; a federated humanity,481. § 4.The moral criterion of political activity:—Its statement,482; the individualistic formula,483; the collectivistic formula,484.XXII.The Ethics of the Economic Life486§ 1.General analysis:—The economic in relation to happiness,487; relation to character,488; social aspects,491. § 2.The problem set by the new economic order:—Collective and impersonal organizations,495; readjustments required,496. § 3.The agencies for carrying on commerce and industry:—Early agencies,497; the business enterprise,498; the labor union,499; reversion to group morality,500; members and management,500; employer and employed,501; relations to the public,502; to the law,503. § 4.The methods of production, exchange, and valuation:—The machine,507; basis of valuation,508. § 5.The factors which aid ethical reconstruction:—Principles more easily seen,511.XXIII.Some Principles in the Economic Order5141. Wealth subordinate to personality,514. 2. Wealth and activity,514. 3. Wealth and public service,515. 4. A change demanded from individual to collective morality,517. 5. Personal responsibility,519. 6. Publicity and legal control,520. 7. Democracy and distribution,521.XXIV.Unsettled Problems in the Economic Order523§ 1.Individualism and socialism:—General statement,523; equal opportunity,526. § 2.Individualism or free contractanalyzed; its values:—Efficiency,527; initiative,527; regulation of production,528. § 3.Criticisms upon individualism:—It does not secure real freedom,528; nor justice,530; competition tends to destroy itself,531; position of the aristocratic individualists,532.XXV.Unsettled Problems in the Economic Order (Continued)536§ 4.The theory of public agency and control,536. § 5.Society as agency of production:—Charges against private management,537; corruption,538; conditions of labor,540; collective agency not necessarily social,544. § 6.Theories of just distribution:—Individualistic theory,546; equal division,547; a working programme,548. § 7.Ownership and use of property:—Defects in the present system,551. § 8.Present tendencies:—Individualistic character of the Constitution,554; increased recognition of public welfare,555; social justice through economic, social, and scientific progress,557. § 9.Three special problems:—The open versus the closed shop,559; the capitalization of corporations,561; the unearned increment,564. Appendix: Prof. Seager's programme of social legislation,566.XXVI.The Family571§ 1.Historical antecedents of the modern family:—Maternal type,572; paternal type,572; influence of the church,576. § 2.The psychological basis of the family:—Emotional and instinctive basis,578; common will,580; parenthood,581; social and religious factors,582; the children,582. § 3.General elements of strain in family relations:—Differences between the sexes in temperament and occupation,584; in attitude toward the family,587; differences between parents and children,589. § 4.Special conditions which give rise to present problems:—The economic factors,590; cultural and political factors,593. § 5.Unsettled problems:—Economic problems,594; the dilemma between the domestic life and occupations outside the home,595; the family as consumer,598. § 6.Unsettled problems:—Political problems, authority within the family,599; equality or inequality,600; isolation not the solution,602; authority over the family, divorce,603; general law of social health,605; conclusion,605.