1166. If God can creatures make to suit his will,Foresee, if they can, his design fulfill,Wherefore those creatures to trial expose,Traits to find out, which he thus foreknows?
1166. If God can creatures make to suit his will,Foresee, if they can, his design fulfill,Wherefore those creatures to trial expose,Traits to find out, which he thus foreknows?
1166. If God can creatures make to suit his will,Foresee, if they can, his design fulfill,Wherefore those creatures to trial expose,Traits to find out, which he thus foreknows?
1166. If God can creatures make to suit his will,
Foresee, if they can, his design fulfill,
Wherefore those creatures to trial expose,
Traits to find out, which he thus foreknows?
1167. Persons who should differ about axioms could never agree in mathematical demonstrations, nor is it possible for A and B to agree in theology, when A assumes what to B appears to comprise a contradiction within its premises and conclusions. Having for years held the opinion conveyed in the above lines, to be self-evident truth, it is of course useless to debate with those who take an opposite view, especially just at this time, when I believe that opinion to be sanctioned by my spirit friends. This opinion was urged in my letter to the Episcopal clergy; yet this kind adviser has not seen, or has not taken pains to understand, its all-important bearing.
1168. The letter of this charming woman commences with begging the question. It is assumed that the arguments of her clerical friendrequire for comprehension a higher power than any power created in man. Butthis to me appears fanatical presumption, just as much as it would be in any other sectarian. The excellent authoress of the epistle puts herself in a class of females whom it has been my object to emancipate from the restraint imposed upon their minds, no less cramping than that to which the feet of Chinese ladies are subjected.
1169. It must be evident, that unless there was a successful precursory effort by facts and reasoning, to make me believe that what appears to mebelowgood sense, is actually above it, her inference that discussion would be useless is quite evident. But this amounts to an admission that the opinions which it is her object to impart, are not founded in reason.
1170. Her clerical friend falls into the same error, as will appear from the following quotation. The last postulate in the world which he could induce me to admit, would be that any thing which owes its existence entirely to barbarous, wicked, ignorant, covetous, and blood-thirsty men, can be God’s word, and, therefore, paramount to human reason.
1171. How would he enable an idiot to believe in the Bible, or in any thing? Is not our capacity to believe correctly, greater as our reason is better by nature? It is only through his own intellectual faculties that he has received his opinions and can defend them. It is through my reason that my head and heart repel the Old Testament as, for the most part, the work of a set of unprincipled bigots, comprising allegations which the present state of astronomy and geology demonstrate to be fallacious, and which, independently of that cramping of the intellect by education, which it is my ardent desire to remove, would be denounced replete with indecency, immorality, and misrepresentation of God.
1172. It is striking that this kind lady, in referring to my sister and other spirit friends, should suppose that I would slight thedirect heartfelt evidence received from them, in obedience toimpressions felt by her in common with every other devotee to any religion whatever. They could, with just as much consistency, appeal to their tenets, and assume their “Koran,” their “Shasters,” or “Zendavesta” to be above my reason.
1173. But the whole tenor of this application shows that the authoress expects to set aside the results of nearly twenty months’ investigation, creating in me a firm devout conviction that I have a correct knowledge of the spirit world, received through my relatives, friends, and high spirits, in deference to those of a set of people of whom I know nothing but ill. May God do that for her which she has so benevolently implored for me, and remove from her brain the influence of educational narrowness. I would utter the same aspiration for the divine whom she has brought in as her advocate, who I hope assincerelybelieves what he alleges, as I believe in the communications of my guardian spirits.
1174. But this superior intellect, it will be shown, falls into one of the most inexcusable errors, into which a tyro in reasoning can fall, that of founding his arguments on premises which are emphatically denied bythe other party—a gross begging of the question, that the Bible is the word of God, and paramount to human reason.
1175. In a subsequent part of this letter, Hume’s excellent rule is set aside: that we must weigh the probability of the evidence against the improbability of the miracle. Rochefoucault alleges, ‘Tis better to tell a probable lie, than an extremely improbable truth. By what evidence can any record be proved true, when it is vastly more probable it should be false, than the facts recorded by it should be true.
1176. Manifestly, there are but these two ways in which any record can command credence: either there must be external evidence sufficient to weigh against the improbability of the facts which it has recorded; or those facts must be of a nature to create belief from their probability, from what is called internal evidence. As to external evidence, clearly any amount of that, may be adduced without creating a belief in spiritual manifestations. Human evidence is wholly inadequate to prove any thing which sectarianism does not wish to admit. Considering the external evidence of Scripture as vastly inferior to that on which Spiritualism is founded, and the miracles recorded, and the doctrines taught, as carrying no evidence of their truth, but the contrary, I do not understand upon what reasonable ground they are to be identified with the word of God.
1177. This fascinating lady supposes that she gave ear to my exposition of my views; but I am under the impression that she is quite deaf to any thing that does not concur with her fanatical impressions, otherwise she would never have looked upon me as one to be converted from the opinions which I entertain by the reasoning of her clerical friend, beginning with a begging of the question: assuming that revelation is God’s word, in order to prove it to be God’s word.
1178. So the Bible is true because of the miracles which it records; and these are true because the Bible records them!
1179. If she can so confine her mind as to become master of the pyramid of facts which I have raised in favour of Spiritualism, she will perceive that all other evidence of immortality sinks into insignificance as compared with it. Now all this may be nominally abrogated by denying the truth of it. But if I do not rely on my own senses, is it likely I shall rely on those of other persons, in whom I have no more confidence than her clerical adviser and herself have in Mohammed and his disciples.
1180. I subjoin a portion of the letter of the clerical champion, whose reasoning this interesting devotee deems so conclusive. I have gone over the whole of it, and have ascertained that by substituting Allah for God, Mohammed for Christ, Prophet for Redeemer, Mediator for Saviour, it has a qualification which would be deemed a merit elsewhere, if not in Christendom: it would serve just as well to uphold the religion of Mohammed, as that of Christ.
1181. The letter is so long that it would occupy too many pages to givethe whole; but I will give a portion, sufficient to show how the reasoning, on which many sectarians rely, may be just as good for any other creed, founded on an arrogation of premises, as that for which they contend.
1182. “Allah forbid that I should depreciate the value of reason in any of its offices. Reason is Allah’s gift to man, and must be used as Allah designs. But so is the Koran Allah’s gift to man, and must be used as Allah designs. Two gifts from the same perfect being cannot conflict with each other. The Koran in its teachings and revealings may go beyond or rise above the comprehension of our reason, because reason in man is a finite and imperfect gift, while the Koran from Allah opens the mind of an infinite and perfect being. But the Koran does not and cannot in any thing contradict reason, because Allah does not and cannot contradict himself. Unless, therefore, you are prepared to say that the Koran isnotAllah’s gift to man—if you are a believer in its true divine inspiration—you must see and admit that when the Koran, as Allah’s mouth, reveals any thing whichourreason cannot as yet comprehend, because beyond or above, though not against, that reason, thenFaithmust submissively receive the revelation addressed to it, andReasonstop her speculation and shut her mouth at the limit which Allah has set. Reason has to do with theevidenceswhich show the Koranto beAllah’s gift; with the grammatical and intendedsenseof what Allah taught and revealed in the Koran, and with theuseof what in the Koran is clear to the comprehension of man. But here Reason’s province ends. When the Koran goes beyond or rises above this point,Reason mustpause and adore, and Faith must go forward and receive. I do not hold, as you intimate, that the right exercise of reason ‘is impious,’ or that Reason is to bediscardedand Faithsubstituted, if by this be implied any thingincompatiblebetween the proper offices of Reason and Faith; but I mean thatourfinite reason is tostopat the limit assigned her by herauthor, and letFaithas ahigherpower go forward and receive what Allah teaches or reveals to her acceptance. Faith can now receive more than Reason can as yet comprehend. Shedoesso in the province ofnature; she must do so in the province ofrevelation. This cannot be denied without taking at once the ground of the infidel—a ground from which, I doubt not, you would shrink back as from the border of an open pit of destruction.
1183. I am thus brought to your remark, that ‘The Mohammedan system, as generally received, is not difficult to understand.’ If this be strictly true, it must be because that system, ‘as generally received,’ is not thetruesystem; for, in this sense, or astrulyandrightlyreceived, the Mohammedan system contains various things which it is difficult to understand, if by understanding be meantcomprehending. We may, indeed,understandthat a fact or a truthexistsor isrevealed, while that fact or that truthitselfis, for the present, utterly beyond or above ourcomprehension. And this is precisely the case with the Mohammedan systemrightlyviewed.It contains various facts and truths whichourreason cannot yet fathom. Natural reason loves toseparateand set aside these great and high things from the Koran asnon-essentials, and then to busy itself with those parts of the Koran which are level with its own height; pleased with the dream that it has graspedenough, has graspedallthat can be of any real value. Believe me when reason does this, for one who has the Koran in his hands, she plays at a perilous game.
1184. The main position which I have thus far taken is, however, virtually conceded in another part of your letter. Alluding to what I had urged as to the importance of acknowledging Mohammed as your mediator, and relying on his mediation only for justification as all-sufficient, reconciling all difficulties, and removing all embarrassment from the consideration of the union of justice and mercy in the deity, you say: ‘Butdoesit remove all embarrassment? Is not Allah himself the author of the plan of salvation? Was not Mohammed himself Allah, and also his vicegerent?’ Theimpossibilityof answering these questions satisfactorily to the plainest reason, teaches me to recoil from the impiety of inquiringhowmy Maker will save me or reconcile his own attributes? I know full well that the great mass of human minds are totally incapable of considering such a subject with any approximation to a solution of it, and therefore do I feel that the eternal salvation or condemnation of mankind does not depend on such theological questions. Here you directly admit the inability of reason in most minds satisfactorily to comprehend some of the great and high points of the Mohammedan system, and the consequent impiety of herattemptingsuch a comprehension. You might as well explicitly admit her inability for this comprehension inallminds; fornomind in its present state can byreason alonegrasp all that Allah has revealed in the Koran. These great and high things are not proposed to reasonalone, but to reason so far as theirevidenceis concerned, and tofaithso far as their substance is to be received. Reason may satisfy herself that theyarerevealed.Faith alonecan take in the substance which they contain. When theyareproposed to it, faithmustreceive them, or salvation cannot come, whether the reason of the individual addressed be the ‘plainest’ or otherwise.
1185. Yourargumentin the above extract does not satisfy me so well as youradmission. From the inability of the great mass of minds satisfactorily to comprehend the high mysteries of the Koran, you infer that the ‘eternal salvation or condemnation of mankind does not depend on such theological questions.’ Certainly, the salvation of mankind in the mass does not depend on these or any other theological questions; if by this be meant depending on the ability tocomprehendsuch questions, because the points involved in these questions, so far as they are mysteries, are proposed not toreasonascomprehending, but tofaithasreceiving. But do you mean to be understood as saying, that when the Koran is put intoany man’s hand, and when Allah through the Koran opens to that man hisrevealedway of salvation, the individual thus approached may accept what is level with hisreason, but reject what is proposed to hisfaithandabovehis reason, and that yet notwithstanding such rejection he may reasonably hope to be saved? If so, I ask you by what right you argue thus? Who is Allah, and what is man? When he tells you the way in which he will save you, not the mass of mankind or the heathen to whom the Koran has never come, butyou yourself, what right have you to say thatyoursalvation does not depend on your faith’s reception of those very things which are above your reason’s comprehension? How do you know but that the whole efficacy of the planproposed to you, depends on your receiving the great facts and truths propounded to yourfaith? ‘Faithitself, I admit,’ you may contend, ‘does not save any man; it is the Mediator that saves.’ But you have no right to say, or think, or hope that he will or can saveyouwith the Koran in your hand, in any other way than that which in the Koran he proposes to yourfaith. And if when he demands yourfaithin what surpasses your reason, you withhold that faith, and plead the sufficiency of what he has incidentally made level with yourreason, do you not thereby show that you have not the spirit which he requires, and that you are yet none of his? In the Koran he has not only revealed to you his mission and sanctification, but also proposed to you his mediation as a propitiation for your sin; and he has told you that ‘you must beborn again,’ not only of water, but also ‘of the spirit;’ that except you be converted and become as a ‘little child, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven;’ and that ‘he thatbelievethand is baptized shall be saved, but he thatbelieveth notshall bedamned:’ ‘believeth’ not apartonly, but thewholeof the Koran then intrusted to its Ulemas. Here he explicitly demands your faith in the whole Koran. But suppose it had been otherwise, suppose he had simply opened to youaway by which he couldcertainlysaveyou, without saying any thing aboutfaith, as the one great and necessary receiver of the facts and truths involved in that way; I ask, would not a rejection of apartof those involved facts and truths be equivalent to a rejection of the whole? Would it not display the same spirit as a rejection of the whole? Would it not show that you were not walking inhisway, but in someotherwhich you supposedmight possiblybe found? Nay, would it not show that in your heart you had no confidence in him as a mediator; that you even rebelled against his right to prescribe to you the terms on which he would save you?”
1186. To conclude, with respect to this guardian angel of my soul, to whom this digression owes its existence; it may comfort her to know that I conceive myself so securely protected and guided already, and so sure of the result of that guidance and protection, that I would advise her, in my turn, to consider well whether she ought not to pray to God to give her a little more light respecting her own destiny, than is afforded by thebook which is vaunted as being above reason, and as being the word of God. Does she conceive the subterranean cave with the “lake of unquenchable fire,” in which Dives is roasting in sight of the blessed, to be so satisfactory as to be unwilling to hear of a preferable abode in the azure sky? Does she aspire to some official position commensurate with that of the judgships which Christ promised his disciples? If it is to procure me a place in the heaven described in Scripture, I beg leave to decline, being pre-engaged; and therefore give her an invitation to meet me hereafter in the glorious abode to which I confidently aspire, and where I shall feel myself especially called upon to render her my assistance to rise from the inferior though happy sphere to which, with her present opinions, she is destined.
1187. I would recommend to her, and to others in the same predicament, the perusal of the influence of the conversion to Spiritualism on my friends, as presented in this volume. I would also recommend her to study the comparison made between the heaven and hell of Scripture and that of Spiritualism, as herein presented.
1188. I hope my would-be mundane guide to salvation will find in the verse and prose addressed to me by one more nearly allied (215,250,538) a sufficient apology for declining her kindly-tendered guidance, especially as the path through which she would lead me is known to this excellent relative, who has frequently passed and repassed it during her residence of more than two years in the spirit world, while to my mundane friend it is as yet unknown, and, as I believe, misapprehended. But although my mind has not been converted to her view of the service tendered, my heart will never cease to be gratefully inclined toward one who, while actually in want of guidance herself, thought so much of the supposed deficiency from which it is imagined I suffer.
1189. If a man cannot be guilty of infidelity to another man’s wife, how can he be guilty of infidelity to another man’s religion? The Mohammedan wrongfully calls the Christian “infidel,” because he does not believe in Mohammed; and as wrongfully is the epithet retorted, because the Mohammedan does not believe in Christ. The epithet can only be truly applicable to those who, while professing a religion, do not act up to their professions. In this sense, Christendom, so called, teems with infidels to Christianity.
1190. Since my spirit sister’s translation to the spheres, she has risen from the fifth to the sixth sphere. It has been alleged by her that her ascent was retarded by her belief in the atonement. I subjoin some reasoning on that subject:
1191. As respects free-will, Dr. Johnson shrewdly said that all practice is in its favour, all theory against it; but whatever view may be taken on this subject, no one can deny thatso far as it is possible for sin to be avoided, it must be within the power of God to make men virtuous. The fact that they are not sinless, must arise either from his not wishing to make them more virtuous, or from his inability to make them so. That he does not make them free from sin implies either a want of will or a want of power.
1192. But whatever may in this respect be true, his omniscience must have enabled him to perceive the result beforehand, and of course it is inconceivable that he would, consistently with his goodness, have created them, foreknowing that they would be so wicked as to deserve eternal punishment.
1193. All this it was in his power to obviate by not creating men, or by making their temptations less, or their power of resistance greater. But foreseeing their wickedness, and imposing fetters on his omnipotent power, so as to rendera certain amount of suffering inevitable, he is said to have determined that a portion of the godhead should expiate in the flesh, by the pains of crucifixion, the punishment due to the sinful creatures which he has been supposed to have wilfully created, foreseeing this result.
1194. But in order to make men better, instead of using that almighty power with which he is said to have hardened the heart of Pharaoh, to soften the human heart and enlighten the human mind universally, he is made to resort to a method which, however cruel and manifestly unjust in making an innocent being suffer for the guilty, has proved utterly inefficient, since only a small minority of mankind profess Christianity, and of that minority only an imperceptible portion, if any, comply with its requisitions, as before observed; hence the greater part are liable “to be beaten with many stripes,” while those to whom the mission of Christ has been unknown are to “be beaten with but few stripes.”
1195. Human lawgivers may enact constitutions which result in practical failure, because they do not foresee the issue. Such failures are ascribed to their deficiency in practical wisdom. But the failure of measures for the production of any result proving it unwise, must demonstrate that it did not originate with an all-wise author; in other words, with the Almighty.
1196. It is manifestly absurd to ascribe to that Being any measures which have failed to effect the ends for which they have been specially devised. Knowing that Mohammed would have more followers than Christ, that the largest portion of mankind would remain pagans, that even in Christendom the Christian religion would be a source of bloody contention and theological hatred, making scarcely any real Christians,—how could it originate with a wise and prescient Deity?
1197. “By their fruits ye shall know them?” It being premised that God is omniscient, all-wise, and omnipotent, can any fruit proceed from that high source which has not proved to answer well the purpose for which it was intended?
1198. The actual morality of Christendom being the inverse of that excessive and impracticable restraint, which Christ enjoined as the object of his mission, must prove that his doctrine could not have originated with a being by whom its failure must have been foreseen.
1199. Arguments such as I have used are met often by referring to the evils, to which all animated nature is subjected, in the way of misery, mutilation, disease, or death. But when the government of the universe is attributed to general laws, it may be inferred that evil results from a want of power to render those laws free from bad consequences. Nothing but such limitation of power, or an indisposition to prevent those evils, can account for their occurrence. But this is widely different from assuming, in the first place, with self-called orthodoxy, that God is omnipotent, omniscient, all-wise, and all-good, and then representing him as resorting to measures for the accomplishment of his ends which are utterly inefficacious. This is accusing the Almighty of acting like an idiot. Can any thing be more preposterous, than that an all-wise, all-good, all-powerful, and all-foreseeing Deity should require the services of human missionaries to carry out his will? Would he not at least require that such messengers of his word should first agree as to what that word ought to be? A pagan might remain during his whole life a pagan, should he, before adopting any creed, require that professed Christians, in general, should agree as to the tenets which he should espouse.
1200. Agreeably to the attributes assigned to the Deity by orthodoxy, the state of things which exists in the universe cannot be otherwise than as God wishes it to be, to the falling of a sparrow; so that any change sought by man, beyond the immediate sphere of his necessities, must be an officious interference with God’s providence.
1201. Yet if a man be considered as an instrument in attaining certain beneficent ends, without which those ends could not be accomplished, then human exertion is reasonable, in whatever way it can be productive of good.
1202. How can any being who contemplates the wonderful power displayed in the creation, hesitate to perceive that if the divine Architect desired that all men should coincide in their modes of worship, he would have furnished them sufficient evidence of his will, and disposed their minds to receive the desired impression?
1203. Nevertheless, his measures are represented as the inverse of these. It is represented that a creed which he wished all men to embrace was promulgated in an obscure part of an obscure country, under the yoke of heathen despotism, in a language unknown to any other people. It was so promulgated that the great majority of mankind were entirely out ofthe reach of its influence, and have remained so for nearly two thousand years. Moreover, those who have been made acquainted with Christianity are unable to agree in what it consists.
1204. As I have already urged, if we were to judge of the extention of Christianity by the number of Christians who do not in practice violate the precepts of Christ, it might be a question whether the name of Christendom is applicable to any part of the world.
1205. As in consideration of the idolatry of the Amalekites the Israelites were, according to the Bible, authorized to extirpate that nation, for a wrong done to Israel some hundred years before, may not the Russians imagine themselves justified for the massacre of Sinope? (1 Sam. xv.)
1206. The Turks have done vastly more harm to the Greek Christians, when, with fire and sword, they subdued the Greek empire, and obliged each man to pay annually for wearing his head, than the tribe of Amalek did to the Hebrews. In the one case there does not appear to have been for centuries any repetition of the wrong; but in the other the wrongs were reiterated, and of an enduring nature. It is true that the Mohammedan sovereigns were in Turkey more tolerant of their Christian subjects than Christian sovereigns were of Mohammedans; or even of the Albigenses, Lollards, Wicliffites, Lutherans, or Calvinists. The Turks never introduced an inquisitorial tribunal to burn or torture unbelievers. On this account they may think themselves less open to the charge of cruel intolerance than some of the self-called disciples of Christ; and no doubt the discordancy between the conduct of those disciples and the precepts of their teacher, may have contributed to their contemptuous opinions of those whom they improperly call infidels to Mohammed, not perceiving that people who have not professed a religion, can no more be infidels thereto than one man can be guilty of infidelity to another man’s wife. This argument, however, would be answered by the fact that Christians call Mohammedans infidels, not in consequence of any violation oftheirfaith in Mohammed, but because they have never had any faith in Christ.
1207. Such skeptical Mohammedans as Lady Mary Wortley Montague made mention of in her letters from Constantinople, will no doubt consider the term infidel applicable only to such as break their professed faith, whatever it may be.
1208. Agreeably to this definition, every fighting or wealth-seeking Christian is an infidel to the religion which he professes; every Mohammedan who indulges in wine is an infidel.
1209. The religion taught by Mohammed, like that of Moses, authorized the most cruel wars, the extermination of nations for erroneous belief,while the religion of Christ directs us to love our neighbours as ourselves; to return good for evil; to give our coat when our cloak is taken; to submit passively to blows, and that the possession of wealth interferes with access to heaven. Christianity is, moreover, unfavourable to polygamy or concubinage.
1210. It follows that the precepts of Jesus call for restraint upon the predominant passions of human nature, while those of Mohammed, in justifying warfare, excessive indulgence in women, and in the spoliation and massacre of unbelievers, coincide with the most predominating propensities of human nature. It is, therefore, far easier to be faithful to the precepts of Mohammed than those of Christ.
1211. Nevertheless, as both Christ and Mohammed treated the Old Testament as authentic, it is to be feared that the Turks and Russians may look to it for justification of their intolerant cruelty.
1212. None of the ancient Pagans were as hostile to the Hebrews, as the disciples of Mohammed have been to the Greek Christians. But not even the Mohammedans have been so intolerant to those whom they call infidels, as Christian sectarians have been, to such persons as they have dogmatically adjudged to be heretics.
1213. It should be well considered whether any authority dependent on human records can justify the inference that God, anywhere, or in any age, ever authorized such cruelty as that exhibited at Sinope.
1214. Whenever men adopt the idea entertained by the Jews and Mohammedans, and certain sects of Christians, that a peculiar creed is necessary to salvation, it is deemed humane to inflict any temporal evil in order to eradicate any other belief which will subject souls to eternal punishment. When to the Catholics in the reign of Queen Mary it was urged that burning heretics alive would not change their creed, the reply was, that although the victims should not be converted, the souls of their progeny would be saved from damnation by the extirpation of the heresy with the heretics. Admitting the premises, the conclusion was correct, and the auto-da-fé and the tortures of the inquisition were even more excusable than a painful chirurgical operation, when it preserves the temporal life of the patient.
1215. If the Czar is of opinion, that for every Christian who may replace a Turk, a soul will be saved from damnation, he may conceive himself as well authorized to extirpate the Turks, as were Moses and Joshua to extirpate any heathen nation.
1216. Moreover, by some Christians, Jesus is considered as having sanctioned the retention of that characteristic of the Hebrew portraiture of Jehovah, which makes it right to exterminate unbelievers in the orthodox creed. This must be a source of discord wherever it is recognised, as it induces persecution from conscientious regard to the salvation of the victims upon whom it acts, while in them it naturally creates bitter resentment instead of gratitude.
1217. Having submitted the representations of Jehovah, given in the Old Testament, I will subjoin those of the great modern philosopher Newton, and those of Seneca, one of the most distinguished sages of antiquity. The reader may, from these data, judge how far piety or morality would suffer, were that ancient record to give way to the direct evidence of Spiritualism.
1218. “God has no need of organs; he being everywhere present to the things themselves.
1219. “It appears from phenomena, that there is a being incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who, in infinite space, as it were in his sensory, sees the things themselves, intimately and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to himself.
1220. “This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets could only arise from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being; and if the fixed stars be centres of similar systems, these, being all formed by like wisdom, must be subject to the dominion of one; especially since the light of the fixed stars is of the same nature with the light of the sun; and all systems mutually give and receive light.
1221. “God governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as the Lord of the universe. The Supreme Deity is an eternal, infinite, and absolutely perfect being, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, his duration extends from eternity to eternity, and his presence from infinity to infinity; he governs all things, and knows all things which exist, or can be known. He is not eternity or infinity; but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space; but he endures and is present; he endures forever and is present everywhere. Since every portion of space is always, and every indivisible moment of duration is everywhere, certainly the Maker and Lord of all things cannot beneverornowhere. God is omnipresent, not virtually only, but substantially; for power cannot subsist without substance. In him all things are contained and move, but without reciprocal affection. God is not affected by the motion of bodies, nor do bodies suffer resistance from the omnipresence of God.
1222. “It is universally allowed that God exists necessarily; and by the same necessity he exists always and everywhere. Whence he is throughout similar, all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all power of perceiving, understanding, and acting; but in a manner not at all human, not at all corporeal; in a manner to us altogether unknown. As a blind man has no idea of colours, so we have no idea of the manner in which the most wise God perceives and understands all things. He is entirely without body, and bodily form, and therefore can neither be seen, nor heard, nor touched; nor ought he to be worshipped under any corporeal representation. We have ideas of his attributes, but what thesubstanceofanything is, we are wholly ignorant. We see only the figures and colours of bodies; we hear only sounds; we touch only external superficies; we smell only odours; we taste only savours; of their internal substance we have no knowledge by any sense, or by any reflex act of the mind; much less have we any idea of the substance of God. We know him only by his properties and attributes, by the most wise and excellent structure of things, and by final causes; and we reverence and worship him on account of his dominion. A God without dominion, providence, and design, is nothing else but fate and nature.”
1223. The language above quoted does not involve the idea that Newton owed his idea of God to the Bible, or that he considered him as having any person, much less that he consisted of three persons. He makes no allusion to Christ or to the Scriptures. His opinions are quite reconcilable with Theism, but incompatible with the existence of the Trinity.
1224. “Great respect is due to universal opinion. We consider common assent an evidence of truth. That there are Gods, we are convinced, among other proofs, from the fact that the belief in their existence is natural to man. No nation has been found so brutal as to be entirely without religion.
1225. “We begin to know God from his works. What is God? All that you see, and all that you do not see. In what does the nature of God and man differ? The best part of man is his mind; in God there is nothing but mind. He is pure spirit. Many names are applicable to him. Do you call him Fate? You do not err. He it is upon whom every thing depends. The cause of causes. Do you call him Providence? You are right. It is by his appointment that this world is so arranged that it performs without confusion the part assigned to it. Do you call him Nature? You do not sin. It is he from whom all things are produced.
1226. “You may properly apply to God any name expressive of celestial power. All his benefits may give rise to distinctive appellations. Thus he is called Father, Hercules, Mercury, &c. Father, because he is truly the Father of all; Hercules, because he is omnipotent; Mercury, because he is pure Reason, the principle of science, of order, and of harmony.
1227. “Justice, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, are all names ofoneGod, expressive of his various attributes, and are qualities of the one mind;whichever of them you love, you love God. Known unto God are all his works.
1228. “Whatever is to happen is present with him. What to us is sudden and unexpected, has by him been foreseen andprovidedfor.
1229. “A wise man does not change his opinion, how much less God! As a river does not flow back, or stop in its course,so the order of nature is governed by fixed laws, which are nothing less than divine decrees.
1230. “Who is so wretched, so neglected, who born to so cruel a destiny, as not to have received any benefits from the gods? Look at those who complain of their lot, you will find that they are not deprived of all comforts. Is the gift of life nothing? Are there no objects pleasant to the eye, to the ear, or to the mind? God’s kindness does not only supply us with what is necessary to existence, he provides also for our pleasure. Witness the variety of fruits, differing in flavour; the many healthful vegetables, so great a variety of food for different seasons of the year, some produced from the earth without culture,even for the idle; animals of all kinds abounding in the earth, the sea, and the air, as if all things in nature were tributary to our enjoyment. Consider the rivers flowing gracefully through the fields which they fertilize; others, whose deep beds in their vast and navigable courses, afford the means of a profitable commerce, or by overflowing their banks during the drought and heat of summer, water the parched earth and cause it to bring forth abundantly. You deny that you have received any favours, and yet are unwilling to part with what you possess. There are some philosophers who do not appreciate the divine gifts. They complain that we are not endowed with perfect health, incorruptible virtue, and foreknowledge. They scarcely refrain from impudently despising nature, that she has made us less than gods. How much better would it be to return thanks to the gods for the many benefits we have received, and for placing us in this beautiful world, and subjecting it to our rule, as their vicegerents.
1231. “The Deity has thought of us from the beginning; and this world has been so arranged as to make his care of us manifest. We admit our obligation to love our parents, as those from whom we derive our existence. They were, however, certainly not the authors of our existence, but were utterly ignorant of the mysteries of nature.
1232. “That we are indebted for our existence to anintelligent cause, is evident from the provisions made for our support long before our birth.
1233. “The strong instinct of a mother, making her willing to endure any privation for the helpless stranger; the sacred fountain which, at the moment it is wanted, flows from the mother’s breast; the air adapted to the lungs, the light to the eye: what more shall I say?—a present God is revealed!
1234. “Our kind Father begins to bestow benefits on us before we are capable of perceiving our obligations to him, and continues them even when we are ungrateful. Some accuse him of forgetting them; some of injuring them; others believe him to be regardless of his works; nevertheless, like a good parent, whosmilesat the follies of his children, God does not ceaseto confer his benefits on those who deny his existence, butwith an equal eye regards all nations, and uses his power only to bless. He sprinkles the earth with soft showers; he moves the sea by his breath; tempers the severity of winter and the heat of summer, and isplacable to the errors of imperfect mortals.”
1235. The subjoined essay, as above designated, was written nearly ten years ago, before the author had any hope that any knowledge of a future state would be mercifully afforded through himself, as well as many others, which would supply the only deficiency in the elements requisite to the proposed innovation. Fortunately the doctrines, since taught by the spirits, entirely corroborate the suggestions of this essay; so that Spiritualism, natural religion, and literature, may hereafter go hand in hand on Sunday.
1236. This now gloomy day, may, through the happy united instrumentality suggested, become a day of real intellectual improvement, as well as of every species of variety of innocent recreation. Yet every species of selfish sensual pleasure will be avoided and condemned by every conscientious believer in spiritual manifestations.
1237. It is suggested that persons opposed to sabbatarianism, inconsistent with the early and long-continued practice of Christianity, and with the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, should unite to render Sunday (erroneously called the Sabbath) a day of moral, literary, and scientific instruction, for those who, dissatisfied with the sectarianism of the existing places of worship, pass the day without edifying occupation.
1238. The object of this association would be to contemplate the Deity, agreeably to the opinions entertained by the first and one of the best of philosophers, Sir Isaac Newton; the sentiments of morality comprised in the precepts ascribed to Confucius, as well as to Christ, “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”
1239. As respects the object of devotion, the idea of the Deity entertained by Newton, and this sentiment of Pope’s universal prayer, might be adopted:
1240. “Father of all, in every age,In every clime adored,By saint, by savage, and by sage,Jehovah, Jove, or Lord.”
1240. “Father of all, in every age,In every clime adored,By saint, by savage, and by sage,Jehovah, Jove, or Lord.”
1240. “Father of all, in every age,In every clime adored,By saint, by savage, and by sage,Jehovah, Jove, or Lord.”
1240. “Father of all, in every age,
In every clime adored,
By saint, by savage, and by sage,
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord.”
1241. As regards ceremonial, that sanctioned by Christ, agreeably to which the brief appeal of the humble, contrite publican, was deemed preferable to that of the self-complacent, multiloquent, pompous Pharisee.
1242. The opinions of the Deity given by Newton, are quoted to show that there is nothing therein to justify intolerant sectarianism, nor to indicate the distinguished author to have been indebted for them to Revelation.
1243. As favouring toleration, the sentiments expressed by Seneca, theRoman sage, should be cherished. The sentiments of this sage prove that among the heathens a more pious idea of God existed than that given by the Bible, which represents him as jealous, and as punishing not only the individual, but his posterity, for an involuntary ignorance, which by a mere fiat, omnipotency could correct.
1244. God is quite tolerant, according to Seneca, as respects any misapprehension of his pretensions, while, according to Moses, he is extremely intolerant.
1245. Instead of teaching people to dislike and disesteem those who may differ from them, as to the designation, form, or name under which the Deity is to be worshipped, it should be held that no person of sound mind would waste his time and his energies in worshipping that which he does not conscientiously believe to be entitled to adoration, any more than a man willknowinglypay a debt to or court the favour of one to whom he owes nothing, and from whom he cannot expect any thing in return. It might be argued as reasonably, that a person in paying bymistakea forged draft, is less honest than in paying one which is genuine, as that a virtuous pagan is to have less favour with God than any other man, however orthodox his creed. (See Theological Axioms, page 34.)
1246. Were a lessee to pay a forged order for rent due to his landlord, would the latter strive to punish him for the mistake, especially if so wealthy as not to feel the want of the money? But what would be said of the landlord who, knowing that his lessee had received an erroneous impression as to the owner of his tenement, should allow him to pay year after year without any effort to prevent him from being cheated? Would not this deprive him of moral if not of legal claim to the rent? God is represented as omniscient, and consequently as cognizant of the misapprehension which leads the pagan to kneel before his idol, and yet without either influencing his mind, or placing before him any evidence of his error, punishing him for his mistake.
1247. It should, moreover, be an object to prove the greatness and goodness of God, by making men acquainted with the wondrous miracles of that universe of which a nook has been assigned to the inhabitants of this planet, which, in comparison with the totality, is as minute as any grain of sand which contributes to form our terrestrial globe is to the whole mass of which it constitutes a part—so insignificant. It should be an object to show how that “honesty is the best policy,”—the bad never being happy.
1248. Those well-educated sectarians of different creeds should be held wanting in humility, who severally considered themselves free from that error in belief to which they deem all other men liable. It is conceived, also, that individuals are answerable for their opinions to God only, and that for one man to condemn another for not thinking as he himself thinks, is to violate the precept, “judge not, lest ye be judged,” and the golden rule of acting toward other men as you would have them act toward you.
1249. Since our missions are all intended to induce pagans and others to think freely as respects the tenets in which they have been educated, how can it be otherwise than proper for every person to think without fear of denunciation upon the tenets of his ancestry. Are we to deny ourselves the liberty of thought, which we claim for all who differ from us as to their creeds?
1250. A sectarian who is a Christian only as toobservances, and is therefore really apracticalinfidel, accuses a man of infidelity who ispracticallya Christian, so far as Christianity and virtue are associated, because that man does not arrive at his morality by the route which his denunciator points out, but never follows to any good purpose.
1251. While missionaries, whooughtto know all that can be learned,do not agree among themselves, wherefore do they attempt to instruct the ignorant? How is the unlettered pagan to judge between the Catholic, Calvinist, Unitarian, or Deist?
1252. It is believed that a great majority of the people of the United States, while favourable to the observance of Sunday as a day of worship, of innocent recreation, and of moral and intellectual improvement, are adverse to the legal enforcement of restrictions introduced into Christianity by puritanism. They do not consider thefirstday of the week as liable to the commandment given to the Jews for the observance ofthe seventhday; still less that theinnocent recreation allowed to the Jews under that commandmentis to be denied to Christians on that day of rest. The commandmentforbids work, but does notprohibit recreation. That it was thus viewed by the Hebrews, is asserted upon the authority of a learned Jew.
1253. It is conceived that the enforcement of any observance on sectarian ground, is inconsistent with the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
1254. If God intended the Sabbath to be kept so strictly, wherefore is it not kept holy by him? why do not the rivers stop flowing, vegetables growing, and the wind stop blowing on the day selected for the Sabbath, especially if a sparrow does not fall without his cognizance.
1255.Precepts may lead, but example will draw.Aware of this, is it conceivable that God would enjoin man to keep any day holy, and yet fail to keep it holy himself? Regulating the blowing of the winds, as well as thefalling of sparrows, when creating a storm, would he not be responsible for forcing the breach of the Sabbath upon the mariner?
1256. Ought the farmer to lose his crops in order to avoid working on Sunday? The Romans took advantage of the Hebrew Sabbath to make their advances upon Jerusalem, the tenets of the Jews restricting them from resistance; yet there was no divine interference to shield this chosenpeople against the heathen conqueror, or to assist them in the observance of the commandment.
1257. The plea on which the commandment was founded is manifestly groundless—that an omnipotent God could be so weary as to require rest. But it has been suggested by enlightened Christians, that the six days were periods of immense duration, and of course the seventh day being like the rest could not be a day of twenty-four hours, like the Jewish Sabbath so called, but, on the contrary, an era comprising many ages.
1258. In the spheres, agreeably to the communication received from spirits, great importance is attached to the friendship, the affection, and the ardent love, which may subsist between congenial minds or souls; they seem to recognise love as something which cannot be felt by all to all; so that while benevolence, charity, and sympathy may be sentiments entertained to mankind generally, there are other sentiments which require concentration, in order to have any efficacy. Of this nature are parental, filial, and conjugal affection, as well as other intimate friendships.
1259. Sympathy between the parent and child, between husband and wife, and likewise occasionally between brothers and sisters, or such friends as Pylades and Orestes, may be so strong as to induce the risk, if not the loss of life, but this sympathy cannot be self-induced. Where, from principle, a person may determine to make the sacrifice, not from impulse, he cannot endow himself with the sensitiveness which would make him feel for the sufferer as for himself. A being may admire such a sentiment, and have an ambition to be so actuated, but that would not create the sensibility to which its existence is due. It has been alleged that Napoleon’s mother said of him, as I remember to have read somewhere: “He wished to have a good heart.” The most that can be done is to act as if we did love, and consequently sympathize, so as to feel the pains and privations of another as if they were our own. But it were inconsistent to entertain a love so powerful and peculiar, and not give our time, thought, services, or attention to the object of our affection. It were inconsistent so to love and keep at a distance, and behave toward the object as if we were indifferent. But were the sentiment to be felt universally, or even generally, there would be such a cutting up of our time, service, or attention, that, as respects any individual in particular, it would be nugatory, and might as well not exist. There would likewise be such a multiplicity and perplexity of yearnings that it would distract the heart, perhaps place it in a less happy condition than if it were devoid of any affection whatever.
1260. Although temporal life may at times be sacrificed by one being to save that of another, it is manifestly because the being who makes thesacrifice is constituted so nobly as to endure less pain under the circumstances in question in making than avoiding self-immolation. But can any one who has not been so organized and educated as to make such a sacrifice, be sufficiently changed by preaching, or monition, to undergo self-immolation to save a fellow-creature?
1261. Is it reasonable to order, direct, or advise people to love, especially on the part of any one who by his acknowledged omnipotency could so constitute them as to sympathize to any required extent? I admit, that it may be consistent to urge them to act toward others, as far as possible, as if they wereloved.[25]
1262. Should not the great object of cultivation be sympathy and benevolence, which are general in their nature? We may deeply sympathize with a sufferer, even with a brute, whom we do not love. Benevolence should we not also cultivate, by endeavouring habitually to take the most favourable view of those around us which our observation and reason can permit? Does it not argue a want of discrimination to treat love as a sentiment, to be entertained toward all other mortals by mere volition? Is it reasonable that Christ, or any other teacher, assuming to be missionaries of the Creator, should enjoin us to love, when the capacity for that sentiment manifestly varies through organization and education, derived from that Creator by various human beings, as much nearly, as the opposite propensities of the wolf and dog? Behold the difference between the elephant and rhinoceros: the former capable of a canine fidelity and affection, the latter irretrievably hostile; and again between a wild elephant and one tamed by education.
1263. Were his organization and education dependent on himself, it might be reasonable to say to a human being, Love your neighbour as yourself, love your enemies; but how can that Deity who determines man’s race and his parentage, and of course whether he be a savage or a civilized man, whether a Thug or arealChristian, if such a thing can be,—how can that Deity require a being to do that which is irreconcilable with his passions, opinions, and habits, derived from nature and education, as well as the examples set by those around him?
1264. The inutility of precepts in controlling human passions, may be seen in the history of Christendom, in which, as already urged, the morals and conduct of mankind, with very few exceptions, have been diametrically opposite to that of their divine Master, so called. Who have been moreaggressive than the great majority of professed Christians? Who have been more actuated by cupidity? Yet these votaries have been, for the most part, vociferous in their professions of devotedness to Christ, making him the Son of God as well as their teacher, and too often cruelly maltreating those who have denied his divinity.
1265. Both on the part of the ancient Jews, or on that of modern Christians, religion has been made an excuse or a plea for despoiling unbelievers of their patrimony. In the contention respecting the right to Oregon, the great question, on which judgment was to turn, was, which of all of the Christian potentates claiming it, was the first to lay his longing eyes upon the object of contention? It has been shown that the massacre of whole nations involved no criminality, provided they were pagans. David put to the sword the pagan communities, man, woman, and child, during which time Jehovah was with him. The pagans being mere vermin in the estimation of the Jewish deity, the wrongs done to them were not cited as among David’s misdoings. No Nathan came to call him to account for his flagitious conduct to them, or to Achish, (1 Sam. xxvii. 8 to 12.)
1266. In his correspondence with the British minister, respecting territorial rights granted to the English by the Mosquito king, Mr. Clayton urged that the aborigines never had been admitted to have any rights to their own lands, which could interfere with Christian claimants.
1267. In the preceding pages, I have endeavoured to show that the existing morality of Christendom does not owe its existence to Christianity. My object has been to do away the apprehension that this morality would be deprived of its foundation were Spiritualism or any other innovation to be accredited which would be inconsistent with revelation. But I hope I have shown that whatever merit may be possessed by the existing state of morals, it cannot be ascribed to any influence exercised by those precepts of Christ which are not only neglected, but acted in diametric opposition to.
1268. Another cause of alarm has been that it would weaken that belief in a future state of rewards and punishments which is so essential to encourage virtue and repress vice. But it has been pointed out that the authority of Moses is against the existence of a future state, not merely negatively, but positively, so far as any authority is given to him as inspired by God. For what stronger argument need there be that there is no state of existence beyond the grave, than the fact that the being who of all mankind solely had immediate converse with the Deity, should not have learned from him the all-important fact? If, as now held generally among Christians, an unbeliever in a future state is culpable in the sight of God, as well as theirs, and disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, can it be conceived that God would have failed to communicate a knowledge of immortal existence to his favourite lawgiver; or how could that lawgiver have been so devoid of that desire for immortality as to have been satisfied to remain ignorant?
1269. Materialists who have become converts to Spiritualism, all represent themselves as having entertained a great anxiety to believe in immortality prior to the blessed, cherished truth having been made evident to their thirsting souls.
1270. Converts from Materialism to Spiritualism, who have shown much zeal in the investigation of the subject, and eagerness in believing in immortality as soon as evidence was obtained, were, by certain sectarians, doomed to hell for their heresy. Yet this Hebrew materialist, who made no use of his transcendent opportunities of acquiring correct knowledge of futurity from the Deity, is made an object of veneration, and the book which he wrote, while devoid of this pre-eminently important information, is worshipped as an idol.
1271. His allegations that God authorized the Israelites toborrowin order topurloin, or that he authorized the murder of the people misled by Aaron to worship the golden calf, are manifestly as false as blasphemous. Then why imagine that mankind can suffer by the substitution of a belief in a future state associated with the purest principles of morality, for the books of Moses, which sanction crimes and discredit immortality?
1272. As respects any subsequent alleged inspirations to which Pharisees, the papists of Judea, owed theirprofessedbelief in a future state, in the first place, we have the authority of Christ for viewing them as hypocrites: externally, like whited sepulchres, internally, as no less corrupt than dead men’s bones. Of course there is reason, on this account, to doubt whether they acquired a sincere belief in a future state from any part of Scripture. But evidently it did not make them moral. Their immorality, on the contrary, was made more hideous by the cloak of false religion. Nothing is more detestable than to see religion in men’s mouths, with cupidity and unprincipled ambition at their hearts. Yet this much may be said for the Pharisees, that they had notprofessedthemselvesChristians, and thus subject to those precepts of Jesus which place the acquisition of wealth on a level with felony as respects the accessibility to heaven. The Pharisees of Christendom, even those who assumed to be exclusively the depositories of revelation and sole expounders of God’s word, have beenabsolutelyas wicked as the Pharisees, andrelativelymore wicked by the monstrous discordancy of their course with their professed devotion to the ultra precepts of the alleged Son of their God.
1273. It has been shown, moreover, that although Christ occasionally referred to hell, yet he gave inconsistent views of it, (738,764764.) At onetime it is fire, into which any one is to be doomed for alleging his brother a fool, whether this allegation be true or not; at another, it is utterdarkness, with weeping and gnashing of teeth; and of course there could be no fire. Then the disgusting description given by Josephus is sanctioned, agreeably to which, like the Elysium and Erebus of the heathen, both hell and heaven are subterranean localities, but separated by a lake of unquenchable fire, across which Abraham and Dives converse. At another time, heaven is above; he ascends to heaven in sight of his apostles, yet the penitent thief is to be with him in paradise, which, agreeably to Genesis and Josephus, is upon the earth on the river Tigris, near the Persian Gulf. But wherever the Elysium and Erebus of the gospel may be, all souls, according to it, are to remain in their graves till the “lastday,” and then, like Samuel, being called up from their tombs, are to be sorted into two squadrons, of which one is to go to anundescribedheaven, the other to the “hell fire prepared for the devil and his angels from the beginning of the world.” The injustice which would follow from a judgment of this kind, by which two souls differing from each other only by a shade would meet a fate so different that one would have to go to heaven, the other to hell to remain eternally, is so manifest, that, like the ultraism of the same record, it loses its effect altogether upon people in general.
1274. It must be clear that the great mass of professed Christians are very little restrained by their fears of such an eternity of punishment. Had Christ any specific knowledge of the kingdom of heaven to which he occasionally alluded, wherefore did he not convey that knowledge to his disciples? But they seem to have learned no more from Jesus than Moses did from Jehovah, and hence their querulous inquiry as to what would be their reward. But the promise of judgeships, (743to 745,) of worldly preeminence, was a satire upon them. It argues that he considered them as worldly-minded. Had he known the world to be looked upon by the apostles as beneath consideration in comparison with immortal life, he would hardly have insulted them by the offer. But their tone has a great deal too much of the Swiss in it. Had they been so very dull, or Christ so reserved, that the idea was not conveyed to them that in acting the part of pious, virtuous men, they would have the reward promised to the righteous in the other world.
1275. Thank God, no spiritualist who reads with attention the communications given in this work, will ever inquire as to the extent of selfish reward which he is to enjoy! He would be impressed by his general knowledge with the idea that the less any being is actuated by selfish aspiration, the greater his capacity for happiness and his pretensions to the means of felicity.
1276. It were in vain, I think, to find in the apple of discord, in the mischiefs let loose from Pandora’s box, or any other figurative exemplification, any idea adequate to convey my conception of the mischief done to the world by introducing the dogma, that belief could be the means of salvation; so that if God had so constituted or so situated a people, that they could not believe what was communicated to them by certain itinerant preachers, it should be worse for them in the day of judgment than for Sodom and Gomorrah; two cities which God had destroyed because he had not so organized them, and circumstanced them, as to make them as virtuous as he, subsequently to their creation, desired.
1277. Christ fully justified this opinion, when he alleged himself to have come as asword, not as a messenger of peace, and to set father and son, mother and daughter, &c., at variance with each other, making the people of a man’s own household his foes. It may be said that he identified himself with piety and rectitude; so that it was for the virtue of which he, as the Son or missionary of God, was the representative, that he plead; but this pious devotion has much more of self in it than people imagine. They identify God or Christ with the welfare of their souls and bodies. It is through the hope of benefit to these that they take such a deep interest in God.
1278. But is it not strange that the Christian religion should be treated as a harbinger of peace and harmony, when, with its entrance into the world, came the intolerance, before confined to Judea, and when by its founder it is represented as a sword, to sever the dearest ties by introducing the poisoning idea that belief could be a virtue or a sin? It seems to have been the cause of a peculiar animosity which has always accompanied its progress, if not its endurance, and which set the example to Mohammed of attaching the same fanatical idea to another basis, comporting with his individual aggrandizement, at the expense of much human misery.
1279. The language of Christ held to his apostles, showing that he considered them as thirsting for temporal honours, and his aspiration for thethroneof hisglory, situated, of course, in the same mundane region, may warrant the surmise that his views did not differ from those of Mohammed as to the ultimate object, however much he may have found it necessary, under the Roman despotism, to fight with the tongue instead of the sword.
1280. But how can this sentiment be justified in which he makes devotion to himself irreconcilable with the holy ties between the child and hisparents, or the parents and their children? The God of Spiritualism would view parental and filial love as the truest piety. He asks only that love. He has not constituted us to have that sort of love for him. Had he wished it, he would have made us so, as to be thus actuated.
1281. “He that believeth in me shall have eternal life.” “Thy faith hath made thee whole.” These allegations produced a change in the world at large. That bigotry and animosity which led the Jews to consider that all who did not agree with them in creed, were objects of spoliation, massacre, rape, enslavement, were now extended to other parts of the world.
1282. No doubt the success of this exclusive notion, on the part of Christ, led to its adoption by Mohammed, and thus some hundred millions have been actuated by this mischievous impression, which is now at work on the Russian territory. It has been already suggested that this idea always begets persecution to the extent of the power to exercise it. While seeing the horrid consequences of this error in the persecution of the French Calvinists, Calvin could not avoid the diabolic impulse in the instance of Servetus. It cannot be necessary to recall to our readers the many bloody persecutions and religious wars which have disgraced Christendom far more than any other part of the globe, nor to allude to the tyranny reciprocally employed by any sect having complete ascendancy. Yet with these consequences before the mind—the facts which I have adduced to prove that the morality of Christendom is not due to Scripture—the tocsin is sounded wherever any effort is made to get rid of the crimes and indecencies of the Old Testament, or the error of making bigoted belief, under the name of faith, a primary consideration on the part of the New Testament. People are taught that every thing good is due to Scripture; that thence alone can we get any correct notions of morality, any knowledge of a future state. The idea is entertained that Christianity made a great change for the better as soon as it prevailed, and that without it we should sink into a state of demoralization.
1283. Consistently with my experience of the effect of a confident belief in a future state of existence on my own mind, as already suggested, I was always under the impression, prior to my conversion, that those who believed in a future state must be happier; and if that belief were not associated with mischievous error, that it should not be assailed. The idea that what I considered as bigotry, should be a counterpoise for sin, I did consider a mischievous error, tending to substitute devotion for good works, and as I saw, too, made nations selfish. The love of hoarding was very commonly coupled with this selfishness, which operated at once to produce efforts to lay up treasure on earth by close dealing, and in heaven by strict sectarianism, bigotry, and intolerance. But, nevertheless, I was restrained from any effort to cure these errors, from the conviction that religion, unaccompanied by the expectation of a future state, can never take hold of the human heart.