Corrupt men are bad citizens.Men buying or selling votes are corrupt men.Therefore, men buying or selling votes are bad citizens.
Corrupt men are bad citizens.Men buying or selling votes are corrupt men.Therefore, men buying or selling votes are bad citizens.
Corrupt men are bad citizens.Men buying or selling votes are corrupt men.Therefore, men buying or selling votes are bad citizens.
Corrupt men are bad citizens.
Men buying or selling votes are corrupt men.
Therefore, men buying or selling votes are bad citizens.
Here the class of corrupt men agrees with the class of bad citizens; it also agrees with the class who buy or sell votes; now, as it agrees with each of the two classes, it is certain that those two classes also agree with each other. This is the plain form of the syllogism.
The following is an instance of disagreement:
Good citizens are patriotic men.Traitors are not patriotic.Therefore, traitors are not good citizens.
Good citizens are patriotic men.Traitors are not patriotic.Therefore, traitors are not good citizens.
Good citizens are patriotic men.Traitors are not patriotic.Therefore, traitors are not good citizens.
Good citizens are patriotic men.
Traitors are not patriotic.
Therefore, traitors are not good citizens.
When an agreement and disagreement are thus stated in the first and second lines, the result stated in the third line must be a disagreement. But if the first and second lines both state disagreements no result can be drawn, for there is more than one mode of disagreement. This may be illustrated by the case of two witnesses to thesame circumstance. If both tell the truth their stories will agree; if one tells the truth and the other does not, their stories disagree; but if neither tells the truth, their stories may or may not agree—that is, they may tell the same falsehood or different kinds of falsehood.
In the syllogism it is necessary to see that the comparisons made are real and not fictitious. False logic or fallacies arise where a comparison seems to be made which is not real. Part of one thing or class may be compared with the whole of another, and then an agreement affirmed or denied for the whole of the two things or classes, and this fatal fault in reasoning may be very carefully concealed. It can usually be detected by turning around the sentence in which the defective comparison is made. Thus:
Men are animals.Horses are animals.Therefore, men are horses.
Men are animals.Horses are animals.Therefore, men are horses.
Men are animals.Horses are animals.Therefore, men are horses.
Men are animals.
Horses are animals.
Therefore, men are horses.
This seems to be a perfectly fair specimen of correct syllogisms. But in the first line the class “men” is compared with only a part of the class “animals,” and in the second line the whole of the class “horses” is compared with another part of the class “animals,” and as the comparison is not restricted to the same objects no statement of agreement or disagreement can be made. We detect the insufficiency of the comparison by saying,it is true that all men are animals, but not true that all animals are men.
Another mode of making a seeming comparison without the reality is by using words in unlike senses. Thus:
All light bodies dispel darkness.A bag of feathers is a light body.Therefore, a bag of feathers will dispel darkness.
All light bodies dispel darkness.A bag of feathers is a light body.Therefore, a bag of feathers will dispel darkness.
All light bodies dispel darkness.A bag of feathers is a light body.Therefore, a bag of feathers will dispel darkness.
All light bodies dispel darkness.
A bag of feathers is a light body.
Therefore, a bag of feathers will dispel darkness.
To guard against this and all similar fallacies it is only necessary to notice whether the comparison is fair and complete. Practice will give great expertness in doing this, even when the comparison is implied rather than expressed.
Indeed, the greater part of reasoning lies outside the range of formal logic. The orator who would reduce each argument to a syllogistic form would be considered a clown endeavoring to make sport of, or for his audience. A statement is often made which depends for its validity upon a comparison or even a series of comparisons either flashing through the mind at the moment, or recalled as having previously been made. To this there can be no objection, provided such comparisons are obvious and indisputable. If a chain of reasoning rests upon the understanding that all men desire to be happy, it will be just as forcible as if that truism were stated or proved. Anything which an audiencewill accept without question is only weakened by the processes of proof. Something must be taken for granted in all kinds of argument, and the wider the domain of such assumptions can be fairly made the better for the interest and effectiveness of the arguments which follow.
A syllogism in which one of the essential parts is left to be supplied in the mind is called anenthymeme, and is the most common of all forms of reasoning. Whenever we state a fact, and adduce a reason for that fact, it takes this form. As an instance, we may give the beatitudes in the fifth chapter of St. Matthew. In each we have a declaration made and a reason given for that declaration, but that reason would have no necessary validity were it not for a well-understood principle, upon which, in each case, it is founded. When it is said, “Blessed are the poor in spirit; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven,” we mentally add, or concede even without thinking it, “whoever has the kingdom of heaven is blessed.”
The same declaration may be put in logical form, thus:
Whoever possesses the kingdom of heaven is blessed.The poor in spirit possess the kingdom of heaven.Therefore, they are blessed.
Whoever possesses the kingdom of heaven is blessed.The poor in spirit possess the kingdom of heaven.Therefore, they are blessed.
Whoever possesses the kingdom of heaven is blessed.The poor in spirit possess the kingdom of heaven.Therefore, they are blessed.
Whoever possesses the kingdom of heaven is blessed.
The poor in spirit possess the kingdom of heaven.
Therefore, they are blessed.
It will be noticed that in all the beatitudes the syllogismis inverted, the conclusion coming first (which also is placed in an inverted form), while the major premise is left to be mentally supplied.
Another instance may be given of this most common of all the syllogistic forms—the only one of which the orator makes very frequent use.
It is stated, “Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall see God;” the reader mentally supplies, “and those who see God are blessed.”
Or in syllogistic form:
Those who see God are blessed.The pure in heart see God.Therefore, the pure in heart are blessed.
Those who see God are blessed.The pure in heart see God.Therefore, the pure in heart are blessed.
Those who see God are blessed.The pure in heart see God.Therefore, the pure in heart are blessed.
Those who see God are blessed.
The pure in heart see God.
Therefore, the pure in heart are blessed.
The great frequency of theenthymemeis explained by the very nature of reasoning, which—at least in the case of the true orator—ever proceeds from the known to the unknown. One of our propositions should either be self-evident or tacitly conceded; it need not therefore be expressed. The other must be brought out fully and proved by appropriate evidence, and from these two foundations we draw out the conclusion, or, what is only another way of accomplishing the same purpose, we state the conclusion and then give a reason for it, which itself rests upon another reason mentally supplied. We may test the correctness of the process by inquiring if the unexpressed reason be of the nature of a necessary,or at least of a generally received, truth; then, if the expressed reason is supported by impregnable evidence (which in the case of the beatitudes is the authority of Teacher Himself); and finally, if the conclusion inevitably results from the union of the two preceding parts.
Much might be said of fallacies and their various forms, but the student who has not time to pursue a full course of logic would find little profit in such a brief sketch as is here possible. It will be enough to point out that all false reasoning involves a violation of some logical rules, the simplest and most useful of which we have already pointed out. The orator who carefully defines his terms, who watches every comparison to see if it is real and not merely pretended, who refuses to accept a plausible statement for a universal truth, who notices what an argument takes for granted as carefully as what it states, will not be likely to commit glaring errors himself, or to be led into them by others.
In controversy a most important logical direction may be given. Strive to ascertain just the standpoint of the audience in regard to your subject. Every speaker has much in common with his hearers, and if he would convince or persuade them he must start from that common position.
In doing this there is no compromise of principle. It is simply leaving out of view points of difference until points of agreement are explored. From these anargument, as strong as logic can make it, should lead to the conclusion either in thought or action to which you wish your audience conducted. The eminent Methodist missionary, Rev. Wm. Taylor, in speaking to the heathen of Africa, used first to dwell upon those things in their belief which were common with his own, giving them credit for trying to worship the true God as well as they could, and then declaring that he came to them with a fuller revelation from the same source. In this way he persuaded thousands to accept his guidance and believe the Bible, who would have been utterly repelled if he had first attacked their superstitions, and tried to show that they were wrong in everything. In the same manner every masterly persuader of men must proceed. Seeking out all that he regards as true in their opinions and beliefs, he will waste no time in proving what they already believe, or in persuading them to do what they are already engaged in, but will show them other things which necessarily follow from what they already admit. St. Paul, on Mars’ Hill, got a great logical advantage by his reference to the Unknown God, and from this starting place he worked his way carefully to the new truth which he had to declare. A political orator may simply abuse the opposite party; but he makes no converts and wins no enduring laurels by that method. If he will strive to understand the position of his opponents and then from the great principles regarding government,which all parties hold in common, proceed to show that the side he advocates carries out those principles to their legitimate result, he may change votes, and will be sought for where the empty declamation of one who pursues the opposite course would be felt as a hindrance rather than a help. “What do you do when you have no case at all?” said one lawyer to another. “Oh!” was the reply, “I abuse the opposite counsel.” This was only a mode of covering a retreat, and may have answered that purpose well enough after the battle had been lost; but as long as there is any hope of convincing the judge or winning the jury, such abuse is worse than useless. The advocate should not, however, take his opponent’s view of the subject at issue as the groundwork of his argument, but that which he believes the jury to entertain. Success in this instance is not won by convincing an opponent, but by bringing over to his views that body of men in the jury-box who are supposed to be impartial, but who always have their mode of viewing any given subject—a mode which an ingenious and observant advocate will not be slow to discover.
There are three phases of any controverted question which the orator who will discuss it successfully needs to study. He should know and estimate justly all that a determined opponent of his own view can advance. Nothing is gained by failing to appreciate the strengthand plausibility of an adversary’s position. Complete justice to an enemy is often the first step to complete victory over him. Then the position of that part of an audience—possibly few in numbers, but from the logical standpoint exceedingly important—who are in suspense, and as ready to fall to one side as the other, ought to be fully weighed. The more perfectly intellectual sympathy exists between them and the orator, the more likely is he to bring them over to his own party. And this is the great object to be aimed at. Pronounced opponents are not often converted. “A man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still.” The attention directed to them is really for the sake of the doubtful class who may, unless resistance is offered, be won over by their efforts.
Some attention may also properly be given by the speaker to confirming his own party by showing them the solid grounds upon which their opinions rest. But usually the same arguments which are likely to decide the wavering will best accomplish this purpose also. Beginning with a simple but clearly defined statement of those principles or facts upon which he intends to base his arguments, and about which no difference of opinion is possible, he shows clearly that the opinions he and his friends hold must follow from the grounds already conceded. This should be set forth as the establishment of positive truth rather than as the refutationof any errors; then, when the waverers have been convinced and his own party strongly confirmed, he may, with advantage, show the weakness and absurdity of the position of those who hold opposed views. Such a course pursued by an able reasoner who really has truth on his side, which he thoroughly understands, will seldom fail to win all whose minds are open to conviction.
It is to these broad principles and to the careful study of all aspects of the questions he has to treat, rather than to the refinements of mediæval logic, that we would direct the orator’s attention. Whoever will follow the course prescribed in preceding chapters, carefully arranging the outline of his address, mastering all his material, and speaking the language of his own convictions, will be truly logical, and such logic carried to the highest degree will take nothing from any other grace either of form or substance that belongs to oratory.
CHAPTER XII.After the Speech.
When a fervent and successful discourse has been concluded there comes a feeling of inexpressible relief. The burden of an important speech rests with accumulating force upon the mind from the time the subject is chosen until it becomes well-nigh intolerable. When speech actually begins every power is called into play and exerted to its utmost capacity. The excitement of the conflict hurries the speaker on, and although he may not at the time realize the gigantic exertions put forth, yet when he pauses at length, perhaps exhausted, but with the victory won, the sense of rest, relief, and security, is exceedingly delightful.
After such an effort both mind and body do need rest. There are speakers who profess to feel no fatigue after an hour’s labor, but these are seldom in the front rank of orators. If the soul has been aroused and all the man’s faculties bent to the accomplishment of a great purpose, relaxation is often followed by a sense of utter prostration. Nothing better for the moment can be advised than to abandon one’s self to the luxury of utter repose. Social intercourse and all distractions should as far as possible be avoided. If circumstances permit, ashort sleep, if but for a few minutes, will afford great relief; and in most cases sleep will come if wisely courted.
After resting, it is well to ponder closely the lessons derived from each new experience in speaking. To indulge in exultation over success or to lament over failure is not profitable. The speaker is not a perfect judge of either. He has probably done the best he could at the time, and there the case should rest, except so far as he sees the need or the means of future improvement.
But judgment of success or failure cannot easily be avoided. If the speaker’s standard is low, he may pass beyond it without accomplishing anything worthy of high praise: or if he is despondent in nature he may have expected little and may now feel correspondingly elated because he has exceeded his very moderate expectations. But it is a curious fact that speakers are often least pleased with their best speeches. In the mightiest efforts of the mind the standard is placed very high—perhaps beyond the possibility of attainment—and the speaker works with his eyes fixed upon that summit, and probably, after all his exertions, sees it shining still far above him. His ideas are but half expressed; he is mortified that there should be such a difference between conception and realization. But his hearers have been led over untrodden fields of thought, and knowing nothing of the grander heights still above theorator’s head, they are naturally filled with enthusiasm, and cannot enter into the feelings of the speaker if he is foolish enough to tell them of his disappointment.
This is the reason that we are least able to judge of the success of speeches that have been long meditated and thoroughly prepared. The subject expands as we study, its outlines becoming grander and vaster until they pass beyond our power of adequate representation. Each separate thought in the whole discussion that is fully mastered becomes familiar, and is not, therefore, valued at its true worth. Sometimes, when we begin to speak with little thought, intending to give only easy and common views of the subject, everything appears fresh before us, and if some striking ideas arise, their novelty gives them three-fold value, and we imagine that we have made a great speech. All this constitutes no argument against diligent preparation, but it should stimulate us to bring up our powers of expression more nearly to the level of our conceptions.
There should never be extreme discouragement over an apparent failure. Some good end may be reached even by a very poor speech. One evening the writer preached when weary and almost unprepared. From first to last the effort was painful, and to prevent absolute failure the intended plan had to be abandoned, and detached thoughts from any source thrown in. Yet that discourse, which was scarcely worthy of the name,elicited warmer approval and did more apparent good than any one preached for several previous months. One or two fortunate illustrations redeemed every defect, so far as the audience (but not the speaker) was concerned.
Whatever judgment we may entertain of our own performances, it is not usually wise to tell our hearers, or to ask their opinions. Criticisms spontaneously offered need not be repulsed, but all seeking for commendation is childish or disgusting. It is sweet to hear our efforts praised, and most of men can bear an amount of flattery addressed to themselves which would be insufferable if offered to others; but this disposition, if much indulged, becomes ungovernable and exposes us to well-deserved ridicule. It is pitiable to see a man who has been uttering wise and eloquent words afterward stooping to beg crusts of indiscriminating flattery from his hearers.
Whenever there is a probability that any discourse will be repeated, it is well to review it soon after delivery, while its impression is still fresh upon the mind, and if any defect appears, amend it in the plan, and add to the same plan all the valuable ideas that have been suggested during the speech or afterward. In this manner we keep each discourse up to the high watermark of our ability.
Some orators are accustomed to write their speechesout in full after delivery. When the theme is important and time permits, this is a good exercise, but in many—perhaps the majority of cases—the labor would outweigh the profit.
No such objection applies to reviewing and correcting a verbatim report of our speeches. To many speakers such a review of the exact words they have uttered would be a striking and not altogether pleasing revelation. Pet phrases, which might otherwise be unnoticed for years; faults of expression, and especially the profuseness of words, in which extemporaneous speakers are tempted to indulge;—would all be forced upon our notice. We would be surprised to learn that we could often write the discourse in one-fourth the words employed in delivery. To form the habit of thus condensing our speeches after delivery would have a powerful tendency toward compacting thought in speech itself. The only hindrance in applying this capital means of improvement consists in the difficulty of obtaining such shorthand reports. Where this cannot be overcome a part of the advantage may be gained by taking the plan and from it writing out the same kind of a compact presentation of the thoughts as uttered. This differs from writing in full by making no effort to record exact words or forms of expression, but only to recall from memory and from the sketch the exact thoughts that were expressed in the language of the moment. Evenif the same kind of brief sketch has been made previous to the act of speech, this does not take the place of what we now recommend; for the former outline may have been greatly modified by the experience of delivery.
In whatever form the best result of the discourse is recorded, great care should be taken in its preservation. The plan, sketch, or fully written discourse may be slipped into an envelope (which may also contain all illustrative scraps, notes, or references to books that bear upon the discourse) and on the back may be written the title, time, and character of delivery, with any other facts of importance. If the young speaker will faithfully follow up such a method of recording the results of his oratorical experience, he will find it one of the best forms of discipline, and the record itself—carefully indexed, frequently reviewed, and kept within reasonable bulk—will in time possess a value greater than gold.
FINIS.
FINIS.
FINIS.