From the foregoing examples it will be seen that at the advent of the Commonwealth, which was to set on foot so sweeping a revolution in the naval art, all attempts to formulate a tactical system had been abandoned. This is confirmed by the following extract from the orders issued by the Long Parliament in 1648. It was the time when the revolt of a part of the fleet and a rising in the South Eastern counties led the government to apprehend a naval coalition of certain foreign powers in favour of Charles. It is printed by Granville Penn in hisMemorials of Sir William Pennas having been issued in 1647, but the original copy of the orders amongst the Penn Tracts (Sloane MSS.1709, f. 55) is marked as having been delivered on May 2, 1648, to 'Captain William Penn, captain of the Assurance frigate and rear-admiral of the Irish Squadron.' They are clearly based on the later precedents of Charles I, but it must be noted that Penn is told 'to expect more particular instructions' in regard to the fighting article. We may assume therefore that the admiralty authorities already recognised the inadequacy of the established fighting instructions, and so soon as the pressure of that critical time permitted intended to amplify them.
Amongst those responsible for the orders however there is no name that can be credited with advanced views. They were signed by five members of the Navy Committee, and at their head is Colonel Edward Mountagu, afterwards Earl of Sandwich, but then only twenty-two years old.[1] Whether anything further was done is uncertain. No supplementary orders have been found bearing date previous to the outbreak of the Dutch war. But there exists an undated set which it seems impossible not to attribute to this period. It exists in theHarleian MSS.(1247, ff. 43b), amongst a number of others which appear to have been used by the Duke of York as precedents in drawing up his famous instructions of 1665. To begin with it is clearly later than the orders of 1648, upon which it is an obvious advance. Then the use of the word 'general' for admiral, and of the word 'sign' for 'signal' fixes it to the Commonwealth or very early Restoration. Finally, internal evidence shows it is previous to the orders of 1653, for those orders will be seen to be an expansion of the undated set so far as they go, and further, while these undated orders have no mention of the line, those of 1653 enjoin it. They must therefore lie between 1648 and 1653, and it seems worth while to give them here conjecturally as being possibly the supplementary, or 'more particular instructions,' which the government contemplated; particularly as this hypothesis gains colour from the unusual form of the heading 'Instructions for the better ordering.' Though this form became fixed from this time forward, there is, so far as is known, no previous example of it except in the orders which Lord Wimbledon propounded to his council of war in 1625, and those were also supplementary articles.[2]
Be this as it may, the orders in question do not affect the position that up to the outbreak of the First Dutch War we have no orders enjoining the line ahead as a battle formation. Still we cannot entirely ignore the fact that, in spite of the lack of orders on the subject, traces of a line ahead are to be detected in the earliest action of the war. Gibson, for instance, in hisReminiscenceshas the following passage relating to Blake's brush with Tromp over the honour of the flag on May 9, 1652, before the outbreak of the war:[3] 'When the general had got half Channel over he could see the Dutch fleet with their starboard tacks aboard standing towards him, having the weather-gage. Upon which the general made a sign for the fleet to tack. After which, having their starboard tacks aboard (the general's ship, the Old James, being the southernmost and sternmost ship in the fleet), the rest of his fleet tacking, first placed themselves in a line ahead of the general, who after tacking hauled up his mainsail in the brails, fitted his ship to fight, slung his yards, and run out his lower tier of guns and clapt his fore topsail upon the mast.' If Gibson could be implicitly trusted this passage would be conclusive on the existence of the line formation earlier than any of the known Fighting Instructions which enjoined it; but unfortunately, as Dr. Gardiner pointed out, Gibson did not write his account till 1702, when he was 67. He is however to some extent corroborated by Blake himself, who in his official despatch of May 20, relating the incident, says that on seeing Tromp bearing down on him 'we lay by and put ourselves into a fighting posture'—i.e.battle order—but what the 'posture' was he does not say. If however this posture was actually the one Gibson describes, we have the important fact that in the first recorded instance of the complete line, it was taken as a defensive formation to await an attack from windward.
The only other description we have of English tactics at this time occurs in a despatch of the Dutch commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, Van Galen, in which he describes how Captain Richard Badiley, then commanding a squadron on the station, engaged him with an inferior force and covered his convoy off Monte Christo in August 1652. When the fleets were in contact, he says, as though he were speaking of something that was quite unfamiliar to him, 'then every captain bore up from leeward close to us to get into range, and so all gave their broadsides first of the one side and then again of the other, and then bore away with their ships before the wind till they were ready again; and then as before with the guns of the whole broadside they fired into my flagship, one after the other, meaning to shoot my masts overboard.'[4] From this it would seem that Badiley attacked in succession in the time-honoured way, and that the old rudimentary form of the line ahead was still the ordinary practice. The evidence however is far from strong, but really little is needed. Experience teaches us that the line ahead formation would never have been adopted as a standing order unless there had been some previous practice in the service to justify it or unless the idea was borrowed from abroad. But, as we shall see, the oft-repeated assertion that it was imitated from the Dutch is contrary to all the evidence and quite untenable. The only experience the framers of the order of 1653 can have had of a line ahead formation must have been in our own service.
The clearest proof of this lies in the annexed orders which Tromp issued on June 20, 1652, immediately before the declaration of war, and after he had had his brush with Blake, in which, if Gibson is to be trusted, Tromp had seen Blake's line. From these orders it is clear that the Dutch conception of a naval action was still practically identical with that of Lindsey's instructions of 1635, that is, mutual support of squadrons or groups, with no trace of a regular battle formation. In the detailed 'organisation' of the fleet each of the three squadrons has its own three flag officers—that is to say, it was organised, like that of Lord Wimbledon in 1625, in three squadrons and nine sub-squadrons, and was therefore clearly designed for group tactics. It is on this point alone, if at all, that it can be said to show any advance on the tactics which had obtained throughout the century, or on those which Tromp himself had adopted against Oquendo in 1639.
Yet further proof is to be found in the orders issued by Witte Corneliszoon de With to his captains in October 1652, as commander-in-chief of the Dutch fleet. In these he very strictly enjoins, as a matter of real importance, 'that they shall all keep close up by the others and as near together as possible, to the end that thereby they may act with united force … and prevent any isolation or cutting off of ships occurring in time of fight;' adding 'that it behoved them to stand by and relieve one another loyally, and rescue such as might be hotly attacked.' This is clearly no more than an amplification of Tromp's order of the previous June. It introduces no new principle, and is obviously based on the time-honoured idea of group tactics and mutual support. It is true that De Jonghe, the learned historian of the Dutch navy, regards it as conclusive that the line was then in use by the Dutch, because, as he says, several Dutch captains, after the next action, were found guilty and condemned for not having observed their instructions. But really there is nothing in it from which a line can be inferred. It is all explained on the theory of groups. And in spite of De Jonghe's deep research and his anxiety to show that the line was practised by his countrymen as well as by the English in the first Dutch War, he is quite unable to produce any orders like the English instructions of 1653, in which a line formation is clearly laid down.
But whether or not we can accept De Jonghe's conclusions as to the time the line was introduced into the Dutch service, one thing is clear enough—that he never ventured to suggest that the English copied the idea from his own countrymen. It is evident that he found nothing either in the Dutch archives or elsewhere even to raise such an idea in his mind. But, on the other hand, his conspicuous impartiality leads him to give abundant testimony that throughout these wars thoughtful Dutch officers were continually praising the order and precision of the English tactics, and lamenting the blundering and confusion of their own. It may be added that Dr. Gardiner's recent researches in the same field equally failed to produce any document upon which we can credit the Dutch admirals with serious tactical reforms. Even De Ruyter's improvements in squadronal organisation consisted mainly in superseding a multiplicity of small squadrons by a system of two or three large squadrons, divided into sub-Squadrons, a system which was already in use with the English, and was presumably imitated by De Ruyter, if it was indeed he who introduced it and not Tromp, from the well-established Commonwealth practice.[5]
[1] The others were John Rolle, member for Truro, a merchant and politician, who died in November 1648, and who as early as 1645 had been proposed, though unsuccessfully, for the Navy Committee; and three less conspicuous members of Parliament: Sir Walter Earle (of the Presbyterian party), Giles Greene, and Alexander Bence. They were all superseded the following year by the new Admiralty Committee of the Council of State.
[2]Supra, p. 63. It may also be noted that these articles are intended for a fleet not large enough to be divided into squadrons—just such a fleet in fact as that in which Penn was flying his flag. The units contemplated,e.g.in Articles 2-4, are 'ships,' whereas in the corresponding articles of 1653 the units are 'squadrons.'
[3] Gardiner,Dutch War, i. 9.
[4] This at least is what Van Galen's crabbed old Dutch seems to mean. 'Alsoo naer bij quam dat se couden toe schieter dragen, de elcken heer onder den windt, gaven so elck hare laghe dan vinjt d'eene sijde, dan veer van d'anden sijde, hielden alsdan met haer schepen voor den vindt tal dat se weer claer waren, dan wast alsvooren met cannoneren van de heele lagh en in sonderheijt op mijn onderhebbende schip vier gaven van meeninge masten aft stengen overboort to schieten.' A copy of Van Galen's despatch is amongst Dr. Gardiner'sDutch Wartranscripts.
[5] See De Jonghe's introduction to his Third Book on 'The Condition of the British and Dutch Navies at the outbreak of and during the Second English War,'Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewesen, vol. ii. part ii. pp. 132-141, and his digression on Tactics, pp. 290et seq., and p. 182 note. De Witte's order is p. 311.
[+Sloane MSS. 1709, f. 55. Extract+]
Instructions given by the Right Honourable the Committee of the Lords and Commons for the Admiralty and Cinque Ports, to be duly observed by all captains and officers whatsoever and common men respectively in their fleet, provided to the glory of God, the honour and service of Parliament, and the safety of the Kingdom of England. [Fol.59.]
If any fleet shall be discovered at sea which may probably be conjectured to have a purpose to encounter, oppose, or affront the fleet in the Parliament's service, you may in that case expect more particular directions. But for the present you are to take notice, that in case of joining battle you are to leave it to the vice-admiral to assail the enemy's admiral, and to match yourself as equally as you can, to succour the rest of the fleet as cause shall require, not wasting your powder nor shooting afar off, nor till you come side to side.
SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS, circa1650.
[+Harleian MSS. 1247, 43b. Draft unsigned+.]
Instructions for the better ordering and managing the fleet in fighting.
1. Upon discovery of a fleet, receiving a sign from the general's ship, which is putting abroad the sign made for each ship or frigate, they are to make sail and stand with them so nigh as to gain knowledge what they are and of what quality, how many fireships and others, and what order the fleet is in; which being done the frigates or vessels are to speak together and conclude on the report they are to give, and accordingly report to the general or commander-in-chief of the squadron, and not to engage if the enemy's ships exceed them in number except it shall appear to them on the place that they have the advantage.
2. At sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral or he that commands in the second place, and the rear-admiral or he that commands in the third place, are to make what sail they can to come up with the admiral on each wing, as also each ship according to her quality, giving a competent distance from each other if there be sea-room enough.
3. As soon as they shall [see] the general engage, or [he] shall make a sign by shooting off two guns and putting a red flag on the fore topmast-head, that each ship shall take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy next unto him.
4. If any ship shall happen to be over-charged and distressed the next ship or ships are immediately to make towards their relief and assistance upon signal given; which signal shall be, if the admiral, then a pennant in the fore topmast-head; the vice-admiral or commander in the second place, a pennant in the main topmast-head; and the rear-admiral the like.
5. In case any ship shall be distressed or disabled by loss of masts, shot under water, or otherwise so as she is in danger of sinking or taking, he or they are to give a signal thereof so as, the fleet having knowledge, they may be ready to be relieved. Therefore the flagships are to have a special care to them, that such provisions may be made that they may not be left in distress to the mercy of the enemy; and the signal is to be a weft[1] of the ensign of the ship so distressed.
6. That it is the duty of the commanders and masters of all the small frigates, ketches and smacks belonging to the fleet to know the fireships that belong to the enemy, and accordingly by observing their motion to do their utmost to cut off their boats (if possible), or if opportunity serve that they lay them on board, fire and destroy them; and to this purpose they are to keep to windward of the fleet in time of service. But in case they cannot prevent the fireships from coming on board us by coming between us and them, which by all means possible they are to endeavour, that then, in such a case, they show themselves men in such an exigent,[2] and shear aboard them, and with their boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from us and destroy them; which service, if honourably done, according to its merit shall be rewarded, and the neglect thereof strictly and severely called to account.
7. That the fireships belonging to the fleet endeavour to keep the wind, and they with the small frigate's to be as near the great ships as they can, and to attend the signal from the commander-in-chief and to act accordingly.
8. If any engagement shall happen to continue until night and the general please to anchor, that upon signal given they all anchor in as good order as may be, the signal being as in the instructions for sailing; and if the general please to retreat without anchoring, then the signal to be firing two guns so nigh one the other as the report may be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do the like with two guns more. And the commander of this ship is to sign copies of these instructions to all ships and other vessels of this fleet. Given on board the ——
[1] See note, p. 99. [Transcriber's note: The text for this note reads: 'Waft(more correctly writtenwheft). It is any flag or ensign stopped together at the head and middle portion, slightly rolled up lengthwise, and hoisted at different positions at the after-part of a ship.'—Admiral Smyth (Sailors' Word-Book).]
[2] 'Exigent' = exigence, emergency. Shakespeare has 'Why do you cross me in this exigent?'—Jul. Cæs.v. i.
MARTEN TROMP, June20, 1652.
[+Dr. Gardiner's First Dutch War, vol. i. p. 321. Extract+.]
June20/30, 1652.The resolution of Admiral Tromp on the distribution of the fleet in case of its being attacked.
Each captain is expressly ordered, on penalty of 300 guilders,to keep near[1] the flag officer under whom he serves. Also he is to have his guns in a serviceable condition. The squadron under Vice-Admiral Jan Evertsen is to lie or sail immediately ahead of the admiral. Further Captain Pieter Floriszoon (who provisionally carries the flag at the mizen as rear-admiral) is always to remain with his squadron close astern of the admiral; and the Admiral Tromp is to take his station between both with his squadron. The said superior officers and captains are to stand by one another with all fidelity; and each squadron when another is vigorously attacked shall second and free the other, using therein all the qualities of a soldier and seaman.
[1] The Dutch has 'troppen' = to gather round (cf.our 'trooping the colour'). De With's corresponding order has 'dat zij allen bij den anderen … gesloten zou den blijven.'Supra, p. 86.
The earliest known 'Fighting Instructions' in any language which aimed at a single line ahead as a battle formation, were issued by the Commonwealth's 'generals-at-sea' on March 29, 1653, in the midst of the Dutch War. This is placed beyond doubt by an office copy amongst the Duke of Portland's MSS. at Welbeck Abbey.[1] It is of high importance for the history of naval tactics that we are at last able to fix the date of these memorable orders. Endless misapprehension on the subject of our battle formations during the First Dutch War has been caused by a chronological error into which Mr. Granville Penn was led in hisMemorials of Penn(Appendix L). Sir William Penn's copy of these Instructions is merely dated 'March 1653,'[2] and his biographer hazarded the very natural conjecture that, as this is an 'old style' date, it meant 'March 1654.' This would have been true of any day in March before the 25th, but as we now can fix the date as the 29th, we know the year is really 1653 and not 1654.[3] There was perhaps some anxiety on Mr. Penn's part to get his hero some share in the orders, and as William Penn was not appointed one of the 'generals-at-sea' till December 2, 1653, he could not officially have had the credit of orders issued in the previous March. This point however is also set at rest by the Welbeck copy, which besides the date has the signatures of the generals, and they are those of Blake, Deane and Monck. Penn did not sign them at all, but this really in no way affects his claim as a tactical reformer. For as he was vice-admiral of the fleet and an officer of high reputation, his share in the orders was probably as great as that of anyone else.
The winter of 1652-3 was the turning point of the war. The summer campaign had shown how serious the struggle was to be, and no terms for ending it could be arranged. Large reinforcements consequently had been ordered, and Monck and Deane nominated to assist Blake as joint generals-at-sea for the next campaign. Four days later, on November 30, 1652, Blake had been defeated by Tromp off Dungeness, and several of his captains were reported to have behaved badly. An inquiry was ordered, and the famous 'Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea,' prepared by Sir Harry Vane by order of Parliament for the better enforcement of discipline, were put in force. Notwithstanding these vigorous efforts to increase the strength and efficiency of the sea service, it was not till after the first action of the new campaign that an attempt was made to improve the fleet tactics. The action off Portland on February 18, 1653, and the ensuing chase of Tromp, marked the first real success of the war; but though the generals succeeded in delivering a severe blow to the Dutch admiral and his convoy, it must have been clear to everyone that they narrowly escaped defeat through a want of cohesion between their squadrons. On the 19th and 20th Tromp executed a masterly retreat, with his fleet in a crescent or obtuse-angle formation and his convoy in its arms, but nowhere is there any hint that either side fought in line ahead.[4] On the 25th the fleet had put into Stokes Bay to refit, and between this time and March 29 the new orders were produced.[5]
The first two articles it will be seen are practically the same as the 'Supplementary Instructions' on p. 99, but in the third, relating to 'general action,' instead of the ships engaging 'according to the order presented,' as was enjoined in the previous set, 'they are to endeavour to keep in a line with the chief,' as the order which will enable them 'to take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy.' Article 6 directs that where a flagship is distressed captains are to endeavour to form line between it and the enemy. Article 7 however goes still further, and enjoins that where the windward station has been gained the line ahead is to be formed 'upon severest punishment,' and a special signal is given for the manoeuvre. Article 9 provides a similar signal for flagships.
Compared with preceding orders, these new ones appear nothing less than revolutionary. But it is by no means certain that they were so. Here again it must be remarked that it is beyond all experience for such sweeping reforms to be so rigorously adopted, and particularly in the middle of a war, without their having been in the air for some time previously, and without their supporters having some evidence to cite of their having been tried and tried successfully, at least on a small scale. The natural presumption therefore is that the new orders only crystallised into a definite system, and perhaps somewhat extended, a practice which had long been familiar though not universal in the service. A consideration of the men who were responsible for the change points to the same conclusion. Blake, the only one of the three generals who had had experience of naval actions, was ashore disabled by a severe wound, but still able to take part, at least formally, in the business of the fleet. Deane, another soldier like Blake, though he had commanded fleets, had never before seen an action, but had done much to improve the organisation of the service, and at this time, as his letters show, was more active and ardent in the work than ever. Monck before the late cruise had never been to sea at all, since as a boy he sailed in the disastrous Cadiz expedition of 1625; but he was the typical and leading scientific soldier of his time, with an unmatched power of organisation and an infallible eye for both tactics and strategy, at least so far as it had then been tried. Penn, the vice-admiral of the fleet, was a professional naval officer of considerable experience, and it was he who by a bold and skilful movement had saved the action off Portland from being a severe defeat for Blake and Deane. Monck's therefore was the only new mind that was brought to bear on the subject. Yet it is impossible to credit him with introducing a revolution in naval tactics. All that can be said is that possibly his genius for war and his scientific and well-drilled spirit revealed to him in the traditional minor tactics of the seamen the germ of a true tactical system, and caused him to urge its reduction into a definite set of fighting instructions which would be binding on all, and would co-ordinate the fleet into the same kind of homogeneous and handy fighting machine that he and the rest of the Low Country officers had made of the New Model Army. In any case he could not have carried the thing through unless it had commended itself to the experience of such men as Penn and the majority of the naval officers of the council of war. And they would hardly have been induced to agree had they not felt that the new instructions were calculated to bring out the best of the methods which they had empirically practised.
How far the new orders were carried out during the rest of the war is difficult to say. In both official and unofficial reports of the actions of this time an almost superstitious reverence is shown in avoiding tactical details. Nevertheless that a substantial improvement was the result seems clear, and further the new tactics appear to have made a marked impression upon the Dutch. Of the very next action, that off the Gabbard on June 2, when Monck was left in sole command, we have a report from the Hague that the English 'having the wind, they stayed on a tack for half an hour until they put themselves into the order in which they meant to fight, which was in file at half cannon-shot,' and the suggestion is that this was something new to the Dutch. 'Our fleet,' says an English report by an eye-witness, 'did work together in better order than before and seconded one another.' Then there is the important testimony of a Royalist intelligencer who got his information at the Hague on June 9, from the man who had brought ashore the despatches from the defeated Dutch fleet. After relating the consternation which the English caused in the Dutch ranks as well by their gunnery as their refusal to board, he goes on to say, 'It is certain that the Dutch in this fight (by the relation and acknowledgment of Tromp's own express sent hither, with whom I spoke) showed very great fear and were in very great confusion, and the English he says fought in excellent order.'[6]
Again, for the next battle—that of the Texel—fought on July 31 in the same year, we have the statement of Hoste's informant, who was present as a spectator, that at the opening of the action the English, but not the Dutch, were formed in a single line close-hauled. 'Le 7 Aoust' [i.e.N.S.], the French gentleman says, 'je découvris l'armée de l'amiral composée de plus de cent vaisseaux de guerre. Elle était rangée en trois escadrons et elle faisoit vent-arrière pour aller tomber sur les Anglois, qu'elle rencontra le même jour à peu près en pareil nombre rangez[sic]sur une ligne qui tenoit plus de quatre lieues Nord-Nord-Est et Sud-Sud-Ouest, le vent étant Nord-Ouest. Le 8 et le 9 se passèrent en des escarmouches, mais le 10 on en[sic]vint à une bataille decisive. Les Anglois avoient essaié de gagner le vent: mais l'amiral Tromp en aiant toujours conservé l'avantage, et l'étant rangé sur une ligne parallèle à celle des Anglois arriva sur eux,' &c. This is the first known instance of a Dutch fleet forming in single line, and, so far as it goes, would tend to show they adopted it in imitation of the English formation.[7] At any rate, so far as we have gone, the evidence tends to show that the English finally adopted the regular line-ahead formation in consequence of the orders of March 29, 1653, and there is no indication of the current belief that they borrowed it from the Dutch.
By the English admirals the new system must have been regarded as a success. For the Fighting Instructions of 1653 were reissued with nothing but a few alterations of signals and verbal changes by Blake, Monck, Disbrowe, and Penn, the new 'admirals and generals of the fleet of the Commonwealth of England,' appointed in December 1653, when the war was practically over. They are printed by Granville Penn (Memorials of Penn, ii. 76), under date March 31, 1655, but that cannot be the actual date of their issue, for Blake was then in the Mediterranean, Penn in the West Indies, and Monck busy with his pacification of the Highlands. We must suspect here then another confusion between old and new styles, and conjecture the true date to be March 31, 1654, that is just before Monck left for Scotland, and a few days before the peace was signed. So that these would be the orders under which Blake conducted his famous campaign in the Mediterranean, Penn and Venables captured Jamaica, and the whole of Cromwell's Spanish war was fought.
[1]Hist. MSS. Com.XIII. ii. 85. It is from a transcript of this copy made for Dr. Gardiner that I have been permitted to take the text below. A set of 'Instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in Sailing' accompanies them.
[2]British Museum, Shane MSS.3232, f. 81.
[3] The Sloane copy is not quite identical with that in the Portland MSS. The variations, however, are merely verbal and in a few signals, and are of such a nature as to be accounted for by careless transcription.
[4] Hoste, the author of the first great treatise on Naval Tactics, quotes Tromp's formation as a typical method of retreat; but his account is vitiated by what seems a curious mistake. He says: 'Il rangea son armée en demi-lune et il mit son convoi au milieu: c'est à dire que son vaisseau faisait au vent l'angle obtus de la demi-lune, et les autres s'étendoient de part (sic) et d'autresur les deux lignes du plus- prèspour former les faces de la demi-lune qui couvroient le convoi. Ce fut en cet ordre qu'il fit vent arrière, foudroiant à droite et à gauche tous les anglois qui s'approchent' But if with the wind aft his two quarter lines bore from the flagship seven points from the wind, the formation would have been concave to the enemy and the convoy could not have beenau milieu. (Evolutions Navales, pp. 90, 95, and plate 29, p. 91.) The passage is in any case interesting, as showing that what was then called the crescent or half-moon formation was nothing but our own 'order of retreat,' or 'order of retreat reverted,' of Rodney's time. As defined by Sir Charles Knowles in 1780, the order of retreat reverted was formed on two lines of bearing,i.e.by the seconds of the centre ship keeping two points abaft her starboard and larboard beams respectively. In the simple order of retreat they kept two points before the beam.
[5] No reference to these orders appears in the correspondence of the generals at this time, unless it be in a letter of John Poortmans, deputy-treasurer of the fleet, to Robert Blackbourne, in which he writes on March 9: 'The generals want 500 copies of the instructions for commanders of the state's ships printed and sent down.' (S.P. Dom.48, f. 65.)
[6]Clarendon MSS.45, f. 470.
[7] Hoste,Evolutions Navales, p. 78. Dr. Gardiner declared himself sceptical as to the genuineness of the French gentleman's narrative, mainly on the ground of certain inaccuracies of date and detail; but, as Hoste certainly believed in it, it cannot well be rejected as evidence of the main features of the action for which he used it.
[+Duke of Portland's MSS.+]
By the Right Honourable the Generals and Admirals of the Fleet. Instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in fighting.
First. Upon the discovery of a fleet, receiving a sign from the general, which is to be striking the general's ensign, and making a weft,[2] two frigates [3] appointed out of each squadron are to make sail, and stand with them so nigh as they may conveniently, the better to gain a knowledge of them what they are, and of what quality, and how many fireships and others, and in what posture[4] the fleet is; which being done the frigates are to speak together and conclude in that report they are to give, and accordingly repair to their respective squadrons and commanders-in-chief, and not to engage if the enemy[5] exceed them in number, except it shall appear to them on the place they have the advantage:
Ins. 2nd. At sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral, or he that commands in chief in the 2nd place, and his squadron, as also the rear-admiral, or he that commandeth in chief in the 3rd place, and his squadron, are to make what sail they can to come up with the admiral on each wing, the vice-admiral on the right wing, and the rear-admiral on the left wing, leaving a competent distance for the admiral's squadron if the wind will permit and there be sea-room enough.
Ins. 3rd. As soon as they shall see the general engage, or make a signal by shooting off two guns and putting a red flag over the fore topmast-head, that then each squadron shall take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy next unto them; and in order thereunto all the ships of every squadron shall endeavour to keep in a line with the chief unless the chief be maimed or otherwise disabled (which God forbid!), whereby the said ship that wears the flag should not come in to do the service which is requisite. Then every ship of the said squadron shall endeavour to keep[6] in a line with the admiral, orhe that commands in chief[7] next unto him, and nearest the enemy.
Inst. 4th. If any squadron shall happen to be overcharged or distressed, the next squadron or ships arespeedily[8] to make towards their relief and assistance upon a signal given them; which signal shall be, in the admiral's squadron a pennant on the fore topmast-head, the vice-admiral or he that commands in chief in the second place a pennant on the main topmast-head, [and] the rear-admiral's squadron the like.
Inst. 5th. If in case any ship shall be distressed or disabled for lack of masts, shot under water, or otherwisein danger of sinking or taking, he or they,[9] thus distressed shall make a sign by the weft of his jack or ensign, and those next him are strictly required to relieve him.
Inst. 6th. That if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy to stop a leak or mend what else is amiss, which cannot be otherwise repaired, he is to put out a pennant on the mizen yard-arm or ensign staff, whereby the rest of the ships may have notice what it is for; and if it should be that the admiral or any flagship should do so, the ships of the fleet or the respective squadrons are to endeavour tokeep up in a line as close[10] as they can betwixt him and the enemy, having always one eye to defend him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition.
Inst. 7th. In case the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, and that other ships of the fleet are to windward of the admiral, then upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard, or the mizen topmast,[11] every such ship then is to bear up into his wake,and grain upon severest punishment[12] In case the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part thereof to leeward of him, to the end such ships to leeward may come up into the line with their admiral, if he shall put abroad a flag as before and bear up, none that are to leeward are to bear up, but to keep his or their luff to gain the wake or grain.
Inst. 8th. If the admiral will have any of the shipsto endeavour[13] by tacking or otherwise to gain the wind of the enemy, he will put abroad a red flag at his spritsail, topmast shrouds, forestay or main topmast[14] stay. He that first discovers the signal shall make sail and hoist and lower his sail[15] or ensign, that the rest of the ships may take notice of it and follow.
Inst. 9th. If we put out a red flag on the mizen shrouds, or mizen yard-arm, we will have all the flagships to come up in the grain and wake[16] of us.
Inst. 10th. If in time of fight God shall deliver any of the enemy's ships into our hands, special care is to be taken to save their men as the present state of our condition will permit in such a case, but that the ships be immediately destroyed, by sinking or burning the same, so that our own ships be not disabled or any work interrupted by the departing of men or boats from the ships; and this we require all commanders to be more than mindful of.[17]
Inst. 11th. None shall fire upon any ship of the enemy that is laid aboard by any of our own ships, but so that he may be sure he endamage not his friend.
Inst. 12th. That it is the duty of commanders and masters of all small frigates,[18] ketches, and smacks belonging to the several squadrons to know the fireships belonging to the enemy, and accordingly by observing their motions to do their utmost to cut off their boats if possible, or, if opportunity be, that they lay them aboard, seize or destroy them. And to this purpose they are to keep to windward of their squadrons in time of service. But in case they cannot prevent the fireships [coming][19] on board by clapping between us and them (which by all means possible they are to endeavour), that then in such cases they show themselves men in such an exigent and steer on board them, and with their boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from us and destroy them; which service (if honourably done) according to its merit shall be rewarded, but the neglect severely to be called to accompt.
Inst. 13th. That the fireships in the several squadrons endeavour to keep the wind; and they with the small frigates to be as near the great ships as they can, to attend the signal from the general or commander-in-chief, and to act accordingly. If the general hoist up a white flag on the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head, all small frigates in his squadron are to come under his stern for orders.
Inst. 14th. That if any engagement by day shall continue till night and the general shall please to anchor, then upon signal given they all anchor in as good order as may be, the signal being as in the 'Instructions for Sailing'; and if the general please to retreat without anchoring, the signal to be firing two guns, the one so nigh the other as the report may be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do the like with two guns more.
Given under our hands at Portsmouth, this March 29th, 1653.
[1] Re-issued in March 1654, by Blake, Monck, Disbrowe, and Penn, with some amendments and verbal alterations. As reissued they are inSloane MSS.3232, f. 81, and printed in Granville Penn'sMemorials of Sir William Penn, ii. 76. All the important amendments in the new edition, apart from mere verbal alterations, are given below in notes to the articles in which they occur.
[2] 'Waft(more correctly writtenwheft). It is any flag or ensign stopped together at the head and middle portion, slightly rolled up lengthwise, and hoisted at different positions at the after-part of a ship.'—Admiral Smyth (Sailors' Word-Book).
[3] The orders of 1654 have 'one frigate.'
[4]I.e.'formation.'
[5] 1654, 'enemy's ships.'
[6] 1654, 'get.'
[7] 1654, 'or the commander-in-chief.'
[8] 1654, 'immediately.'
[9] 1654, 'so as she is in danger of being sunk or taken, then they.'
[10] 1654, 'to keep on close in a line.'
[11] 1654, 'mizen topmast-head.'
[12] 1654, 'or grain upon pain of severe punishment.' Nothing is more curious in naval phraseology than the loss of this excellent word 'grain,' or 'grayne,' to express the opposite of 'wake.' To come into a ship's grain meant to take station ahead of her. There is nothing now which exactly supplies its place, and yet it has long fallen into oblivion, so long, indeed, that its existence was unknown to the learned editors of the newOxford Dictionary. This is to be the more regretted as its etymology is very obscure. It may, however, be traced with little doubt to the old Norse 'grein,' a branch or prong, surviving in the word 'grains,' a pronged harpoon or fish spear. From its meaning, 'branch,' it might seem to be akin to 'stem' and to 'bow,' which is only another spelling of'bough.' But this is not likely. The older meaning of 'bows' was 'shoulders,' and this, it is agreed, is how it became applied to the head of a ship. There is, however, a secondary and more widely used sense of 'grain,' which means the space between forking boughs, and so almost any angular space, like a meadow where two rivers converge. Thus 'grain,' in the naval sense, might easily mean the space enclosed by the planks of a ship where they spring from the stem, or if it is not actually the equivalent of 'bows,' it may mean the diverging waves thrown up by a ship advancing through the water, and thus be the exact analogue of 'wake.'
[13] 1654, 'to make sail and endeavour.'
[14] 1654, 'Fore topmast.'
[15] 1654, 'jack.'
[16] 1654, 'wake or grain.'
[17] 1654, 'more than ordinarily careful of.'
[18] It should be remembered that 'frigate' at this time meant a 'frigate-built ship.' The larger ones were 'capital ships' and lay in the line, while the smaller ones were used as cruisers.
[19] Inserted from 1654 copy.
Though several fleets were fitted out in the first years of the Restoration, the earliest orders of Charles II's reign that have come down to us are those which the Earl of Sandwich issued on the eve of the Second Dutch War. Early in the year 1665, when hostilities were known to be inevitable, he had sailed from Portsmouth with a squadron of fifteen sail for the North Sea. On January 27th he arrived in the Downs, and on February 9th sailed for the coast of Holland.[1] War was declared on March 4th following. The orders in question are only known by a copy given to one of his frigate captains, which has survived amongst the manuscripts of the Duke of Somerset. So far as is known no fresh complete set of Fighting Instructions was issued before the outbreak of the war, and as Monck and Sandwich were still among the leading figures at the admiralty it is probable that those used in the last Dutch and Spanish Wars were continued. The four orders here given are supplementary to them, providing for the formation of line abreast, and for forming from that order a line ahead to port or starboard. It is possible however that no other orders had yet been officially issued, and that these simple directions were regarded by Sandwich as all that were necessary for so small a squadron.
[1]Domestic Calendar, 1664-5, pp. 181, 183.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH, Feb. 1, 1665.
[+Duke of Somerset's MSS., printed by the Historical MSS. Commission.Rep. XV. part vii. p. 100+.]
Orders given by direction of the Earl of Sandwich to Captain Hugh Seymour,[1] of the Pearl frigate.
1665, February 1. On board the London in the Downs.
If we shall bear up, putting abroad the standard on the ancient[2] staff, every ship of this squadron is to draw up abreast with the flag, on either side, in such berth as opportunity shall present most convenient, but if there be time they are to sail in the foresaid posture.[3]
If the admiral put up a jack[4]-flag on the flagstaff on the mizen topmast-head and fire a gun, then the outwardmost ship on the starboard side is to clap upon a wind with his starboard tacks aboard, and all the squadron as they lie above or as they have ranked themselves are presently to clap upon a wind and stand after him in a line.
And if the admiral make a weft with his jack-flag upon the flagstaff on the mizen topmast-head and fire a gun, then the outwardmost ship on the larboard side is to clap upon a wind with his larboard tacks aboard, and all the squadrons as they have ranked themselves are presently to clap upon a wind and stand after him in a line.
All the fifth and sixth rates[5] are to lie on that broadside of the admiral which is away from the enemy, looking out well when any sign is made for them. Then they are to endeavour to come up under the admiral's stern for to receive orders.
If we shall give the signal of hanging a pennant under the flag at the main topmast-head, then all the ships of this squadron are, with what speed they can, to fall into this posture, every ship in the place and order here assigned, and sail and anchor so that they may with the most readiness fall into the above said posture.[6]
[1] Son of Colonel Sir Edward Seymour, 3rd baronet, Governor of Dartmouth.
[2]I.e.ensign.
[3]I.e.in the 'order of battle' already given.
[4] The earliest known use of the word 'jack' for a flag in an official document occurs in an order issued by Sir John Pennington to his pinnace captains in 1633. He was in command of the Channel guard in search of pirates, particularly 'The Seahorse lately commanded by Captain Quaile' and 'Christopher Megges, who had lately committed some outrage upon the Isle of Lundy, and other places.' The pinnaces were to work inshore of the admiral and to endeavour to entrap the piratical ships, and to this end he said, 'You are also for this present service to keep in your Jack at your boultsprit end and your pendant and your ordnance.' (Sloane MSS.2682, f. 51.) The object of the order evidently was that they should conceal their character from the pirates, and at this time therefore the 'jack' carried at the end of the bowsprit and the pennant must have been the sign of a navy ship. Boteler however, who wrote hisSea Dialoguesabout 1625, does not mention the jack in his remarks about flags (pp. 327-334). The etymology is uncertain. The newOxford Dictionaryinclines to the simple explanation that 'jack' was used in this case in its common diminutive sense, and that 'jack-flag' was merely a small flag.
[5]I.e.his cruisers.
[6] In the Report of the Historical MSS. Commission it is stated that the position of the ships is shown in a diagram, but I have been unable to obtain access to the document.
It has hitherto been universally supposed that the Dutch Wars of the Restoration were fought under the set of orders printed as an appendix to Granville Penn'sMemorials of Penn. Mr. Penn believed them to belong to the year 1665, but recent research shows conclusively that these often-quoted orders, which have been the source of so much misapprehension, are really much later and represent not the ideas under which those wars were fought, but the experience that was gained from them.
This new light is mainly derived from a hitherto unknown collection of naval manuscripts belonging to the Earl of Dartmouth, which he has generously placed at the disposal of the Society. The invaluable material they contain enables us to say with certainty that the orders which the Duke of York issued as lord high admiral and commander-in-chief at the outbreak of the war were nothing but a slight modification of those of 1654, with a few but not unimportant additions. Amongst the manuscripts, most of which relate to the first Lord Dartmouth's cousin and first commander, Sir Edward Spragge, is a 'Sea Book' that must have once belonged to that admiral. It is a kind of commonplace book, the greater part unused, in which Spragge appears to have begun to enter various important orders and other matter of naval interest with which he had been officially concerned, by way of forming a collection of precedents.[1] Amongst these is a copy of the orders set out below, dated from the Royal Charles, the Duke of York's flagship, 'the 10th of April, 1665,' by command of his royal highness, and signed 'Wm. Coventry.' This was the well-known politician Sir William Coventry, the model, if not the author, of theCharacter of a Trimmer, who had been made private secretary to the duke on the eve of the Restoration, and was now a commissioner of the navy and acting as secretary on the duke's staff. So closely it will be seen do they follow the Commonwealth orders of 1653, as modified in the following year, that it would be scarcely worth while setting them out in full, but for the importance of finally establishing their true origin. The scarcely concealed doubts which many writers have felt as to whether the new system of tactics can have been due to the Duke of York may now be laid at rest, and henceforth the great reform must be credited not to him, but to Cromwell's 'generals-at-sea.'
Nevertheless the credit of certain developments which were introduced at this time must still remain with the duke and his advisers: Rupert, Sandwich, Lawson, and probably above all Penn, his flag captain. For instance, differences will be found in Articles 2 and 3, where, instead of merely enjoining the line, the duke refers to a regular 'order of battle,' which has not come down to us, but which no doubt gave every ship her station in the line, like those which Sandwich had prepared for his squadron a few months earlier, and which Monck and Rupert certainly drew up in the following year.[2] Then again the truculent Article 10 of 1653 and 1654 ordering the immediate destruction of disabled ships of the enemy after saving the crews if possible, which contemporary authorities put down to Monck, is reversed. At the end, moreover, two articles are added; one, numbered 15, embodying numbers 2 and 3 of Sandwich's orders of the previous year, with such modifications as were necessary to adapt them to a large fleet, and another numbered 16 enjoining 'close action.' Nor is this all. Spragge's 'Sea Book' contains also a set of ten 'additional instructions' all of which are new. They are undated, but from another copy in Capt. Robert Moulton's 'Sea Book' we can fix them to April 18th, 1665.[3] Their whole tenour suggests that they were the outcome of prolonged discussions in the council of war; and in the variously dated copies which exist of sections of the orders we have evidence that between the last week in March, when the duke hoisted his flag, and April 21st, when he put to sea, much time must have been spent upon the consideration of the tactical problem.[4]
The result was a marked advance. In these ten 'additional instructions,' for instance, we have for the first time a clear distinction drawn between attacks from windward and attacks from leeward. We have also the first appearance of the close-hauled line ahead, and it is enjoined as a defensive formation when the enemy attacks from windward. A method of attack from windward is also provided for the case where the enemy stays to receive it. Amongst less important developments we have an article making the half-cable's length, originally enjoined under the Commonwealth, the regular interval between ships, and others to prevent the line being broken for the sake of chasing or taking possession of beaten ships. Finally there are signals for tacking in succession either from the van or the rear, which must have given the fleet a quite unprecedented increase of tactical mobility. Nor are we without evidence that increased mobility was actually exhibited when the new instructions were put to a practical test.
It was under the old Commonwealth orders as supplemented and modified by these noteworthy articles of April 1665, that was fought the memorable action of June 3rd, variously known as the battle of Lowestoft or the Second Battle of the Texel. It is this action that Hoste cites as the first in which two fleets engaged in close hauled line ahead, and kept their formation throughout the day. After two days' manoeuvring the English gained the wind, and kept it in spite of all their enemy could do, and the various accounts of the action certainly give the impression that the evolutions of the English were smarter and more complex than those of the Dutch. It is true that about the middle of the action one of the new signals, that for the rear to tack first, threw the fleet into some confusion, and that later the van and centre changed places; still, till almost the end, the duke, or rather Penn, his flag captain, kept at least some control of the fleet. Granville Penn indeed claims that the duke finally routed the Dutch by breaking their line, and that he did it intentionally. But this movement is only mentioned in a hasty letter to the press written immediately after the battle. If the enemy's line was actually cut, it must have been an accident or a mere instance of the time-honoured practice of trying to concentrate on or 'overcharge' a part of the enemy's fleet. Coventry in his official despatch to Monck, who was ashore in charge of the admiralty, says nothing of it, nor does Hoste, while the duke himself tells us the object of his movement was merely to have 'a bout with Opdam.' Granville Penn was naturally inclined to credit the statement in the Newsletter because he believed the action was fought under Fighting Instructions which contained an article about dividing the enemy's fleet. But even if this article had been in force at the time—and we now know that it was not—it would still have been inapplicable, for it was only designed in view of an attack from leeward, a most important point which modern writers appear unaccountably to have overlooked.[5]
But although we can no longer receive this questionable movement of the Duke of York as an instance of 'breaking the line' in the modern sense, it is certain that the English manoeuvres in this action were more scientific and elaborate than ever before—so much so indeed that a reaction set in, and it is this reaction which gave rise to the idea in later times that the order in line ahead had not been used in Commonwealth or Restoration times. We gather that in spite of the victory there was a widespread conviction that it ought to have been more decisive. It was felt that there had been perhaps too much manoeuvring and not enough hard fighting. In the end the Duke of York and Sandwich were both tenderly relieved of their command, and superseded by Monck. He and Rupert then became joint admirals for the ensuing campaign. They had the reputation of being two of the hardest fighters alive, and both were convinced of their power of sweeping the Dutch from the sea by sheer hard hitting, a belief which so far at least as Monck was concerned the country enthusiastically shared. The spirit in which the two soldier-admirals put to sea in May 1666 we see reflected in the hitherto unknown 'Additional Instructions for Fighting' given below. For the knowledge of these remarkable orders, which go far to solve the mystery that has clouded the subject, we are again indebted to Lord Dartmouth. They are entered like the others in Sir Edward Spragge's 'Sea Book.' They bear no date, but as they are signed 'Rupert' and addressed to 'Sir Edward Spragge, Knt., Vice-Admiral of the Blue,' we can with certainty fix them to this time. For we know that Spragge sailed in Rupert's squadron, and on the fourth day of the famous June battle was raised to the rank here given him in place of Sir William Berkley, who had been killed in the first day's action.[6] What share Monck had in the orders we cannot tell, but Rupert, being only joint admiral with him, could hardly have taken the step without his concurrence, and the probability is that Rupert, who had been detached on special service, was issuing a general fleet order to his own squadron which may have been communicated to the rest of the fleet before he rejoined. It must at any rate have been after he rejoined, for it was not till then that Spragge received his promotion. Both Monck and Rupert must therefore receive the credit of foreseeing the danger that lay in the new system, the danger of tactical pedantry that was destined to hamper the action of our fleets for the next half century, and of being the first to declare, long before Anson or Hawke, and longer still before Nelson, that line or no line, signals or no signals, 'the destruction of the enemy is always to be made the chiefest care.'
In the light of this discovery we can at last explain the curious conversation recorded by Pepys, which, wrongly interpreted, has done so much to distort the early history of tactics. The circumstances of Monck's great action must first be recalled. At the end of May, he and Rupert, with a fleet of about eighty sail, had put to sea to seek the Dutch, when a sudden order reached them from the court that the French Mediterranean fleet was coming up channel to join hands with the enemy, and that Rupert with his squadron of twenty sail was to go westward to stop it. The result of this foolish order was that on June 1 Monck found himself in presence of the whole Dutch fleet of nearly a hundred sail, with no more than fifty-nine of his own.[7] Seeing an advantage, however, he attacked them furiously, throwing his whole weight upon their van. Though at first successful shoals forced him to tack, and his rear fell foul of the Dutch centre and rear, so that he came off severely handled. The next day he renewed the fight with forty-four sail against about eighty, and with so much skill that he was able that night to make an orderly retreat, covering his disabled ships with those least injured 'in a line abreadth.'[8] On the 3rd the retreat was continued. So well was it managed that the Dutch could not touch him, and towards evening he was able near the Galloper Sand to form a junction with Rupert, who had been recalled. Together on the 4th day they returned to the fight with as fierce a determination as ever. Though to leeward, they succeeded in breaking through the enemy's line, such as it was. Being in too great an inferiority of numbers, however, they could not reap the advantage of their manoeuvre.[9] It only resulted in their being doubled on, and the two fleets were soon mingled in a raging mass without order or control; and when in the end they parted after a four days' fight, without example for endurance and carnage in naval history, the English had suffered a reverse at least as great as that they had inflicted on the Dutch in the last year's action.
Such a terrific object lesson could not be without its effects on the great tactical question. But let us see how it looked in the eyes of a French eye-witness, who was naturally inclined to a favourable view of his Dutch allies. Of the second day's fight he says: 'Sur les six heures du matin nous apperçumes la flotte des Anglais qui revenoit dans une ordre admirable. Car ils marchent par le front comme seroit une armée de terre, et quand ils approchent ils s'etendent et tournent leurs bords pour combattre: parce que le front à la mer se fait par le bord des vaisseaux': that is, of course, the English bore down on the Dutch all together in line abreast, and then hauled their wind into line ahead to engage. Again, in describing the danger Tromp was in by having weathered the English fleet with his own squadron, while the rest of the Dutch were to leeward, he says: 'J'ai déjà dit que rien n'égale le bel ordre et la discipline des Anglais, que jamais ligne n'a été tirée plus droite que celle que leurs vaisseaux forment, qu'on peut être certain que lorsqu'on en approche il les faux [sic] tous essuïer.' The very precision of the English formation however, as he points out, was what saved Tromp from destruction, because having weathered their van-ship, he had the wind of them all and could not be enveloped. On the other hand, he says, whenever an English ship penetrated the Dutch formation it fared badly because the Dutch kept themselves 'redoublez'—that is, not in a single line. As a general principle, then, he declares that it is safer to 'entrer dans une flotte d'Angleterre que de passer auprès' (i.e.stand along it), 'et bien mieux de passer auprès d'une flotte Hollandaise que se mêler au travers, si elle combat toujours comme elle fit pour lors.' But on the whole he condemns the loose formation of the Dutch, and says it is really due not to a tactical idea, but to individual captains shirking their duty. It is clear, then, that whatever was De Ruyter's intention, the Dutch did not fight in a true line. Later on in the same action he says: 'Ruyter de son côté appliqua toute son industrie pour donner une meilleure forme à sa ligne … enfin par ce moyen nous nous remismes sur une ligne parallèle à celle des Anglais.' Finally, in summing up the tactical lesson of the stupendous battle, he concludes: 'A la vérité l'ordre admirable de leur [the English] armée doit toujours être imité, et pour moi je sais bien que si j'étais dans le service de mer, et que je commandasse des vaisseaux du Roi je songerois à battre les Angloispar leur propre manière et non par celle des Hollandoises, et de nous autres, qui est de vouloir aborder.' In defence of his view he cites a military analogy, instancing a line of cavalry, which being controlled 'avec règle' devotes itself solely to making the opposing force give way, and keeps as close an eye on itself as on the enemy. Supposing such a line engaged against another body of horse in which the squadrons break their ranks and advance unevenly to the charge, such a condition, he says, would not promise success to the latter, and the parallel he contends is exact.[10]
From this account by an accomplished student of tactics we may deduce three indisputable conclusions, 1. That the formation in line ahead was aimed at the development of gun power as opposed to boarding. 2. That it was purely English, and that, however far Dutch tacticians had sought to imitate it, they had not yet succeeded in forcing it on their seamen. 3. That the English certainly fought in line, and had reached a perfection in handling the formation which could only have been the result of constant practice in fleet tactics.
It remains to consider the precisely opposite impression we get from English authority. To begin with, we find on close examination that the whole of it, or nearly so, is to be traced to Pepys or Penn. Thelocus classicusis as follows from Pepys'sDiaryof July 4th. 'In the evening Sir W. Penn came to me, and we walked together and talked of the late fight. I find him very plain, that the whole conduct of the late fight was ill…. He says three things must be remedied, or else we shall be undone by their fleet. 1. That we must fight in line, whereas we fight promiscuously, to our utter demonstrable ruin: the Dutch fighting otherwise, and we whenever we beat them. 2. We must not desert ships of our own in distress, as we did, for that makes a captain desperate, and he will fling away his ship when there are no hopes left him of succour. 3. That ships when they are a little shattered must not take the liberty to come in of themselves, but refit themselves the best they can and stay out, many of our ships coming in with very little disableness. He told me that our very commanders, nay, our very flag officers, do stand in need of exercising amongst themselves and discoursing the business of commanding a fleet, he telling me that even one of our flag men in the fleet did not know which tack lost the wind or kept it in the last engagement…. He did talk very rationally to me, insomuch that I took more pleasure this night in hearing him discourse than I ever did in my life in anything that he said.'
Pepys's enjoyment is easily understood. He disliked Penn—thought him a 'mean rogue,' a 'coxcomb,' and a 'false rascal,' but he was very sore over the supersession of his patron, Sandwich, and so long as Penn abused Monck, Pepys was glad enough to listen to him, and ready to believe anything he said in disparagement of the late battle. Penn was no less bitter against Monck, and when his chief, the Duke of York, was retired he had sulkily refused to serve under the new commander-in-chief. For this reason Penn had not been present at the action, but he was as ready as Pepys to believe anything he was told against Monck, and we may be sure the stories of grumbling officers lost nothing when he repeated them into willing ears. That Penn really told Pepys the English had not fought in line is quite incredible, even if he was, as Sir George Carteret, treasurer of the navy, called him, 'the falsest rascal that ever was in the world.' The fleet orders and the French testimony make this practically impossible. But he may well have expressed himself very hotly about the new instruction issued by Monck and Rupert which modified his own, and placed the destruction of the enemy above a pedantic adherence to the line. Pepys must clearly have forgotten or misunderstood what Penn said on this point, and in any case both men were far too much prejudiced for the passage to have any historical value. Abuse of Monck by Penn can have little weight enough, but the same abuse filtered through Pepys's acrid and irresponsible pen can have no weight at all.[11]
[1] It is a folio parchment-bound volume, labelled 'Royal Charles Sea Book,' but this is clearly an error, due to the fact that the first order copied into it is dated from the Royal Charles, April 24, 1666. The first entry, however, is the list of a ship's company which Spragge commanded in 1661-2, as appears from his noting the deaths and desertions which took place amongst the crew in those years. At this time he is known to have commanded the Portland. For some years the book was evidently laid aside, and apparently resumed when in 1665 he commissioned the Triumph for the Dutch War.
[2] See notessupra, pp. 108-9, and in theDartmouth MSS., Hist. MSS. Com. Rep.XI. v. 15.
[3]Harleian MSS.1247. It contains orders addressed to Moulton and returns for the Centurion, Vanguard and Anne, the ships he commanded in 1664-6. At p. 52 it has a copy of the above 'Additional Instructions,' but numbered 1 to 6, articles 1 to 5 of the Dartmouth copy being in one long article. At p. 50 it has the original articles as far as No. 6. Then come two articles numbered as 7 and 8, giving signals for a squadron 'to draw up in line' and to come near the admiral. They are subscribed 'Royal James, Admiral.' The Royal James was Rupert's flagship in 1665, and the two articles may be squadronal orders of his. Then, numbered 9 to 12, come four 'additional instructions for sailing' by the Duke of York, relating to chasing, and dated April 24, 1665.
[4] Some of these articles are dated even as late as April 27, See in thePenn Tracts, Sloane MSS.3232, f. 33,infra, p. 128.
[5] Seepost, p. 177. For the despatches, &c., see G. Penn,Memorials of Penn, II. 322-333, 344-350. He also quotes a work published at Amsterdam in 1668 which says: 'Le Comte de Sandwich sépara la flotte Hollandaise en deux vers l'une heure du midi.' He explains that by the order for the rear to tack first, Sandwich was leading, forgetting Coventry's despatch (ibid.p. 328), which tells how by that time the duke had taken Sandwich's place and was leading the line himself, and that it was he, not Sandwich, who led the movement upon Opdam's ship in the centre of the Dutch line.
[6] Charnock,Biographia Navalis, i. 65.
[7] Pepys, it must be said, persuaded himself that this order was suggested and approved by the admirals. He traced it to Spragge's desire to get away with his chief on a separate command. Pepys however was clearly not sure about it, and he almost certainly would have been if the Duke of York was really innocent of the blunder. The truth probably can never be known.
[8] Vice-Admiral Jordan to Penn, June 5,Memorials of Penn, II. 389. This is the first known instance of the use of the term 'line abreast.' In the published account a different term is used. 'By 3 or 4 in the morning,' it says, 'a small breeze sprang up at N.E. and at a council of flag officers, his grace the lord general resolved to draw the fleet into a "rear line of battle" and make a fair retreat of it.' (Brit. Museum, 816, m. 23(13), p. 5, andS.P. Dom. Car. II, vol. 158.) The French and Dutch called it the 'crescent' formation. See note, p. 94.
[9] Seepost, pp. 136-7.
[10]Mémoires d'Armand de Gramont, Comte de Guiche, concernant les Provinces Unis des Pays-Bas servant de supplément et de confirmation à ceux d'Aubrey du Maurier et du Comte d'Estrades. Londres, chez Philippe Changuion, 1744. (The italics are not in the original.)Cf.the similar French account quoted by Mahan,Sea Power, 117et seq.
[11]Cf.a similar conversation that Pepys had on October 28 with a certain Captain Guy, who had been in command of a small fourth-rate of thirty-eight guns in Holmes's attack on the shipping at Vlie and Shelling after the 'St. James's Fight' and of a company of the force that landed to destroy Bandaris. The prejudice of both Pepys and Penn comes out still more strongly in their remarks on Monck's and Rupert's great victory of July 25, and their efforts to make out it was no victory at all. The somewhat meagre accounts we have of this action all point as before to the superiority of the English manoeuvring, and to the inability or unwillingness of the Dutch, and especially of Tromp, to preserve the line.
THE DUKE OF YORK, April10, 1665.
[+Sir Edward Spragge's Sea Book. The Earl of Dartmouth MSS.+]
_James, Duke of York and Albany, Earl of Ulster, Lord High Admiral of England and Ireland, &c, Constable of Dover Castle, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, and Governor of Portsmouth.
Instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in time of fighting_.
Upon discovery of a fleet receiving a sign from the admiral, which is to be striking of the admiral's ensign, and making a weft, one frigate appointed out of each squadron are to make sail and stand in with them so nigh as conveniently they may, the better to gain a knowledge of what they are and what quality, how many fireships and others, and in what posture the fleet is; which being done the frigates are to meet together and conclude on the report they are to give, and accordingly to repair to their respective squadrons and commanders-in-chief, and not engage if the enemy's ships exceed them in number, except it shall appear to them on the place that they have an advantage.
2. At the sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral, or he that commands in chief in the second place, and his squadron, and the rear-admiral, or he that commands in chief in the third place, and his squadron are to make what sail they can to come up and put themselves into the place and order which shall have been directed them before in the order of battle.
3. As soon as they shall see the admiral engage or shall make a signal by shooting off two guns and putting out a red flag on the fore topmast-head, that then each squadron shall take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy according to the order prescribed.
4. If any squadron shall happen to be overcharged and distressed, the next squadron or ships are immediately to make towards their relief and assistance upon a signal given them: which signal shall be in the admiral's squadron a pennant on the fore topmast-head; if any ship in the vice-admiral's squadron, or he that commands in chief in the second place, a pennant on the main topmast-head; and the rear-admiral's squadron the like.[1]