AN IDEALIST HYPOTHESIS.
29. The system of the Idealists cannot stand without supposing the connection and dependence which we refer to external objects, to exist only within us, and the causality which we attribute to external objects, to belong solely to our own acts.
I pull a rope in my chamber, and a bell never fails to ring; or in idealist language, the sensation formed from that union of sensations into which enters what we call therope and pulling it, produces or involves that other, which we callringing a bell. Either from habit or some hidden law, that relation of two phenomena will exist, the never interrupted succession of which causes the illusion in us, whereby we transfer to the real order, what is purely imaginary. This is the most irrational explanation possible, and a few observations will show it to be futile.
Today, we pull the rope, and strangely enough, no bell rings: but why not? The causing phenomenon exists; for undoubtedly there passes within us the act called pulling the rope, and yet we pull and pull again, and the bell does not ring. Who has changed the succession of phenomena?Why does not the phenomenon which a little while ago produced another, not produce it now? Nothing new has happened within us, we experience the first phenomenon just as clearly and vividly as before; why, then, is not the second presented? Why is it that formerly we experienced the second whenever we wished, by only exciting the first, and now we cannot? We make the act of our will just as efficaciously as before; who, then, has rendered our will impotent?
Hence we infer: first, that the second phenomenon does not depend upon the first, considered only as a purely internal fact, for this now exists precisely as it did before, and yet produces not the same phenomenon; secondly, that it does not depend upon the act of our will; for this is now as firm and strong as before, and yet produces nothing. We cannot, however, doubt that there is some connection between the two phenomena, for we have innumerable times seen one follow the other, and this cannot be explained by mere chance. Since then, one does not cause the other in the internal order, they must have some dependence in the external order; in other words, still keeping in view the case under examination, although the cause which produced the first phenomenon continues to exist, its connection with that which produced the other phenomenon must be interrupted; and so it was, in fact; for when we pulled the rope no sound followed, for the simple reason that the bell had been removed. This is comprehensible, if there be causes external to what we call sensations; but if there be only simple internal phenomena, no rational explanation can be given.
30. And here it is to be observed, that when we would explain the failure of succession of those phenomena which always have been united, we may recur to many very different ones, such as are internal phenomena, which, as such,have neither relation nor resemblance, and can only have some connection as corresponding to external objects. We may, when seeking the reason why the bell did not ring, in order to explain the cause of the change in the regular order of appearances, think of various causes, which we now consider as mere appearances or internal phenomena; we may have the following sensations: the rope broken, or caught, the bell broken, or removed, or without a tongue. We may attribute the failure of sound to any one of these sensations: but nothing can possibly be more irrational than to attribute it to them, if we regard them as mere internal facts; for as sensations, they nowhere appear. We cannot discourse rationally if we do not make an external object correspond to each of these sensations, of itself alone sufficing to interrupt the connection between pulling the rope and the vibration of the air which produces the sound.
31. Hence we conclude: First, that our sensations considered as purely internal phenomena, are divided into two very different classes; some depend upon our will, others do not; some have no mutual connection, or are variable in their relations, at the pleasure of him who experiences them; others have a certain connection which we can neither change nor destroy. Secondly, we conclude that the existence as well as the modifications of this last class, proceeds from causes not ourselves, independent of our will, and outside of us. That instinct, therefore, which impels us to refer these sensations to external objects, is confirmed by reason: therefore the testimony of the senses, in so far as it assures us of the reality of objects, is admissible at the tribunal of philosophy.
This demonstrates, in a certain manner, the existence of bodies; for we find, in philosophically examining the conception of body, something in it distinct from our ownbeing, the presence of which causes us such and such sensations. We know not the intimate essence of bodies; but even if we did know it, it would not aid our present purpose, for we are not treating of the idea which a philosopher would in such a case form, but of that formed by the generality of men.