FENELON'S OPINION.
72. Clarke's opinion is very similar to that of Fenelon, who in hisTreatise on the existence and attributes of God, explains immensity in a very surprising manner. He says: "After considering the eternity and immutability of God, which are the same thing, I ought to examine his immensity. Since he is by himself, he is sovereignly, and since he is sovereignly, he has all being in himself. Since he has all being in himself, he has without doubt extension; extension is a manner of being, of which I have an idea. I have already seen that my ideas upon the essence of things, are real degrees of being, which actually exist in God, and are possible out of him, because he can produce them. Therefore, extension is in him; he can produce it outside of himself, only because it is contained in the fulness of his being."
To a certain extent the words of Fenelon may be explained in a sense which most theologians would not reject. They distinguish two classes of perfections; those which involve no imperfection; such as wisdom, holiness, and justice; and those which involve imperfection, as, for example, all which belong to bodies, extension, form, etc. The former, which are also called perfectionssimpliciter, are in Godformaliter; that is to say, just as they are, because their nature involves no kind of imperfection, and, therefore, in God, they do not diminish nor tarnish his infinite perfection. Those of the second class, which are called perfectionssecundum quid, are in God notformaliter; for the imperfection which they involve is repugnant to his infinite perfection, butvirtualiteroreminenter; that is to say, that all the perfection, all the being which they contain is in God, who is infinite perfection, infinite being; and God can produce them exteriorly by his creative omnipotence. But inasmuch as they pre-exist in an infinite being, they are freed from all limitation and imperfection, and identified with the infinite essence, and have a mode of being far superior to what they are in reality. This is expressed by the termeminenter.
Among these perfectionssecundum quid, extension has always been numbered.
73. If the illustrious Archbishop of Cambrai had held to this sense, we should have nothing to say in relation to his doctrine, but the words which follow seem to show that he inclined to the opinion of those who maintain that space is the immensity of God.
"Whence, then," he adds, "is it that I do not call him extended and corporeal? It is because there is an extreme difference, as I have already remarked, between attributing to God all that is positive in extension, and attributing to him extension with a limit or negation.He that places extension without limits changes extension into immensity; he who places extension with limits, makes a corporeal nature." From these words it might be believed that Fenelon did not distinguish the two modes of being of extension as theologians do; but he gives to God all that is positive in extension, though he gives it to him without limit. From this it would seem to follow that God is really extended, although his extension is infinite. With all the respect due to the illustrious shade of one of the greatest ornaments of the Catholic Church, and one of the greatest men of modern times, I must say that such an opinion does not seem to me to be sustainable. A God really extended though with an infinite extension is not God. That whichis extended is essentially composite; God is essentially simple. Therefore, God and extension are contradictory.
74. But let us hear the illustrious prelate continue the explanation and defence of his opinion. He says: "From the moment that you place no limit to extension, you take from it figure, divisibility, motion, and impenetrability;—figure, because this is only a mode of limiting by surfaces;—divisibility, because, as we have seen, that which is infinite cannot be diminished, therefore, it cannot be divided, and consequently, it is notcompositeand divisible;—motion, because, if you suppose a whole, which has no parts nor limits, it cannot move beyond its place, because there can be no place beyond the true infinite; neither can it change the arrangement and situation ofits parts, because it hasno partsof which it is composed;—impenetrability, in fine, because impenetrability can only be conceived by conceiving two limited bodies, one of which is not the other, and cannot occupy the same space as the other. There are no two such bodies in infinite and indivisible extension; therefore there is no impenetrability in this extension. These principles established, it follows that all that is positive in extension is in God, although God has no figure, is not movable, divisible, or impenetrable, and consequently is not palpable, nor measurable."
From this passage it is very evident that Fenelon was far from imagining a composite God, a God with parts. He expressly denies it more than once in these few lines. Not less was to be looked for from his deep penetration and the purity of his doctrines; but, although this saves the rectitude of his intention, it does not satisfy philosophical exactness. For my part, I honestly confess that if extension is to be taken in its true sense, I cannot conceive how taking away its limits destroys its parts. On the contrary, I should rather say that an infinite extension would have infinite parts. If it is infinite it will have no figure; because figure involves a limit; but if it be true extension, it is a sort of immense field on which all imaginable figures may be traced. It will have no essential figure of its own, but it will be the recipient of all figures, the inexhaustible sea from which they all arise. That which is traced in it, will be in it; the points which terminate the figures must be in it. Is not this to have parts, composition? Infinite extension could have no figure, not because it has no parts, or is simple, but because it has infinite parts, because its composition is infinite.
I agree that an infinite extension would not be divisible, if by dividing, is meant separating; because in that immense fulness everything would be in its position with infinite firmness. So also we imagine space, the place of all motion, with its parts immovable, the field of all separation, with its parts inseparable; but we are treating of division, not of separation. If there is true extension, it is divisible; we conceive space with its parts inseparable, but still divisible; for we measure them, count them, and it is by relation to them that we form an idea of the size, distance, and motion of bodies.
74. Such clear and conclusive reflections could not fail to present themselves to the mind of the illustrious philosopher; but he seems to have preferred inconsequence or obscurity of language to the fatal corollaries of his first proposition. He said plainly and without any restriction, that all that is positive in extension, except the limit, is in God. He had asserted that extension with limits is corporeal, and that to change extension into immensity it was only necessary to take away its limits. He consequently attributed to God a true, although infinite, extension, and then wishing to explain and strengthen his doctrine he tells us that this extension has no parts. What is extension without parts?Who can conceive it? Does not extension necessarily imply an order of things of which some are outside of others. It has been always so understood. To speak of an extension without parts is to speak of an extension improperly so called. When speaking of such extension it is not enough to say it has no limits, it should be added that it is of an entirely different nature, that the word extension is used in another sense. Fenelon seemed to know this, when, notwithstanding the obscurity of his former expressions, elevated on the wings of his religion and his genius, he says: "God is in no place, as in no time; for his absolute and infinite beinghas no relation to place or time, which are but limits and restrictions of being. To ask if he is beyond the universe, if he exceeds its extremities in length, breadth, and depth, is as absurd a question as to ask if he was before the world, and if he will still be when the world is no more. As there is neither past nor future in God, so there is neither hither nor thither. As his absolute permanence excludes all measure of succession, so also his immensity excludes all measure of extension. He has not been, he will not be, buthe is. In the same manner, to speak properly, he is not here, he is not there, he is not beyond such a limit, but he is, absolutely. All expressions which place him in relation to any term, or fix him in a certain place, are improper and unbecoming. Where then is he? He is. He is in such a manner that we must not ask where. That which only half is, or with limits, is a certain thing in such a way that it is nothing else. But God is not any particular and restricted thing. He is all; he is being; or better and more simply,he is. For the fewer words we use, the more we say.He is.Beware of adding any thing to this."
76. While reading these magnificent words, I am carried away by the elevation and grandeur of his ideas of Godand of his immensity, and I forget the objections to the first proposition, which, if not false or inexact, is not, to say the least, expressed with all the clearness that could be desired. Still, I do not hesitate to maintain that his opinion coincides with Clarke's; although the illustrious writer, Christian, and poet, seem to merit a pardon for the philosopher.