BOOK FIRST.ON CERTAINTY.CHAPTERPAGEI.Importance and Utility of the Question of Certainty3II.True State of the Question7III.Certainty of the Human Race and Philosophical Certainty14IV.Existence of Transcendental Science in the Absolute Intellectual Order24V.Transcendental Science in the Human Intellectual Order cannot emanate from the Senses32VI.Transcendental Science.—Insufficiency of Real Truths37VII.The Philosophy of the Me cannot produce Transcendental Science41VIII.Universal Identity56IX.Universal Identity,—Continued64X.Problem of Representation: Monads of Leibnitz67XI.Problem of Representation examined71XII.Immediate Intelligibility76XIII.Representation of Causality and Ideality83XIV.Impossibility of Finding the first Principle in the Ideal Order89XV.The Indispensable Condition of all Human Knowledge.—Meansof perceiving Truth92XVI.Confusion of Ideas in Disputes on the Fundamental Principle 102XVII.Thought and Existence.—Descartes' Principle105XVIII.The Principle of Descartes, continued.—His Method111XIX.Value of the Principle, I Think:—Its Analysis118XX.True Sense of the Principle of Contradiction.—Kant's Opinion126XXI.Does the Principle of Contradiction merit the Title of Fundamental; and if so, in what Sense140XXII.The Principle of Evidence146XXIII.The Criterion of Consciousness151XXIV.The Criterion of Evidence157XXV.The Objective Value of Ideas163XXVI.Can all Cognitions be reduced to the Perception of Identity?171XXVII.Continuation of the same subject176XXVIII.Continuation of the same subject183XXIX.Are there true Synthetic Judgmentsa prioriin the Sense of Kant188XXX.Vico's Criterion200XXXI.Continuation of the same subject212XXXII.The Criterion on Common Sense219XXXIII.Error of Lamennais on Common Consent230XXXIV.Summary and Conclusion253BOOK SECOND.ON SENSATION.I.Sensation in Itself249II.Matter is incapable of Sensation255III.Sleep and Waking263IV.Relation of Sensations to an External World267V.An Idealist Hypothesis273VI.Is the External and Immediate Cause of Sensations a Free Cause?276VII.Analysis of the Objectiveness of Sensations279VIII.Sensation of Extension283IX.Objectiveness of the Sensation of Extension287X.Force of Touch to make Sensations Objective293XI.Inferiority of Touch compared with other Senses296XII.Can Sight alone give us the Idea of a Surface?302XIII.Cheselden's Blind Man310XIV.Can Sight give us the Idea of a Solid?315XV.Sight and Motion319XVI.Possibility of other Senses324XVII.Existence of New Senses328XVIII.Solution of Lamennais' Objection333BOOK THIRD.EXTENSION AND SPACE.I.Extension Inseparable from the Idea of Body339II.Extension not Perceptible as the Direct and Immediate Object of Sensations345III.Scientific Fruitfulness of the Idea of Extension348IV.Reality of Extension357V.Geometrical Exactness Realized in Nature360VI.Remarks on Extension365VII.Space.—Nothing369VIII.Descartes and Leibnitz on Space375IX.Opinion of those who attribute to Space a Nature distinct from Bodies380X.Opinion of those who hold Space to be the Immensity of God382XI.Fenelon's Opinion386XII.What Space consists in391XIII.New Difficulties396XIV.Another Important Consequence400XV.Illusion of Fixed Points in Space403XVI.Observations on Kant's Opinion407XVII.Inability of Kant's Doctrine to solve the Problem of thePossibility of Experience415XVIII.The Problem of Sensible Experience418XIX.Extension abstracted from Phenomena421XX.Are there Absolute Magnitudes?427XXI.Pure Intelligibility of the Extended World432XXII.Infinite Divisibility436XXIII.Unextended Points439XXIV.A Conjecture on the Transcendental Notion of Extension442XXV.Harmony of the Real, Phenomenal, and Ideal Orders446XXVI.Character of the Relations of the Real Order to the Phenomenal450XXVII.Whether every Thing must be in some Place452XXVIII.Contingency of Corporeal Relations459XXIX.Solution of two Difficulties462XXX.Passive Sensibility466XXXI.Possibility of a greater Sphere in active Sensibility469XXXII.Possibility of the Penetration of Bodies480XXXIII.A Triumph of Religion in the Field of Philosophy483XXXIV.Conclusion and Summing up489Notes to Book First495Note to Book Second514Notes to Book Third517