RELATION OF THE PROPOSITION, I THINK, TO THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE ME.
35. The proposition,I think, can have no sense unless we admit that the soul is a substance. Philosophy loses its resting-point, and all that experience within us is a series of unconnected phenomena, incapable of being observed, or subjected to any rule.
36. My present thought is not individually my thought of yesterday, as my thought of to-morrow will not be my thought of to-day. These thoughts, considered in themselves and abstracted from a subject in which they are found, have no connection with one another: perhaps their objects are without any relation to each other, or even contradictory; perhaps the thought of to-day is the denial of the thought of yesterday.
37. The same is true of all thoughts, all acts of the will, of all sentiments, imaginary representations, and sensations, and, in general, of all that I experience within myself. Turning my attention to all internal affections, whatever they may be, I see in them only a series of phenomena, a sort of current of existences passing away and disappearing, some never to return, others to reappear at a different time,expresslypresenting this difference. The reappearance is not individual, but similar: the affection which is repeated is not the same, but another resembling it. When the affection returns, I am conscious of its presence at the time, and conscious of its presence at a previous time; this double consciousness constitutes recollection, makes me distinguish between the two affections, and necessarily implies the judgment that one is not the other. There would be no recollection, if the affectionrecallingwere identified with the affectionrecalled. A thingpresentsitself, but does notrecallitself.
38. Therefore every thing passes away within us never to return, the disappearance is real, the reappearance but apparent; that which ceases to be can never return to be again; there may be a similar thing, but not the same; that which was, is passed, and time does not retrace its steps.
39. Therefore, the series of internal phenomena, considered in themselves and abstracted from the subject in whichthey reside, are necessarily unconnected, and there is no way of subordinating the terms of the series to any law, or connecting link.
40. Still this law exists in all our intellectual acts; reason, without laws which govern it, would be the greatest of absurdities; this link is found in all our affections. That they pass from us with their distinction and difference and resemblance is a fact of our mind, to which we are subjected, as to a primitive and inevitable condition of our existence.
41. The proposition,I think, in the sense in which the wordthinkincludes all internal affections, does not relate to isolated phenomena alone, but it necessarily implies a point, which we call theme, in which these phenomena are connected. If this point does not exist, if it is not one and identical, the thought of to-day can have no connection with the thought of yesterday: they are two distinct things, at different times, and perhaps contradictory: when I say to-day,I think, and mean that theIis the same as in the proposition,I thought yesterday, my language would be absurd; if they are mere phenomena, two thoughts without any connecting link, themeis nothing, I cannot say,I thought, I think; but I must saythere wasthought,there isthought. If, then, you ask me,where? in whom?I must reply, that there is nowhere, nowho; I must deny the supposition, and confine myself to repeating,there wasthought,there isthought.
42. To sayme, it is necessary to suppose a permanent reality; a reality, because that which is not real is nothing; permanent, because that which passes away disappears, ceases to be, and cannot serve as the point to unite other things.