THE PRINCIPLE OF PRECEDENCY.
62. The transition from not-being to being implies succession: to conceive that something begins, we must conceive that something did not exist. The series
not-A, A,
has no sense if either term is wanting; and these terms, inasmuch as they are contradictory, cannot exist at the same time.
63. Let us imagine absolute nothingness. The first term, not-A, stands alone. All existence is denied: nothing can be affirmed without contradicting the supposition. Then there is no time; for time being only the succession of things, or of being and not-being,[77]cannot exist when there is nothing which can succeed. If we suppose any thing to begin, we establish the series not-A, A; in which case we imagine two different instants M and N, to which the terms of the series respectively correspond in this manner:
not-A .. A.M .... N.
It may be said with truth: M is not N. What is the meaning of this proposition? Since time and duration ingeneral is not distinct from the things that endure[78], N can only represent the existence of A, in relation to not-A; M in the same manner can represent only not-A, in relation to A. Hence the conception of A, in so far as it begins, contains the relation to not-A, without which it could not be conceived asbegun.
64. What we have explained is conceivable on the supposition at least of one intelligence; because this intelligence would refer not-A and A to their proper duration, successively, if this duration were successive like ours; in some other way, if this duration were not successive. But if there is absolutely nothing, the series, not-A ... A, is inconceivable, since the relation of A, in so far as it begins, has no real or conceived term of comparison, unless we imagine a pure time, entirely empty, in which we suppose the terms of the series to be placed.
65. Thus it seems that by the mere fact of thinking A, in so far as begun, we think also a preceding existence, because there is no beginning unless not-A preceded A; and this precedence means nothing unless there is an existence to which it relates, either as to a successive series, or as to an immutable duration.
66. If A must be preceded by an existence B, then nothing can begin independently of a preceding existence, or unless something already exists; or the simple conception of succession implies the necessity of somethingalwaysexisting, in order that something may begin.
67. As duration is nothing distinct from things, the two terms of the series, B, A, of which one precedes the other, cannot be placed in an absolute duration distinct from the things themselves, as in two distinct instants, independently of the things. The relation, then, which existsbetween B and A is not a relation of one instant to another, since the instants in themselves are nothing, but of one thing to another. Therefore A, inasmuch as it begins, has a necessary relation to B. Therefore B is the necessary condition of the existence of A. Therefore it is demonstrated that every being which begins, depends on an existent being.
68. This demonstration, though differently developed, is found in the works of Baron Pascual Galuppi, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Naples;[79]and although it is impossible to deny that it is very profound, still it does not leave the understanding wholly satisfied. These are the words of the Italian philosopher:
"Is the proposition: there is no effect without a cause, an identical proposition? I have demonstrated its identity in this manner: whatever has a beginning of existence must have been preceded either by an empty time or by a being; because otherwise the thing of which we are speaking would be the first existence, and the first letter of the alphabet of beings, and it could not be said that it begins to be, for the notion ofbeginning of existenceimplies a priority in relation to the being which begins. These two notions,existence begun, andexistence preceded by another, are then identical; but is it possible for an existence to be preceded by an empty time? I have proved that an empty duration is a chimera, a product of the imagination, without any reality. The development of this proof, which I shall not give in this place, may be found in myEssays on the Critique of Knowledge. I have there established that time is nothing else than thenumber of productions. Aristotle said that time was thenumber of motion. Therefore anexistence begun is an existence preceded by another existence.This proposition is identical; but how can an existence be preceded by another? Is that which precedes, perchance, found in an instant of time prior to that in which that which is preceded is found? Then we fall again into the doctrine of a time distinct from existent things. Thus we must admit that the existence which precedes is such as to make the existence precededexistence begun. It is not begun because it is preceded; thepriorityof the existence which precedes, is a priority ofnature, an objective priority, which makes the beginning of the existence which is preceded; it is therefore theefficient causeof this existence. Thus the great principle of causality stands invincibly demonstrated,—it is an identical proposition."
69. I say again that this demonstration does not leave one wholly satisfied; not because it is not conclusive in itself, but because it needs greater development. The nerve of the proof is in the impossibility of conceiving abeginning, without conceiving something pre-existent; or to conceive precedency, without the relation of that which begins to that which pre-exists. It is not easy to conceive how from this may be inferred the intrinsic dependence of the things; and founding the argument upon so difficult an idea as that of time, greatly increases the doubt.
70. Let us suppose the world to exist, and something to begin now. Precedence is then conceived without dependence. This, in fact, happens continually; since beings are continually beginning which are preceded by others on which they do not depend. It may be said that they do not depend on all those which precede them, but still they depend on one of them. This is precisely what is to be proved. In order to prove that the principle of causality is demonstrated by the mere idea of the order of duration, it is necessary to prove that the relation of precedence is a relation of dependence. That which begins supposes something: certainly; but it remains to be proved that it depends on this thing as on something producing it, and not only as on a condition which makes the conception of beginning possible for us. Until it is proved that theactionof a being is indispensable for the transition from not-being to being, the principle of causality does not seem to be proved, but only that of precedency; and as the order of things in duration, as priority and posteriority, can represent no other dependence than that of pure succession, it would follow that if we should confine ourselves to precedency, we should not prove that every thing that begins must depend on another, but that every thing that begins must succeed another; this last is not the principle of causality, but of succession.
71. We will make these ideas clearer. The difficulty raised against the former demonstration will be better understood, if we observe that those who reject the principle of causality, do not conceive it impossible foranything to begin atanymoment without any cause. Let us represent the successive beings of the universe by the series ... A, B, C, D, E, ... and the times in which they exist, by the series ...a,b,c,d,e.... According to the demonstration which we are examining, no term could have begun, unless another had preceded it; wherefore, Dbegunmeans the same as Dpreceded. Therefore D has a necessary relation to C, because the instantsdandcare nothing in themselves, as distinguished from D and C.
Any one who does not admit the principle of causality will say that D may begin without any dependence on C; and that in order that the conception of beginning may be possible, it is only necessary that there shouldalwayshave been something existing, although the termsprecedingand thoseprecededhave no relation to each other. Thus as the order of beings is represented by the series ... A, B,C, D, E, ... another series ... M, N, P, Q, R, ... may be imagined, to both of which the series ...a,b,c,d,e, ... corresponds. Then D may begin without anynecessarydependence on C, for it is sufficient that P pre-exists at the instantc, in order to make the conception of beginning possible for us; in which case, D will have nonecessaryrelation, either to C or to P; since the precedence of either is sufficient. And as it is evident that what we have said of C and P may be said of any other terms of these or other series, it follows that the demonstration only leads us to the necessity of conceiving somethingpre-existent; and this only in order to make the conception of a beginning possible. If to this we add the peculiar difficulty proceeding from the nature of the ideas of time and of all duration, I think we must conclude that the demonstration is not so satisfactory as might be desired. Those who have not examined the idea of time very profoundly will scarcely understand the meaning of the proof; the others will see the contradiction involved in an absolute beginning demonstrated, and therefore the necessity of something having beenalwaysexisting; but not the intrinsic dependence implied in the relation of an effect to a cause. These difficulties render a more rigorous and profound examination necessary.
72. The principle of precedency leads us to an important result. Our understanding conceives absolutely an external existence; since it is impossible for it to conceive an absolute beginning without a preceding being.
73. The conception of absolute nothing is impossible. I. Because this conception would be entirely void, or rather, the absence of all conception. We conceive negation relatively to an existence,[80]but not absolutely. II. Because aconception is not possible without consciousness, and consciousness implies the idea of a being, of something, and this is contradictory of absolute nothing.
74. Unable to conceive absolute nothing, we always conceive something existing; and since, as we have demonstrated, we cannot conceive an absolute beginning, it follows that we cannot think without our thought implying an eternal existence.
How luminous a truth! What reflections it inspires! Let us continue to meditate on it.
75. Hence the necessity of thinking the necessary and eternal is a primitive fact of our mind, and the confusion which we feel in thinking on duration in the abstract, and the inclination to imagine time before the world existed, arise from the necessity of conceiving the eternal,—a necessity, from which our mind cannot emancipate itself so long as it thinks.
76. The basis of the principle of contradiction, the idea of being, is found in our conceptions in an absolute manner; its opposite, the conception of not-being is found only in relation to the contingent, and is a sort of condition implied by contingency.
77. Every thing contingent includes some not-being, so far as contingent it cannot be, and therefore its not-being is at least in the order of possibility. But these transitions from not-being to being are not even conceivable without presupposing something existing, necessary, and eternal.
78. Thus in our ideas we find being as absolute, and not-being only as relative; and we can conceive being which has proceeded from not-being, or has begun, only in relation to an absolute being.
79. This relation considered objectively does not seem at first sight to be the relation of causality, but only of succession; but it presents a subjective fact which brings usto the knowledge of the objective truth. Our conceptions of not-being and being are connected in such sort that we cannot conceive the transition from not-being to being without conceiving a pre-existent being: here we find a reflex of objective causality which is revealed to us in subjective facts. Duration, as distinct from things, is a pure imagination; the relation of durations is therefore a relation of beings. True, in this relation of durations we discover only succession, and not intrinsic dependence; but this dependence, though not known intuitively, is represented in the very connection in which we conceive beings in duration. It is certain that we can imagine different series; but that of time is a pure imagination in so far as we conceive it distinct from others. If the series of times disappears, there remains only the series of things: the relation between the terms will be the relation between the things; and what is called the dependence ofsuccessionwill be the dependence ofreality. The real relation of that which passes from not-being to being, with that which is absolutely, is a dependence of causality.
80. Let us imagine any series of realities. A, B, C, D, E, ... M, N, P, Q, R....
The series of timesa,b,c,d,e, in so far as distinct from the others, means nothing. In this case it may be eliminated, and all the relations of some of the terms on others will be relations of things, not of time.
Now, it has been demonstrated that a term, D, for example, cannot be conceived as passing from not-being to being, or as beginning, without a relation, and it has been shown that this relation is a real relation of D to any of the terms. It has been objected that D, in order to begin, requires only a term which would make the conception of priority, and consequently, of beginning, possible, which term might be sought in another distinct series; but this is really only tochange a name; for, if the term which is necessary for the beginning is found in another series, the cause is found in it also, for in it is found that which is necessary for the effect.
81. All the terms begun presuppose another, either one or more, for we here abstract their unity; therefore we must come at last to one or more terms not begun. Those which have begun could not have begun without the existence of those which have not begun; therefore the existence of these is necessary for the existence of those. Therefore the existence of these last contains the reasons of the beginning of the existence of the others; therefore they contain true causality.
82. The difficulties opposed to this demonstration arise from inadvertently violating the supposition by attributing to duration an existence distinct from the beings. In order to perceive the whole force of the proof, it is necessary to eliminate entirely the imaginary conception of pure duration: and then it will be seen that the dependence represented as the relation of duration is the dependence of the beings themselves,—a dependence which represents nothing else than the relation expressed by the principle of causality.
83. After completely eliminating the conception of pure duration as a thing distinct from the beings, there remains only the transition from not-being to being as all that is expressed by the word, beginning. In this case we find that the principle of precedency is the same as the principle of causality; and as we have had to abstract entirely duration in itself in order to solve the difficulties, we find that if the principle of causality is to be placed beyond all doubt, and to be regarded as an axiom, it can only rest on the contradiction between not-being and being, or the impossibility of conceiving a being which suddenly makes itsappearance, without any thing more than a pure not-being preceding it.
84. Thus, after examining the question on every side, we come to what we established in the preceding chapters: a not-being cannot arrive at being without the intervention of a being: the series not-A, A, is impossible without the intervention of a being, B. We find it so even in our ideas, and to contradict this truth is to deny our reason.
I believe, then, that the principle of causality is completely explained only in the manner in which we have treated it in the preceding chapters. To begin supposes a not-being of that which begins; and it is impossible and contradictory to deduce being from the conception of not-being. The principle is true subjectively, because it is founded on our ideas; but it is also true objectively, because in these cases objectiveness is necessarily joined with subjectiveness.[81]The being which suddenly appears, without a cause, without a reason, without any thing, is an absurd representation which our intellect rejects as instantly and as strongly as it accepts the principle of contradiction.
As time is the relation of not-being to being—the order of the variable—it is a contradiction to conceive succession without any thing which pre-exists; and thus the principle of precedency confirms the principle of causality; or rather, it shows that the two are one, though presented under different aspects: the principle of precedency relates to duration, that of causality to being; but both of them express an application of the fundamental principle: it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time.