FICHTE'S PANTHEISTIC SYSTEM.
129. I am going to fulfil a promise made in the beginning of this work,[51]to explain and refute the system of Fichte. We have seen the cabalistic forms employed by the German philosopher to obtain a simple result, which amounted to neither more nor less than Descartes' principle, "I think, therefore, I am." The reader could never imagine that any one should attempt to found pantheism on this fact of consciousness, and that the human mind, because it finds itself, should have the arrogance to maintain that nothing exists beside itself, that whatever there is, proceeds from itself, and what is still more extraordinary, that it is itself produced by itself. In order to believe that such things have been written we have to see them, and therefore in explaining Fichte's system, I shall copy his own words.
Thus, although he may suffer a little from the foreign garb, and the reader may be fatigued with deciphering enigmas, he will have an idea of the matter and of the form of the system, which he could not have, if we should take from the philosopher his extravagant originality, which, however, relates to the form, rather than to the substance.
130. "This act, namely X = I am, is founded on no higher principle."[52]
This is true to a certain extent, inasmuch as it affirms that in the series of the facts of consciousness, we come to our own existence as the last limit, and can go no farther. The reflex act, by which we perceive our existence, is expressed by the proposition,I am, or,I exist; but this proposition by itself alone, tells us nothing as to the nature of theme, and is very far from proving our absolute independence. On the contrary, from the moment that we begin to reflect, internal facts are presented to us which incline us to believe that our being is dependent on another; and in proportion as we continue to reflect, we acquire a deep conviction of this truth, arising from a rigorous demonstration.
In no way can we affirm that the act,I am, does not depend on any higher principle, if we mean by that, that the act does not spring from anyprinciple of action, and that by itself alone, it produces existence. Besides plainly contradicting common sense, this assertion is without any proof, and is also opposed to the most fundamental notions of sound philosophy.
131. Fichte thinks differently, and without knowing why, he deduces from the above propositions these consequences: "Therefore it (the act, X =I am) issupposed absolutely, andfounded on itself, as the principleof a certain(and, as will be seen by the wholeDoctrine of Science,of every) act of the human mind, consequently, also of its pure character,—the pure character of activity in itself, abstractedfrom its particular empirical conditions." It is no great discovery that the character ofactisactivity; but this character is notpure, since in us no act is pure activity, but it is always a particular exercise of activity.
"Consequently," he continues, "the supposition of themeby itself is its pure activity. Theme supposes itself, and itis, in virtue of this mere supposition by itself; and on the other hand, theme isand itsupposesits being, by virtue of its mere being. It is at the same time the acting, and the product of the act; the active, and that which is brought about by the activity; act and fact are one and precisely the same thing; and, therefore,I amis the expression of an act, and also of the only one possible, as must be seen from the wholeDoctrine of Science."
He that can, may understand what is the meaning of a being which is at the same time producing and produced, principle and term of the same action, cause and effect of the same thing. He that can, may understand the meaning of existing in virtue of a mere action, and exercising this action in virtue of existence. If these be not contradictions, I know not what is. In God, who is infinite being, essence, existence, and action are identical; but we cannot say that the actionproduceshis being, that hesupposeshimself by his action; we say that he exists necessarily, and that it is therefore impossible that he should have been produced, that he should have passed from not-being to being.
132. There occurs to me here a rational explanation of Fichte's language, an explanation which even if admissible would not excuse the philosopher for expressing very simple things in contradictory terms. However, it is this. The soul is an activity; its essence consists in thought, by which it is manifested to its own eyes, and finds itself in the act of consciousness. In this sense we may say that the soul supposes itself, that is, knows itself, takes itself as subject of a proposition to which it applies the predicate of existence. The soul is the principle of its act of consciousness; and thus it is productive; it is also presented in the act of consciousness as object, hence it may also be said, though inexactly, that in the ideal order it is produced; in this way it is the principle and the term of the action, but under different respects. This explanation, whether more or less founded, is at least reasonable and even intelligible, and the basis on which it rests, that the essence of the soul consists in thought, has the name of Descartes in its favor. Thus although we do not defend the words of Fichte, we might at least defend his ideas. But unfortunately, the philosopher has taken good care to prevent even this; his words could not have been more opposed to it.
"We now consider once more," he says, "the proposition:me is me.
"Themeis supposed absolutely. If it is admitted that themewhich in the above proposition stands in the place of the formal subject is theme supposed absolutely; and that in the place of the predicate means theexisting me; it is expressed in the judgment which is absolutely valid, that both are completely one, or supposed absolutely; that themeis,becauseit has supposed itself."
Every judgment implies identity of the predicate and the subject; but in the proposition:meisme, the identity is not only implied but explicitly asserted; for which reason, the proposition belongs to the class of what are termed identical propositions, because its predicate explains nothing concerning the idea of the subject, but only repeats it. Whence then does Fichte deduce that themeexists because it has supposed itself? So far we have only themesaying:me is me; it affirms itself and thussupposesitself as subject and predicate of a proposition: but it is clearer than day-lightthat tosuppose by affirmingis altogether different fromsupposing by producing: on the contrary, common sense and reason alike teach that the existence of the thing affirmed is necessary to the legitimacy of the affirmation. To confound these two ideas, to consider it the same thing toaffirmas tosuppose by producing, is an inconceivable absurdity.[53]
133. Explaining this in a note, Fichte adds what follows: "It is also certainly so according to the logical form of every proposition. In the proposition A = A, the first A is that which is supposed in themeeither absolutely as themeitself, or on any other ground as every determinednot-me. In this case themerepresents the absolute subject, and hence the first A is called the subject. The second A denotes what theme, which takes itself as the object of reflection, finds assupposedin itself because it has first supposed it in itself. The judgingmepredicates something, not properly of A, but of itself, namely, that it finds an A in itself; and hence the second A is called the predicate. So in the proposition: A = B, A denotes that which is supposed now; B that which is found already supposed.Itrepresents the transition of themefrom the act of supposing to the reflection on that which is supposed."
What does Fichte mean by this comparison of ideas and of language? Does he mean that in this proposition themeis subject and predicate according to the different aspects under which it is considered? Does he mean that theme, in so far as it occupies the place of subject, expresses simplyexistence, and that as predicate it is presented as an object of reflection? What does he mean by the wordsuppose? If he means by it to produce, how is it possible for a thing which is not to produce itself? If he means by it the manifestation of itself, so that the object manifested may serve as the logical term of a proposition, why does he tell us that themeexists because it supposes itself? But let us follow the German philosopher in his wandering deductions.
134. "Themein the first acceptation and that in the second must be absolutely the same. We can therefore invert the above proposition and say: themesupposes itself, absolutelybecauseit is. Itsupposesitself by its mere being, andisby its mere supposition."
Without defining the sense of the wordsuppose, without saying any thing more than what all the world knows; that themeis theme; he infers that themeexists because it supposes itself, and supposes itself because it exists: he identifies existence with supposition without even noticing that at least some preliminary remarks were necessary before placing himself in direct opposition with common sense and the doctrines of all philosophers, including Descartes, who make existence necessary for action, and regard it as a contradiction for a thing to be active without existing. Leibnitz thought that there was nothing and could be nothing without a sufficient reason; but thanks to the author of theDoctrine of Science, we may henceforth people the world at pleasure with finite or infinite beings, and if asked whence they came, we may answer that they have been supposed; if we are further asked why they have been supposed, we may answer; because they exist; and if still again asked why they exist, we may say, because they have been supposed; thus we may pass from supposition to existence, and from existence to supposition, without any danger of refutation.
135. Although this philosophy is any thing but clear, it seems to have satisfied its author, who goes on with admirable gravity to say: "Thus, then, it isperfectly clearin what sense we here use the wordme, and we are led to a determinate explanation of themeas absolute subject.Every thing whose being (existence) consists solely in its supposing itself as being, is theme, as absolute subject. So far as itsupposesitself, itis; and so far as itis, itsupposesitself; and themeis therefore absolute and necessary for theme. That which is not for itself is nome." Ideal pantheism could not be established more explicitly, and at the same time more gratuitously; one is astonished to find one's self seriously occupied with such extravagances. They have made a noise, because they have not been known; they ought therefore to be presented to the reader as they are, even at the risk of fatiguing him.
136. Fichte tries to make his ideas clearer, but we may be always sure that each explanation will add to their obscurity. Let us permit him to continue:
"Explanation! One often hears the question asked,whatwas I before I came to the consciousness of myself? The natural answer to this is:Iwas nothing at all; for I was not theme. Themeis only in so far as it is conscious of itself. The possibility of this question is founded on a confusion of themeassubject, and themeasobjectof the reflection of the absolute subject, and is entirely inadmissible. Themerepresents itself, takes itself so far under the form of the representation, and is now for the first timesomething, an object; consciousness receives under this form a substratum whichis, and although without actual consciousness, is here thought corporeally. Such a case is considered, and it is asked: what was then theme; that is, whatis the substratum of consciousness? But even then we think theabsolute subjectas that which has intuition of this substratum,together with it, although we do not take note of it; we also, without taking note of it, at the same time think that which we pretended to abstract, and thus fall into a contradiction. We can think absolutely nothing without at the same time thinking themeas conscious of of itself; we can never abstract our own consciousness: hence all questions of this kind are unanswerable; for they would be, if well understood, unaskable."
That themedid not exist as the object of its reflection before it had consciousness of itself, is an evident truth; before thinking itself, it does not think itself; who ever doubted it? But the difficulty is, whether themeis any thing, independently of its own reflections or its objectiveness in relation to itself; that is, whether there is in themeany thing more than the being thought by itself. The question is not contradictory, but it is one which naturally presents itself to reason and to common sense; for reason as well as common sense resist the taking as identical, that which exists, and that which is known; that which knows itself, and that which produces itself. We are not now examining whether we have or have not a clear idea of thesubstratumof consciousness; but it is curious to hear the German philosopher remark that when we do not conceive themeas the object of reflection, we conceive it under a bodily form. This is to confound imagination with ideas, things, as I have elsewhere[54]shown, which are very different.
137. It follows from Fichte's doctrine that the existence of themeconsists in its supposing itself by means of consciousness; and that if consciousness should not exist, themewould not exist. In this case to be and to be knownare the same thing. Although I might ask Fichte for his proofs of so extravagant an assertion, I shall confine myself to insisting on the difficulty which he proposes, and which he only eludes by a confusion of ideas. What would themebe, if it were not conscious of itself? If to exist is to have consciousness, when there is no consciousness there is no existence. Fichte answers that themewithout consciousness is not theme, in which case, it does not exist; but that the question rests on an impossible supposition, the abstraction of consciousness. "We can think absolutely nothing," he says, "without at the same time thinking themeas conscious of itself; we can never abstract our own consciousness." I say again; these words do not solve the difficulty; they only elude it. I pass over his assertion that consciousness is the same as existence: but it is certain that we conceive an instant in which themeis not conscious of itself. Has this conception never been realized? Has there, or has there not, been an instant in which themewas not conscious of itself? If we admit this instant, we must admit that at this instant themedid not exist; therefore it never could have existed, unless Fichte will concede that themedepends on a superior being, and thus admit the doctrine of creation. If we do not admit this instant, themehas always existed, and with the consciousness of itself; therefore themeis an eternal and immutable intelligence; it is God. There is no way for Fichte to escape this dilemma. There is no room here for the distinction between themeas subject and themeas object: we are speaking of themeas having consciousness of itself,—that consciousness in which Fichte makes its existence consist,—and we ask whether thismehas always existed or not; if the first, themeis God; if the second, you must either acknowledge creation, or hold that a being which does not exist can give itself existence.
138. Fichte does not retreat from the first consequence, and although he does not callmeGod, he gives it all the attributes of divinity. "If theme," he says, "is only in so far as it supposes itself, it is onlyforthe supposing, and supposes only for being.The me is for the me,—but if it supposes itself absolutely as it is, it supposes itself necessary, and is necessary, for theme.I am only for myself; but I am necessary for myself—(in sayingfor myselfI always suppose my being.)
"To suppose itself, andto be, are, speaking of theme, entirely the same. The proposition: I am, because I have supposed myself, can, therefore, be also expressed in this manner:I am absolutely, because I am.
"Moreover, themewhich supposes itself, and themewhich is, are entirely identical; they are one and the same thing. Themeis for thatwhichit supposes itself; and it supposes itself asthatwhich it is. Therefore,I am absolutely, what I am.
"The immediate expression of the act which we have now developed would be the following formula:I am absolutely, that is,I am absolutely, because I am; and am absolutely, what I am; both for the me.
"But if the enunciation of this act is intended to be placed at the head of a doctrine of science, it should be expressed somewhat in the following manner:The me originally supposes its own being absolutely."[55]
There is only one fact which is clear in all this extravagance of expression; and that is, the pantheism openly professed by Fichte; the deification of theme, and, consequently, the absorption of all reality in theme. Themeceases to be a limited spirit; it is an infinite reality. Fichte does not deny it: "The me determines itself, the absolutetotality of reality is ascribed to theme. Themecan determine itself only as reality, for it is supposed absolutely as reality, and no negation whatever is supposed in it.[56]
"But reality is supposed in theme. Therefore thememust be supposed as theabsolute totalityof reality, (therefore as a quantity, which contains all quantities, and which may be a measure for them all;) and this, too, originally and absolutely, if the synthesis, which we have just explained problematically, be possible, and the contradiction is to be solved in a satisfactory manner. Therefore:
"Themesupposes absolutely, without any foundation, and under no possible condition, theabsolute totality of reality, as a quantity, than which, by virtue of this supposition, none greater is possible; and this absolute maximum of reality it supposesin itself. All that is supposed in themeis reality: and all reality that is, is supposed in theme....
... "The conception of reality is similar to the conception of activity. All reality is supposed in theme, is the same as: All activity is supposed in theme, and reversely; all in themeis reality, is the same as: Themeisonlyactive; it is themeonly in so far as it is active; and in so far as it is not active, it is thenot-me."[57]
"Only in the understanding is there reality; it is the faculty of theactual;init the ideal first becomes real."[58]
"Themeis only that which it supposes itself; it is infinite; that is, it supposes itself infinite....
"Without the infinity of theme,—without a productive faculty whose tendency is unlimited and illimitable,—it is impossible to explain the possibility of representation."