Naturally, my mind dwells happily just now upon our incoming New Army formations. Yet every now and then I feel compelled to look back to regret the lack of systematic flow of drafts and munitions which have turned our fine victory of the 28th into a pyrrhic instead of a fruitful affair. When Pyrrhus gained his battle over the Romans and exclaimed, "One more such victory and I am done in," or words to that effect, he had no organized system of depots behind him from which the bloody gaps in his ranks could be filled. A couple of thousand years have now passed and we are still as unscientific as Pyrrhus. A splendid expeditionary force sails away; invades an Empire, storms the outworks and in doing so knocks itself to bits. Then a second expeditionary force is sent, but that would have been unnecessary had any sort of arrangement been thought out for promptly replacing first wastages in men and in shell.
6th July, 1915.From early morning till 5 p.m. stuck as persistently to my desk as the flies stuckpersistently to me. After tea went riding with Maitland. Then with Pollen to dine on board H.M.S.Triad. The two Territorial Divisions are coming. What with them and the Rooskies we ought to get a move on this time. Discoursed small craft with the Admiral. The French hate the overseas fire—small blame to them—and Bailloud agrees with his predecessor Gouraud in thinking that one man hit in the back from Asia affects themoralof his comrades as badly as half a dozen bowled over by the enemy facing them. The Admiral's idea of landing from Tenedos would help us here, but it is admitted on all hands now that the Turks have pushed on with their Asiatic defences, and it is too much to ask of either the New Army or of the Territorials that they should start off with a terrible landing.
7th July, 1915.No escape from the steadily rising flood of letters and files,—none from the swarms of filthy flies. General Bailloud and Colonel Piépape (Chief of Staff) came across with Major Bertier in a French torpedo boat to see me. They stayed about an hour. Bailloud's main object was to get me to put off the attack planned by General Gouraud for to-morrow. Gouraud has worked out everything, and I greatly hoped in the then state of the Turks the French would have done a very good advance on our right. The arrival of these fresh Turkish Divisions from Adrianople does make a difference. Still, I am sorry the attack is not to come off. Girodon is a heavy loss to Bailloud. Piépape has never been a General Staff Officer before; by training, bentof mind and experience he is an administrator. He is very much depressed by the loss of the 2,000 quarts of wine by the Asiatic shell. Since Gouraud and Girodon have left them the French seem to be less confident. When Bailloud entered our Mess he said, in the presence of four or five young Officers, "If the Asiatic side of the Straits is not held by us within fifteen days our whole force isvoué à la destruction." He meant it as a jest, but when those who prophesy destruction aregros bonnets; big wigs; it needs no miracle to make them come off—I don't mean the wigs but the prophecies. Fortunately, Bailloud soon made a cheerier class of joke and wound up by inviting me to dine with him in an extra chic restaurant at Constantinople.
Have told K. plainly that the employment of an ordinary executive soldier as Boss of so gigantic a business as Mudros is suicidal—no less. Heaven knows K. himself had his work cut out when he ran the communications during his advance upon Khartoum. Heaven knows I myself had a hard enough job when I became responsible for feeding our troops at Chitral, two hundred miles into the heart of the Himalayas from the base at Nowshera. Breaking bulk at every stage—it was heart-breaking. First the railway, then the bullock cart, the camel, the mules—till, at the Larram Pass we got down to the donkey. But here we have to break bulk from big ships to small craft; to send our stuff not to one but to several landings, to run the show with a mixed staff of Naval and Military Officers. No, give me deserts or precipices,—anything fixed and solid is better than this capricious, ever-changing sea. The problem is a real puzzler, demanding experience, energy, good temper as well as the power of entering into the point of view of sailors as well as soldiers, and of being (mentally) in at least three places at once—
"From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener.(No. M.F. 424).
"Private. I am becoming seriously apprehensive about my Lines of Communication and am forced to let you know the state of affairs.
"Much of the time of General Headquarters has been taken up during the last few days considering matters relating to Mudros and Lines of Communication generally. The Inspector-General of Communications must be a man of energy and ideas. The new Divisions will find the Mudros littoral on arrival better prepared for their reception than it was a month ago. The present man is probably excellent in his own line, but he himself in writing doubts his own ability to cope with one of the most complicated situations imaginable. Please do not think for a moment that I am still hankering after Ellison, I only want a man of that type, someone, for instance, like Maxwell or Sir Edward Ward. Unless I can feel confident in the Commandant of my Lines of Communication I shall always be looking behind me. Wallace could remain as Deputy Inspector-General of Communications. Something, however, must be done meanwhile, and I am sending Brigadier-General Hon. H.A. Lawrence, a man of tried businesscapacity and great character, to Mudros to-day as dry-nurse."
I have followed up this cable in my letter to Lord K. of date, where I say, "I have just seen Bertie Lawrence who I am sending to reinforce Wallace. He is bitterly disappointed at losing his Brigade, but there is no help for it. He is a business man of great competence, and I think he ought to be able to do much to get things on to a ship-shape footing. General Douglas is very sorry too and says that Lawrence was one of the best Brigadiers imaginable."
The last sentence has been written, I confess, with a spice of malice. When, about a month ago, I had hurriedly to lay my hands on a Commander for the 127th Brigade, I bethought me of Bertie Lawrence, then G.S.O. to the Yeomanry in Egypt. The thrust of a Lancer and the circumspection of a Banker do not usually harbour in the same skull, but I believed I knew of one exception. So I put Lawrence in. By return King's Messenger came a rap over the knuckles. To promote a dugout to be a Brigadier of Infantry was risky, but to put in a Cavalry dugout as a Brigadier of Infantry was outrageous! Still, I stuck to Lorenzo, and lo and behold! Douglas, the Commander of the East Lancs. Division, is fighting tooth and nail for his paragon Brigadier![26]
Since 19th March we have been asking for bombs—any kind of bombs—and we have not even got answers. Now they offer us some speciality bombs for which France, they say, has no use.
I have replied—
"I shall be most grateful for as many bombs of this and any other kind as you can spare. Anything made of iron and containing high explosive and detonator will be welcome. I should be greatly relieved if a large supply could be sent overland via Marseilles, as the bomb question is growing increasingly urgent. The Turks have an unlimited supply of bombs, and our deficiencies place our troops at a disadvantage both physically and morally and increase our difficulties in holding captured trenches.
"Could you arrange for a weekly consignment of 10,000 to be sent to us regularly?"
De Lisle came over to dine and stay the night.
8th July, 1915. H.M.S. "Triad." Tenedos.Started off in H.M.S.Triadwith Freddie Maitland, Aspinall and our host, the Admiral.
Had a lovely sail to Tenedos where Colonel Nuillion (acting Governor) and Commander Samson, now Commandant of the Flying Camp, came on board. After lunch, rowed ashore. There was some surf on and I jumped short, landing (if suchan expression may pass) in the sea. Wet feet rather refreshing than otherwise on so hot a day. Tenedos is lovely. Each of these islands has its own type of coasts, vegetation and colouring: like rubies and diamonds they are connected yet hardly akin. Climbed Tenedos Hill, our ascent ending in a desperate race for the crest. My long legs and light body enabled me to win despite the weight of age. Very hot, though, and the weight of age has got even less now.
From the top we had an hour's close prospecting of the opposite coasts, where the Turks have done too much digging to make landing anything but a very bloody business. Half a mile to the South looks healthier, but they are sure to have a lot of machine guns there now. The landing would be worse than on the 25th April. Anyway,I am not going to do it.
On the ground we now have a fair showing of aeroplanes, but mostly of the wingless sort. At this precise moment only two are really fit. K. has stuck to his word and is not going to help us here, and I can't grumble as certainly I was forewarned. Had he only followed Neville Usborne's £10,000,000 suggestion, we might now be bombing the Turks' landing places and store depots, as well as spotting every day for our gunners. But these naval airmen, bold fellows, always on for an adventurous attack, are hardly in their element when carrying out the technical gunnery part of our work.
Re-embarked, and during our sail back saw a trawler firing at a submarine, whilst other trawlers and picket boats were skurrying up from all points of the compass. Nets were run out in a jiffy, but I fear the big fish had already given them the slip. Cast anchor about 7 o'clock.
Colonel Dick and Mr. Graives dined.
9th July, 1915.Spent the morning writing for the King's Messenger. My letter to K. (an answer to that of Fitz to me) tells him—
(1) That we have passed through the most promising week since the first landing. The thousand yards' advance on the left and the rows of dead Turks left by the receding tide of their counter-attack are solid evidences to the results of the 28th ult., and of the six very heavy Turkish assaults which have since broken themselves to pieces against us.
(2) That Gouraud's loss almost wipes out our gains. Bailloud does not attack till next week when he hopes to have more men and more ammunition, but will this help us so much if the Turks also have more men and more ammunition?
(3) That the Asiatic guns are giving us worry, but that I hope to knock them out with our own heavy guns (the French 9.4s and our own 9.2s) just being mounted. When the new Monitors come they ought to help us here.
(4) That "power of digestion, sleeping and nerve power are what are essential above all things to anyonewho would command successfully at the Dardanelles. Compared with these qualifications most others are secondary."
(5) That the British and Australians are marvels of endurance, but that I am having to pull the Indian Brigade right out and send them to Imbros. Their Commander, fine soldier though he be, is too old for the post of Brigadier; he ought to be commanding a Division; and the men are morally and physically tired and have lost three-fourths of their officers: with rest they will all of them come round.
(6) That Baldwin's Brigade of the 13th Division have been landed on the Peninsula and are now mixed up by platoons with the 29th Division where they are tumbling to their new conditions quite quickly. They have already created a very good impression at Helles.
Godley and his New Zealander A.D.C. (Lieutenant Rhodes), both old friends, came over from H.M.S.Triadto lunch. Hunter-Weston crossed from Helles to dine and stay the night.
10th July, 1915. Imbros.These Imbros flies actually drink my fountain pen dry! Hunter-Weston left for Helles in the evening.
Yesterday a cable saying there were no men left in England to fill either the 42nd Division or the 52nd. We have already heard that the Naval Division must fade away. Poor old Territorials! The War Office are behaving like an architectwho tries to mend shaky foundations by clapping on another storey to the top of the building. Once upon a time President Lincoln and the Federal States let their matured units starve and thought to balance the account by the dispatch of untried formations. Why go on making these assurances to the B.P. that we have as many men coming in voluntarily as we can use?
Have refused the request made by His Excellency, Weber Pasha, who signs himself Commandant of the Ottoman Forces, to have a five hours' truce for burying their piles of dead. The British Officers who have been out to meet the Turkish parlementaires say that the sight of the Turkish dead lying in thousands just over the crestline where Baikie's guns caught them on the 5th inst. is indeed an astonishing sight. Our Intelligence are clear that the reason the Turks make this request is that they cannot get their men to charge over the corpses of their comrades. Dead Turks are better than barbed wire and so, though on grounds of humanity as well as health, I should like the poor chaps to be decently buried, I find myself forced to say no.
Patrick Shaw Stewart came to see me. I made Peter take his photo. He was on a rat of a pony and sported a long red beard. How his lady friends would laugh!
Fig. 2
FOOTNOTES:[1]Except in a small way at some foreign manœuvres.[2]The letters, cables, etc., published here have either: (a) been submitted to the Dardanelles Commission; or, (b) have been printed by permission.—Ian H.[3]I.e. after the others had come in.—Ian H., 1920.[4]More than four years after this was written a member of a British Commission sent out to collect facts at the Dardanelles was speaking to the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, Djavad Pasha. In the course of the conversation His Excellency said, "I prefer the British to the Germans for they resemble us so closely—the Germans do not. The Germans are good organisers but they do not love fighting for itself as we do—and as you do. Then again, although the Turks and British are so fond of righting they are never ready for it:—in that respect also the resemblance between our nations is extraordinary."—Ian H., 1920.[5]Arrangements.—Ian H., 1920.[6]Since these early days, Birdwood has told me he does not think a scheme of an immediate landing could have been carried out.—Ian H., 1920.[7]Para. 2. "Before any serious undertaking is carried out in the Gallipoli Peninsula all the British military forces detailed for the expedition should be assembled so that their full weight can be thrown in."[8]An Indian word denoting anxious thought.[9]Enemy.[10]Kudos.[11]The 1st Manchesters.[12]This was my original draft; it was slightly condensed for cyphering home.—Ian H., 1920.[13]I wanted very much to get this brave fellow a decoration but we were never able to trace him.—Ian H., 1920.[14]Quoted on pp.62-63.[15]Captured by the Gurkhas five days later—by surprise.—Ian H., 1920.[16]This was by General Hunter-Weston's order: the machine guns of the enemy had too good a field of fire.—Ian. H., 1920.[17]Long afterwards I heard that a responsible naval officer, being determined that this instance of lack of method should be brought to my personal notice, had hit upon the plan of ordering the Fleet-sweeper crew to do what they did.—Ian H., 1920.[18]I learnt afterwards that great play had been made with this third paragraph of my cable by the opponents of the Dardanelles idea; in doing so they slurred over the words "at present," also the fifth paragraph of the same cable, overleaf.—Ian H., 1920.[19]The Fifth Lancs Fusiliers were also working with this Brigade and behaved with great bravery.—Ian H., 1920.[20]See page302.[21]Stated no more Japanese bombs could be supplied.[22]All this was based, be it remembered, upon a complete misconception of the state these two divisions, formerly, good, afterwards destined to become splendid, had been allowed to fall into. No one at the Dardanelles, least of all myself, had an inkling that since I had inspected them late in 1914 and found them good, they had passed into a squeezed-lemon stage of existence and had ceased to be able "to press forward to Chanak." The fact that they were at half strength and that the best of their officers and men had been picked out for the Western theatre was unknown to us at the Dardanelles.—Ian H., 1920.[23]See Appendix I for the exact facts which were not known to me until long afterwards.—Ian H., 1920.[24]The considered opinion proved right.—Ian H., 1920.[25]This period fell between two of my despatches. As most writers have naturally based themselves on those despatches, the full understanding of the blows inflicted on the Turks between June 29th and July 13th has never yet been grasped; nor, it may be added, the effect which would have been produced had the August offensive been undertaken three weeks earlier.—Ian H., 1920.[26]Lawrence never looked back. After his good work at Mudros I put him in to command the 53rd Division, and the War Office made no objection, I suppose because they were beginning to hear about him. As is well known, he went on then from one post to another till he wound up gloriously as Chief of the General Staff on the Western Front.—Ian H., 1920.
[1]Except in a small way at some foreign manœuvres.
[1]Except in a small way at some foreign manœuvres.
[2]The letters, cables, etc., published here have either: (a) been submitted to the Dardanelles Commission; or, (b) have been printed by permission.—Ian H.
[2]The letters, cables, etc., published here have either: (a) been submitted to the Dardanelles Commission; or, (b) have been printed by permission.—Ian H.
[3]I.e. after the others had come in.—Ian H., 1920.
[3]I.e. after the others had come in.—Ian H., 1920.
[4]More than four years after this was written a member of a British Commission sent out to collect facts at the Dardanelles was speaking to the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, Djavad Pasha. In the course of the conversation His Excellency said, "I prefer the British to the Germans for they resemble us so closely—the Germans do not. The Germans are good organisers but they do not love fighting for itself as we do—and as you do. Then again, although the Turks and British are so fond of righting they are never ready for it:—in that respect also the resemblance between our nations is extraordinary."—Ian H., 1920.
[4]More than four years after this was written a member of a British Commission sent out to collect facts at the Dardanelles was speaking to the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, Djavad Pasha. In the course of the conversation His Excellency said, "I prefer the British to the Germans for they resemble us so closely—the Germans do not. The Germans are good organisers but they do not love fighting for itself as we do—and as you do. Then again, although the Turks and British are so fond of righting they are never ready for it:—in that respect also the resemblance between our nations is extraordinary."—Ian H., 1920.
[5]Arrangements.—Ian H., 1920.
[5]Arrangements.—Ian H., 1920.
[6]Since these early days, Birdwood has told me he does not think a scheme of an immediate landing could have been carried out.—Ian H., 1920.
[6]Since these early days, Birdwood has told me he does not think a scheme of an immediate landing could have been carried out.—Ian H., 1920.
[7]Para. 2. "Before any serious undertaking is carried out in the Gallipoli Peninsula all the British military forces detailed for the expedition should be assembled so that their full weight can be thrown in."
[7]Para. 2. "Before any serious undertaking is carried out in the Gallipoli Peninsula all the British military forces detailed for the expedition should be assembled so that their full weight can be thrown in."
[8]An Indian word denoting anxious thought.
[8]An Indian word denoting anxious thought.
[9]Enemy.
[9]Enemy.
[10]Kudos.
[10]Kudos.
[11]The 1st Manchesters.
[11]The 1st Manchesters.
[12]This was my original draft; it was slightly condensed for cyphering home.—Ian H., 1920.
[12]This was my original draft; it was slightly condensed for cyphering home.—Ian H., 1920.
[13]I wanted very much to get this brave fellow a decoration but we were never able to trace him.—Ian H., 1920.
[13]I wanted very much to get this brave fellow a decoration but we were never able to trace him.—Ian H., 1920.
[14]Quoted on pp.62-63.
[14]Quoted on pp.62-63.
[15]Captured by the Gurkhas five days later—by surprise.—Ian H., 1920.
[15]Captured by the Gurkhas five days later—by surprise.—Ian H., 1920.
[16]This was by General Hunter-Weston's order: the machine guns of the enemy had too good a field of fire.—Ian. H., 1920.
[16]This was by General Hunter-Weston's order: the machine guns of the enemy had too good a field of fire.—Ian. H., 1920.
[17]Long afterwards I heard that a responsible naval officer, being determined that this instance of lack of method should be brought to my personal notice, had hit upon the plan of ordering the Fleet-sweeper crew to do what they did.—Ian H., 1920.
[17]Long afterwards I heard that a responsible naval officer, being determined that this instance of lack of method should be brought to my personal notice, had hit upon the plan of ordering the Fleet-sweeper crew to do what they did.—Ian H., 1920.
[18]I learnt afterwards that great play had been made with this third paragraph of my cable by the opponents of the Dardanelles idea; in doing so they slurred over the words "at present," also the fifth paragraph of the same cable, overleaf.—Ian H., 1920.
[18]I learnt afterwards that great play had been made with this third paragraph of my cable by the opponents of the Dardanelles idea; in doing so they slurred over the words "at present," also the fifth paragraph of the same cable, overleaf.—Ian H., 1920.
[19]The Fifth Lancs Fusiliers were also working with this Brigade and behaved with great bravery.—Ian H., 1920.
[19]The Fifth Lancs Fusiliers were also working with this Brigade and behaved with great bravery.—Ian H., 1920.
[20]See page302.
[20]See page302.
[21]Stated no more Japanese bombs could be supplied.
[21]Stated no more Japanese bombs could be supplied.
[22]All this was based, be it remembered, upon a complete misconception of the state these two divisions, formerly, good, afterwards destined to become splendid, had been allowed to fall into. No one at the Dardanelles, least of all myself, had an inkling that since I had inspected them late in 1914 and found them good, they had passed into a squeezed-lemon stage of existence and had ceased to be able "to press forward to Chanak." The fact that they were at half strength and that the best of their officers and men had been picked out for the Western theatre was unknown to us at the Dardanelles.—Ian H., 1920.
[22]All this was based, be it remembered, upon a complete misconception of the state these two divisions, formerly, good, afterwards destined to become splendid, had been allowed to fall into. No one at the Dardanelles, least of all myself, had an inkling that since I had inspected them late in 1914 and found them good, they had passed into a squeezed-lemon stage of existence and had ceased to be able "to press forward to Chanak." The fact that they were at half strength and that the best of their officers and men had been picked out for the Western theatre was unknown to us at the Dardanelles.—Ian H., 1920.
[23]See Appendix I for the exact facts which were not known to me until long afterwards.—Ian H., 1920.
[23]See Appendix I for the exact facts which were not known to me until long afterwards.—Ian H., 1920.
[24]The considered opinion proved right.—Ian H., 1920.
[24]The considered opinion proved right.—Ian H., 1920.
[25]This period fell between two of my despatches. As most writers have naturally based themselves on those despatches, the full understanding of the blows inflicted on the Turks between June 29th and July 13th has never yet been grasped; nor, it may be added, the effect which would have been produced had the August offensive been undertaken three weeks earlier.—Ian H., 1920.
[25]This period fell between two of my despatches. As most writers have naturally based themselves on those despatches, the full understanding of the blows inflicted on the Turks between June 29th and July 13th has never yet been grasped; nor, it may be added, the effect which would have been produced had the August offensive been undertaken three weeks earlier.—Ian H., 1920.
[26]Lawrence never looked back. After his good work at Mudros I put him in to command the 53rd Division, and the War Office made no objection, I suppose because they were beginning to hear about him. As is well known, he went on then from one post to another till he wound up gloriously as Chief of the General Staff on the Western Front.—Ian H., 1920.
[26]Lawrence never looked back. After his good work at Mudros I put him in to command the 53rd Division, and the War Office made no objection, I suppose because they were beginning to hear about him. As is well known, he went on then from one post to another till he wound up gloriously as Chief of the General Staff on the Western Front.—Ian H., 1920.