Strategical Interests of Russia

The Russian groups lay great stress on the strategical interests of Russia. The separation of Latvia, they say, would greatly prejudice these. The frontiers of Russia, afterLatvia’s separation, would strategically be so disadvantageous that it would be difficult to defend them successfully. The former frontiers, with Latvia included, were on the contrary very favourable. Yet Russia did not and could not defend them. There is no doubt that if, in 1914, the Germans had, instead of throwing themselves on France, directed their forces to the East, they would have occupied without much difficulty the whole territory of Latvia; and Russia would have been deprived anyhow of the advantages of strategical frontiers and bases for her fleet. This hypothesis has been fully proved by the events that followed. In the spring of 1915, the German forces, relatively weak, easily succeeded in seizing the South of Courland, with the very important base for their navy at Libau, and took up positions on the River Venta. An attempt was then made to draw the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich, to the necessity of a vigorous defence of Courland in view of her military, political and economic importance. It was then that the Grand Duke, not sharingthe opinion of the Russian groups on the strategical importance of Latvia, made his famous retort, “I don’t give a damn for your Courland!”—words which to-day still resound in the ears of every Lett. And in the summer of 1915, a few German detachments were seen occupying, almost without any resistance on the part of the Russians, the greater part of Courland. It is easy to believe in the little importance of the German forces and in Courland’s weak defence when one learns that mere patrols of cavalry took possession of whole towns almost without firing a shot. Seeing this, two sections of Lettish reservists who had been ordered to retreat, begged to be allowed to defend Mitau, and the permission was granted to them. These heroic soldiers offered to the Germans such a violent and unexpected resistance that the latter hesitated for a long time before coming nearer to the town.

In the autumn of 1915, the front was established on the line of the River Daugava (Dwina). The Russian Political Conference will perhaps say that this is precisely thestrategic line which they contemplate. If that is so, it is fresh proof that in the hands of Russia strategical advantages have no importance. We know from the words publicly pronounced by the commander of an army on the Riga front, Radko-Dmitrieff, that Riga would have fallen in the autumn of 1915 but for the bravery of the Lettish troops, raised, as it is known, by Lettish patriots, after heated argument with the Russian bureaucracy. In the main, it was not the Russians so much as the Letts who defended the Riga front. It is enough to recollect the long siege which they sustained without respite on the “island of death,” near Ixküle, and the famous breach made by them in the German front near Mangoul, a breach which unfortunately led to nothing, owing to the lack of Russian troops to support them. Let us quote the characteristic and significant words spoken by the Kaiser after an inspection of the Riga front: “Riga will fall into my hands like a ripe fruit when eight stars have died out on that front.” He meant by this the eight detachments of the Lettish army.

The 2nd September, 1917, the Germans broke through the Riga front, and at least two Russian divisions would have been made prisoners if it had not been for the stubborn resistance of certain Lettish regiments, which were then annihilated. After this struggle they existed only in name, a glorious name with which the Bolsheviki continued to frighten their Russian adversaries.3

By this we can see that favourable strategical positions, in unskilful hands, become rather a snare than an advantage. The fact is that you cannot get immediate advantage out of a favourable strategical line if you have not the wish, the will, and the capacity to profit by it. Russia lacked both the goodwilland the capacity; they were absent in the Commander-in-Chief as well as in that moujik deserter from Riazan who replied to all exhortations: “Why should I fight? I’m not going to fish in that sea.”

The world-war has proved that patriotic spirit in an army and an understanding of duty are no less indispensable than the technique, favourable positions, etc. Will Russia be able to make her Grand Dukes and moujiks believe that their feeling of duty must extend to the strategic frontiers of the Baltic Sea, in a foreign land? We doubt it. Therefore, Russia’s defence will not be prejudiced if the strategical points aimed towards the West fall into stronger and surer hands than hers.

And the question of Russia’s defence must be examined from another point of view. Against whom is Russia preparing her defence in the West? Against Latvia? It would be a grave insult to Russia to pretend that Latvia, with her two million and a half inhabitants, could dream of an aggressive act against Russia, which, counting only the Great-Russians, possesses 65 million inhabitants.Against Esthonia then, with her million and a half inhabitants? Against Lithuania, with her six million inhabitants? To put these questions is to answer them. Against Poland or Ukraine? But in that case the strategical positions of the Baltic Sea have nothing to do with it. Against a coalition of all these States? This is questionable, for strong and adequate as a defensive coalition of all these States might be regarded, an offensive coalition on their part against Russia is obviously unlikely and futile, for in the latter case there could be neither community of interest nor a common object in aggression.

There remains the hypothesis of M. Mandelstam (Memorandum on the Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations, p. 57), that the territory of Latvia may serve as a very favourable point of disembarkation for armies attacking Russia. If M. Mandelstam has Germany in view as a potential adversary, one can set him at ease by telling him that all the interests of Latvia are directed against Germany, and to suspect her of a future alliance with Germany is simply inadmissible. In thecase of an aggressive tendency on the part of Germany, Latvia will have to defend herself, and one can suppose that she will do it more successfully than Russia, which could not thus be other than much obliged to her, in view of Latvia’s carrying out for her a task which had proved beyond Russia’s power.

Russia’s defence will thus in no way be prejudiced by the shores of the Baltic not being guarded by herself but by a more watchful sentry, of whom one could not expect any aggressive tendency, but who would nevertheless oppose himself, in the name of his own interests, to any aggression coming either from the West or East.

The Lettish people claims the realisation of its natural right to an independent existence and free development. Within the boundaries of Russia this was and will be impossible. Consequently, the Lettish people is right in demanding its constitution as an independent State, and this all the more because the interests of the Russian people will not suffer by it.

It would be possible to end here if the question was merely one of tracing a line of delimitation between the interests of the Russian people and those of the Lettish people. But that is not so—one could not lose sight of a more universal interest. What will be the result of the limits traced between the Lettish people and the Russian people, in the matter of other nations’ interests? A new international dawn will rise when the Paris Conference has established guarantees for the maintenance of peace. Everything must be done to avoid the disasters of a future war.

And precisely from this point of view, voices are heard proclaiming that in the interests of political equilibrium, a strong Russia must be rebuilt, as far as possible within her former frontiers. They even say that if no Russia existed, one must be invented.

Certainly, it is possible to make a primary reply to this opinion by saying that politicalequilibrium is incriminated, and that in its place will come the League of Nations guaranteeing peace and justice for all. The reply is valid. But we are also disposed to agree with those who say that the League of Nations will be formed only in the future and at present it is incapable of fulfilling all the tasks which we await from it. For this reason, if only as a subsidiary factor, one must not lose sight of the problems of political equilibrium.

This equilibrium does not establish the necessity of re-creating Russia as she was before the war, for Russia was in no way a factor powerful enough to support that equilibrium. Knowing Russia’s internal weakness, Germany had no fear in launching the world-war. And during the war Russia’s forces proved insufficient to weigh down the scales of victory on the Allies’ side. On the contrary, during all the time the hostilities lasted,Russia was strategically, as well as politically and economically, the weakest point of the Allies. Finally she left them to the grace of God after having made them a present of the pest of Bolshevism. It is clear that, even in the case of reconstruction in her former boundaries, Russia will not for a long time be in a position to perform the part of an ally and help to maintain the European equilibrium. Russia is ruined; ruined not only by the war, but also, and much more, by Bolshevism; ruined physically, economically and much more morally and intellectually. More than a generation will be required before Russia can count as a factor in European policy. And who will maintain the equilibrium in the meantime?

But even after a long rest and complete external reconstruction, Russia, in the case of serious aggression, will always prove internally to be a considerably weaker factor thanit would be possible to judge of from the outside. That was the case during the Japanese war in 1904-5. And so she was also during the war which has just ended. Russia’s external strength has always been imaginary, for she has always been weak internally. And this is not an accidental, momentary or passing weakness, but a weakness dependent on Russia’s composition and her home-policy. We have already shown that Russia is composed of a series of regions which by their population, history, culture and economic interests are not bound together, but tend in different directions, and are merely held together by perpetual compulsion. By reason of this there will always be a centralised home-policy in Russia, and, consequently, a lot of unsolved and insoluble problems therein; a policy the principal means of which will always be force and compulsion. And as soon as compulsion relaxes, the problems and anomalies artificially kept under come again to the surface and paralyse all the forces of Russia. The history of Russia shows that precisely on account of her internal weaknessand under the threat of revolution, she has been unable to end with success any one of the last wars.

But besides that, as concerns Russia, it will never be possible to tell in which direction she will turn. At the beginning of the last century, allied to Prussia and Austria, she fought against France, and became the inspirer of the Holy Alliance which was directed, in full accord with the character of Russia’s home-policy, against all the rights of peoples. In the middle of the last century, she fought against England, France, and Sardinia, after having secured the neutrality of Austria and Prussia. In 1870, her friendly neutrality gave Prussia the opportunity to crush France. There is something fateful in her traditional friendship with Germany. Behind the back of France, though allied to her, it was towards Germany that Nicholas II. felt himself attracted(see his correspondence with William II., published in Bourtzeff’s paperL’Avenir, 1917), as well as his ministers Sturmer and Protopopoff, unmasked in the speech of P. Miliukoff in the Imperial Douma, in February, 1917; M. Miliukoff himself (Pages Modernes, April number, 1919, page 6); and the Tzar’s General Skoropadsky; and Lenin and Trotsky who signed peace with Germany of the Kaiser and wanted an alliance with Germany of Scheidemann at any cost. At heart, M. Mandelstam also is not too remote from this fatal leaning. He threatens war if the Paris Conference shows itself disposed to recognise the independence of the States detached from Russia (Some Reflections on the Question of a Great Poland and the Shores of the Baltic, p. 10;Memorandum on the Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations, p. 81). With what war and in alliance with whom does M. Mandelstam threaten us?

It is evident that the Russian Political Conference is not free from that fatal inclination. Its representative, M. Sazonoff, former Minister, is revealed by Prince Lichnovskyas ready to abandon France, “Russia’s cherished ally,” to Germany for plunder, on condition that the latter consents to give Russia a free hand in regard to Austria-Hungary.

It is also very interesting to notice that the crusade against the independent States of the Baltic, preached by M. Mandelstam in Paris, is put into execution in Latvia by the armies of General von der Goltz which have upset the legal Government of Latvia recognised by England and Japan. The hand of M. Mandelstam, seeking allies for the crusade against Latvia, has not remained in the air; von der Goltz has grasped it enthusiastically. Future Russia and bygone Germany have met in a common intrigue against independent Latvia. Finland, Esthonia, Lithuania, Ukraine and independent Poland are specks in the eyes of both; and who can guarantee that the points of contact will not increase with the lapse of time?

Russia has been and will be an ally too unsteady to count as a factor of equilibrium in European politics. Moreover, she is a troublesome factor, and likely to become directly or indirectly the instigator of a European war. In 1904, Russia got herself involved in war with Japan, which exhausted all her forces. During a sequence of years, Germany had her hands completely free in the East, and it was certainly not Russia’s balancing forces, but considerations of a quite different nature, which then prevented Germany from falling upon France. On three occasions during the last century Russia’s leanings towards complete possession of the Black Sea have served as causes of war; and in that just ended, Russia’s interests in the Balkans were the motives for aggression on the part of Austria and Germany. With Russia’s reconstitution her leanings towards possession of the Black Sea and particularlythe Straits will necessarily revive; this has already been announced by the “Chairman of the Slav Congress in Moscow and of the Russian Conference in London,” M. Briantchaninoff, with the idea that the mandate of guardianship over the Dardanelles and Constantinople should in all justice be entrusted to nobody but Russia.

M. Briantchaninoff’s opinion is not a mere accident; we have no reason to regard it as such. There is no doubt that, in a reconstituted Russia, by a natural reaction from the humiliations and outrages suffered by the country, the nationalist wave will rise very high. This nationalism will have as its aims those of militant Slavism. One of these aims has always been the orthodox Cross towering over “Haghia-Sophia.” And the Straits were promised to Russia. M. Sazonoff spoke of that in the Imperial Douma amidst a storm of applause. This long-pursued object has escaped from Russian hands thanks only to the microbes which made their way into M. Lenin’s sealed-up carriage. It was almost reached, and it can be reached. It is necessaryto try to reach it. Lenin is already no more. M. Briantchaninoff will be heard with thundering voice; M. Miliukoff will not be able to refuse his help, having shown interest in the Dardanelles during his whole life. M. Sazonoff has in his hands the Allies’ promises, which only for a time fell into the hands of “Comrade” Tchitcherin. Thus the watchword: “To Constantinople!” And that means: “To Belgrade! To Athens! To Bucharest!” and also “To Paris! To London! To Washington!”

From the direction of the Baltic Sea, reconstituted Russia threatens us with another political danger. This danger comes from the strange policy Russia has pursued in the Baltic countries, a policy whose repetition is revealed by many signs. Feeling instinctively her administrative incapacity, Russia thus distinctly shows the effects of the influence of German elements in the staff of her administrators.During all the time of her domination over these countries, she left full power in the hands of the Baltic barons who—except in some accidental and temporary cases—have been the administrators and the real masters of the land. They took great advantage of this situation, endeavouring to give the country a German character. Further, they organised systematic German colonisation, for the realisation of which Berlin put large sums at their disposal. This colonisation took on such vast proportions and was carried on so openly that it finally attracted the attention of the Russian Government itself, which, in order to paralyse its effects, set up Russian colonisation in its turn. The latter, however, led to no results, the Russian peasant not being prepared for the intensive agricultural methods adopted in the country. The feelings and leanings of the Baltic nobility have clearly shown themselves during the war. It is enough to remember that they offered to General Hindenburg a third part of their lands for the purpose of colonisation. Their leanings were in perfect accord with the aims of the Pan-Germans,of whom many were emigrants from the Baltic, and who, like Professor Schiemann and P. Rohrbach, have not been playing an unimportant part. It is extremely interesting to observe that these tendencies have not ceased with the defeat of Germany. It is known that the Germans have promised to Latvia energetic assistance against the Bolsheviki if a right to the land is granted to all the combatants.

It is certain that after the war there will be a surplus of population in Germany, and it is not for nothing that Count Brokdorff-Rantzau complains in one of his notes that it will be difficult to find room for this surplus of inhabitants, as it is probable that the principal States will close their doors to them. There is no doubt whatever that a large part of this excess of population will go over to the Baltic, where they will find land ready for them and will be received with open arms by the Baltic barons of Pan-German mind. The Russian Government, as past experience has proved, will be unable to oppose this freshDrang nach Osten, and if the Lettish people do notpossess enough freedom of action, that is to say, if there is no independent Latvia, one can be supremely sure that German influence will be very great. On the other hand, the resolution of the various Landestags, Landesrats, and Regentschaftsrats, which have asked for the closestrapprochementwith Germany, militarily and economically, and have offered the ducal crown to the Hohenzollern dynasty, leaves no doubt about the direction in which the sympathies of the Baltic Germans will go. The Baltic is, in the hands of Russia, a borderland with predominant German interests, a land to which Germany stretches out her hand, a land always ready, at a moment favourable to Pan-Germanism, to detach itself from Russia and pass over to the side of her adversaries. Thus, to be logical in the matter of the Baltic States, one must decide, not between Russia and Latvia, but between the latter and Germany.

And thus the argument of political motives leads to a conclusion which is not at all to the advantage of Russia’s reconstitution. For the re-establishment of equilibrium in Europeanpolitics, Russia is of no value. She is not, to that end, something which should be invented if she did not exist.4

In order to have an absolutely clear idea of the question, it is still necessary to look at the other side;i.e., to represent to oneself the probable policy of the States detached from Russia. We have already shown that one cannot expect aggression from these States, because of the relative external weakness of them individually. It is equally unimaginable that they should form an aggressive alliance, for one cannot realise a common aggressive aim for all these States. Consequently one cannot expect a violation of peace from their side.

But taking into account their relative weakness, will these States not be subject toenvy and aggression on the part of their stronger neighbours, and will they not in this way, against their will, be the cause of disturbing the peace? It is necessary to envisage this peril, but it is possible to avert it. In this one may rightly rely on the League of Nations in which the small nations put all their hope.

Assuredly, the League of Nations is just now not strong enough; but, in view of the general national exhaustion, one cannot expect, as soon as peace is concluded, aggression against the States which have the authority of the Peace Conference on their side. If aggressive forces gather later, the League of Nations will have had time in the interval to organise itself definitely and to command moral and material strength sufficient to check aggression.

There is another way, too, of guaranteeing the security of the new States: an alliance between them, or at least between those of them which have access to the Baltic Sea; viz., Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and probably White-Russia, an alliancewith many certain chances of development in one direction or another. Assuredly, there are still ancient accounts to be settled between some of these nations, but common and vital interests are so strong that History will be no obstacle in the matter. All these nationalities have always had continual relations with Western civilisation, and there would quickly and easily be formed between them a community of intellectual and moral interests. The economic intercourse between them is also capable of vast development. For instance, Poland can supply all the other States with her coal, and Lithuania can supply the corn which Finland needs. Undoubtedly, there are common interests between all the above-named States in the trade of the Baltic Sea. Each one of them has a naturalHinterland, and, consequently, is vitally interested in the guarantee of freedom of trade in the Baltic Sea. Besides, the mere political interest of common defence is a strong enough basis for an alliance of all the Baltic States, for they are under the double menace of Germany on one side and Russia on the other. All theseStates have experienced in fact the gravity of this menace, and so all will understand the great value of this defensive alliance.

(Command of the Baltic Sea) has been for centuries a bone of contention between the Northern and Eastern States of Europe. For this the Teutons have contended, and Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Denmark, Russia. Germany had the same aim, and before the war had nearly reached it. During the whole of history, every State which acquired strength and authority in the North or East of Europe, evinced this inevitable leaning towards possession of the Baltic Sea, and it was only in the measure of its success in that direction that it could play its part as a Great Power, a rôle which ceased the moment the State was deprived of thatDominium Maris Baltici. To give it again to one of the coastwise States would mean a fresh menace to the peace of Europe; but by putting it into the hands ofthose to whom it belongs by natural right, that is to say, into the common possession of the States surrounding that sea, one would remove one of the causes of probable conflicts in the future of Europe.

For yet another reason the Baltic States, or rather their alliance, will have a great rôle to play—that of a boundary line of economic and political culture between Russia and Germany. This partition—which might be called acordon sanitaire—is absolutely indispensable. Germany’s direct influence on Russia, with no obstacle between them, is a real danger. To the naïve and dreamy soul of the childlike Russian villagers, the extreme sociological theories of the West, born from a very complex economic situation, are a direct temptation and a dangerous poison, as illustrated by M. Lenin’s sealed railway carriage. The teachings of German Social Democracyhave taken such root in Russian soil and have produced such a harvest that it has caused much merriment to the Teuton Field-Marshals; while to Russia it has brought extreme abasement and almost irretrievable disaster.

And this is likely to happen again, everywhere and always, whenever a backward race, neighbour of another highly developed, would fain borrow from the latter and put into immediate operation “the latest advances of civilisation.”

It is the same in regard to economic relations. Germany, deprived of her colonies, and lacking sufficient resources in raw materials and rich markets, will necessarily direct the surplus of her economic energy towards Russia, which will easily become a German colony and submit entirely to German influence. In this respect, Germany had already arrived at considerable results before the war. She will work in the same direction, and after the signing of peace with still greater activity, which will assuredly lead to results hardly desirable from the political point of view. A Russia invaded by capital and technicalforces from Germany, and a Germany with Russian raw materials and Russia’s market at her disposal, will be such great economic powers that each will separately appear a serious menace, and all the more so if in alliance.

But what is more clear and more important is the line of political partition between Germany and Russia. The political security of Europe used to be constantly under the menace of an alliance between Russia and Germany, an alliance which would have radically destroyed the balance of power. This menace was in no way artificial but perfectly real, and might have been realised at any moment. As we have tried to prove, it will inevitably reappear with the reconstitution of Russia. The vanquished two of this great war will not at once submit to their fate; both will be discontented and will cogitate ways of improving their situation. This alone is a sufficient basis for arapprochementor an alliance. Russia will not resist for long the temptation of an alliance with Germany, of which the leaders beyondthe Rhine are already openly talking. Consequently, it is necessary to separate Russia from Germany, that is, to prevent their direct union, and to that end it would be impossible to find a more adequate and easy means than thecordon sanitaireof the States named. Truth to tell, it would be necessary to invent this alliance if it did not force itself into being.

We have arrived at the end of this study and may now summarise.

The question of the organisation of the Lettish people in an independent State must be decided quickly and definitely. The restoration of anything whatever of thestatus quo ante, whetherde facto, temporary or indefinite, would serve no purpose because it would not give to the Lettish people the juridical basis necessary to the reconstruction of a ruined life. This question must be solved independently of the will of the Russianpeople, because, in principle, the idea that the destiny of any people whatsoever depends on the will of another people, is inadmissible; because also it is impossible to foresee when the Russian people will be in a position to make its will freely known. In definitely deciding the destiny of Latvia, it is necessary to reject the project of an All-Russian Federation.

Such a federation is impossible. In accordance with the laws of historical continuity, it is impossible to pass from a centralised State to one of the most complicated and most delicate forms of State organisation. Besides, the peoples of Russia have no such community of intellectual, moral and economic interests as might become the solid foundation of a free co-existence in one and the same State. The All-Russian Federation will either divide itself into different States or change itself into a centralised State in which the natural rights of its different peoples will not be guaranteed. The only just solution of the question of Latvia is the recognition of that country as an independent State.

This is not only the natural right of the Lettish people. It has long been the object of its permanent and definite leanings, and these are in harmony with its well-recognised interests.

The interests of Russia will in no way suffer from the separation of Latvia; neither economically, for Latvia will certainly be a better intermediary between the West and the East than Russia was or would be; nor strategically, for Latvia will be a much more conscientious sentinel on the Baltic Sea than Russia was or would be.

It is impossible for Russia to claim to re-enter her former boundaries on the necessity of European balance of power, for, as a factor of equilibrium, Russia has been found wanting, and one can foresee her future complete submission to the economic and political influence of Germany, as well as to her civilisation.

On the other hand, the interests of a lasting peace demand the creation of a series of independent national States for the peoples inhabiting the shores of the Baltic Sea; and, between them, a defensive alliance for whichthere are sufficient grounds in the shape of common economic, political and intellectual interests. Such an alliance would play at the same time the rôle of the necessary line of demarcation between Russia and Germany. Moreover, it is the only natural solution of the problem of theDominium maris Baltici, which has been an apple of discord for centuries and has often been the disturber of the world’s peace.

TheTemple PressLetchworthENGLAND

Footnotes:1One of the published works of the Russian Political Conference (from the pen of Mandelstam), specially devoted to the question of Poland, has received a well-merited refutation in the brilliant pamphlet of M. H. Grappin (Memorandum on the Application of the Nationalities Principle to the Russian Question).M. Gaston Gaillard, in his bookThe Pan-Russian Movement and the Borderland Peoples, Paris, 1919, gives a remarkable summary, with full documentary evidence, of the aspirations of the borderland peoples of Russia.2P. J. Sahlit,Devastation of Latvia by the Russian Armies, Petrograd, 1917 (in Russian).3As fear has big eyes, even among fearless people like M. Savinkoff, it is believed, for instance, that this latter gentleman has found in the Bolshevik lines two divisions of Lettish Rifles,i.e., 60,000 men (Pages Modernes, No. 1, page 7). If we take into account that many Letts have fought from the beginning in the ranks of the Czeko-Slovaks, in the army of Denikin and in that of the North, and remembering that the Lettish regiments have suffered great losses during the war, one can only ask with amazement where this great number of Lettish youths comes from. No more than 3,500 Letts can be counted among the Bolsheviki, all the rest are a vision inspired by fear.4Details on this point will be found in the pamphlet of Count Jean Tarnovsky,La Menace Allemande et le Péril Russe, Imprimerie Moderne, 17, rue Duler, Biarritz, 1919.

1One of the published works of the Russian Political Conference (from the pen of Mandelstam), specially devoted to the question of Poland, has received a well-merited refutation in the brilliant pamphlet of M. H. Grappin (Memorandum on the Application of the Nationalities Principle to the Russian Question).M. Gaston Gaillard, in his bookThe Pan-Russian Movement and the Borderland Peoples, Paris, 1919, gives a remarkable summary, with full documentary evidence, of the aspirations of the borderland peoples of Russia.

M. Gaston Gaillard, in his bookThe Pan-Russian Movement and the Borderland Peoples, Paris, 1919, gives a remarkable summary, with full documentary evidence, of the aspirations of the borderland peoples of Russia.

2P. J. Sahlit,Devastation of Latvia by the Russian Armies, Petrograd, 1917 (in Russian).

3As fear has big eyes, even among fearless people like M. Savinkoff, it is believed, for instance, that this latter gentleman has found in the Bolshevik lines two divisions of Lettish Rifles,i.e., 60,000 men (Pages Modernes, No. 1, page 7). If we take into account that many Letts have fought from the beginning in the ranks of the Czeko-Slovaks, in the army of Denikin and in that of the North, and remembering that the Lettish regiments have suffered great losses during the war, one can only ask with amazement where this great number of Lettish youths comes from. No more than 3,500 Letts can be counted among the Bolsheviki, all the rest are a vision inspired by fear.

4Details on this point will be found in the pamphlet of Count Jean Tarnovsky,La Menace Allemande et le Péril Russe, Imprimerie Moderne, 17, rue Duler, Biarritz, 1919.

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