FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[1]1st Series of our work,Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne, five volumes.[2]The Appendix has been translated by Mr. N. E. S. A. Hamilton of the British Museum, who is alone entitled to credit and alone responsible.—Tr.[3]We have so much felt the necessity of understanding well the philosophy of the century that ours succeeds, that three times we have undertaken the history of philosophy in the eighteenth century, here first, in 1818, then in 1819 and 1820, and that is the subject of the last three volumes of the 1st Series of our works; finally, we resumed it in 1829, vol. ii. and iii. of the 2d Series.[4]This word was used by the old English writers, and there is no reason why it should not be retained.[5]On the method of Descartes, see 1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 20; 2d Series, vol. i., lecture 2; vol. ii., lecture 11; 3d Series, vol. iii.,Philosophie Moderne, as well asFragments de Philosophie Cartésienne; 5th Series,Instruction Publique, vol. ii.,Défense de l'Université et de la Philosophie, p. 112, etc.[6]On this return to the scholastic form in Descartes, see 1st Series, vol iv., lecture 12, especially three articles of theJournal des Savants, August, September, and October, 1850, in which we have examined anew the principles of Cartesianism,à propostheLeibnitii Animadversiones ad Cartesii Principia Philosophiæ.[7]See on Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, 2d Series, vol. ii., lectures 11 and 12; 3d Series, vol. iv.,Introduction aux Œuvres Philosophiques de M. de Biran, p. 288; and theFragments de Philosophie Cartésienne, passim.[8]On Locke, see 1st Series, vol. iii., lecture 1, especially 2d Series, vol. iii.,Examen du Système de Locke.[9]1st Series, vol. iii., lectures 2 and 3.[10]1st Series, vol. iv., lectures on the Scotch School.[11]See on Kant and theCritique of Pure Reason, vol. v. of the 1st Series, where that great work is examined with as much extent as that of Reid in vol. iv., and theEssayof Locke in vol. iii. of the 2d Series.[12]On Fichte, 2d Series, vol. i., lecture 12; 3d Series, vol. iv.,Introduction aux Œuvres de M. de Biran, p. 324.[13]We expressed ourselves thus in December, 1817, when, following the great wars of the Revolution, and after the downfall of the empire, the constitutional monarchy, still poorly established, left the future of France and of the world obscure. It is sad to be obliged to hold the same language in 1835, over the ruins accumulated around us.[14]1st Series, vol. i., Course of 1816.[15]Ibid., Course of 1817.[16]On the legitimate employment and the imperative conditions of eclecticism, see 3d Series,Fragments Philosophiques, vol. iv., preface of the first edition, p. 41, &c., especially the article entitledDe la Philosophie en Belgique, pp. 228 and 229.[17]We have translated his excellentManual of the History of Philosophy. See the second edition, vol. ii., 8vo., 1839.[18]1st Series of our Course, vol. i.[19]1st Series, vol. i.[20]Ibid.[21]1st Series, vol. i., Fragments of the Course of 1817.[22]See that criticism, 1st Series, vol. v.,Kant, lecture 8.[23]This classification of the human faculties, save some differences more nominal than real, is now generally adopted, and makes the foundation of the psychology of our times. See our writings, among others, 1st Series, Course of 1816, lectures 23 and 24:Histoire du moi; ibid.,Des faits de Conscience; vol. iii., lecture 3,Examen de la Théorie des Facultés dans Condillac; vol. iv., lecture 21,des Facultés selon Reid; vol. v., lecture 8,Examen de la Théorie de Kant; 3d Series, vol iv.,Preface de la Première Edition, Examen des Leçons de M. Laromiguière, Introduction aux Œuvres de M. de Biran, etc.[24]This lecture on the existence of universal and necessary principles, which was easily comprehended, in 1818, by an auditory to which long discussions had already been presented during the two previous years, appearing here without the support of these preliminaries, will not perhaps be entirely satisfactory to the reader. We beseech him to consult carefully the first volume of the 1st Series of our Course, which contains an abridgment, at least, of the numerous lectures of 1816 and 1817, of which this is arésumé; especially to read in the third, fourth, and fifth volumes of the 1st Series, the developed analyses, in which, under different forms, universal and necessary principles are demonstrated as far as may be, and in the third volume of the 2d Series the lectures devoted to establish against Locke the same principles.[25]First Series, vol. iv., lectures 1, 2, and 3.[26]Ibid., vol. iv., etc.[27]Ibid., vol. v., lecture 8.[28]We have everywhere called to mind, maintained, and confirmed by the errors of those who have dared to break it, this rule of true psychological analysis, that, before passing to the question of the origin of an idea, a notion, a belief, any principle whatever, the actual characters of this idea, this notion, this belief, this principle, must have been a long time studied and well established, with the firm resolution of not altering them under any pretext whatever in wishing to explain them. We believe that we have, as Leibnitz says, settled this point. See 1st Series, vol. i., Programme of the Course of 1817, and the Opening Discourse; vol. iii., lecture 1,Locke; lecture 2,Condillac; lecture 3, almost entire, and lecture 8, p. 260; 2d Series, vol. iii.,Examen du Système de Locke, lecture 16, p. 77-87; 3d Series, vol. iv.,Examination of the Lectures of M. Loremquière, p. 268.[29]This theory of spontaneity and of reflection, which in our view is the key to so many difficulties, continually recurs in our works. One may see, vol. i. of the 1st Series, in a programme of the Course of 1817, and in a fragment entitledDe la Spontanéité et de la Réflexion; vol. iv. of the same Series, Examination of Reid's Philosophy,passim; vol. v., Examination of Kant's System, lecture 8; 2d Series, vol. i.,passim; vol. iii., Lectures on Judgment; 3d Series,Fragments Philosophiques, vol. iv., preface of the first edition, p. 37, etc.; it will be found in different lectures of this volume, among others, in the third, On the value of Universal and Necessary Principles; in the fifth, On Mysticism; and in the eleventh, Primary Data of Common Sense.[30]On immediate abstraction and comparative abstraction, see 1st Series, vol. i., Programme of the Course of 1817, and everywhere in our other Courses.[31]On M. de Biran, on his merits and defects, see ourIntroductionat the head of his Works.[32]Seelecture 1.[33]See vol. i. of the 1st Series, course of 1816, and 2d Series, vol. iii., lecture 18, p. 140-146.[34]We have developed this analysis, and elucidated these results in the 17th lecture of vol. ii. of the 2d Series.[35]We have already twice recurred, and more in detail, to the impossibility of legitimately explaining universal and necessary principles by any association or induction whatever, founded upon any particular idea, 2d Series, vol. iii.,Examen du Système de Locke, lecture 19, p. 166; and 3d Series, vol. iv.,Introduction aux Œuvres de M. de Biran, p. 319. We have also made known the opinion of Reid, 1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 22, p. 489. Finally, the profoundest of Reid's disciples, the most enlightened judge that we know of things philosophical, Sir W. Hamilton, professor of logic in the University of Edinburgh, has not hesitated to adopt the conclusions of our discussion, to which he is pleased to refer his readers:—Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, etc., by Sir William Hamilton, London, 1852. Appendix I, p. 588.[36]Œuvres de Reid, vol. iv., p. 435. "When we revolt against primitive facts, we equally misconceive the constitution of our intelligence and the end of philosophy. Is explaining a fact any thing else than deriving it from another fact, and if this kind of explanation is to terminate at all, does it not suppose facts inexplicable? The science of the human mind will have been carried to the highest degree of perfection it can attain, it will be complete, when it shall know how to derive ignorance from the most elevated source."[37]On conceptualism, as well as on nominalism and realism, see theIntroduction to the inedited works of Abelard, and also 1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 21, p. 457; 2d Series, vol. iii., lecture 20, p. 215, and the work already cited on theMetaphysics of Aristotle, p. 49: "Nothing exists in this world which has not its law more general than itself. There is no individual that is not related to a species; there are no phenomena bound together that are not united to a plan. And it is necessary there should really be in nature species and a plan, if every thing has been made with weight and measure,cum pondere et mensura, without which our very ideas of species and a plan would only be chimeras, and human science a systematic illusion. If it is pretended that there are individuals and no species, things in juxtaposition and no plan; for example, human individuals more or less different, and no human type, and a thousand other things of the same sort, well and good; but in that case there is nothing general in the world, except in the human understanding, that is to say, in other terms, the world and nature are destitute of order and reason except in the head of man."[38]See precedinglecture.[39]On the just limits of the personality and the impersonality of reason, see the followinglecture, near the close.[40]We have everywhere maintained, that consciousness is the condition, or rather the necessary form of intelligence. Not to go beyond this volume, see farther on,lecture 5.[41]1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 22, p. 494.[42]Œuvres de Reid, vol. iii., p. 450.[43]We have not thought it best to make this lecture lengthy by an exposition and detailed refutation of theCritique of Pure Reasonand its sad conclusion; the little that we say of it is sufficient for our purpose, which is much less historical than dogmatical. We refer the reader to a volume that we have devoted to the father of German philosophy, 1st Series, vol. v., in which we have again taken up and developed some of the arguments that are here used, in which we believe that we have irresistibly exposed the capital defect of the transcendental logic of Kant, and of the whole German school, that it leads to skepticism, inasmuch as it raises superhuman, chimerical, extravagant problems, and, when well understood, cannot solve them. See especially lectures 6 and 8.[44]See our work entitled,Metaphysics of Aristotle, 2d edition,passim. In Aristotle himself, see especiallyMetaphysics, book vii., chap. xii., and book xiii., chap. ix.[45]There are doubtless many other ways of arriving at God, as we shall successively see; but this is the way of metaphysics. We do not exclude any of the known and accredited proofs of the existence of God; but we begin with that which gives all the others. See further on,part ii.,God, the Principle of Beauty, andpart iii.,God, the Principle of the Good, and the lastlecture, which sums up the whole course.[46]We have said a word on the Platonic theory of ideas, 1st Series, vol. iv., p. 461 and 522. See also, vol. ii. of the 2d Series, lecture 7, onPlato and Aristotle, especially 3d Series, vol. i., a few words on theLanguage of the Theory of Ideas, p. 121; our work on theMetaphysics of Aristotle, p. 48 and 149, and our translation of Plato,passim.[47]Aristotle first stated this; modern peripatetics have repeated it; and after them, all who have wished to decry the ancient philosophy, and philosophy in general, by giving the appearance of absurdity to its most illustrious representative.[48]See particularly p. 121 of theTimaeus, vol. xii. of our translation.[49]Republic, book vi., vol. x. of our translation, p. 57.[50]Republic, book vii., p. 20.[51]Phædrus, vol. vi., p. 51.[52]Phædrus, vol. vi., p. 55.[53]Vol. xi., p. 261.[54]Edit. Bened., vol. vi., p. 17:Idex sunt formæ quædam principales et rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quæ ipsæ formatæ non sunt ac per hoc æternæ ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quæ in divina intelligentia continentur....[55]Edit. Bened., vol. vi., p. 18.Singula igitur propriis creata sunt rationibus. Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse nisi in mente Creatoris? non enim extra se quidquam intuebatur, ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat: nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est.[56]Ibid.See also, book of theConfessions, book ii. of theFree Will, book xii. of theTrinity, book vii. of theCity of God, &c.[57]Summa totius theologiæ. Primæ partis quæst. xii. art. 11.Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnia dicimus in Deo videre, et secundum ipsum de omnibus judicare, in quantum per participationem sui luminis omnia cognoscimus et dijudicamus. Nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis participatio quædam est divini luminis.[58]On the doctrine of Descartes, and on the proof of the existence of God and the true process that he employs, see 1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 12, p. 64, lecture 22, p. 509-518; vol. v., lecture 6, p. 205; 2d Series, vol. xi., lecture 11; especially the three articles, already cited, of theJournal des Savantsfor the year 1850.[59]See on Malebranche, 2d Series, lecture 2, and 3d Series, vol. iii.,Modern Philosophy, as well as theFragments of Cartesian Philosophy; preface of the 1st edition of ourPascal:—"On this basis, so pure, Malebranche is not steady; is excessive and rash, I know; narrow and extreme, I do not fear to say; but always sublime, expressing only one side of Plato, but expressing it in a wholly Christian spirit and in angelic language. Malebranche is a Descartes who strays, having found divine wings, and lost all connection with the earth."[60]We use the only good edition of the treatise on the Existence of God, that which the Abbé Gosselin has given in the collection of theWorks of Fenelon. Versailles, 1820. See vol. i., p. 80.[61]Edit. de Versailles, p. 145.[62]It is not necessary to remark how incorrect are the expressions,representation of the infinite, image of the infinite, especiallyinfinite image of the infinite. We cannot represent to ourselves, we cannot imagine to ourselves the infinite. We conceive the infinite; the infinite is not an object of the imagination, but of the understanding, of reason. See 1st Series, vol. v., lecture 6, p. 223, 224.[63]By a trifling anachronism, for which we shall be pardoned, we have here joined to theTraité de la Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même, so long known, theLogique, which was only published in 1828.[64]4th Series, vol. i., preface of the 1st edition ofPascal: "Bossuet, with more moderation, and supported by a good sense which nothing can shake, is, in his way, a disciple of the same doctrine, only the extremes of which according to his custom, he shunned. This great mind, which may have superiors in invention, but has no equal for force in common sense, was very careful not to place revelation and philosophy in opposition to each other: he found it the safer and truer way to give to each its due, to borrow from philosophy whatever natural light it can give, in order to increase it in turn with the supernatural light, of which the Church has been made the depository. It is in this sovereign good sense, capable of comprehending every thing, and uniting every thing, that resides the supreme originality of Bossuet. He shunned particular opinions as small minds seek them for the triumph of self-love. He did not think of himself; he only searched for truth, and wherever he found it he listened to it, well assured that if the connection between truths of different orders sometimes escapes us, it is no reason for closing the eyes to any truth. If we wished to give a scholastic name to Bossuet, according to the custom of the Middle Age, we would have to call him the infallible doctor. He is not only one of the highest, he is also one of the best and solidest intelligences that ever existed; and this great conciliator has easily reconciled religion and philosophy, St. Augustine and Descartes, tradition and reason."[65]The best, or, rather, only good edition is that which was published from an authentic copy, in 1846, by Lecoffre.[66]These words,d'une certaine manière qui m'est incompréhensible, c'est en lui, dis-je, are not in the first edition of 1722.[67]Leibnitzii Opera, edit. Deutens, vol. ii., p. 17.[68]Ibid., p. 24.[69]1st edition, Amsterdam, 1710, p. 354, edit. of M. de Jaucourt, Amsterdam, 1747, vol. ii., p. 93.[70]We have many times designated these two rocks, for example, 2d Series, vol. i., lecture 5, p. 92:—"One cannot help smiling when, in our times, he hears individual reason spoken against. In truth it is a great waste of declamation, for the reason is not individual; if it were, we should govern it as we govern our resolutions and our volitions, we could at any moment change its acts, that is to say, our conceptions. If these conceptions were merely individual, we should not think of imposing them upon another individual, for to impose our own individual and personal conceptions on another individual, on another person, would be the most extravagant despotism.... We call those mad who do not admit the relations of numbers, the difference between the beautiful and the ugly, the just and the unjust. Why? Because we know that it is not the individual that constitutes these conceptions, or, in other terms, we know that the reason has something universal and absolute, that upon this ground it obligates all individuals; and an individual, at the same time that he knows that he himself is obligated by it, knows that all others are obligated by it on the same ground."—Ibid., p. 93: "Truth misconceived is thereby neither altered nor destroyed; it subsists independently of the reason that perceives it or perceives it ill. Truth in itself is independent of our reason. Its true subject is the universal and absolute reason."[71]See the preceding lectures.[72]See thePhædrusand theBanquet, vol. vii. of our translation.[73]We shall not be accused of perverting the holy Scriptures by these analogies, for we give them only as analogies, and St. Augustine and Bossuet are full of such.[74]See part ii.,The Beautiful,lecture 6, and part iii.,lecture 13, on theMorals of Sentiment. See also ourPascal, preface of the last edition, p. 8, etc., vol. i. of the 4th Series.[75]See the admirable work of Bossuet,Instruction sur les états d'Oraison.[76]Lecture 4.[77]See especially in our writings the regular and detailed refutation of the double extravagance of considering substance apart from its determinations and its qualities, or of considering its qualities and its facilities apart from the being that possesses them. 1st Series, vol. iii., lecture 3,On Condillac, and vol. v., lectures 5 and 6,On Kant. We say, the same Series, vol. iv., p. 56: "There are philosophers beyond the Rhine, who, to appear very profound, are not contented with qualities and phenomena, and aspire to pure substance, to being in itself. The problem stated as follows, is quite insoluble: the knowledge of such a substance is impossible, for this very simple reason, that such a substance does not exist. Being in itself,das Ding in sich, which Kant seeks, escapes him, and this does not humiliate Kant and philosophy; for there is no being in itself. The human mind may form to itself an abstract and general idea of being, but this idea has no real object in nature. All being is determinate, if it is real; and to be determinate is to possess certain modes of being, transitory and accidental, or constant and essential. Knowledge of being in itself is then not merely interdicted to the human mind; it is contrary to the nature of things. At the other extreme of metaphysics is a powerless psychology, which, by fear of a hollow ontology, is condemned to voluntary ignorance. We are not able, say these philosophers, Mr. Dugald Stewart, for example, to attain being in itself; it is permitted us to know only phenomena and qualities: so that, in order not to wander in search of the substance of the soul, they do not dare affirm its spirituality, and devote themselves to the study of its different faculties. Equal error, equal chimera! There are no more qualities without being, than being without qualities. No being is without its determinations, and reciprocally its determinations are not without it. To consider the determinations of being independently of the being which possesses them, is no longer to observe; it is to abstract, to make an abstraction quite as extravagant as that of being considered independently of its qualities."[78]On the school of Alexandria, see 2d Series, vol. ii.,Sketch of a General History of Philosophy, lecture 8, p. 211, and 3d Series, vol. i.,passim.[79]See the previouslecture.[80]3d Series, vol. i.,Ancient Philosophy, articleXenophanes, and articleZeno.[81]The Sophist, vol. xi. of our translation, p. 261.[82]Timæus, vol. xii., p. 117.[83]Republic, book vii., p. 70 of vol. x.[84]Phædrus, vol. vi., p. 55.[85]The Sophist, p. 261, 262. The following little-known and decisive passage, which we have translated for the first time, must be cited:—"Stranger.But what, by Zeus! shall we be so easily persuaded that in reality, motion, life, soul, intelligence, do not belong to absolute being? that this being neither lives nor thinks, that this being remains immobile, immutable, without having part in august and holy intelligence?—Theatetus.That would be consenting, dear Eleatus, to a very strange assertion.—Stranger.Or, indeed, shall we accord to this being intelligence while we refuse him life?—Theatetus.That cannot be.—Stranger.Or, again, shall we say that there is in him intelligence and life, but that it is not in a soul that he possesses them?—Theatetus.And how could he possess them otherwise?—Stranger.In fine, that, endowed with intelligence, soul, and life, all animated as he is, he remains incomplete immobility.—Theatetus.All that seems to me unreasonable."[86]Timæus, p. 119: "Let us say that the cause which led the supreme ordainer to produce and compose this universe was, that he was good."[87]Bouquet, discourse of Diotimus, vol. vi., and the 2d part of this vol.,The Beautiful,lecture 7.[88]Republic.Ibid.[89]Book xii. of theMetaphysics.De la Métaphysique d'Aristotle, 2d edition, p. 200, etc.[90]On this fundamental point, seelecture 3, in this vol.—2d Series, vol. i., lecture 5, p. 97. "The peculiarity of intelligence is not the power of knowing, but knowing in fact. On what condition is there intelligence for us? It is not enough that there should be in us a principle of intelligence; this principle must be developed and exercised, and take itself as the object of its intelligence. The necessary condition of intelligence is consciousness—that is to say, difference. There can be consciousness only where there are several terms, one of which perceives the other, and at the same time perceives itself. That is knowing, and knowing self; that is intelligence. Intelligence without consciousness is the abstract possibility of intelligence, it is not real intelligence. Transfer this from human intelligence to divine intelligence, that is to say, refer ideas, I mean ideas in the sense of Plato, of St. Augustine, of Bossuet, of Leibnitz, to the only intelligence to which they can belong, and you will have, if I may thus express myself, the life of the divine intelligence ..., etc."[91]Vol. ii. of the 2d Series,Sketch of a General History of Philosophy, lectures 5 and 6,On the Indian Philosophy.[92]See theEuthyphron, vol. i. of our translation.[93]Lucien, Apuleius, Lucius of Patras.[94]2d Series, vol. ii.,Sketch of a General History of Philosophy, lecture 10,On the Philosophy of the Renaissance.[95]One was then ardently occupied with magnetism, and more than a magnetizer, half a materialist, half a visionary, pretended to convert us to a system of perfect clairvoyance of soul, obtained by means of artificial sleep. Alas! the same follies are now renewed. Conjunctions are the fashion. Spirits are interrogated, and they respond! Only let there be consciousness that one does not interrogate, and superstition alone counterpoises skepticism.[96]Except the estimableEssay on the Beautiful, by P. André, a disciple of Malebranche, whose life was considerably prolonged into the eighteenth century. On P. André, see 3d Series, vol. iii.,Modern Philosophy, p. 207, 516.[97]See in the works of Diderot,Pensées sur la Sculpture, les Salons, etc.[98]See 1st Series, vol. iv., explained and estimated, the theories of Hutcheson and Reid.[99]The theory of Kant is found in theCritique of Judgment, and in theObservationson theSentiment of the Beautiful and the Sublime. See the excellent translation made by M. Barny, 2 vols., 1846.

[1]1st Series of our work,Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne, five volumes.

[2]The Appendix has been translated by Mr. N. E. S. A. Hamilton of the British Museum, who is alone entitled to credit and alone responsible.—Tr.

[3]We have so much felt the necessity of understanding well the philosophy of the century that ours succeeds, that three times we have undertaken the history of philosophy in the eighteenth century, here first, in 1818, then in 1819 and 1820, and that is the subject of the last three volumes of the 1st Series of our works; finally, we resumed it in 1829, vol. ii. and iii. of the 2d Series.

[4]This word was used by the old English writers, and there is no reason why it should not be retained.

[5]On the method of Descartes, see 1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 20; 2d Series, vol. i., lecture 2; vol. ii., lecture 11; 3d Series, vol. iii.,Philosophie Moderne, as well asFragments de Philosophie Cartésienne; 5th Series,Instruction Publique, vol. ii.,Défense de l'Université et de la Philosophie, p. 112, etc.

[6]On this return to the scholastic form in Descartes, see 1st Series, vol iv., lecture 12, especially three articles of theJournal des Savants, August, September, and October, 1850, in which we have examined anew the principles of Cartesianism,à propostheLeibnitii Animadversiones ad Cartesii Principia Philosophiæ.

[7]See on Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, 2d Series, vol. ii., lectures 11 and 12; 3d Series, vol. iv.,Introduction aux Œuvres Philosophiques de M. de Biran, p. 288; and theFragments de Philosophie Cartésienne, passim.

[8]On Locke, see 1st Series, vol. iii., lecture 1, especially 2d Series, vol. iii.,Examen du Système de Locke.

[9]1st Series, vol. iii., lectures 2 and 3.

[10]1st Series, vol. iv., lectures on the Scotch School.

[11]See on Kant and theCritique of Pure Reason, vol. v. of the 1st Series, where that great work is examined with as much extent as that of Reid in vol. iv., and theEssayof Locke in vol. iii. of the 2d Series.

[12]On Fichte, 2d Series, vol. i., lecture 12; 3d Series, vol. iv.,Introduction aux Œuvres de M. de Biran, p. 324.

[13]We expressed ourselves thus in December, 1817, when, following the great wars of the Revolution, and after the downfall of the empire, the constitutional monarchy, still poorly established, left the future of France and of the world obscure. It is sad to be obliged to hold the same language in 1835, over the ruins accumulated around us.

[14]1st Series, vol. i., Course of 1816.

[15]Ibid., Course of 1817.

[16]On the legitimate employment and the imperative conditions of eclecticism, see 3d Series,Fragments Philosophiques, vol. iv., preface of the first edition, p. 41, &c., especially the article entitledDe la Philosophie en Belgique, pp. 228 and 229.

[17]We have translated his excellentManual of the History of Philosophy. See the second edition, vol. ii., 8vo., 1839.

[18]1st Series of our Course, vol. i.

[19]1st Series, vol. i.

[20]Ibid.

[21]1st Series, vol. i., Fragments of the Course of 1817.

[22]See that criticism, 1st Series, vol. v.,Kant, lecture 8.

[23]This classification of the human faculties, save some differences more nominal than real, is now generally adopted, and makes the foundation of the psychology of our times. See our writings, among others, 1st Series, Course of 1816, lectures 23 and 24:Histoire du moi; ibid.,Des faits de Conscience; vol. iii., lecture 3,Examen de la Théorie des Facultés dans Condillac; vol. iv., lecture 21,des Facultés selon Reid; vol. v., lecture 8,Examen de la Théorie de Kant; 3d Series, vol iv.,Preface de la Première Edition, Examen des Leçons de M. Laromiguière, Introduction aux Œuvres de M. de Biran, etc.

[24]This lecture on the existence of universal and necessary principles, which was easily comprehended, in 1818, by an auditory to which long discussions had already been presented during the two previous years, appearing here without the support of these preliminaries, will not perhaps be entirely satisfactory to the reader. We beseech him to consult carefully the first volume of the 1st Series of our Course, which contains an abridgment, at least, of the numerous lectures of 1816 and 1817, of which this is arésumé; especially to read in the third, fourth, and fifth volumes of the 1st Series, the developed analyses, in which, under different forms, universal and necessary principles are demonstrated as far as may be, and in the third volume of the 2d Series the lectures devoted to establish against Locke the same principles.

[25]First Series, vol. iv., lectures 1, 2, and 3.

[26]Ibid., vol. iv., etc.

[27]Ibid., vol. v., lecture 8.

[28]We have everywhere called to mind, maintained, and confirmed by the errors of those who have dared to break it, this rule of true psychological analysis, that, before passing to the question of the origin of an idea, a notion, a belief, any principle whatever, the actual characters of this idea, this notion, this belief, this principle, must have been a long time studied and well established, with the firm resolution of not altering them under any pretext whatever in wishing to explain them. We believe that we have, as Leibnitz says, settled this point. See 1st Series, vol. i., Programme of the Course of 1817, and the Opening Discourse; vol. iii., lecture 1,Locke; lecture 2,Condillac; lecture 3, almost entire, and lecture 8, p. 260; 2d Series, vol. iii.,Examen du Système de Locke, lecture 16, p. 77-87; 3d Series, vol. iv.,Examination of the Lectures of M. Loremquière, p. 268.

[29]This theory of spontaneity and of reflection, which in our view is the key to so many difficulties, continually recurs in our works. One may see, vol. i. of the 1st Series, in a programme of the Course of 1817, and in a fragment entitledDe la Spontanéité et de la Réflexion; vol. iv. of the same Series, Examination of Reid's Philosophy,passim; vol. v., Examination of Kant's System, lecture 8; 2d Series, vol. i.,passim; vol. iii., Lectures on Judgment; 3d Series,Fragments Philosophiques, vol. iv., preface of the first edition, p. 37, etc.; it will be found in different lectures of this volume, among others, in the third, On the value of Universal and Necessary Principles; in the fifth, On Mysticism; and in the eleventh, Primary Data of Common Sense.

[30]On immediate abstraction and comparative abstraction, see 1st Series, vol. i., Programme of the Course of 1817, and everywhere in our other Courses.

[31]On M. de Biran, on his merits and defects, see ourIntroductionat the head of his Works.

[32]Seelecture 1.

[33]See vol. i. of the 1st Series, course of 1816, and 2d Series, vol. iii., lecture 18, p. 140-146.

[34]We have developed this analysis, and elucidated these results in the 17th lecture of vol. ii. of the 2d Series.

[35]We have already twice recurred, and more in detail, to the impossibility of legitimately explaining universal and necessary principles by any association or induction whatever, founded upon any particular idea, 2d Series, vol. iii.,Examen du Système de Locke, lecture 19, p. 166; and 3d Series, vol. iv.,Introduction aux Œuvres de M. de Biran, p. 319. We have also made known the opinion of Reid, 1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 22, p. 489. Finally, the profoundest of Reid's disciples, the most enlightened judge that we know of things philosophical, Sir W. Hamilton, professor of logic in the University of Edinburgh, has not hesitated to adopt the conclusions of our discussion, to which he is pleased to refer his readers:—Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, etc., by Sir William Hamilton, London, 1852. Appendix I, p. 588.

[36]Œuvres de Reid, vol. iv., p. 435. "When we revolt against primitive facts, we equally misconceive the constitution of our intelligence and the end of philosophy. Is explaining a fact any thing else than deriving it from another fact, and if this kind of explanation is to terminate at all, does it not suppose facts inexplicable? The science of the human mind will have been carried to the highest degree of perfection it can attain, it will be complete, when it shall know how to derive ignorance from the most elevated source."

[37]On conceptualism, as well as on nominalism and realism, see theIntroduction to the inedited works of Abelard, and also 1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 21, p. 457; 2d Series, vol. iii., lecture 20, p. 215, and the work already cited on theMetaphysics of Aristotle, p. 49: "Nothing exists in this world which has not its law more general than itself. There is no individual that is not related to a species; there are no phenomena bound together that are not united to a plan. And it is necessary there should really be in nature species and a plan, if every thing has been made with weight and measure,cum pondere et mensura, without which our very ideas of species and a plan would only be chimeras, and human science a systematic illusion. If it is pretended that there are individuals and no species, things in juxtaposition and no plan; for example, human individuals more or less different, and no human type, and a thousand other things of the same sort, well and good; but in that case there is nothing general in the world, except in the human understanding, that is to say, in other terms, the world and nature are destitute of order and reason except in the head of man."

[38]See precedinglecture.

[39]On the just limits of the personality and the impersonality of reason, see the followinglecture, near the close.

[40]We have everywhere maintained, that consciousness is the condition, or rather the necessary form of intelligence. Not to go beyond this volume, see farther on,lecture 5.

[41]1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 22, p. 494.

[42]Œuvres de Reid, vol. iii., p. 450.

[43]We have not thought it best to make this lecture lengthy by an exposition and detailed refutation of theCritique of Pure Reasonand its sad conclusion; the little that we say of it is sufficient for our purpose, which is much less historical than dogmatical. We refer the reader to a volume that we have devoted to the father of German philosophy, 1st Series, vol. v., in which we have again taken up and developed some of the arguments that are here used, in which we believe that we have irresistibly exposed the capital defect of the transcendental logic of Kant, and of the whole German school, that it leads to skepticism, inasmuch as it raises superhuman, chimerical, extravagant problems, and, when well understood, cannot solve them. See especially lectures 6 and 8.

[44]See our work entitled,Metaphysics of Aristotle, 2d edition,passim. In Aristotle himself, see especiallyMetaphysics, book vii., chap. xii., and book xiii., chap. ix.

[45]There are doubtless many other ways of arriving at God, as we shall successively see; but this is the way of metaphysics. We do not exclude any of the known and accredited proofs of the existence of God; but we begin with that which gives all the others. See further on,part ii.,God, the Principle of Beauty, andpart iii.,God, the Principle of the Good, and the lastlecture, which sums up the whole course.

[46]We have said a word on the Platonic theory of ideas, 1st Series, vol. iv., p. 461 and 522. See also, vol. ii. of the 2d Series, lecture 7, onPlato and Aristotle, especially 3d Series, vol. i., a few words on theLanguage of the Theory of Ideas, p. 121; our work on theMetaphysics of Aristotle, p. 48 and 149, and our translation of Plato,passim.

[47]Aristotle first stated this; modern peripatetics have repeated it; and after them, all who have wished to decry the ancient philosophy, and philosophy in general, by giving the appearance of absurdity to its most illustrious representative.

[48]See particularly p. 121 of theTimaeus, vol. xii. of our translation.

[49]Republic, book vi., vol. x. of our translation, p. 57.

[50]Republic, book vii., p. 20.

[51]Phædrus, vol. vi., p. 51.

[52]Phædrus, vol. vi., p. 55.

[53]Vol. xi., p. 261.

[54]Edit. Bened., vol. vi., p. 17:Idex sunt formæ quædam principales et rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quæ ipsæ formatæ non sunt ac per hoc æternæ ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quæ in divina intelligentia continentur....

[55]Edit. Bened., vol. vi., p. 18.Singula igitur propriis creata sunt rationibus. Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse nisi in mente Creatoris? non enim extra se quidquam intuebatur, ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat: nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est.

[56]Ibid.See also, book of theConfessions, book ii. of theFree Will, book xii. of theTrinity, book vii. of theCity of God, &c.

[57]Summa totius theologiæ. Primæ partis quæst. xii. art. 11.Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnia dicimus in Deo videre, et secundum ipsum de omnibus judicare, in quantum per participationem sui luminis omnia cognoscimus et dijudicamus. Nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis participatio quædam est divini luminis.

[58]On the doctrine of Descartes, and on the proof of the existence of God and the true process that he employs, see 1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 12, p. 64, lecture 22, p. 509-518; vol. v., lecture 6, p. 205; 2d Series, vol. xi., lecture 11; especially the three articles, already cited, of theJournal des Savantsfor the year 1850.

[59]See on Malebranche, 2d Series, lecture 2, and 3d Series, vol. iii.,Modern Philosophy, as well as theFragments of Cartesian Philosophy; preface of the 1st edition of ourPascal:—"On this basis, so pure, Malebranche is not steady; is excessive and rash, I know; narrow and extreme, I do not fear to say; but always sublime, expressing only one side of Plato, but expressing it in a wholly Christian spirit and in angelic language. Malebranche is a Descartes who strays, having found divine wings, and lost all connection with the earth."

[60]We use the only good edition of the treatise on the Existence of God, that which the Abbé Gosselin has given in the collection of theWorks of Fenelon. Versailles, 1820. See vol. i., p. 80.

[61]Edit. de Versailles, p. 145.

[62]It is not necessary to remark how incorrect are the expressions,representation of the infinite, image of the infinite, especiallyinfinite image of the infinite. We cannot represent to ourselves, we cannot imagine to ourselves the infinite. We conceive the infinite; the infinite is not an object of the imagination, but of the understanding, of reason. See 1st Series, vol. v., lecture 6, p. 223, 224.

[63]By a trifling anachronism, for which we shall be pardoned, we have here joined to theTraité de la Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même, so long known, theLogique, which was only published in 1828.

[64]4th Series, vol. i., preface of the 1st edition ofPascal: "Bossuet, with more moderation, and supported by a good sense which nothing can shake, is, in his way, a disciple of the same doctrine, only the extremes of which according to his custom, he shunned. This great mind, which may have superiors in invention, but has no equal for force in common sense, was very careful not to place revelation and philosophy in opposition to each other: he found it the safer and truer way to give to each its due, to borrow from philosophy whatever natural light it can give, in order to increase it in turn with the supernatural light, of which the Church has been made the depository. It is in this sovereign good sense, capable of comprehending every thing, and uniting every thing, that resides the supreme originality of Bossuet. He shunned particular opinions as small minds seek them for the triumph of self-love. He did not think of himself; he only searched for truth, and wherever he found it he listened to it, well assured that if the connection between truths of different orders sometimes escapes us, it is no reason for closing the eyes to any truth. If we wished to give a scholastic name to Bossuet, according to the custom of the Middle Age, we would have to call him the infallible doctor. He is not only one of the highest, he is also one of the best and solidest intelligences that ever existed; and this great conciliator has easily reconciled religion and philosophy, St. Augustine and Descartes, tradition and reason."

[65]The best, or, rather, only good edition is that which was published from an authentic copy, in 1846, by Lecoffre.

[66]These words,d'une certaine manière qui m'est incompréhensible, c'est en lui, dis-je, are not in the first edition of 1722.

[67]Leibnitzii Opera, edit. Deutens, vol. ii., p. 17.

[68]Ibid., p. 24.

[69]1st edition, Amsterdam, 1710, p. 354, edit. of M. de Jaucourt, Amsterdam, 1747, vol. ii., p. 93.

[70]We have many times designated these two rocks, for example, 2d Series, vol. i., lecture 5, p. 92:—"One cannot help smiling when, in our times, he hears individual reason spoken against. In truth it is a great waste of declamation, for the reason is not individual; if it were, we should govern it as we govern our resolutions and our volitions, we could at any moment change its acts, that is to say, our conceptions. If these conceptions were merely individual, we should not think of imposing them upon another individual, for to impose our own individual and personal conceptions on another individual, on another person, would be the most extravagant despotism.... We call those mad who do not admit the relations of numbers, the difference between the beautiful and the ugly, the just and the unjust. Why? Because we know that it is not the individual that constitutes these conceptions, or, in other terms, we know that the reason has something universal and absolute, that upon this ground it obligates all individuals; and an individual, at the same time that he knows that he himself is obligated by it, knows that all others are obligated by it on the same ground."—Ibid., p. 93: "Truth misconceived is thereby neither altered nor destroyed; it subsists independently of the reason that perceives it or perceives it ill. Truth in itself is independent of our reason. Its true subject is the universal and absolute reason."

[71]See the preceding lectures.

[72]See thePhædrusand theBanquet, vol. vii. of our translation.

[73]We shall not be accused of perverting the holy Scriptures by these analogies, for we give them only as analogies, and St. Augustine and Bossuet are full of such.

[74]See part ii.,The Beautiful,lecture 6, and part iii.,lecture 13, on theMorals of Sentiment. See also ourPascal, preface of the last edition, p. 8, etc., vol. i. of the 4th Series.

[75]See the admirable work of Bossuet,Instruction sur les états d'Oraison.

[76]Lecture 4.

[77]See especially in our writings the regular and detailed refutation of the double extravagance of considering substance apart from its determinations and its qualities, or of considering its qualities and its facilities apart from the being that possesses them. 1st Series, vol. iii., lecture 3,On Condillac, and vol. v., lectures 5 and 6,On Kant. We say, the same Series, vol. iv., p. 56: "There are philosophers beyond the Rhine, who, to appear very profound, are not contented with qualities and phenomena, and aspire to pure substance, to being in itself. The problem stated as follows, is quite insoluble: the knowledge of such a substance is impossible, for this very simple reason, that such a substance does not exist. Being in itself,das Ding in sich, which Kant seeks, escapes him, and this does not humiliate Kant and philosophy; for there is no being in itself. The human mind may form to itself an abstract and general idea of being, but this idea has no real object in nature. All being is determinate, if it is real; and to be determinate is to possess certain modes of being, transitory and accidental, or constant and essential. Knowledge of being in itself is then not merely interdicted to the human mind; it is contrary to the nature of things. At the other extreme of metaphysics is a powerless psychology, which, by fear of a hollow ontology, is condemned to voluntary ignorance. We are not able, say these philosophers, Mr. Dugald Stewart, for example, to attain being in itself; it is permitted us to know only phenomena and qualities: so that, in order not to wander in search of the substance of the soul, they do not dare affirm its spirituality, and devote themselves to the study of its different faculties. Equal error, equal chimera! There are no more qualities without being, than being without qualities. No being is without its determinations, and reciprocally its determinations are not without it. To consider the determinations of being independently of the being which possesses them, is no longer to observe; it is to abstract, to make an abstraction quite as extravagant as that of being considered independently of its qualities."

[78]On the school of Alexandria, see 2d Series, vol. ii.,Sketch of a General History of Philosophy, lecture 8, p. 211, and 3d Series, vol. i.,passim.

[79]See the previouslecture.

[80]3d Series, vol. i.,Ancient Philosophy, articleXenophanes, and articleZeno.

[81]The Sophist, vol. xi. of our translation, p. 261.

[82]Timæus, vol. xii., p. 117.

[83]Republic, book vii., p. 70 of vol. x.

[84]Phædrus, vol. vi., p. 55.

[85]The Sophist, p. 261, 262. The following little-known and decisive passage, which we have translated for the first time, must be cited:—"Stranger.But what, by Zeus! shall we be so easily persuaded that in reality, motion, life, soul, intelligence, do not belong to absolute being? that this being neither lives nor thinks, that this being remains immobile, immutable, without having part in august and holy intelligence?—Theatetus.That would be consenting, dear Eleatus, to a very strange assertion.—Stranger.Or, indeed, shall we accord to this being intelligence while we refuse him life?—Theatetus.That cannot be.—Stranger.Or, again, shall we say that there is in him intelligence and life, but that it is not in a soul that he possesses them?—Theatetus.And how could he possess them otherwise?—Stranger.In fine, that, endowed with intelligence, soul, and life, all animated as he is, he remains incomplete immobility.—Theatetus.All that seems to me unreasonable."

[86]Timæus, p. 119: "Let us say that the cause which led the supreme ordainer to produce and compose this universe was, that he was good."

[87]Bouquet, discourse of Diotimus, vol. vi., and the 2d part of this vol.,The Beautiful,lecture 7.

[88]Republic.Ibid.

[89]Book xii. of theMetaphysics.De la Métaphysique d'Aristotle, 2d edition, p. 200, etc.

[90]On this fundamental point, seelecture 3, in this vol.—2d Series, vol. i., lecture 5, p. 97. "The peculiarity of intelligence is not the power of knowing, but knowing in fact. On what condition is there intelligence for us? It is not enough that there should be in us a principle of intelligence; this principle must be developed and exercised, and take itself as the object of its intelligence. The necessary condition of intelligence is consciousness—that is to say, difference. There can be consciousness only where there are several terms, one of which perceives the other, and at the same time perceives itself. That is knowing, and knowing self; that is intelligence. Intelligence without consciousness is the abstract possibility of intelligence, it is not real intelligence. Transfer this from human intelligence to divine intelligence, that is to say, refer ideas, I mean ideas in the sense of Plato, of St. Augustine, of Bossuet, of Leibnitz, to the only intelligence to which they can belong, and you will have, if I may thus express myself, the life of the divine intelligence ..., etc."

[91]Vol. ii. of the 2d Series,Sketch of a General History of Philosophy, lectures 5 and 6,On the Indian Philosophy.

[92]See theEuthyphron, vol. i. of our translation.

[93]Lucien, Apuleius, Lucius of Patras.

[94]2d Series, vol. ii.,Sketch of a General History of Philosophy, lecture 10,On the Philosophy of the Renaissance.

[95]One was then ardently occupied with magnetism, and more than a magnetizer, half a materialist, half a visionary, pretended to convert us to a system of perfect clairvoyance of soul, obtained by means of artificial sleep. Alas! the same follies are now renewed. Conjunctions are the fashion. Spirits are interrogated, and they respond! Only let there be consciousness that one does not interrogate, and superstition alone counterpoises skepticism.

[96]Except the estimableEssay on the Beautiful, by P. André, a disciple of Malebranche, whose life was considerably prolonged into the eighteenth century. On P. André, see 3d Series, vol. iii.,Modern Philosophy, p. 207, 516.

[97]See in the works of Diderot,Pensées sur la Sculpture, les Salons, etc.

[98]See 1st Series, vol. iv., explained and estimated, the theories of Hutcheson and Reid.

[99]The theory of Kant is found in theCritique of Judgment, and in theObservationson theSentiment of the Beautiful and the Sublime. See the excellent translation made by M. Barny, 2 vols., 1846.

Back to Index Next