XII.
ARISTOCRACY AND KAKISTOCRACY.
Themembers of the Upper House or Legislative Council of New South Wales are nominated for life by the Governor, not elected, like those of Victoria and Tasmania, by a higher-class constituency. This plan was adopted by the framers of the Constitution with the intention of giving it a Conservative character. The effect has been the reverse of what was intended. A nominee of the Governor is generally in reality a nominee of the Ministry for the time being. Subject to his consent, it is in the power of the Ministry to swamp the Council by the creation of new members, and thus obtain a preponderating majority; and on at least one occasion this has been done. It is indeed understood that the Governor who gave his consent much regrets having done so, and it may be hoped that the experiment will not be repeated. But the authority of a legislative chamber cannot fail to be impaired by the bare possibility of such treatment. Under the most favourable circumstances, the Members, being nominated for having already attained a certain position in the colony, are not likely to be very youngwhen appointed; and as they hold their seats for life, it is likely that there will generally be an unduly large proportion of old men. A Council so constituted, and having but little prestige of superior birth or education to support it, is not likely to be a match for a capricious and turbulent Lower House, borne on the flood-tide of present popularity, and ever ready to provide for present emergencies at the expense of the future. Hence it is not to be wondered at if it does not occupy so prominent a position relatively as the Victorian Council, which has lately so firmly and successfully opposed the unconstitutional proceedings of a Ministry supported by a large majority of the Lower House, and by a small majority of the population.
In answer to a question as to the character and composition of the Lower House, or Legislative Assembly, I was told that it wasnowno worse than that of Victoria. Probably this was about as much as could be said for it. The facts which I mentioned in a former letter concerning the Victorian Assembly may be an assistance in estimating the force of the comparison. I may add that since I wrote, one of its Members has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for forgery, and the keeper of one of the most notoriously disreputable taverns in Melbourne has entered it, being chosen for an important district in preference to an opponent who is an old colonist, an educated gentleman, and a man of unquestionable ability and integrity.
One does not, however, hear in Sydney of the wholesalecorruption, the taking of palpable 10l.notes, universally attributed to several legislators of the sister colony. The present Ministry of Mr. Martin and Mr. Parkes, in spite of some recent failures in finance, is generally described by reliable people as about the best since the existing Constitution came into force; and as the Opposition is weak, and contains few, if any, men of ability, the Government can do things pretty much in its own way. But other Administrations have been less powerful, and when they felt themselves tottering have, in order to prolong their lease of office a little longer, been sometimes by no means fastidious in the means they employed to obtain support. Different people were to be conciliated in different ways, and one of the results was the creation of a certain number ofWindmill Magistrates. Lest the termWindmill Magistrateshould be unintelligible to those who are not fully initiated into the mysteries of colonial democracy, perhaps I should explain that there have been persons aspiring, and not always in vain, to the honour of being magistrates, whose early education was not very comprehensive, and who, not being able to sign their names, were in the habit of affixing their mark x instead. The supposed resemblance of this mark to the sails of a windmill suggested the term.
Whatever be the cause or causes, the Legislative Assembly certainly is not held in much respect. It is in vain that its members strive to assert their importance by voting themselves free passes on the railways and a Members’ Stand at the races. The leading Sydneypaper, ‘The Sydney Morning Herald,’ has been publishing a series of articles, appearing two or three times a week, entitled ‘The Collective Wisdom of New South Wales,’ in which all the bad grammar, bad language, and extravagant and unbecoming behaviour of the Members, not mentioned in the reports of the debates, are chronicled and commented on. The following observations are from a leading article (not from one of the series I have alluded to) in the same paper,[12]which is as temperate and well conducted as any in Australia:—
‘The specimens we have had of ribaldry and vituperation are, unhappily, too familiar with the Assembly, and even these hardly represent what is heard within the precincts of the Houses. We say, and with much regret, that there are members pretending to political leadership whose language would be a disgrace to a stable; who, when excited by drink or passion, pour out a stream of invective which is not merely blasphemous, but filthy. They have no hesitation to couple the names of persons with whom they have had more or less friendly intercourse, according as the changes of private interest or political sentiment may permit.... We believe that such language is rarely heard in British society of the present day. That it lingers in some parts of New South Wales is to be traced to causes which we shall not describe more specially, but which will, we hope, some day disappear. It is unfortunate when men who have been taught from their early youth to express themselves in a strain which becomes too natural by indulgence are in a position to propagate their example.... We can produce proofs to establish every syllable we say, namely, that the conspicuous men in the House, with one or two exceptions, have been for the last seven years accustomed to speak of each other in such terms asgentlemen never apply, and excepting under the power of that mighty principle which conquers resentment, which gentlemen never forgive.’
Here is an extract from a debate in the Sydney Legislative Assembly:—[13]
‘Mr. M.said that he only knew of one minister who ever attempted to make political capital out of religious differences.
‘An Hon. Member.—Who?
‘Mr. M.—The Colonial Secretary.
‘An Hon. Member.—“Shut up!”
‘Voices.—“Boots,” “laughing jackass,” and other remarks, the application of which could only be seen by persons actually present, and the import of which it is hardly worth while to explain.
‘An Hon. Member.—“How’s your nose?”
‘Mr. M.—Sir, I am sober; I hope you are.
‘An Hon. Member.—“Who?”
‘Mr. M.—Is the hon. member addressing me or addressing the chair?
‘Mr. F.—The hon. member is addressing the “jackass.”
‘An Hon. Member.—Is that the “jackass?”
‘Mr. M.—I have been told that there are liars and blackguards in this House, and I believe there are one or two.
‘Mr. P.—I can see one now.
‘Mr. F.—I move that the words be taken down.
‘The words having been taken down by the clerk, and handed to the Chairman,
‘Mr. G.read—“I see one now.” (Great laughter.)
‘Mr. F..—I have no hesitation in saying that the hon. member meant to say, and I do not think the hon. member is coward enough to deny—
‘Mr. P..—Does the hon. member accuse me of cowardice? Let him come outside and do it.
‘Mr. L.—The hon. member does not accuse you of cowardice.
‘Mr. P.—I know what he means. Let him come outside and say it.
‘Mr. H.called attention to the presence of strangers in the House, and the reporters were again directed to withdraw.
‘Up to our going to press, the House continued to sit with closed doors.’
As I write, the following account of a debate in the House, telegraphed to the Melbourne papers, is brought in:—
‘The Opposition prevented a single item of the Estimates passing last night. During the debate a disgraceful scene took place. Mr. Forster insinuated that the Premier began his public career with perjury. Mr. Martin (the Premier) called Mr. Forster a liar and a blackguard repeatedly. The galleries were cleared, and the disorder lasted for two hours. Mr. Martin’s words were taken down, but the Government members carried the previous question. Mr. Martin then apologized.’
Nor do members always confine their abusive language to each other. It sometimes happens that they bring charges against persons outside the House which those persons have no opportunity of answering, and for which, if false and libellous, no legal redress can be obtained, as the speakers are protected by privilege of Parliament. One of the very best and most valuable institutions of Sydney is the Grammar-school. Unfortunately there have been disputes about its management, and it has its enemies. One day a member rosein the House and charged one of the masters with habitually using expressions of the grossest blasphemy. The accused demanded of the School trustees an investigation. It was held. The charge broke down completely, being supported solely by the evidence of another master who in cross-examination was compelled to confess himself guilty of a string of deliberate falsehoods. Yet no retractation was made, no apology offered.
This state of things is not cheering. Men of by no means conservative or retrograde instincts will tell you sadly that it was not always so, that sixteen or seventeen years ago, in the days of mixed government, not only was the colony better governed, but it was in many respects in a sounder and healthier condition generally. The wealthy were not so wealthy, but neither were the poor so poor. There was work for all who wanted it, and at high wages. Now there is not a little pauperism and distress. Immigration was steadily increasing then; now it has almost ceased.
What is the cause? It is always dangerous to attempt to couple cause and effect in political matters, especially when events are so nearly contemporary. But there can be no doubt that the discovery of gold, if it has conferred wealth and brought advantages, has also brought serious temporary disadvantages which have not yet passed away. It would be hard to strike a balance between them. The population was greatly increased. But the whole framework of industry was put out of gear, and has hardly yet recovered the shock;and the stream of immigration was not, as in Victoria, so great as to give an entirely new character to the colony and its population, and to build the framework afresh. It gave, too, a sudden and undue impulse to extreme democratic tendencies; and I think that the majority of well-informed men look upon the extreme democratic character of the existing constitution as amongst the principal causes of much of the misgovernment and corruption that exist. There are indeed few who ever say so publicly, and withstand Demos to his face; but at least one man, long the foremost champion of the anti-bureaucratic or popular party, to whom that party, in the days when they had real grievances to complain of, owed more than to anyone, has not shrunk from saying openly what he thinks or from deploring publicly the evil results of universal suffrage in the colony.[14]
It is bad enough to have bad legislation. But it is a much worse matter when those who originate it do so from weak or selfish motives,knowingthat it is bad. In view of much that has been done, it is almost impossible to doubt that this has not infrequently been the case of late years in some of the Australian colonies, when we consider the comparatively high intellectual abilities of some of the leading statesmen, and consider also the notoriously low character of the various Legislative Assemblies with which they have had to deal. I believe the worst measures, amongst which the land-lawsare pre-eminent, will in general be found to have been simply bids for popular support at the expense of common sense, common honour, and common patriotism, by men clinging selfishly to office for its own sake, and indifferent to the ultimate consequences of their policy.
In Tasmania things are not so bad. And that colony is at the present time singularly fortunate in possessing a Colonial Secretary whose name is a guarantee of fair and honourable dealing in the conduct of public affairs, who, unlike too many Australasian Colonial Secretaries, does not live with the love of office and the fear of Demos ever before his eyes. But the religion of Demos is not without a footing even there. I will give an instance, slight in itself, but significant. The Tasmanian climate does not admit the wine being made. Beer is made, but it is almost as dear as imported English beer. There is no cheap beverage, and as the climate (compared with that of England) is hot and dry, it would be a great boon, one would think, to be able to get the excellent, cheap light clarets and hocks of New South Wales. Unfortunately, there is an import duty of eight shillings a dozen, which, added to other charges, is, of course, simply prohibitory. Customs’ revenue is sorely needed, as the returns have been falling off alarmingly for some years; and it is indisputable that a reduction of the duty on light wines would increase the amount of revenue from that source. But Demos does not drink light wine. His particular libation is rum. And so it is admitted that no one couldventure to propose the reduction, because Demos, though his own pockets would gain by it, would raise an irresistible outcry at anyone getting wine cheap which he does not care for, unless at the same time the duty on rum were lowered, which the revenue cannot afford.
Great is the god Demos of the Australians! He is lavish in his rewards to his votaries while his favour lasts. But he is fickle, and must be humoured to the top of his bent, and worshipped with unswerving devotion. As long as statesmen bow at his shrine, so long will there be danger that Legislative Assemblies will be contemptible, individual members corrupt, magistrates incompetent, and the mass of the people tempted to lose reverence and regard for Queen, country, and law; so long also will successive ministries be compelled to go from bad to worse, to foster class prejudices and jealousies, to persistently misstate points at issue between them and their opponents, as the Victorian Ministers are doing at the elections now going on; so long also will their supporters not shrink even from exciting sedition by using language like the threat uttered the other day by the ministerialist candidate for North Gipps Land that ‘the crack of the rifle may yet be heard beneath the windows of the Legislative Council.’
Some day or other, it may be, the question will be asked, Who destroyed a great empire? Who prematurely broke, or indolently suffered to be broken, a dominion that might have endured for generations? It will not, indeed, be easy to apportion the blamejustly. Doubtless it would have been as practicable to dam up the river Hawkesbury in flood as to have simply defied the torrent of popular impulses in Australia. But all need not have been given up without a struggle. Something might have been saved, as by a little courage and skill a homestead here, an acre of corn there, is rescued from the flood. A Pitt, a Cromwell, even a Wellington with his simple straightforward love of good government in any form, would surely have done, or at least tried to do, something, whether popular or unpopular, to secure the ‘carrying on of the Queen’s government’ firmly and honestly in her Australian colonies. But for the last sixteen years or so, since the old traditions of the conservative party have been abandoned, and it has been bidding for popular support by seeking to outdo its opponents in democratic concessions, the government of Australia by the Colonial Office has been gradually tending to become a simple ‘cutting of straps,’ and attempting, with very little regard to ultimate consequences, to please everybody, and fall in with the popular cry for the time being, whatever it might happen to be.
It is true that there were no aristocracies worthy of the name in the Australian colonies in whom a restraining power could be reposed (although in Victoria an aristocracy of mere wealth—perhaps the least desirable form of aristocracy—has by its representatives, the Legislative Council, just made a conspicuously steadfast and honourable stand against lawlessness and wrong). But surely some substantial power might have been leftto the Governors. It would not have been difficult to have established some plan for so doing, with which the great majority of the colonists would have been well satisfied. It has been suggested to me by one who has had great colonial experience that the simple expedient of giving the Ministry for the time beingex-officioseats in the Legislative Assembly, would have had considerable effect, especially in the less populous colonies, in increasing the political influence of the Governor.
If this is not apparent at first sight, a little consideration will perhaps make it so. It must be remembered that in a colony where the population is comparatively small and public questions less numerous and intricate long parliamentary experience and skill in debate are not so absolutely essential to a Minister. It is quite possible that the fittest man to be Colonial Secretary or Treasurer may have had neither the opportunity nor the desire to obtain a seat in the Parliament; for the worthiest and fittest men have ordinarily little temptation to seek for one. Under the present system the Governor’s choice of Ministers is practically confined to those who are in parliament. But if Ministers held seatsex officio, the Governor might choose anyone he liked and seat him at once. No doubt the Houses must so far ratify the Governor’s choice as to give his Minister a majority, otherwise he could not carry his measures or remain in office; and this would suffice to prevent any specially unpopular man or policy from being put forward. But, in the first place, the mereaddition of from three to seven votes in a House of from thirty to seventy members would be some slight addition to the strength of Government. This, however, is but a small matter. What is more important is that it would do much to prevent the growth, and to interfere with the organisation, of a merely factious Opposition. This sort of Opposition, based, as is generally the case in the colonial parliaments, on no sort of political principle, but cohering merely with the selfish and almost avowed object of seizing an opportunity for ousting Ministers and occupying their places, is a serious impediment to good and honest government. It is always on the watch to catch any passing breeze of popular clamour as a means of tripping up the Government, and the Government is in self-defence obliged to be equally amenable and subservient. When the Administration appears strong, and seems likely to remain in, the Members of the House crowd their ranks for the sake of the loaves and fishes; and the Opposition is left scarcely strong enough to exercise legitimate control over the expenditure. But when the loaves and fishes are nearly all gone, and especially if there is any suspicion of ministerial insecurity, there comes a serious defection from their supporters. Thus the Opposition may be composed chiefly of disappointed deserters from the other side, and in a small colony may sometimes contain scarcely a single man of weight or ability, or who is in any way fitted to be entrusted with office. Yet it is worth while for them to persist and to watch their opportunities, for sooner or later every Ministrymust fall, and under the present system the Governor has no choice but to send for the leader of Opposition, or, in the absence of anyone entitled to be so considered, for the mover of the motion the success of which has caused the crisis. Now the effect of givingex-officioseats to Ministers would be this. The knowledge that the Governor might, if he thought fit, make his next selection of advisers from outside Parliament altogether, would make the objects pursued by a merely factious Opposition too uncertain of attainment to be worth contending for with such persistence. The prospect of being possibly left out in the cold altogether would weaken their cohesion and diminish their strength; while to a corresponding extent the Government would be strengthened, and would be better enabled to dispense with those means of conciliating their supporters which are so fertile a source of one-sided class-legislation and of corruption.
In its Colonial Governors, England possesses a body of tried and faithful servants in whom it may well place confidence. Many of them have had experience and training from their youth upwards in the work of governing. The Home Government can select them from any profession; it can appoint them on the simple ground of fitness without any arbitrary or technical qualification; it can recall them at its pleasure. Gentlemen by birth and education, many of them picked men from the army or navy (almost the only callings in modern times where men learn to obey, and therefore the fittest for learning to command), impartial upon thepetty local questions which vex colonial statesmen, they are (with an exception here and there) eminently well qualified for governing new and unsettled communities, and in three cases out of four infinitely superior in ability, as in everything else, to the Ministers whose advice they are now obliged to follow. Of course, there have been exceptions, and because of them no one would for a moment wish to see restored the almost absolute power which Governors possessed in the very early days when they had no one to rule over but soldiers and convicts. But surely it was a fatal mistake by a stroke of the pen to limit the functions of the not unworthy successors of the Phillipses, the Collinses, and the Bourkes, to holding levées and giving balls.
Sir Charles Hotham, when Governor of Victoria, foreseeing what would happen, when some modifications of the Constitution were sent home for ratification, wrote a despatch pointing out the powerless condition to which his authority was being reduced. It was not perhaps altogether a logical or judicious despatch. Sir Charles Hotham was a sailor, without any previous experience in government, promoted from the quarterdeck to a most difficult and responsible position, at a most critical time; and it was not surprising if he had not thoroughly mastered the intricate clauses of a Constitution Act. But if Lord John Russell (then at the Colonial Office) had wished to discredit the Queen’s Representative, he could hardly have done it more effectually than he did by publishing the despatch, tobe a butt (which at that time, from its Conservative tone, it was sure to be) for the vituperation of the colonial press.[15]Up to this time the Colonial Governors had found it impossible to obtain from the Colonial Office at home even an outline of the course they were to pursue with reference to the new Constitutions. No instructions whatever were vouchsafed in answer to their enquiries. But at last the Secretary for the Colonies had spoken out. There was a significance about the publication of this despatch which could not be mistaken. Sir Charles Hotham died a few months afterwards, worn out by overwork, anxiety, and hostility on all sides. And since that time every Governor in a constitutional colony knows that his office is all but a cipher, and that the Colonial Office is content to have it so.
I have known a Governor ask his Ministers for a simple Return, for the information of the Home Government, for three years, without succeeding in obtaining it. Even their social power is curtailed. Marks of distinction, instead of being conferred according to their recommendation, are given at haphazard, often to the most unfit recipients. Perhaps as effectual and desirable a means, as far as it goes, of preserving a close union and sympathy between the colonists and the old country would be to induce the sons of colonists to serve in the British Army and Navy. It was accordingly suggested that Governors should have the power of recommending for a certain number of commissions.The Home Government approved, and expressed its approval by according to each of the Australian Governors the astonishing privilege of presenting toonecadetship in the Navyonce in three years!