"Mens ubi materna est?"Where is maternal affection.
"Mens ubi materna est?"Where is maternal affection.
A FARMER.
Beloved Countrymen,
It may perhaps be objected against the arguments that have been offered to the public concerning the legal power of the parliament, that it has always exercised the power of imposing duties for the purposes of raising a revenue on the productions of these colonies carried to Great-Britain, which may be called a tax on them. To this I answer; that is no more a violation of the rights of the colonies, than their being ordered to carry certain of their productions to Great-Britain, which is no violation at all; it being implied in the relation between them, that the colonies should not carry such commodities to other nations, as should enable them to interfere with the mother country. The duties imposed on these commodities when brought to her, are only a consequence of her paternal right; and if the point is thoroughly examined, will be found to be laid on the people of the mother country, and not at all dangerous to the liberties of the colonies. Whatever these duties are, they must proportionably raise the price of the goods, and consequently the duties must be paid by the consumers. In this light they wereconsidered by the parliament in the 25 Char. II. Chap. 7, sec. 2, which says, that the productions of the plantations were carried from one to another free from all customs "while the subjects of this your kingdom of England have paid great customs and impositions for what of them have been spent here, &c." Such duties therefore can never be injurious to the liberties of the colonies.
Besides, if Great-Britain exports these commodities again, the duties will injure her own trade, so that she cannot hurt us without plainly and immediately hurting herself; and this is our check against her acting arbitrarily in this respect.
It[27]may, perhaps, be further objected, "that it being granted that statutes madefor regulating trade are binding upon us, it will be difficult for any persons but the makers of the laws to determine, which of them are made for the regulating of trade, and which for raising a revenue; and that from hence may arise confusion."
To this I answer, that the objection is of no force in the present case, or such as resemble it, because the act now in question is formed expressly for the sole purpose of raising a revenue.
However, supposing the design of the parliament had not been expressed, the objection seems to me of no weight, with regard to the influence, which those who may makeit, might expect it ought to have on the conduct of the colonies.
It is true, that impositions for raising a revenue, may be hereafter called regulations of trade, but names will not change the nature of things. Indeed we ought firmly to believe, what is an undoubted truth, confirmed by the unhappy experience of many states heretofore free, that unless the most watchful attention be exerted, a new servitude may be slipped upon us under the sanction of usual and respectable terms.
Thus the Cæsars ruined Roman liberty, under the titles of tribunical and dictatorial authorities,——old and venerable dignities, known in the most flourishing times of freedom. In imitation of the same policy, James II. when he meant to establish popery, talked of liberty of conscience, the most sacred of all liberties; and had thereby almost deceived the dissenters into destruction.
All artful rulers, who strive to extend their own power beyond its just limits, endeavour to give to their attempts, as much semblance of legality as possible. Those who succeed them may venture to go a little farther; for each new encroachment will be strengthened by a former,[28]"That which is now supported by examples, growing old, will become an example itself," and thus support fresh usurpations.
A free people, therefore, can never be too quick in observing, nor too firm in opposing the beginnings of alterations, either in form or reality, respecting institutions formed for their security. The first leads to the last; on the other hand nothing is more certain, than that forms of liberty may be retained, when the substance is gone. In government as well as in religion, "the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life."[29]
I will beg leave to enforce this remark by a few instances. The crown, by the constitution, has the prerogative of creating peers; the existence of that order in due number and dignity, is essential to the constitution; and if the crown did not exercise that prerogative, the peerage must have long since decreased so much, as to have lost its proper influence. Suppose a prince for some unjust purposes, should from time to time advance many needy profligate wretches, to that rank, that all the independance of the house of Lords should be destroyed, there would then be a manifest violation of the constitution, under the appearance of using legal prerogative.
The house of Commons claim the privilege of forming all money-bills, and will not suffer either of the other branches of the legislature to add to or alter them; contending that their power, simply extends to anacceptance or rejection of them. This privilege appears to be just; but under pretence of this just privilege, the house of Commons has claimed a licence of tacking to money bills, clauses relating to many things of a totally different kind, and have thus forced them, in a manner, on the crown and lords. This seems to be an abuse of that privilege, and it may be vastly more abused. Suppose a future house; influenced by some displaced discontented demagogues, in a time of danger, should tack to a money bill something so injurious to the king and peers, that they would not assent to it and yet the Commons should obstinately insist on it; the whole kingdom would be exposed to ruin,under the appearance of maintaining a valuable privilege.
In these cases it might be difficult for a while to determine, whether the King intended to exercise his prerogative in a constitutional manner or not; or whether the Commons insisted on the demand factitiously, or for the public good: But surely the conduct of the crown, or of the house, would in time sufficiently explain itself.
Ought not the people therefore to watch to observe facts? to search into causes? to investigate designs? and have they not a right of judging from the evidence before them, on no slighter points than their liberty and happiness? It would be less than trifling, wherever a British government is established, to make use of any other argumentsto prove such a right. It is sufficient to remind the reader of the day on which King William landed at Torbay.[30]
I will now apply what has been said to the present question. The nature of any impositions laid by parliament on the colonies, must determine the design in laying them. It may not be easy in every instance to discover that design. Whenever it is doubtful, I think submission cannot be dangerous; nay, it must be right: for, in my opinion, there is no privilege the colonies claim, which they ought, in duty and prudence, more earnestly to maintain and defend, than the authority of the British parliament to regulate the trade of all her dominions. Without this authority, the benefits she enjoys from our commerce, must be lost to her: The blessings we enjoy from our dependance upon her, must be lost to us; her strength must decay; her glory vanish; and she cannot suffer, without our partaking in her misfortune.——"Let us therefore cherish her interest as our own, and give her every thing that it becomes FREEMEN to give or to receive."
Thenatureof any impositions she may lay upon us, may in general be known, considering how far they relate to the preserving, in due order, the connexion between theseveral parts of theBritishempire. One thing we may be assured of, which is this; whenever a statute imposes duties on commodities, to be paid only upon their exportation from Great-Britain to these colonies, it is not a regulation of trade, but a design to raise a revenue upon us. Other instances may happen, which it may not be necessary to dwell on. I hope these colonies will never, to their latest existence, want understanding sufficient to discover the intentions of those who rule over them, nor the resolution necessary for asserting their interests. They will always have the same right that all free states have, of judging when their privileges are invaded, and of using all prudent measures for preserving them.
"Quocirca vivite fortes""Fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus,"
"Quocirca vivite fortes""Fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus,"
Wherefore keep up your spirits, and gallantly oppose this adverse course of affairs.
A FARMER.
Beloved Countrymen,
This letter is intended more particularly for such of you, whose employment in life may have prevented your attending to the consideration of some points that are of great and public importance. For many such persons there must be even in these colonies, where the inhabitants in general are more intelligent than any other people, as has been remarked by strangers, and it seems with reason.
Some of you perhaps, filled as I know your breasts are with loyalty to our most excellent prince, and with love to our dear mother country, may feel yourselves inclined by the affections of your hearts, to approve every action of those whom you so much venerate and esteem.
A prejudice thus flowing from goodness of disposition is amiable indeed. I wish it could be indulged without danger. Did I think this possible, the error should have been adopted, not opposed by me. But in truth, all men are subject to the passions and frailties of nature; and therefore whatever regard we entertain for the persons of those who govern us, we should always rememberthat their conduct as rulers may be influenced by human infirmities.
When any laws injurious to these colonies are passed, we cannot, with the least propriety, suppose that any injury was intended us by his Majesty or the Lords. For the assent of the crown and peers to law seems, as far as I am able to judge, to have been vested in them, more for their own security than for any other purpose. On the other hand, it is the particular business of the people to enquire and discover what regulations are useful for themselves, and to digest and present them in the form of bills to the other orders, to have them enacted into laws—Where these laws are to bind themselves, it may be expected that the house of Commons will very carefully consider them: But when they are making laws, that are not designed to bind themselves, we cannot imagine that their deliberations will be as cautious and scrupulous as in their own case.[31]
I find that this clause "privately got into an act," for the benefit of Capt. Cole, "to the vast loss of the nation," is foisted into the 3d Anne, chap. 5, intituled, "An act for granting to her Majesty a further subsidy on wines and merchandizes imported," with which it has no more connexion, than with 34th Edw. I. 34th and 35th of Henry VIII. or the 25th of Car. II. which provide that no person shall be taxed but by himself or his representative.]
I am told that there is a wonderful address frequently used in carrying points in the house of commons, by persons experienced in these affairs—that opportunities are watched—and sometimes votes are past, that if all the members had been present, wouldhave been rejected by a great majority. Certain it is, that when a powerful and artful man has determined on any measure against these colonies, he has always succeeded in his attempt. Perhaps therefore it will be proper for us, whenever any oppressive act affecting us is past, to attribute it to the inattention of the members of the house of commons, and to the malevolence or ambition of some factious great man, rather than to any other cause.
Now I do verily believe, that the late act of parliament imposing duties on paper, &c. was formed by Mr. Grenville and his party, because it is evidently a part of that plan, by which he endeavoured to render himself popular at home; and I do also believe that not one half of the members of the house of commons, even of those who heard it read, did perceive how destructive it was to American freedom.
For this reason, as it is usual in Great-Britain, to consider the King's speech, as the speech of the ministry, it may be right here to consider this act as the act of a party.—Perhaps I should speak more properly if I was to use another term.—
There are two ways of laying taxes.—One is by imposing a certain sum on particular kinds of property, to be paid by the user or consumer, or by taxing the person at a certain sum; the other is, by imposing a certain sum on particular kinds of property to be paid by the seller.
When a man pays the first sort of tax, he knows with certainty that he pays so much money for a tax. The consideration for which he pays it is remote, and it may be does not occur to him. He is sensible too that he is commanded and obliged to pay it as a tax; and therefore people are apt to be displeased with this sort of tax.
The other sort of tax is submitted to in a very different manner. The purchaser of any article very seldom reflects that the seller raises his price so as to indemnify him for the tax he has paid. He knows the prices of things are continually fluctuating, and if he thinks about the tax, he thinks at the same time in all probability, that he might have paid as much, if the article he buys had not been taxed. He gets something visible and agreeable for his money, and tax and price are so confounded together, that he cannot separate, or does not chuse to take the trouble of separating them.
This mode of taxation therefore is the mode suited to arbitrary and oppressive governments. The love of liberty is so naturalto the human heart, that unfeeling tyrants think themselves obliged to accommodate their schemes as much as they can to the appearance of justice and reason, and to deceive those whom they resolve to destroy or oppress, by presenting to them a miserable picture of freedom, when the inestimable original is lost.
This policy did not escape the cruel and rapacious Nero. That monster, apprehensive that his crimes might endanger his authority and life, thought proper to do some popular acts to secure the obedience of his subjects. Among other things, says[32]Tacitus, "he remitted the twenty-fifth part of the price on the sale of slaves, but rather in shew than reality; for the seller being ordered to pay it, it became a part of the price to the buyer."
This is the reflection of the judicious historian: but the deluded people gave their infamous emperor full credit for his false generosity. Other nations have been treated in the same manner the Romans were. The honest industrious Germans who are settled in different parts of this continent can inform us, that it was this sort of tax that drove them from their native land to our woods, at that time the seats of perfect and undisturbed freedom.
Their princes inflamed by the lust of power and the lust of avarice, two furies,that the more hungry they grow, transgressed the bounds, they ought in regard to themselves, to have observed. To keep up the deception in the minds of subjects "there must be," says a very learned author[33]"some proportion between the impost and the value of the commodity; wherefore there ought not to be an excessive duty upon merchandizes of little value. There are countries in which the duty exceeds seventeen or eighteen times the value of the commodity. In this case the prince removes the illusion. His subjects plainly see they are dealt with in an unreasonable manner, which renders them most exquisitely sensible of their slavish situation."
From hence it appears that subjects may be ground down into misery by this sort of taxation as well as the other. They may be as much impoverished if their money is taken from them in this way, as in the other; and that it will be taken, may be more evident, by attending to a few more considerations.
The merchant, or importer who pays the duty at first, will not consent to be so much money out of pocket. He, therefore, proportionably raises the price of his goods. It may then be said to be a contest between him and the person offering to buy, who shall lose the duty. This must be decided by the nature of the commodities and the purchasers demand for them. If they aremere luxuries, he is at liberty to do as he pleases, and if he buys, he does it voluntarily: But if they are absolute necessaries, or conveniences which use and custom have made requisite for the comfort of life, and which he is not permitted, by the power imposing the duty, to get elsewhere, there the seller has a plain advantage, and the buyer must pay the duty. In fact, the seller is nothing less than the collector of the tax for the power that imposed it. If these duties then are extended to necessaries and conveniences of life in general, and enormously increased, the people must at length become indeed "most exquisitely sensible of their slavish situation."
Their happiness, therefore, entirely depends on the moderation of those who have authority to impose the duties.
I shall now apply these observations to the late act of parliament. Certain duties are thereby imposed on paper and glass, &c. imported into these colonies. By the laws ofGreat-Britainwe are prohibited to get these articles from any other part of the world. We cannot at present, nor for many years to come, though we should apply ourselves to these manufactures with the utmost industry, make enough ourselves for our own use. That paper and glass are not only convenient, but absolutely necessary for us, I imagine very few will contend. Some, perhaps, who think mankind grew wicked and luxurious as soon as they found out another way of communicatingtheir sentiments than by speech, and another way of dwelling than in caves, may advance so whimsical an opinion. But I presume nobody will take the unnecessary trouble of refuting them.
From these remarks I think it evident, that we must use paper and glass, that what we use must beBritish, and that we must pay the duties imposed unless those who sell these articles are so generous as to make us presents of the duties they pay, which is not to be expected.
Some persons may think this act of no consequence, because the duties are sosmall. A fatal error. That is the very circumstance most alarming to me. For I am convinced that the authors of this law, would never have obtained an act to raise so trifling a sum, as it must do, had they not intended by it to establish aprecedentfor future use. To console ourselves with thesmallnessof the duties, is to walk deliberately into the snare that is set for us, praising theneatnessof the workmanship. Suppose the duties, imposed by the late act, could be paid by these distressed colonies, with the utmost ease, and that the purposes, to which they are to be applied, were the most reasonable and equitable that could be conceived, the contrary of which I hope to demonstrate before these letters are concluded, yet even in such a supposed case, these colonies ought to regard the act with abhorrence. For who are a free people? not those over whom government is reasonably and equitably exercisedbut those who live under a government, soconstitutionally checkedandcontrouled, that proper provision is made against its being otherwise exercised. The late act is founded on the destruction of this constitutional security.
If the parliament have a right to lay a duty of four shillings and eight pence on a hundred weight of glass, or a ream of paper, they have a right to lay a duty of any other sum on either. They may raise the duty as the author before quoted says, has been done in some countries, till it "exceeds seventeen or eighteen times the value of the commodity." In short, if they have a right to levy a tax ofone pennyupon us, they have a right to levy amillionupon us. For where does their right stop? At any given number of pence, shillings, or pounds? To attempt to limit their right, after granting it to exist at all, is as contrary to reason, as granting it to exist at all is contrary to justice. If they have any right to tax us, then, whether our own money shall continue in our own pockets, or not, depends no longer onus, but onthem. "There is nothing which we can call our own", or to use the words of Mr.Locke, "What property have" we "in that, which another may, by right, take, when he pleases, to himself."[34]
These duties, which will inevitably be levied upon us, and which are now levying upon us, are expressly laid for the sole purpose of taking money. This is the true definitionof taxes. They are therefore taxes. This money is to be taken from us. We are therefore taxed. Those who are taxed without their own consent, given by themselves, or their representatives, are slaves.[35]We aretaxed without our own consent given by ourselves, or our representatives. We are therefore——I speak it with grief——I speak it with indignation——we are slaves.
"Miserabile vulgus."A miserable tribe.
"Miserabile vulgus."A miserable tribe.
A FARMER.
Beloved Countrymen,
In my opinion, a dangerous example is set in the last act relating to these colonies. The power of parliament to levy money upon us for raising a revenue, is therein avowed and exerted. Regarding the act on this single principle, I must again repeat, and I think it my duty to repeat, that to me it appears to be unconstitutional.
No man, who considers the conduct of parliament since the repeal of the Stamp-act, and the disposition of many people at home, can doubt, that the chief object of attention there, is, to use Mr. Grenville's expression, "providing that the dependance and obedience of the colonies be asserted and maintained."
Under the influence of this notion, instantly on repealing the Stamp-act, an act passed, declaring the power of parliament to bind these colonies in all cases whatever. This, however, was only planting a barren tree, that cast a shade indeed over the colonies, but yielded no fruit. It being determined to enforce the authority on which the Stamp-act was founded, the parliament having never renounced the right, as Mr. Pitt advised them to do; and it being thoughtproper to disguise that authority in such a manner, as not again to alarm the colonies; some little time was required to find a method, by which both these points should be united. At last the ingenuity of Mr. Greenville and his party accomplished the matter, as it was thought, in "An act for granting certain duties in the British colonies and plantations in America, for allowing drawbacks, &c. which is the title of the act laying duties on paper, &c."
The parliament having several times before imposed duties to be paid in America, it was expected no doubt, that the repetition of such a measure would be passed over as an usual thing. But to have done this, without expressly asserting and maintaining "the power of parliament to take our money without our consent," and to apply it as they please, would not have been sufficiently declarative of its supremacy, nor sufficiently depressive of American freedom.
Therefore it is, that in this memorable act we find it expressly "provided" that money shall be levied upon us without our consent, for purposes, that render it, if possible, more dreadful than the Stamp-act.
That act, alarming as it was, declared, the money thereby to be raised, should be applied "towards defraying the expences of defending, protecting and securing the British colonies and plantations in America:" And it is evident from the whole act, that by the word "British" were intendedcolonies and plantations settled by British people, and not generally, those subject to the British crown. That act therefore seemed to have something gentle and kind in its intention, and to aim only at our own welfare: But the act now objected to, imposes duties upon the British colonies, "to defray the expences of defending, protecting and securing his Majesty's dominions in America."
What a change of words! What an incomputable addition to the expences intended by the Stamp-act! "His Majesty's dominions" comprehended not only the British colonies; but also the conquered provinces of Canada and Florida, and the British garrisons of Nova-Scotia; for these do not deserve the name of colonies.
What justice is there in making us pay for "defending, protecting and securing" these places? What benefit can we, or have we ever derived from them? None of them was conquered for us; nor will "be defended, protected and secured" for us.
In fact, however advantageous the subduing or keeping any of these countries may be to Great-Britain, the acquisition is greatly injurious to these colonies. Our chief property consists in lands. These would have been of a much greater value, if such prodigious additions had not been made to the British territories on this continent. The natural increase of our own people, if confined withinthe colonies, would have raised the value still higher and higher, every fifteen or twenty years. Besides, we should have lived more compactly together, and have been therefore more able to resist any enemy.
But now the inhabitants will be thinly scattered over an immense region, as those who want settlements, will chuse to make new ones, rather than pay great prices for old ones.
These are the consequences to the colonies of the hearty assistance they gave to Great-Britain in the late war.——A war, undertaken solely for her own benefit. The objects of it were, the securing to herself the rich tracts of land on the back of these colonies, with the Indian trade, and Nova-Scotia with the fishery. These, and much more has that kingdom gained; but the inferior animals that hunted with the Lion, have been amply rewarded for all the sweat and blood their loyalty cost them, by the honour of having sweated and bled in such company.
I will not go so far as to say, that Canada and Nova-Scotia are curbs on New-England; the chain of forts through the back woods, on the middle provinces; and Florida, on the rest: but I will venture to say, that if the products of Canada, Nova-Scotia and Florida, deserve any consideration, the two first of them are only rivals of our northern colonies and the other of our southern.
It has been said, that without the conquest of these countries, the colonies could not have been "protected, defended, and secured;" If that is true, it may with as much propriety be said, that Great-Britain could not have been "defended, protected, and secured" without that conquest: for the colonies are parts of her empire, which it is as much concerns her as them to keep out of the hands of any other power.
But these colonies when they were much weaker, defended themselves, before this conquest was made; and could again do it, against any that might properly be called their enemies. If France and Spain indeed should attack them, as members of the British empire perhaps they might be distressed; but it would be in a British quarrel.
The largest account I have seen of the number of people in Canada, does not make them exceed 90,000. Florida can hardly be said to have any inhabitants——It is computed that there are in our colonies, 3,000,000.—Our force therefore must encrease with a disproportion to the growth of their strength, that would render us very safe.
This being the state of the case, I cannot think it just, that these colonies, labouring under so many misfortunes, should be loaded with taxes, to maintain countries not only not useful, but hurtful to them. The support of Canada and Florida cost yearly, it is said, half a million sterling. From hence wemay make some guess of the load that is to be laid upon us; for we are not only to "defend, protect, and secure" them, but also to make "an adequate provision for defraying the charge of the administration of justice and the support of civil government, in such provinces where it shall be found necessary."
Not one of the provinces of Canada, Nova-Scotia, or Florida, has ever defrayed these expences within itself: And if the duties imposed by the last statute are collected, all of them together, according to the best information I can get, will not pay one-quarter as much as Pennsylvania alone. So that the British colonies are to be drained of the rewards of their labour, to cherish the scorching sands of Florida, and the icy rocks of Canada and Nova-Scotia, which never will return to us one farthing that we send to them.
Great-Britain——I mean the ministry in Great-Britain, has cantoned Canada and Florida out into five or six governments, and may form as many more. She now has fourteen or fifteen regiments on this continent; and may send over as many more. To make "an adequate provision" for all these expences, is, no doubt, to be the inheritance of the colonies.
Can any man believe that the duties upon paper, &c. are the last that will be laid for these purposes? It is in vain to hope, that because it is imprudent to lay duties on theexportation of manufactures from a mother country to colonies, as it may promote manufactures among them, that this consideration will prevent them.
Ambitious, artful men have made the measure popular, and whatever injustice or destruction will attend it in the opinion of the colonists, at home it will be thought just and salutary.[36]
The people of Great-Britain will be told, and they have been told, that they are sinking under an immense debt—that great part of this debt has been contracted in defending the colonies—that these are so ungrateful and undutiful, that they will not contribute one mite to its payment—nor even to the support of the army now kept up for their "protection and security"—that they are rolling in wealth, and are of so bold and republican a spirit, that they are aiming at independence—that the only way to retain them in "obedience" is to keep a strict watch over them, and to draw off part of their riches in taxes—and that every burden laid upon them is taking off so much from Great-Britain—These assertions will be generally believed, and the people will be persuaded that they cannot be too angry with their colonies, as that anger will be profitable to themselves.
In truth, Great-Britain alone receives any benefit from Canada, Nova-Scotia, and Florida; and therefore she alone ought to maintain them.—The old maxim of the law is drawn from reason and justice, and never could be more properly applied, than in this case.
"Qui sentit, commodum, sentire debet et onus."They who feel the benefit, ought to feel the burden.
"Qui sentit, commodum, sentire debet et onus."
They who feel the benefit, ought to feel the burden.
A FARMER.
Beloved Countrymen,
I have made some observations on the purposes for which money is to be levied upon us by the late act of parliament. I shall now offer to your consideration some further reflections on that subject; and, unless I am greatly mistaken, if these purposes are accomplished, according to the exprest intention of the act, they will be found effectually to supersede that authority in our respective assemblies, which is most essential to liberty. The question is not whether some branches shall be lopt off—The ax is laid to the root of the tree; and the whole body must infallibly perish, if we remain idle spectators of the work.
No free people ever existed, or ever can exist, without, keeping, to use a common but strong expression, "the purse strings" in their own hands. Where this is the case, they have a constitutional check upon the administration, which may thereby be brought into order without violence: but where such a power is not lodged in the people, oppression proceeds uncontrouled in its career, till the governed, transportedinto rage, seeks redress in the midst of blood and confusion.
The elegant and ingenious Mr. Hume, speaking of the Anglo-Norman government, says "princes and ministers were too ignorant to be themselves sensible of the advantages attending an equitable administration; and there was no established council or assembly which could protect the people, and, by withdrawing supplies, regularly and peaceably admonish the King of his duty, and ensure the execution of the laws."
Thus this great man, whose political reflections are so much admired, makes this power one of the foundations of liberty.
The English history abounds with instances, proving that this is the proper and successful way to obtain redress of grievances. How often have Kings and ministers endeavoured to throw off this legal curb upon them, by attempting to raise money by a variety of inventions, under pretence of law, without having recourse to parliament? And how often have they been brought to reason, and peaceably obliged to do justice, by the exertion of this constitutional authority of the people, vested in their representatives?
The inhabitants of these colonies have on numberless occasions, reaped the benefits of this authority lodged in their assemblies.
It has been for a long time, and now is, a constant instruction to all governors, to obtain a permanent support for the officers of government. But as the author of the administration of the colonies says, "this order of the crown is generally, if not universally, rejected by the legislatures of the colonies."
They perfectly know how much their grievances would be regarded, if they had no other method of engaging attention, than by complaining. Those who rule, are extremely apt to think well of the constructions made by themselves, in support of their own power. These are frequently erroneous and pernicious to those they govern—Dry remonstrances, to shew that such constructions are wrong and oppressive, carry very little weight with them, in the opinion of persons, who gratify their own inclinations in making these constructions. They cannot understand the reasoning that opposes their power and desire: but let it be made their interest to understand such reasoning—and a wonderful light is instantly thrown on the matter; and then rejected remonstrances become as clear as "proof of holy writ."[37]
The three most important articles, that our assemblies, or any legislatures can provide for, are, first the defence of the society:secondly—the administration of justice: and, thirdly, the support of civil government.
Nothing can properly regulate the expence of making provision for these occasions, but the necessities of the society; its abilities; the conveniency of the modes of levying money among them; the manner in which the laws have been executed; and the conduct of the officers of government; all which are circumstances that cannot possibly be properly known, but by the society itself; or, if they should be known, will not, probably, be properly considered, but by that society.
If money may be raised upon us, by others, without our consent, for our "defence," those who are the judges in levying it, must also be the judges in applying it. Of consequence, the money said to be taken from us for our defence, may be employed to our injury. We may be chained in by a line of fortifications: obliged to pay for building and maintaining them; and be told that they are for our defence. With what face can we dispute the fact, after having granted, that those who apply the money, had a right to levy it; for, surely, it is much easier for their wisdom to understand how to apply it in the best manner, than how to levy it in the best manner. Besides, the right of levying is of infinitely more consequence, than that of applying it. The people of England, that would burst out intofury, if the crown should attempt to levy money by its own authority, have assigned to the crown the application of money.
As to "the administration of justice"—the judges ought, in a well regulated state, to be equally independant of the legislative powers. Thus, in England, judges hold their commissions from the crown "during good behaviour;" and have salaries, suitable to their dignity, settled on them by parliament. The purity of the courts of law, since this establishment, is a proof of the wisdom with which it was made.
But, in these colonies, how fruitless has been every attempt to have the judges appointed during good behaviour; yet whoever considers the matter will soon perceive, that such commissions are beyond all comparison more necessary in these colonies, than they are in England.
The chief danger to the subject there, arose from the arbitrary designs of the crown; but here, the time may come, when we may have to contend with the designs of the crown, and of a mighty kingdom. What then will be our chance, when the laws of life and death, are to be spoken by judges, totally dependant on that crown and kingdom—sent over, perhaps, from thence—filled with British prejudice—and backed by a standing army, supported out of our own pockets, to "assert and maintain" our own "dependance and obedience."
But supposing, that through the extreme lenity that will prevail in the government, through all future ages, these colonies never will behold any thing like the campaign of chief justice Jeffereys, yet what innumerable acts of injustice may be committed, and how fatally may the principles of liberty be sapped by a succession of judges utterly independant of the people? Before such judges, the supple wretches, who cheerfully join in avowing sentiments inconsistent with freedom, will always meet with smiles: while the honest and brave men, who disdain to sacrifice their native land to their own advantage, but on every occasion, boldly vindicate her cause, will constantly be regarded with frowns.
There are two other considerations, relating to this head, that deserve the most serious attention.
By the late act the officers of the customs are impowered "to enter into any house, warehouse, shop, cellar, or other place, in the British colonies or plantations in America, to search for, or seize prohibited or unaccustomed goods," &c. on "writs granted by the inferior or supreme court of justice, having jurisdiction within such colony or plantation respectively."
If we only reflect that the judges of these courts are to beduring pleasure—that they are to have "adequate provision" made for them, which is to continue during theircomplisant behaviour—that they may bestranger to these colonies—what an engine of oppression may this authority be in such hands?
I am well aware that writs of this kind may be granted at home, under the seal of the court of exchequer: But I know also that the greatest asserters of the rights of Englishmen, have always strenuously contended, that such a power was dangerous to freedom, and expressly contrary to the common law, which ever regarded a man's house, as his castle, or a place of perfect security.
If such a power is in the least degree dangerous there, it must be utterly destructive to liberty here.—For the people there have two securities against the undue exercise of this power by the crown, which are wanting with us, if the late act takes place. In the first place, if any injustice is done there, the person injured may bring his action against the offender, and have it tried by independant judges, who are[38]no parties in committing the injury. Here he must have it tried before dependant judges, being the men who granted the writ.
To say that the cause is to be tried by a jury can never reconcile men, who have any idea of freedom to such a power.—For we know, that sheriffs in almost every colonyon this continent, are totally dependant on the crown; and packing of juries has been frequently practiced even in the capital of the British empire. Even if juries are well inclined, we have too many instances of the influence of overbearing unjust judges upon them. The brave and wise men who accomplished the revolution, thought the independency of judges essential to freedom.
The other security which the people have at home, but which we shall want here, is this.—If this power is abused there, the parliament, the grand resource of the opprest people, is ready to afford relief. Redress of grievances must precede grants of money. But what regard can we expect to have paid to our assemblies, when they will not hold even the puny privilege of French parliaments——that of registering the edicts, that take away our money, before they are put in execution.
The second consideration above hinted at, is this—There is a confusion in our laws that is quite unknown in Great-Britain. As this cannot be described in a more clear or exact manner, than has been done by the ingenious author of the history of New-York, I beg leave to use his words. "The state of our laws opens a door to much controversy. The uncertainty which respect them, renders property precarious, and greatly exposes us to the arbitrary decision of unjust judges.The common law of England is generally received, together with such statutes, as were enacted before we had a legislature of our own; but our courts exercise a sovereign authority, in determining what parts of the common and statute law ought to be extended: For it must be admitted, that the difference of circumstances necessarily requires us, in some cases, to reject the determination of both. In many instances they have also extended even acts of parliament, passed since we had a distinct legislature, which is greatly adding to our confusion. The practice of our courts is no less uncertain than the law. Some of the English rules are adopted, others rejected. Two things therefore seem to be absolutely necessary for the public security. First the passing an act for settling the extent of the English laws. Secondly, that the courts ordain a general set of rules for the regulation of the practice."
How easy will it be under this "state of our laws" for an artful judge to act in the most arbitrary manner, and yet cover his conduct under specious pretences, and how difficult will it be for the injured people to obtain redress, may be readily perceived. We may take a voyage of three thousand miles to complain; and after the trouble and hazard we have undergone, we may be told, that the collection of the revenue and maintenance of the prerogative, must not be discouraged.——And if the misbehaviour is sogross as to admit of no justification, it may be said that it was an error in judgment only, arising from the confusion of our laws, and the zeal of the King's servants to do their duty.
If the commissions of judges are during the pleasure of the crown, yet if their salaries are during the pleasure of the people, there will be some check upon their conduct. Few men will consent to draw on themselves the hatred and contempt of those among whom we live, for the empty honour of being judges. It is the sordid love of gain that tempts men to turn their backs on virtue, and pay their homage where they ought not.
As to the third particular, the "support of civil government," few words will be sufficient. Every man of the least understanding must know, that the executive power may be exercised in a manner so disagreeable and harassing to the people, that it is absolutely requisite, they should be enabled by the gentlest method which human policy has yet been ingenious enough to invent, that is by the shutting their hands, to "admonish" (as Mr. Hume says) certain persons "of their duty."
What shall we now think, when, upon looking into the late act, we find the assemblies of these provinces thereby stript of their authority on these several heads? The declared intention of that act is, "that a revenueshould be raised in his Majesty's dominions in America, for making a more certain and adequate provision for defraying the charge of the administration of justice, and the support of civil government, in such provinces where it shall be found necessary; and towards further defraying the expences of defending, protecting, and securing the said dominions," &c.
Let the reader pause here one moment, and reflect—whether the colony in which he lives, has not made such "certain and adequate provisions" for these purposes, as is by the colony judged suitable to its abilities, and all other circumstances. Then let him reflect—whether, if this act takes place, money is not to be raised on that colony without its consent to make provision for these purposes, which it does not judge to be suitable to its abilities, and all other circumstances. Lastly, let him reflect—whether the people of that country are not in a state of the most abject slavery, whose property may be taken from them under the notion of right, when they have refused to give it. For my part, I think I have good reason for vindicating the honour of the assemblies on this continent, by publicly asserting, that they have made as "certain and adequate provision" for the purposes above-mentioned, as they ought to have made; and that it should not be presumed, that they will not do it hereafter. Why thenshould these most important truths be wrested out of their hands? Why should they not now be permitted to enjoy that authority, which they have exercised from the first settlement of these colonies? Why should they be scandalized by this innovation, when their respective provinces are now, and will be for several years, labouring under loads of debts imposed on them for the very purposes now spoken of? Why should the inhabitants of all these colonies be with the utmost indignity treated, as a herd of despicable wretches, so utterly void of common sense, that they will not even make "adequate provision" for the "administration of justice" and "the support of civil government" among them, for their "own defence"—though without such "provision" every people must inevitably be overwhelmed with anarchy and destruction? Is it possible to form an idea of slavery more complete, more miserable, more disgraceful, than that of a people, where justice is administered, government exercised, and a standing army maintained, at the expence of the people, and yet without the least dependance upon them? If we can find no relief from this infamous situation, let Mr. Grenville set his fertile fancy again to work, and as by one exertion of it, he has stripped us of our property and liberty, let him by another deprive us of our understanding too, that unconscious of what we havebeen or are, and ungoaded by tormenting reflections, we may tamely bow down our necks with all the stupid serenity of servitude, to any drudgery, which our lords and masters may please to command.—
When the "charges of the administration of justice,"—"the support of civil government;"—and "the expences of defending protecting and securing" us, are provided for, I should be glad to know upon what occasion the crown will ever call our assemblies together. Some few of them may meet of their own accord, by virtue of their charters: But what will they have to do when they are met? To what shadows will they be reduced? The men, whose deliberations heretofore had an influence on every matter relating to the liberty and happiness of themselves and their constituents, and whose authority in domestic affairs, at least, might well be compared to that of Roman senators, will now find their deliberations of no more consequence than those of constables.—They may perhaps be allowed to make laws for yoking of hogs, or pounding of stray cattle. Their influence will hardly be permitted to extend so high as the keeping roads in repair, as that business may more properly be executed by those who receive the public cash.
One most memorable example in history is so applicable to the point now insisted on,that it will form a just conclusion of the observations that have been made.
Spain was once free. TheirCortesresembled our parliament. No money could be raised on the subject, without their consent. One of their Kings having received a grant from them to maintain a war against the Moors, desired, that if the sum which they had given, should not be sufficient, he might be allowed for that emergency only, to have more money, without assembling theCortes. The request was violently opposed by the best and wisest men in the assembly. It was however, complied with by the votes of a majority; and this single concession was a precedent for other concessions of the like kinds, until, at last, the crown obtained a general power for raising money in cases of necessity. From that period theCortesceased to be useful, and the people ceased to be free.