(d) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE
To treat of the complicated problems of the political and social life of the present does not come within our purpose; we can consider them only so far as the task of the construction of an independent spiritual world is affected either for good or evil by the nature of their solution.
In contrast to the epoch of the Enlightenment, the nineteenth century brought about a transition from the individual to society: social life has developed in numerous branches, has disclosed a superabundance of new facts, and has set us new tasks. But this development has also brought much perplexity with it. It becomes evident in this development also, that each spiritual movement that attains power experiences in its further course limitations, and is degraded by its contact with human conditions. Along with the social movement there has been the often-discussed change by which life from being centred in an invisible world becomes occupied with the visible one, and by which all departments of life are given a naturalistic, realistic character and tendency. There has been no lack of opposition to the movement to make society the first consideration; the opposition has gone even so far as to dispute the right of the whole. Further, the earlier and the later conception of society, the idealistic and the realistic, are often confused; and from this confusion contradictions arise that not only confuse our ideas but also degrade our life. There is a danger that a zealous and excited occupationwith nothing but individual tasks may take our attention from the whole, and that the problems which the inner condition of man involves may not obtain due consideration.
This turning to society is most manifest in the powerful advance of the state. In this, an inner longing for a more social life, as Hegel especially philosophically advocated it; and actual changes of conditions operated together, and strengthened one another. The more definite manifestation of individuality on the part of nations and the sharper division between them; the active interest of wider circles in political problems; the mechanical organisation of work, with its more exact differentiation and its more rigid organisation of forces; but primarily the longing, which grows out of the ceaselessly increasing economical and social perplexities, for a power superior to the parties in dispute and acting as arbitrator—all these have immeasurably increased the power of the state in different degrees among different peoples, but in general through the whole civilised world.
The freedom of the individual, therefore, cannot but suffer from manifold limitations; there arises a danger that the individual may gradually lose all initiative, and expect all stimulation from the state. The spontaneity and the wealth of life suffer from the tendency to increase the power of the state, and a bureaucracy which delights in correct forms, but which spiritually is entirely unproductive, indeed even indifferent, appropriates more and more to itself. The substance of the spiritual life is also threatened by the fact that the omnipotent state is inclined to treat that life, with all its branches, as a mere means in the attainment of its own particular aims; to look upon science and art, and chiefly religion and education, especially with regard to that which they achieve for the aims of the state, and to shape them as much as possible in accordance with these aims. There is also a strong tendency to follow the same course to accomplish the ends of the contemporary form of government. An independent and genuine spiritual life can hardly offer too great an opposition to such a perversion,with its deification of human forms. But the matter is by no means simple; for not the will of single individuals and parties, but the whole tendency of modern life has given this power to the state; indeed, on the economic side the state will soon experience a further increase of power. The more the guidance on this side belongs to the state, the more necessary is a free movement of spiritual culture in opposition to it; the more urgent is the demand that the amalgamation of church and state should be discontinued—an amalgamation which, by the growing disputes that arise from it, forces religion into an undignified position; the more definitely is a greater independence to be desired for school organisation in all its branches. The Germans especially have much to do in this matter; and there is much at stake. For, with the limitations of our spatial extension, we can be a permanent determining factor in world-culture only by giving our culture the greatest intensity; but this requires a calling forth of the complete power and of the spontaneity of individuals. Ultimately, in this matter also, the chief thing proves to be the taking up again of central problems and the realisation of human being in its innermost depths as an unconditional end in itself and the bearer of an infinite life. No conception can guard us from sinking to the position of puppets of the soulless mechanism of the state, if we do not find the power to give soul to our life and to maintain it against all attempted limitation.
The longing for more freedom and independence has therefore an indisputable validity. But this acknowledgment may easily lead to new complications by freedom and independence being conceived in a manner much too external, and also by a really questionable association of these ideas with the problem of equality. The conviction of the modern man concerning the world on the one hand, and the demands of life on the other, are often in direct contradiction with regard to the conception of equality. We become aware of our limitation on all sides: we are represented simply as a product of heredity and environment:all possibility of making a decision for ourselves is rejected as a delusion. If thus we are deprived of all independence and all spontaneity of life, then even in social life we shall become mere bearers of arôleimposed upon us by a dark fate. One does not see how freedom could retain a value, arouse enthusiasm, and lead to sacrifice in such a case. If the whole is a soulless mechanism, in which only the excess of existent power is the cause of decisions, then we ourselves cannot be exceptions.
Other complications have their origin in the democratic tendency which permeates not only our political endeavour but also our whole life of culture. How far-reaching a change, indeed how complete a revolution, has been accomplished by this tendency in opposition to a condition of things which has stood for hundreds or rather thousands of years, is but seldom fully appreciated. In the earlier form of social life spiritual work was the chief matter only of a limited and exclusive circle; to the people as a whole it was only secondary, and the benefit that they received from it was often of the most meagre character. Even the Reformation left this aristocratic form of life as it was; for as certainly as it made the care for every individual member of the church more urgent, that care was bestowed from above in an authoritative manner. The earlier Enlightenment, as it was represented, for example, by Bayle, was of the conviction that the deliverance from delusion and superstition would always be limited to a small circle of those standing spiritually high, and would never reach the masses. We know how this has changed; how the masses are determined to form a mere dependent body of the so-called higher classes no longer, but to take the problem of life independently into their own hands, and how they obtain their representation of the world and the task of their life from that which is more immediately present to them and directly concerns their welfare; and how in this way they are inclined to look upon themselves as the whole of humanity. We have already referred tothe danger that culture as a whole will thus be made shallow—a danger that arises from the fact that here the decision is made by those who scarcely participate in the work of history, and who depend almost entirely upon the immediate impression. Further, we have already contended that only a simplification and rejuvenation of culture are able to cope with this danger. The fact is important that this democratic movement appeals to the equality of all who bear human features. Here again there appears to be a direct contradiction between theoretical conviction and actual conditions. Experience everywhere shows a pronounced inequality among men; it shows this not only in the traditional social relationships but also in the organisation of modern industry. More, however, than all social arrangements, nature shows the greatest inequality amongst men; and the actual relation of individuals in work and idleness, in love and hate, in independent thinking and blind subordination shows it none the less. From the point of view of experience the idea of equality seems to be an empty phrase. If it is more than this, if we recognise in it a truth that we cannot afford to lose, then it implies the conviction that humanity has spiritual relations; that each has a significance in a spiritual nature, and that there is a universal life present everywhere which opposes the guilt and folly of the individual and even in spite of himself gives him a value. Thus we have seen that in history, religion and ideal culture were the first to bring the idea of equality into good repute. But to-day the champions of equality turn with particular keenness against religion and ideal culture, and are not aware that in so doing they are destroying the foundations of their own belief.
These inconsistencies are not felt, chiefly because of the power which abstractions usually exercise over men in the present day. A faith in abstractions reigns amongst us which is capable of far greater things than faith in religion or faith in reason. We are surrounded by the bustle of a fierce and ceaselessly increasing struggle for existence:ideas are overgrown by interests; the motives of people in general are trivial, and all spiritual aspiration is feeble, and along with this there is an unutterable amount of pretence which permeates and distorts all conduct. Yet the disagreeable aspect of this condition seems to vanish as soon as the mere word “humanity” is mentioned. But what is humanity from the point of view of Naturalism other than a collection of beings of nature? How can a power to elevate and to strengthen proceed from this conception, which in the naturalistic context signifies no more than the subjective unification of the individuals? Or, again, the idea of a ceaseless progress of humanity is placed in opposition to the confusions which exist in the present. But how can this idea be established if a compelling reason is not active within man? How could the present be so incomplete and so full of perplexity as it seems, especially to the advocates of the idea of progress, if century after century had made progress upon progress? Rather, if man has such a noble nature as he is assumed to have, life should be full of reason and bliss. The old faith saved man by resorting to an invisible world; it required a firm confidence in that which one did not see. The new faith, which denies an invisible world, desires more: it desires that we should be convinced of the direct opposite of that which we see and comprehend. These considerations in no way signify a depreciation on our part of the effort to attain freedom and equality—an effort that has an indisputable validity. But this validity must be based upon a whole of life and be more definitely determined, otherwise the effort is stifled by the inconsistencies in which the conceptions of freedom and equality are involved in the minds of their advocates.
The independence of the individual and the spontaneity of the spiritual life are endangered not only by the mechanism of a bureaucracy indifferent to spiritual values but also none the less by the movements of the masses, which in modern life in particular surround and browbeat the individual. The man of the present day often believesthat he has gained freedom when in reality he has only changed the nature of his dependence. What makes the movements of the masses, with their so-called public opinion, so irksome is the falsehood that is generally contained in this opinion, which is presented as proceeding from the experience and decision of a great majority, and therefore as having a definite presupposition of truth. The fact, as a rule, is that a few venture an assertion and urge it upon the others with unobserved compulsion, since they proclaim as already existent the agreement that they are only seeking. Of course sometimes there is much more in public opinion; it may be the expression of a spiritual necessity which subjects to itself the dispositions of men. Whether public opinion is to be an interpreter of truth or a mere product of man remains to be decided; and this decision can rest only with the individual. He will be equal to making this decision if he possesses a spiritual experience, and has in this a touchstone by which to distinguish the genuine from the false.
Philosophy can maintain the rights of the individual only so far as he is rooted in spiritual relationships and derives power from them; it must absolutely oppose all glorification of the natural, spiritually destitute individual. We find such a glorification to-day more especially in that which, with particular emphasis, is called “modern” morality, but which in fact threatens rather to be a complete negation of morality; even though this negation is against the intentions of its advocates, mostly women, who display great enthusiasm for this “modern” morality. It seems as though life is limited and degraded because society, particularly in the matter of the sexual life, prescribes rigid statutes which, if they were not irrational at the beginning, have nevertheless become irrational, and tend to brand the right as wrong and the wrong as right. The shaking off of these restrictions and of the pressure of society in general seems to promise a form of life incomparably more powerful, sincere, and individual: this life is also to offer more beauty, for to-day generally the ideaof beauty is emphasised with great partiality where life has no clear ideas and no significant content.
This criticism of the statutes of society is not entirely without reason. Such statutes do not in themselves constitute a morality, as it is easy to imagine they do; but they only advocate a morality; as life undergoes such far-reaching changes, these statutes must continually be examined anew as to their validity and value. But this relativity does not make them worthless, and does not justify their complete rejection in favour of an absolute freedom on the part of individuals. We could expect an elevation of life by such an effort for freedom only if we might assume that the individuals are thoroughly noble, energetic, and spiritually rich, and if in the relations between the sexes a state of paradisiacal innocence reigned which only the evil arrangements of society had disturbed. But this is a way of thinking which does more honour to the hearts than to the heads of its advocates. He who takes men as they really are and does not paint them in romantic colours, and who at the same time recognises the dangers of a highly developed, pleasure-seeking, and over-refined state of culture, will not despise those social arrangements, notwithstanding their relativity, but value them as an indispensable safeguard against the selfishness, the greed for pleasure, and the instability of the mere individual—a safeguard not only against the tyranny of externals but also for the individual against himself. It is unfortunate enough that such safeguards are necessary; but, as they are necessary, it is better to preserve and improve them as much as possible than to reject them, and to expose humanity to dangers that might throw it back into the condition of the animals. Man is not better because he is painted more beautifully; rather Pascal is right when he says: “L’homme n’est ni ange ni bête, et le malheur veut, que qui veut faire l’ange fait la bête.”
The tendency to think that man may be transformed inwardly and the whole condition of life raised by changes in external organisation is most definitely felt in the socialmovements of the age. In this there is a clearly marked opposition to the earlier mode of thought, which, placing a low estimate upon everything external, and finding greatness too easily in disposition, overlooked how much the organisation of the conditions of life means for men in whom the spiritual is only in process of development; and, further, failed to notice that there is also a strong movement from external to internal. Nevertheless, the fact cannot be denied, notwithstanding all this, that the problems of the whole and of man’s inner nature require to be treated as of chief importance. Otherwise, as Aristotle suggested, notwithstanding all the alteration of conditions, the old problems will continually make their appearance anew, and the substance of life might easily suffer from that which was intended to improve its condition.
In conclusion, we may briefly consider the problems that have been raised in the nineteenth century by the increased emphasis on the idea of nationality. Influences of an idealistic nature first raised the cultivation and establishment of a particular national character to the position of a matter of the greatest importance. This character appeared to be an extremely valuable form of individualisation of the spiritual life, a form in which that life attains to concreteness and greater definiteness and penetration. The co-existence of these individual nationalities gave promise of an incomparably richer formation of the life of humanity as a whole: the inner development of their peculiar natures, and their lofty rivalry, also promised to bring a wealth of arousing and elevating motives. The nineteenth century has, indeed, won an incalculable amount through this movement; to take up an abstract cosmopolitanism again would be decidedly retrograde.
But the more the idea of nationality has been brought from its high place in the realm of thought to the domain of human circumstance, the more has it been debased and the more dangers has it produced. If previously the cultivation of an ideal type of life was most prominent, and ifthe nations could thus permit one another to follow their own courses peacefully, this has become less and less the case in face of the desire and effort for power and expansion in the visible world; and owing to the narrowness of physical space occupied by the nations, the different strivings have clashed together more and more severely. If this tendency continues without the counteraction of an inner task common to humanity as a whole, and of unifying and elevating ideas, it is hardly possible to avoid mutual hostility, a degeneration into obstinacy and injustice. The idea of nationality may therefore become a danger to the ethical character of life. This is the case if, by milder or by severer means, one nation tries to force its own character and speech upon another. The mode of thought based on the oldcujus regio ejus natiois in no way better than that based on the oldcujus regio ejus religio, which we are now accustomed to regard with contempt as a piece of barbarism. The desire for external power at the same time tends to lessen the attention to the inner development and unification of nationality, without which ultimately little progress can be made in the development of power. It is through a common national character, with its unification of the feelings and efforts of the individuals, that a people is first elevated into a genuine nation; it is a character such as this that gives to a people a power of influencing humanity as a whole; it is a character such as this that gives to the individuals the consciousness of being “members one of another,” and with this a stability and a joy in life and activity. Such a national character necessitates certain natural conditions, that are like the veins in marble which prescribe a certain direction to the work of the artist. But these conditions must first be organised and by the complete elevation of their nature spiritually unified; and this cannot be achieved otherwise than through our own work, which through common events and experiences follows its ideal. So far, therefore, national character is not a gift of nature but a task which presents itself distinctively to each people according to its natureand conditions. In this matter a people must always in the first place realise a unity in its own nature.
In the fulfilment of this task hardly any other people has had to contend with keener opposition, both external and internal, than the Germans. Our physical environment does not direct us so definitely into distinctive paths as is the case with other peoples. But our inner nature contains, before all else, harsh antitheses. Our strength lies chiefly in arousing to life depths of the soul otherwise undreamt of. Thus in music and in poetry we have been able to surpass all other peoples; again, we have been able to give to religion a wonderful inwardness, and in education to evolve the leading ideas. At the same time, however, we are driven to the physical world to take possession of and to shape things; we are not the Hindus of Europe, as other people indeed previously called us. We came into history by achievements in war, and the desire for conflict and victory has been maintained through all the phases of our varied history. By the continued diligence of our citizens in work we have subordinated the world around us to our aims; our capacity for organisation has been most marked, as the present state of industry and trade shows. However, not only have these movements towards inwardness, and towards the world, a strong tendency to oppose one another, but also, in contrast with these magnificent gifts, there are many defects and tendencies that make the development of a powerful and unified life exceedingly difficult. We show a want of form and taste, a heaviness and formality, a tendency to occupation with detail and, in general, with what is petty in life, and, as a result of this, an uncultured “Philistinism” in all spheres of society, and along with this the inclination on the part of individuals to insist on the correctness of their positions, and thus to cause division; finally—and this is the worst of all—much envy and jealousy. None of these features can be denied. There is an infinite amount which must be altered and overcome amongst us if we are to become what we are capable of becoming, and if we are to reach the highest in our nature.The limitations that have been brought about by our history, which on the whole has not been a happy one, constitute an important determining factor in this matter. The more problems we bear within us, the more possibilities of genuine creation that exist within us, and the more we may be to humanity in the future, the more painful is it if attention and activity are diverted from the chief task, and if an externalising of the idea of nationality allows us to consider ourselves great rather than lead us to strive for true greatness. The people that has produced Luther and Bach, Kant and Goethe, cannot be devoid of true greatness, if it only remains faithful to its own nature, and if it concentrates its power and treats the chief thing really as such.
(e) THE LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
The problems and antitheses that are to be found in the life of the present penetrate deeply into the life of the individual, and often make their appearance within him with a particular power. The antithesis that exists between the conceptions of the world and the demands of life is especially harsh. The tendency of the age is to form a conception of the world which reduces the status of the individual in the greatest degree: from the point of view of nature and of society, he seems to be no more than a fleeting appearance, a matter of indifference, and to show no independence, and never to be able to take part with spontaneous activity in the course of events. On the other hand, the contemporary form of life demands the greatest independence and freedom of the individual. We see in him the chief bearer of life, and we expect salvation from the severe perplexities of the time, primarily from his strengthening. This state of inconsistency cannot be tolerated for long; either the degradation of the individual, that is found in the conceptions of the world, must beapplied to life, and lead it to a resigned submission to an impenetrable world-process, or the positive estimate of the individual which governs conduct must be acknowledged in the conviction concerning reality as a whole: only a weakness of disposition and a feebleness of thought can divide our existence between the one conviction and the other.
The course which our investigation has taken cannot leave any possible doubt as to the direction which our conviction points out to us in this matter: however much we also demand an energetic development of the individual, that the stagnation of the age may be overcome, at the same time we insist upon a necessary condition of this, on his inner strengthening by an inner world present to him, on his elevation by a spirituality transcending nature. Only if he thus acquires an inner relation to infinity, and becomes an independent centre of life, can he satisfy the demands that are generally made upon him, and, remarkably enough, especially by those who theoretically deny the inner world as a whole, and hail a most shallow Naturalism as a deliverance.
Of course that inner elevation of the individual by no means lifts him gently and simply out of all the confusion that the experience of our existence shows; at the first glance it may even seem to make the confusion greater. For, if each individual can become a co-operator in the building up of a new world, and if his activity thereby acquires a value for the whole, then the complete indifference with which, according to our human impression, the individual is treated by the course of the physical world, the inflexibility and injustice that he often experiences in this world, the defect of love and justice in this world, in which the bad so often obtain the victory and the good are led to destruction, are all the greater mystery. The more the development of the spiritual life widens the field of vision; the more it leads us beyond a lifeless resignation to the question of the rationality of events and compels us to compare the destiny of one man with that of another,the deeper must that feeling of mystery become. All attempts at a theodicy founder on this difficulty; we must inevitably submit to the view that with regard to this problem all is obscure to the eyes of man. There is, however, no need on this account to doubt and to regard our life as hopeless; our investigation also has shown this. For, in contrast with the obscurity of the world around us, we are able to set the fact of the emergence of a new world within us. Great things take place within us; not only does a new world appear, but we are called by an inner necessity of our own being to co-operate in its development, and this co-operation is not limited to individual activities, but involves our being as a whole. For it was just in this that we were able to recognise the development of being as the essence of the spiritual life—that the chief movement of our life is to win a genuine being, and that in the development of personality and spiritual individuality such a being is in question. We saw clearly enough that we are not personalities and individuals from the beginning; but that nature gives us only the possibility of becoming this. To realise this possibility our own activity is necessary; and this activity is not a sudden resolution, but requires a revolution of our being and the development of a new nature; and this can only be achieved by a faithful and zealous life-work, and even then only approximately. Thus life as a whole is a task which includes all multiplicity within it, the task of winning our own being completely, and just in this way to increase the kingdom of the spirit at our point.
This task cannot be completely recognised and adopted without making a great divergence from the aim, harsh oppositions and difficult conflicts, manifest in the inner recesses of the soul. If our life, therefore, appears to be in the highest degree incomplete, a mere beginning, then this increase of the task demonstrates more than anything else that, in this matter, we are concerned not with phantoms and imaginations, but with realities: so here, notwithstanding all our incompleteness, we can obtain the certaintyof a spiritual existence, and even become strengthened by the direct resistance of the external world, because that world is henceforth reduced to the secondary position. Thus, as we saw, the question upon which minds separate into irreconcilable opposition is whether they acknowledge in the inwardness of being itself not merely individual problems but a universal task; if this is the case, the seriousness of the task will give to them an unshakable stability of possession and a security superior to all attacks; if it is not the case, the spiritual world is an unintelligible paradox, because the want of an independent inner life means that there is no basis for the development of an organ for the comprehension of a world of inwardness. In this matter there is no possibility of a direct agreement; only the proof of the spirit and of power can decide.
But where the life of the individual acquires a genuine being and a connection with the realm of self-consciousness, then, notwithstanding all that is fleeting and insubstantial, the individual cannot regard himself as a transitory appearance in the whole, even in the ultimate basis of his being. Where, in contrast with all the meaninglessness of mere nature and all the pretence of mere society, a movement towards inner unity and substantial being emerges, the individual will be elevated into a time-transcendent order, and must necessarily acquire some position within it. The whole movement towards spirituality in the human sphere would be vain, and all distinctively human life would be a meaningless contradiction, if the individuals in whom alone the spiritual life breaks forth spontaneously were included solely and entirely in the stream of the process of nature. If the spiritual life has once revealed itself to us, so far as to begin an independent and distinctive being within us, then this being will assert itself in some way. This does not imply agreement with the usual belief in immortality, which would preserve man just as he is through all eternity, and thus condemn him to the torture of rigid continuance in the same form; a state that would, indeed, be as unbearable as the pain of the traditionalhell. As the world as a whole is in the highest degree mysterious to us, so our future is veiled in the deepest obscurity. But, if with the essence of our being we are elevated into a universal spiritual life, and if in the innermost basis of our life we participate in an eternal order, then the time-transcendence of this life assures to us also some kind of time-transcendence in our being.
So löst sich jene grosse FrageNach unserm zweiten Vaterland,Denn das Beständige der ird’schen TageVerbürgt uns ewigen Bestand.Goethe
So löst sich jene grosse Frage
Nach unserm zweiten Vaterland,
Denn das Beständige der ird’schen Tage
Verbürgt uns ewigen Bestand.
Goethe
CONCLUSION
Inconclusion a few words will suffice. The last section showed that the present sets great problems and reveals possibilities in every department of life; but that we men are very far from being equal to cope with these problems. We are limited especially by the fact that we are incapable of elevating ourselves inwardly above the present; that we do not take possession of it sufficiently as a whole, and find an inner independence in relation to it; and that therefore we do not enter with the necessary vigour into the conflict against the trivial and the poor-spirited, the decadent and the sceptical that the present contains. To point out the way to attain such independence appeared to us to be the chief task of philosophy in the present. In the service of this task, which cannot be achieved without the manifestation of a new actuality, without a fundamental deepening of our reality, we have made our investigation, which contains a distinctive conception of the spiritual life. In that everywhere we have pressed back from the results to the experience, and from the wealth of achievement to the generating basis, we have seen nature, history, culture, and human nature as a whole in a new light. We have hoped,by widening and strengthening life itself from within, to supply a substitute for the external supports that life has lost. How far we have succeeded in our endeavour is another question; we shall be satisfied even if our work only contributes to bring the present to a clearer consciousness of the state of spiritual crisis in which it exists and concerning the seriousness of which it deceives itself in a thousand ways. There is an enormous amount of vigorous activity and efficient work, of honest endeavour and serious disposition, in our time, and the tendency to make life more spiritual is also evident. But the movement is still far from attaining the depth which is necessary to the chief question of our spiritual existence; thus the conflict, instead of being between whole and whole, is divided; that which is significant and valuable in the endeavour of the time is in danger of becoming problematic, and of producing the opposite of what it purposes, because it does not fit itself into a universal life, and in this realise its limitations and at the same time its right. A more energetic concentration of life in itself is therefore the first condition of transcending the chaos of the life of the present and of preventing spiritual degeneration in the midst of too intense an occupation with externals. As for the rest, we may say with Plotinus: “The doctrine serves to point the way and guide the traveller; the vision, however, is for him who will see it.”
INDEX
Abstractions; their power in modern life,362ff.Activism; profession of faith in,255ff.; how it differs from a system of mere force,255ff.; its ethical character,256; how it differs from Voluntarism and Pragmatism,256ff.Æsthetic Individualism,61ff.Æstheticism; its antithesis to Activism,258ff.Antiquity; its distinctive synthesis of life,208ff.A priori; its validity and its limitations,234Archimedean point in the spiritual life; its impossibility,94ff.,154Art and literature, condition and tasks in the present,354ff.Ascetic organisation of life; rejected,281ff.Being, development of; as a system of life,212ff.,314Catholicism; different tendencies in,328ff.Christianity; its unique character,6; the opposition to,7ff.; its permanent truth,331ff.; changes necessary to it,332ff.; Christian and Greek forms of life,283ff.“Classical,” the; its significance,192Concentration of life (within the whole),156ff.,160Conscience; its significance,129ff.Critical character of modern work; its presuppositions,250ff.Culture,110ff.; genuine and apparent,269ff.; requirements of a new type,298ff.; organisation of,315ff.Democratic tendency of modern culture,361ff.Departments of life; their relation to life as a whole,316ff.Dogmatic sectarian point of view; rejected,328Duty; significance of the idea,184ff.,231Education; problems in the present state of,343ff.Enlightenment, the; its synthesis of life,209ff.; how far problematic,249; relation of the present to it,347ff.Equality; problems of the present conception of,362Eternity; how far implied in the life of the individual,372Ethical character of life; how to be understood,256,258; of spiritual culture,309ff.; its necessity,337ff.Ethics (morality); different types in the present time,336ff.; conditions of a morality,338ff.; requirements of morality in a spiritual culture,339ff.Evil; the problem of,263ff.; the way in which it is solved,279ff.Evolution, doctrine of; spiritual, its limitations,194ff.,257ff.Experience; its significance for the spiritual life in man,235ff.Freedom; its nature,174ff.; its conflict with destiny,181ff.; genuine and false,323ff.; inconsistency in contemporary treatment of the problem,360ff.German character; its greatness and its dangers,317ff.,368ff.Goethe; characteristic influence,299Good, the (idea of the good); how it differs from the Useful,119ff.; apparent inconsistency,138ff.; more detailed determination,185ff.Great man, the; his relation to his time,292Greek and Christian forms of life,283ff.Hegel; relation of the present to him indefinite,348Historical and social organisation of life; its limitations,200Historical Relativism; rejected,290ff.,323ff.History; the spiritual conception of, its conditions,188ff.; esoteric and exoteric history,243ff.Human life; how far it is from the spiritual life,161ff.Idealisation, false; of immediate existence,83ff.,362ff.Idealism and Realism; their unification in a spiritual culture,312ff.Ideas in history; their unique character,126ff.,188ff.Imagination; indispensable in all departments of life,239Immanent Idealism, its rise and fall,15ff.Immanental treatment (from the life-process),107ff.Individual, the, and the Society; problems of their relation,364ff.Individual, the; his significance in the new relations,246,369ff.Individual, life of the; its form in the new system,369ff.Individuality (spiritual); as a problem,132ff.,181ff.,370Instruction; problems in the present time with reference to,343ff.Inwardness; its attainment of independence in man,123ff.,146ff.; as the inner life of reality,148ff.; inwardness and the inner world,303Irrationality, of existence; in what manner overcome,279Kant; inconsistency in the relation to him in the present time,348Knowledge; its form in the new system,351Life; its detachment from the mere individual,119ff.; the two movements in it,282ff.Life-process; as the fundamental principle of investigation,104ff.,305ff.,349ff.Life’s attainment of greatness,240ff.Life-work; its significance in acquiring stability,253Love; as a witness to the union with the whole,231Man; as a being of nature,110ff.; growing beyond nature,113ff.; his union with the whole,226ff.Masses, the culture of the; its problems,89ff.Mass-movements; their dangers and limitations,363ff.Metaphysic; in what sense necessary,141ff.“Modern,” the; double meaning,296Modern Age, the (in a broad sense); the characteristic in its nature,9ff.“Modern” Morality; discussed and rejected,364ff.Movement, of the spiritual life in man; its uniqueness,233ff.; its increase in the new system of life,247ff.Mysticism; in what sense justifiable,246National Character,198,367ff.Nationality, the idea of; its problems,366ff.Naturalism; its significance and its limitations,24ff.Nature and Spirit,270ff.Negation; impossibility of an absolute,267ff.Newer Systems of Life; what they have in common,22ff.,81ff.Noölogical Method; distinguished from the psychological and the cosmological,243,352Norms; their significance,184Pantheism; vague character of the general conception of it,84Past; impossibility of flight to the,93ff.People and nation,366ff.Personal conviction, concerning reality as a whole; where the decision is made,253,281,311ff.,340,372Personality; the difficulty of the conception,95ff.; no mere gift of nature,311,370Philosophy; its present position,346ff.; its three main tendencies in the present time,347ff.; chief demands,349ff.Philosophy of life; the conception of a,3ff.Political and social life; condition and tasks in the present time,358ff.Present, the; difficulties of determining its extent,289ff.Protestantism; the different tendencies in it,329Public opinion; manner of its formation,364Reality; difficulty of the conception,84ff.; longing for,159ff.; new conception of,220ff.Relation (fundamental), of man to reality; new, from the point of view of the spiritual life,152ff.Religion; the system of life of,6ff.; its form and its justification,273ff.; its necessity in a spiritual culture,312ff.; its present condition,324; its requirements in a spiritual culture,330ff.; specific religious system of life rejected,281ff.Romanticism; its significance and its limitations,258ff.Science; its present greatness and problems,345ff.Self-preservation, spiritual; distinguished from natural self-preservation,126Sense; its estimate,260Simplification (in revivals),128Socialistic system; its significance and its limitations,41ff.Society; the spiritual conception of,196ff.; emphasis upon society in the nineteenth century,358ff.Spiritual culture, and human culture,308ff.Spiritual life; its independence a necessity,141ff.; as the fundamental principle of a new organisation of the individual departments of life,157ff.,244ff.Spiritual work; its relation to time,290ff.Stability in life; how won,251ff.State, the; the greater emphasis upon it in the nineteenth century,359ff.Suffering and spiritual destitution,314Syntheses of life; in history,207ff.Theodicy; rejected,279ff.,371Thought; its relation to life,108,126ff.,141ff.,349ff.; its unique operation (in distinction from association),125ff.Time; fundamental relation of man to,116ff.Transcendent Spirituality; as the fundamental principle of religion,278ff.Transcendental method; in what sense justifiable,248Truth, conception of; its history,138; new conception,216ff.Work; its distinctive character,122; its power to develop,201ff.; the world of work,201ff.World, conceptions of the; chief types,353ff.
Abstractions; their power in modern life,362ff.
Activism; profession of faith in,255ff.; how it differs from a system of mere force,255ff.; its ethical character,256; how it differs from Voluntarism and Pragmatism,256ff.
Æsthetic Individualism,61ff.
Æstheticism; its antithesis to Activism,258ff.
Antiquity; its distinctive synthesis of life,208ff.
A priori; its validity and its limitations,234
Archimedean point in the spiritual life; its impossibility,94ff.,154
Art and literature, condition and tasks in the present,354ff.
Ascetic organisation of life; rejected,281ff.
Being, development of; as a system of life,212ff.,314
Catholicism; different tendencies in,328ff.
Christianity; its unique character,6; the opposition to,7ff.; its permanent truth,331ff.; changes necessary to it,332ff.; Christian and Greek forms of life,283ff.
“Classical,” the; its significance,192
Concentration of life (within the whole),156ff.,160
Conscience; its significance,129ff.
Critical character of modern work; its presuppositions,250ff.
Culture,110ff.; genuine and apparent,269ff.; requirements of a new type,298ff.; organisation of,315ff.
Democratic tendency of modern culture,361ff.
Departments of life; their relation to life as a whole,316ff.
Dogmatic sectarian point of view; rejected,328
Duty; significance of the idea,184ff.,231
Education; problems in the present state of,343ff.
Enlightenment, the; its synthesis of life,209ff.; how far problematic,249; relation of the present to it,347ff.
Equality; problems of the present conception of,362
Eternity; how far implied in the life of the individual,372
Ethical character of life; how to be understood,256,258; of spiritual culture,309ff.; its necessity,337ff.
Ethics (morality); different types in the present time,336ff.; conditions of a morality,338ff.; requirements of morality in a spiritual culture,339ff.
Evil; the problem of,263ff.; the way in which it is solved,279ff.
Evolution, doctrine of; spiritual, its limitations,194ff.,257ff.
Experience; its significance for the spiritual life in man,235ff.
Freedom; its nature,174ff.; its conflict with destiny,181ff.; genuine and false,323ff.; inconsistency in contemporary treatment of the problem,360ff.
German character; its greatness and its dangers,317ff.,368ff.
Goethe; characteristic influence,299
Good, the (idea of the good); how it differs from the Useful,119ff.; apparent inconsistency,138ff.; more detailed determination,185ff.
Great man, the; his relation to his time,292
Greek and Christian forms of life,283ff.
Hegel; relation of the present to him indefinite,348
Historical and social organisation of life; its limitations,200
Historical Relativism; rejected,290ff.,323ff.
History; the spiritual conception of, its conditions,188ff.; esoteric and exoteric history,243ff.
Human life; how far it is from the spiritual life,161ff.
Idealisation, false; of immediate existence,83ff.,362ff.
Idealism and Realism; their unification in a spiritual culture,312ff.
Ideas in history; their unique character,126ff.,188ff.
Imagination; indispensable in all departments of life,239
Immanent Idealism, its rise and fall,15ff.
Immanental treatment (from the life-process),107ff.
Individual, the, and the Society; problems of their relation,364ff.
Individual, the; his significance in the new relations,246,369ff.
Individual, life of the; its form in the new system,369ff.
Individuality (spiritual); as a problem,132ff.,181ff.,370
Instruction; problems in the present time with reference to,343ff.
Inwardness; its attainment of independence in man,123ff.,146ff.; as the inner life of reality,148ff.; inwardness and the inner world,303
Irrationality, of existence; in what manner overcome,279
Kant; inconsistency in the relation to him in the present time,348
Knowledge; its form in the new system,351
Life; its detachment from the mere individual,119ff.; the two movements in it,282ff.
Life-process; as the fundamental principle of investigation,104ff.,305ff.,349ff.
Life’s attainment of greatness,240ff.
Life-work; its significance in acquiring stability,253
Love; as a witness to the union with the whole,231
Man; as a being of nature,110ff.; growing beyond nature,113ff.; his union with the whole,226ff.
Masses, the culture of the; its problems,89ff.
Mass-movements; their dangers and limitations,363ff.
Metaphysic; in what sense necessary,141ff.
“Modern,” the; double meaning,296
Modern Age, the (in a broad sense); the characteristic in its nature,9ff.
“Modern” Morality; discussed and rejected,364ff.
Movement, of the spiritual life in man; its uniqueness,233ff.; its increase in the new system of life,247ff.
Mysticism; in what sense justifiable,246
National Character,198,367ff.
Nationality, the idea of; its problems,366ff.
Naturalism; its significance and its limitations,24ff.
Nature and Spirit,270ff.
Negation; impossibility of an absolute,267ff.
Newer Systems of Life; what they have in common,22ff.,81ff.
Noölogical Method; distinguished from the psychological and the cosmological,243,352
Norms; their significance,184
Pantheism; vague character of the general conception of it,84
Past; impossibility of flight to the,93ff.
People and nation,366ff.
Personal conviction, concerning reality as a whole; where the decision is made,253,281,311ff.,340,372
Personality; the difficulty of the conception,95ff.; no mere gift of nature,311,370
Philosophy; its present position,346ff.; its three main tendencies in the present time,347ff.; chief demands,349ff.
Philosophy of life; the conception of a,3ff.
Political and social life; condition and tasks in the present time,358ff.
Present, the; difficulties of determining its extent,289ff.
Protestantism; the different tendencies in it,329
Public opinion; manner of its formation,364
Reality; difficulty of the conception,84ff.; longing for,159ff.; new conception of,220ff.
Relation (fundamental), of man to reality; new, from the point of view of the spiritual life,152ff.
Religion; the system of life of,6ff.; its form and its justification,273ff.; its necessity in a spiritual culture,312ff.; its present condition,324; its requirements in a spiritual culture,330ff.; specific religious system of life rejected,281ff.
Romanticism; its significance and its limitations,258ff.
Science; its present greatness and problems,345ff.
Self-preservation, spiritual; distinguished from natural self-preservation,126
Sense; its estimate,260
Simplification (in revivals),128
Socialistic system; its significance and its limitations,41ff.
Society; the spiritual conception of,196ff.; emphasis upon society in the nineteenth century,358ff.
Spiritual culture, and human culture,308ff.
Spiritual life; its independence a necessity,141ff.; as the fundamental principle of a new organisation of the individual departments of life,157ff.,244ff.
Spiritual work; its relation to time,290ff.
Stability in life; how won,251ff.
State, the; the greater emphasis upon it in the nineteenth century,359ff.
Suffering and spiritual destitution,314
Syntheses of life; in history,207ff.
Theodicy; rejected,279ff.,371
Thought; its relation to life,108,126ff.,141ff.,349ff.; its unique operation (in distinction from association),125ff.
Time; fundamental relation of man to,116ff.
Transcendent Spirituality; as the fundamental principle of religion,278ff.
Transcendental method; in what sense justifiable,248
Truth, conception of; its history,138; new conception,216ff.
Work; its distinctive character,122; its power to develop,201ff.; the world of work,201ff.
World, conceptions of the; chief types,353ff.