Chapter 26

[284]Madame Bertrand mentioned to Dr. Shortt that Napoleon conceived himself dying of cancer in the stomach, which she considered as a mere whim.—S.[285]Antommarchi, vol. ii., p. 120.[286]When at St. Helena, he was much troubled with toothache and scurvy in the gums.—S.[287]Las Cases, tom. i., part ii., p. 5.[288]SeeAppendix,No. VI.[289]Seeante, p.57.[290]Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule, par Le Général Foy.—S.[291]"And all the courses of my life do show, I am not in the roll of common men."—Henry IV., act iii., sc. 2.[292]"Fordeity, readgreat man, and Gourgaud's account is perfectly correct."—Joseph Buonaparte,Erreurs de Bourrienne, tom. i., p. 233.[293]Memorable Events at Paris, p. 93.[294]Thibaudaud, Mémoires sur le Consulat, p. 148.—S.[295]Antommarchi, vol. i., p. 249.[296]SeeAppendix,No. VII.[297]The precise words of the Will seem to bear, that it was theComte d'Artois'confession which established this charge. But no such confession was ever made; neither, if made, could it have been known to Napoleon at the time of the trial; nor, if known, could it have constituted evidence against the party accused, who was no accessary to the fact alleged. The assertion is utterly false in either case, but under the latter interpretation, it is also irrelevant. The Duc d'Enghien might be affected by his own confession, certainly not by that of his kinsman.—S.[298]Cantillon. See Fourth Codicil to Will, Appendix,No. VII.[299]See Dr. O'Meara's Voice from St. Helena, who seems himself to have been startled at the enormity of the fiction. What makes it yet more extravagant is, that Napoleon's Will disposes of a part of that very treasure, as if it were still in the hands of Maria Louisa.—S.[300]Liv. ix., Mémoires Historiques de Napoleon. London, Sir R. Philips, 1820.—Montholon, Mémoires de Napoleon; Colburn, London, 1823.—Las Cases; London, 2 vols.—Gourgaud, War of 1815; London, 1824.—Many passages in these works will be found quite parallel; for instance, Montholon, vol. ii., pp. 272-289, with Liv. ix., p. 43. Grouchy, p. 4, designates these works from St. Helena, as containing, "des instructions et des ordres supposés; des mouvements imaginaires," &c. &c.; also, "des assertions erronnées, des hypothèses faites après coup;" see also p. 26. P. 22, he says, with justice, of these authors: "Des individus qui se persuadent que l'auréole de gloire d'un grand homme, en les éclairant un moment, les à transformé en d'irrécusables autorités, et ne voyant pas qu'un éclat d'emprunt qui ne se refléchit sur aucun fait d'armes connus, sur aucuns services éminens, ne sert qu'à mieux faire ressortir la présomptueuse impéritie des jugements qu'ils prononcent."[301]The best account of the campaign is by an anonymous author, C. de W., published at Stutgard, 1817, and is attributed to Baron Muffling. It does honour to its illustrious author, from its candour and manliness, though he naturally wishes to give more effect to the Prussian attack on the 18th, than was actually the case; that is, he brings them into action, with their whole force, considerably too early in the day.[302]It is well remarked, in Liv. ix., p. 150,—"Ces détails en appartient plus à l'histoire de chaque régiment qu'à l'histoire générale de la bataille."[303]Rogniat, p. 147, speaking of charges, says,—"S'ils marchent, à la baïonette, ce n'est qu'un simulacre d'attaque: ils ne la croisent jamais avec celle d'un ennemi qu'ils craignent d'aborder, parcequ'ils se sentent sans défence contre ses coups, et l'un de deux partis prend la fuite avant d'en venir aux mains."—Such is the case in all charges.[304]The salt-water inundation could be raised at Ghent, so as to place the Great Square five feet under water.[305]Such, however, could only be a desultory attack, for the chaussée by Charleroi and Givet was the nearest entry from France on this side. The country from this to Mayence was then nearly impracticable for large armies. Good roads have since been made through it.[306]Buonaparte blames the allied generals for not having formed a camp in front of Brussels, as he alleges might have been done in the beginning of May. The wet season, and difficulty of subsisting so large a body of troops, is some reason against it. Besides which, Buonaparte might have made demonstrations in front, and sent 20,000 men from his garrisons to ravage Ghent and the country beyond the Scheldt, and cut off our communications with Ostend. In 1814, when the Prussians were concentrated near Brussels, this had been done with effect from Lisle. Though little advantage might have resulted to the enemy from such a measure, much blame would have been attached for not taking precautions against it. To cover Brussels, the capital of the country, was certainly of great importance; and had that been the only object, a camp in its front would have certainly been the best means of effecting it.[307]Buonaparte himself has remarked,—"L'unité de commandement est la chose la plus importante dans la guerre."[308]Buonaparte, Liv. ix., p. 69, rates his force at 122,400 men, and 350 guns. Muffling, p. 17, at 130,000. Other accounts make it smaller, and Batty, 127,400, with 350 guns.[309]Grouchy, p. 59, speaks of the rapidity with which Blucher assembled his army. It is also adverted to by several French military writers.[310]Ney might probably have driven back these troops, and occupied the important position at Quatre-Bras; but hearing a heavy cannonade on his right flank, where Ziethen had taken up his position, he thought it necessary to halt, and detach a division in the direction of Fleurus. This brings forward a remarkable case, as he was severely censured by Napoleon for not having literally followed his orders, and pushed on to Quatre-Bras. This was done in the presence of Maréchal Grouchy,—(see Grouchy's Observations)—who gives it as a reason (pp. 32, 33, 61,) for acting in the manner he did on the 18th, and not moving to his left to support Napoleon at Waterloo.[311]Rogniat, p. 341, says that a great portion of the French army only reached Charleroi late on the 15th, and Fleurus at 11A.M.on the 16th.—SeeGrouchy, p. 36.[312]Official Despatch; Muffling, pp. 8, 10, 18.[313]Muffling, p. 17. Yet a story is told of Fouché, who is said to have sent intelligence of Buonaparte's movements to Lord Wellington. The courier was attacked and waylaid, as supposed by Fouché's contrivance, so that he had an excuse ready for both parties.[314]Muffling, p. 64, allows that the position at Ligny was too much extended to the left, but the object of this was to have a line of communication with the Meuse and Cologne; a fault alluded to as arising from having two armies, and two chiefs, with different objects in view.[315]Grouchy, p. 47; Gourgaud, Liv. ix., p. 102.[316]It is hardly to be supposed that an officer of Ney's bold and enterprising character, with so much at stake, would have hesitated to attack at Quatre-Bras, if he had had his troops in readiness; but it appears that he could not have had time to move to that point at the early hour stated by Buonaparte. Ney had, also, too much experience of the nature of the troops he was opposed to, to act rashly.[317]The French did not attack until threeP.M., the different corps not being arrived to make the necessary arrangements at an earlier hour.—Grouchy, p. 36;Rogniat, p. 341.[318]Ney's Letter to the Duc d'Otranto. Paris, 1815.—Muffling, p. 14.[319]Muffling, pp. 15-64.—Blucher had employed his reserves to support his right at St. Amand, and was not prepared for this change of attack. Muffling, however, considers, that, instead of his cavalry, had he moved his infantry from St. Amand to retake Ligny, he would have succeeded and gained the action.[320]Grouchy, p. 10, shows how little decisive the battle was. "La bataille de Ligny n'a fini que vers la neuf heure de soir, seulement alors la retraite des Prussiens a été présumée."[321]Here it was that Blucher was so nearly falling into the hands of the French cavalry.[322]Grouchy, p. 11, says, that, even on the 17th, it was supposed the Prussians had retired upon Namur, so feebly were they followed; the light cavalry of General Pajot pursued them in this direction on the 17th, captured a few guns, which, with some stragglers, as are found in all armies, was his whole success.[323]The St. Helena productions raise the amount to 20,000 men, 40 guns, standards, &c. See Grouchy, pp. 48, 49.—Montholon says they lost 60,000.—Liv. x., 148, says, that the Prussian army was reduced to 40,000 men by the loss they had sustained; 30,000 men killed and wounded, and 20,000 men, who had disbanded and ravaged the banks of the Meuse, and by the detachments sent to cover their retreat, and that of the baggage, in the direction of Namur.[324]The intention of the allied maréchals to remain together, whatever might be the issue, is known. Lord Wellington had ordered the inundations of Antwerp to be effected to their utmost extent. The fortresses were to have been abandoned to their own strength, and had the events of the 16th been such as to necessitate a retreat, and give up Brussels, Maestricht is probably the point on which both armies would have retired.[325]Had earlier or more positive information of the enemy's plans been received by Lord Wellington, and the troops put in movement on the evening of the 15th, the combinations of the two allied chiefs would have been perfect. Nothing more is necessary to show how well their plans had been laid, but which were not carried into full effect, by one of those accidental occurrences which no human foresight can prevent.[326]Liv. ix., p. 103. Buonaparte says, that Ney attacked with 16,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 44 guns, leaving 16,000 infantry, 4500 cavalry, and 64 guns, in reserve at Frasnes.[327]This belonged to the 69th regiment, not to the 42d, as Liv. ix. states, p. 104, and was almost the only one captured during the whole war. It may here be remarked, that if the French had carried one quarter the number of eagles with their regiments that we have of colours, a much larger proportion would now be found at Whitehall. A weak battalion of English infantry always carries two large colours, very heavy and inconvenient, whilst a French eagle, about the size of a blackbird, was only given to a regiment composed of several battalions, which was easily secured in case of defeat.[328]Liv. ix., p. 60. Buonaparte remarks, that the numbers of the allied army must not be rated at their numerical force. "Parceque l'armée des alliés étoit composée de troups plus ou moins bonnes. Un Anglois pourrait être compté pour un Français; et deux Hollandais, Prussiens, ou hommes de la confédération, pour un Français. Les armées ennemies étoient cantonnées sous le commandement de deux Généraux différents, et formées de deux nations divisées d'intérêts et de sentiments." His army, on the contrary, was under one chief, the idol of his soldiers, who were of the best description—veterans who had fought in the brilliant campaign of 1813-14, and draughts from the numerous garrisons who had since entered France from Antwerp, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Dantzic, Mayence, Alexandria, Mantua, &c., with the numerous prisoners from England. Liv. ix., p. 201.[329]Three brigades of iron eighteen-pounders were preparing at Brussels, but not in a state of forwardness to be sent to Waterloo.[330]Muffling, p. 20, says, "that Blucher only asked for time to distribute food and cartridges to his men."[331]Montholon, vii., p. 134; Liv. ix., pp. 123-207; Gourgaud, p. 131.[332]See Liv. ix., p. 196. "Ainsi à cinq heures après midi, l'armée se trouva sans avoir une reserve de cavalerie. Si, à huit heures et demi, cette reserve eut existée," &c. &c. It is singular how great soldiers, in reporting military actions, will contradict each other. Napoleon ascribes the loss of the battle in great measure to his cavalry being so soon and generally engaged, that he had not a reserve left to protect his retreat. General Foy, on the contrary, affirms, that it was not the French, but the British cavalry, which was annihilated at Waterloo.—Guerre de la Péninsule, p. 116.Note.[333]On the 16th, at Quatre-Bras, the 33d regiment (British,) and afterwards two battalions of the Guards, when obliged to give way to an attack of the enemy, and pursued by the French cavalry, saved themselves in the wood of Bossu, formed along the skirts of it, and repelled the enemy with severe loss.[334]The armies were now placed under their favourite commanders, as the military of both nations had long wished; and on an arena which may be considered as fair a one as could well have offered in the chances of war. The British troops, however, were not composed of our best regiments, at least our infantry, nor equal to that army which had been in the preceding year in the south of France. Many of the most efficient regiments had been sent to America; first a brigade from Bourdeaux to Washington; another to Canada: and afterwards a force from Portsmouth to New Orleans. None of those returned in time for Waterloo, though they wereon their way.—Liv. ix., p. 208. It has been shown how the French army was composed.[335]Buonaparte, liv. ix., 142, says, that he saw with pleasure that the English guards were placed on our right, as they were our best troops, which rendered his premeditated attack on our left more easy. Our guards are not, as is the case in other armies, the élite of our army; they are not selected, as in other services, from the best soldiers in other regiments, but are recruited exactly as troops of the line, except that they are required to be somewhat taller. It may be here remarked, the great superiority inappearance, that the French and other troops possessed over ours at the close of the war. The mode of recruiting accounts for this. Even our militia were much superior in this point of view to the troops of the line, and most of the best men were obtained from them. Our recruits were in general composed of the population of large cities, or of manufacturing towns, certainly not the best specimens of our population; the military service is not in any estimation amongst our peasantry, whilst the French army was composed of the picked men of thirty millions, and other nations in proportion.[336]Rogniat, p. 231, blames both generals for the too early employment of their cavalry. In the case here mentioned, he says, the success was "contre toute probabilité," as the cavalry charged unbroken infantry. The head of the attacking columns had, however, been already shaken by the charge of the 92d regiment, which took place nearly at the moment the cavalry charged.[337]Muffling, p. 26, observes, "La fumée étoit si épaisse que personne ne voyoit l'ensemble de l'action."[338]Liv. ix., p. 209. Buonaparte says, "L'infanterie Anglaise a été ferme et solide. La cavalerie pouvait mieux faire."[339]Rogniat, p. 231, says they amounted to 12,000, including other heavy cavalry.[340]The cavalry came up to one of the squares at a trot, and appeared to be hanging back, as if expecting our fire; they closed round two sides of it, having a front of seventy or eighty men, and came so close to one angle, that they appeared to try to reach over the bayonets with their swords. The squares were generally formed four deep, rounded at the angles: on the approach of the cavalry, two files fired, the others reserving their fire; the cavalry then turned, and it is not easy to believe how few fell,—only one officer and two men; no doubt many were wounded, but did not fall from their horses. Many squares fired at the distance of thirty paces, with no other effect. In fact, our troops fired too high, which must have been noticed by the most casual observer.[341]It has been said, that if the enemy had brought up infantry and light artillery, our squares must have given way. This would no doubt have been preferable: but then our reserve and cavalry would have been moved forward to check the cavalry, and the squares would have probably repelled the attack of the infantry. The enemy had tried to bring guns with the attacking columns, on our left, early in the day; the consequence was, that the horses were killed before they had advanced far, so that they could not follow the movements of the infantry, and were left behind. A similar attempt was made in the south of France, in the attack of Lord Hill's corps on the Nive; the guns were harnessed, so as to allow them to fire as they advanced, but the horses were soon killed or disabled, and the guns were abandoned when the attack was repulsed.[342]This was what Marmont had done at the Aripiles, at the battle of Salamanca, and for which he suffered so severely.[343]Muffling, p. 27, says, after this attack, which he states to be at four o'clock, "La bataille avoit été très sanglante, mais il n'y avoit point de danger pour l'armée Anglaise." He says it was then five o'clock.[344]See Muffling, p. 32, who makes the number amount to 10,000, and there is little doubt but that he is correct. A regiment of allied cavalry, whose uniform resembled the French, having fled to Brussels, an alarm spread that the enemy were at the gates. Numbers of those who had quitted the field of battle, and, let the truth be spoken, Englishmen too, fled from the town, and never halted until they reached Antwerp. This fact is too well attested to be doubted.[345]Muffling, p. 29. At four o'clock, he says, "Il n'avoit pas encore paru un homme de cette armée."[346]See Soult's letter to Grouchy, dated from the field of battle, at one o'clock.[347]Liv. ix., p. 175. Buonaparte says it was seven o'clock when Lobau repulsed them.[348]Of these, about 12,700 were cavalry.[349]Liv. ix., p. 193. This force is stated "4 à 5000 hommes."[350]Muffling, p. 58, mentions, that Buonaparte stated to some general officer on the morning of the 18th, that he had 75,000 men, and the English only 50,000. Liv. ix., p. 193, by taking Buonaparte's own account in this part of the book, upon calculation it will be seen that he there allows that he had upwards of 74,000.[351]See Muffling, pp. 22, 31, 62. Gourgaud, pp. 98 and 99, says it was half-past four when General Dumont informed Buonaparte of their arrival.[352]Liv. ix., pp. 168, 169, Buonaparte makes Bulow's attack after sunset.[353]Muffling, p. 62, says, it was hoped the Prussian army could have attacked at two o'clock, but that it was half-past four before a cannon was fired by them.[354]Liv. ix., p. 167, Ney's letter.[355]See Lord Wellington's dispatches.[356]Gneisnau says, it was half-past seven o'clock before Pirch's corps arrived.—See Blucher's dispatches.[357]Liv. ix. says it was eleven o'clock when the Prussians joined. Gourgaud and Montholon copy this. The letter from Soult to Grouchy, dated half-past one o'clock, stating that they were informed by a prisoner of Bulow's march, and that they thought they discovered his advanced posts at that hour, completely contradicts this.—Liv. ix.[358]Muffling, p. 61. "Il ne s'agit pas de savoir ce qu'un général ordinaire auroit fait; mais une nouvelle de cette nature auroit pu entraîner le général le plus distingué à prendre des precautions, ou la resolution de changer l'offensive vigoureuse en simple demonstration."

[284]Madame Bertrand mentioned to Dr. Shortt that Napoleon conceived himself dying of cancer in the stomach, which she considered as a mere whim.—S.

[285]Antommarchi, vol. ii., p. 120.

[286]When at St. Helena, he was much troubled with toothache and scurvy in the gums.—S.

[287]Las Cases, tom. i., part ii., p. 5.

[288]SeeAppendix,No. VI.

[289]Seeante, p.57.

[290]Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule, par Le Général Foy.—S.

[291]"And all the courses of my life do show, I am not in the roll of common men."—Henry IV., act iii., sc. 2.

[292]"Fordeity, readgreat man, and Gourgaud's account is perfectly correct."—Joseph Buonaparte,Erreurs de Bourrienne, tom. i., p. 233.

[293]Memorable Events at Paris, p. 93.

[294]Thibaudaud, Mémoires sur le Consulat, p. 148.—S.

[295]Antommarchi, vol. i., p. 249.

[296]SeeAppendix,No. VII.

[297]The precise words of the Will seem to bear, that it was theComte d'Artois'confession which established this charge. But no such confession was ever made; neither, if made, could it have been known to Napoleon at the time of the trial; nor, if known, could it have constituted evidence against the party accused, who was no accessary to the fact alleged. The assertion is utterly false in either case, but under the latter interpretation, it is also irrelevant. The Duc d'Enghien might be affected by his own confession, certainly not by that of his kinsman.—S.

[298]Cantillon. See Fourth Codicil to Will, Appendix,No. VII.

[299]See Dr. O'Meara's Voice from St. Helena, who seems himself to have been startled at the enormity of the fiction. What makes it yet more extravagant is, that Napoleon's Will disposes of a part of that very treasure, as if it were still in the hands of Maria Louisa.—S.

[300]Liv. ix., Mémoires Historiques de Napoleon. London, Sir R. Philips, 1820.—Montholon, Mémoires de Napoleon; Colburn, London, 1823.—Las Cases; London, 2 vols.—Gourgaud, War of 1815; London, 1824.—Many passages in these works will be found quite parallel; for instance, Montholon, vol. ii., pp. 272-289, with Liv. ix., p. 43. Grouchy, p. 4, designates these works from St. Helena, as containing, "des instructions et des ordres supposés; des mouvements imaginaires," &c. &c.; also, "des assertions erronnées, des hypothèses faites après coup;" see also p. 26. P. 22, he says, with justice, of these authors: "Des individus qui se persuadent que l'auréole de gloire d'un grand homme, en les éclairant un moment, les à transformé en d'irrécusables autorités, et ne voyant pas qu'un éclat d'emprunt qui ne se refléchit sur aucun fait d'armes connus, sur aucuns services éminens, ne sert qu'à mieux faire ressortir la présomptueuse impéritie des jugements qu'ils prononcent."

[301]The best account of the campaign is by an anonymous author, C. de W., published at Stutgard, 1817, and is attributed to Baron Muffling. It does honour to its illustrious author, from its candour and manliness, though he naturally wishes to give more effect to the Prussian attack on the 18th, than was actually the case; that is, he brings them into action, with their whole force, considerably too early in the day.

[302]It is well remarked, in Liv. ix., p. 150,—"Ces détails en appartient plus à l'histoire de chaque régiment qu'à l'histoire générale de la bataille."

[303]Rogniat, p. 147, speaking of charges, says,—"S'ils marchent, à la baïonette, ce n'est qu'un simulacre d'attaque: ils ne la croisent jamais avec celle d'un ennemi qu'ils craignent d'aborder, parcequ'ils se sentent sans défence contre ses coups, et l'un de deux partis prend la fuite avant d'en venir aux mains."—Such is the case in all charges.

[304]The salt-water inundation could be raised at Ghent, so as to place the Great Square five feet under water.

[305]Such, however, could only be a desultory attack, for the chaussée by Charleroi and Givet was the nearest entry from France on this side. The country from this to Mayence was then nearly impracticable for large armies. Good roads have since been made through it.

[306]Buonaparte blames the allied generals for not having formed a camp in front of Brussels, as he alleges might have been done in the beginning of May. The wet season, and difficulty of subsisting so large a body of troops, is some reason against it. Besides which, Buonaparte might have made demonstrations in front, and sent 20,000 men from his garrisons to ravage Ghent and the country beyond the Scheldt, and cut off our communications with Ostend. In 1814, when the Prussians were concentrated near Brussels, this had been done with effect from Lisle. Though little advantage might have resulted to the enemy from such a measure, much blame would have been attached for not taking precautions against it. To cover Brussels, the capital of the country, was certainly of great importance; and had that been the only object, a camp in its front would have certainly been the best means of effecting it.

[307]Buonaparte himself has remarked,—"L'unité de commandement est la chose la plus importante dans la guerre."

[308]Buonaparte, Liv. ix., p. 69, rates his force at 122,400 men, and 350 guns. Muffling, p. 17, at 130,000. Other accounts make it smaller, and Batty, 127,400, with 350 guns.

[309]Grouchy, p. 59, speaks of the rapidity with which Blucher assembled his army. It is also adverted to by several French military writers.

[310]Ney might probably have driven back these troops, and occupied the important position at Quatre-Bras; but hearing a heavy cannonade on his right flank, where Ziethen had taken up his position, he thought it necessary to halt, and detach a division in the direction of Fleurus. This brings forward a remarkable case, as he was severely censured by Napoleon for not having literally followed his orders, and pushed on to Quatre-Bras. This was done in the presence of Maréchal Grouchy,—(see Grouchy's Observations)—who gives it as a reason (pp. 32, 33, 61,) for acting in the manner he did on the 18th, and not moving to his left to support Napoleon at Waterloo.

[311]Rogniat, p. 341, says that a great portion of the French army only reached Charleroi late on the 15th, and Fleurus at 11A.M.on the 16th.—SeeGrouchy, p. 36.

[312]Official Despatch; Muffling, pp. 8, 10, 18.

[313]Muffling, p. 17. Yet a story is told of Fouché, who is said to have sent intelligence of Buonaparte's movements to Lord Wellington. The courier was attacked and waylaid, as supposed by Fouché's contrivance, so that he had an excuse ready for both parties.

[314]Muffling, p. 64, allows that the position at Ligny was too much extended to the left, but the object of this was to have a line of communication with the Meuse and Cologne; a fault alluded to as arising from having two armies, and two chiefs, with different objects in view.

[315]Grouchy, p. 47; Gourgaud, Liv. ix., p. 102.

[316]It is hardly to be supposed that an officer of Ney's bold and enterprising character, with so much at stake, would have hesitated to attack at Quatre-Bras, if he had had his troops in readiness; but it appears that he could not have had time to move to that point at the early hour stated by Buonaparte. Ney had, also, too much experience of the nature of the troops he was opposed to, to act rashly.

[317]The French did not attack until threeP.M., the different corps not being arrived to make the necessary arrangements at an earlier hour.—Grouchy, p. 36;Rogniat, p. 341.

[318]Ney's Letter to the Duc d'Otranto. Paris, 1815.—Muffling, p. 14.

[319]Muffling, pp. 15-64.—Blucher had employed his reserves to support his right at St. Amand, and was not prepared for this change of attack. Muffling, however, considers, that, instead of his cavalry, had he moved his infantry from St. Amand to retake Ligny, he would have succeeded and gained the action.

[320]Grouchy, p. 10, shows how little decisive the battle was. "La bataille de Ligny n'a fini que vers la neuf heure de soir, seulement alors la retraite des Prussiens a été présumée."

[321]Here it was that Blucher was so nearly falling into the hands of the French cavalry.

[322]Grouchy, p. 11, says, that, even on the 17th, it was supposed the Prussians had retired upon Namur, so feebly were they followed; the light cavalry of General Pajot pursued them in this direction on the 17th, captured a few guns, which, with some stragglers, as are found in all armies, was his whole success.

[323]The St. Helena productions raise the amount to 20,000 men, 40 guns, standards, &c. See Grouchy, pp. 48, 49.—Montholon says they lost 60,000.—Liv. x., 148, says, that the Prussian army was reduced to 40,000 men by the loss they had sustained; 30,000 men killed and wounded, and 20,000 men, who had disbanded and ravaged the banks of the Meuse, and by the detachments sent to cover their retreat, and that of the baggage, in the direction of Namur.

[324]The intention of the allied maréchals to remain together, whatever might be the issue, is known. Lord Wellington had ordered the inundations of Antwerp to be effected to their utmost extent. The fortresses were to have been abandoned to their own strength, and had the events of the 16th been such as to necessitate a retreat, and give up Brussels, Maestricht is probably the point on which both armies would have retired.

[325]Had earlier or more positive information of the enemy's plans been received by Lord Wellington, and the troops put in movement on the evening of the 15th, the combinations of the two allied chiefs would have been perfect. Nothing more is necessary to show how well their plans had been laid, but which were not carried into full effect, by one of those accidental occurrences which no human foresight can prevent.

[326]Liv. ix., p. 103. Buonaparte says, that Ney attacked with 16,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 44 guns, leaving 16,000 infantry, 4500 cavalry, and 64 guns, in reserve at Frasnes.

[327]This belonged to the 69th regiment, not to the 42d, as Liv. ix. states, p. 104, and was almost the only one captured during the whole war. It may here be remarked, that if the French had carried one quarter the number of eagles with their regiments that we have of colours, a much larger proportion would now be found at Whitehall. A weak battalion of English infantry always carries two large colours, very heavy and inconvenient, whilst a French eagle, about the size of a blackbird, was only given to a regiment composed of several battalions, which was easily secured in case of defeat.

[328]Liv. ix., p. 60. Buonaparte remarks, that the numbers of the allied army must not be rated at their numerical force. "Parceque l'armée des alliés étoit composée de troups plus ou moins bonnes. Un Anglois pourrait être compté pour un Français; et deux Hollandais, Prussiens, ou hommes de la confédération, pour un Français. Les armées ennemies étoient cantonnées sous le commandement de deux Généraux différents, et formées de deux nations divisées d'intérêts et de sentiments." His army, on the contrary, was under one chief, the idol of his soldiers, who were of the best description—veterans who had fought in the brilliant campaign of 1813-14, and draughts from the numerous garrisons who had since entered France from Antwerp, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Dantzic, Mayence, Alexandria, Mantua, &c., with the numerous prisoners from England. Liv. ix., p. 201.

[329]Three brigades of iron eighteen-pounders were preparing at Brussels, but not in a state of forwardness to be sent to Waterloo.

[330]Muffling, p. 20, says, "that Blucher only asked for time to distribute food and cartridges to his men."

[331]Montholon, vii., p. 134; Liv. ix., pp. 123-207; Gourgaud, p. 131.

[332]See Liv. ix., p. 196. "Ainsi à cinq heures après midi, l'armée se trouva sans avoir une reserve de cavalerie. Si, à huit heures et demi, cette reserve eut existée," &c. &c. It is singular how great soldiers, in reporting military actions, will contradict each other. Napoleon ascribes the loss of the battle in great measure to his cavalry being so soon and generally engaged, that he had not a reserve left to protect his retreat. General Foy, on the contrary, affirms, that it was not the French, but the British cavalry, which was annihilated at Waterloo.—Guerre de la Péninsule, p. 116.Note.

[333]On the 16th, at Quatre-Bras, the 33d regiment (British,) and afterwards two battalions of the Guards, when obliged to give way to an attack of the enemy, and pursued by the French cavalry, saved themselves in the wood of Bossu, formed along the skirts of it, and repelled the enemy with severe loss.

[334]The armies were now placed under their favourite commanders, as the military of both nations had long wished; and on an arena which may be considered as fair a one as could well have offered in the chances of war. The British troops, however, were not composed of our best regiments, at least our infantry, nor equal to that army which had been in the preceding year in the south of France. Many of the most efficient regiments had been sent to America; first a brigade from Bourdeaux to Washington; another to Canada: and afterwards a force from Portsmouth to New Orleans. None of those returned in time for Waterloo, though they wereon their way.—Liv. ix., p. 208. It has been shown how the French army was composed.

[335]Buonaparte, liv. ix., 142, says, that he saw with pleasure that the English guards were placed on our right, as they were our best troops, which rendered his premeditated attack on our left more easy. Our guards are not, as is the case in other armies, the élite of our army; they are not selected, as in other services, from the best soldiers in other regiments, but are recruited exactly as troops of the line, except that they are required to be somewhat taller. It may be here remarked, the great superiority inappearance, that the French and other troops possessed over ours at the close of the war. The mode of recruiting accounts for this. Even our militia were much superior in this point of view to the troops of the line, and most of the best men were obtained from them. Our recruits were in general composed of the population of large cities, or of manufacturing towns, certainly not the best specimens of our population; the military service is not in any estimation amongst our peasantry, whilst the French army was composed of the picked men of thirty millions, and other nations in proportion.

[336]Rogniat, p. 231, blames both generals for the too early employment of their cavalry. In the case here mentioned, he says, the success was "contre toute probabilité," as the cavalry charged unbroken infantry. The head of the attacking columns had, however, been already shaken by the charge of the 92d regiment, which took place nearly at the moment the cavalry charged.

[337]Muffling, p. 26, observes, "La fumée étoit si épaisse que personne ne voyoit l'ensemble de l'action."

[338]Liv. ix., p. 209. Buonaparte says, "L'infanterie Anglaise a été ferme et solide. La cavalerie pouvait mieux faire."

[339]Rogniat, p. 231, says they amounted to 12,000, including other heavy cavalry.

[340]The cavalry came up to one of the squares at a trot, and appeared to be hanging back, as if expecting our fire; they closed round two sides of it, having a front of seventy or eighty men, and came so close to one angle, that they appeared to try to reach over the bayonets with their swords. The squares were generally formed four deep, rounded at the angles: on the approach of the cavalry, two files fired, the others reserving their fire; the cavalry then turned, and it is not easy to believe how few fell,—only one officer and two men; no doubt many were wounded, but did not fall from their horses. Many squares fired at the distance of thirty paces, with no other effect. In fact, our troops fired too high, which must have been noticed by the most casual observer.

[341]It has been said, that if the enemy had brought up infantry and light artillery, our squares must have given way. This would no doubt have been preferable: but then our reserve and cavalry would have been moved forward to check the cavalry, and the squares would have probably repelled the attack of the infantry. The enemy had tried to bring guns with the attacking columns, on our left, early in the day; the consequence was, that the horses were killed before they had advanced far, so that they could not follow the movements of the infantry, and were left behind. A similar attempt was made in the south of France, in the attack of Lord Hill's corps on the Nive; the guns were harnessed, so as to allow them to fire as they advanced, but the horses were soon killed or disabled, and the guns were abandoned when the attack was repulsed.

[342]This was what Marmont had done at the Aripiles, at the battle of Salamanca, and for which he suffered so severely.

[343]Muffling, p. 27, says, after this attack, which he states to be at four o'clock, "La bataille avoit été très sanglante, mais il n'y avoit point de danger pour l'armée Anglaise." He says it was then five o'clock.

[344]See Muffling, p. 32, who makes the number amount to 10,000, and there is little doubt but that he is correct. A regiment of allied cavalry, whose uniform resembled the French, having fled to Brussels, an alarm spread that the enemy were at the gates. Numbers of those who had quitted the field of battle, and, let the truth be spoken, Englishmen too, fled from the town, and never halted until they reached Antwerp. This fact is too well attested to be doubted.

[345]Muffling, p. 29. At four o'clock, he says, "Il n'avoit pas encore paru un homme de cette armée."

[346]See Soult's letter to Grouchy, dated from the field of battle, at one o'clock.

[347]Liv. ix., p. 175. Buonaparte says it was seven o'clock when Lobau repulsed them.

[348]Of these, about 12,700 were cavalry.

[349]Liv. ix., p. 193. This force is stated "4 à 5000 hommes."

[350]Muffling, p. 58, mentions, that Buonaparte stated to some general officer on the morning of the 18th, that he had 75,000 men, and the English only 50,000. Liv. ix., p. 193, by taking Buonaparte's own account in this part of the book, upon calculation it will be seen that he there allows that he had upwards of 74,000.

[351]See Muffling, pp. 22, 31, 62. Gourgaud, pp. 98 and 99, says it was half-past four when General Dumont informed Buonaparte of their arrival.

[352]Liv. ix., pp. 168, 169, Buonaparte makes Bulow's attack after sunset.

[353]Muffling, p. 62, says, it was hoped the Prussian army could have attacked at two o'clock, but that it was half-past four before a cannon was fired by them.

[354]Liv. ix., p. 167, Ney's letter.

[355]See Lord Wellington's dispatches.

[356]Gneisnau says, it was half-past seven o'clock before Pirch's corps arrived.—See Blucher's dispatches.

[357]Liv. ix. says it was eleven o'clock when the Prussians joined. Gourgaud and Montholon copy this. The letter from Soult to Grouchy, dated half-past one o'clock, stating that they were informed by a prisoner of Bulow's march, and that they thought they discovered his advanced posts at that hour, completely contradicts this.—Liv. ix.

[358]Muffling, p. 61. "Il ne s'agit pas de savoir ce qu'un général ordinaire auroit fait; mais une nouvelle de cette nature auroit pu entraîner le général le plus distingué à prendre des precautions, ou la resolution de changer l'offensive vigoureuse en simple demonstration."

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