GEN. THOMAS' BIVOUAC AFTER THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.
GEN. THOMAS' BIVOUAC AFTER THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.
"Upon an inspection of the map, you will observe these are all divergent lines, but rendered necessary, from the fact that our enemies choose them as places of refuge from pursuit, where they can receive assistance from neighboring States. Our lines are all too weak, probably with the exception of that of Prestonburg. To strengthen these, I am thrown on the raw levies of Ohio and Indiana, who arrive in detachments, perfectly fresh from the country, and loaded down with baggage, also upon the Kentuckians,who are slowly forming regiments all over the State, at points remote from danger, and whom it will be almost impossible to assemble together. The organization of this latter force is, by the laws of Kentucky, under the control of a military board of citizens, at the capital, Frankfort, and they think they will be enabled to have fifteen regiments toward the middle of this month, but I doubt it, and deem it unsafe to rely on them. There are four regiments forming in the neighborhood of Owensboro', near the mouth of Green River, who are doing good service, also in the neighborhood of Campbellsville, but it is unsafe to rely on troops so suddenly armed and equipped. They are not yet clothed or uniformed. I know well you will think our force too widely distributed, but we are forced to it by the attitude of our enemies, whose force and numbers the country never has and probably never will comprehend.
"I am told that my estimate of troops needed for this line, viz., two hundred thousand, has been construed to my prejudice, and therefore leave it for the future. This is the great centre on which our enemies can concentrate whatever force is not employed elsewhere."
Two days later Sherman wrote again:
"General McClellan telegraphs me to report to him daily the situation of affairs here. The country is so large that it is impossible to give clear and definite views. Our enemies have a terrible advantage in the fact that in our midst, in our camps, and along our avenues of travel, they have active partisans, farmers and business-men, who seemingly pursue their usual calling, but are in fact spies. They report all our movements and strength, while we can procure information only by circuitous and unreliable means. I inclose you the copy of an intercepted letter,which is but the type of others. Many men from every part of the State are now enrolled under Buckner—have gone to him—while ours have to be raised in neighborhoods, and cannot be called together except at long notice. These volunteers are being organized under the laws of the State, and the 10th of November is fixed for the time of consolidating them into companies and regiments. Many of them are armed by the United States as home guards, and many by General Anderson and myself, because of the necessity of being armed to guard their camps against internal enemies. Should we be overwhelmed, they would scatter, and their arms and clothing will go to the enemy, furnishing the very material they so much need. We should have here a very large force, sufficient to give confidence to the Union men of the ability to do what should be done—possess ourselves of all the State. But all see and feel we are brought to a standstill, and this produces doubt and alarm. With our present force it would be simple madness to cross Green River, and yet hesitation may be as fatal. In like manner the other columns are in peril, not so much in front as rear, the railroads over which our stores must pass being exposed. I have the Nashville Railroad guarded by three regiments, yet it is far from being safe; and, the moment actual hostilities commence, these roads will be interrupted, and we will be in a dilemma. To meet this in part I have put a cargo of provisions at the mouth of Salt River, guarded by two regiments. All these detachments weaken the main force, and endanger the whole. Do not conclude, as before, that I exaggerate the facts. They are as stated, and the future looks as dark as possible. It would be better if some man of sanguine mind were here, for I am forced to order according to my convictions."
Distrust of Sherman increased at the War Department. Whether or not he was really considered insane, the Government hesitated to intrust to him the command of the increased forces it was presently to place in Kentucky. Accordingly, on November 12th, Sherman was relieved from command and was sent to the Missouri, to drill and organize volunteers. His successor in command at Louisville was General Don Carlos Buell. The extraordinary extent to which the rumors of his mental unsoundness were carried, may be appreciated after perusal of the following passage, which occurred in an editorial inThe Cincinnati Commercial—a paper supposed to be friendly to Sherman—early in December, 1861:
"The painful intelligence reaches us in such form that we are not at liberty to discredit it, that General W. T. Sherman, late Commander of the Department of the Cumberland is insane! It appears that he was at times, when commanding in Kentucky, stark mad. We learn that he at one time telegraphed to the War Department three times in one day for permission to evacuate Kentucky and retreat into Indiana. He also, on several occasions, frightened the leading Union men of Louisville almost out of their wits by the most astounding representations of the overwhelming force of Buckner, and the assertion that Louisville could not be defended. The retreat from Cumberland Gap was one of his mad freaks. When relieved from the command in Kentucky, he was sent to Missouri and placed at the head of a brigade at Sedalia, where the shocking fact that he was a madman was developed by orders that his subordinates knew to be preposterous and refused to obey. He has, of course, been relieved altogether from command. The harsh criticisms which have been lavished upon this gentleman, provokedby his strange conduct, will now give way to feelings of the deepest sympathy for him in his great calamity. It seems providential that the country has not to mourn the loss of an army through the loss of the mind of a General into whose hands were committed the vast responsibilities of the command in Kentucky."
This article inThe Commercialwas based on information furnished by a Washington correspondent of that paper. Sherman received a copy of the paper containing the editorial while he was with his family at Lancaster. He read it carefully, threw down the paper, and exclaimed nervously, "Well, now, I shouldn't be surprised if they fastened that on me. It's the hardest thing in the world for a man to prove himself sane when many people think him insane." His family and friends did not take the matter so calmly. They attributed the article to General McClellan, and would never be persuaded that he did not inspire it. As a matter of fact, McClellan's confidential adviser, Colonel Key, had actually been sent out to see Sherman and to report on his mental condition, and had reported that, in his opinion, Sherman was not sufficiently master of his judgment to warrant the intrusting to him of an important military command.
It will be of interest to quote at this point from a letter which was written some months afterward by General Halleck, referring to the current reports of Sherman's madness.
"The newspaper attacks are certainly shameless and scandalous, but I cannot agree with you, that they have us in their power 'to destroy us as they please.' I certainly get my share of abuse, but it will not disturb me."
Among those who stood by Sherman firmly was Grant, who had from the first unbounded faith in him; a feelingwhich Sherman fully reciprocated. It is told that, late in the war, some one sought to win Sherman's favor by speaking disparagingly of Grant. "It won't do, sir," said Sherman. "It won't do at all. Grant is a great general, he stood by me when they said I was crazy, and I stood by him when they said he was drunk, and now, by thunder, sir, we stand by each other."
Halleck treated Sherman kindly during the months of his career in Missouri, but the popular clamor against him continued. After camp inspection work at Sedalia and service at Benton Barracks, St. Louis, Sherman was sent to Paducah, Kentucky, to command the post there. This was on February 13th, 1862. At about this time Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were captured, and Bowling Green was evacuated by the Rebels. It is interesting to recall that one day, just before these great events, Sherman, Halleck and other officers were discussing at St. Louis the general plan of the campaign. The question arose, "Where is the Rebel line?" It was indicated as passing through Bowling Green, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson and Columbus. Halleck asked, "Where should it be broken by our forces?" "In the centre," replied Sherman promptly. Then Halleck pointed out that the line of the Tennessee River cut the centre of the Rebel line, and that there would properly be the point of attack. As Grant conducted the Donelson campaign under Halleck's orders, Sherman always felt that Halleck was to be credited with the strategy; but certainly the execution of it was due to Grant.
The Gloomy Winter of 1861–2—Exultation over Donelson—The Advance up the Tennessee—Responsibility for the Encampment at Pittsburgh Landing—Controversies over the Battle—Varying Accounts—Sherman's Personal Heroism—Number of Troops Engaged on Both Sides—Services of the Army of the Ohio—Losses of the two Armies.
The Gloomy Winter of 1861–2—Exultation over Donelson—The Advance up the Tennessee—Responsibility for the Encampment at Pittsburgh Landing—Controversies over the Battle—Varying Accounts—Sherman's Personal Heroism—Number of Troops Engaged on Both Sides—Services of the Army of the Ohio—Losses of the two Armies.
The winter of 1861–62 was a time of gloom and depression to the Union. Vast armies were in the field, and the wealth of the Government was being poured out most lavishly for their support. Yet they remained chiefly inert, while the active and energetic Southern leaders strengthened the position of the Rebel hosts and promoted the claims of the Rebel cause upon the sympathetic interest of the world. A few small bodies of Union troops encountered the enemy here and there, with results not cheering to the Nation. And there was throughout the North such a feeling of discouragement and gloom as only those who personally experienced it can fully realize.
The eyes of the Government and of the Nation were chiefly fixed upon McClellan, the "Young Napoleon," from whom great things were expected. But they were to be gladdened not by the glory of his achievements, but by a sunburst of victory from another quarter, from thatvery central western region which, according to Sherman's bitter complaints, had hitherto been so much neglected. The news of the triumphs of Grant and Foote at Forts Donelson and Henry, in February, 1862, literally thrilled the heart of the Nation. For the first time Northern valor was grandly vindicated, and for the first time since Bull Run, a cheerful confidence in the victory of the Union cause prevailed. "Unconditional Surrender" Grant became the hero of the hour, and his terse message to Buckner, "I propose to move immediately upon your works," was exultingly re-echoed from Maine to California. Even the stern War Secretary, Stanton, who had succeeded Cameron, was moved to enthusiastic expressions of joy.
This campaign on the Tennessee, for the conception and direction of which Sherman should doubtless be largely credited, was, however, merely the beginning of incomparably greater operations, in which Sherman himself played a most important part. After the fall of Donelson, Grant incurred the displeasure of Halleck and was removed from the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and General Charles F. Smith, who had distinguished himself greatly at Donelson, was appointed to take his place. Smith accordingly directed the forward movement of the victorious army, southward, up the Tennessee River, but presently fell sick, at Savannah, Tennessee, and a few weeks later died. Thus Grant was restored to his command, and thenceforth was responsible for the conduct of the campaign.
Who was responsible for the encampment of the army at Pittsburgh Landing, however, has been a matter of dispute. To place the army there, instead of on the other side of the river, has been criticised as a serious error. Grant'sfriends have sought to free him from blame by saying that the choice was made by Smith, while Grant was in disgrace and practically under arrest. As Smith was dead when this statement was made, he could not reply to it. Grant himself made no effort to exculpate himself at Smith's expense. He has left it on record that when he was restored to his command, on March 13th, he found his army partly at Savannah, on the northeast bank, and partly at Pittsburgh Landing, on the southwest bank, nine miles apart. He at once moved them all to the latter place, but personally remained at Savannah, awaiting the arrival of Buell, who was to join him there with his Army of the Ohio. Lew. Wallace was with his division at Crump's Landing, on the southwest bank, five miles below Pittsburgh Landing, where he had been placed by Smith and where Grant was well satisfied to let him remain. By this acceptance of the place selected by Smith, Grant practically approved it; and by remaining there for three weeks, until the battle was fought, he made himself entirely responsible for the whole situation, a responsibility which he never sought to evade.
Concerning the arrangement and management of the Federal army during the three weeks before the battle, there have been voluminous and bitter controversies. Sherman was in a measure responsible for whatever was done, or left undone, since he was at Pittsburgh Landing all the time, while Grant spent half of his time at Savannah; and Sherman was the adviser of McClernand, who was the actual senior. The Rebels were known to be massed in force at Corinth, only a score of miles away, under their ablest and bravest commanders. Sherman himself had been, before the rendezvous was made at Pittsburgh Landing, sent out to cut the communicationbetween the two points, to prevent a sudden advance of the enemy. In this he had not been successful. The errand was then accomplished by W. H. L. Wallace, but the damage done was quickly repaired by the Rebels and the line of approach restored. With such danger of attack staring them in the face, the troops made no elaborate preparations for defence. General Buell and other critics have charged them with the most astounding and culpable negligence. The army, according to Buell, had no line or order of battle, although it was on the enemy's ground and the enemy was confronting it in force; it had no defensive works of any sort; no outposts, properly speaking, to give warning of or to check the advance of an enemy; and no recognized head in the absence of its Commander, who spent half his time nine miles away. And so, continues this drastic critic, the enemy advanced upon it and formed in line of battle only a mile and a half away without being checked or even observed; and the actual attack was a complete and overwhelming surprise to the Union army. In this view the Rebel commander, General Beauregard, coincides, characterizing the attack as "one of the most surprising surprises ever achieved."
Grant made no detailed reply to these charges, merely saying, as to the lack of fortifications, that at that time the pick and spade were little used in the Western armies, and that he considered drill and discipline of more value than mere earthworks. Sherman himself thought very highly of the Pittsburgh Landing site, as of great strategic importance and as easy of defence. At a later period of the war, he says, the place might in one night have been rendered impregnable. That it was not fortified, he freely admits; and he adds that it was probably well that it was not thus fortified. It was next to impossible to move rawtroops from fortified lines in such offensive work as that contemplated by Grant and Sherman. The story of a surprise, he indignantly repudiates, from first to last.
As this volume is not written for purposes of controversy, no discussion of these points will be indulged in here. The two sides of the case will be presented to the reader, and he may draw his own conclusions, if he has not already done so. Whatever that verdict may be, it cannot seriously affect the transcendent fame of Sherman.
Grant was superseded, as we have seen, by C. F. Smith, on March 4th, 1862. At this time Sherman was busy at Paducah, sending out boats and organizing troops, which he hoped soon to be allowed to lead in the field. The movement up the river was now begun, and on March 10th, Sherman, to his great satisfaction, was ordered to join it. He at once embarked with his four brigades, and proceeded to Fort Henry, where he reported to Smith, and was ordered to wait near by for the remainder of the army. A day or two later, he was sent on, escorted by two gunboats, to cut the Memphis and Charleston Railroad between Tuscumbia and Corinth. On his way up the river he was impressed with the importance of Pittsburgh Landing, and sent back word to Smith that it ought to be occupied. He landed at the mouth of the Yellow River, and tried to reach the railroad and destroy it. But the country was flooded, and an advance was impossible; so he returned. Smith sent him back to take possession of Pittsburgh Landing, along with General Hurlbut, and told him to make room there for the whole army.
Sherman occupied Pittsburgh Landing on March 16th, and immediately marched inland about ten miles to a cross-road hamlet called Monterey, or Pea Ridge, where he learned that the enemy were gathering in force atCorinth. His idea was to take the offensive. To throw up fortifications would, he thought, make the raw recruits more timid. Presently other divisions came up, until the bulk of the army was at the landing.
Pittsburgh Landing, then, was an insignificant settlement of two or three cabins on the Tennessee River, near the mouth of Snake Creek. The country there is rolling, almost hilly. The table-land comes boldly up to the river, forming abrupt bluffs along the water-edge. At that time the country was well wooded and thinly populated. A couple of miles back from the Landing was a little log meeting-house, called Shiloh Church, and from this the place has become popularly known as the battleground of Shiloh. It was at such a place as this that the Union army of 32,000 or 33,000 men lay, awaiting the enemy's attack, although Sherman was anxious to attack the enemy instead.
About the first of April, the Rebel cavalry began skirmishing and raiding along the front of the Union camp, and on April 4th actually captured a number of pickets. That was Friday. On Saturday nothing of importance occurred, though skirmishing was continued, and the sounds of battle were heard at Savannah, where Grant lay abed, injured by the fall of his horse. The weather was wet, the roads miry. Sunday morning there was more skirmishing, then the whole Rebel army came through the woods with a rush, and one of the greatest battles of the war had begun.
Accounts of this tremendous conflict vary greatly. In the succeeding chapters will be found Sherman's own official report, giving his version, and also that ofThe Cincinnati Gazette'scorrespondent, which presents most forcibly the other view—that of the surprise. But uponone point all the numerous narratives are agreed, and that is, Sherman's personal valor in the battle, and his consummate ability in rallying and leading his men in action. Grant was on the field on Sunday, going from division to division, to encourage the commanders; but he "never deemed it important to stay long with Sherman." Sherman held the most critical position, and his troops had never been under fire before. But his constant presence inspired them with such courage that the most of them stood and fought like veterans of a long campaign. Sherman was shot twice, once in the hand and once in the shoulder, and a third bullet passed through his hat; and several horses were shot under him. But nothing made him waver for a moment. To him, the post of danger was the post of honor.
The severest critic of Sherman's management at Shiloh, was General Buell. Yet he frankly says of Sherman that, when he met him on that very field, he appeared a frank, brave soldier, ready without affectation or bravado to do anything that duty required of him.
When the battle began on Sunday morning there were about 33,000 Federal troops at Pittsburgh Landing, and on the evening of that day General Lew. Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing with some 5,000 more. But as many men fled from the field, panic-stricken, without firing a shot, it is not likely that on that day there were at any time more that 25,000 men in line. This is Grant's estimate. The next day, Buell came up with the Army of the Ohio, 20,000 strong. And then, there were the two gunboats, the Tyler and Lexington, which rendered valuable service.
Reports of the strength of the Rebel force vary. According to General Beauregard, it contained more than40,000 men on the first day of the battle, although, he says, he was not able to get more than 20,000 into action on the morning of the second day. Official records state that the effective Rebel forces, at the beginning of the battle, included 35,953 infantry and artillery and 4,382 cavalry, a total of 40,335. From these figures it is apparent that the two armies were, on the first day, by no means equally matched, the Rebels having a preponderance of about 7,000 men, while on the second day the Union army was numerically by far the stronger.
The Union loss in the two days' fighting was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and 2,885 captured or missing; total, 13,047. Of these, Buell's Army of the Ohio lost 241 killed, 1,807 wounded and 55 captured or missing; total, 2,103. The official report of Rebel losses was 1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, and 959 missing; total, 10,699. This, Grant says, cannot be correct, for the Union troops after the battle buried, by actual count, more Rebel dead than thus reported in front of Sherman's and McClernand's divisions alone. The estimate of the Union burial parties was that fully 4,000 Rebel dead lay on the whole field.
Sherman's Own Story—How his Troops were Posted—The Attack—Troops in Disorder—Grant and Buell at the Bivouac—The Battle Resumed in the Morning—Death of General Johnston—Gallant Conduct of Individual Officers—Grant's Official Report—Special Mention of Sherman for his Gallantry as a Soldier and his Skill as a Commander.
Sherman's Own Story—How his Troops were Posted—The Attack—Troops in Disorder—Grant and Buell at the Bivouac—The Battle Resumed in the Morning—Death of General Johnston—Gallant Conduct of Individual Officers—Grant's Official Report—Special Mention of Sherman for his Gallantry as a Soldier and his Skill as a Commander.
Few battles have been more discussed, or more vigorously discussed, than that of Shiloh, or Pittsburgh Landing. In these often acrimonious controversies, Sherman himself took a leading part. It is doubtful if an agreement as to the facts in the case can ever be reached; certainly the flood of argument, narration and abuse that has been poured forth has not materially tended toward such a settlement. The chief point at issue is, whether or not the Federal officers, especially Sherman, were surprised by the enemy. That they were, and that they were not, have both been stated and restated with every possible accumulation of emphasis. Perhaps it will best serve the present purpose to rehearse here, side by side, two narratives of the battle, both written at the time and on the spot, the one giving, in his own language, Sherman's account of the battle, the other the account written by one of the ablest newspaper correspondents in the war.
The gist of Sherman's own report, addressed to Captain Rawlins, Grant's Assistant Adjutant-General, was as follows:
"I had the honor to report that on Friday, the 4th instant, the enemy's cavalry drove in our pickets, posted about a mile and a half in advance of my centre, on the main Corinth road, capturing one First Lieutenant and seven men; that I caused a pursuit by the cavalry of my division, driving them back about five miles, and killing many. On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming down to our front; yet I did not believe he designed anything but a strong demonstration. On Sunday morning, early, the 6th instant, the enemy drove our advance guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms all my division, and sent word to General McClernand, asking him to support my left; to General Prentiss, giving him notice that the enemy was in our front in force, and to General Hurlbut, asking him to support General Prentiss. At this time, 7 A. M., my division was arranged as follows:
"First Brigade, composed of the Sixth Iowa, Colonel J. A. McDowell; Fortieth Illinois, Colonel Hicks; Forty-sixth Ohio, Colonel Worthington; and the Morton Battery, Captain Behr, on the extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road, over Owl Creek.
"Second Brigade, composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, Colonel D. Stuart; Fifty-fourth Ohio, Colonel T. Kilby Smith; and the Seventy-first Ohio, Colonel Mason, on the extreme left, guarding the ford over Lick Creek.
"Third Brigade, composed of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, Colonel Hildebrand; Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel Appler; and the Fifty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Mungen, on the left of the Corinth road, its right resting on Shiloh meeting house.
"Fourth Brigade, composed of the Seventy-second Ohio, Colonel Buckland; Forty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Sullivan; and Seventieth Ohio, Colonel Cockerill, on the right of the Corinth road, its left resting on Shiloh meeting-house.
"Two batteries of artillery, Taylor's and Waterhouse's, were posted, the former at Shiloh, and the latter on a ridge to the left, with a front fire over open ground between Mungen's and Appler's Regiments. The cavalry, eight companies of the Fourth Illinois, under Colonel Dickey, were posted in a large open field to the left and rear of Shiloh meeting-house, which I regarded as the centre of my position. Shortly after seven A. M., with my entire staff, I rode along a portion of our front, and when in the open field before Appler's Regiment, the enemy's pickets opened a brisk fire on my party, killing my orderly, Thomas D. Holliday, of company H, Second Illinois Cavalry.
"The fire came from the bushes which line a small stream which rises in the field in front of Appler's camp, and flows to the north along my whole front. This valley afforded the enemy cover, but our men were so posted as to have a good fire at him as he crossed the valley and ascended the rising ground on our side.
"About eight A. M. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to our left front, in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on our whole camp. All the regiments of my division were then in line of battle, at their proper posts. I rode to Colonel Appler, and ordered him to hold his ground at all hazards, as he held the left flank of our first line of battle, and I informed him that he had a good battery on his right and strong support in his rear. General McClernand had promptly and energetically responded to my request,and had sent me three regiments, which were posted to protect Waterhouse's battery and the left flank of my line. The battle began by the enemy opening a battery in the woods to our front, and throwing shell into our camp.
MAJOR-GENERAL O. O. HOWARD.
MAJOR-GENERAL O. O. HOWARD.
"Taylor's and Waterhouse's batteries promptly responded, and I then observed heavy battalions of infantry passing obliquely to the left across the open field in Appler's front; also other columns advancing directly upon my division. Our infantry and artillery opened along the whole line, and the battle became general. Other heavy masses of the enemy's forces kept passing across the field to our left, and directing their course on General Prentiss. I saw at once that the enemy designed to pass my left flank, and fall upon Generals McClernand and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the Tennessee River, and about two miles back from it.
"Very soon the sound of musketry and artillery announced that General Prentiss was engaged, and about 9 A. M. I judged that he was falling back. About this time Appler's Regiment broke in disorder, followed by Mungen's Regiment, and the enemy pressed forward on Waterhouse's Battery, thereby exposed. The three Illinois regiments in immediate support of this battery stood for some time, but the enemy's advance was vigorous, and the fire so severe that when Colonel Raith, of the Forty-third Illinois, received a severe wound, and fell from his horse, his regiment and the others manifested disorder, and the enemy got possession of three guns of this (Waterhouse's) battery.
"Although our left was thus turned, and the enemy was pressing our whole line, I deemed Shiloh so important, that I remained by it, and renewed my orders to Colonels McDowell and Buckland to hold their ground; and we didhold these positions until about 10 o'clock A. M., when the enemy had got his artillery to the rear of our left flank, and some change became absolutely necessary. Two regiments of Hildebrand's Brigade (Appler's and Mungen's) had already disappeared to the rear, and Hildebrand's own regiment was in disorder. I therefore gave orders for Taylor's Battery, still at Shiloh, to fall back as far as the Purdy and Hamburgh road, and for McDowell and Buckland to adopt that road as their new line. I rode across the angle, and met Behr's battery at the cross-roads, and ordered it immediately to come into battery, action right. Captain Behr gave the order, but he was almost instantly shot from his horse, when drivers and gunners fled in disorder, carrying off the caissons, and abandoning five out of six guns without firing a shot.
"The enemy pressed on, gaining this battery, and we were again forced to choose a line of defence. Hildebrand's Brigade had substantially disappeared from the field, though he himself bravely remained. McDowell's and Buckland's brigades maintained their organization, and were conducted by my aids so as to join on General McClernand's right, thus abandoning my original camps and line. This was about half-past 10 A. M., at which time the enemy had made a furious attack on General McClernand's whole front. He struggled most determinedly, but finding him pressed, I moved McDowell's Brigade directly against the left flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and directed the men to avail themselves of every cover—trees, fallen timber, and a wooded valley to our right.
"We held this position for four long hours, sometimes gaining and at other times losing ground, General McClernand and myself acting in perfect concert, and strugglingto maintain this line. While we were so hardly pressed, two Iowa regiments approached from the rear, but could not be brought up to the severe fire that was raging in our front, and General Grant, who visited us on that ground, will remember our situation about 3 P. M.; but about 4 P. M. it was evident that Hurlbut's line had been driven back to the river, and knowing that General Wallace was coming with re-enforcements from Crump's Landing, General McClernand and I, on consultation, selected a new line of defence, with its right covering a bridge by which General Wallace had to approach. We fell back as well as we could, gathering in addition to our own, such scattered forces as we could find, and formed the new line. During this change the enemy's cavalry charged us, but were handsomely repulsed by an Illinois regiment, whose number I did not learn at that time or since.
"The Fifth Ohio Cavalry, which had come up, rendered good service in holding the enemy in check for some time and Major Taylor also came up with a new battery, and got into position just in time to get a good flank fire upon the enemy's column as he pressed on General McClernand's right, checking his advance, when General McClernand's Division made a fine charge on the enemy, and drove him back into the ravines to our front and right. I had a clear field about two hundred yards wide in my immediate front, and contented myself with keeping the enemy's infantry at that distance during the day. In this position we rested for the night. My command had become decidedly of a mixed character. Buckland's Brigade was the only one that retained organization. Colonel Hildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not. Colonel McDowell had been severely injured by a fall of his horse, and had gone to the river, and the three regiments of his brigade were not in line.
"The Thirteenth Missouri, Colonel Crafts J. Wright, had reported to me on the field, and fought well, retaining its regimental organization, and it formed a part of my line during Sunday night and all Monday. Other fragments of regiments and companies had also fallen into my division, and acted with it during the remainder of the battle.
"Generals Grant and Buell visited me in our bivouac that evening, and from them I learned the situation of affairs on other parts of the field. General Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing shortly after dark, and formed his line to my right and rear. It rained hard during the night, but our men were in good spirits and lay on their arms, being satisfied with such bread and meat as could be gathered at the neighboring camps, and determined to redeem on Monday the losses of Sunday. At daybreak of Monday I received General Grant's orders to advance and recapture our original camps.
"I despatched several members of my staff to bring up all the men they could find, and especially the brigade of Colonel Stuart, which had been separated from the division all the day before; at the appointed time the division, or rather, what remained of it, with the Thirteenth Missouri, and other fragments moved forward, and occupied the ground on the extreme right of General McClernand's camp, where we attracted the fire of a battery located near Colonel McDowell's former headquarters.
"Here I remained patiently awaiting for the sound of General Buell's advance upon the main Corinth road. About 10 A. M., the firing in this direction, and its steady approach, satisfied me, and General Wallace being on our right, flanked with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my column to General McClernand's right, formedline of battle facing south, with Buckland's Brigade directly across the ridge, and Stuart's Brigade on its right, in the woods, and thus advanced steadily and slowly, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. Taylor had just got to me from the rear, where he had gone for ammunition, and brought up three guns, which I ordered into position to advance by hand-firing. These guns belonged to Company A, Chicago Light Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant P. P. Wood, and did most excellent service.
"Under cover of their fire, we advanced till we reached the point where the Corinth road crosses the line of General McClernand's camp; and here I saw, for the first time, the well-ordered and compact Kentucky forces of General Buell, whose soldierly movement at once gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined forces. Here, I saw Willich's Regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest musketry fire I ever heard, and lasted some twenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back. This green point of timber is about five hundred yards east of Shiloh meeting-house, and it was evident here was to be the struggle. The enemy could also be seen forming his lines to the south. General McClernand sending to me for artillery, I detached to him the three guns of Wood's Battery, with which he speedily drove them back; and seeing some others to the rear, I sent one of my staff to bring them forward, when, by almost Providential decree, they proved to be two twenty-four-pounder howitzers belonging to McAllister's Battery, and served as well as guns ever could be.
"This was about 2 P. M. The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh, and another near the Hamburgh road,both pouring grape and canister upon any volume of troops that advanced from the green point of water-oaks. Willich's Regiment had been repulsed, but a whole Brigade of McCook's Division advanced, beautifully deployed, and entered this dreaded wood. I ordered my Second Brigade, then commanded by Colonel T. Kilby Smith, (Colonel Stuart being wounded,) to form on its right, and my Fourth Brigade, Colonel Buckland, on its right, all to advance abreast with this Kentucky brigade before mentioned which I afterward found to be Rousseau's Brigade of McCook's Division. I gave personal direction to the twenty-four pounder guns, whose well-directed fire first silenced the enemy's guns to the left, and afterward at the Shiloh meeting-house.
"Rousseau's Brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the front, sweeping everything before it, and at 4 P. M., we stood upon the ground of our original front line, and the enemy was in full retreat. I directed my several brigades to resume at once their original camps. I am now ordered by General Grant to give personal credit where I think it is due, and censure where I think it merited. I concede that General McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth road, which was the great centre of the field of battle and where Beauregard commanded in person, supported by Bragg's, Polk's, and Beckinridge's divisions. I think Johnson was killed by exposing himself in front of his troops at the time of their attack on Buckland's Brigade on Sunday morning, although in this I may be mistaken.
"My division was made up of regiments perfectly new all having received their muskets for the first time at Paducah. None of them had ever been under fire, or beheld heavy columns of an enemy bearing down on them, asthis did on last Sunday. To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of older troops would be wrong. They knew not the value of combination and organization. When individual fear seized them, the first impulse was to get away. My Third Brigade did break much too soon, and I am not yet advised where they were during Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. Colonel Hildebrand, its Commander, was as cool as any man I ever saw, and no one could have made stronger efforts to hold his men to their places than he did. He kept his own regiment, with individual exceptions, in hand an hour after Appler's and Mungen's regiments had left their proper field of action.
"Colonel Buckland managed his brigade well. I commend him to your notice as a cool, intelligent and judicious gentleman, needing only confidence and experience to make a good commander. His subordinates, Colonels Sullivan and Cockerill, behaved with great gallantry, the former receiving a severe wound on Sunday, and yet commanding and holding his regiment well in hand all day; and on Monday, until his right arm was broken by a shot, Cockerill held a larger proportion men than any Colonel in the division, and was with me from first to last.
"Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the First Brigade, held his ground on Sunday till I ordered him to fall back, which he did in line of battle, and when ordered he conducted the attack on the enemy's left in good style. In falling back to the next position he was thrown from his horse and injured, and his brigade was not in position on Monday morning. His subordinates, Colonels Hicks and Worthington, displayed great personal courage. Colonel Hicks led his regiment in the attack on Sunday, and received a wound which is feared may prove fatal. Heis a brave and gallant gentleman, and deserves well of his country. Lieutenant-Colonel Walcutt, of the Ohio Forty-sixth, was severely wounded on Sunday, and has been disabled ever since. My Second Brigade, Colonel Stuart, was detached near two miles from my headquarters. He had to fight his own battle on Sunday against superior numbers, as the enemy interposed between him and General Prentiss early in the day. Colonel Stuart was wounded severely, and yet reported for duty on Monday morning, but was compelled to leave during the day, when the Command devolved on Colonel T. Kilby Smith, who was always in the thickest of the fight, and led the brigade handsomely. I have not yet received Colonel Stuart's report of the operations of his brigade during the time he was detached, and must therefore forbear to mention names. Lieutenant-Colonel Kyle, of the Seventy-first, was mortally wounded on Sunday, but the regiment itself I did not see, as only a small fragment of it was with the brigade when it joined the division on Monday morning.
"Several times during the battle cartridges gave out, but General Grant had thoughtfully kept a supply coming from the rear. When I appealed to regiments to stand fast although out of cartridges, I did so because to retire a regiment for any cause has a bad effect on others. I commend the Fortieth Illinois and Thirteenth Missouri for thus holding their ground under heavy fire, although their cartridge-boxes were empty. Great credit is due the fragments of men of the disordered regiments who kept in the advance. I observed and noticed them, but until the Brigadiers and Colonels make their reports, I cannot venture to name individuals, but will in due season notice all who kept in our front, as well as those who preferred to keep back near the steamboat landing.
"The enemy captured seven of our guns on Sunday, but on Monday we recovered seven—not the identical guns we had lost, but enough in number to balance the amount. At the time of recovering our camps, our men were so fatigued that we could not follow the retreating masses of the enemy; but on the following day, I followed up with Buckland's and Hildebrand's Brigades for six miles, the result of which I have already reported. Of my personal staff, I can only speak with praise and thanks. I think they smelt as much gunpowder and heard as many cannon-balls and bullets as must satisfy their ambition. Captain Harmon, my Chief of Staff, though in feeble health, was very active in rallying broken troops, encouraging the steadfast, and aiding to form the lines of defence and attack. I commend him to your notice. Major Sanger's intelligence, quick perception and rapid execution, were of very great value to me, especially in bringing into line the batteries that co-operated so efficiently in our movements. Captains McCoy and Dayton, Aids-de-Camp, were with me all the time, carrying orders and acting with coolness, spirit and courage.
"To Surgeon Hartshorn and Doctor L'Hommedieu, hundreds of wounded men are indebted for the kind and excellent treatment received on the field of battle, and in the various temporary hospitals created along the line of our operations. They worked day and night, and did not rest till all the wounded of our own troops, as well as of the enemy, were in safe and comfortable shelter. To Major Taylor, Chief of Artillery, I feel under deep obligations for his good sense and judgment in managing the batteries on which so much depended. I enclose his report and endorse his recommendations. The cavalry of my command kept to the rear and took little part in the action, but itwould have been madness to have exposed horses to the musketry fire under which we were compelled to remain, from Sunday at 8 A. M., till Monday at 4 P. M. Captain Kossack, of the Engineers, was with me all the time, and was of great assistance. I enclose his sketch of the battle-field, which is the best I have seen, and which will enable you to see the various positions occupied by my division, as well as of the others that participated in the battle."
Said General Grant in his official report:
"It becomes my duty again to report another battle fought between two great armies, one contending for the maintenance of the best Government ever devised, and the other for its destruction. It is pleasant to record the success of the army contending for the former principle.
"On Sunday morning our pickets were attacked and driven in by the enemy. Immediately the five divisions stationed at this place were drawn up in line of battle to meet them. The battle soon waxed warm on the left and centre, varying at times to all parts of the line. There was the most continuous firing of musketry and artillery ever heard on this Continent, kept up until nightfall.
"The enemy having forced the centre line to fall back nearly half way from their camps to the Landing, at a late hour in the afternoon a desperate effort was made by the enemy to turn our left and get possession of the Landing, transports, etc. This point was guarded by the gunboats, Tyler and Lexington, Captains Gwin and Shirk commanding, with four twenty-four-pounder Parrott guns, and a battery of rifled guns.
"As there is a deep and impassable ravine for artillery or cavalry, and very difficult for infantry at this point, no troops were stationed here except the necessary artillerists and a small infantry force for their support. Just at thismoment the advance of Major-General Buell's column and a part of the division of General Nelson arrived, the two Generals named both being present. An advance was immediately made upon the point of attack, and the enemy was soon driven back. In this repulse, much is due to the presence of the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, and their able commanders, Captains Gwin and Shirk.
"During the night the divisions under Generals Crittenden and McCook arrived. General Lew. Wallace, at Camp Landing, six miles below, was ordered, at an early hour in the morning, to hold his division in readiness to move in any direction it might be ordered. At eleven o'clock, the order was delivered to move up to Pittsburgh, but owing to its being led by a circuitous route did not arrive in time to take part in Sunday's action.
"During the night all was quiet, and feeling that a great moral advantage would be gained by becoming the attacking party, an advance was ordered as soon as day dawned. The result was the gradual repulse of the enemy at all points of the line, from nine until probably five o'clock in the afternoon, when it became evident the enemy was retreating. Before the close of the action the advance of General T. J. Wood's Division arrived in time to take part in the action.
"My force was too much fatigued, from two days' hard fighting and exposure in the open air to a drenching rain during the intervening night, to pursue immediately. Night closed in cloudy and with a heavy rain, making the roads impracticable for artillery by the next morning. General Sherman, however, followed the enemy, finding that the main part of the army had retreated in good order.
"I feel it a duty, to a gallant and able officer, Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, to make special mention. Henot only was with his command during the entire two days of the action, but displayed great judgment and skill in the management of his men; although severely wounded in the hand on the first day, his place was never vacant. He was again wounded, and had three horses killed under him. In making this mention of a gallant officer no disparagement is intended to other Division Commanders or Major-Generals, Jno. A. McClernand, and Lewis Wallace, and Brigadier-Generals Hurlbut, Prentiss, and W. H. L. Wallace, all of whom maintained their places with credit to themselves and the cause."
A characteristic private letter of Sherman's will be read with interest at this point. It was written many years after the battle of Shiloh, and was addressed to Mr. Marshall P. Wilder, who had sent to Sherman a copy of a paper containing a sketch of Shiloh as seen from the rear of the army by a drummer boy. This is the letter:
"No. 75 West Seventy-first Street,"New York, Jan. 1st, 1890."My Dear Friend: I thank you for sending me the printed paper containing the observations and experiences of our friend about the battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburgh Landing, April 6th and 7th, 1862. Having leisure this New Year's Day I have read every word of it, and from his standpoint as a boy in the rear of where the hard fighting was done his account is literally true. His father (a noble gentleman) and I were fighting for time—because our enemy for the moment outnumbered us, and we had good reason to expect momentarily Lew. Wallace's Division, only six miles off, and Buell's whole army, only twenty miles away. By contesting every foot of ground the enemy was checked till night. Our reinforcements came on the 7th, we swept on in front and pursued a retreatingenemy ten miles, and afterwards followed up to Corinth, Memphis, Vicksburg, etc., to the end."That bloody battle was fought April 6th and 7th, 1862. After we had actually driven our assailants back to Corinth, twenty-six miles, we received the St. Louis, Cincinnati and Louisville newspapers, from which we learned that we were 'surprised,' bayonetted in our beds (blankets on the ground), and disgracefully routed. These reports were heard at the river bank and from steamboats under high pressure to get well away, and such is history."In the rear of all battles there is a mass of fugitives. We had at the time 32,000 men, of which, say, 5,000 or 6,000 were at the steamboat landing—but what of the others? A braver, finer set of men never existed on earth. The reporters dwell on the fugitives because they were of them, but who is to stand up for the brave men at the front? We had no reporters with us. Like sensible men they preferred a steamboat bound for Paducah and Cincinnati, whence they could describe the battle better than we who were without pen or ink."This to me is straw already threshed, for we have fought this battle on paper several times, a much more agreeable task than to fight with bullets. When in England some years ago, I was gratified to listen to veterans fighting Waterloo and Sebastopol over again. So I infer our children will continue the fight of Shiloh long after we are dead and gone. Wishing you a happy New Year, I am, sincerely yours,W. T. Sherman."
"No. 75 West Seventy-first Street,"New York, Jan. 1st, 1890.
"My Dear Friend: I thank you for sending me the printed paper containing the observations and experiences of our friend about the battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburgh Landing, April 6th and 7th, 1862. Having leisure this New Year's Day I have read every word of it, and from his standpoint as a boy in the rear of where the hard fighting was done his account is literally true. His father (a noble gentleman) and I were fighting for time—because our enemy for the moment outnumbered us, and we had good reason to expect momentarily Lew. Wallace's Division, only six miles off, and Buell's whole army, only twenty miles away. By contesting every foot of ground the enemy was checked till night. Our reinforcements came on the 7th, we swept on in front and pursued a retreatingenemy ten miles, and afterwards followed up to Corinth, Memphis, Vicksburg, etc., to the end.
"That bloody battle was fought April 6th and 7th, 1862. After we had actually driven our assailants back to Corinth, twenty-six miles, we received the St. Louis, Cincinnati and Louisville newspapers, from which we learned that we were 'surprised,' bayonetted in our beds (blankets on the ground), and disgracefully routed. These reports were heard at the river bank and from steamboats under high pressure to get well away, and such is history.
"In the rear of all battles there is a mass of fugitives. We had at the time 32,000 men, of which, say, 5,000 or 6,000 were at the steamboat landing—but what of the others? A braver, finer set of men never existed on earth. The reporters dwell on the fugitives because they were of them, but who is to stand up for the brave men at the front? We had no reporters with us. Like sensible men they preferred a steamboat bound for Paducah and Cincinnati, whence they could describe the battle better than we who were without pen or ink.
"This to me is straw already threshed, for we have fought this battle on paper several times, a much more agreeable task than to fight with bullets. When in England some years ago, I was gratified to listen to veterans fighting Waterloo and Sebastopol over again. So I infer our children will continue the fight of Shiloh long after we are dead and gone. Wishing you a happy New Year, I am, sincerely yours,
W. T. Sherman."
The Situation Before the Battle—The First Skirmish—Plans of the Rebel Leaders—The Scene on Sunday Morning—Troops in Disorder—Analysis of the Situation—Faulty Disposition of the Federal Troops—Arrangement of Sherman's Division—The Rebel Plan of Attack—Sherman's Old Friend Bragg among the Rebel Leaders.
The Situation Before the Battle—The First Skirmish—Plans of the Rebel Leaders—The Scene on Sunday Morning—Troops in Disorder—Analysis of the Situation—Faulty Disposition of the Federal Troops—Arrangement of Sherman's Division—The Rebel Plan of Attack—Sherman's Old Friend Bragg among the Rebel Leaders.
In the records of the Rebellion, written amid the actual roar of the conflict or years afterward amid the calm of reestablished peace, no chapter is more noteworthy than the story of Shiloh, written forThe Cincinnati Gazetteby its correspondent "Agate," who has since become famous throughout the world for his work as a journalist, historian and statesman. No record of Sherman's campaigns would be complete without it, and no other pen could write a chapter worthy to replace it. So it is given here in full, as it was written from the "Field of Battle, Pittsburgh Landing, Tenn., April 9th:"
Fresh from the field of the great battle, with its pounding and roaring of artillery, and its keener-voiced rattle of musketry still sounding in my wearied ears; with all its visions of horror still seeming seared upon my eyeballs, while scenes of panic-stricken rout and brilliant charges, and obstinate defences, and succor, and intoxicating success are burnedalike confusedly and indelibly upon the brain, I essay to write what I know of the battle of Pittsburgh Landing.
Yet how bring order out of such a chaos? How deal justly, writing within twenty-four hours of the closing of the fight, with all the gallant regiments, of the hundred present, that bravely won or as bravely lost, and with all that ignobly fled in panic from the field? How describe, so that one man may leisurely follow, the simultaneous operations of a hundred and fifty thousand antagonists, fighting backward and forward for two long days, in a five miles' line and over four miles' retreat and advance, under eight Division Commanders on one side, and an unknown number on the other? How, in short, picture on a canvas so necessarily small a panorama, so grandly great? The task is impossible.
But what one man, diligently using all his powers of observation through those two days, might see, I saw, and that I can faithfully set down. For the rest, after riding carefully over and over the ground, asking questions innumerable of those who knew, and sifting consistent truth from the multiplicity of replies with whatever skill some experience may have taught, I can only give the concurrent testimony of the actors.
Our great Tennessee Expedition had been up the river some four weeks. We had occupied Pittsburgh Landing for about three; had destroyed one railroad connection, which the Rebels had restored in a day or two, and had failed in a similar but more important attempt on another. Beyond this we had engaged in no active operations. The Rebels, alarmed by our sudden appearance, began massing their troops under our eyes. Presently they had more in the vicinity than we had. Then we waited for Buell, who was crossing the country from Nashville by easy marches.The Rebels had apparently become restive under our slow concentrations, and General Grant had given out that an attack from them seemed probable. Yet we had lain at Pittsburgh Landing, within twenty miles of the Rebels, that were likely to attack us in superior numbers, without throwing up a single breastwork or preparing a single protection for a battery, and with the brigades of one division stretched from extreme right to extreme left of our line, while four other divisions had been crowded in between, as they arrived.
On the evening of Friday, April 4th, there was a preliminary skirmish with the enemy's advance. Rumors came into camp that some of our officers had been taken prisoners by a considerable Rebel force, near our lines, and that pickets had been firing. A brigade, the Seventieth, Seventy-second, and Forty-eighth Ohio, was sent out to see about it. They came upon a party of Rebels, perhaps a thousand strong, and after a sharp little action drove them off, losing Major Crocket, of the Seventy-second Ohio, and a couple of lieutenants from the Seventieth, prisoners, taking in return some sixteen, and driving the Rebels back to a battery they were found to have already in position, at no great distance from our lines. General Lew. Wallace's troops, at Crump's Landing, were ordered out under arms, and they marched to Adamsville, half-way between the river and Purdy, to take position there and resist any attack in that direction. The night passed in dreary rain, but without further Rebel demonstration; and it was generally supposed that the affair had been an ordinary picket-fight, presaging nothing more. Major-General Grant had indeed said there was great probability of a Rebel attack, but there were no appearances of his making any preparations for such an unlooked-for event, and sothe matter was dismissed. Yet on Saturday there was more skirmishing along our advanced lines.