SHERMAN SENDING HIS LAST TELEGRAM BEFORE CUTTING THE WIRES.
SHERMAN SENDING HIS LAST TELEGRAM BEFORE CUTTING THE WIRES.
"I had anticipated this movement, and had by signal and telegraph ordered General Corse to reinforce that post from Rome. General Corse had reached Allatoona with a brigade during the night of the 4th, just in time to meet the attack by French's Division on the morning of the 5th. In person I reached Kenesaw Mountain about 10 A. M. of the 5th, and could see the smoke of battle and hear the faint sounds of artillery. The distance, eighteen miles, was too great for me to make in time to share in the battle, but I directed the Twenty-third Corps, Brigadier-General Cox commanding, to move rapidly from the base of Kenesawdue west, aiming to reach the road from Allatoona to Dallas, threatening the rear of the forces attacking Allatoona I succeeded in getting a signal message to General Corse during the fight, notifying him of my presence. The defence of Allatoona by General Corse was admirably conducted, and the enemy repulsed with heavy slaughter. His description of the defence is so graphic that it leaves nothing for me to add; and the movement of General Cox had the desired effect of causing the withdrawal of French's Division rapidly in the direction of Dallas.
"On the 6th and 7th I pushed my cavalry well toward Burnt Hickory and Dallas, and discovered that the enemy had moved westward, and inferred that he would attempt to break our railroad again in the neighborhood of Kingston. Accordingly, on the morning of the 8th I put the army in motion through Allatoona Pass to Kingston, reaching that point on the 10th. There I learned that the enemy had feigned on Rome, and was passing the Coosa River on a pontoon bridge about eleven miles below Rome. I therefore, on the 11th, moved to Rome, and pushed Garrard's Cavalry and the Twenty-third Corps, under General Cox, across the Oostanaula, to threaten the flanks of the enemy passing north. Garrard's cavalry drove a cavalry brigade of the enemy to and beyond the Narrows, leading into the Valley of the Chattooga, capturing two field pieces. The enemy had moved with great rapidity, and made his appearance at Resaca, and Hood had in person demanded its surrender.
"I had from Kingston reinforced Resaca by two regiments of the Army of the Tennessee. I at first intended to move the army into the Chattooga Valley, to interpose between the enemy and his line of retreat down the Coosa, but feared that General Hood would in that event turneastward by Spring Place, and down the Federal road, and therefore moved against him at Resaca. Colonel Weaver at Resaca, afterward reinforced by General Raum's brigade, had repulsed the enemy from Resaca, but he had succeeded in breaking the railroad from Tilton to Dalton, and as far north as the tunnel. Arriving at Resaca on the evening of the 14th, I determined to strike Hood in flank, or force him to battle; and directed the Army of the Tennessee, General Howard, to move to Snake Creek Gap which was held by the enemy, while General Stanley, with the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps, moved by Tilton, across the mountains, to the rear of Snake Creek Gap in the neighborhood of Villianow.
"The Army of the Tennessee found the enemy occupying our old lines in Snake Creek Gap, and on the 15th skirmished for the purpose of holding him there until Stanley could get to his rear. But the enemy gave way about noon, and was followed through the gap, escaping before General Stanley had reached the further end of the pass. The next day (the 16th) the armies moved directly toward Lafayette, with a view to cut off Hood's retreat. We found him intrenched in Ship's Gap, but the leading division (Wood's) of the Fifteenth Corps rapidly carried the advanced posts held by two companies of a South Carolina regiment, making them prisoners. The remaining eight companies escaped to the main body near Lafayette. The next morning we passed over into the Valley of the Chattooga, the Army of the Tennessee moving in pursuit by Lafayette and Alpine, toward Blue Pond; the Army of the Cumberland by Summerville and Melville Postoffice, to Gaylesville, and the Army of the Ohio and Garrard's Cavalry from Villainow, Dirttown, and Gover's Gap, to Gaylesville. Hood, however, was little incumbered withtrains, and marched with great rapidity, and had succeeded in getting into the narrow gorge formed by the lookout Range abutting against the Coosa River, in the neighborhood of Gadsden. He evidently wanted to avoid the fight.
"On the 19th all the armies were grouped about Gaylesville, in the rich valley of the Chattooga, abounding in corn and meat, and I determined to pause in my pursuit of the enemy, to watch his movements and live on the country. I hoped that Hood would turn toward Guntersville and Bridgeport. The Army of the Tennessee was posted near Little River, with instructions to feel forward in support of the cavalry, which was ordered to watch Hood in the neighborhood of Will's Valley, and to give me the earliest notice possible of his turning northward. The Army of the Ohio was posted at Cedar Bluff, with orders to lay a pontoon across the Coosa, and to feel forward to Center and down in the direction of Blue Mountain. The Army of the Cumberland was held in reserve at Gaylesville; and all the troops were instructed to draw heavily for supplies from the surrounding country. In the meantime communications were opened to Rome, and a heavy force set to work in repairing the damages done to our railroads. Atlanta was abundantly supplied with provisions, but forage was scarce, and General Slocum was instructed to send strong foraging parties out in the direction of South River and collect all the corn and fodder possible, and to put his own trains in good condition for further service.
"Hood's movements and strategy had demonstrated that he had an army capable of endangering at all times my communications, but unable to meet me in open fight. To follow him would simply amount to being decoyed away fromGeorgia, with little prospect of overtaking and overwhelming him. To remain on the defensive would have been bad policy for an army of so great value as the one I then commanded, and I was forced to adopt a course more fruitful in results than the naked one of following him to the southwest. I had previously submitted to the Commander-in-Chief a general plan, which amounted substantially to the destruction of Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and sallying forth from Atlanta, through the heart of Georgia, to capture one or more of the great Atlantic seaports. This I renewed from Gaylesville, modified somewhat by the change of events.
"On the 26th of October, satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, I detached the Fourth Corps, Major-General Stanley, and ordered him to proceed to Chattanooga and report to Major-General Thomas at Nashville. Subsequently, on the 30th of October, I also detached the Twenty-third Corps, Major-General Schofield, with the same destination, and delegated to Major-General Thomas full power over all the troops subject to my command, except the four corps with which I designed to move into Georgia. This gave him the two divisions under A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, but en route for Tennessee, the two corps named, and all the garrisons in Tennessee, as also all the cavalry of my Military Division, except one division under Brigadier-General Kilpatrick, which was ordered to rendezvous at Marietta. Brevet-Major-General Wilson had arrived from the Army of the Potomac, to assume command of the cavalry of my army, and I dispatched him back to Nashville with all dismounted detachments, and orders as rapidly as possible to collect the cavalry serving in Kentucky and Tennessee, to mount, organize and equip them, and report to Major-GeneralThomas for duty. These forces I judged would enable General Thomas to defend the railroad from Chattanooga back, including Nashville and Decatur, and give him an army with which he could successfully cope with Hood, should the latter cross the Tennessee northward.
"By the 1st of November Hood's army had moved from Gadsden, and made its appearance in the neighborhood of Decatur, where a feint was made; he then passed on to Tuscumbia and laid a pontoon bridge opposite Florence. I then began my preparations for the march through Georgia, having received the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief carrying into effect my plan, the details of which were explained to all my corps commanders and heads of staff departments, with strict injunctions of secrecy. I had also communicated full details to General Thomas, and had informed him I would not leave the neighborhood of Kingston until he felt perfectly confident that he was entirely prepared to cope with Hood, should he carry into effect his threatened invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky. I estimated Hood's force at 35,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.
"I moved the Army of the Tennessee by slow and easy marches on the south of the Coosa back to the neighborhood of Smyrna camp ground, and the Fourteenth Corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, to Kingston, whither I repaired in person on the 2d of November. From that point I directed all surplus artillery, all baggage not needed for my contemplated march, all the sick and wounded, refugees, &c., to be sent back to Chattanooga; and the four corps above-mentioned, with Kilpatrick's Cavalry, were put in the most efficient condition possible for a long and difficult march. This operation consumed the time until the 11th of November, when, everything being ready, I ordered General Corse, who still remained at Rome, to destroy the bridgesthere, all foundries, mills, shops, warehouses, or other property that could be useful to an enemy, and to move to Kingston. At the same time the railroad in and about Atlanta, and between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee, was ordered to be utterly destroyed.
"The garrisons from Kingston northward were also ordered to draw back to Chattanooga, taking with them all public property and all railroad stock, and to take up the rails from Resaca back, saving them, ready to be replaced whenever future interests should demand. The railroad between the Etowah and the Oostanaula was left untouched, because I thought it more than probable we would find it necessary to re-occupy the country as far forward as the Etowah. Atlanta itself is only of strategic value as long as it is a railroad centre; and as all the railroads leading to it are destroyed, as well as all its foundries, machine shops, warehouses, depots, &c., it is of no more value than any other point in North Georgia; whereas the line of the Etowah, by reasons of its rivers and natural features, possesses an importance which will always continue. From it all parts of Georgia and Alabama can be reached by armies marching with trains down the Coosa or the Chattahoochee Valleys.
"On the 12th of November, my army stood detached and cut off from all communication with the rear. It was composed of four corps, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth constituting the right wing, under Major-General O. O. Howard; the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, constituting the left wing, under Major-General H. W. Slocum; of an aggregate strength of 60,000 infantry; one cavalry division, in aggregate strength 5,500, under Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, and the artillery reduced to the minimum, one gun per thousand men.
"The whole force moved rapidly and grouped about Atlanta on the 14th November. In the meantime Captain O. M. Poe had thoroughly destroyed Atlanta, save its mere dwelling houses and churches, and the right wing, with General Kilpatrick's cavalry, was put in motion in the direction of Jonesborough and McDonough, with orders to make a strong feint on Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee about Planters' Mills, and rendezvous in the neighborhood of Gordon in seven days, exclusive of the day of march. On the same day General Slocum moved with the Twentieth corps by Decatur and Stone Mountain, with orders to tear up the railroad from Social Circle to Madison, to burn the large and important railroad bridge across the Oconee, east of Madison, and turn south and reach Milledgeville on the seventh day, exclusive of the day of march.
"In person I left Atlanta on the 16th, in company with the Fourteenth Corps, Brevet-Major-General Jeff. C. Davis, by Lithonia, Covington, and Shady Dale, directly on Milledgeville. All the troops were provided with good wagon trains, loaded with ammunition, and supplies approximating twenty days' bread, forty days' sugar and coffee, a double allowance of salt for forty days, and beef cattle equal to forty days' supplies. The wagons were also supplied with about three days' forage, in grain. All were instructed by a judicious system of foraging, to maintain this order of things as long as possible, living chiefly, if not solely, upon the country, which I knew to abound in corn, sweet potatoes and meats.
"My first object was, of course, to place my army in the very heart of Georgia, interposing between Macon and Augusta, and obliging the enemy to divide his forces to defend not only those points, but Millen, Savannah and Charleston. All my calculations were fully realized.During the 22d, General Kilpatrick made a good feint on Macon, driving the enemy within his intrenchments, and then drew back to Griswoldville, where Walcott's Brigade of infantry joined him to cover that flank, while Howard's trains were closing up and his men scattered, breaking up railroads. The enemy came out of Macon and attacked Wolcott in position, but was so roughly handled that he never repeated the experiment. On the eighth day after leaving Atlanta, namely, on the 23d, General Slocum occupied Milledgeville and the important bridge across the Oconee there, and Generals Howard and Kilpatrick were in and about Gordon.
"General Howard was then ordered to move eastward, destroying the railroad thoroughly in his progress as far as Tennille Station, opposite Sandersville, and General Slocum to move to Sandersville by two roads. General Kilpatrick was ordered to Milledgeville, and thence move rapidly eastward, to break the railroad which leads from Millen to Augusta, then to turn upon Millen and rescue our prisoners of war supposed to be confined at that place. I accompanied the Twentieth Corps from Millegeville to Sandersville, approaching which place, on the 25th, we found the bridges across Buffalo Creek burned, which delayed us three hours. The next day we entered Sandersville, skirmishing with Wheeler's Cavalry, which offered little opposition to the advance of the Twentieth and Fourteenth Corps, entering the place almost at the same moment.
"General Slocum was then ordered to tear up and destroy the Georgia Central Railroad, from Station No. 13 (Tennille) to Station No. 10, near the crossing of Ogeechee; one of his Corps substantially followed the railroad, the other by way of Louisville, in support of Kilpatrick'sCavalry. In person I shifted to the right wing, and accompanied the Seventeenth Corps, General Blair, on the south of the railroad, till abreast of Station No. 9½, (Barton;) General Howard, in person, with the Fifteenth Corps, keeping further to the right, and about one day's march ahead, ready to turn against the flank of any enemy who should oppose our progress.
"At Barton I learned that Kilpatrick's Cavalry had reached the Augusta railroad about Waynesborough, where he ascertained that our prisoners had been removed from Millen and therefore the purpose of rescuing them, upon which we had set our hearts, was an impossibility. But as Wheeler's Cavalry had hung around him, and as he had retired to Louisville to meet our infantry, in pursuance of my instructions not to risk a battle unless at great advantage, I ordered him to leave his wagons and all incumbrances with the left wing, and moving in the direction of Augusta, if Wheeler gave him the opportunity, to indulge him with all the fighting he wanted. General Kilpatrick, supported by Baird's Division of infantry of the Fourteenth Corps, again moved in the direction of Waynesborough, and encountering Wheeler in the neighborhood of Thomas's station, attacked him in position, driving him from three successive lines of barricades handsomely through Waynesborough and across Brier Creek, the bridges over which he burned; and then, with Baird's Division, rejoined the left wing, which in the meantime had been marching by easy stages of ten miles a day in the direction of Lumpkin's Station and Jacksonborough.
"The Seventeenth Corps took up the destruction of the railroad at the Ogeechee, near Station No. 10, and continued it to Millen; the enemy offering little or no opposition, although preparation had seemingly been made at Millen."
"On the 3d of December the 17th Corps which I accompanied, was at Millon; the 15th Corps, General Howard, was south of the Ogeechee, opposite Station No. 7 (Scarboro); the 20th Corps, General Slocum, on the Augusta Railroad, about four miles north of Millen, near Buckhead Church, and the 14th Corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, in the neighborhood of Lumpkin's Station, on the Augusta Railroad. All were ordered to march in the direction of Savannah—the 15th Corps to continue south of the Ogeechee, the 17th to destroy the railroad as far as Ogeechee Church—and four days were allowed to reach the line from Ogeechee Church to the neighborhood of Halley's Ferry, on the Savannah River. All the columns reached their destinations in time, and continued to march on their several roads—General Davis following the Savannah River road, General Slocum the middle road by way of Springfield, General Blair the railroad, and General Howard still south and west of the Ogeechee, with orders to cross to the east bank opposite 'Eden Station,' or Station No. 2.
"As we approached Savannah the country became more marshy and difficult, and more obstructions were met, in the way of felled trees, where the roads crossed the creek swamps or narrow causeways; but our pioneer companies were well organized, and removed the obstructions in an incredibly short time. No opposition from the enemy worth speaking of was encountered until the heads of columns were within 15 miles of Savannah, where all the roads leading to the city were obstructed more or less by felled timber, with earthworks, and artillery. But these were easily turned and the enemy driven away, so that by the 10th of December the enemy was driven within his lines at Savannah. These followed substantially a swampy creek which empties into the Savannah River about three miles above the city,across to the head of a corresponding stream which empties into the Little Ogeechee. These streams were singularly favorable to the enemy as a cover, being very marshy, and bordered by rice-fields, which were flooded either by the tide-water or by inland ponds, the gates to which were controlled and covered by his heavy artillery.
"The only approaches to the city were by five narrow causeways, namely, the two railroads, and the Augusta, the Louisville, and the Ogeechee dirt roads; all of which were commanded by heavy ordnance, too strong for us to fight with our light field guns. To assault an enemy of unknown strength at such a disadvantage appeared to me unwise, especially as I had so successfully brought my army, almost unscathed, so great a distance, and could surely attain the same result by the operation of time. I therefore instructed my army commanders to closely invest the city from the north and west, and to reconnoitre well the ground in their fronts, respectively, while I gave my personal attention to opening communication with our fleet, which I knew was waiting for us in Tybee, Warsaw, and Ossabaw Sounds.
"In approaching Savannah, General Slocum struck the Charleston Railroad near the bridge, and occupied the river bank as his left flank, where he had captured two of the enemy's river boats, and had prevented two others (gunboats) from coming down the river to communicate with the city; while General Howard, by his right flank, had broken the Gulf Railroad at Fleming's and way stations, and occupied the railroad itself down to the Little Ogeechee, near 'Station No. 1;' so that no supplies could reach Savannah by any of its accustomed channels. We, on the contrary, possessed large herds of cattle, which we had brought along or gathered in the country, and our wagons still contained a reasonable amount of breadstuffs and other necessaries,and the fine rice crops of the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers furnished to our men and animals a large amount of rice and rice straw. We also held the country to the south and west of the Ogeechee as foraging ground. Still, communication with the fleet was of vital importance, and I directed General Kilpatrick to cross the Ogeechee by a pontoon bridge, to reconnoitre Fort McAllister, and to proceed to Catherine's Sound, in the direction of Sunbury or Kilkenny Bluff, and open communication with the fleet. General Howard had previously by my direction sent one of his best scouts down the Ogeechee in a canoe for a like purpose. But more than this was necessary. We wanted the vessels and their contents, and the Ogeechee River, a navigable stream, close to the rear of our camps, was the proper avenue of supply.
"The enemy had burned the road-bridge across the Ogeechee, just below the mouth of the Canoochee, known as 'King's bridge.' This was reconstructed in an incredibly short time, in the most substantial manner, by the 58th Indiana, Colonel Buel, under the direction of Captain Reese, of the Engineers' Corps, and on the 13th of December the 2d Division of the 15th Corps, under command of Brigadier-General Hazen, crossed the bridge to the west bank of the Ogeechee and marched down with orders to carry by assault Fort McAllister, a strong inclosed redoubt, manned by two companies of artillery and three of infantry, in all about two hundred men, and mounting 23 gunsen barbette, and one mortar. General Hazen reached the vicinity of Fort McAllister about 1P. M., deployed his division about that place, with both flanks resting upon the river, posted his skirmishers judiciously behind the trunks of trees whose branches had been used forabattis, and about 5P. M., assaulted the place with nine regimentsat three points; all of them successful. I witnessed the assault from a rice-mill on the opposite bank of the river, and can bear testimony to the handsome manner in which it was accomplished.
"Up to this time we had not communicated with our fleet. From the signal station at the rice-mill our officers had looked for two days over the rice-fields and salt marsh in the direction of Ossabaw Sound, but could see nothing of it. But while watching the preparations for the assault on Fort McAllister, we discovered in the distance what seemed to be the smoke-stack of a steamer, which became more and more distinct. Until about the very moment of the assault she was plainly visible below the fort, and our signal was answered. As soon as I saw our colors fairly planted upon the walls of McAllister, in company with General Howard I went in a small boat down to the fort and met General Hazen, who had not yet communicated with the gunboat below, as it was shut out to him by a point of timber. Determined to communicate that night, I got another small boat and a crew and pulled down the river till I found the tug 'Dandelion,' Captain Williamson, U. S. N., who informed me that Captain Duncan, who had been sent by General Howard, had succeeded in reaching Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster, and that he was expecting them hourly in Ossabaw Sound. After making communications to those officers, and a short communication to the War Department, I returned to Fort McAllister that night, and before daylight was overtaken by Major Strong, of General Foster's staff, advising me that General Foster had arrived in the Ogeechee, near Fort McAllister, and was very anxious to meet me on board his boat. I accordingly returned with him, and met General Foster on board the steamer 'Nemeha,' and, after consultation, determinedto proceed with him down the sound in hopes to meet Admiral Dahlgren. But we did not meet him until we reached Warsaw Sound, about noon. I there went on board the Admiral's flag-ship, the 'Harvest Moon,' after having arranged with General Foster to send us from Hilton Head some siege ordnance and some boats suitable for navigating the Ogeechee River. Admiral Dahlgren very kindly furnished me with all the data concerning his fleet and the numerous forts that guarded the inland channels between the sea and Savannah. I explained to him how completely Savannah was invested at all points, save only the plank road on the South Carolina shore known as the 'Union Causeway,' which I thought I could reach from my left flank across the Savannah River. I explained to him that if he would simply engage the attention of the forts along Wilmington Channel, at Beaulieu and Rosedew, I thought I could carry the defenses of Savannah by assault as soon as the heavy ordnance arrived from Hilton Head. On the 15th the Admiral carried me back to Fort McAllister, whence I returned to our lines in the rear of Savannah.
"Having received and carefully considered all the reports of division commanders, I determined to assault the lines of the enemy as soon as my heavy ordnance came from Port Royal, first making a formal demand for surrender. On the 17th, a number of thirty-pounder Parrott guns having reached King's Bridge, I proceeded in person to the headquarters of Major-General Slocum, on the Augusta Road, and dispatched thence into Savannah, by flag of truce, a formal demand for the surrender of the place; and on the following day received an answer from General Hardee refusing to surrender.
"In the meantime further reconnoissances from our left flank had demonstrated that it was impracticable or unwiseto push any considerable force across the Savannah River, for the enemy held the river opposite the city with iron-clad gunboats, and could destroy any pontoons laid down by us between Hutchinson's Island and the South Carolina shore, which would isolate any force sent over from that flank. I therefore ordered General Slocum to get into position the siege guns and make all the preparations necessary to assault, and to report to me the earliest moment when he could be ready, while I should proceed rapidly round by the right and make arrangements to occupy the Union Causeway from the direction of Port Royal. General Foster had already established a division of troops on the peninsula or neck between the Coosawatchie and Tullifinney Rivers, at the head of Broad River, from which position he could reach the railroad with his artillery.
"I went to Port Royal in person, and made arrangements to reinforce that command by one or more divisions, under a proper officer, to assault and carry the railroad, and thence turn toward Savannah until it occupied the causeway in question. I went on board the Admiral's flagship, the 'Harvest Moon,' which put out to sea the night of the 20th. But the wind was high, and increased during the night, so that the pilot judged Ossabaw bar impassable, and ran into the Tybee, whence we proceeded through the inland channels into Warsaw Sound, and thence through Romney Marsh. But the ebb tide caught the 'Harvest Moon' and she was unable to make the passage. Admiral Dahlgren took me in his barge, and pulling in the direction of Vernon River we met the army tug 'Red Legs,' bearing a message from my Adjutant, Captain Dayton, of that morning, the 21st, to the effect that our troops were in possession of the enemy's lines, and were advancing without opposition into Savannah,the enemy having evacuated the place during the previous night.
"Admiral Dahlgren proceeded up the Vernon River in his barge, while I transferred to the tug, in which I proceeded to Fort McAllister, and thence to the rice-mill; and on the morning of the 22d rode into the city of Savannah, already occupied by our troops.
"I was very much disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his garrison, and had to content myself with the material fruits of victory without the cost to life which would have attended a general assault. The substantial results will be more clearly set forth in the tabular statements of heavy ordnance and other public property acquired, and it will suffice here to state that the important city of Savannah, with its valuable harbor and river, was the chief object of the campaign. With it we acquire all the forts and heavy ordnance in its vicinity, with large stores of ammunition, shot and shells, cotton, rice, and other valuable products of the country. We also gain locomotives and cars, which, though of little use to us in the present condition of the railroads, are a serious loss to the enemy; as well as four steamboats gained, and the loss to the enemy of the ironclad 'Savannah,' one ram and three transports, blown up or burned by them the night before.
"Formal demand having been made for the surrender, and having been refused, I contend that everything within the line of intrenchments belongs to the United States; and I shall not hesitate to use it, if necessary, for public purposes. But inasmuch as the inhabitants generally have manifested a friendly disposition, I shall disturb them as little as possible consistently with the military rights of present and future military commanders, without remitting the least our just rights as captors.
CAPTURING THE FLAG.
CAPTURING THE FLAG.
"After having made the necessary orders for the disposition of the troops in and about Savannah, I ordered Captain O. M. Poe, Chief Engineer, to make a thorough examination of the enemy's works in and about Savannah, with a view to making it conform to our future uses. New lines of defenses will be built, embracing the city proper, Forts Jackson, Thunderbolt, and Pulaski retained, with slight modifications in their armament and rear defenses. All the rest of the enemy's forts will be dismantled and destroyed, and their heavy ordnance transferred to Hilton Head, where it can be more easily guarded. Our base of supplies will be established in Savannah, as soon as the very difficult obstructions placed in the river can be partially removed. These obstructions at present offer a very serious impediment to the commerce of Savannah, consisting of crib-work of logs and timber heavily bolted together, and filled with the cobble-stones which formerly paved the streets of Savannah. All the channels below the city were found more or less filled with torpedoes, which have been removed by order of Admiral Dahlgren, so that Savannah already fulfills the important part it was designed in our plans for the future.
"In thus sketching the course of events connected with this campaign, I have purposely passed lightly over the march from Atlanta to the seashore, because it was made in four or more columns, sometimes at a distance of fifteen or twenty miles from each other, and it was impossible for me to attend but one. Therefore I have left it to the army and corps commanders to describe in their own language the events which attended the march of their respective columns. These reports are herewith submitted, and I beg to refer to them for further details. I would merely sum up the advantages which I conceive have accrued to us by this march.
"Our former labors in North Georgia had demonstrated the truth that no large army, carrying with it the necessary stores and baggage, can overtake and capture an inferior force of the enemy in his own country. Therefore, no alternative was left me but the one I adopted, namely, to divide my forces, and with one part act offensively against the enemy's resources, while with the other I should act defensively, and invite the enemy to attack, risking the chances of battle. In this conclusion I have been singularly sustained by the results. General Hood, who, as I have heretofore described, had moved to the westward near Tuscumbia with a view to decoy me away from Georgia, finding himself mistaken, was forced to choose either to pursue me or to act offensively against the other part left in Tennessee. He adopted the latter course, and General Thomas has wisely and well fulfilled his part in the grand scheme in drawing Hood well up into Tennessee until he could concentrate all his own troops, and then turn upon Hood, as he has done, and destroy or fatally cripple his army. That part of my army is so far removed from me that I leave, with perfect confidence, its management and history to General Thomas.
"I was thereby left with a well-appointed army to sever the enemy's only remaining railroad communication eastward and westward for over one hundred miles, namely, the Georgia State Railroad, which is broken up from Fairburn Station to Madison and the Oconee, and the Central Railroad from Gordon clear to Savannah, with numerous breaks on the latter road from Gordon to Eatonton, and from Millen to Augusta, and the Savannah and Gulf Railroad. We have also consumed the corn and fodder in the region of country thirty miles on either side of a line from Atlanta to Savannah, as also the sweet potatoes, cattle, hogs, sheep,and poultry, and have carried away more than ten thousand horses and mules, as well as a countless number of their slaves. I estimate the damage done to the State of Georgia and its military resources at $100,000,000, at least $20,000,000 of which has inured to our advantage, and the remainder is simple waste and destruction. This may seem a hard species of warfare, but it brings the sad realities of war home to those who have been directly or indirectly instrumental in involving us in its attendant calamities.
"This campaign has also placed this branch of my army in a position from which other great military results may be attempted, beside leaving in Tennessee and North Alabama a force which is amply sufficient to meet all the chances of war in that region of our country.
"Since the capture of Atlanta my staff is unchanged, save that General Barry, Chief of Artillery, has been absent, sick, since our leaving Kingston, Surgeon Moore, United States Army, is Chief Medical Director in place of Surgeon Kittoe, relieved to resume his proper duties as a Medical Inspector. Major Hitchcock, A. A. G., has also been added to my staff, and has been of great assistance in the field and office. Captain Dayton still remains as my Adjutant-General. All have, as formerly, fulfilled their parts to my entire satisfaction.
"In the body of my army I feel a just pride. Generals Howard and Slocum are gentlemen of singular capacity and intelligence, thorough soldiers and patriots, working day and night, not for themselves, but for their country and their men. General Kilpatrick, who commanded the cavalry of this army, has handled it with spirit and dash to my entire satisfaction, and kept a superior force of the enemy's cavalry from even approaching our infantry columns or wagon trains. His report is full and graphic. All the divisionand brigade commanders merit my personal and official thanks, and I shall spare no efforts to secure them commissions equal to the rank they have exercised so well. As to the rank and file, they seem so full of confidence in themselves, that I doubt if they want a compliment from me; but I must do them the justice to say that whether called on to fight, to march, to wade streams, to make roads, clear out obstructions, build bridges, make 'corduroy,' or tear up railroads, they have done it with alacrity and a degree of cheerfulness unsurpassed. A little loose in foraging, they 'did some things they ought not to have done,' yet on the whole they have supplied the wants of the army with as little violence as could be expected, and as little loss as I calculated. Some of these foraging parties had encounters with the enemy which would in ordinary times rank as respectable battles. The behavior of our troops in Savannah has been so manly, so quiet, so perfect, that I take it as the best evidence of discipline and true courage. Never was a hostile city, filled with women and children, occupied by a large army with less disorder, or more system, order, and good government. The same general and generous spirit of confidence and good feeling pervades the army which it has ever afforded me especial pleasure to report on former occasions.
"I avail myself of this occasion to express my heartfelt thanks to Admiral Dahlgren and the officers and men of his fleet and also to General Foster and his command, for the hearty welcome given us on our arrival at the coast, and for their steady and prompt co-operation in all measures tending to the result accomplished.
"I send herewith a map of the country through which we have passed; reports from General Howard, General Slocum, and General Kilpatrick, and their subordinatesrespectively, with the usual lists of captured property killed, wounded and missing, prisoners of war taken and rescued, as also copies of all papers illustrating the campaign, all of which are respectfully submitted by
"Your obedient servant,"W. T. Sherman, Major-General."
In the Cradle of Secession—The Occupation and Destruction of Columbia—Reprisals against Wade Hampton: Men—Arrival at Goldsboro—Summing up the Results of the Northward March—Work accomplished by the Engineers.
In the Cradle of Secession—The Occupation and Destruction of Columbia—Reprisals against Wade Hampton: Men—Arrival at Goldsboro—Summing up the Results of the Northward March—Work accomplished by the Engineers.
Sherman always contended that the war should have closed on July 4, 1863. The fall of Vicksburg and the battle of Gettysburg sealed the doom of the rebellion, and the Southern leaders should have recognized that fact and accepted the situation. But even now, with Atlanta and Savannah captured, Hood's army destroyed, and a pathway driven by the Union army through the heart of the South, they were still stubborn and resolved, as they expressed it, to hold out till the last man died in the last ditch. It was inevitable that this attitude should be exasperating to the National leaders. Sherman himself doubtless felt a certain grim determination, since the South wanted more war, to give it war to its heart's content, and to carry the war through South Carolina, the cradle of the rebellion. His army at Savannah was in good condition. In twenty-seven days it had marched more than three hundred miles, with losses of five officers and fifty-eight men killed, thirteen officers and two hundred and thirty-two men wounded, and one officer and two hundred and fifty-eight men missing. Seven thousand slaves had joined the march to the coast.
Twenty thousand bales of cotton had been burned and three hundred and twenty miles of railroad destroyed, including all the stations, engine-houses, turn-tables, etc. Ten million pounds of corn had been captured and an equal amount of fodder; more than 1,200,000 rations of meat, 919,000 of bread, 483,000 of coffee, 581,000 of sugar, and 137,000 of salt.
Nor had the demoralization of the enemy been less than the material loss inflicted upon him. Not only had the army swept the pathway thirty miles wide through the heart of Georgia, but it had sent out detachments in this direction and that, menacing many points which it did not actually strike. For four weeks, therefore, all of Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and South Carolina suffered painful suspense, not knowing whither the army would march next. For this reason, also, it had been impracticable for the rebels to mass any considerable force against Sherman, even had such a force been at their command, for they did not know where to meet him.
It is not to be wondered at that universal rejoicing was caused at the North by the results of this campaign, nor that those who had once distrusted Sherman as a man of erratic judgment, now lavished upon him exuberant confidence and praise. Not even Grant himself was more applauded. It was from the depths of an appreciative heart that the President wrote to Sherman as follows:
"Executive Mansion,"Washington, D. C., Dec. 26, 1864."My Dear General Sherman"Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift—the capture of Savannah."When you were about to leave Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was anxious, if not fearful; but feeling you were the better judge, and remembering that 'nothing risked nothing gained,' I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours, for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce. And taking the work of General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success."Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing forces of the whole—Hood's army—it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light."But what next? I suppose it will be safe if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide."Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole army, officers and men."Yours very truly,"A. Lincoln."
"Executive Mansion,"Washington, D. C., Dec. 26, 1864.
"My Dear General Sherman
"Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift—the capture of Savannah.
"When you were about to leave Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was anxious, if not fearful; but feeling you were the better judge, and remembering that 'nothing risked nothing gained,' I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours, for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce. And taking the work of General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success.
"Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing forces of the whole—Hood's army—it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light.
"But what next? I suppose it will be safe if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide.
"Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole army, officers and men.
"Yours very truly,"A. Lincoln."
With characteristic generosity Sherman, in his official report on the campaign, gave due credit to his subordinates for their work. He said:
"Generals Howard and Slocum are gentlemen of singular capacity and intelligence, thorough soldiers and patriots, working day and night, not for themselves, but for their country and their men. General Kilpatrick, who commanded the cavalry of this army, has handled it with spirit and dash to my entire satisfaction, and kept a superior force of the enemy's cavalry from even approaching our infantry columns or wagon trains. All the division and brigade commanders merit my personal and official thanks, and Ishall spare no efforts to secure them commissions equal to the rank they have exercised so well.
"As to the rank and file, they seem so full of confidence in themselves that I doubt if they want a compliment from me; but I must do them the justice to say that, whether called on to fight, to march, to wade streams, to make roads, clear out obstructions, build bridges, make 'corduroy,' or tear up railroads, they have done it with alacrity and a degree of cheerfulness unsurpassed. A little loose in foraging, they 'did some things they ought not to have done,' yet, on the whole, they have supplied the wants of the army with as little violence as could be expected, and as little loss as I calculated. Some of these foraging parties had encounters with the enemy which would, in ordinary times, rank as respectable battles."
Concerning the general situation of affairs in the South, or in that part of it, Sherman wrote:
"Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come in, and I am satisfied that, by judicious handling and by a little respect shown to their prejudices, we can create a schism in Jeff. Davis's dominions. All that I have conversed with realized the truth that slavery as an institution is defunct, and the only questions that remain are what disposition shall be made of the negroes themselves. I confess myself unable to offer a complete solution for these questions, and prefer to leave it to the slower operations of time. We have given the initiative, and can afford to await the working of the experiment.
"As to trade matters, I also think it is to our interest to keep the Southern people somewhat dependent on the articles of commerce to which they have hitherto been accustomed. General Grover is now here, and will, I think, be able to handle this matter judiciously, and may graduallyrelax, and invite cotton to come in in large quantities. But at first we should manifest no undue anxiety on that score, for the rebels would at once make use of it as a power against us. We should assume a tone of perfect contempt for cotton and everything else in comparison with the great object of the war—the restoration of the Union, with all its right and power. If the rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simply play into our hands by taking away the only product of value they have to exchange in foreign ports for war-ships and munition. By such a course, also, they alienate the feelings of a large class of small farmers, who look to their little parcels of cotton to exchange for food and clothing for their families."
Early in January the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, visited Sherman at Savannah and spent several days with him there. They discussed together many important topics, such as the disposition of the cotton, treatment of the negroes, etc. The future of the war was also carefully considered, and Sherman had much correspondence with Grant and Halleck on the same subject. Sherman's own idea was that the rebels should be thoroughly whipped and their pride broken. He would march to the innermost recesses of their country and strike terror to every disloyal heart. Toward the negroes his attitude was kindly, and he favored enlisting them in the army and forming black regiments and brigades.
And now the march Northward, to effect a junction with the army of the Potomac and end of the war by capturing both Lee and Johnston, was begun. It was Sherman himself who planned this Northward march through the Carolinas, and it was not without opposition that he did so. Grant wanted him to come on at once to Virginia by sea, and Sherman at first desired it. But a few days later hewrote to Grant that he wanted to march thither by land, by the way of Columbia, S. C., and Raleigh, N. C. "You know," he said, "how much better troops arrive by a land march than when carried by transports.... This march is necessary to the war. It must be made sooner or later, and I am in the proper position for it. I ask no re-enforcement, but simply with the utmost activity at all other points, so that the enemy may not concentrate too powerfully against me. I expect Davis will move heaven and earth to resist me, for the success of my army is fatal to his dream of empire." Grant finally consented to the march, to Sherman's delight, and by January 15 the army was ready to move Northward.
First, Howard led the right wing, all but Corse's Division, by water to Beaufort and thence to Pocataligo, half way to Charleston, and after a sharp engagement, established a sub-depot there, with easy water connection with Beaufort and Hilton Head. Slocum, with the left wing, Corse's Division, and Kilpatrick, with the cavalry, went up the Savannah and via Sistus Ferry to Robertsville, S. C., some miles further inland. On January 18 Sherman turned the command at Savannah over to General Foster, and then went up to join Howard.
Floods delayed Slocum and his army, but on February 1 Howard moved forward. On February 3 he crossed the Salkehatchie, marching for three miles in bitter cold weather through water from two to three feet deep, while rain was falling in torrents. The Edisto was next crossed and the whole army pushed on rapidly. Kilpatrick's cavalry, meanwhile, made various raids and had some skirmishing with Wheeler. Sherman pursued his old policy of directing no wilful damage to private property, but the rumor got abroad that he was pillaging and burninghouses everywhere. So Wheeler presently wrote to him saying that unless he stopped burning houses, he, Wheeler, would burn all the cotton in the country. Sherman replied:
"I hope you will burn all the cotton, and save us the trouble. We don't want it. It has been a curse to our country. All you don't burn I will. As to private houses occupied by peaceful families my orders are not to molest or disturb them, and I think my orders are obeyed. Vacant houses, being of no use to anybody, I care little about, as the owners have thought them of little use to themselves; I don't wish to have them destroyed, but do not take much care to preserve them."
Sherman was as familiar with this country as he had been with Northern Georgia, since he had often, years before, come up here on hunting excursions while he was stationed near Charleston. The march was made with great difficulty, however, as floods prevailed in the lowlands and the weather was most inclement. By the middle of February they reached Columbia, and Sherman issued the following orders for the occupation of that city:
"General Howard will cross the Saluda and Broad Rivers as near their mouths as possible, occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildings, railroad property, manufacturing and machine shops, but will spare libraries, asylums, and private dwellings. He will then move to Winnsborough, destroying utterly that section of the railroad. He will also cause all bridges, trestles, water-tanks, and depots on the railroad back to the Wateree to be burned, switches broken, and such other destruction as he can find time to accomplish consistent with proper celerity."
A few cannon shots were fired into Columbia to drive away the lingering rebel troops. Before abandoning the city, the rebels burned the railroad station and fired somelong piles of cotton bales. When Sherman and Howard rode into the city they found the ruins of the buildings still smouldering and the cotton still burning. Howard and his troops took possession of the city, and worked vigorously to put out the fires which had been started by the rebels, and spread rapidly by a high wind. At night the wind became furious, and the air was soon filled with sparks and bits of burning cotton. The result was that, despite the utmost efforts of the Union troops, the heart of the city was burned, including several churches and schools and the old State House. Sherman was afterward accused by several writers of having himself deliberately ordered the burning of the city. The falsity of this charge has been abundantly demonstrated. Sherman himself, doubtless with entire justice, threw the responsibility upon the rebel general, Wade Hampton, and his cavalrymen, who were the last to evacuate the city. Said Sherman in his official report:
"I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. And, without hesitation, I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a silly 'Roman stoicism,' but from folly and want of sense, in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well to extinguish the flames; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been imprisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it had once begun, and may have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the Capital of South Carolina."
Columbia, the political capital of the foremost secession State, fell on February 17, and the next day Charleston, the commercial and social capital, was captured. Shermanthen pressed on toward North Carolina. Kilpatrick reported on February 22 that Wade Hampton's cavalry had murdered some of his men, and left their bodies by the wayside with labels on them threatening a like fate to all foragers. Sherman promptly ordered him to retaliate upon the rebels, and to Hampton he wrote as follows:
"General—It is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered after being captured, and labelled, 'Death to All Foragers.' One instance is that of a lieutenant and seven men near Chester, and another of twenty, near a ravine eight rods from the main road, and three miles from Easterville. I have ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner. I hold about one thousand prisoners, captured in various ways, and can stand it as long as you, but I hardly think these murders are committed with your knowledge, and would suggest that you give notice to your people at large that every life taken by them simply results in the death of one of your Confederates."
Chesterfield was captured on March 2 and Cheraw on March 3. On the 8th Sherman crossed the line into North Carolina, and now the weather became as fair as it had formerly been foul. The troops entered Fayetteville in high spirits on March 11 and remained there several days. The army now numbered 65,000 fighting men, with 25,000 non-combatants, chiefly negro women and children, 40,000 horses and cattle, and 3,000 wagons. On March 15, a stormy day, Slocum was at Averysboro, and encountered the enemy, infantry and artillery, in force, soon driving all before him. Near Bentonville, on the 18th, there was another battle, with the same result, both wings, Slocum and Howard, being engaged. Johnston was now in command of the rebel armies ahead of Sherman and hadgathered together all available troops from all directions for a last struggle. Sherman occupied Goldsboro on March 21, and effected a junction with Terry and Scofield, who had after Hood's defeat been brought hither, and thus had not less than 100,000 men between Goldsboro and Bentonville. This concluded the hostile part of the march through the Carolinas. In reviewing the campaign, Sherman said:
"I cannot, even with any degree of precision, recapitulate the vast amount of injury done the enemy, or the quantity of guns and materials of war captured and destroyed. In general terms, we have traversed the country from Savannah to Goldsboro, with an average breadth of forty miles, consuming all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats, corn-meal, etc. The public enemy, instead of drawing supplies from that region to feed his armies, will be compelled to send provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. A map herewith, prepared by my chief engineer, Colonel Poe, with the routes of the four corps and cavalry, will show at a glance the country traversed. Of course the abandonment to us by the enemy"
Colonel Poe, the chief engineer of the army, said in his report of the march:
"It involved an immense amount of bridging of every kind known in active campaigning, and some four hundred miles of corduroying. The latter was a very simple affair, where there were plenty of fence rails, but, in their absence, involved the severest labor. It was found that a fence on each side of the road furnished enough rails for corduroying it so as to make it passable. I estimate the amount of corduroying at fully one hundred miles for each army corps. This is a moderate estimate, and would make for the four corps some four hundred miles of corduroying. Thecavalry did very little of this kind of work, as their trains moved with the infantry columns.
"The right wing built fifteen pontoon bridges, having an aggregate length of 3,720 feet; the left wing built about 4,000 feet, being a total of one and one-half miles. There were no measurements of the amount of trestle bridge built, but it was not so great."