To venture on an assumption harmonizing these confusions. When Lincoln came to Washington, being still in his delusion that slavery was the issue and therefore that the crisis was "artificial," he was willing to make almost any concession, and freely offered to evacuate Sumter if thereby he could induce Virginia to drop the subject of secession. Even later, when he was beginning to appreciate the real significance of the moment, he was still willing to evacuate Sumter if the issue would not be pushed further in the Border States, that is, if Virginia would not demand a definite concession of the right of secession. Up to this point I can not think that he had taken seriously Seward's proposed convention of the States and the general discussion of permanent Federal relations that would be bound to ensue. But now he makes his fateful discovery that the issue is not slavery but sovereignty. He sees that Virginia is in dead earnest on this issue and that a general convention will necessarily involve a final discussion of sovereignty in the United States and that the price of the Virginia Amendment will be the concession of the right of secession. On this assumption it is hardly conceivable that he offered to evacuate Sumter as late as the fourth of April. The significance therefore of the Baldwin interview would consist in finally convincing Lincoln that he could not effect any compromise without conceding the principle of state sovereignty. As this was the one thing he was resolved never to concede there was nothing left him but to consider what course would most strategically renounce compromise. Therefore, when it was known at Washington a day or two later that Port Pickens was in imminent danger of being taken by the Confederates (see note 24), Lincoln instantly concentrated all his energies on the relief of Sumter. All along he had believed that one of the forts must be held for the purpose of "a clear indication of policy," even if the other should be given up "as a military necessity." Lincoln, VI, 301. His purpose, therefore, in deciding on the ostentatious demonstration toward Sumter was to give notice to the whole country that he made no concessions on the matter of sovereignty. In a way it was his answer to the Virginia compromise.
At last the Union party in Virginia sent a delegation to confer with Lincoln. It did not arrive until Sumter had been fired upon. Lincoln read to them a prepared statement of policy which announced his resolution to make war, if necessary, to assert the national sovereignty. Lincoln, VI, 243-245.
The part of Montgomery in this tangled episode is least understood of the three. With Washington Montgomery had no official communication. Both Lincoln and Seward refused to recognize commissioners of the Confederate government Whether Seward as an individual went behind the back of himself as an official and personally deceived the commissioners is a problem of his personal biography and his private morals that has no place in this discussion. Between Montgomery and Richmond there was intimate and cordial communication from the start. At first Montgomery appears to have taken for granted that the Secessionist party at Richmond was so powerful that there was little need for the new government to do anything but wait But a surprise was in store for it During February and March its agents reported a wide-spread desire in the South to compromise on pretty nearly any terms that would not surrender the central Southern idea of state sovereignty. Thus an illusion of that day—as of this—was exploded, namely the irresistibility of economic solidarity. Sentimental and constitutional forces were proving more powerful than economics. Thereupon Montgomery's problem was transformed. Its purpose was to build a Southern nation and it had believed hitherto that economic forces had put into its hands the necessary tools. Now it must throw them aside and get possession of others. It must evoke those sentimental and constitutional forces that so many rash statesmen have always considered negligible. Consequently, for the South no less than for the North, the issue was speedily shifted from slavery to sovereignty. Just how this was brought about we do not yet know. Whether altogether through foresight and statesmanlike deliberation, or in part at least through what might almost be called accidental influences, is still a little uncertain. The question narrows itself to this: why was Sumter fired upon precisely when it was? There are at least three possible answers.
(1) That the firing was dictated purely by military necessity. A belief that Lincoln intended to reinforce as well as to supply Sumter, that if not taken now it could never be taken, may have been the over-mastering idea in the Confederate Cabinet. The reports of the Commissioners at Washington were tinged throughout by the belief that Seward and Lincoln were both double-dealers. Beauregard, in command at Charleston, reported that pilots had come in from the sea and told him of Federal war-ships sighted off the Carolina coast. O. R. 297, 300, 301, 304, 305.
(2) A political motive which to-day is not so generally intelligible as once it was, had great weight in 1861. This was the sense of honor in politics. Those historians who brush it aside as a figment lack historical psychology. It is possible that both Governor Pickens and the Confederate Cabinet were animated first of all by the belief that the honor of South Carolina required them to withstand the attempt of what they held to be an alien power.
(3) And yet, neither of these explanations, however much either or both may have counted for in many minds, gives a convincing explanation of the agitation of Toornbs in the Cabinet council which decided to fire upon Sumter. Neither of these could well be matters of debate. Everybody had to be either for or against, and that would be an end. The Toombs of that day was a different man from the Toombs of three months earlier. Some radical change had taken place in his thought What could it have been if it was not the perception that the Virginia program had put the whole matter in a new light, that the issue had indeed been changed from slavery to sovereignty, and that to join battle on the latter issue was a far more serious matter than to join battle on the former. And if Toombs reasoned in this fearful way, it is easy to believe that the more buoyant natures in that council may well have reasoned in precisely the opposite way. Virginia had lifted the Southern cause to its highest plane. But there was danger that the Virginia compromise might prevail. If that should happen these enthusiasts for a separate Southern nationality might find all their work undone at the eleventh hour. Virginians who shared Montgomery's enthusiasms had seen this before then. That was why Roger Pryor, for example, had gone to Charleston as a volunteer missionary. In a speech to a Charleston crowd he besought them, as a way of precipitating Virginia into the lists, to strike blow. Charleston Mercury, April 11, 1861.
The only way to get any clue to these diplomatic tangles is by discarding the old notion that there were but two political ideals clashing together in America in 1861. There were three. The Virginians with their devotion to the idea of a league of nations in this country were scarcely further away from Lincoln and his conception of a Federal unit than they were from those Southerners who from one cause or another were possessed with the desire to create a separate Southern nation. The Virginia program was as deadly to one as to the other of these two forces which with the upper South made up the triangle of the day. The real event of March, 1861, was the perception both by Washington and Montgomery that the Virginia program spelled ruin for its own. By the middle of April it would be difficult to say which had the better reason to desire the defeat of that program, Washington or Montgomery.
24. Lincoln, VI, 240, 301, 302; N. R., first series, IV, 109, 235, 239; Welles, I, 16, 22-23, 25; Bancroft, II, 127, 129-130,138,139, 144; N. and H., III, Chap. XI, IV, Chap. I. Enemies of Lincoln have accused him of bad faith with regard to the relief of Fort Pickens. The facts appear to be as follows: In January, 1861, when Fort Pickens was in danger of being seized by the forces of the State of Florida, Buchanan ordered a naval expedition to proceed to its relief. Shortly afterward—January 2—Senator Mallory on behalf of Florida persuaded him to order the relief expedition not to land any troops so long as the Florida forces refrained from attacking the fort. This understanding between Buchanan and Mallory is some-times called "the Pickens truce," sometimes "the Pickens Armistice." N. and H., III, Chap. XI; N. R., first series, 1, 74; Scott, II, 624-625. The new Administration had no definite knowledge of it. Lincoln, VI, 302. Lincoln despatched a messenger to the relief expedition, which was still hovering off the Florida coast, and ordered its troops to be landed. The commander replied that he felt bound by the previous orders which had been issued in the name of the Secretary of the Navy while the new orders issued from the Department of War; he added that relieving Pickens would produce war and wished to be sure that such was the President's intention; he also informed Lincoln's messenger of the terms of Buchanan's agreement with Mallory. The messenger returned to Washington for ampler instructions. N. and H., IV, Chap. I; N. R., first series, I, 109-110, 110-111.
Two days before his arrival at Washington alarming news from Charleston brought Lincoln very nearly, if not quite, to the point of issuing sailing orders to the Sumter expedition. Lincoln, VI, 240. A day later, Welles issued such orders. N. IL, first series, I, 235; Bancroft, II, 138-139. On April sixth, the Pickens messenger returned to Washington. N. and H., IV, 7. Lincoln was now in full possession of all the facts. In his own words, "To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible, rendered so by the exhaustion of provisions at the latter named fort. . . . The strongest anticipated case for using it (the Sumter expedition) was now presented, and it was resolved to send it forward." Lincoln, VI, 302. He also issued peremptory orders for the Pickens expedition to land its force, which was done April twelfth. N. R., first series, I, 110-111, 115. How he reasoned upon the question of a moral obligation devolving, or not devolving, upon himself as a consequence of the Buchanan-Mallory agreement, he did not make public. The fact of the agreement was published in the first message. But when Congress demanded information on the subject, Lincoln transmitted to it a report from Welles declining to submit the information on account of the state of the country. 10. IL, 440-441.
25. Lincoln, VI, 241.
XVI. ON TO RICHMOND.
1. May MS, I, 23.
2. N. and H., IV, 152.
3. Hay MS, I, 45.
4. Hay MS, I, 46.
5. Hay MS, I, 5~56.
6. Sherman, I, 199.
7. Nicolay, 213.
8. N. and H., IV, 322-323, 360.
9. Bigelow, I, 360.
10. Nicolay, 229.
11. Lincoln, VI, 331-333.
12. Own Story, 55, 82.
XVII. DEFINING THE ISSUE.
1. Lincoln, VI, 297-325.
2. Lincoln, X, 199.
3. Lincoln, X, 202-203.
4. Lincoln, VI, 321.
5. Lincoln, VII, 56-57.
6. Bancroft, II, 121; Southern Historical Papers, I, 446.
7. Lincoln, VI, 304.
8. Hay MS, I, 65.
9. Lincoln, VI, 315.
10. 39 Globe, I, 222; N. and H., IV, 379.
XVIII. THE JACOBIN CLUB.
1. White, 171.
2. Riddle, 40-52.
3. Harris, 62.
4. Public Man, 139.
5. 37 Globe, III, 1334.
6. Chandler, 253.
7. White, 171.
8. Conway, II, 336.
9. Conway, II, 329.
10. Rhodes, III, 350.
11. Lincoln, VI, 351.
12. Hay MS, I, 93.
13. Hay MS, 1, 93.
14. Bigelow, I, 400.
15. Chandler, 256.
XIX. THE JACOBINS BECOME INQUISITORS.
1. Lincoln, VII, 28-60.
2. Nicolay, 321.
3. C. W. I 3 66
4. Julian, 201.
5. Chandler, 228.
6. 37 Globe, II, 189-191; Lincoln, VII, 151-152; O. R., 341-346; 114 0. R., 786, 797; C. W., I, 5, 74, 79; Battles and Leaders, II, 132-134; Blaine, I, 383-384, 392-393; Pearson, 1, 312-313; Chandler, 222; Porter.
7. Swinton, 79-85, quoting General McDowell's memoranda of their proceedings.
8 37 Globe, II, 15.
9 Riddle, 296; Wade, 316; Chandler, 187.
10. C. W., 1, 74.
11. 37 Globe, II, 1667.
12. 37 Globe, II, 1662-1668, 1732-1742.
13. Lincoln, VII, 151-152.
XX. IS CONGRESS THE PRESIDENT'S MASTER.
1. 37 Globe, II, 67.
2. Rhodes, III, 350.
3. 37 Globe, II, 3328.
4. 37 Globe, II, 2764.
5. 37 Globe, II, 2734.
6. 37 Globe II, 2972-2973.
7. 37 Globe, II, 440.
8. 37 Globe, II, 1136-1139.
9. Quoting 7 Howard, 43-46.
XXI. THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE ARMY.
1. N. and H., IV, 444.
2. Own Story, 84.
3. Own Story, 85.
4. Gurowski, 123.
5. Hay MS, 1, 99; Thayer, 1,125.
6. N. and H., IV, 469.
7. Hay MS, I, 93.
8. 5 0. R., 41.
9. Swinton, 79-84; C. W., 1, 270.
10. C. W., I, 270, 360, 387; Hay MS, II, 101.
11. Gorham, I, 347-348; Kelly, 34.
12. Chandler, 228; Julian, 205.
13. Hay MS, I, 101; 5 0. R., 1~
14. 5 0. R., 50.
15. 5 0. R., 54-55; Julian, 205.
16. Hay MS, I, 103.
17. Hitchcock, 439.
18. Hitchcock, 440. The italics are his.
19. 5 0. R., 58. 20. 5 0. R., 59. 21. 5 0. R, 63.
22. Own Story, 226; 5 0. R., 18.
23. C. W., I, 251-252. 24. C. W., 1, 251-253, 317-318.
25. 15 0. R., 220; Hitchcock, 439, note.
26. 14 0. R., 66. 27. 12 0. R., 61. 28. 17 0. R., 219.
29. Rhodes, IV, 19.
30. Nicolay, 306; McClure, 168.
31. 17 0. R., 435.
32. Julian, 218.
33. N. and H., V, 453.
34. Lincoln, VII, 266-267.
35. 37 Globe, II, 3386-3392.
XXII. LINCOLN EMERGES.
1. Alexander, III, 15-17.
2. 37 Globe, II, 1493.
3. Julian, 215; Conway, I, 344.
4. 37 Globe II, 2363.
5. Lincoln, VII, 171-172.
6. 37 Globe, II, 1138.
7. Lincoln, VII, 172-173.
8. Pierce, IV, 78; 37 Globe, II, 25%.
9. Schurz, I, 187.
10. London Times, May 9, 1862, quoted in American papers.
11. 128 0. R., 2-3.
12. Lincoln, VII, 270-274.
13. Carpenter, 2021.
14. Galaxy, XIV, 842-843.
15. Lincoln, VII, 270-277; 37 Globe, II, 3322-3324, 3333.
16. Julian, 220; 37 Globe, II, 3286-3287.
17. Lincoln, VII, 280-286.
XXIII. THE MYSTICAL STATESMAN.
1. Carpenter, 189.
2. Recollections, 161.
3. Recollections, 161-164; Carpenter, 119.
4. Carpenter, 116.
5. Carpenter, 90.
6. Chapman, 449-450.
7. Carpenter, 187.
8. Lincoln, VIII, 52-53.
9. Lincoln, VIII, 50-51.
XXIV. GAMBLING IN GENERALS.
1. Reminiscences, 434.
2. Recollections, 261.
3. Galaxy, 842.
4. Galaxy, 845.
5 Carpenter, 22.
6. O. R., 80-81. 7. C. W., I, 282.
8. Lincoln, VIII, 15.
9. Julian, 221.
10. Thayer, 1, 127.
11. Welles, 1,104; Nicolay, 313.
12. Thayer, 1,129.
13. Thayer, 1, 161.
14. Reminiscences, 334-335, 528; Tarbell, II, 118-120; Lincoln, VIII, 28-33.
15. Chase, 87-88.
16. Lincoln, VII, 40.
XXV. A WAR BEHIND THE SCENES.
1. Bigelow, I, 572.
2. 37 Globe, III, 6.
3. 37 Globe, III, 76.
4. Lincoln, VII, 57-60.
5. Lincoln, VII, 73.
6. Swinton, 231.
7. C. W., 1, 650.
8. Bancroft, II, 365; Welles, 1, ~198.
9. N. and H., VI, 265.
10. Welles, I, 205; Alexander, III, 185.
11. Welles, 1, 196-198.
12. Welles, 1, 201-202.
13. Welles, I, 200.
14. Lincoln, VII, 195-197.
XXVI. THE DICTATOR, THE MARPLOT, AND THE LITTLE MEN.
1. Harris, 64.
2. Gurowski, 312.
3. Sherman Letters, 167.
4. Julian, 223.
5. Recollections, 215; Barnes, 428; Reminiscences, XXXI, XXXI I, XXXVI II. Nicolay and Hay allude to this story, but apparently doubt its authenticity. They think that Weed "as is customary with elderly men exaggerated the definiteness of the proposition."
6. Jullan, 225.
7. Lincoln, VIII, 154.
8. Raymond, 704.
9. Recollections, 193-194.
10. Lincoln, VII I, 206207.
11. 37 Globe, III, 1068.
12. Riddle, 278.
13. Welles, I, 336.
14. Lincoln, VIII, 235-237.
15. Welles, I, 293.
16. Lincoln, VIII, 527.
17. Lincoln, IX, 3A.
18. Lincoln, VIII, 307-308.
19. Barnes, 428; Reminiscences, XXX, XXXIII-XXXVIII.
This story is told on the authority of Weed with much circumstantial detail including the full text of a letter written by McClellan. The letter was produced because McClellan had said that no negotiations took place. Though the letter plainly alludes to negotiations of some sort, it does not mention the specific offer attributed to Lincoln. Nicolay and Hay are silent on the subject. See also note five, above.
20. Tribune, July 7, 1863.
21. Tribune, July 6, 1863.
22. Lincoln, IX, 17.
23. Lincoln, IX, 20-21.
XXVII. THE TRIBUNE OF THE PEOPLE.
1. Rhodes, III, 461; Motley's Letters, II, 146.
2. Reminiscences, 470.
3. Hay, Century.?
4. Carpenter, 281-282.
5. Van Santvoord.
6. Hay, Century, 35.
7. Carpenter, 150.
8. Recollections, 97.
9. Recollections, 80.
10. Carpenter, 65.
11. Carpenter, 65-67.
12. Carpenter, 64.
13. Recollections, 267.
14. Carpenter, 64.
15. Recollections, 83-84.
16. Carpenter, 152.
17. Carpenter, 219.
18. Recollections, 103-105.
19. Lincoln, X, 274-275.
20. Recollections, 103.
21. Recollections, 95-96.
22. Hay, Century.
23. Rankin, 177-179.
24. Hay, Century, 35.
25. Carpenter.
26. Thayer, I, 198-190.
27. Thayer, I, 196-197.
28. Thayer, I, 199-200.
29. Carpenter, 104.
30. Lincoln, VIII, 112-115.
31. Lincoln, IX, 210.
XXVIII. APPARENT ASCENDENCY.
1. Lincoln, IX, 284.
2. Lincoln, IX, 219-221.
3. Lincoln, X, 38-39.
4. 38 Globe, I, 1408.
5. Bancroft, II, 429-430; Moore, VI, 497-498
6. Grant, II, 123.
7. Lincoln, X, 90-91.
XXIX. CATASTROPHE.
1. Nicolay, 440.
2. Carpenter, 130; Hay MS.
3. Nicolay, 440.
4. Lincoln, X, 25-26.
5. 37 Globe, II, 2674.
6. Nicolay, 352.
7. Lincoln, X, 49.
8. Lincoln, X, 5~54.
9. Rankin, 381-387; Hay, Century.
10. Carpenter, 217.
11. Carpenter, 81.
12. Carpenter, 218.
13. Hay, Century, 37.
14. Lincoln, X, 89.
15. Carpenter, 131.
16. Lincoln, X, 122-123.
17. Carpenter. 168-169.
18. Carpenter, 30-31.
19. Lincoln, X, 129.
XXX. THE PRESIDENT VERSUS THE VINDICTIVES.
1. Lincoln, X, 139-140.
2. Chittenden, 379.
3. Lincoln, X, 140-141.
4. Carpenter, 181-183.S. N. and H., X, 95-100.
5. Hay MS, I, 1617; N. and H., IX, 120121.
XXXI. A MENACING PAUSE.
1. Reminiscences, 398.
2. Globe, I, 3148.
3. Riddle, 254.
4. Greeley, II, 664-666.
5. N. and H., 186190.
6. Gilmore, 240.
7. Gilmore, Atlantic. & Gilmore, 243-244.
9. Hay MS, I, 7677; N. and H., 167-173; Carpenter, 301-302.
10. N. and H., IX, 338-339.
11. Carpenter, 223-225.
12. Carpenter, 282; also, N. and H., IX, 364.
13. N. and H., IX, 188.
14. N. and H., IX, 192.
15. N. and H., IX, 195.
16. N. and H IX, 212, note.
17. Lincoln, X, 164-166.
XXXII. THE AUGUST CONSPIRACY.
1. Julian, 247.
2. Times, August 1, 1864.
3. Herald, August 6, 1864.
4. Sun, June 30, 1889.
5. N. and H., IX, 250.
6. N. and H., IX, 218.
7. Times, August 18, 1864. & N. and H., IX, 197.
9. Herald, August 18, 1864.
10. Lincoln, X, 308.
11. N. and H., IX, 250.
12. Lincoln, X, 203-204.
13. N. and H., IX, 221.
14. Ibid.
15. Herald, August 26, 1864.
16. Tribune, August 27, 1864.
17. Times, August 26, 1864.
XXXIII. THE RALLY TO THE PRESIDENT.
1. Herald, August 24, 1864.
2. Times, August 26, 1864~
3. Pierce, IV, 197-198.
4. Pearson, 11,150-151.
5. Herald, August 23, 1864.
6. Pearson, II, 168.
7. Ibid. The terms offered Davis were not stated in the Atlantic article. See Gilmore, 289-290.
8. Tribune, August 27', 1864.
9. Sun, June 30, 1889.
10. Sun, June 30, 1889; Pearson, II, 160-161.
11. Pearson,, II, 164.
12. Pearson, II, 166.
13. Sun, June 30, 1889.
14. Tribune, August 30, 1864.
15. Pearson, II, 162.
16. Tribune, September 3, 1864.
17. Pearson, 11,165.
18. Sun, June 30, 1889.
19. Pearson, II, 167; Tribune, September 7, 1864.
20. Tribune, September 6, 1864.
21. Sun, June 30, 1889.
22. Tribune, September 9, 1864.
23. Tribune, September 7, 1864.
24. Tribune, September 12, 1864.
25. Tribune, September 22, 1864.
XXXIV. "FATHER ABRAHAM."
1. N. and H., IX, 339.
2. Ibid.
3. Arnold, 390.
4. Chandler, 274-276.
5. The familiar version of the retirement of affair is contained in the Life of Chandler issued by the Detroit Post and Tribune without an author's name. This book throughout is an apology for Chandler. In substance its story of this episode is as follows: Chandler beheld with aching heart the estrangement between Lincoln and Wade; he set to work to bring them together; at a conference which he had with Wade, in Ohio, a working understanding was effected; Chandler hurried to Washington; with infinite pains he accomplished a party deal, the three elements of which were Lincoln's removal of Blair, Fremont's resignation, and Wade's appearance in the Administration ranks. Whatever may be said of the physical facts of this narrative, its mental facts, its tone and atmosphere, are historical fiction. And I have to protest that the significance of the episode has been greatly exaggerated. The series of dates given in the text can not be reconciled with any theory which makes the turn of the tide toward Lincoln at all dependent on a Blair-Fremont deal. Speaking of the tradition that Chandler called upon Lincoln and made a definite agreement with him looking toward the removal of Blair, Colonel W. O. Stoddard writes me that his "opinion, or half memory, would be that the tradition is a myth." See also, Welles, II, 156-158.
6. Lincoln, X, 228-229.
7. Times, September 24, 1864.
8. Times, September 28, 1864.
9. N. and H., IX, 364.
10. Thayer, II, 214; Hay MS.
11. N. and H., IX, 377.
12. Thayer, II, 216; Hay MS, III, 29.
13. Lincoln, X, 261.
14. N. and H., IX, 378-379.
XXXV. THE MASTER OF THE MOMENT.
1. Lincoln, X, 283.
2. N. and H., IX, 392-394.
3. N. and H., IX, 210-211.
4. One of the traditions that has grown up around Lincoln makes the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment a matter of threats. Two votes were needed. It was discovered according to this simpleminded bit of art that two members of the opposition had been guilty of illegal practices, the precise nature of which is conveniently left vague. Lincoln, even in some highly reputable biographies, sent for these secret criminals, told them that the power of the President of the United States was very great, and that he expected them to vote for the amendment. The authority for the story appears to be a member of Congress, John B. Aley. Reminiscences, 585-586; Lord Charnwood, Abraham Lincoln, 335-336. To a great many minds it has always seemed out of key. Fortunately, there is a rival version. Shrewd, careful Riddle has a vastly different tale in which Lincoln does not figure at all, in which three necessary votes were bought for the amendment by Ashley. Riddle is so careful to make plain just what he can vouch for and just what he has at second hand that his mere mode of narration creates confidence. Riddle, 324-325. Parts of his version are to be found in various places.
5. Nicolay, Cambridge, 601.
6. Lincoln, X, 38-39, and note; XI, 89.
7. 38 Globe, II, 903.
8. 38 Globe, II, 1127.
9. 38 Globe, 11,1129; Pierce, IV, 221-227.
10. Recollections, 249.
11. Nicolay, 503-504; Lincoln, XI, 43.
12. Lincoln, XI, 4446.
XXXVI. PREPARING A DIFFERENT WAR.
1. Grant, II, 459.
2. Tarbell, II, 229.
3. N. and H., IX, 457.
4. Pierce, IV, 236.
5. Lincoln, XI, 84-91.
XXXVII. FATE INTERPOSES.
1. Tarbell, II, 231-232.
2. Pierce, IV, 235.
3. Tarbell, II, 232.
4. Recollections, 116.
5. Nicolay, 531.
6. N. and H., X, 283-284.
7. Julian, 255.
8. Recollections, 249.
9. Recollections, 119.
10. Nicolay, 532.
11. Recollections, 119-120; Carpenter, 293; Nicolay, 532; Tarbell, II, 235.
12. Nicolay, 539.
13. Thayer, II, 219; Hay MS,
14. Riddle, 332.
15. Nicolay, 530.