FOOTNOTES:

THE COMMISSIONER OF WEIHAIWEI (SIR J. H. STEWART LOCKHART, K.C.M.G.), WITH PRIEST AND ATTENDANTS AT THE TEMPLE OF CH'ÊNG SHAN.

But China has not yet fully grasped the truth that military and naval strength is not the only qualification—or the principal one—that will win the respect and support of the Western Powers. If she will honestly devote herself to the work of internal reform, to the thorough reorganisation of her administrative, judicial and fiscal systems, and to the loyal fulfilment of her treaty obligations, it is as certain as anything in politics can be that she will be doing far more for her own protection against foreign interference than if she were to construct a dozen coast-fortresses and naval bases and a fleet of thirty "Dreadnought" battleships. Her military weakness will not invite aggression: it might do so if she were friendless, and matched against a single ruthless strong Power or group of allied Powers, but the state of international politics at the present day is such that an orderly and progressive China is absolutely certain to find herself backed by at least two mighty friends the instant that her legitimate interests are wantonly attacked by any aggressive or adventurous foreign state.

On the other hand, if the Government adheres to its present course of alternate radicalism and conservatism and continues to play with reform schemes as if they were ninepins and foreign treaties as if they were packs of cards, the new fleet and naval bases will not only be of no avail to the country in her hour of need but will serve to hasten a catastrophe in which the dynasty, at least, will in all probability be overwhelmed and foreign intervention will once more become a painful necessity. We saw in a former chapter that to charge the Chinese, as a people, with a proclivity to untruthfulness, or at any rate to assign such untruthfulness, if it exists, to Confucianism, is erroneous and unjust. But let it be admitted at once that the charge of insincerity in politics is one that can without unfairness be brought against the Chinese Government—as, indeed, it can be brought against some other states that have had less excuse for their conduct than China.

In her transactions with Western Powers she has too often shown want of straightforwardness, duplicity, even treachery. Not only does she try to play offone Power against another (a game that is played with more or less assiduity by every government in the world) but she makes promises which she does not intend to fulfil except under compulsion, she adopts an attitude that is now arrogant and now cringing, she is alternately dilatory and hasty, she is often hypocritical, and her perpetual changes of external and internal policy are a source of the greatest embarrassment to the governments and merchants of foreign lands and a source of gravest danger to herself. Nothing distresses the sincere friends and well-wishers of China so much as the manner in which she palters with her international obligations, unless it be her haphazard and erratic attempts at administrative reform—now hesitating and half-hearted, now extravagant and ultra-progressive.

As regards her foreign relations one is tempted to assert that Obstruction, Prevarication and Procrastination seem to be the three leading principles of Chinese statesmanship. Those who know how sound China is at heart, how able, industrious and intelligent are her sons, and how well fitted their great country is in many ways to play a grand part in the history of the world and in the development of civilisation, are perhaps even more ready than others to denounce the Manchu government of China for its gross mismanagement of the internal and external affairs of the nation, its pitiful misuse of splendid material and its shameful waste of magnificent opportunities.

It is obvious to every foreigner who knows China well that the first and most urgent necessity is the thorough reform of the entire Civil Service in all its branches. So long as offices are bought and sold, so long as salaries are so meagre that they must necessarily be supplemented in irregular ways, so long as revenue and expenditure accounts go through no proper system of audit, so long as bribery and the "squeeze" system are practically recognised as necessary features of civil administration—so long will itbe utterly futile to attempt far-reaching reforms in other directions. When these abuses have become things of the past the general progress of the country will be swift and sure, but not till then. It may be that they will never be abolished until the new Provincial Assemblies—the most striking development of Chinese political life that has been witnessed since the opening of the country to foreign intercourse—have compelled the central government to admit the popular representatives to an active share in the real business of administration.

A question was recently asked in the British House of Commons[430]as to whether the Chinese Government had taken any steps to carry out the provisions of Article VIII. of the Mackay Treaty relating to the abolition of theLikinsystem. The reply was that China had not yet done anything in the matter except in so far as to express a desire to enter into negotiations for an increase of the Customs tariff in return for the abolition of likin.[431]"In view, however, of the failure of the Chinese Government to carry out other important provisions of the Treaty of 1902, His Majesty's Government are not at present disposed to give this proposal their support; more especially in view of the fact that new likin stations are being established in China, and that foreign trade is being subjected to likin exactions of greater frequency and amount."

Probably the most important of the other unobserved provisions of the Mackay Treaty, to which Mr. McKinnon Wood referred, was the second article, in which China undertook to reform her currency. Financial reform (including a reorganisation and readjustment of the system of internal taxation as well as the establishment of a uniform national coinage) is, next to the thorough cleansing of the whole machinery of administration, the most urgently necessary of all the tasks that confront the Government, yet though nearly eight years have elapsed since the Mackay Treaty was signed, the only indications that the Chinese Government has given any serious consideration to this vitally important problem have consisted in the despatch of a costly Mission to enquire into the financial systems of other countries and in the periodical issue of Imperial Edicts which promise the standardisation of the coinage and other useful reforms but have not as yet been followed up by practical measures. Not to dwell upon the commercial interests of the great foreign communities of Hongkong, Shanghai and Tientsin, which are most seriously hampered by the apathy of the Chinese Government in the matter of currency reform, there can be very little doubt that if the present policy of "drift" is adhered to, the country will be gravely menaced by the peril of bankruptcy. The wiser heads among the Chinese officials know perfectly well that an inability to meet their foreign liabilities will inevitably result in the loss of the economic independence of their country, yet they hesitate to introduce the drastic financial reforms without which China cannot hope to make real progress or to assume a dignified position in the councils of nations.

Provincial independence in matters affecting currency and finance is still to a great extent unchecked; local officials still make large temporary profits out of the excessive issue of copper coin; the most elementary laws of economics are ignored; innumerable native banks are allowed to issue notes against which are held cash reserves that are generally inadequate and sometimes (so it is whispered) non-existent.[432]If China would declare her intention of engaging the services of a European or American Financial Adviser—the best and ablest she could get—the mere announcement would do more to re-establish her financial reputation than a hundred plausibly-worded Imperial Decrees. Yet even the ablest of advisers would accomplish little of permanent value unless he were given a free hand to deal with official corruption in high places and safeguarded against petty jealousies and underhand intrigues; and judging from the present temper of Chinese officialdom it is very doubtful whether any satisfactory guarantees of this kind would or could be given.

The Chinese, not unnaturally, resent the suggestion that they should apply to a foreign government for the loan of a guide and teacher, or that among all their millions of population they possess no able statesmen of their own; but what they should understand is this, that though there may be and probably are hundreds of Chinese officials who in intellect, energy, and devotion to duty (if not in actual experience) are quite as fully qualified to reorganise the finances of the country as any foreigner could be, yet it is inconceivable in the present state of Chinese politics that any native official, however capable and energetic, would be able to withstand and overcome the conservative forces that would certainly oppose him as soon as he began to assail the fortresses of corruption. A foreign adviser might be denounced to the Throne in memorial after memorial and yet possibly retain his position and authority; a Chinese minister who attempted to initiate reforms worthy of the approval of foreign experts would probably be overwhelmed by his enemies before a single important measure had been carried into effect.

One of the strongest reasons why the Chinese Government is reluctant to invoke the assistance of a foreign Financial Adviser is that such a step might lead to the introduction of foreign capital on an immense scale, and its gradual monopolisation of industry and exclusive exploitation of the national resources. Many recent events have shown that the Chinese people—even more than the Government—are exceedingly averse from throwing China freely open to foreign capital, even when the want of capital obviously retards the material development of the country. This attitude, though naturally enough it excites the indignation of foreign financiers and traders, who are apt to regard the matter solely from the economic standpoint, is probably only temporary, and not unjustifiable when we remember the enormous power wielded by capital in these days, not only in commerce and industry but also in international politics. Sir Alfred Lyall truly points out that the European money-market is to Asia a "most perilous snare," and that the more any Asiatic Government runs into debt with European financiers, or has permitted the investment of foreign capital within its territory, the more it falls under the stringent, self-interested and inquisitive "political superintendence" of the capitalist state.[433]

That China cannot expect to develop her resources fully and rapidly without the help of European and American capital is doubtless true enough: but in view of her somewhat precarious political condition it may be that she is acting not unwisely in restricting the inflow of foreign capital to the irreducible minimum, and if she has reason to believe that the recommendations of a Financial Adviser would include the free admission of alien capital, her hesitation to avail herself of foreign expert advice may perhaps be easily explained. Chinese apprehensions on this subject might perhaps remain for ever unrealised, but at least they can hardly be said to be totally unreasonable.[434]

Next to finance there is perhaps no department that calls more peremptorily for foreign supervision than that of forestation. The dearth of timber throughout the greater part of north China has caused a serious deterioration of the climate within historic times, and is largely responsible for the denudation of once fertile lands and the periodical recurrence of famines. Forestry is an unknown science in China, and without foreign expert assistance it is unlikely that reforestation will be undertaken seriously and methodically. In legal and judicial matters, education, railways, municipal government, the army, hospitals, technical institutions, and other important matters, some considerable progress has already been made with or without direct foreign assistance, though it seems obvious that until the national finances and the Civil Service have been thoroughly reorganised every effort made in the direction of other reforms must to some extent be crippled.

The Chinese are naturally most anxious to secure the abolition of the foreign rights of extra-territorial jurisdiction. They feel very keenly the undignified position of their country in respect of the fact that they alone, of the great nations of the world, have no judicial authority over the foreigners who reside within their territorial limits, and they know that the reasons why they are in this undignified position are that their laws are to some extent inconsistent with Western legal theories, that many or most of their judicial officers are corrupt, that torture is sometimes resorted to as a means of extorting confessions, and that their prisons are dens of filth and disease. Knowing that until these matters are remedied it will be impossible to persuade the Western Powers to relinquish jurisdiction over their own nationals, the Chinese have devoted a good deal of attention during recent years to the reform of their judicial procedure and—under Japanese and other foreign advice—to the production of a new legal code.[435]Time will show whether the importation of a brand-new legal system into a country like China will effect all the good that is expected of it. There is a very serious danger that by adapting Western legal notions to a country in which the native legal system (however faulty in practice in some respects) has for many centuries been closely intertwined with the traditions and customs that govern the lives of the Chinese people, the Government may be applying a treatment that will act as a solvent of the bases of the entire social organism. Even the abolition of foreign consular jurisdiction might be bought too dearly if it necessitated a surrender of doctrines and principles which, as we have seen in the foregoing chapters, have formed the foundation of the social and political system of China throughout the whole of her known history.

If in the matter of finance the Chinese Government would unquestionably do well to act on the advice of the best foreign expert it can get, it is by no means so certain that it would be wise to follow foreign counsel, with tacit obedience, in all matters affecting social, administrative, or even judicial reform. That changes are urgently needed in certain directions goes without saying; but in view of the impossibility of carrying out extensive legal reforms in China without simultaneously affecting the social organism, perhaps in serious and unexpected ways, it will be well for the stability of the State if amid the contending factions into which the intelligent sections of the country are sure to be divided there may always be one party in the land whose programme will be summed up in the words "Back to Confucius!" That such a call will ever be literally obeyed is quite improbable and certainly undesirable; but it is earnestly to be hoped that however drastic may be the social and political changes that China is destined to undergo her people may never come to regard Confucianism, with all that the term implies, merely as a fossil in the stratum of a dead civilisation.

In the course of the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to show that there is much fundamental soundness in many of China's social institutions, much that it is to the interest of China herself and of the whole world to respect and conserve. It is difficult to say whether China stands at present in greater danger from her own over-enthusiastic revolutionary reformers or from her well-meaning but somewhat ignorant foreign friends who are pressing her to accept Western civilisation with all its political and social machinery and its entire religious and ethical equipment. If ever a State required skilful guidance and wise statesmanship, China needs them now: but wise statesmanship will not consist in tearing up all the old moral and religious sanctions that have been rooted in the hearts of the Chinese people through all the ages of their wonderful history.

FOOTNOTES:[421]See p.85.[422]In Article iii. of the "Port Arthur and Talienwan Agreement" between Russia and China it is provided that "the duration of the lease shall be twenty-five years from the day this treaty is signed [March 27, 1898], but may be extended by mutual agreement between Russia and China." It may be noted that the British, German and Russian treaties with respect to the leases of Weihaiwei, of the Kowloon Extension (ninety-nine years), of Kiaochou (ninety-nine years) and Port Arthur (twenty-five years), all stipulate that Chinese war-vessels, whether neutral or not, retain the right to the free use of the several leased harbours. It is a right that seems to be seldom exercised. The ultimate "sovereignty" of China over the various leased territories is specially safeguarded in the treaties relating to Kiaochou and Port Arthur, and has been admitted in respect of Weihaiwei.[423]See pp.93seq.[424]It has been urged in some quarters that the occupation of Kiaochou by Germany and that of Weihaiwei by Great Britain are specially objected to by the Chinese on the ground that Shantung, through its associations with Confucius, Mencius, Chou Kung and other ancient sages, is China's Sacred Province, and one that ought to remain inviolate. There is no reason to suppose that this notion has any basis in fact. The Chinese undoubtedly regard certain districts in the south-west of Shantung with immense reverence, more particularly the district of Ch'ü-fou, which contains the temple and tomb of Confucius, but no pre-eminent sanctity attaches to the province as a whole. The province of Shantung, indeed, did not exist as such in Confucius's time. If China's provinces were to be arranged in order of sanctity or inviolability it is probable that both Honan and Shensi would, for historical reasons, take precedence of Shantung.[425]There are many Chinese who speak English fluently, and the number is increasing daily, but as a rule such persons have devoted so much time to the acquirement of a totally alien tongue, and "Western learning" generally, that they have been obliged to neglect the culture of their own country. (One of the greatest dangers ahead of China is the possibility that her foreign-educated students may, through ignorance, grow contemptuous of the intellectual achievements of their ancestors, and that Chinese culture may consequently suffer a long, though probably it would not be a permanent, eclipse.) There are also some Englishmen who can speak Chinese fluently, but very few of them have had the time or inclination to acquire a sound knowledge of Chinese literature. Thus it too often happens that an educated Englishman and an educated Chinese whose natures are such that they might become intimate friends, fail to become so through inability to exchange ideas in the region of politics, philosophy, literature or art. A German and an Englishman, even if they disagree on the subject of naval armaments, may find themselves at one in the matter of the music of Mozart or the psychological condition of the mind of Hamlet. Between an Englishman and a Frenchman a friendship may spring up on the basis of a common admiration for the prose of Flaubert or Anatole France or the philosophy of Bergson. But though there are now many Chinese who can discourse fluently on evolution or the conservation of energy, how many Western students of Chinese would bear themselves creditably in a conversation with a Chinese scholar on the ethics of Chu Hsi or the poetry of Su Tung-po? In the vast majority of cases, conversation between a Chinese and an Englishman (unless the relation between them is that of teacher and pupil) is very apt to degenerate into the merest "small talk" and exchange of civilities, and it is obvious that friendships can hardly be built up on so slender a foundation as this. But among those Europeans and Chinese who have successfully surmounted the barrier of language there is, I believe, nothing to prevent the growth of sincere friendships. Yet it should be observed that a recognition of the possibility of intimate social intercourse between European and Chinese does not necessarily imply an acceptance of the view that the races may safely and successfully intermarry. This point must be emphasised, for my own views on the subject have been to some extent misapprehended by a very friendly critic inThe Spectator(August 22, 1908, p. 268). This question is really one for biological experts, and no definite answer has yet been given to it, though Herbert Spencer, we know, was strongly of opinion that the white and yellow races should not mingle their blood. From the physiological point of view the question is, of course, in no way concerned with any fanciful theories as to one race being "higher" than another. (For Herbert Spencer's views see the Appendix to Lafcadio Hearn'sJapan: an Interpretation.)[426]See an able article on "Britain's Future in India," inThe Timesof June 28, 1909.[427]These translations are from Dr. De Groot'sReligious System of China, vol. ii. p. 508.[428]In her purely commercial relations with China, Japan's policy will of course continue to be consistent and strenuously active. It is a vital necessity to Japan that she should enjoy a large share of China's foreign trade.[429]"It is, I think, an error to assume that elimination of the school and immigration questions will mean complete restoration of the former Japanese-Americanentente. This never can be restored in the shape which it previously assumed. Conditions never will revert to the situation which gave it vitality. It is perhaps not going too far to say that relations of America and Japan are only now becoming serious, in the sense that they directly include propositions about which modern nations will, upon due provocation, go to war.... The genesis of a collision between Japan and the United States of America, if it ever occurs, will be found in conditions on the mainland of Asia." (The Far Eastern Question, by T. F. Millard (T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), pp. 60-61.)[430]The question was asked by Captain Murray, M.P., and answered by Mr. McKinnon Wood, in September 1909.[431]The "Mackay" Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and China was signed at Shanghai on September 5, 1902.Likinis an internal tax on merchandise in transit.[432]A good general view of the nature of the grave difficulties that stand in the way of currency reform may be gained from a perusal of H. B. Morse'sThe Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire(Shanghai, 1908). See especially pp. 166-9. Another recent work well worth consulting is T. F. Millard'sThe Far Eastern Question(T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), pp. 316seq.[433]Asiatic Studies(Second Series, 2nd ed.), pp. 374-5, 376-7.[434]The following remarks by Lafcadio Hearn on the question of the admission of foreign capital into Japan are not inapposite. "It appears to me that any person comprehending, even in the vaguest way, the nature of money-power and the average conditions of life throughout Japan, must recognise the certainty that foreign capital, with right of land-tenure, would find means to control legislation, to control government, and to bring about a state of affairs that would result in the practical domination of the Empire by alien interests.... Japan has incomparably more to fear from English or American capital than from Russian battleships and bayonets." (Japan: An Interpretation, p. 510.) Urgent economic considerations have, of course, compelled Japan not only to admit foreign capital in enormous amounts, but even to make heavy sacrifices in order to obtain it: but if any other course had been open to her she would gladly have adopted it.[435]Article xii. of the Mackay Treaty reads thus: "China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extra-territorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for their administration, and other considerations warrant her doing so."

[421]See p.85.

[422]In Article iii. of the "Port Arthur and Talienwan Agreement" between Russia and China it is provided that "the duration of the lease shall be twenty-five years from the day this treaty is signed [March 27, 1898], but may be extended by mutual agreement between Russia and China." It may be noted that the British, German and Russian treaties with respect to the leases of Weihaiwei, of the Kowloon Extension (ninety-nine years), of Kiaochou (ninety-nine years) and Port Arthur (twenty-five years), all stipulate that Chinese war-vessels, whether neutral or not, retain the right to the free use of the several leased harbours. It is a right that seems to be seldom exercised. The ultimate "sovereignty" of China over the various leased territories is specially safeguarded in the treaties relating to Kiaochou and Port Arthur, and has been admitted in respect of Weihaiwei.

[423]See pp.93seq.

[424]It has been urged in some quarters that the occupation of Kiaochou by Germany and that of Weihaiwei by Great Britain are specially objected to by the Chinese on the ground that Shantung, through its associations with Confucius, Mencius, Chou Kung and other ancient sages, is China's Sacred Province, and one that ought to remain inviolate. There is no reason to suppose that this notion has any basis in fact. The Chinese undoubtedly regard certain districts in the south-west of Shantung with immense reverence, more particularly the district of Ch'ü-fou, which contains the temple and tomb of Confucius, but no pre-eminent sanctity attaches to the province as a whole. The province of Shantung, indeed, did not exist as such in Confucius's time. If China's provinces were to be arranged in order of sanctity or inviolability it is probable that both Honan and Shensi would, for historical reasons, take precedence of Shantung.

[425]There are many Chinese who speak English fluently, and the number is increasing daily, but as a rule such persons have devoted so much time to the acquirement of a totally alien tongue, and "Western learning" generally, that they have been obliged to neglect the culture of their own country. (One of the greatest dangers ahead of China is the possibility that her foreign-educated students may, through ignorance, grow contemptuous of the intellectual achievements of their ancestors, and that Chinese culture may consequently suffer a long, though probably it would not be a permanent, eclipse.) There are also some Englishmen who can speak Chinese fluently, but very few of them have had the time or inclination to acquire a sound knowledge of Chinese literature. Thus it too often happens that an educated Englishman and an educated Chinese whose natures are such that they might become intimate friends, fail to become so through inability to exchange ideas in the region of politics, philosophy, literature or art. A German and an Englishman, even if they disagree on the subject of naval armaments, may find themselves at one in the matter of the music of Mozart or the psychological condition of the mind of Hamlet. Between an Englishman and a Frenchman a friendship may spring up on the basis of a common admiration for the prose of Flaubert or Anatole France or the philosophy of Bergson. But though there are now many Chinese who can discourse fluently on evolution or the conservation of energy, how many Western students of Chinese would bear themselves creditably in a conversation with a Chinese scholar on the ethics of Chu Hsi or the poetry of Su Tung-po? In the vast majority of cases, conversation between a Chinese and an Englishman (unless the relation between them is that of teacher and pupil) is very apt to degenerate into the merest "small talk" and exchange of civilities, and it is obvious that friendships can hardly be built up on so slender a foundation as this. But among those Europeans and Chinese who have successfully surmounted the barrier of language there is, I believe, nothing to prevent the growth of sincere friendships. Yet it should be observed that a recognition of the possibility of intimate social intercourse between European and Chinese does not necessarily imply an acceptance of the view that the races may safely and successfully intermarry. This point must be emphasised, for my own views on the subject have been to some extent misapprehended by a very friendly critic inThe Spectator(August 22, 1908, p. 268). This question is really one for biological experts, and no definite answer has yet been given to it, though Herbert Spencer, we know, was strongly of opinion that the white and yellow races should not mingle their blood. From the physiological point of view the question is, of course, in no way concerned with any fanciful theories as to one race being "higher" than another. (For Herbert Spencer's views see the Appendix to Lafcadio Hearn'sJapan: an Interpretation.)

[426]See an able article on "Britain's Future in India," inThe Timesof June 28, 1909.

[427]These translations are from Dr. De Groot'sReligious System of China, vol. ii. p. 508.

[428]In her purely commercial relations with China, Japan's policy will of course continue to be consistent and strenuously active. It is a vital necessity to Japan that she should enjoy a large share of China's foreign trade.

[429]"It is, I think, an error to assume that elimination of the school and immigration questions will mean complete restoration of the former Japanese-Americanentente. This never can be restored in the shape which it previously assumed. Conditions never will revert to the situation which gave it vitality. It is perhaps not going too far to say that relations of America and Japan are only now becoming serious, in the sense that they directly include propositions about which modern nations will, upon due provocation, go to war.... The genesis of a collision between Japan and the United States of America, if it ever occurs, will be found in conditions on the mainland of Asia." (The Far Eastern Question, by T. F. Millard (T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), pp. 60-61.)

[430]The question was asked by Captain Murray, M.P., and answered by Mr. McKinnon Wood, in September 1909.

[431]The "Mackay" Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and China was signed at Shanghai on September 5, 1902.Likinis an internal tax on merchandise in transit.

[432]A good general view of the nature of the grave difficulties that stand in the way of currency reform may be gained from a perusal of H. B. Morse'sThe Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire(Shanghai, 1908). See especially pp. 166-9. Another recent work well worth consulting is T. F. Millard'sThe Far Eastern Question(T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), pp. 316seq.

[433]Asiatic Studies(Second Series, 2nd ed.), pp. 374-5, 376-7.

[434]The following remarks by Lafcadio Hearn on the question of the admission of foreign capital into Japan are not inapposite. "It appears to me that any person comprehending, even in the vaguest way, the nature of money-power and the average conditions of life throughout Japan, must recognise the certainty that foreign capital, with right of land-tenure, would find means to control legislation, to control government, and to bring about a state of affairs that would result in the practical domination of the Empire by alien interests.... Japan has incomparably more to fear from English or American capital than from Russian battleships and bayonets." (Japan: An Interpretation, p. 510.) Urgent economic considerations have, of course, compelled Japan not only to admit foreign capital in enormous amounts, but even to make heavy sacrifices in order to obtain it: but if any other course had been open to her she would gladly have adopted it.

[435]Article xii. of the Mackay Treaty reads thus: "China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extra-territorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for their administration, and other considerations warrant her doing so."

[Chinese words that appear in the text of this book and in the index have been given their Pekingese sounds in accordance with Wade's system of transliteration.—R.F.J.]

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