"Milton is a great poet." "Quoth Hudibras,I smell a rat."Great poetis a general name: it means certain qualities, and applies to anybody possessing them.Quothimplies a general name, a name for personsspeaking, connoting or meaning a certain act and applicable to anybody in the performance of it.Quothexpresses also past time: thus it implies another general name, a name for personsin past time, connoting a quality which differentiates a species in the genus persons speaking, and making the predicate term "persons speaking in past time". Thus the propositionQuoth Hudibras, analysed into the syllogistic form S is in P, becomes S (Hudibras) is in P (persons speaking in past time). The Predicate term P is a class constituted on those properties.Smell a ratalso implies a general name, meaning an act or state predicable of many individuals.
Even if we add the grammatical object ofQuothto the analysis, the Predicate term is still a general name. Hudibras is only one of the persons speaking in past time who have spoken of themselves as being in a certain mood of suspicion.1
The learner may well ask what is the use of twistingplain speech into these uncouth forms. The use is certainly not obvious. The analysis may be directly useful, as Aristotle claimed for it, when we wish to ascertain exactly whether one proposition contradicts another, or forms with another or others a valid link in an argument. This is to admit that it is only in perplexing cases that the analysis is of direct use. The indirect use is to familiarise us with what the forms of common speech imply, and thus strengthen the intellect for interpreting the condensed and elliptical expression in which common speech abounds.
There are certain technical names applied to the components of many-worded general names,CategorematicandSyncategorematic,SubjectandAttributive. The distinctions are really grammatical rather than logical, and of little practical value.
A word that can stand by itself as a term is said to be Categorematic.Man,poet, or any other common noun.
A word that can only form part of a term is Syncategorematic. Under this definition come all adjectives and adverbs.
The student's ingenuity may be exercised in applying the distinction to the various parts of speech. A verb may be said to beHypercategorematic, implying, as it does, not only a term, but also a copula.
A nice point is whether the Adjective is categorematic or syncategorematic. The question depends on the definition of "term" in Logic. In common speech an adjective may stand by itself as a predicate, and so might be said to be Categorematic. "This heart is merry." But if a term is a class, or the name of a class, it is not Categorematic in the abovedefinition. It can only help to specify a class when attached to the name of a higher genus.
Mr. Fowler's wordsSubjectandAttributiveexpress practically the same distinction, except that Attributive is of narrower extent than syncategorematic. An Attributive is a word that connotes an attribute or property, ashot,valorous, and is always grammatically an adjective.
Theexpression of Quantity, that is, of Universality or non-universality, is all-important in syllogistic formulæ. In them universality is expressed byAllorNone. In ordinary speech universality is expressed in various forms, concrete and abstract, plain and figurative, without the use of "all" or "none".
Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.He can't be wrong whose life is in the right.What cat's averse to fish?Can the leopard change his spots?The longest road has an end.Suspicion ever haunts the guilty mind.Irresolution is always a sign of weakness.Treason never prospers.
Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.He can't be wrong whose life is in the right.What cat's averse to fish?Can the leopard change his spots?The longest road has an end.Suspicion ever haunts the guilty mind.Irresolution is always a sign of weakness.Treason never prospers.
Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right.
What cat's averse to fish?
Can the leopard change his spots?
The longest road has an end.
Suspicion ever haunts the guilty mind.
Irresolution is always a sign of weakness.
Treason never prospers.
A proposition in which the quantity is not expressed is called by AristotleIndefinite(ἀδιόριστος). For "indefinite"2Hamilton suggestsPreindesignate,undesignated, that is, before being received from common speech for the syllogistic mill. A proposition isPredesignatewhen the quantity is definitely indicated. All the above propositions are "Predesignate" universals, and reducible to the form All S is P, or No S is P.
The following propositions are no less definitely particular, reducible to the form I or O. In them as in the preceding quantity is formally expressed, though the forms used are not the artificial syllogistic forms:—
Afflictions are often salutary.Not every advice is a safe one.All that glitters is not gold.Rivers generally3run into the sea.
Afflictions are often salutary.Not every advice is a safe one.All that glitters is not gold.Rivers generally3run into the sea.
Afflictions are often salutary.
Not every advice is a safe one.
All that glitters is not gold.
Rivers generally3run into the sea.
Often, however, it is really uncertain from the form of common speech whether it is intended to express a universal or a particular. The quantity is not formally expressed. This is especially the case with proverbs and loose floating sayings of a general tendency. For example:—
Haste makes waste.Knowledge is power.Light come, light go.Left-handed men are awkward antagonists.Veteran soldiers are the steadiest in fight.
Haste makes waste.Knowledge is power.Light come, light go.Left-handed men are awkward antagonists.Veteran soldiers are the steadiest in fight.
Haste makes waste.
Knowledge is power.
Light come, light go.
Left-handed men are awkward antagonists.
Veteran soldiers are the steadiest in fight.
Such sayings are in actual speech for the most part delivered as universals.4It is a useful exercise of the Socratic kind to decide whether they are really so. This can only be determined by a survey of facts. The best method of conducting such a survey is probably (1) to pick out the concrete subject, "hasty actions," "men possessed of knowledge," "things lightly acquired"; (2) to fix the attribute or attributes predicated; (3) to run over the individuals of the subject class and settle whether the attribute is as a matter of fact meant to be predicated of each and every one.
This is the operation ofInduction. If one individual can be found of whom the attribute is not meant to be predicated, the proposition is not intended as Universal.
Mark the difference between settling what is intended and settling what is true. The conditions of truth and the errors incident to the attempt to determine it, are the business of the Logic of Rational Belief, commonly entitled Inductive Logic. The kind of "induction" here contemplated has for its aim merely to determine the quantity of a proposition in common acceptation, which can be done by considering in what cases the proposition would generally be alleged. This corresponds nearly as we shall see to Aristotelian Induction, the acceptance of a universal statement when no instance to the contrary is alleged.
It is to be observed that for this operation we do notpractically use the syllogistic form All S is P. We do not raise the question Is All S, P? That is, we do not constitute in thought a class P: the class in our minds is S, and what we ask is whether an attribute predicated of this class is truly predicated of every individual of it.
Suppose we indicate bypthe attribute, knot of attributes, or concept on which the class P is constituted, then All S is P is equivalent to "All S hasp": and Has All Sp? is the form of a question that we have in our minds when we make an inductive survey on the above method. I point this out to emphasise the fact that there is no prerogative in the form All S is P except for syllogistic purposes.
This inductive survey may be made a usefulCollateral Discipline. The bare forms of Syllogistic are a useless item of knowledge unless they are applied to concrete thought. And determining the quantity of a common aphorism or saw, the limits within which it is meant to hold good, is a valuable discipline in exactness of understanding. In trying to penetrate to the inner intention of a loose general maxim, we discover that what it is really intended to assert is a general connexion of attributes, and a survey of concrete cases leads to a more exact apprehension of those attributes. Thus in considering whetherKnowledge is poweris meant to be asserted of all knowledge, we encounter along with such examples as the sailor's knowledge that wetting a rope shortens it, which enabled some masons to raise a stone to its desired position, or the knowledge of French roads possessed by the German invaders,—along with such examples as these we encounter cases where a knowledge of difficulties without a knowledgeof the means of overcoming them is paralysing to action. Samuel Daniel says:—
Where timid knowledge stands consideringAudacious ignorance has done the deed.
Where timid knowledge stands consideringAudacious ignorance has done the deed.
Where timid knowledge stands considering
Audacious ignorance has done the deed.
Studying numerous cases where "Knowledge is power" is alleged or denied, we find that what is meant is that a knowledge of the right means of doing anything is power—in short, that the predicate is not made of all knowledge, but only of a species of knowledge.
Take, again,Custom blunts sensibility. Putting this in the concrete, and inquiring what predicate is made about "men accustomed to anything" (S), we have no difficulty in finding examples where such men are said to become indifferent to it. We find such illustrations as Lovelace's famous "Paradox":—
Through foul we follow fairFor had the world one faceAnd earth been bright as airWe had known neither place.Indians smell not their nestThe Swiss and Finn taste bestThe spices of the East.
Through foul we follow fairFor had the world one faceAnd earth been bright as airWe had known neither place.Indians smell not their nestThe Swiss and Finn taste bestThe spices of the East.
Through foul we follow fair
For had the world one face
And earth been bright as air
We had known neither place.
Indians smell not their nest
The Swiss and Finn taste best
The spices of the East.
So men accustomed to riches are not acutely sensible of their advantages: dwellers in noisy streets cease to be distracted by the din: the watchmaker ceases to hear the multitudinous ticking in his shop: the neighbours of chemical works are not annoyed by the smells like the casual passenger. But we find also that wine-tasters acquire by practice an unusual delicacy of sense; that the eyes once accustomed to a dim light begin to distinguish objects that were atfirst indistinguishable; and so on. What meanings of "custom" and of "sensibility" will reconcile these apparently conflicting examples? What are the exact attributes signified by the names? We should probably find that by sensibility is meant emotional sensibility as distinguished from intellectual discrimination, and that by custom is meant familiarity with impressions whose variations are not attended to, or subjection to one unvarying impression.
To verify the meaning of abstract proverbs in this way is to travel over the road by which the Greek dialecticians were led to feel the importance of definition. Of this more will be said presently. If it is contended that such excursions are beyond the bounds of Formal Logic, the answer is that the exercise is a useful one and that it starts naturally and conveniently from the formulæ of Logic. It is the practice and discipline that historically preceded the Aristotelian Logic, and in the absence of which the Aristotelian formulæ would have a narrowing and cramping effect.
Can all propositions be reduced to the syllogistic form?Probably: but this is a purely scientific inquiry, collateral to Practical Logic. The concern of Practical Logic is chiefly with forms of proposition that favour inaccuracy or inexactness of thought. When there is no room for ambiguity or other error, there is no virtue in artificial syllogistic form. The attempt so to reduce any and every proposition may lead, however, to the study of what Mr. Bosanquet happily calls the "Morphology" of Judgment, Judgment being the technical name for the mental act that accompanies the utterance of a proposition. Even in such sentences as "How hot it is!" or "It rains," the rudiment ofsubject and predicate may be detected. When a man says "How hot it is," he conveys the meaning, though there is no definitely formed subject in his mind, that the outer world at the moment of his speaking has a certain quality or attribute. So with "It rains". The study of such examples in their context, however, reveals the fact that the same form of Common speech may cover different subjects and predicates in different connexions. Thus in the argument:—
"Whatever is, is best.It rains!"—
"Whatever is, is best.It rains!"—
"Whatever is, is best.
It rains!"—
the Subject isRainand the Predicateis now, "is at the present time," "is in the class of present events".
Footnote 1:Remember that when we speak of a general name, we do not necessarily mean a single word. A general name, logically viewed, is simply the name of agenus, kind, or class: and whether this is single-worded or many-worded is, strictly speaking, a grammatical question. "Man," "man-of-ability," "man-of-ability-and-courage," "man-of-ability-and-courage-and-gigantic-stature," "man-who-fought-at-Marathon"—these are all general names in their logical function. No matter how the constitutive properties of the class are indicated, by one word or in combination, that word or combination is a general name. In actual speech we can seldom indicate by a single word the meaning predicated.
Footnote 2:The objection taken to the word "indefinite," that the quantity of particular propositions is indefinite,somemeaning any quantity less than all, is an example of the misplaced and frivolous subtlety that has done so much to disorder the tradition of Logic. By "indefinite" is simply meant not definitely expressed as either Universal or Particular, Total or Partial. The same objection might be taken to any word used to express the distinction: the degree of quantity in Some S is not "designate" any more than it is "definite" or "dioristic".
Footnote 3:Generally.In this word we have an instance of the frequent conflict between the words of common speech and logical terminology. How it arises shall be explained in next chapter. A General proposition is a synonym for a Universal proposition (if the forms A and E are so termed): but "generally" in common speech means "for the most part," and is represented by the symbol of particular quantity,Some.
Footnote 4:With some logicians it is a mechanical rule in reducing to syllogistic form to treat as I or O all sentences in which there is no formal expression of quantity. This is to err on the safe side, but common speakers are not so guarded, and it is to be presumed rather that they have a universal application in their minds when they do not expressly qualify.
The formula forExclusive Propositions. "None but the brave deserve the fair": "No admittance except on business": "Only Protestants can sit on the throne of England".
These propositions exemplify different ways in common speech of naming a subjectexclusively, the predication being made of all outside a certain term. "None that are not brave, etc.;" "none that are not on business, etc.;" "none that are not Protestants, etc.". No not-S is P. It is only about all outside the given term that the universal assertion is made: we say nothing universally about the individuals within the term: we do not say that all Protestants are eligible, nor that all persons on business are admitted, nor that every one of the brave deserves the fair. All that we say is that the possession of the attribute named is an indispensable condition: a person maypossess the attribute, and yet on other grounds may not be entitled to the predicate.
The justification for taking special note of this form in Logic is that we are apt by inadvertence to make an inclusive inference from it. Let it be said that None but those who work hard can reasonably expect to pass, and we are apt to take this as meaning that all who work hard may reasonably expect to pass. But what is denied of every Not-S is not necessarily affirmed of every S.
The expression ofTenseorTimein the Syllogistic Forms. Seeing that the Copula in S is P or S is in P does not express time, but only a certain relation between S and P, the question arises Where are we to put time in the analytic formula? "Wheat is dear;" "All had fled;" time is expressed in these propositions, and our formula should render the whole content of what is given. Are we to include it in the Predicate term or in the Subject term? If it must not be left out altogether, and we cannot put it with the copula, we have a choice between the two terms.
It is a purely scholastic question. The common technical treatment is to view the tense as part of the predicate. "All had fled," All S is P,i.e., the whole subject is included in a class constituted on the attributes of flight at a given time. It may be that the Predicate is solely a predicate of time. "The Board met yesterday at noon." S is P,i.e., the meeting of the Board is one of the events characterised by having happened at a certain time, agreeing with other events in that respect.
But in some cases the time is more properly regarded as part of the subject.E.g., "Wheat is dear". S does not here stand for wheat collectively, but for thewheat now in the market, the wheat of the present time: it is concerning this that the attribute of dearness is predicated; it is this that is in the class of dear things.
The expression ofModalityin the Syllogistic Forms. Propositions in which the predicate is qualified by an expression of necessity, contingency, possibility or impossibility [i.e., in English bymust,may,can, orcannot], were called in Mediæval LogicModalPropositions. "Two and twomustmake four." "Grubsmaybecome butterflies." "Zcanpaint." "Ycannotfly."
There are two recognised ways of reducing such propositions to the form S is P. One is to distinguish between theDictumand theMode, the proposition and the qualification of its certainty, and to treat theDictumas the Subject and theModeas the Predicate. Thus: "That two and two make four is necessary"; "That Y can fly is impossible".
The other way is to treat the Mode as part of the predicate. The propriety of this is not obvious in the case of Necessary propositions, but it is unobjectionable in the case of the other three modes. Thus: "Grubs are things that have the potentiality of becoming butterflies"; "Z has the faculty of painting"; "Y has not the faculty of flying".
The chief risk of error is in determining the quantity of the subject about which the Contingent or Possible predicate is made. When it is said that "Victories may be gained by accident," is the predicate made concerning All victories or Some only? Here we are apt to confuse the meaning of the contingent assertion with the matter of fact on which in common belief it rests. It is true only that some victories have beengained by accident, and it is on this ground that we assert in the absence of certain knowledge concerning any victory that it may have been so gained. The latter is the effect of the contingent assertion: it is made about any victory in the absence of certain knowledge, that is to say, formally about all.
The history of Modals in Logic is a good illustration of intricate confusion arising from disregard of a clear traditional definition. The treatment of them by Aristotle was simple, and had direct reference to tricks of disputation practised in his time. He specified four "modes," the four that descended to mediæval logic, and he concerned himself chiefly with the import of contradicting these modals. What is the true contradictory of such propositions as, "It is possible to be" (δυνατὸν εἶναι), "It admits of being" (ἐνδέχεται εἶναι), "It must be" (ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι), "It is impossible to be" (ἀδύνατον εἶναι)? What is implied in saying "No" to such propositions put interrogatively? "Is it possible for Socrates to fly?" "No." Does this mean that it is not possible for Socrates to fly, or that it is possible for Socrates not to fly?
A disputant who had trapped a respondent into admitting that it is possible for Socrates not to fly, might have pushed the concession farther in some such way as this: "Is it possible for Socrates not to walk?" "Certainly." "Is it possible for him to walk?" "Yes." "When you say that it is possible for a man to do anything do you not believe that it is possible for him to do it?" "Yes." "But you have admitted that it is possible for Socrates not to fly?"
It was in view of such perplexities as these that Aristotle set forth the true contradictories of his four Modals. We may laugh at such quibbles now andwonder that a grave logician should have thought them worth guarding against. But historically this is the origin of the Modals of Formal Logic, and to divert the names of them to signify other distinctions than those between modes of qualifying the certainty of a statement is to introduce confusion.
Thus we find "Alexander was a great general," given as an example of a Contingent Modal, on the ground that though as a matter of fact Alexander was so he might have been otherwise. It was notnecessarythat Alexander should be a great general: therefore the proposition iscontingent. Now the distinction between Necessary truth and Contingent truth may be important philosophically: but it is merely confusing to call the character of propositions as one or the other by the name of Modality. The original Modality is a mode of expression: to apply the name to this character is to shift its meaning.
A more simple and obviously unwarrantable departure from tradition is to extend the name Modality to any grammatical qualification of a single verb in common speech. On this understanding "Alexander conquered Darius" is given by Hamilton as aPureproposition, and "Alexander conquered Darius honourably" as aModal. This is a merely grammatical distinction, a distinction in the mode of composing the predicate term in common speech. In logical tradition Modality is a mode of qualifying the certainty of an affirmation. "The conquest of Darius by Alexander was honourable," or "Alexander in conquering Darius was an honourable conqueror," is the syllogistic form of the proposition: it is simply assertory, not qualified in any "mode".
There is a similar misunderstanding in Mr. Shedden'streatment of "generally" as constituting a Modal in such sentences, as "Riversgenerallyflow into the sea". He argues that asgenerallyis not part either of the Subject term or of the Predicate term, it must belong to the Copula, and is therefore amodalqualification of the whole assertion. He overlooked the fact that the word "generally" is an expression of Quantity: it determines the quantity of the Subject term.
Finally it is sometimes held (e.g., by Mr. Venn) that the question of Modality belongs properly to Scientific or Inductive Logic, and is out of place in Formal Logic. This is so far accurate that it is for Inductive Logic to expound the conditions of various degrees of certainty. The consideration of Modality is pertinent to Formal Logic only in so far as concerns special perplexities in the expression of it. The treatment of it by Logicians has been rendered intricate by torturing the old tradition to suit different conceptions of the end and aim of Logic.
fancy rule
We cannot inquire far into the meaning of proverbs or traditional sayings without discovering that the common understanding of general and abstract names is loose and uncertain. Common speech is a quicksand.
Consider how we acquire our vocabulary, how we pick up the words that we use from our neighbours and from books, and why this is so soon becomes apparent. Theoretically we know the full meaning of a name when we know all the attributes that it connotes, and we are not justified in extending it except to objects that possess all the attributes. This is the logical ideal, but between theought to beof Logic and theisof practical life, there is a vast difference. How seldom do we conceive words in their full meaning! And who is to instruct us in the full meaning? It is not as in the exact sciences, where we start with a knowledge ofthe full meaning. In Geometry, for example, we learn the definitions of the words used,point,line,parallel, etc., before we proceed to use them. But in common speech, we learn words first in their application to individual cases. Nobody ever definedgoodto us, orfair, orkind, orhighly educated. We hear the words applied to individual objects: we utter them in the same connexion: we extend them to other objects that strike us as like without knowing the precise points of likeness that the convention of common speech includes. The more exact meaning we learn by gradual induction from individual cases.Ugly,beautiful,good,bad—we learn the words first as applicable to things and persons: gradually there arises a more or less definite sense of what the objects so designated have in common. The individual's extension of the name proceeds upon what in the objects has most impressed him when he caught the word: this may differ in different individuals; the usage of neighbours corrects individual eccentricities. The child in arms shoutsDaat the passing stranger who reminds him of his father: for him at first it is a general name applicable to every man: by degrees he learns that for him it is a singular name.
The mode in which words are learnt and extended may be studied most simply in the nursery. A child, say, has learnt to saymambrowhen it sees its nurse. The nurse works a hand-turned sewing machine, and sings to it as she works. In the street the child sees an organ-grinder singing as he turns his handle: it callsmambro: the nurse catches the meaning and the child is overjoyed. The organ-grinder has a monkey: the child has an india-rubber monkey toy: it calls this alsomambro. The name is extended to a monkey ina picture-book. It has a toy musical box with a handle: this also becomesmambro, the word being extended along another line of resemblance. A stroller with a French fiddle comes within the denotation of the word: a towel-rail is also calledmambrofrom some fancied resemblance to the fiddle. A very swarthy hunch-backmambrofrightens the child: this leads to the transference of the word to a terrific coalman with a bag of coals on his back. In a short time the word has become a name for a great variety of objects that have nothing whatever common to all of them, though each is strikingly like in some point to a predecessor in the series. When the application becomes too heterogeneous, the word ceases to be of use as a sign and is gradually abandoned, the most impressive meaning being the last to go. In a child's vocabulary where the wordmambrohad a run of nearly two years, its last use was as an adjective signifying ugly or horrible.
The history of such a word in a child's language is a type of what goes on in the language of men. In the larger history we see similar extensions under similar motives, checked and controlled in the same way by surrounding usage.
It is obvious that to avoid error and confusion, the meaning or connotation of names, the concepts, should somehow be fixed: names cannot otherwise have an identical reference in human intercourse. We may call this ideal fixed concept theLogical Concept: or we may call it theScientific Concept, inasmuch as one of the main objects of the sciences is to attain such ideals in different departments of study. But in actual speech we have also thePersonal Concept, which varies more or less with the individual user,and thePopularorVernacular Concept, which, though roughly fixed, varies from social sect to social sect and from generation to generation.
The variations in Popular Concepts may be traced in linguistic history. Words change with things and with the aspects of things, as these change in public interest and importance. As long as the attributes that govern the application of words are simple, sensible attributes, little confusion need arise: the variations are matters of curious research for the philologist, but are logically insignificant. Murray's Dictionary, or such books as Trench'sEnglish Past and Present, supply endless examples, as many, indeed as there are words in the language.Clerkhas almost as many connotations as our typicalmambro: clerk in holy orders, church clerk, town clerk, clerk of assize, grocer's clerk. In Early English, the word meant "man in a religious order, cleric, clergyman"; ability to read, write, and keep accounts being a prominent attribute of the class, the word was extended on this simple ground till it has ceased altogether to cover its original field except as a formal designation. But no confusion is caused by the variation, because the property connoted is simple.1So with any common noun: street, carriage, ship, house, merchant, lawyer, professor. We might be puzzled to give an exact definition of such words,to say precisely what they connote in common usage; but the risk of error in the use of them is small.
When we come to words of which the logical concept is a complex relation, an obscure or intangible attribute, the defects of the popular conception and its tendencies to change and confusion, are of the greatest practical importance. Take such words asMonarchy,tyranny,civil freedom,freedom of contract,landlord,gentleman,prig,culture,education,temperance,generosity. Not merely should we find it difficult to give an analytic definition of such words: we might be unable to do so, and yet flatter ourselves that we had a clear understanding of their meaning. But let two men begin to discuss any proposition in which any such word is involved, and it will often be found that they take the word in different senses. If the relation expressed is complex, they have different sides or lines of it in their minds; if the meaning is an obscure quality, they are guided in their application of it by different outward signs.
Monarchy, in its original meaning, is applied to a form of government in which the will of one man is supreme, to make laws or break them, to appoint or dismiss officers of state and justice, to determine peace or war, without control of statute or custom. But supreme power is never thus uncontrolled in reality; and the word has been extended to cover governments in which the power of the titular head is controlled in many different modes and degrees. The existence of a head, with the title of King or Emperor, is the simplest and most salient fact: and wherever this exists, the popular concept of a monarchy is realised. The President of the United States has more real power than the Sovereign of Great Britain; but theone government is called a Republic and the other a Monarchy. People discuss the advantages and disadvantages of monarchy without first deciding whether they take the word in its etymological sense of unlimited power, or its popular sense of titular kingship, or its logical sense of power definitely limited in certain ways. And often in debate, monarchy is really a singular term for the government of Great Britain.
Culture,religious,generous, are names for inward states or qualities: with most individuals some simple outward sign directs the application of the word—it may be manner, or bearing, or routine observances, or even nothing more significant than the cut of the clothes or of the hair. Small things undoubtedly are significant, and we must judge by small things when we have nothing else to go by: but instead of trying to get definite conceptions for our moral epithets, and suspending judgment till we know that the use of the epithet is justified, the trifling superficial sign becomes for us practically the whole meaning of the word. We feel that we must have a judgment of some sort at once: only simple signs are suited to our impatience.
It was with reference to this state of things that Hegel formulated his paradox that the true abstract thinker is the plain man who laughs at philosophy as what he calls abstract and unpractical. He holds decided opinions for or against this or the other abstraction,freedom,tyranny,revolution,reform,socialism, but what these words mean and within what limits the things signified are desirable or undesirable, he is in too great a hurry to pause and consider.
The disadvantages of this kind of "abstract" thinking are obvious. The accumulated wisdom of mankindis stored in language. Until we have cleared our conceptions, and penetrated to the full meaning of words, that wisdom is a sealed book to us. Wise maxims are interpreted by us hastily in accordance with our own narrow conceptions. All the vocables of a language may be more or less familiar to us, and yet we may not have learnt it as an instrument of thought. Outside the very limited range of names for what we see and use in the daily routine of life, food and clothes and the common occupations of men, words have little meaning for us, and are the vehicles merely of thin preconceptions and raw prejudices.
The remedy for "abstract" thinking is more thinking, and in pursuing this two aims may be specified for the sake of clearness, though they are closely allied, and progress towards both may often be made by one and the same operation. (1) We want to reach a clear and full conception of the meaning of names as used now or at a given time. Let us call this theVerification of the Meaning. (2) We want to fix such conceptions, and if necessary readjust their boundaries. This is the province ofDefinition, which cannot be effectually performed withoutScientific ClassificationorDivision.
This can only be done by assembling the objects to which the words are applied, and considering what they have in common. To ascertain the actual connotation we must run over the actual denotation. And since in such an operation two or more minds are better than one, discussion or dialectic is both more fruitful and more stimulating than solitary reflection or reading.
The first to practise this process on a memorable scale, and with a distinct method and purpose, was Socrates. To insist upon the necessity of clear conceptions, and to assist by his dialectic procedure in forming them, was his contribution to philosophy.
His plan was to take a common name, profess ignorance of its meaning, and ask his interlocutor whether he would apply it in such and such an instance, producing one after another. According to Xenophon'sMemorabiliahe habitually chose the commonest names,good,unjust,fitting, and so forth, and tried to set men thinking about them, and helped them by his questions to form an intelligent conception of the meaning.
For example, what is the meaning of injustice? Would you say that the man who cheats or deceives is unjust? Suppose a man deceives his enemies, is there any injustice in that? Can the definition be that a man who deceives his friends is unjust? But there are cases where friends are deceived for their own good: are these cases of injustice? A general may inspirit his soldiers by a falsehood. A man may cajole a weapon out of his friend's hand when he sees him about to commit suicide. A father may deceive his son into taking medicine. Would you call these men unjust? By some such process of interrogation we are brought to the definition that a man is unjust who deceives his friends to their hurt.
Observe that in much of his dialectic the aim of Socrates was merely to bring out the meaning lying vague and latent, as it were, in the common mind. His object was simply what we have called the verification of the meaning. And a dialectic thatconfines itself to the consideration of what is ordinarily meant as distinct from what ought to be meant may often serve a useful purpose. Disputes about words are not always as idle as is sometimes supposed. Mr. H. Sidgwick truly remarks (à proposof the terms of Political Economy) that there is often more profit in seeking a definition than in finding it. Conceptions are not merely cleared but deepened by the process. Mr. Sidgwick's remarks are so happy that I must take leave to quote them: they apply not merely to the verification of ordinary meaning but also to the study of special uses by authorities, and the reasons for those special uses.
"The truth is—as most readers of Plato know, only it is a truth difficult to retain and apply—that what we gain by discussing a definition is often but slightly represented in the superior fitness of the formula that we ultimately adopt; it consists chiefly in the greater clearness and fulness in which the characteristics of the matter to which the formula refers have been brought before the mind in the process of seeking for it. While we are apparently aiming at definitions of terms, our attention should be really fixed on distinctions and relations of fact. These latter are what we are concerned to know, contemplate, and as far as possible arrange and systematise; and in subjects where we cannot present them to the mind in ordinary fulness by the exercise of the organs of sense, there is no way of surveying them so convenient as that of reflecting on our use of common terms.... In comparing different definitions our aim should be far less to decide which we ought to adopt, than to apprehend and duly consider the grounds on which each has commended itself to reflective minds. We shall generally find that each writer has noted some relation, some resemblance or difference, which others have overlooked; and we shall gain in completeness, and oftenin precision, of view by following him in his observations, whether or not we follow him in his conclusions."2
"The truth is—as most readers of Plato know, only it is a truth difficult to retain and apply—that what we gain by discussing a definition is often but slightly represented in the superior fitness of the formula that we ultimately adopt; it consists chiefly in the greater clearness and fulness in which the characteristics of the matter to which the formula refers have been brought before the mind in the process of seeking for it. While we are apparently aiming at definitions of terms, our attention should be really fixed on distinctions and relations of fact. These latter are what we are concerned to know, contemplate, and as far as possible arrange and systematise; and in subjects where we cannot present them to the mind in ordinary fulness by the exercise of the organs of sense, there is no way of surveying them so convenient as that of reflecting on our use of common terms.... In comparing different definitions our aim should be far less to decide which we ought to adopt, than to apprehend and duly consider the grounds on which each has commended itself to reflective minds. We shall generally find that each writer has noted some relation, some resemblance or difference, which others have overlooked; and we shall gain in completeness, and oftenin precision, of view by following him in his observations, whether or not we follow him in his conclusions."2
Mr. Sidgwick's own discussions ofWealth,Value, andMoneyare models. A clue is often found to the meaning in examining startlingly discrepant statements connected with the same leading word. Thus we find some authorities declaring that "style" cannot be taught or learnt, while others declare that it can. But on trying to ascertain what they mean by "style," we find that those who say it cannot be taught mean either a certain marked individual character or manner of writing—as in Buffon's saying,Le style c'est l'homme même—or a certain felicity and dignity of expression, while those who say style can be taught mean lucid method in the structure of sentences or in the arrangement of a discourse. Again in discussions on the rank of poets, we find different conceptions of what constitutes greatness in poetry lying at the root of the inclusion of this or the other poet among great poets. We find one poet excluded from the first rank of greatness because his poetry was not serious; another because his poetry was not widely popular; another because he wrote comparatively little; another because he wrote only songs or odes and never attempted drama or epic. These various opinions point to different conceptions of what constitutes greatness in poets, different connotations of "great poet". Comparing different opinions concerning "education" we may be led to ask whether it means more than instruction in the details of certain subjects, whether it does not also import the formation of adisposition to learn or an interest in learning or instruction in a certain method of learning.
Historically, dialectic turning on the use of words preceded the attempt to formulate principles of Definition, and attempts at precise definition led to Division and Classification, that is to systematic arrangement of the objects to be defined. Attempt to define any such word as "education," and you gradually become sensible of the needs in respect of method that forced themselves upon mankind in the history of thought. You soon become aware that you cannot define it by itself alone; that you are beset by a swarm of more or less synonymous words,instruction,discipline,culture,training, and so on; that these various words represent distinctions and relations among things more or less allied; and that, if each must be fixed to a definite meaning, this must be done with reference to one another and to the whole department of things that they cover.
The first memorable attempts at scientific arrangement were Aristotle's treatises on Ethics and Politics, which had been the subjects of active dialectic for at least a century before. That these the most difficult of all departments to subject to scientific treatment should have been the first chosen was due simply to their preponderating interest: "The proper study of mankind is man". The systems of what are known as the Natural Sciences are of modern origin: the first, that of Botany, dates from Cesalpinus in the sixteenth century. But the principles on which Aristotle proceeded in dividing and defining, principles which have gradually themselves been more precisely formulated, are principles applicable to all systematicarrangements for purposes of orderly study. I give them in the precise formulæ which they have gradually assumed in the tradition of Logic. The principles of Division are often given in Formal Logic, and the principles of Classification in Inductive Logic, but there is no valid reason for the separation. The classification of objects in the Natural Sciences, of animals, plants, and stones, with a view to the thorough study of them in form, structure, and function, is more complex than classifications for more limited purposes, and the tendency is to restrict the word classification to these elaborate systems. But really they are only a series of divisions and subdivisions, and the same principles apply to each of the subordinate divisions as well as to the division of the whole department of study.
Confusion in the boundaries of names arises from confused ideas regarding the resemblances and differences of things. As a protective against this confusion, things must be clearly distinguished in their points of likeness and difference, and this leads to their arrangement in systems, that is, to division and classification. A name is not secure against variation until it has a distinct place in such a system as a symbol for clearly distinguished attributes. Nor must we forget, further, that systems have their day, that the best system attainable is only temporary, and may have to be recast to correspond with changes of things and of man's way of looking at them.