Relation of the logical with the Æsthetic form.
With the ascent from the intuition-expression to the concept, and with the concentration upon it of our attention, we have risen from the purely imaginative to the purely logical form of the spirit. We must now, so to speak, begin the descent; or rather consider in greater detail the position that has been reached, in order to understand it in all its conditions and circumstances. Were we not to do this, we should have given a concept of the concept, which would err by abstraction.
The concept as expression.
The concept, to which we have risen from intuition, does not live in empty space. It does not exist as a mere concept, or as something abstract. The air it breathes is the intuitionitself, from which it detaches itself, but in whose ambient it continues. If these images seem unsuitable, or somewhat drawn from the sphere of representations, we may choose others, such as that, which we used on another occasion, of the second grade, which, to be second, must rest upon the first, and, in a certain sense, be the first. The concept does not exist, and cannot exist, save in the intuitive and expressive forms, or in what is called language. To think is also to speak; he who does not express, or does not know how to express his concept, does not possess it: at the most, he presumes or hopes to possess it. Not only is there never in reality an unexpressed representation, a pictorial vision unpainted, or a song unsung; but there is never even a concept which is simply thought and not also translated into words.
We have previously defended this thesis against the objections which are wont to be made to it.[1]But in order to recapitulate and thus to avoid the misunderstandings which might arise from the abbreviating formulæ which we use, it will be well to repeat that the concept is not expressed only in the so-called vocal or verbal forms; and if we mention these more thanothers, it will be by synecdoche, that is to say, when we refer to them, we desire to take them as representative of all the others. Undoubtedly, the affirmation that the concept can also be expressed in non-verbal form may cause surprise. It will be said that geometry itself, in so far as it describes geometrical figures, at the same time employs or implies speech; and we shall be ironically challenged to attempt to set theCritique of Pure Reasonto music or to make a building of Newton'sNatural Philosophy.But we must carefully beware of breaking up the unity of the intuitive spirit, because errors arise and become incorrigible, precisely through such breaking up. Words, tones, colours, and lines are physical abstractions, and only by abstraction can they be successfully separated. In reality, he who looks at a picture with his eyes also speaks it in words to himself; he who sings an air also has its words in his spirit; he who builds a palace or a church speaks, sings, and makes music; he who reads a poem sings, paints, sculptures, constructs.The Critique of Pure Reasoncannot be set to music, because it already has its music; theNatural Philosophycannot be built in stone, because it is already architectonic; in exactly the same way that theTransfigurationcannot beturned into a symphony in four movements, or thePromessi Sposiinto a series of pictures. Thus the challenge, if made, would testify to the lack of reflection on the part of the challengers, for they would confuse physical distinctions with the real and concrete act of the intuitive spirit.
Æsthetic and Æsthetic-logical expressions or expressions of the concept; propositions and judgments.
Owing to the incarnation of the concept or logic in expression and language, language is quite full of logical elements; hence people are often led astray into affirming (we have already made clear the erroneousness[2]of this) that language is a logical function. Water might as well be called wine, because wine has been poured into the water. But language as language or as simple æsthetic fact is one thing, and language as expression of logical thought is another, for in this case, certainly, language remains always language and subject to the law of language, but is also more than language. If the first be termed simple expression,logos seimantikos,as Aristotle said, orjudicium æstheticum sive sensitivum,according to the school of Baumgarten, the second must on the contrary be called affirmation,logos apophantikos, judicium logicumoræsthetico-logicum.To this same issue we can reduce, if we understand itproperly, the distinction betweenpropositionandjudgment,for they are only distinguishable in so far as it is assumed that the second form is dominated by the concept, whereas the first is given as free of such domination.
But we should seek in vain for facts in proof of expressions belonging to either form, because we cannot furnish them without making the proviso that we understand them in the meaning of one or other of the two forms. Taken by themselves, any verbal expressions which we adduce or can adduce as proofs are indeterminate and therefore of many meanings. "Love is life" can be the saying of a poet who notes an impression with which his soul is agitated and marks it with fervour and solemnity; or it can be, equally, the logical affirmation of some one philosophizing on the essence of life. "Clear, fresh, and sweet waters," when uttered by Petrarch, is an æsthetic proposition; but the same words become a logical judgment when, for example, they answer the question as to which is the most celebrated love song of Petrarch, or pseudological when applied by a naturalist to the substance water. A word no longer has meaning, or—what amounts to the same thing—has no definite meaning, when it is abstracted fromthe circumstances, the implications, the emphasis, and the gesture with which it has been thought, animated, and pronounced. Nevertheless, forgetfulness of this elementary hermeneutic canon, by which a word is a word only on the soil that has produced it and to which it must be restored, has been in Logic the cause of interminable disputes as to the logical nature of this or that verbal phrase, separated from the whole to which it belonged and rendered abstract. It would be much less equivocal to adduce such poems asI Sepolcri,or the songA Silvia,as documents of æsthetic propositions, and philosophical treatises (for examples, theMetaphysicsor theAnalytics) as documents of æsthetic-logical judgments or propositions. But here, too, we should need to add: "poetry considered as poetry," and "philosophy considered as philosophy," since it is clear that a poem is prose in the soul of him who reflects upon it, and prose is poetry in the soul of a writer vibrating with enthusiasm and emotion in the act of composition. Facts do not constitute proofs in philosophy, save when they are interpreted through the medium of philosophy; and then, too, they become mereexamples,which aid in fixing the attention upon what is being demonstrated.
Surpassing of the dualism of thought and language.
The relation between language and thought, conceived as we have conceived it, does not admit the criticism that it creates an insuperable dualism, though that criticism was justly aimed at those who set the two concepts side by side and parallel with one another. In that case the sole means that remained of obtaining unity was to present language as an acoustic fact and declare thought to be the unique psychic reality, and language the physical side of the psychophysical nexus. But no one will henceforth wish to repeat the blasphemy that language (the synonym of fancy and poetry) is nothing but a physical-acoustic fact and merely adherent to thought. We have in the two forms, notwithstanding their clear distinction, not parallelism and dualism, but an organic relation of connection in distinction,—the first form being implied in the second, the second crystallized into the first,—precisely in conformity with that rhythmical movement of the concepts which we have already discussed. And thus, too, when asked if thepriusof Logic be the concept or the judgment, we must reply that the judgment, understood as an æsthetic proposition, is certainly aprius;but understood as a logical judgment, it is neither apriusnor aposteriusin relation tothe concept, since it is the concept itself in its effectuality.
The logical judgment as definition.
This pure expression of the concept, which is the logical judgment, constitutes what is calleddefinitive judgmentordefinition.This, considered on its verbal side, or as the synthesis of thought and word, does not give rise to any special logical theory in addition to that which we have already stated, when definition showed itself to be one with distinction or conceptual thought; nor does it give rise to any special æsthetic doctrine, since the general doctrine expounded elsewhere includes this also. The dispute, as to whether the definition be verbal or real, finds its solution in the relation we have just established between thought and words; hence definition is verbal because it is real, andvice versa.And as to the other meaning of the question, whether, that is to say, definition benominalorreal,conventional or corresponding with the truth, that finds its solution in the distinction between pseudoconcepts and concepts, the first of which, it is clear, aredefinedonly in a nominalist or conventional way, because theyare,in fact, nominalist and conventional.
The indistinguishability of subject and predicate in the definition. Unity of essence and existence.
Greater importance attaches to the other dispute, as to whether the definitive judgment beanalysable into subject, predicate, and copula, whether, for example, the definition: "the will is the practical form of the spirit," can be resolved in the terms: "will" (subject), "practical form of the spirit" (predicate), and "is" (copula). Now, the difference between subject and predicate is here illusory, since predicate means the universal which is predicated of an individual, and here both the so-called subject and the so-called predicate are two universals, and the second, far from being more ample than the first, is the first itself. As to the "is," since the two distinct terms which should be copulated are wanting, it is not a copula; nor has it even the value of a predicate, as in the case in which it is asserted of an individual fact that it is, that is to say, that it has really happened and isexisting.The "is," in the case of the definition, expresses nothing except simply the act of thought which thinks; and what is thought is, in so far as it is thought; if it were not, it would not be thought; and if it were not thought, it would not be. The concept gives the essence of things, and in the conceptessence involves existence.That this proposition has sometimes been contested is due solely to the confusion between the essence, which is existence and therefore concept, and the existencewhich is not essence and therefore is representation. It is due therefore to the problem to which representations gave rise in this respect, and with which we shall deal further on. Freed from this confusion, the proposition is not contestable, and is the very basis of all logical thought, of which we have to examine the conceivability, or essence, that is, its internal necessity and coherence; and when this has been established, existence has also been established. If the concept ofvirtuebe conceivable, virtue is; if the concept ofGodbe conceivable, God is. To the most perfect concept the perfection of existence cannot be wanting without beingitselfnon-existent.
Alleged emptiness of the definition.
Yet it would seem that though the definition affirms both essence and existence, and therefore the reality of the concept, it is, nevertheless, an empty form; for we have recognized that in every definition subject and predicate are the same, and it is therefore a tautological judgment. Certainly, the definition is tautological, but it is a sublime tautology, altogether different from the emptiness which is usually condemned in that expression. The tautology of the definition means that the concept is equal only to itself and cannot be resolved into another or explained by another. In the definition truthpraesentia patet,and if theGoddess does not reveal herself by her simple presence, it is in vain that the priest will strive to discover her to the multitude by comparing her with what is inferior to her: with sensible things, which are particular manifestations of her.
Critique of the definition as fixed verbal form.
As in relation to the concept the definition is not to be held distinguishable, so in its expressive or verbal aspect it must not be understood as a formula separate from the basis of the discourse, as though it were the official garb of truth, the only worthy setting for that gem. Such a conception of its nature has causedpedantry of definition, hatredof and consequent rebellionagainst definitions.That pedantry, however, like all pedantries, had some good in it; that is to say, it energetically affirmed the need for exactitude; and too frequently the rebellion, denying, like all rebellions, not only the evil but also whatever good there might be in the thing opposed, has, through its hatred of formulæ, made exactitude of thought a negligible matter. But definition, taken verbally, is not a formula, a period or part of a book or discourse; it is the whole book or the whole discourse, from the first word to the last, including all that in it may seem accidental or superficial, including even the accent, the warmth, the emphasis, and the gestureof the living word, the notes, the parentheses, the full stops, and commas of the writing. Nor can we indicate a special literary form of definition, such asthe treatise or system or manual,because the definition or concept is given alike in opuscules and in dialogues, in prose and in verse, in satire and in lyric, in comedy and in tragedy. To define, from the verbal point of view, means to express the concept; and all the expressions of the concept are definitions. This might trouble rhetoricians desirous of devoting a special chapter to the form of scientific treatment; but it does not trouble good sense, which quickly recognizes that the thing is just so, and that an epigram may give that precise and efficacious definition in which the ample scholastic volume of a professor sometimes fails, although full of pretence in this respect.
[1]SeeÆsthetic,part i. chap. iii.
[1]SeeÆsthetic,part i. chap. iii.
[2]See Sect. I. Chap. III.
[2]See Sect. I. Chap. III.
Identity of definition and syllogism.
The definition not only is not a formula separable or distinguishable from the thread of the discourse, but it cannot even be separated or distinguished from the ratiocinative forms or forms of demonstration, as is implied in the custom of logicians, who make the doctrine of the definition or of thesystematicforms, as they usually call them, follow that of the forms of demonstration. They ingenuously imagine that thought, after having had a rough-and-tumble with its adversaries, and after having proclaimed, shouted, and finally vindicated its own right, mounts the rostrum and henceforth calm and sure of itself begins to define. But, in reality, to think is to combat continuously without any repose; and at every moment of that battle there is always peace and security; and definition is indistinguishable from demonstration, because it is found atevery instant of the demonstration and coincides with it.Definition and Syllogismare the same thing.
Connection of concepts and thought of the concept.
The syllogism, indeed, is nothing but a connection of concepts; and although it has been disputed as to whether it must be considered so, or rather as a connection of logical propositions or judgments, the dispute is at once solved, so far as we are concerned, by observing :hat precisely because the syllogism is a connection of concepts, and concepts only exist in verbal forms, that is to say, in propositions or judgments, the syllogism is also a connection of judgments. This serves to reinforce the truth that if the effective presence of the verbal form must always be recognized in the logical fact, it must, on the other hand, be forgotten when Logic is being constructed and the nature of Logic and of the concept is being sought. Now, the connection of the concepts represents nothing new in relation to the thinking of the concept. As has already been seen, to think the concept signifies to think it in its distinctions, to place it in relation with the other concepts and to unify it with them in the unique concept. A concept thought outside its relations is indistinct, that is to say, not thought at all.
Therefore, the connection of the concepts, or syllogizing, cannot be conceived as a new and more complex logical act. To syllogize and to think are synonymous; although, in the ordinary use of language, the term "to syllogize" throws into special relief the verbal aspect of thinking, and, more exactly, thedynamiccharacter of verbal exposition, which is indeed the very character of this exposition, for it is with difficulty, or only empirically, that it can be distinguished into static and dynamic, definition and demonstration.
Identity of judgment and of syllogism.
But if the syllogism be thus identified with the concept itself, it may nevertheless seem that it must be distinguished from the judgment of definition seeing that the syllogism is a form of logical thought, and consequently of verbal expression, quite distinct from and incapable of being confounded with any other: a connection ofthreejudgments, two of which are calledpremissesand the thirdconclusion,closely cemented by the syllogistic force, which is placed in themiddleterm. This character of triplicity seems ineradicable and peculiar to the syllogism in contrast with the judgment.
Some question, however, must be raised concerning this characteristic because of anothercharacteristic universally recognized in the syllogism; namely, that the premisses are conclusions of other syllogisms, just as the conclusion becomes, in its turn, a premiss. This being so, it might be said with greater truth that the syllogism is to syllogize or to think; and since this is infinite, so the propositions of which it consists are also infinite. On the other hand, there is no judgment which is not a syllogism, since it is clear that he who affirms a judgment affirms it by some reasoning or syllogism, present and active in his spirit, though more or less understood in the words. And are not other propositions understood in the syllogisms which are properly so-called, not only in the forms, which are called abbreviated (immediate inferences, enthymemes, etc.), but also in all the other forms; since it is admitted that every syllogism, as has just been observed, presupposes other preceding syllogisms, indeed an infinity of others? It will be replied that at the end of the chain there must yet be found the difference between judgment and syllogism, or two first judgments, which are not produced by syllogism, and form the columns, upon which the structure of the first conclusion rests. But such an answer (if it do not imply simply the strange fancythat thought has a beginning and therefore also an end in time) will mean that judgment and syllogism are distinct in intrinsic character, which makes the one the necessary condition of the other. Now, this intrinsic distinctive character is precisely what cannot be found, because it does not exist; and if it be not in every link, it is vain to seek it at the beginning of the chain.
The middle term and the nature of the concept.
Certainly, thatvenatio medii,thatergo,that unification of triplicity, are things of much importance. But whence comes their importance if not from being the expression of the synthetic force of thought, of thought which unifies and distinguishes, and distinguishes because it unifies and unifies because it distinguishes? And is triplicity truly triplicity, one, two, three, arithmetically enumerable? But if this be so, how is it that we never succeed in counting those three, resolving each one of them into a series of similar terms, or of other propositions and concepts? Upon attentive consideration we perceive that here, too, the number three is symbolical, and that it does no more than designate the distinction, which unifies or thinks thesingularconcept in theuniversalthrough theparticular,or determines theuniversalthrough theparticular,by making it asingularconcept, whence it remains perfectly certain that the relation of these three determinations is not numerical. Such a logical operation, not being anything special, but simply logical reasoning itself, is of necessity found also in the judgment.
Pretended non-definitive logical judgments.
A possible objection at this point is that even if the unity of judgment and syllogism can be held to be demonstrated as regards definitions and syllogisms which are the basis of definitions, yet it has not been demonstrated for the other forms of syllogisms and logical judgments, which are not definitive. But if these judgments and syllogisms be logical, they cannot fail to be definitive, or to have for their content affirmations of concepts. "All men are mortal" is a definition of the concept of man, whose mortality is verbally emphasized or his immortality denied. It is without doubt an incomplete definition, because it is torn from the web of thoughts and of speech of which it formed part; and this web will also always be incomplete or capable of infinite completion by means of new affirmations and new negations. But in its incompleteness it is at the same time also complete, because it affirms a concept of reality, of life and death,of finite and infinite, of spirituality and of its forms, and so on; these are all presupposed determinations, and therefore existing and operating in the concepts ofmanandmortality."Caius is a man" (which is the second premiss of the syllogism traditionally adduced as an example) is certainly not a definition (though it presupposes and contains many definitions) precisely for the reason that it is not a pure logical judgment. Hence it happens that the conclusion itself: "therefore Caius is mortal," is more than a pure logical conclusion, since it also contains a historical element, the person of Caius. But we shall speak further on of these individual or historical judgments; and then we shall also see in what relation they stand to the universal or pure logical judgments, and if it be truly possible to distinguish between them, otherwise than for the sake of convenience. The distinction is in any case convenient and does no harm at this point; and therefore for didactic reasons we allow it to stand; indeed we make use of it.
The syllogism as fixed verbal form. Its use and abuse.
Just as in the case of definitions, so also in the case of the syllogism, it is to be noted that the verbal expression does not consist of an obligatory formula, but assumes the most varied forms,apparently very remote from syllogizing as commonly understood. The abuse of the syllogism as a formula continued for centuries, notably in mediæval Scholasticism, and notwithstanding the rebellion of the Renaissance, it has persisted among many philosophical schools, its last conspicuous manifestation being the didactic elaboration of the Leibnitzian philosophy, or Wolffianism. Certain of Wolff's demonstrations have remained famous, such as that concerning the construction of windows, contained in hisManual of Architecture."A window must be large enough for two persons to lean against it, side by side," he developed it in this way: "Demonstration.It is customary to lean against a window with another person in order to look out. But the architect must serve the interests of his employer in everything. Therefore he must make the window large enough for two persons to be able to be there side by side.[1]Q.E.D."
No more such syllogistic pedantries have been seen in our times, but (as has been already remarked in reference to pedantry of definition) contempt for the formula has too often resulted in contempt even for the correctness of the reasoning. Sothat it has sometimes been necessary to advise a bracing bath of scholasticism, and it has been observed and lamented of certain new civilizations (for example, of Russian culture, or of the Japanese people, who are so little addicted to mathematics), that they have not had a scholastic period, like that of the West, so general with them is the habit of incorrect, loose, and passionately impulsive and fantastic reasoning. Certainly the formula, the exercise of disputation informa,thelogica scholastica utenshas its merits; and we must know how to have recourse to it when it is advantageous to do so, and to express thought in the brief and perspicuous formulæ of the syllogism, of the sorites, or of the dilemma. From this point of view the new methods of mathematical Logic or Logistic, upon which some are now working, and even the logical machines which have been constructed, would help; they would help—if they helped. For the point is just this: when formulæ, methods of demonstration, machines and the like, are recommended, expedients and instruments of practical or economic use are thereby proposed; and these cannot make good their existence otherwise than by getting themselves accepted for the utility—the saving of time and space, and so of fatigue, which theyeffect. Like all technical inventions, those products must be brought to the market; and the market alone decides upon their value and assigns to them their price. At the present time, it seems that logistic methods have no value and price, save for certain narrow circles of people, who amuse themselves with them in their own way and so pass the time.
Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in the pure concepts.
Certain erroneous doctrines take their origin from the undue separation of demonstration and definition, conspicuously that particular error which places a difference of degree betweentruthandreasonof truth, and consequently admits that a truth can be known without its reason being known. But a truth, of which the reason is not known, is not even truth; or it is truth only in preparation and in hypothesis. We hear much about theintuitionwith which men of genius are equipped, and which enables them to go straight to the truth, even when they are not capable of demonstrating it. But this intuition, when it is not that truth in preparation, or that orientation towards a truth still quite hypothetical, must of necessity be thought and thus also be demonstration of truth; it must be truth and also reason of truth; thought and reasoning performed no doubt with lightning rapidity, which is expressed in brief propositionsand needs going over again and rethinking, in order that it may afford a more ample and, from the didactic point of view, a more persuasive, exposition; but it is always thought and reasoning.
Things are still worse, when not only is a diversity of degree admitted, but the completeindifferenceof demonstration to truth is proclaimed, so that many or infinite possible demonstrations of one identical truth would be possible. If by this it were meant merely that one identical truth, or one identical concept, can assume infinite verbal or expressive forms, and if demonstration were understood as "exposition" or "expression," there would be nothing to object. But if by demonstration be meant something truly logical, that which is properly called by that name in Logic, this thesis leads directly to the negation of truth, making the demonstration of truth, or truth itself, an illusion, a sophistical appearance created simply to persuade. Those acquainted with courts of law know that very often when a magistrate has made his decision and pronounced sentence he deputes to a younger colleague the task of "reasoning" it, or of providing an appearance of reasoning to what is indeed not a logical product, but simply thevoluntasof a certain provision. But though this procedure be intelligibleand useful when it occurs in the field of practice and of law, it cannot be admitted in the theoretical field, where it would be the ruin of thought and indirectly of the will itself.
Difference between truth and reason of truth in the pseudoconcepts.
Naturally, all that has been said as to the definition and the syllogism has reference to the true and proper concept, or the pure concept. In the case of pseudoconcepts, where practical motives enter, definition is a simplecommand(a nominalist definition), and demonstration has no place, save for those of its elements that are derived from the pure concept:giventhe definitions, the reasoning must logically proceed in a determinate manner. In pseudoconcepts, then, definitions are separate from demonstrations: the first do not spring from the second and are not all one with them; the second presuppose the first and do not produce them. Of these definitions infinite demonstrations are possible, precisely because in reality none is possible, for the definitions themselves are infinite; and when a demonstration is given, this is done onlypro forma; it is a deception, to conceal a practical convenience, or rather a logical reasoning employed to make it clear. It is for this reason also that the definitions employed in those demonstrationsseem to be obtained by means of an act offaithin the irrational; and here faith signifies, not the confidence of thought in itself, but the making a virtue of necessity, accepting as true what is not known as such.—For the rest, pseudoconcepts and concepts have the same relation with the verbal form; that is to say, all are expressed in the most various ways, and there is no obligatory form of language, which can be called the literary form of logical character. The style of theCivil Code,which aroused the admiration of Stendhal, is not the eternal style of laws, for laws were once even put into verse; as in like barbaric times the sciences used to be put into verse. In the life of the word, concepts and pseudoconcepts rush forward in such a way that it is vain to seek there for distinction among them.
[1]Mentioned in Hegel,Wiss. d. Logik 2,iii. 370n.
[1]Mentioned in Hegel,Wiss. d. Logik 2,iii. 370n.
Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic.
From the fact that in the verbal form all distinctions (pure concepts, and empirical and abstract concepts, distinct concepts and opposite concepts) are indistinguishable, and on the other hand all identities, such as that of concept, definition and demonstration, appear differentiated or capable of differentiation, we can deduce the impossibility of constructing logical Science by means of an analysis of the verbal form. The condemnation of allformalLogic is thus pronounced.
Its nature.
This Logic has been variously calledAristotelian, peripatetic, scholastic,after its authors and historical representatives;syllogistic,from the doctrine that forms its principal content;formal,from its pretensions to philosophic purity;empirical,by those who tried to drive it back to its place; and although this last name is correct, it would be better to call itformal,and still better,verbal,to indicate of what the empiricism to which it is desired to allude, chiefly consists. Indeed, if empiricism be marked by its limiting itself to single representations, regrouping them in types and arranging them in classes, there is no doubt that that method of treatment is empirical, which takes the logical function, not in the eternal peculiarity of its character as thought of the universal, but only in its various particular translations or manifestations, in which it acquires contingent characteristics. Since these contingent characteristics come to it, in the first place, from the verbal form, it can well be called verbalism. Owing to its verbalism, too, it has happened, that over and above the grammars of individual languages, there has been conceived as existing ageneral, rationalandlogicalGrammar; and this hybrid science, which is no longer grammar and arose from logical assumptions, has developed in such a way as to be indistinguishable from empirical or verbal Logic.
Its partial justification.
Certainly, as mere empiricism, this so-called Logic could not be condemned. And Hegel was not wrong in remarking that if people are interested in establishing that there are sixty species of parrots and one hundred and thirty-sevenof veronica, it is not clear why it should be of less interest to establish the various forms of the judgment and of the syllogism. That discipline has its utility as mere empiricism, and it may be useful to any one to employ in certain cases the terminology in which an affirmation is characterized as positive or as merely negative, as particular or as universal, as a judgment that awaits reasoning and demonstration, as an immediate inference, enthymeme or sorites, as a conclusive or an inconclusive, or as a correct or an incorrect syllogism, and so on. It is also comprehensible how, as mere empiricism, it assumed anormativecharacter, and was translated intorules; rules, which are valid within their own sphere, neither more nor less than are all empirical rules.
Its error.
But it does not limit itself to acting simply as an empirical description, nor even as a simple technique; it usurps a much more lofty office. Just as Rhetoric and Grammar, innocent and useful so long as they limit themselves to the functions of convenient grouping and convenient terminology, become false and harmful when they assume the attitude of sciences of absolute values, and must then be resolved into, and replaced by Æsthetic; so empirical or verbalLogic becomes transformed into error when it claims to give the laws of thought, or the thought of thought, which cannot be other than the concept of the concept. It is not, then,formal,as it boasts itself to be, because the only logical form is the universal, and this alone is the object of logical investigation; but it is falsely formal, since it relies upon contingencies, and must, therefore, be calledformalist.We reject it here exclusively in its formalist aspect; that is to say, in so far as it is a complex of empirical distinctions that wish to pass as rational and usurp the place of true rationality.
Its traditional constitution.
Several of such empirical distinctions, such as the distinction between thought and principle of thought, truth and reason of truth, judgments and syllogisms, and such-like, have been recorded and criticized; we shall proceed to mention others, when suitable opportunities occur. Here it will be well to refer to the general physiognomy and structure of that Logic, as it was embodied for centuries in the schools and still persists in treatises.
The three logical forms.
Its point of departure is the external distinction between words and connections of words, which belongs properly to Grammar. But words are then treated by it as concepts, and connectionsof words, as judgments. Thus it obtains the identification of the concept with the abstract and mutilated grammatical word and arrives at the monstrous determination of the concepts as things which are not in themselves either true or false. Thus, again, by constantly calling upon the connections of the concepts for succour, it succeeds in distinguishing the judgment from the mere proposition. A double criterion is constantly adopted in establishing these and other fundamental forms: the verbal and the logical; and formalist Logic oscillates equivocally between the two different determinations; whence the alternating appearance of truth and of falsehood, with which its distinctions present themselves. The syllogism, which should be the third fundamental form, is conceived as the connection of three distinct judgments; but if it yet retains its importance and preponderance over two-membered forms or over serial forms of more than three propositions and judgments, this is really because to the distinction and enumeration of the three propositions there is added the criterion of the concept as a nexus, or as a triunity of universal, particular and singular.
The theories of the concept and of the judgment.
The three fundamental forms have been reduced by some logicians to two, by others;amplified to four or to five, by adding to them the perceptive form or the definitive and systematic form. These restrictions and amplifications have always encountered resistance, because it was justly felt that in this way one form of empiricism was being mingled with another: the verbal form with empirical distinctions drawn from other presuppositions. But in determining in particular the three fundamental forms, formalist Logic has not been able to restrict itself to the mere distinction of words and propositions, artificially placed in relation with the pure concept; but has been obliged to draw from other sources. The concepts are variously classified, sometimes from the verbal point of view, asidentical, equivalent, equivocal, anonymousandsynonymous; sometimes from the logical point of view, asdistinct, disparate, contraryorcontradictory; sometimes from the psychological point of view, asincompleteandcomplete, obscureandclear,the concepts further always being understood as names, so that, for example, distinct concepts are indifferently philosophically distinct concepts, and empirically distinct concepts; and the contraries are both the philosophical contraries and those empirically so-called. The same has occurred in the classification of judgments wheresometimes the determinations of the concept are taken as foundation and the judgments distinguished asuniversal particularandindividual;sometimes the intrinsic dialectic nature of the concept, and they are distinguished asaffirmative, negativeandindeterminateorinfinite; sometimes the stages passed through in the search for truth, and they are distinguished intocategorical, hypotheticalanddisjunctive,orapodeictic, assertoryandproblematic.And these forms have further always been understood verbally. "Universality" is the "totality" empirically designated by the word, and not true universality; and "individuality," on the contrary, is not only the individuality of the representation, but also the single particularity of the distinct concept; "affirmative" is differentiated from "negative" by accidental grammatical form, and not because that unique act which is thought, at once affirmation and negation (as the will is both love and hatred) can be truly divided.
The theory of the syllogism.
The classification of syllogisms, founded exactly upon the empirical conception of the judgment as the copulation of asubjectand apredicateaffords a suitable parallel to this method of treatment of the judgment; subject and predicate being understood in an empirical andgrammatical manner, whence they are also discovered in those verbal affirmations, in which they are not distinct, because they are identical, as in the case of the judgment of definition. For empirical Logic, in the judgment: "The will is the practical form of the spirit," "will" is subject and "practical form" predicate in the same way as in "Peter is a man," "Peter" is subject, and "man" predicate. From the distinction between subject and predicate, arise the fourfiguresof the syllogism; the criterion being the position of the middle term in the two premisses of the three propositions of which the syllogism is formed. If the middle term be subject in the first premiss and predicate in the second, we have the first figure; if it be predicate in both, the second; if it be subject in both, the third; if it be predicate in the first and subject in the second, the fourth figure ("sub-prae,turnprae-prae,turnsub-sub,turnprae-sub").But in order to deduce the moods of each figure recourse is then had to another criterion, indeed to two other criteria; that is, to the empirical distinctions of judgments into universal and particular, and into affirmative and negative, with the four consequent determinations into universal-affirmative judgments (A), universal-negative (E), particular-affirmative (I),and particular-negative (O). Thus, in the first figure, two universal affirmative premisses constitute the first mood, and the conclusion is universal affirmative(Barbara); two premisses, both universal, but one affirmative and the other negative, constitute the second, and the conclusion is universal negative(celarent); two premisses, one universal affirmative and the other particular affirmative, constitute the third mood, and the conclusion is particular affirmative(darii);two premisses, one universal negative and one particular affirmative, constitute the fourth mood, and the conclusion is particular negative(ferio).And so on.
Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal Logic.
This is not the occasion to go on expounding in its other particulars this construction, of which we have given an example, for it is very well known: nor to attach importance to criticizing it, since' its foundations themselves have already been shown to be false and its hybrid genesis explained. Verbal Logic, which vaunts itself as rational, carries its own caricature in itself, namely the creation ofSophisms; because, since it seeks the force of thought in words, it cannot prevent sophistical ability from making use, in its turn, of words, in order capriciously to create thoughts and forms of thought. Thus verbalLogic, in order to combat sophisms, is constrained hastily and eagerly to abandon simple verbal connections, and to take refuge in concepts and connections of concepts thought in words; that is to say, neither more nor less than to negate the formalist point of view. And with analogous self-irony it renounces that point of view and dissolves itself, when it tries to refute the fourth figure of the syllogism, or to reduce the second, third and fourth to the first, as the only real figure, and then the first to a connection of three concepts; not to mention the permanent self-irony and patent demonstration of falsity involved in the logical deduction of the figures of the syllogism which it makes from a series of moods, recognized asnot conclusive.