NOTEThere are in all now twelve dogs known to communicate by means of "raps." The experiences I have had with my own dog have been reported by me in the article entitled "Respecting a Dog's Memory," and appeared in the "Zoologischen Anzeiger," 1919, No. 11-13. The name of my dog "Awa" is quite intentionally put together, as Lola has herself "invented" all the names given to her progeny.
NOTE
There are in all now twelve dogs known to communicate by means of "raps." The experiences I have had with my own dog have been reported by me in the article entitled "Respecting a Dog's Memory," and appeared in the "Zoologischen Anzeiger," 1919, No. 11-13. The name of my dog "Awa" is quite intentionally put together, as Lola has herself "invented" all the names given to her progeny.
A Critical Discussion of Developments from 1914 to 1919
BY
DR. WILLIAM MACKENZIE
OF GENOA
[Translated from the Italian with the omission of
III. THE HYPOTHESIS OF INTELLIGENCE IN ANIMALS
Assuming, as I have done, and as I think I must do, that we have not here to do with a trick or fraud, we seem to be dreaming, or to be reading the account of a dream. Those poor horses of Elberfeld, so greatly extolled and so much discussed in their day, are not in the same field with Lola. And yet I am convinced that it is not a dream. It is another kind of psychological reality, but it is a reality probably too complex to be reduced to a single formula. Let us then try to face the facts.
As to the "intelligent" character of the manifestations, there is no possible doubt, even though we put on one side for the present the arithmetical phenomena, which perhaps must be treated from a particular standpoint, as I shall explain. The question before us is therefore a dilemma. Is there intelligence in the dog, or is the intelligence in others?
If, by intelligence in this case we mean the possibility of the animal under observation giving replies to questions with, in the human sense, actual understanding of the import of such replies, as well as the possibility of the animal, a dog two years old, being able after a maximum of fifteen hours' lessons to read, write and count,and know what it is learning; if that is what is meant by intelligence in this case, I must say that I do not believe in it, and that I feel compelled for scientific reasons to examine every other hypothesis before having recourse to this one.
And again, "Intelligence in others"? This may be so, but it is not necessary to suppose that the intelligence is in others alone. I mean that a few of the manifestations may within narrow limits probably be rightly attributed to the intelligence of the animal, (but, I repeat, the arithmetical facts must be considered by themselves).
If all the manifestations were to be attributed to the intelligence of others and none to the animal, we should have to accept the supposition of an absolutelymechanicalautomatism in the animal itself of the type suggested by Neumann (8)29as the result of his experiments with Rolf, when, for instance, the dog mechanically kept on tapping an unlimited number of times on the cardboard, which Neumann held out to it without, as far as possible, moving it.
This negative result of Neumann's is capable of various possible explanations, and in no way gives any clear indication (just because it is negative) as to how a positive result is at all possible; that is, we cannot conclude from it any better than before, whether the apparently "mechanical" behaviour of the animal was intentional, and therefore whether the animal itself could or could not have behaved otherwise; whether, given the impossibility of the animal behaving differently, we should say that this impossibility was absolute or only happened to occur on this occasion; whether perchance the action of some psychical factor unknown to Neumann between the animal and himself may not have been omitted; and whether such factor was not in operation when the animal was working with its late mistress, etc., etc. In this connexion I feel it incumbent upon me to recall that I myself saw Rolf on two or three occasions behave in this same apparently mechanical way with his mistress (Mrs. Moekel) (II), whose annoyance thereat seemed so real that I felt certain that it was not feigned. From Neumann's point of view this would be incomprehensible—since he makes use of the argument from the supposed absolute automatism under the impression that it had taken place in Rolf withhim, Neumann, alone,but notwith the Moekels. Here, then, it is clear that the intelligence is, or at least that it is also, "in others."
This negative result of Neumann's is capable of various possible explanations, and in no way gives any clear indication (just because it is negative) as to how a positive result is at all possible; that is, we cannot conclude from it any better than before, whether the apparently "mechanical" behaviour of the animal was intentional, and therefore whether the animal itself could or could not have behaved otherwise; whether, given the impossibility of the animal behaving differently, we should say that this impossibility was absolute or only happened to occur on this occasion; whether perchance the action of some psychical factor unknown to Neumann between the animal and himself may not have been omitted; and whether such factor was not in operation when the animal was working with its late mistress, etc., etc. In this connexion I feel it incumbent upon me to recall that I myself saw Rolf on two or three occasions behave in this same apparently mechanical way with his mistress (Mrs. Moekel) (II), whose annoyance thereat seemed so real that I felt certain that it was not feigned. From Neumann's point of view this would be incomprehensible—since he makes use of the argument from the supposed absolute automatism under the impression that it had taken place in Rolf withhim, Neumann, alone,but notwith the Moekels. Here, then, it is clear that the intelligence is, or at least that it is also, "in others."
But whatever value we may attach to Neumann's experiment, it appears to me sufficiently clear that the supposition of an absolutely mechanically passive process in the animal will not hold as a sufficient explanation of thewholeof the facts related by Miss Kindermann, nor will it hold with regard to what science certainly seems to me to be compelled to admit in the case of the Elberfeld horses, which (as is known) "worked" magnificently without contact with anyone, tapping their replies on a board, completely isolated on the ground, and even when all alone in their stable with the one door tightly closed and all the spectators outside. The spectators heard and observed the rapped answers of the horses (for example, to written questions) through a little glass window. Neither will it hold with regard to the many experiments made, some also by myself, by means of requests, pictures, questions, presented to the horses in such a way as to be unknown toeveryone, including the experimenter. Besides, the animals at times gave spontaneous communications. This Assagioli and I, and many others, have observed even without the presence of Krall and of members of the Moekel family. Miss Kindermann also gives some of Lola's replies tapped on the arm of a friend of the authoress, although the latter held out as usual her own hand to the dog.
Therefore, there must be some "intelligence" in the animal, as everything cannot come from outside it in these experiments. Probably this intelligence is not human in quality, but nevertheless not quite rudimentary, and is such as we may imagine without too much effort to exist in domestic animals which by many signs often give us proof that they understand at least in part what is taking place around and within us. That such an intelligence could very probably be educated, always within prehuman limits or in a lesser degree than in human infancy, does not on the whole seem to me so contradictory to our actual psychological knowledge: since we may very well suppose that the animal under examination may make use of its proper faculties, as far as lies in its power, to profit by the situation for the purpose of accomplishing that which is required of it, under the stimulus of allurements or threats. (It may even be rather assumed that the exercise of its proper faculties, which I regard as "intelligent," may procure for the animal a certain degree of pleasure.) All this is apart from the question of the arithmetical phenomena which, as I have already said, deserve separate consideration.
Upon the facts as now established the knowledge of numbers seems to be the basis of any educability in animals. And this is perhaps the first and most important discovery in the "new zoopsychology."
In their search for others things, Von Osten, Krall, and the Moekels have brought out clearly among various other facts, without exactly accounting for it, the fundamental fact of the existence in the animal of a psychic substratum predisposed in some manner to arithmetic. I say "in some manner," and by that I do not wish to prejudge any particular view of the argument; and above all I do not make of this predisposition or mathematical permeability, a criterion of intelligence. I do not forget either the mentally deficient or the prodigies among child calculators, etc. But likewise I cannot forget another thing: that all organisms are already throughout permeated with mathematics, and that the more we descend the scale, from man down to the most "simple" biological fact, the more nearly we approach to physics, which is nothing but mathematics.I have not the space here to digress on the intermediate gradations. Besides, I have already done so, in part at least, elsewhere. But I wish to recall the curious coincidence that the mathematical achievements of the Elberfeld horses were much more brilliant and much more prodigious than those of the dogs which have up to now been experimented on. And horses in the phylo-genetic line are more ancient than dogs: they are lower in the zoologic scale. Much lower still, i.e. among the Arthropoda, occur many other mathematical wonders. I only mention in a cursory way the logarithmic spiral of the spider's web, the precise curves realized without instruments of any kind by the Coleoptera and Hymenoptera in cutting leaves, the stereometry of the aphides. Then, as it were, at the bottom of the scale (if one may still speak of a descent and a bottom) the marvellous plancton filters of the Appendiculata; the geometrical spots of the Amœbae; the cases of perfect forms of so many other Protozoa; and, finally, think of the constructive technic of the static organs, or of those of movement either in man or animals or plants; think of the complex mathematics of the mitosi, or of any cell proceeding to its own indirect division.It seems to me clear that the mathematical faculty—assuming always, let it be understood, that it may give rise to more or less conscious phenomena in the biological subject—may be amongst the most natural of imaginable causes, and that even the smallest amount of consciousness may help this existing capacity in the animal to express itself. That we are concerned with an expression by raps or not, does not seem to me as important as a proper estimation of the importance of the central fact constituted by this mathematical capacity.
In their search for others things, Von Osten, Krall, and the Moekels have brought out clearly among various other facts, without exactly accounting for it, the fundamental fact of the existence in the animal of a psychic substratum predisposed in some manner to arithmetic. I say "in some manner," and by that I do not wish to prejudge any particular view of the argument; and above all I do not make of this predisposition or mathematical permeability, a criterion of intelligence. I do not forget either the mentally deficient or the prodigies among child calculators, etc. But likewise I cannot forget another thing: that all organisms are already throughout permeated with mathematics, and that the more we descend the scale, from man down to the most "simple" biological fact, the more nearly we approach to physics, which is nothing but mathematics.
I have not the space here to digress on the intermediate gradations. Besides, I have already done so, in part at least, elsewhere. But I wish to recall the curious coincidence that the mathematical achievements of the Elberfeld horses were much more brilliant and much more prodigious than those of the dogs which have up to now been experimented on. And horses in the phylo-genetic line are more ancient than dogs: they are lower in the zoologic scale. Much lower still, i.e. among the Arthropoda, occur many other mathematical wonders. I only mention in a cursory way the logarithmic spiral of the spider's web, the precise curves realized without instruments of any kind by the Coleoptera and Hymenoptera in cutting leaves, the stereometry of the aphides. Then, as it were, at the bottom of the scale (if one may still speak of a descent and a bottom) the marvellous plancton filters of the Appendiculata; the geometrical spots of the Amœbae; the cases of perfect forms of so many other Protozoa; and, finally, think of the constructive technic of the static organs, or of those of movement either in man or animals or plants; think of the complex mathematics of the mitosi, or of any cell proceeding to its own indirect division.
It seems to me clear that the mathematical faculty—assuming always, let it be understood, that it may give rise to more or less conscious phenomena in the biological subject—may be amongst the most natural of imaginable causes, and that even the smallest amount of consciousness may help this existing capacity in the animal to express itself. That we are concerned with an expression by raps or not, does not seem to me as important as a proper estimation of the importance of the central fact constituted by this mathematical capacity.
From this central fact, proved over and over again without any possible doubt to be true of the "thinking" animals, there have been developed two distinct groups of consequences: (1) the prodigious mathematical performances occurring as by magic among the Elberfeld horses at a certain point of their "education": (2) the apparent manifestations of thought through the typtology or rapping out of words, culminating in the "philosophic" achievements of Rolf and Lola.
For the reasons just mentioned the first group of consequences seems to me to admit largely of biological (i.e. biopsychical) explanation; however, anything which eventually does not fit into the biological explanation may be made to enter without any effort into the second method of explanation which, in view of the facts, it seems to me that we must adopt for the second of the two groups of consequences above referred to.
That mathematics can be "lived" rather than "known"—or, if any one prefers the term, "realized"—by an organism which is without any psychical accompaniment whatever of the human type, is a fact which I find credible. But when Rolf speaks to me of the origin of the soul, or makes up poetry; when Lola complains to me of honour lost, etc., the thing is not credible to me in any way except by paying attention to nothing except the feeling, which is so difficult to avoid, that what is here speaking to me, versifying and complaining, is a psychical "quid," absolutely human and only human; a "quid" which therefore is (after all) not the animal's, although manifested in some way through it. The difficulty naturally consists in deciding precisely how this happens. But it does not seem to me altogether impossible to arrive at a proper hypothesis.
I have already said that we must discard, because of its inability to explain a great part of the facts, the most easy and simple hypothesis—that of some mechanical signal (e.g. by means of a supposed pressure of the hand under the cardboard, or by the hand itself which is held out to the animal, in the case of the dogs which have so far been experimented with). Here we also have to remember the proposition laid down by Miss Kindermann herself that "She did not wish to let herself be carried away by sentiment," and that she would seek all possible proofs which were good logically. Having excluded the hypothesis of deceit, it is a further proof of the sheer impotency of the theory of signals, when regard is had to the available amount of the material observed and recorded in the authoress, if we ask how is it possible to imagine that she (knowing very well, as she says, the suspicion resting on the method) in a year or more of work with Lola should not herself have perceived that she herself had been producing by mechanical means the rapped answers of her pupil?
In my opinion the answer is that the authoress was not only not aware of, butcould notin the least have been aware of, the action that may have passed from herself to the dog so as to bring about the rapping of the answers; and that on the other hand it is not a question at all of thinking of a simple mechanical operation of the kind mentioned above, because in the presumed action of the authoress on the dog there is no need to have recourse to such a crude hypothesis (as surely there was no similar action of Krall's on his horses, especially when they were separated from him). I maintain, in fact, that in principle, even without any contact by hand, we may still presume that all the "wonders" obtained by Miss Kindermann are obtainable, taking, of course, into account the peculiar endowments of the animal we are dealing with. For if there be any automatism (and there is surely a good dose of it), it is certainly not a question of a mechanical automatism (of the type of Neumann's), but quite certainly of a true and properpsychic automatism; a very different thing, and without doubt much more complex.
In all probability the first condition for the occurrence of genuine phenomena similar to those attributed to "thinking" animals must be a very particular psychic relationship between the animal and his master. And such a relation, although with reluctance, I am compelled to call of the mediumistic type.
My reluctance is due in part to the very unhappy etymology of the term, derived from the famous word "medium," so unscientific both in its origin and in the meaning which some even now wish to associate with it. But even after having freed it from any "spiritistic" meaning, the term still leaves me reluctant; for I cannot hide from myself the weakness of a hypothesis which, in order to explain (only in part) one enigmatical fact (in this case, that of "thinking animals"), must have recourse to another unsolved enigma (in this case that of the "mediumistic phenomena").
However, it will already be something if the two problems are eventually merged together and so become a single problem; but it is not my object to explain any psychical facts themselves, whatever they may be, under which the phenomena of Lola and others of a similar nature may be eventually classified. It will be sufficient for me at present to group the performances of the animals, if possible, with something better known. And "mediumistic" facts, extrinsically at least, are certainly better known. I refer therefore to them as I find them described in the psychology called supernormal; because, from force of circumstances I am compelled to recognize that it is within this psychology that I must now continue the discussion.
IV. MEDIUMISTIC "RAPPORT" AND TELEPATHY
The hypothesis of a psychic automatism of a mediumistic type, as a concomitant phenomenon, at least, in experiments of the "new zoopsychology," offers us a point of support for a possible interpretation of the strange uncertainty and irregularity of the successes and failures of different observers and different animals.
With Krall two of his horses gave magnificent results; two others negative results. In the same way, with the same dogs some experimenters obtain wonders, others obtain nothing.... We may therefore assume that in order to obtain favourable results there must be a proper accord or reciprocal psychic concordance between the animal and the person making the experiment, precisely as happens with mediumistic phenomena.Moreover, this hypothesis in the same way helps us to an interpretation of the fact that the same animal, with the same investigator, gives good results in some matters, poor or no result in others. Taking, however, due account of the central mathematical phenomena, on which, as it seems to me, the whole edifice is superposed, there remains a great variety of marked psychical idiosyncrasies in the various cases. One of the animals is decidedly a calculator; another likes to read or to explain figures; another detests reading but willingly taps out "spontaneous communications."Without possessing much intrinsic probative value of its own, it is certain that all this fits in very badly with the supposition of a purely mechanical automatism operated by the person making the experiments. And on the other hand it bears a close analogy to the mediumistic "specialities"; that is, to the well-known fact that one "medium," for instance, is good for "physical effects" (i.e. gives rise around it to dynamic phenomena), but is not good for "psychography"; or produces "incarnations" but not "apports," etc. In the same way, typtology or rapping, more or less systematic, seems a fundamental gift, common to all the various kinds of "mediums." And the fact is perhaps of a certain value that precisely the same thing is true of "thinking" animals; although we must always remember that an analogous relation may only be apparent or extrinsic. Besides, the tone also of the "communications" in the two fields seems to me very much akin. I allude to the curious, angular, enigmatic, spasmodic, often playful and bantering communications, with frequent "unexpected replies" and philosophic platitudes. I find all these in Lola, and I remember similar stories of Rolf and of the horses, giving me an impression very like that which I get from the accounts of mediumistic seances "with intellectual effects."
With Krall two of his horses gave magnificent results; two others negative results. In the same way, with the same dogs some experimenters obtain wonders, others obtain nothing.... We may therefore assume that in order to obtain favourable results there must be a proper accord or reciprocal psychic concordance between the animal and the person making the experiment, precisely as happens with mediumistic phenomena.
Moreover, this hypothesis in the same way helps us to an interpretation of the fact that the same animal, with the same investigator, gives good results in some matters, poor or no result in others. Taking, however, due account of the central mathematical phenomena, on which, as it seems to me, the whole edifice is superposed, there remains a great variety of marked psychical idiosyncrasies in the various cases. One of the animals is decidedly a calculator; another likes to read or to explain figures; another detests reading but willingly taps out "spontaneous communications."
Without possessing much intrinsic probative value of its own, it is certain that all this fits in very badly with the supposition of a purely mechanical automatism operated by the person making the experiments. And on the other hand it bears a close analogy to the mediumistic "specialities"; that is, to the well-known fact that one "medium," for instance, is good for "physical effects" (i.e. gives rise around it to dynamic phenomena), but is not good for "psychography"; or produces "incarnations" but not "apports," etc. In the same way, typtology or rapping, more or less systematic, seems a fundamental gift, common to all the various kinds of "mediums." And the fact is perhaps of a certain value that precisely the same thing is true of "thinking" animals; although we must always remember that an analogous relation may only be apparent or extrinsic. Besides, the tone also of the "communications" in the two fields seems to me very much akin. I allude to the curious, angular, enigmatic, spasmodic, often playful and bantering communications, with frequent "unexpected replies" and philosophic platitudes. I find all these in Lola, and I remember similar stories of Rolf and of the horses, giving me an impression very like that which I get from the accounts of mediumistic seances "with intellectual effects."
Premising all this, we may suppose that a peculiar psychic concordance, which failing a better term might be called mediumistic, exists between Lola and her mistress. The mistress then in some way will have "communicated" through the dog the substance of her psychic self (perhaps with eventual autonomous additions from the canine or other psychic entity); all this happening, we must suppose, in a subliminal way, with partial psychical disassociation on the part of the authoress, if not also probably on the part of Lola, about which I am quite certain (and in this I agree with Neumann) that it absolutely does not understand anything or know anything of almost all the manifestations of thought which it exhibits.
There remain the questions (if the possibility of such duplicate mediumistic phenomena is admitteda priorito be possible) as to the point at which the normal relationship between a human person and an animal passes over into this supernormal one; and, finally, as to what particular known facts in the case of Lola, besides the rather too general analogies already mentioned, speak in favour of this hypothesis.
Into the mediumistic endowment of the investigator it seems to me useless to inquire sincea priorimany persons, so it seems, are more or less strikingly endowed, and the conditions which determine results are not sufficiently known. At the most there exist some indications—e.g. in Morselli's masterly work (2)—of the existence of some concordances between the phenomenology of mediumism and hysterical, hysteroid, or at least "sensitive" temperaments. And I believe that—with the help of their own publications, properly analysed—it would not be too difficult to attribute one or the other of such physio-psychic varieties to those persons who have up to the present obtained the best results with "thinking animals."
More interesting appears to me the investigation of the question whether animals themselves have already given any clear proof of being able to be "sensitive" in the mediumistic sense. And I must say that such a proof seems to have almost been reached.
I may refer on this subject to the exhaustive monograph published in 1905 by Bozzano (1) and written with the special competency and clearness that distinguish the well-known Genoese psychist.Bozzano at that time was necessarily ignorant of the "thinking" animals, for it was only afterwards that they came to notice. But there were other authors who introduced the possibility (or the necessity) of a supernormal relationship in order to explain the Elberfeld facts, as soon as they were known. Perhaps the first in chronological order was De Vesme, who published in 1912 an interesting article in that sense (3), showing the many analogies between the phenomena of Elberfeld and mediumistic phenomena generally, e.g. the typtological particularities; the wrong orthography ("Firaz" tapped by the horse to express its own name "Zariff," "Dref" instead of "Ferd," etc.); solutions of difficult problems and invincible resistance to simple inquiries; immediate promptitude of correct replies to complicated mathematical problems, etc.A similar work was Maeterlinck's, written in 1909 for a German review, and then transformed into a long and interesting chapter of the well-known volume, "L'hote Inconnu" (10).Then in 1914 was published a book by E. G. Sanford (5) containing some useful comparisons between "thinking" animals and mediumistic psychology.In Italy there were indications in the same sense, in the work of Stefani (1913), Professor Siciliani (1914), and others. But the subject was but little followed up.
I may refer on this subject to the exhaustive monograph published in 1905 by Bozzano (1) and written with the special competency and clearness that distinguish the well-known Genoese psychist.
Bozzano at that time was necessarily ignorant of the "thinking" animals, for it was only afterwards that they came to notice. But there were other authors who introduced the possibility (or the necessity) of a supernormal relationship in order to explain the Elberfeld facts, as soon as they were known. Perhaps the first in chronological order was De Vesme, who published in 1912 an interesting article in that sense (3), showing the many analogies between the phenomena of Elberfeld and mediumistic phenomena generally, e.g. the typtological particularities; the wrong orthography ("Firaz" tapped by the horse to express its own name "Zariff," "Dref" instead of "Ferd," etc.); solutions of difficult problems and invincible resistance to simple inquiries; immediate promptitude of correct replies to complicated mathematical problems, etc.
A similar work was Maeterlinck's, written in 1909 for a German review, and then transformed into a long and interesting chapter of the well-known volume, "L'hote Inconnu" (10).
Then in 1914 was published a book by E. G. Sanford (5) containing some useful comparisons between "thinking" animals and mediumistic psychology.
In Italy there were indications in the same sense, in the work of Stefani (1913), Professor Siciliani (1914), and others. But the subject was but little followed up.
Even psychologists by profession seemed for a time to be willing to accept the hypothesis of some "telepathic" transmission of thought from the investigators to the Elberfeld horses.
Already Claparede (1912) had been forced to refer to this, although he refused, so to speak, to discuss the matter; then G. C. Ferrari, and F. Pulle, in an interesting account (4) relate how the horse taken by them for instruction sometimes guessed the numbers that they were proposing to them, and rapped out the answers before being asked to do so.
Already Claparede (1912) had been forced to refer to this, although he refused, so to speak, to discuss the matter; then G. C. Ferrari, and F. Pulle, in an interesting account (4) relate how the horse taken by them for instruction sometimes guessed the numbers that they were proposing to them, and rapped out the answers before being asked to do so.
Whatever may be the fate of the telepathic hypothesis, it may not be amiss to remind the reader that it undoubtedly is very closely connected with the mediumistic. The distinction between them is not always easy; besides, both may exist together side by side.
"Telepathy," so called, (a term not less unfortunate than that of "medium" and its derivatives), or, better, the transmission of thought, is (shortly put) the hypothesis that at a certain moment an agent transmits, and a receiver perceives, some definite mental image or state of mind. The transmission may be more or less willed (i.e. conscious) on the part of the agent; on the part of the receiver, however, the fact of the transmission always remains unconscious, but the psychical elements perceived bring about a reaction in consciousness and the receiver knows what he is doing, or at any rate may do so, at the moment of the occurrence. Shortly stated, it may be regarded as a kind of suggestion, "à distance," with sometimes immediate and sometimes delayed effect; a kind of posthypnotic performances of a suggestion without the intervention of hypnotism (or, perhaps, with a partial subhypnotic state?), the receiver of the suggestion not receiving it in the form of acoustic vibrations or in any way by means of one of the ordinary senses.
Mediumistic phenomena on the other hand require for their explanation the possibility of a much more direct, more profound and more immediate relationship between the several minds taking part in them. One of these minds—more or less disassociated—might become the instrument of another—even of several others—although still itself in a state of more or less complete disassociation, and always remaining altogether unconscious of its relationship to the other. One of the minds might therefore be an agent, another a recipient, or even several of them simultaneously might join together to produce the phenomena, the subliminal nature of the relationship remaining fixed. The actors would in this way, for ever, all of them without exception, be absolutely unaware that they were the actors. It might also be the case that the recipient through whom the phenomena are produced (i.e. the "medium," or in our case the animal experimented on) would not be conscious at all of the resulting action. With human "mediums" we should find in such cases a more or less advanced state of trance or ecstasy. And with regard to animals, I remember the opinions of Ochorowicz and others—which were preceded, however, long ago by a similar opinion of Cuvier—according to which the consciousness of animals in an awakened state would correspond fairly closely to the consciousness of man in a hypnotic state.
If what has been said above is at all correct, it would seem as if the walls separating various minds one from another all of a sudden are opened wide, and by a partial interpenetration of one mind by the other the several minds join together to produce by mutual determination automatic action. And it is in these special psychical states that "supernormal" phenomena, viz., psychography, clairvoyance, clairaudience, etc., occur.
Now, although all this is to move in a very uncertain ambit, harassed by a multitude of diverse and vain dilettantisms and mysticisms, and only too frequently by fraud, it is not any longer possible nowadays to deny that facts, objectively known, compel the positive scientist to have recourse to some such suppositions. Also without making the "subliminal," with Myers, a kind of "deus ex machina" in the world, it is certain that mediumistic phenomena of the kind mentioned are henceforth to be considered as a subject of study for an open-minded psychology. I may refer in support of this view, among others, to the powerful work of Morselli. And to return to the "thinking" animals, we find that the mediumistic hypothesis, however shifty it may seem, is a better explanation than the telepathic hypothesis—which has already itself become rather more systematized in modern psychology.
After his visits to Elberfeld, Claparede, as I said, had found it difficult to treat as valid the telepathic hypothesis when applied to Krall's horses. What, indeed, had been "transmitted" to them? Numbers? Words? Single letters? (or orders to stop the foot at the right time?) It must be remembered that the horses were tapping their answers by using a sort of stenography, that usually left out the vowels: that besides, although the words could be recognized in the most certain manner, the spelling was most irregular, and, as I have already pointed out, sometimes reversed. Further, as to the words themselves, most infantile phrases were used, certainly such as no adult would have suggested. Was it suggestion then from one unconscious to another? But this is to fall back upon a supposition of the "mediumistic" type, and takes no count of the cases of replies to questions which were unknown to everybody present, and brings us to the single dilemma: either there is intelligence in the human sense in the animal, or a relationship of the mediumistic type above described between the several minds concerned.As to the interesting observations reported by Ferrari and Pulle, it seems to me opportune to quote here some extracts from the first of these distinguished authors."This séance was particularly interesting, because I find it recorded in my notes that a fact was verified three times consecutively, which had occurred sporadically more than once before, and had been observed and noted by us and various other witnesses."It consisted in this: While I was putting in the box the number of balls which I had intended the horse to read, the horse, which often could not even have seen the number of balls, because I covered them partly with my head and hands, tapped out the correct number."The same thing happened when I took in one hand a card, the signs on which it could only have read with difficulty, the light being rather bad. The most curious thing about it was that the taps were then made upon the whole more rapidly and less strongly than usual; and that several times later on the horse gave the same number itself with some little difficulty."It is also curious that it should have repeated the performance, seeing that it was only once rewarded for it, and that, because it was agreed that it had done its reading well. I must add that the person who assisted me told me that generally, even when it was giving correctly the number decided on, it hardly looked to see how I was placing the balls in the box...."Once when I was arranging three balls, because some one standing behind the horse had made me the sign 3, the horse tapped its three beats behind my shoulders while stretching out its neck by my side in order to try to take a salad leaf, thus showing that it was taking very little interest in the sign which I held out to it and in the taps which it was making."Certainly, this time at least, the animal seemed to perform an automatic action, and it seemed to me that we had guessed subconsciously what the horse intended to do. This may appear a crooked hypothesis, but it is less difficult for me than to think that the horse had read in my mind the number which I had there. It certainly did nothing on most occasions to upset the fairly clear and precise impression that it was obeying some more or less complex determinism."
After his visits to Elberfeld, Claparede, as I said, had found it difficult to treat as valid the telepathic hypothesis when applied to Krall's horses. What, indeed, had been "transmitted" to them? Numbers? Words? Single letters? (or orders to stop the foot at the right time?) It must be remembered that the horses were tapping their answers by using a sort of stenography, that usually left out the vowels: that besides, although the words could be recognized in the most certain manner, the spelling was most irregular, and, as I have already pointed out, sometimes reversed. Further, as to the words themselves, most infantile phrases were used, certainly such as no adult would have suggested. Was it suggestion then from one unconscious to another? But this is to fall back upon a supposition of the "mediumistic" type, and takes no count of the cases of replies to questions which were unknown to everybody present, and brings us to the single dilemma: either there is intelligence in the human sense in the animal, or a relationship of the mediumistic type above described between the several minds concerned.
As to the interesting observations reported by Ferrari and Pulle, it seems to me opportune to quote here some extracts from the first of these distinguished authors.
"This séance was particularly interesting, because I find it recorded in my notes that a fact was verified three times consecutively, which had occurred sporadically more than once before, and had been observed and noted by us and various other witnesses.
"It consisted in this: While I was putting in the box the number of balls which I had intended the horse to read, the horse, which often could not even have seen the number of balls, because I covered them partly with my head and hands, tapped out the correct number.
"The same thing happened when I took in one hand a card, the signs on which it could only have read with difficulty, the light being rather bad. The most curious thing about it was that the taps were then made upon the whole more rapidly and less strongly than usual; and that several times later on the horse gave the same number itself with some little difficulty.
"It is also curious that it should have repeated the performance, seeing that it was only once rewarded for it, and that, because it was agreed that it had done its reading well. I must add that the person who assisted me told me that generally, even when it was giving correctly the number decided on, it hardly looked to see how I was placing the balls in the box....
"Once when I was arranging three balls, because some one standing behind the horse had made me the sign 3, the horse tapped its three beats behind my shoulders while stretching out its neck by my side in order to try to take a salad leaf, thus showing that it was taking very little interest in the sign which I held out to it and in the taps which it was making.
"Certainly, this time at least, the animal seemed to perform an automatic action, and it seemed to me that we had guessed subconsciously what the horse intended to do. This may appear a crooked hypothesis, but it is less difficult for me than to think that the horse had read in my mind the number which I had there. It certainly did nothing on most occasions to upset the fairly clear and precise impression that it was obeying some more or less complex determinism."
It seems to me difficult to avoid the impression that what has just been stated does not reveal a simple telepathic relationship but something rather more deep. The want of interest by the animal in its behaviour is for me symptomatic, and agrees perfectly well with the sensation of the observer that he also had to obey some obscure determinism. I see here another case of a combined psychical (partial) operation of a "mediumistic" kind; and this hypothesis makes very plausible the other no less impressive hypothesis of the observer that his mind was reading (in a subconscious way) the mind of the horse. I call this hypothesis of Ferrari impressive, because in this case it was due to a person who is certainly not to be suspected of dilettantism, and still less of any pseudo-scientific mysticism.
For the rest I repeat that "telepathy" also may co-exist along with "mediumistic" action. In a general way, telepathy would seem to assume in the animal a greater amount of "human" psychic affinity, whilst in mediumistic action I look upon the animal as reacting to the intervention of the other mind in a much more "automatic" way: almost like a "speaking table," but a table provided with live feet rather than inert legs, and above all provided with a nervous system forming part of it, so that very little action on the part of the medium is required, but the subliminal action of the investigator is enough by itself to work it. (Of course, this does not exclude altogether action by others or by the horse itself).
Krall admits the possibility of telepathy (but in a very limited measure): and then, if I remember right, he was looking finally for an explanation which to-day I should perhaps call of the mediumistic type, if I had been better acquainted with it; but in fact I had of him, in his lifetime, only some vague hint on the point.As to Miss Kindermann, she recognises the possibility of transmission of thought in certain cases (e.g. when Lola is tired or is unwilling to "work" any more). According to her it would be a question of a line of least resistance, along which the "work" of the animal becomes more easy. Hence arises the necessity, as she maintains, for the investigator to be very careful of the danger of falsified results and toabstain with this object from any intentional thought. But these are the very conditions which "mediums" impose on investigators, and if these conditions are not observed, mediumistic séances seem only to be successful with difficulty. Therefore, in trying to resist the danger of telepathic falsification, and without indeed being aware of the resulting consequences, Lola's mistress may have contributed to create the very conditions most favourable to the development of mediumistic action.
Krall admits the possibility of telepathy (but in a very limited measure): and then, if I remember right, he was looking finally for an explanation which to-day I should perhaps call of the mediumistic type, if I had been better acquainted with it; but in fact I had of him, in his lifetime, only some vague hint on the point.
As to Miss Kindermann, she recognises the possibility of transmission of thought in certain cases (e.g. when Lola is tired or is unwilling to "work" any more). According to her it would be a question of a line of least resistance, along which the "work" of the animal becomes more easy. Hence arises the necessity, as she maintains, for the investigator to be very careful of the danger of falsified results and toabstain with this object from any intentional thought. But these are the very conditions which "mediums" impose on investigators, and if these conditions are not observed, mediumistic séances seem only to be successful with difficulty. Therefore, in trying to resist the danger of telepathic falsification, and without indeed being aware of the resulting consequences, Lola's mistress may have contributed to create the very conditions most favourable to the development of mediumistic action.
V. THE HYPOTHESIS OF CONCOMITANT PSYCHICAL AUTOMATISM
In various parts of her book Miss Kindermann emphasizes the fact that after having given for some days "communications" of a certain kind, a sort of tiredness or annoyance, that gets hold of Lola, completely prevents the repetition of similar communications; but that repetition can take place if some weeks of rest are allowed in the subject which has provoked the tiredness.
In another place she mentions that, with the progress of Lola's "education," the dog's attitude towards herself, and other persons generally, became harder and more difficult, almost hostile (a fact which I find confirmed by certain answers of Lola's referred to elsewhere); just as if the canine consciousness as it gained illumination began to understand the many wrongs done to it by man, which formerly it knew nothing about.
Other observers have repeatedly stated that a capital fact in the story of "thinking" animals is the necessity, which they regard as proved, of aprogressive"education" directed at getting from the animal results proportionate to the instruction received.
All these observations and several others of a similar nature would seem to be arguments in favour of a presumed "intelligence" rather than of an automatism in the animal. But they should be acceptedcum grano. They may indeed contain a good dose of involuntary suggestion, active or passive. And again, it seems to me, for instance, a very doubtful procedure to maintain, after a positive result has been achieved by the animal, that the result should have been on the other hand negative, if the education has not yet reached the corresponding stage of development; and vice versa. As for me, when I read what Miss Kindermann writes about the rapidity of Lola's progress, I cannot help thinking that, if the authoress had believed that she was able to obtain at once from the dog the results which she did obtain after a year's work, she would have obtained them fully and completely.
But this extreme supposition may be exaggerated. I have already repeatedly referred to the hypothesis that the psychic automatism in question may be only concomitant. That is, I am convinced from what I have seen myself and read that a foundation of intelligence, of logical reasoning and of self consciousness, must go to constitute in the animal the substratum on which the wonders of the "new zoopsychology" are built up.
At first I was rather inclined to believe (as so many others) that the facts discovered at Elberfeld and at Mannheim could and should be explained simply by the recognition of "intelligence" in the animal. The chief results obtained up to then (i.e. up to the date of my last publications on the subject), were the mathematical prodigies performed by Krall's horses, and the first "philosophic" manifestations of Rolf. I accordingly thought that I should be able to interpret the new (and, in its complexity, rather modest) canine "knowledge" by the animal's memory of words which it had heard. But since then the educators have taken pleasure in raising the whole level of these wonders. Rolf's "philosophy" was developed; and in the end they went so far as to make him compose poetry, as I have already had occasion to mention. Then came the performances of Lola. And at this point I, too, must say: "Too much, too much!" At least, as far as concerns the hypothesis of intelligence in the animal.
I understand perfectly that just on account of that "too much," people may be tempted to throw up the whole thing. But as far as I am concerned, I repeat that I do not consider myself justified in doing so. I do not forget the possible intervention of active or passive suggestion: I referred to this a short time ago. But a great abuse is often made of this explanation. In practice "suggestion" explains but little to any one who wants to get to the bottom of things. Neither does it explain the bulk of the facts of the "new zoopsychology." Neither do I forget that in this field also (as in every field of psychological experiments) there may be an interfering although subconscious misuse of spurious factors, such as signs (not intentional or perceptible) by the experimenter to the subject experimented with; a certain amount of falsification in interpretation of results on the part of the experimenters, etc.... But the irreducible residue of the facts is, in my opinion, still enormous as compared with the little that could perhaps be eliminated by these means from the discussion. Therefore, in the absence of anything better for the moment, and subject to further information, I hold to the hypothesis of a psychic automatism of the mediumistic type, as a concomitant phenomenon developed from the normal "rapport" which isnecessaryand pre-existent.
This "rapport" is that of a master to a child; but to a very special kind of child, a "child" moreover who, from the biological point of view, has not been corrupted by the thousands of years of reasoning and society that weigh on the human child. It is, therefore, nearer to the "fountains of life" if I may be allowed to express myself in that way; and nearer to the mathematical potentiality (which was at first unself-conscious, but which has subsequently been developed). But, of course, it is not enough for mathematics "to be" in something, for that something to begin at once to tap numbers. The table of the mediumistic séances contains much mathematics (in its physical assemblage), but in order to make it "tap" there must be somebody to move it: in fact, a "medium." In my view, as soon as the animal subject has been able to understand "numbers"—and this postulate of the new zoopsychology, I repeat, I believe to be indispensable to the whole edifice—the animal finds itself sufficiently in harmony with the master to become capable (in principle) of all the subsequent "wonders."
This it is which constitutes the first discovery, as I have called it, of the "new zoopsychology." And on that discovery, in my opinion, are based through various gradations its chief results, on the supposition that at a certain moment there takes place a new specific action, the "déclanchement" of the mediumistic relationship between the animal and the experimenter. And it may be that the development of such a very special relationship between man and animals may be comparatively easy. That is, it may be that the animal is relatively easilypermeableby a mind provided with a reasoning intelligence (without, however, being itself aware of the logical content of such an intelligence), exactly because it is rather poor in logical self-conscious content—or, again, it may be, that the animal in a certain sense is nearer than we to the "fountains of life." (9).
The possibility of this "déclanchement" would therefore constitute the second and more serious discovery made by the educators of animals; although without their knowing it, as is proved by all their accounts which make no mention of it.
It is difficult to say what the precise moment is at which the grafting of this supernormal connexion on the normal one takes place. The most that I can say at present is this: that the grafting in question appears relatively to be quicker as regards the mathematical results. And this would lend an indirect support to the view that generally mathematics must be presupposed as underlying the phenomena. But the wonderful performances of Lola show that even so far as there is real "intelligence" in the animal, the supernormal relationship enters very quickly on the scene. In other words, the subject very quickly learns to express itself by means of a true "xenoglossy," i.e. by means of a language that may be clear to other people although it probably is not understood by the animal or medium making use of it.
Besides, we find in Lola's case a high degree of glossolalia. The authoress observes, e.g. on page 39: "Lola often uses words completely incomprehensible; at one time she declared that they belonged to a special canine language. My investigations on this subject remained, however, without result. It is possible that these words arise from the imagination of the animal...."30Something similar was also produced by Rolf and the Elberfeld horses.
Besides, we find in Lola's case a high degree of glossolalia. The authoress observes, e.g. on page 39: "Lola often uses words completely incomprehensible; at one time she declared that they belonged to a special canine language. My investigations on this subject remained, however, without result. It is possible that these words arise from the imagination of the animal...."30Something similar was also produced by Rolf and the Elberfeld horses.
Of course, even after the development of this "xenoglossy," it is difficult either to admit or to refuse to admit some remainder of self-conscious co-operation by the animal in its "answers." For my part, I believe that simple replies may continue to be formed in the normal self-conscious way. It is certain, in my opinion, that this view is one of the only two alternatives possible when we get replies to questions the contents of which are entirely unknown to everybody else present. The other alternative is that of clairvoyance in those present followed by projection by them to the animal of the idea obtained clairvoyantly; or else of a "telepathic" projection of the sense-impression from the animal to the bystanders, with return of the reply from the latter to the former. I do not dare to complicate this further; the more so as in all the cases which I know of in which replies were obtained to such questions, very simple things only were dealt with: figures, or modest problems; or else problems which are abstruse "to us," such as fourth and fifth roots, but which as the animal was one of the horses at Elberfeld may be explained by the general mathematical faculty without drawing upon the mediumistic hypothesis.
But that there is on the whole much of the subliminal at work in all the cases noted is, I believe, difficult to deny.
We must remember that superior "force" by which Miss Kindermann felt herself, as it were, compelled (page 36). And in another place (page 40), the authoress declares: "However strange it may seem, I have repeatedly remarked that Lola always finds abstract calculation and spelling easy; whilst on the other hand it always seems difficult to make her move single parts of her body, or to carry out practical orders." (I myself was able to make similar observations at Elberfeld and at Mannheim; it seemed to me, however, that the horses were more docile to "practical orders.").On page 42 I find: "During the explanation of the digits and of the tens, the dog did not look at me, but bit with apparently very great interest a leg of the stool." It must be noted, as I have already pointed out, that the digits and the tens were both alike learned quickly and well. The authoress explains this action of Lola's as a "mark of embarrassment." But to me that leg of the stool is exactly on a par with the salad leaf mentioned by Professor Ferrari: i.e. the dog did not pay the slightest attention to the lesson; it replied without the help of intelligent attention on its part; it replied in the subliminal way, like the unconscious instrument of a psychic automatism, and by the use of an intelligence which was not its own.Similar impressions are left by other points in the story of Lola. I read on page 64: "If, for instance, I write one under the other three or four numbers of two figures each, very quickly, and without adding them myself, and then hold up the sheet in front of the dog, I see that her eyes only glance at the sheet for 1-2 seconds; after which the dog bends its head to add but looks away, and then taps the reply." This behaviour is the same as that of Krall's pony Hanschen, when Dr. Assagioli and I made experiments with it.The same can be said of various other performances of an intuitive kind, on the part of Lola, to which the authoress refers: e.g. knowledge in four seconds of a given number of points (up to 35), marked without any regularity whatever on a piece of paper. (Similar experiments were made at Elberfeld and Mannheim.) Other performances of an intuitive kind concern various measures of time, temperature, musical intervals, etc., and they reach their highest point in thepremonitionsas to the course of the weather and the birth of the puppies. Professor Ziegler finds the explanation of this last performance in the prenatal movements of the fœtus within the maternal body. This seems to me doubtful; besides, it must be remembered that this prevision of Lola's was a double one, as it concerned both the number and the sex of the puppies (autoscopia?). The fact that the sex of the puppies was foretoldalmostcorrectly does not eliminate all doubt. And the authoress gives sufficient details on the experiment to make us regard it as genuine, until we have proof to the contrary.
We must remember that superior "force" by which Miss Kindermann felt herself, as it were, compelled (page 36). And in another place (page 40), the authoress declares: "However strange it may seem, I have repeatedly remarked that Lola always finds abstract calculation and spelling easy; whilst on the other hand it always seems difficult to make her move single parts of her body, or to carry out practical orders." (I myself was able to make similar observations at Elberfeld and at Mannheim; it seemed to me, however, that the horses were more docile to "practical orders.").
On page 42 I find: "During the explanation of the digits and of the tens, the dog did not look at me, but bit with apparently very great interest a leg of the stool." It must be noted, as I have already pointed out, that the digits and the tens were both alike learned quickly and well. The authoress explains this action of Lola's as a "mark of embarrassment." But to me that leg of the stool is exactly on a par with the salad leaf mentioned by Professor Ferrari: i.e. the dog did not pay the slightest attention to the lesson; it replied without the help of intelligent attention on its part; it replied in the subliminal way, like the unconscious instrument of a psychic automatism, and by the use of an intelligence which was not its own.
Similar impressions are left by other points in the story of Lola. I read on page 64: "If, for instance, I write one under the other three or four numbers of two figures each, very quickly, and without adding them myself, and then hold up the sheet in front of the dog, I see that her eyes only glance at the sheet for 1-2 seconds; after which the dog bends its head to add but looks away, and then taps the reply." This behaviour is the same as that of Krall's pony Hanschen, when Dr. Assagioli and I made experiments with it.
The same can be said of various other performances of an intuitive kind, on the part of Lola, to which the authoress refers: e.g. knowledge in four seconds of a given number of points (up to 35), marked without any regularity whatever on a piece of paper. (Similar experiments were made at Elberfeld and Mannheim.) Other performances of an intuitive kind concern various measures of time, temperature, musical intervals, etc., and they reach their highest point in thepremonitionsas to the course of the weather and the birth of the puppies. Professor Ziegler finds the explanation of this last performance in the prenatal movements of the fœtus within the maternal body. This seems to me doubtful; besides, it must be remembered that this prevision of Lola's was a double one, as it concerned both the number and the sex of the puppies (autoscopia?). The fact that the sex of the puppies was foretoldalmostcorrectly does not eliminate all doubt. And the authoress gives sufficient details on the experiment to make us regard it as genuine, until we have proof to the contrary.
Many other manifestations of Lola's betray very clearly a subliminal relationship between herself and her mistress (or perhaps between herself and other persons), and so I do not see that there is any reason for us to doubt that Miss Kindermann was really surprised at the replies which she obtained.
I could cite at length: I am content, however, to remind the reader of the many replies of the dog which reveal quite clearly the feeling of the authoress towards the dog itself, as e.g., "I know you, alas, so little"; or again, "Show constancy in your love for me," etc.; then, again, the words never pronounced before in presence of the dog (this makes me think of the famous "Urseele" of Rolf); the things said by Lola, but not known by her mistress, and then found true....
I could cite at length: I am content, however, to remind the reader of the many replies of the dog which reveal quite clearly the feeling of the authoress towards the dog itself, as e.g., "I know you, alas, so little"; or again, "Show constancy in your love for me," etc.; then, again, the words never pronounced before in presence of the dog (this makes me think of the famous "Urseele" of Rolf); the things said by Lola, but not known by her mistress, and then found true....
Finally I must allude to the "discovery" made by Lola that the odours of the human body reveal the state of the human mind—displeasure, jealousy, lie (sic); on which the authoress observes (very justly, in a certain sense), that these experiments make one think of the well-known theories of the late Prof. Jaegar of Stockholm.... I am in agreement with her on that point, because I, too, have read the "Entdeckung der Seele" by that author; as I suppose she, too, had. I am inclined to think that in her case (as she was experimenting with a dog) it was only natural for her to think of these psycho-olfactory theories—perhaps without knowing it—even before the experiments. Therefore, the experiments themselves would always be perfectly "genuine," but of course this genuineness is of a different sort to what she thought it.
To conclude, the supporters of the new zoopsychology must not complain if the views which I have set out above help in course of time to oust their "point of view." It seems to me that even while robbing the "thinking" animals of some of the intelligence attributed to them, and while regarding what remains as qualitatively different from human intelligence (e.g. through the much greater interference of subconscious factors), we are still free to find the animals to be perhaps even more interesting than before.
I am quite conscious of the fact that the "cases" are still few for theories to be built upon; and some may think that I might have done better by reporting them simply without attempting any explanation whatever. However, I believe, that if as the result of my work the recognition of the internal weakness of certain hypotheses—especially in the psychological field—is generally recognized, it will not be so harmful to have put forward some suggestions for dealing with facts which have already been, or will be, established.
I have accordingly tried to do so, but I shall always be ready to modify my views if new facts should persuade me that this is necessary.