Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.India Office: January 14, 1886.Mr. Buckle has just been to see me, full of an idea of his own which struck me as good, and which I persuaded him not to spoil by bringing it out in to-morrow’sTimes.1886Æt.36He wishes the Queen’s Speech of 1833 to be imitated,when, after the agitation of O’Connell, the Government declared in the Speech their intention of maintaining the Union. I send you the paragraph and also the paragraphs from the Speech of 1834, which seem still more to the purpose. Mr. Buckle very forcibly argues that some declaration of such a kind will force on the question at once, and prevent Gladstonian shuffling being resorted to successfully. The Irish would be obliged to meet such a challenge, and all parties would have to declare themselves....
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.
India Office: January 14, 1886.
Mr. Buckle has just been to see me, full of an idea of his own which struck me as good, and which I persuaded him not to spoil by bringing it out in to-morrow’sTimes.
1886Æt.36
He wishes the Queen’s Speech of 1833 to be imitated,when, after the agitation of O’Connell, the Government declared in the Speech their intention of maintaining the Union. I send you the paragraph and also the paragraphs from the Speech of 1834, which seem still more to the purpose. Mr. Buckle very forcibly argues that some declaration of such a kind will force on the question at once, and prevent Gladstonian shuffling being resorted to successfully. The Irish would be obliged to meet such a challenge, and all parties would have to declare themselves....
The paragraph which was finally adopted was modelled on the lines of the Speech of 1834:—
The King’s Speech, Feb. 4, 1834.
But I have seen, with feelingsof deep regret and just indignation,the continuance of attempts to excitethe people of that country todemand a repeal of the LegislativeUnion.
This bond of our nationalstrength and safety I have alreadydeclared my fixed and unalterableresolution, under the blessing ofDivine Providence, to maintaininviolate by all the means in mypower.
In support of this determinationI cannot doubt the zealousand effectual co-operation of myParliament and my people.
The Queen’s Speech, Jan. 21, 1886.
I have seen with deep sorrowthe renewal, since I last addressedyou, of the attempt to excite thepeople of Ireland to hostilityagainst the Legislative Unionbetween that country and GreatBritain. I am absolutely opposedto any disturbance of that fundamentallaw, and in resisting it I amconvinced that I shall be heartilysupported by my Parliament andmy people.
But the Tory leader was meditating a more decided challenge. He proposed to meet Parliament with a declaration of a Coercion policy which should disperse all doubts as to the relations of his Government with the Parnellites and should throw upon the Opposition the odium of defeating a Government upon a measure affecting law and order. He may have been led to this decision partly by a desire thatthe armies should face each other squarely in the coming battle. Partly, no doubt, he was persuaded thereto by the growing clamour and pressure of those sections of his own party who are always powerful to urge repressive measures. Sulky murmurs at the Carlton; loud complainings in theTimes; trumpeted advent of Loyalist and Orange deputations claiming the protection of the Crown—all the storm-signals were flying. But there was a considerable case upon the merits. When Lord Randolph Churchill had visited Ireland in October he found the Viceroy anxious and alarmed by the growing power of the National League, and that organisation was now greatly extended. Throughout those parts of Ireland where the National League was supreme, liberty and law were gravely endangered. There was not, indeed, that kind of treasonable organisation which had existed in 1865 and 1867; nor was there such an amount of capital crime as culminated in the Phœnix Park murders; but a sullen, widespread, and well-organised spirit of resistance to the laws of property had taken possession of the Irish people and grew worse week by week. ‘There were in Ireland, and there are in Ireland now,’ said Lord Randolph at Paddington (February 13, 1886), ‘two governments—there is the Government of the Queen and the government of the National League—and the Government of the Queen is not the stronger government of the two in many parts of Ireland.’
Lord Salisbury first mentions the subject on January 13. ‘I am very perturbed,’ he writes, ‘aboutthe state of Ireland.’ Three days later he met the Cabinet with definite proposals. Lord Ashbourne had prepared a Coercion Bill, and the Prime Minister had drafted a paragraph for the Queen’s Speech announcing its immediate introduction. The Cabinet was startled. Lord Randolph Churchill and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach had not prepared themselves for such a departure, grave as they knew the situation in Ireland to be. They were not satisfied that a case for special legislation was disclosed, still less that it could be sustained in the House of Commons. Both remembered their speeches of the previous summer. Neither responded sympathetically to the militant and autocratic temper of the mass of the party. The council was long and stormy and Ministers separated without having come to any decision. Meanwhile the resignation of Lord Carnarvon was publicly announced.
The decision of Lord Salisbury’s Administration to introduce a Coercion Bill in January 1886 has been the subject of much hostile criticism. It has been censured as a resort to extra-constitutional measures, not for the sake of public safety, but as a party manœuvre. It has been denounced as the callous and unscrupulous reversal of a policy of conciliation so soon as the Irish vote had been cast at the election. There is a degree of justice and truth in these harsh accusations, but it is only a degree; and if the Ministers concerned require a defence, that defence is best supplied by their own secret letters during these days of perplexity and stress.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.Carlton Club: January 16, 1886.Dear Lord Salisbury,—I cannot resist writing to you on Ireland while the proceedings of to-day’s Cabinet are fresh in my mind. As far as I could ascertain, the exact difference of opinion between the view which you hold and the view which I ventured to express amounts (in the measure of time) to a month at the outside. You would announce and produce a Bill at once. It appears to me that at present there is no sufficient Parliamentary case for a Bill, estimated by the weight of facts adduced; and that the Bill which you may decide upon now, upon your incomplete grounds, may and will in all probability be utterly insufficient to meet the facts which you will have to deal with in abundance in a period of time which may be calculated by weeks and even days.What I would like to know, if I am not asking too much, is this—What influence or information not yet disclosed is compelling you to lay such a heavy burden on your sadly inefficient colleagues in the House of Commons? I assume as indubitable that you consider, and almost entirely guide your action by, the state of parties in the House of Commons—that is involved in the decision come to in December to carry on the Government—yet I am certain that you know that none of us could sustain a case for Coercion. Yet you press it on us—for we could have come to an agreement to-day on Lord Cranbrook’s suggestion, only that evidently it was not acceptable or good in your eyes.I wish I knew what you really wanted, and how you wished it to be worked out. I have never thought of anything except the success, or at least the credit, ofyourGovernment; and, knowing how much depends on the House of Commons, I am at the present moment only occupied in imagining how the action which you seem to favour could be effectively sustained from a House of Commons point of view. I do not think you will accuseme of arrogance or conceit if I avow my belief that, unless you show me the way very clearly, that action must fail disastrously. I do not want it to fail so. I know how very great and high your position is, what a really fine party you have behind you, how great their confidence in you is (on these points I do not believe I am capable of making an error), and I am most anxious that that great instrument on which depends not merely the item of Ireland, but also the interests of the entire Empire and home community, should not be damaged or blunted by weak and inefficient House of Commons action such as the immediate demand for Coercion will in practice involve.One word as regards the Government of Ireland. You think the situation so serious that it demands a Coercion Bill. That necessitates a strong Irish Government. That Government you have not got. I think there are three men in the Government who would answer to the requirements of the position—Lord Cranbrook, Mr. Smith, and (please don’t be shocked) myself. Of the three I greatly prefer Mr. Smith. But, assuming that you have decided it is your duty to carry on the Government until you are turned out, I implore you not to think of [the arrangement Lord Salisbury had suggested]. No extra laws could make that good or stable. I hope you won’t be vexed with me for writing so freely. I am only anxious to find myself on Monday loyally and strenuously supporting whatever you may think best to be done; but I admit I have not been able hitherto to refrain from shrinking to take part in an enterprise desperate in its nature, involving certain and immediate Parliamentary death, and which, if determined on, will only leave you without one or two of your most faithful supporters in the House of Commons. Not that they will refuse to obey what you order, but that the order itself will be their ruin.Yours most sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.
Carlton Club: January 16, 1886.
Dear Lord Salisbury,—I cannot resist writing to you on Ireland while the proceedings of to-day’s Cabinet are fresh in my mind. As far as I could ascertain, the exact difference of opinion between the view which you hold and the view which I ventured to express amounts (in the measure of time) to a month at the outside. You would announce and produce a Bill at once. It appears to me that at present there is no sufficient Parliamentary case for a Bill, estimated by the weight of facts adduced; and that the Bill which you may decide upon now, upon your incomplete grounds, may and will in all probability be utterly insufficient to meet the facts which you will have to deal with in abundance in a period of time which may be calculated by weeks and even days.
What I would like to know, if I am not asking too much, is this—What influence or information not yet disclosed is compelling you to lay such a heavy burden on your sadly inefficient colleagues in the House of Commons? I assume as indubitable that you consider, and almost entirely guide your action by, the state of parties in the House of Commons—that is involved in the decision come to in December to carry on the Government—yet I am certain that you know that none of us could sustain a case for Coercion. Yet you press it on us—for we could have come to an agreement to-day on Lord Cranbrook’s suggestion, only that evidently it was not acceptable or good in your eyes.
I wish I knew what you really wanted, and how you wished it to be worked out. I have never thought of anything except the success, or at least the credit, ofyourGovernment; and, knowing how much depends on the House of Commons, I am at the present moment only occupied in imagining how the action which you seem to favour could be effectively sustained from a House of Commons point of view. I do not think you will accuseme of arrogance or conceit if I avow my belief that, unless you show me the way very clearly, that action must fail disastrously. I do not want it to fail so. I know how very great and high your position is, what a really fine party you have behind you, how great their confidence in you is (on these points I do not believe I am capable of making an error), and I am most anxious that that great instrument on which depends not merely the item of Ireland, but also the interests of the entire Empire and home community, should not be damaged or blunted by weak and inefficient House of Commons action such as the immediate demand for Coercion will in practice involve.
One word as regards the Government of Ireland. You think the situation so serious that it demands a Coercion Bill. That necessitates a strong Irish Government. That Government you have not got. I think there are three men in the Government who would answer to the requirements of the position—Lord Cranbrook, Mr. Smith, and (please don’t be shocked) myself. Of the three I greatly prefer Mr. Smith. But, assuming that you have decided it is your duty to carry on the Government until you are turned out, I implore you not to think of [the arrangement Lord Salisbury had suggested]. No extra laws could make that good or stable. I hope you won’t be vexed with me for writing so freely. I am only anxious to find myself on Monday loyally and strenuously supporting whatever you may think best to be done; but I admit I have not been able hitherto to refrain from shrinking to take part in an enterprise desperate in its nature, involving certain and immediate Parliamentary death, and which, if determined on, will only leave you without one or two of your most faithful supporters in the House of Commons. Not that they will refuse to obey what you order, but that the order itself will be their ruin.
Yours most sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill.
Confidential.Foreign Office: January 16, 1886.My dear Randolph,—I cannot say how much touched I am by the great kindness and loyalty of your letter. I cannot help feeling how little I deserve it. I will tell you at once what my dominant feeling is. It is that we should be a united Cabinet—if possible with a united party. I have been throughout ready to postpone my individual opinion to this primary consideration. We have no right to the luxury of divided councils in a crisis such as this. It is evident that the great majority of the Cabinet—and, I believe, the great majority of the party—wish earnestly for a policy which will show that we do not shrink from the duty of government, and that we mean to stand by the Loyalists. The disaster I am afraid of is that we should be driven from office on some motion insisting on the necessity of a vigorous step, and our position in Opposition would then be very feeble and we should be much discredited.I really feel very strongly and deeply all the kindness you have shown to me, and the great and most successful efforts you have made to sustain the Government. I should differ from you and Beach with the most extreme reluctance. But do not let us take any line which will brand us in the eyes of our countrymen—or will enable our opponents to do so—as the timid party, who let things float because they dared not act. The time is coming on us when people will long for government: do not let us get a character of shrinking from responsibility.The question of thepersonnelof the [Irish] Government must be considered, but the Speech presses for settlement in the first instance. I should have thought that the notorious growth of this ‘second government’ throughout Ireland, overshadowing the law and the Queen’s authority and securing its power by organised terror, would have sustained a case for such a Bill as Gibson produced. Ifyou remain of the opposite opinion, let us consider whether some such phrase as the enclosed could unite us.[50]It is merely a suggestion. I confess I have a heavy heart in the whole matter. I have serious doubts whether I am doing my duty. But my train is going. Perhaps I may write again from Hatfield.Ever yours very truly,Salisbury.
Confidential.
Foreign Office: January 16, 1886.
My dear Randolph,—I cannot say how much touched I am by the great kindness and loyalty of your letter. I cannot help feeling how little I deserve it. I will tell you at once what my dominant feeling is. It is that we should be a united Cabinet—if possible with a united party. I have been throughout ready to postpone my individual opinion to this primary consideration. We have no right to the luxury of divided councils in a crisis such as this. It is evident that the great majority of the Cabinet—and, I believe, the great majority of the party—wish earnestly for a policy which will show that we do not shrink from the duty of government, and that we mean to stand by the Loyalists. The disaster I am afraid of is that we should be driven from office on some motion insisting on the necessity of a vigorous step, and our position in Opposition would then be very feeble and we should be much discredited.
I really feel very strongly and deeply all the kindness you have shown to me, and the great and most successful efforts you have made to sustain the Government. I should differ from you and Beach with the most extreme reluctance. But do not let us take any line which will brand us in the eyes of our countrymen—or will enable our opponents to do so—as the timid party, who let things float because they dared not act. The time is coming on us when people will long for government: do not let us get a character of shrinking from responsibility.
The question of thepersonnelof the [Irish] Government must be considered, but the Speech presses for settlement in the first instance. I should have thought that the notorious growth of this ‘second government’ throughout Ireland, overshadowing the law and the Queen’s authority and securing its power by organised terror, would have sustained a case for such a Bill as Gibson produced. Ifyou remain of the opposite opinion, let us consider whether some such phrase as the enclosed could unite us.[50]It is merely a suggestion. I confess I have a heavy heart in the whole matter. I have serious doubts whether I am doing my duty. But my train is going. Perhaps I may write again from Hatfield.
Ever yours very truly,Salisbury.
Lord Randolph now surrendered his view altogether. Never before or afterwards did the two men stand in such cordial relationship. A comradeship in anxiety had drawn these contrasted natures, each so vehement and earnest after its own fashion, very close together:—
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.India Office: January 16, 1886.Dear Lord Salisbury,—I am very grateful for your letter, which enables me to enter more fully into the position from which you view things than I have been able hitherto to do. I greatly like the paragraph suggested, and believe firmly that it meets with wisdom, tact, and courage the necessities and the possibilities of the situation. But,after all, you are the head of the Government, and have had a very long experience of public affairs; and if youthink it absolutely incumbent to go further—well, then, further we must go. A collapse of the Government at the present moment would be a catastrophe too hideous to contemplate.I have said all that occurs to me at much too great length and with far too much reiteration.Kismet.Yours most sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.
India Office: January 16, 1886.
Dear Lord Salisbury,—I am very grateful for your letter, which enables me to enter more fully into the position from which you view things than I have been able hitherto to do. I greatly like the paragraph suggested, and believe firmly that it meets with wisdom, tact, and courage the necessities and the possibilities of the situation. But,after all, you are the head of the Government, and have had a very long experience of public affairs; and if youthink it absolutely incumbent to go further—well, then, further we must go. A collapse of the Government at the present moment would be a catastrophe too hideous to contemplate.
I have said all that occurs to me at much too great length and with far too much reiteration.Kismet.
Yours most sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
There is a passage in the speech of Sir R. Peel on the Address in ‘33, where the constitutional position required before a Coercion demand is very clearly and weightily laid down.
He wrote to Beach accordingly. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was more unyielding and his letter shows the variety of strong characters arrayed against Mr. Gladstone:—
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to Lord Randolph Churchill.January 17, 1886.My dear Churchill,—Of course I should readily accept the sentence Salisbury suggests. But though his letter touches and influences me, it does not persuade me to anything more; and I am sorry your reply goes so far. I do not in the least believe that, with such Irish paragraphs as we are all ready to accept, any motion insisting on the necessity of a vigorous step would be ever proposed, much less carried, against us. I do not think in such a matter we ought to be governed by the ignorant wish of ‘the great majority of the party’ or be forced to action we do not approve for fear of being branded as the ‘timid party.’ If these are Salisbury’s reasons for Coercion, my opinion remains the same.But his last sentences require explanation. If by ‘serious doubts whether I am doing my duty’ he means that he is himself persuaded that the moment has comewhen the government of Ireland cannot be carried on without it, and that he ought not therefore to agree to delay, that is another matter. I would yield my opinion, strong as it is, to his convictions, butonly to his convictions. And in that case hemusthave a man to govern Ireland.Yours sincerely,M. E. Hicks-Beach.
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to Lord Randolph Churchill.
January 17, 1886.
My dear Churchill,—Of course I should readily accept the sentence Salisbury suggests. But though his letter touches and influences me, it does not persuade me to anything more; and I am sorry your reply goes so far. I do not in the least believe that, with such Irish paragraphs as we are all ready to accept, any motion insisting on the necessity of a vigorous step would be ever proposed, much less carried, against us. I do not think in such a matter we ought to be governed by the ignorant wish of ‘the great majority of the party’ or be forced to action we do not approve for fear of being branded as the ‘timid party.’ If these are Salisbury’s reasons for Coercion, my opinion remains the same.
But his last sentences require explanation. If by ‘serious doubts whether I am doing my duty’ he means that he is himself persuaded that the moment has comewhen the government of Ireland cannot be carried on without it, and that he ought not therefore to agree to delay, that is another matter. I would yield my opinion, strong as it is, to his convictions, butonly to his convictions. And in that case hemusthave a man to govern Ireland.
Yours sincerely,M. E. Hicks-Beach.
Monday’s Cabinet was united upon the Queen’s Speech. Lord Salisbury decided to entrust the Irish Office to Mr. Smith. Lord Randolph Churchill, who had acquired much influence with him, was chosen to press it upon him. The task was thankless and unpromising; the occasion momentous; but the post of difficulty and peril was also the post of honour. Gravely and reluctantly Smith accepted, and Lord Cranbrook became Minister of War in his stead. ‘I saw Mr. Smith this morning,’ wrote Lord Randolph to the Prime Minister (January 20), ‘and used every argument to persuade him to take in hand the government of Ireland. The appointment should be settled to-day and announced to-morrow morning without fail. If there is any weakness in our attitude on Coercion (which I do not at all admit) it will be more than contradicted by the appointment of Mr. Smith. This of itself will do much to restore confidence. Please do not, if possible, allow any delay. On second thoughts,’ added Lord Randolph mischievously, ‘would Lord Iddesleigh like to go as Lord-Lieutenant?’
The appointment of the new Irish Secretary was announced on the morning of the 21st, and that sameday formal business, including election of Speaker, having been previously completed, Parliament was opened in state and the Session began.
The Government prolonged a precarious existence for five days. Both parties were in a turmoil. On the one side Whigs and Moderate Liberals endeavoured, without success, to extract from Mr. Gladstone definite declarations upon Ireland. In the Tory camp the demand for a Coercion Bill was loud and insistent. Although the party as a whole had been beaten in the elections, the bulk of its members came fresh from remarkable victories in the big towns. Their temper was aggressive. They welcomed the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that Mr. Smith would go to Ireland at once to consider what special measures were necessary.
We are told that Mr. Gladstone did not resolve to overturn the Ministry until they definitely declared for Coercion on January 26. That act, he considered, imposed the responsibility of government upon him. But Lord Randolph Churchill’s correspondence shows that he had information as early as January 13 that some independent member would move an amendment to the Address regretting that no announcement was made of provision for the wants of the agricultural population. Whether this would fail, or would gain the support of a united Opposition, could not be ascertained till the House met. A few hours of Westminster were, however, sufficient to convince the Tory leaders that the temper of the majority wasadverse to them, that virtual and effective agreement existed between Mr. Gladstone and Parnell, and that Whig and Moderate Liberal support would almost certainly be insufficient to sustain them. They had decided on Coercion; they resolved, if possible, to place the details of their policy and the case in support of it before the country. The adroit and experienced Parliamentarians on the Treasury Bench used all their wits to obtain the necessary delay. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had given notice on the 21st that immediately on the conclusion of the debate on the Address he would move resolutions for the Reform of Procedure and that these would be pressed to the exclusion of other matters, ‘subject to the intervention of any specially important or urgent business.’ On the following day Lord Randolph Churchill suggested that the general debate on the Address should be brought to a conclusion and that the reforms in Parliamentary Procedure, the consideration of which Mr. Gladstone had declared in his election address ought to take precedence of legislation, might be decided before the amendments to the Address were considered. The changes which Ministers proposed were in themselves sufficiently startling to have absorbed the House in calmer times; and Lord Randolph no doubt calculated upon this. But Mr. Gladstone found no difficulty in persuading his party that Procedure reform might safely be a little delayed. Lord Randolph’s proposal was ignored and the debate continued.
On the 23rd Mr. Smith started for Dublin, whichhe reached on the morning of the 24th. The imminent defeat of the Ministry had now become certain. An amendment relating to Burma was moved on the 25th. Mr. Gladstone, though recommending that no decision should be taken upon it, as other more convenient opportunities of discussing Indian matters would occur, indulged in acid criticism of the Burmese policy. ‘Shall I answer him now?’ asked Lord Randolph, taking up the red box in which the India Office papers reposed, ‘or shall I wait for the Indian Budget?’ ‘Now or never,’ answered the Leader of the House; and Lord Randolph thereupon, using the precise information of a great department with the skill of a practised debater, made a vigorous rejoinder. Upon the spur of the moment he managed to cite a number of instances from the record of the late Government where they had themselves been drawn into warlike operations, with, as Lord Randolph contended, far less justification than was presented in Burma. Mr. Gladstone was much provoked by such comparisons. He could not speak again himself, and as the Secretary for India proceeded he was observed repeatedly turning to those about him and behind him, explaining how this did not apply; how that was wholly unfounded: how this, again, was a travesty; and so forth. The Conservatives were delighted at Lord Randolph’s prowess. The attack was repelled. On the next amendment the Liberal Front Bench abstained, and the Government survived by twenty-eight. But this was the end.
Faced by approaching destruction, the Government cared only to rally their friends, to make one last bid for Whig support, and to declare plainly the issue on which they were to be dismissed. The Cabinet which met on the morning of the 26th desired the immediate introduction of a Coercion Bill. But Mr. Smith was not inclined to be hustled. He could not realise the rapid developments which had taken place in his absence. Harassed by telegrams, he appealed to Lord Randolph. The friendship between them was steadily ripening. Of all the characters with which this story deals, scarcely one improves so much upon acquaintance as this valiant and honest man. He was the true type of what Disraeli calls ‘an English worthy.’ Here is his letter:—
Mr. Smith to Lord Randolph Churchill.Private.Chief Secretary’s Office, Dublin Castle: January 25, 1886, 6P.M.My dear Churchill,—I have had a telegram from Salisbury which affords evidence of pressure for what is termed ‘prompt action,’ and I have replied by letter. Another telegram has just come in from Beach, which cannot be deciphered before post leaves.There is only one opinion here—that the League must be suppressed and large powers obtained to protect life, property and public order, unless the Government is prepared to treat for terms of capitulation with the Parnellites. But the Land Question is at the bottom of the trouble, and gives all the force to the agitation. As at present advised, I should be unwilling to ask for large repressive powers unless I had authority to promise a large land scheme.But these telegrams indicate restlessness in my colleagues. So big a question cannot be decided offhand. Itis more than peace or war with a foreign Power. We are at a crisis in the relations of the Imperial Government with Ireland. I may very possibly fail to do any good, but I will not be hurried into a positive decision on such momentous issues by the party or the papers; and if my colleagues think the three or four days I propose to take too long, I will return to London with pleasure. Let me hear from you either by telegraph or post.Yours sincerely,W. H. Smith.
Mr. Smith to Lord Randolph Churchill.
Private.
Chief Secretary’s Office, Dublin Castle: January 25, 1886, 6P.M.
My dear Churchill,—I have had a telegram from Salisbury which affords evidence of pressure for what is termed ‘prompt action,’ and I have replied by letter. Another telegram has just come in from Beach, which cannot be deciphered before post leaves.
There is only one opinion here—that the League must be suppressed and large powers obtained to protect life, property and public order, unless the Government is prepared to treat for terms of capitulation with the Parnellites. But the Land Question is at the bottom of the trouble, and gives all the force to the agitation. As at present advised, I should be unwilling to ask for large repressive powers unless I had authority to promise a large land scheme.
But these telegrams indicate restlessness in my colleagues. So big a question cannot be decided offhand. Itis more than peace or war with a foreign Power. We are at a crisis in the relations of the Imperial Government with Ireland. I may very possibly fail to do any good, but I will not be hurried into a positive decision on such momentous issues by the party or the papers; and if my colleagues think the three or four days I propose to take too long, I will return to London with pleasure. Let me hear from you either by telegraph or post.
Yours sincerely,W. H. Smith.
The correspondence was continued by cypher telegrams:—
Lord R. Churchill to Mr. Smith.January 26.Greatly obliged by your letter.Absolutely necessary for Government to state to-night their intentions with regard to Ireland—viz. suppression of National League followed by Land Bill. This is the only method of averting defeat on Jesse Collings. Notice should be given to-day of introduction of repressive Bill on Thursday, coupled with revival of rules of urgency. Telegraph to me your views. I would earnestly press your return to London.
Lord R. Churchill to Mr. Smith.
January 26.
Greatly obliged by your letter.
Absolutely necessary for Government to state to-night their intentions with regard to Ireland—viz. suppression of National League followed by Land Bill. This is the only method of averting defeat on Jesse Collings. Notice should be given to-day of introduction of repressive Bill on Thursday, coupled with revival of rules of urgency. Telegraph to me your views. I would earnestly press your return to London.
Mr. Smith to Lord R. Churchill.
I think proposed action looks precipitate. There is no excessive urgency here, and great care is required in framing and describing measure. I should prefer, if possible, to provide against the intimidation of League than denounce it by name. I cross to-night.
I think proposed action looks precipitate. There is no excessive urgency here, and great care is required in framing and describing measure. I should prefer, if possible, to provide against the intimidation of League than denounce it by name. I cross to-night.
Lord Randolph replied from the House of Commons at six o’clock the same day:—
Your telegram received half-hour after Cabinet separated. Beach has just announced introduction of Bill by you onThursday for suppression of National League and other dangerous associations, for the prevention of intimidation and for the protection of life, property and order in Ireland.[51]Of course, great sensation.It is not improbable, however, that we shall be defeated to-night, in which case we shall resign. I showed your wire to Lord Salisbury. We both agreed you would not wish unanimous decision of Cabinet modified.
Your telegram received half-hour after Cabinet separated. Beach has just announced introduction of Bill by you onThursday for suppression of National League and other dangerous associations, for the prevention of intimidation and for the protection of life, property and order in Ireland.[51]Of course, great sensation.
It is not improbable, however, that we shall be defeated to-night, in which case we shall resign. I showed your wire to Lord Salisbury. We both agreed you would not wish unanimous decision of Cabinet modified.
Mr. Smith arrived in London with the daylight, to read upon the early placards that the Government was out.
The famous Jesse Collings Amendment produced an interesting debate; but as the members listened to the opposing views of Mr. Chaplin and Mr. Joseph Arch, of Mr. Goschen and Mr. Bradlaugh, of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Hartington, they knew that behind the relevant arguments of the speakers, behind all the talk of peasant-proprietors, allotments, vegetables, and cows, stood a far greater issue. ‘If the result of this division,’ said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘should be unfavourable to Her Majesty’s Government we shall accept that decision without regret. We assumed office reluctantly, and we shall leave it willingly as soon as we are assured that we do not possess the support of the House. But the success of this motion will have another and graver effect.... It will not only be a defeat of Her Majesty’s Government, butit will be a defeat of the policy ... which they believe it to be their duty to pursue with respect to Ireland.’
The Government were beaten on the division by seventy-nine votes, notwithstanding that sixteen Liberals, including Lord Hartington, Mr. Goschen and Sir Henry James, voted with them and fifty-six others stayed away. The next day Lord Salisbury’s Cabinet resigned.
Thus, after a brief but exciting reign, fell the ‘Ministry of Caretakers.’ They had confronted enormous difficulties with small resources. They existed at the caprice of their enemies. They had office, but not power. Yet they faced their task and their opponents with courage and skill. Their Administration was defended by powerful oratory; it was sustained—except in its dying moments—by sedate and efficient Executive action. In a few short months the Conservative party were freed from the reproach of irresponsibility and their capacity for government was recognised by the country. The peace of Europe was preserved amid grave embarrassments and under their guidance the nation emerged safely and honourably from the Russian crisis. They legislated with unexpected good fortune. They inaugurated a new policy, never since abandoned, of Land Purchase in Ireland. They restored and greatly strengthened the defences of India. They laid the foundations of Australian Federation, and by a successful, inexpensive and almost bloodless military expedition added a vast and fertile province to the dominions of the Crown.
‘Vote it as you please. There is a company of poor men that will spend all their blood before they see it settled so.’—Carlyle,Cromwell.
‘Vote it as you please. There is a company of poor men that will spend all their blood before they see it settled so.’—Carlyle,Cromwell.
ONthe last day in January Mr. Gladstone undertook to form his Administration. Its complexion was indicated by the first of the new appointments: for Mr. Morley became Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant. This was followed, without delay, on the one hand by the statement that Lord Spencer had acquiesced in the new Irish policy and would be Lord President of the Council; and upon the other by rumours of Whig refusals. For some days negotiations were protracted with Lord Hartington, Mr. Goschen and Sir Henry James; but, whatever signs of hesitation had marked their previous course, their action now was decided. Sir Henry James was offered successively both the Lord Chancellorship and the Home Secretaryship, and even more important Executive offices were pressed upon the others. All were declined. Doubt and reluctance were also manifested by Mr. Chamberlain and Sir George Trevelyan and both required and received assurances that they were not committed, by joining the Government, to the support of any Irish policy whichinvolved the creation of a separate Parliament. For the rest it may be noticed that Sir William Harcourt became Chancellor of the Exchequer; that Lord Rosebery went to the Foreign Office; and that neither Lord Derby nor Mr. Forster was included in the Government.
The traveller who visits an old battlefield can never fully understand what its various natural features meant to the combatants. He is shown, perhaps, a rocky ridge which is called the key of the position. He reads that it was taken and repurchased on hard terms more than once during the day. But it is an ordinary object in the landscape. A dozen such eminences have been seen during the morning’s ride. Was it really so important? Were the fortunes of kingdoms actually for some hours involved in the possession of those few acres of rank grass and scattered stone? As he stands serenely on ground where once the bravest soldier hardly dared to crawl, he can scarcely believe it. Yet, to the men who fought, those rocks meant much more than life or death. Duty was there; honour was there; and in the end victory. And if the smoky curtain that hangs about the field were lifted and the view enlarged, it might be seen that great causes of truth, or justice, or freedom, and long tranquil years in smiling lands depended indeed upon this ragged ridge, made famous by the blundering collision of two armies, worthless except for the tactical purpose of the moment and probably ill-adapted and wrongly selected even for that.
The actual provisions of the Home Rule Bill do not at all convey the magnitude of the issue or explain the gravity with which it was regarded. A proposal to establish by statute, subject to guarantees of Imperial supremacy, a colonial Parliament in Ireland for the transaction of Irish business may indeed be unwise, but is not, and ought not to be, outside the limits of calm and patient consideration. Such a proposal is not necessarily fraught with the immense and terrific consequences which were so generally associated with it. A generation may arise in England who will question the policy of creating subordinate legislatures as little as we question the propriety of Catholic Emancipation and who will study the records of the fierce disputes of 1886 with the superior manner of a modern professor examining the controversies of the early Church. But that will not prove the men of 1886 wrong or foolish in speech and action.
The controversy of 1886 can never be resolved. Whatever may happen in the future, neither party can be brought to the bar of history and proved by actual experience right or wrong. The cases of Catholic Emancipation, of the Great Reform Bill, of the Repeal of the Corn Laws, are differently placed. We know that in certain circumstances a great change was made and that that change was immediately vindicated by events and afterwards ratified by posterity. The opponents of the change stand condemned. No such assured conclusion of the Home Rule Question of 1886 can ever be reached, unlessby some unthinkable coincidence the actual circumstances of that time were reconstructed.
Mr. Gladstone ultimately succeeded in convincing not only his personal friends and half his fellow-countrymen of his entire sincerity, but his most capable opponents also. Yet at the time his motives were impugned, and not without much reason. Concessions to Ireland made by any British Government which depends for its existence on the Irish vote, will naturally and necessarily be suspect. There must always be a feeling in English minds that such a government is not a free agent, that it is trafficking for personal or party advantage with what belongs to the nation. In 1886 Mr. Gladstone’s Administration lay under deep suspicion. His own appeals for an independent majority at the election; the sudden conversion of his principal colleagues; the absolute dependence of his power upon Mr. Parnell’s followers; the precipitate haste with which he had taken office; all tended to confirm the distrust and prejudices of his opponents. Whether his Bill was proposed upon its merits or not, it was not considered, and could not be considered, upon them. It looked like surrender—not advance; and surrender made shameful by the party advantage that was its first-fruits. The violent scenes in the House of Commons, the declarations of hatred towards England reiterated by Irish Nationalism, however historically excusable, the long nightmare of outrage and unrest through which Ireland was struggling, the American gold, the dynamite explosions, the bloody daggers in thePhœnix Park, had bitten deep into British minds and memories. The tireless conflicts of Catholic and Protestant, of landlord and tenant, provoked and disquieted statesmen of every complexion. Some there were who rose to Mr. Gladstone’s level of enthusiasm, who shared his consciousness of unswerving rectitude and dreams of glorious achievement; but by most of the eminent men in England the Irish proposals of 1886 were regarded as the surrender of national heirlooms at the compulsion of public enemies, involving an act of practical secession with potential consequences of revolution and civil war. And once this conviction was adopted, all chance that the plan itself would be fairly weighed was inevitably destroyed. Radicals who, like Mr. Chamberlain, were committed to all sorts of schemes of devolution, who looked with favour upon National Councils or Legislatures of the Canadian provincial type, were, by the stroke of crisis, united with the ultra-Conservatives and authoritarians. A state of war existed and political leaders selected their positions upon tactical reasons alone. Here it was good to fight; there it was bad. At this point a stand might be made; that it would be well to concede. All question of a reasonable settlement vanished. Every man chose his ground and fought upon it to win. ‘Never,’ said Lord Randolph in after years to a friend, ‘have we approached the Irish Questionavec de bonnes paroles et de bons procédés.’
Thus it happened that in the tremendous enterprise upon which Mr. Gladstone had now determinedto embark, he found arrayed against him nearly all the leading men and most of the strongest forces in England and Scotland. When a party has been for many years supreme in the State, it draws into itself by its prestige and authority many men who are not really with it in sympathy and opinion. The Whigs and many moderate Liberals had long been estranged. They were held by the force of party associations alone and most of them welcomed a shock which ended the strain and freed them from obligations they could no longer faithfully discharge. The wealthy Whig Peers were glad to escape from Radical associates and to be ranked in the mass of their order. Statesmen of the old school like Mr. Bright, Lord Hartington and Mr. Goschen, with many followers whose talents adorned the Liberal party, were quite unprepared to adapt themselves to the new conditions which a democratic franchise had imposed. The Home Rule proposals—already in themselves a sufficient cause for final separation—were, besides, a convenient opportunity. All this was to have been expected, and no doubt the Irish accession was estimated to fill the gap. But a Radical defection was utterly unforeseen.
Of all the men who followed Mr. Gladstone into the Lobby on the night when the Jesse Collings amendment dismissed the ‘Ministry of Caretakers’ from office, Mr. Chamberlain stood to gain the greatest profit, both in the furtherance of his political opinions and in his personal advancement, from the turn events were taking. For five years hehad battled with the Whigs in the Cabinet; for five years they had checked him. He had declared he would not serve with them again. Now they were going. Their influence alone had enabled the Prime Minister to moderate the Radical demands, of which he was the champion. In the place of that influence was now to be substituted the party of Mr. Parnell. If Mr. Chamberlain had been powerful before, what would he be in the Liberal Governments of the future? If Mr. Gladstone had yielded much to his insistence in the past, what must he concede thereafter? At the very moment when the Radical movement was growing in strength, after an election in which the ‘Unauthorised Programme’ had saved the counties from the Tory triumph in the towns, the whole composition of the Liberal party was to be changed—and changed wholly in his favour. The Prime Minister was a very old man. The path was already almost clear. The future of the party lay at the feet of the leader of thorough, precise and militant Radicalism.
And if in one direction all prospects looked so bright, the other seemed entirely barred. He was in acute antagonism with Lord Hartington. Lord Salisbury had just called him ‘Jack Cade.’ The Whigs regarded him as the cause of their undoing. To the Tories he was a warning of the wrath to come. By many acts of his public life, by a hundred speeches, by the affirmation of important principles and the support of definite measures, he had cut himself off from Whigs and Tories alike. Manymen will wrestle with their own party or change to another party, but few will face political extinction. That such a man, careless perhaps of office, but ambitious for power, should in such circumstances quarrel with Mr. Gladstone, tear his own Radical following to pieces and go forth into the night-storm almost alone, was a fact not in human wisdom to be known or imagined in dreams. Yet his reply to Parnell’s demand had been prompt and plain. ‘If these, and these alone, are the terms on which Mr. Parnell’s support is to be obtained,’ he declared as early as September, ‘I will not enter into the compact.’
That Lord Randolph Churchill was consistent and sincere in his opposition to Home Rule was at the time much questioned by both sides, and some shadow of that suspicion has remained. He it was who had rendered possible the co-operation between the Irish party and the Tory Opposition, which had placed and maintained the late Government in office. He was known to hold liberal views on Irish problems. He was described as being unscrupulous in Parliamentary manœuvre. He had opposed the renewal of Coercion. He had defended the Maamtrasna inquiry. If it were true that the Conservative Government had had any Home Rule dealings as a Government, he was reputed their agent. If any Minister had trafficked independently, he was that Minister. Many Home Rulers and Orangemen, agreeing in nothing else, agreed in believing that he at any rate had beenready upon a Home Rule basis to bargain with Parnell. These suspicions are injurious. No man was more vigorous in his public resistance to Home Rule or more vehement in his language than Lord Randolph Churchill; and if in the midst of his denunciations of Mr. Gladstone, while he was rousing England and inflaming Ulster, it had been true that he was fortified by no real conviction, and had been ready a few months before to sell all that he now declared sacred, an odious charge would have been brought home.
The documents printed in preceding chapters constitute an unassailable defence. No Unionist politician has a clearer record. Lord Randolph Churchill was perfectly willing to work with the Irish members. He understood how much they had in common with the Conservative party, and with the best part of the Conservative party. He had no prejudices and many sympathies in their direction. But his arrangement with them, or with any of them—for he counted on dividing their forces—would have been social, religious or economic in its character. It would never have been of a National character. To give the Irish the educational system they desired, to court and coax the Bishops, to win the Catholic Church to the side of the Conservative party—these were objects which all his life he faithfully pursued. The first political pamphlet he wrote was on Irish intermediate education. Whether as a Minister in 1885, or out of office in 1888 and 1889, he will be found deep in schemes of Catholic conciliationby Irish educational reform—primary, intermediate and university. One of the last letters this account contains returns to and reiterates this long-cherished idea. Almost his last speech in the House of Commons was in defence of Catholic schools. But to the repeal of the Parliamentary Union he was always unalterably opposed. He did not even think it worth while to consider seriously the many modified alternatives in which the times abounded. They might be wise or unwise; but they were not, he thought, within the functions of the Conservative party. He knew nothing of the Carnarvon incident, and was incensed to discover it. His letter to Lord Morris of December 7, 1885, shows how unyielding he was even to the suggestion of a conference, before the great attempt was made. His correspondence with Mr. Chamberlain, who always inclined to alternative proposals, proves him quite unconvinced in later years by the course of the struggle or by the change in his own position. ‘It would require circumstances widely different and pressure of an almost overwhelming kind,’ he wrote in August 1887, ‘to induce any portion of the Tories to look at any scheme of Home Rule. Gladstone alone can deal with that measure; and I hope that if he does, and when he does, he may be kept in check and controlled by a powerful Opposition.’
The advent of this great crisis therefore threw him for the first time into complete sympathy with the whole Conservative party. All his energies and talents were freely expended in a cause for whichhe cared intensely. Mr. Gladstone’s vast personal power may perhaps be measured by the opponents by whom he was confronted, and by whom he was so narrowly overborne. It would be profitless to compare the relative services of the various distinguished men who now ranged themselves against him; to observe that Sir Henry James made the heaviest sacrifices, that Mr. Chamberlain ran the greatest risks, that Lord Salisbury showed commanding wisdom or that Lord Hartington struck the weightiest blows. But when the history of the famous battle for the Union in 1886 comes to be worthily written, it will be found that no single man fought with effect in more different quarters of the field than Lord Randolph Churchill or was in the heart and centre of more decisive frays.
Outside the walls of Parliament the issue was determined chiefly in the cities of Birmingham and Belfast. The transference of the whole political strength of the great Midland centre of Radicalism to the Unionist cause and the fierce resistance of the Irish North, were the two most serious obstacles which Mr. Gladstone encountered. In both cities the conflict was marked by every circumstance of passion and excitement. In both Lord Randolph intervened as a leader. He possessed in an eminent degree many of the qualities which may be discovered in a successful military commander. He could detect with almost unerring skill the weak points in his enemy’s array. He could make up his mind with bewildering rapidity and act upon the decision so formedwith absolute confidence. He knew well how to separate what was vital from what was merely important or desirable. He was quite ruthless in casting away smaller objects for the sake of a greater. Few men were better suited to the storms of violent times. Till the explosion of Home Rule in the early days of December, he was deep in schemes of educational concession to the Catholic hierarchy—schemes which were in themselves delicate and complicated and which, on account of the suspicion they would have excited in Protestant Lancashire, were necessarily secret while a General Election was pending. But no sooner did Mr. Gladstone’s intentions become known with certainty than Lord Randolph looked towards Ulster. All plans of Catholic Universities and nice correspondence with princes of the Church had to be unceremoniously stowed away till calmer weather. Christmas found him planning his visit to Belfast. By the New Year the arrangements were completed. The Ulster Hall was prepared and the Orange drums were beating. ‘I decided some time ago,’ he wrote bluntly to FitzGibbon, on February 16, 1886, ‘that if the G.O.M. went for Home Rule, the Orange card would be the one to play. Please God it may turn out the ace of trumps and not the two.... I expect,’ he added, ‘your old Commission will go to the devil now.’
Lord Randolph was the first of the out-going Ministers to break silence and in Paddington, on February 13, he defended the violent oscillations inthe Irish policy of the late Government—the contrast between the policy of August 1885 and that of January 1886. The reader is already in possession of the main features of that defence, but it is set forth in this speech in a complete argumentative shape; and though it is naturally a partisan account, it will be found to bear a close comparison with the facts now published. The situation in Ireland in August had not, he declared, necessitated the renewal of the Crimes Act. The provisions of the Crimes Act were not suited to deal with the National League; and by January the growth of that organisation required the creation of new and different weapons. ‘If the hateful and malignant domination of the National League had been finally and for ever suppressed, if the restoration of order had been effective—then Lord Salisbury’s Government were prepared to propose to Parliament measures which would to a large extent have met the legitimate aspirations of the Irish people, whether as regards Local Government or as regards the further settlement of some portions of the eternal Land Question, or as regards those wishes of the Catholics of Ireland on higher education which a large concurrence of the opinion of this country is disposed to look upon as right and reasonable.’ He concluded by appealing for the support and encouragement of his constituents in his mission to Ulster upon which he was about to embark.
Lord Randolph crossed the Channel, and arrived at Larne early on the morning of February 22. He was welcomed like a king. Thousands of persons,assembling from the neighbouring townships, greeted him at the port. At Carrickfergus, where the train was stopped, he imitated—almost for the only time—a historic example by addressing a ‘great crowd on the platform.’ In Belfast itself a vast demonstration, remarkable for its earnestness and quality and amounting, it is computed, to more than seventy thousand people, marched past him. One who knew Ireland well declared that he had not believed ‘there were so many Orangemen in the world.’ That night the Ulster Hall was crowded to its utmost compass. In order to satisfy the demand for tickets all the seats were removed and the concourse—which he addressed for nearly an hour and a half—heard him standing. He was nearly always successful on the platform, but the effect he produced upon his audience in Belfast was one of the most memorable triumphs of his life. He held the meeting in the hollow of his hand. From the very centre of Protestant excitement he appealed to the loyal Catholics of Ireland to stand firm by the Union and at the same time, without using language of bigotry or intolerance, he roused the Orangemen to stern and vehement emotion.
‘Now may be the time,’ he said, ‘to show whether all those ceremonies and forms which are practised in Orange Lodges, are really living symbols or only idle and meaningless ceremonies; whether that which you have so carefully fostered, is really the lamp of liberty and its flame the undying and unquenchable fire of freedom.... The time maybe at hand when you will have to show that the path of honour and safety is still illuminated by the light of other days. It may be that this dark cloud which is now impending over Ireland, will pass away without breaking. If it does, I believe you and your descendants will be safe for a long time to come. Her Majesty’s Government hesitates. Like Macbeth before the murder of Duncan, Mr. Gladstone asks for time. Before he plunges the knife into the heart of the British Empire he reflects, he hesitates.... The demonstrations to-day will have a very useful effect not only upon the public mind in England, but also on the Ministerial mind, and many more of them must be held. And those demonstrations ought to be imposing not only from their numbers, but also for their orderly character. We are essentially a party of law and order and any violent action resorted to prematurely or without the most obvious and overwhelming necessity might have the most fatal and damaging effect upon the cause which we so dearly value and might alienate forces whose resistance would be beyond all price. The Loyalists in Ulster should wait and watch—organise and prepare. Diligence and vigilance ought to be your watchword; so that the blow, if it does come, may not come upon you as a thief in the night and may not find you unready and taken by surprise.
‘I believe that this storm will blow over and that the vessel of the Union will emerge with her Loyalist crew stronger than before; but it is right and useful that I should add that if the struggleshould continue and if my conclusions should turn out to be wrong, then I am of opinion that the struggle is not likely to remain within the lines of what we are accustomed to look upon as constitutional action. No portentous change such as the Repeal of the Union, no change so gigantic, could be accomplished by the mere passing of a law. The history of the United States will teach us a different lesson; and if it should turn out that the Parliament of the United Kingdom was so recreant from all its high duties, and that the British nation was so apostate to traditions of honour and courage, as to hand over the Loyalists of Ireland to the domination of an Assembly in Dublin which must be to them a foreign and an alien assembly, if it should be within the design of Providence to place upon you and your fellow-Loyalists so heavy a trial, then, gentlemen, I do not hesitate to tell you most truly that in that dark hour there will not be wanting to you those of position and influence in England who would be willing to cast in their lot with you and who, whatever the result, will share your fortunes and your fate. There will not be wanting those who at the exact moment, when the time is fully come—if that time should come—will address you in words which are perhaps best expressed by one of our greatest English poets:—