Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: September 5, 1886.Dear Lord Hartington,—You will have observed in the papers that the Government gave a promise to Parnell to afford him facilities (i.e.a night) for laying his land proposals in the form of a Bill before Parliament.Whether this promise was a wise one or not, I will not say. There were no doubt grave objections to any concession to Parnell of any sort or kind, but I think if you had been in the House last week you might have been of opinion that the objections to a course of stolid resistance on the part of the Government were perhaps greater.However this may be I own that I am extremely anxious that (if possible) when the Bill does come on, the Government may receive your support in opposing it. Of course the Bill will only be Parnell’s original amendment to the Address in another form, and the Government will not give way an inch to him under any consideration.But Parnell has undoubtedly hopes, which if they are unsound cannot be too clearly and speedily demonstrated to be unsound, that he can make out a case so plausible for the tenants on the score of inability to pay that he may securethe support or at least the abstention of the Liberal Unionists; and of course if he were successful in this the moral strength of the Government would be seriously diminished, with corresponding disadvantage to other, greater and more common interests.I therefore trouble you with these few lines now, though I do not suppose the discussion on the Bill can arise till next week at the earliest.Believe me to beVery faithfully yours,Randolph S. Churchill.
Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: September 5, 1886.
Dear Lord Hartington,—You will have observed in the papers that the Government gave a promise to Parnell to afford him facilities (i.e.a night) for laying his land proposals in the form of a Bill before Parliament.
Whether this promise was a wise one or not, I will not say. There were no doubt grave objections to any concession to Parnell of any sort or kind, but I think if you had been in the House last week you might have been of opinion that the objections to a course of stolid resistance on the part of the Government were perhaps greater.
However this may be I own that I am extremely anxious that (if possible) when the Bill does come on, the Government may receive your support in opposing it. Of course the Bill will only be Parnell’s original amendment to the Address in another form, and the Government will not give way an inch to him under any consideration.
But Parnell has undoubtedly hopes, which if they are unsound cannot be too clearly and speedily demonstrated to be unsound, that he can make out a case so plausible for the tenants on the score of inability to pay that he may securethe support or at least the abstention of the Liberal Unionists; and of course if he were successful in this the moral strength of the Government would be seriously diminished, with corresponding disadvantage to other, greater and more common interests.
I therefore trouble you with these few lines now, though I do not suppose the discussion on the Bill can arise till next week at the earliest.
Believe me to beVery faithfully yours,Randolph S. Churchill.
A friendly message emboldened the Minister to write more freely of his difficulties:—
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Hartington.Private.September 13, 1886.The position of this Government must always be most precarious. It may have a long life; but it is a rickety infant, requiring the most careful handling. The condition of the House of Commons, the recklessness and utter lack of all sense of responsibility on the part of the Opposition, their guerilla character and the want of a leader who can control, is most alarming. There is no precedent that I know of in our history of such a combination of ominous circumstances. I hear you are going to India; and if this means your absence from the House till March or April, I think it right to tell you that without your support in Parliament this Government cannot last. The assaults of an Opposition unrestrained by your presence will be too desperate for me to sustain. A state of great confusion will arise; the Government will go, and you will have to try your hand. I feel awfully alone in the House of Commons, and am glad to grasp an opportunity of placing things before you as I look at them.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Hartington.
Private.
September 13, 1886.
The position of this Government must always be most precarious. It may have a long life; but it is a rickety infant, requiring the most careful handling. The condition of the House of Commons, the recklessness and utter lack of all sense of responsibility on the part of the Opposition, their guerilla character and the want of a leader who can control, is most alarming. There is no precedent that I know of in our history of such a combination of ominous circumstances. I hear you are going to India; and if this means your absence from the House till March or April, I think it right to tell you that without your support in Parliament this Government cannot last. The assaults of an Opposition unrestrained by your presence will be too desperate for me to sustain. A state of great confusion will arise; the Government will go, and you will have to try your hand. I feel awfully alone in the House of Commons, and am glad to grasp an opportunity of placing things before you as I look at them.
Lord Hartington to Lord Randolph Churchill.Private.Brantingham Thorpe, Brough, Yorkshire: September 14, 1886.My dear Churchill,—I received your letter this morning before leaving London, and am glad to know so fully your opinions on the position in the House of Commons. It is quite true that I have some doubt, which I expressed to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, as to resisting the whole of Parnell’s Bill. I do not think that you can leave expediency out of the question in dealing with the rights of Irish landlords. They have very few friends; and if they are encouraged to strain their rights, and if disorder could justly be put down to their account, they would have still fewer.It is quite clear that the intention is to fight the Nationalist battle on the question of the land during next winter, and it will be to Parnell’s advantage that there should be as many evictions as possible. Your best chance is that he will not succeed in inducing tenants who can pay to risk eviction. But if landlords evict wholesale tenants who cannot pay, he may succeed in getting up another very dangerous agitation. I thought, therefore, that this was to a great extent a question for the Irish Government, and if they considered a check on eviction necessary I should have been inclined to grant it. But, as I understand, they think that the Courts have already a considerable discretion which may be sufficient, and undoubtedly any concession to Parnell would do harm unless the evil of resistance is still greater.I do not think that I misunderstood your action in giving Parnell a day for discussion of his Bill, though I do not know the exact reasons for the decision. But I certainly thought that, while you were quite right to keep your absolute freedom of action in regard to the Bill, you were not precluded from accepting any part of it which the Irish Government might on further consideration think necessary.
Lord Hartington to Lord Randolph Churchill.
Private.
Brantingham Thorpe, Brough, Yorkshire: September 14, 1886.
My dear Churchill,—I received your letter this morning before leaving London, and am glad to know so fully your opinions on the position in the House of Commons. It is quite true that I have some doubt, which I expressed to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, as to resisting the whole of Parnell’s Bill. I do not think that you can leave expediency out of the question in dealing with the rights of Irish landlords. They have very few friends; and if they are encouraged to strain their rights, and if disorder could justly be put down to their account, they would have still fewer.
It is quite clear that the intention is to fight the Nationalist battle on the question of the land during next winter, and it will be to Parnell’s advantage that there should be as many evictions as possible. Your best chance is that he will not succeed in inducing tenants who can pay to risk eviction. But if landlords evict wholesale tenants who cannot pay, he may succeed in getting up another very dangerous agitation. I thought, therefore, that this was to a great extent a question for the Irish Government, and if they considered a check on eviction necessary I should have been inclined to grant it. But, as I understand, they think that the Courts have already a considerable discretion which may be sufficient, and undoubtedly any concession to Parnell would do harm unless the evil of resistance is still greater.
I do not think that I misunderstood your action in giving Parnell a day for discussion of his Bill, though I do not know the exact reasons for the decision. But I certainly thought that, while you were quite right to keep your absolute freedom of action in regard to the Bill, you were not precluded from accepting any part of it which the Irish Government might on further consideration think necessary.
I shall always be very glad to communicate with you on Parliamentary matters when you think it desirable, and can very well understand the anxiety and responsibility of your position.Yours very truly,Hartington.
I shall always be very glad to communicate with you on Parliamentary matters when you think it desirable, and can very well understand the anxiety and responsibility of your position.
Yours very truly,Hartington.
The Address was disposed of in the first week of September and the House plunged at once into Supply. Forthwith obstruction became patent and flagrant. A select, determined and well-organised band, among whom Mr. Labouchere was the best known, took charge of national interests. They did not disdain trifles, however small; nor grudge study, however laborious. It was the last chance of a minority under the unreformed procedure. No Supply Rule, automatically fixing limits, regulated the votes. No Closure aided the Minister. The Committee debated to their hearts’ content, and on after that till they were sick and weary. Business crawled forward on its belly in the small hours of the morning. Any attempt on the part of the Leader of the House to accelerate its passage was met by alternate motions to report progress and to adjourn. Lord Randolph was teased with mischievous satisfaction upon all the former manœuvres of the Fourth Party. It was a severe, if appropriate, expiation. Nothing but imperturbable temper and physical endurance availed. The Leader of the House was always in his place. He listened to all the discussions. He defended every detail of the Civil Service Estimates himself. On warlike stores, on public accounts,on salaries in the House of Lords, on secret service and town holdings and polluted rivers, on poor ratepayers and gold coinage, he was found suave, adroit, and well informed.
‘The Chancellor of the Exchequer,’ observed theTimes, not always a friendly critic (September 17), ‘is making great progress in the art of so answering questions as to keep the House in a good temper. This he does sometimes by judicious concessions, sometimes by a sly turn of humour, sometimes by a touch of good-natured irony.’ Indeed, he used every Parliamentary art and all the resources of his many-sided character. Sometimes he coaxed and sometimes he complained. Sometimes he resisted with vehemence only to make surrender an hour or two later more valued. Once, as has been shown, he appealed earnestly and with success to the House. Once he rapped out that the tactics of the obstructionists were ‘not conceived in the public interest,’ and after an angry debate made a reconciliation with them and secured incidentally some progress. He knew the House in all its moods. He humoured it and offended it and soothed it again with practised deliberation. Yet he always appeared to be its servant. Ministers and Governments were but the respectful stewards of the public service. Parliament had rights and authority over them, to which, however capriciously asserted, they must bow: ‘My own opinion,’ he said when his attention was roughly drawn to a criticism of the Public Accounts Committee on some departmental practice, ‘is that theComptroller and Auditor-General and the Public Accounts Committee, acting together, ought to be a superior authority to the Treasury; and that, if they distinctly lay down a rule as to the expenditure of money, it is the business of the Treasury to acknowledge that authority as superior to their own.’ The member, Mr. Arthur O’Connor, who had complained, was so contented with this soft answer that, after congratulating the Chancellor of the Exchequer ‘upon the breadth of view with which he always looks at matters of this kind,’ he withdrew his motion for the reduction of the vote. Thus, inch by inch, Supply crept forward.
The Irish members watched Lord Randolph hourly. He and they had obstructed so often together that both sides knew enough of each other’s ways not to be deceived by blandishments or manœuvres which would captivate the innocent spectator. Soured and indignant as they were—not unnaturally—by the turn of events, in their hearts they nourished a certain secret sympathy for the conqueror. They enjoyed seeing the game played scientifically, and they realised how different their new antagonist was from the prosaic authoritarians who chafe the hearts of Celtic peoples. At last the Estimates were done. ‘It is due to the Chancellor of the Exchequer,’ said theTimes(September 16), ‘to say that no Leader of the House of Commons in recent years has met obstruction, open and disguised, with more exemplary patience.’
The general satisfaction of the Conservative partyat Lord Randolph’s management of the House of Commons found expression in much solicitude for his health. ‘Don’t worry yourself and get knocked up,’ wrote Mr. Chamberlain (September 1). ‘I do not believe that the Irish will keep you sweltering very much longer.’ ‘You really must take more care of yourself,’ Mr. Balfour insisted. ‘Now that the main business of the Address is got over, I cannot see why you should spend so much time in your place in the House.’ And Lord Salisbury on the 14th: ‘I am afraid your work is getting intolerably hard. Don’t sit up too much.’
‘I am particularly commanded,’ said Lord Iddesleigh, writing from Balmoral on the 16th, ‘by the Queen to say that Her Majesty was greatly amused by the contents of your box last night. I suppose you won’t understand this message without the gloss—there was a sprinkling of tobacco in it.
‘Her Majesty is very sympathetic over the sufferings of our friends in the House of Commons. You have indeed a very hard task and it is not very clear how it is to be lightened.’
Only Mr. Parnell’s Bill remained after the Estimates were passed. Two days (September 20 and 21) were occupied in its discussion. The Bill was badly drawn. Mr. Gladstone supported it in principle; but was forced to object to nearly every detail. Lord Hartington was severe in his condemnation. The Government declared they would have nothing whatever to do with it. Mr. Morley alone was fortunate in his advocacy. It was rejectedby 297 to 202. Ministers were much advantaged by having persuaded their opponents to expose themselves to the perils of constructive policies.
Lord Randolph Churchill ended the session amid golden opinions. Congratulations and goodwill flowed in upon him from all sides. He himself was in high spirits. ‘You must find it very hard work,’ said an admirer, ‘leading the House and at the same time being at the Exchequer.’ ‘Not half such hard work as it was getting there,’ was the droll answer. The party newspapers were loud in their praises. All doubts about his tact and patience were dispersed, and Conservative members hurried off to the country feeling that a great man had arisen among them, and that ‘Elijah’s mantle’ had lighted upon no unworthy shoulders. The Sovereign wrote him an autograph letter of exceptional favour:—
Balmoral Castle: September 22, 1886.Now that the session is just over, the Queen wishes to write and thank Lord Randolph Churchill for his regular and full and interesting reports of the debates in the House of Commons, which must have been most trying.Lord Randolph has shown much skill and judgment in his leadership during this exceptional session of Parliament.
Balmoral Castle: September 22, 1886.
Now that the session is just over, the Queen wishes to write and thank Lord Randolph Churchill for his regular and full and interesting reports of the debates in the House of Commons, which must have been most trying.
Lord Randolph has shown much skill and judgment in his leadership during this exceptional session of Parliament.
enlarge-imageBalmoral Castle: Sept: 22, 1886. Now that the session is just over the Queen wishes to write and thank Lord Randolph Churchill for his regular and full and interesting reports of the debates in the House of Commons, which must have been
enlarge-image
Difficulties abroad were soon added to the difficulties at home. At the end of August foreign affairs in Eastern Europe were suddenly plunged into crisis through the kidnapping of Prince Alexander by Bulgarian officers under Russian influence, and his consequent abdication. The Chanceries of Europe throbbed with excitement and apprehension. To Lord Randolph Churchill the news was specially unwelcome. He did not concern himself too much about Constantinople, and cared nothing at all for Turkey. The sentiments which had in 1878 induced him to write to Sir Charles Dilke, offering, if the Liberals would support him, to move a vote of censure upon Lord Beaconsfield’s foreign policy, were unaltered. The freedom and independence of the Slav, Bulgarian and Hellenic peoples seemed to him still a wise and lofty object; but any sympathies which he had for stifled or struggling nationalities were strictly controlled. Great Britain should not shrink from her share in the responsibilities of Europe; but no duty of isolated intervention lay upon her. He had, moreover, been deeply impressed by the satisfactory manner in which the Afghan frontier dispute had been settled. He had become much more hopeful of a good understanding with Russia than when he had first gone to the India Office. Above all, he was resolved to offer no wanton provocation which might lead by Russian reprisals in Asia to the reopening of a question of such grave importance to the tranquillity of the Indian Empire.
The proceedings of the Foreign Office seriously disquieted him. As early as September 4 he wrote to Lord Salisbury: ‘I have just read Lord Iddesleigh’s telegram to Lascelles, telling him to prevent Alexander from abdicating and to cause him to appeal to the Great Powers. I think this is very unfair on Alexander. Iddesleigh knows perfectlywell that the Great Powers won’t move a finger, and he knows we cannot act outside a most Platonic range. I am afraid of our incurring moral responsibilities towards the Prince and his people which may lead us on far without previous calculation.... I do most earnestly trust that we may not be drifting into strong and marked action in the East of Europe. It will place us in great peril in the House of Commons, politically and financially.’ And again on the 6th: ‘Iddesleigh’s last telegram to Lascelles is reallyun peu trop fort. I do think we ought to have an immediate Cabinet before such messages are sent. I look at the series together; the two first were startling, but recognised European concert, which the last altogether flings aside. W. H. Smith concurs strongly that the Cabinet ought to meet. Any moment it may leak out at Sofia that we are taking strong action.... Lord John Manners made a remark to me at 4.30 this afternoon symptomatic of surprise that there had been no Cabinet. As you know I loathe Cabinets, you will feel that this is disinterested; but I own to being frightened.’ The Prime Minister consented to summon his colleagues, adding merely that he and Lord Iddesleigh were agreed as to the policy, but that the Cabinet could overrule them if it thought fit. The Cabinet, however, cleared the air and led to better understandings.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: September 15, 1886.Dear Lord Salisbury,—Another desperate night in the H. of C. You may imagine how bad was the Irish conduct when Beach’s last words to me were: ‘I am now all for a strong Clôture.’ ...M. de Staal has just been to see me. He declaimed against White.... I said that in view of our occupation of Egypt it was necessary that we should have a representative at Constantinople of character and resolution. He said the Bulgarians had done something or other rude to the Emperor’s portrait at Sofia. He spoke of the great difficulty Russia had in coming to an understanding with Austria on account of the Hungarians, who thought of nothing but ‘49.’ He tried to ascertain my views as to our interests in the Balkan territories; my reply was (speaking only for myself) that our chief interests were Egypt and India, and that anything which affected our interests in those countries would necessitate very strong action on our part. Speaking generally, I said that with Ireland on our hands, our foreign policy, except under great pressure, would naturally be pacific. He asked about the position of the Government. I told him that Gladstone was hopelessly out of it, and was no longer young enough to get into it again; that his principal supporters were hopelessly discredited and divided; that Hartington possessed great balancing influence, but could not look to forming a Government himself; that whether this particular Government lasted or no, power was with the Conservative party, whose political organisation and strength were increasing and improving every day; that such a fact as London returning forty-three Conservatives against four Gladstonians ought to have great weight with him in appreciating the Conservative position.Finally, I hinted at an understanding with Russia by which she should give us real support in Egypt, abandon herpressure upon Afghanistan, in which case she might settle the Balkan matters as she would—or, rather, as shecould!Yours most sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.
Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: September 15, 1886.
Dear Lord Salisbury,—Another desperate night in the H. of C. You may imagine how bad was the Irish conduct when Beach’s last words to me were: ‘I am now all for a strong Clôture.’ ...
M. de Staal has just been to see me. He declaimed against White.... I said that in view of our occupation of Egypt it was necessary that we should have a representative at Constantinople of character and resolution. He said the Bulgarians had done something or other rude to the Emperor’s portrait at Sofia. He spoke of the great difficulty Russia had in coming to an understanding with Austria on account of the Hungarians, who thought of nothing but ‘49.’ He tried to ascertain my views as to our interests in the Balkan territories; my reply was (speaking only for myself) that our chief interests were Egypt and India, and that anything which affected our interests in those countries would necessitate very strong action on our part. Speaking generally, I said that with Ireland on our hands, our foreign policy, except under great pressure, would naturally be pacific. He asked about the position of the Government. I told him that Gladstone was hopelessly out of it, and was no longer young enough to get into it again; that his principal supporters were hopelessly discredited and divided; that Hartington possessed great balancing influence, but could not look to forming a Government himself; that whether this particular Government lasted or no, power was with the Conservative party, whose political organisation and strength were increasing and improving every day; that such a fact as London returning forty-three Conservatives against four Gladstonians ought to have great weight with him in appreciating the Conservative position.
Finally, I hinted at an understanding with Russia by which she should give us real support in Egypt, abandon herpressure upon Afghanistan, in which case she might settle the Balkan matters as she would—or, rather, as shecould!
Yours most sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
A few days later Lord Salisbury was able to retire to his villa near Dieppe, although the situation still continued critical and obscure. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, delighted by Lord Salisbury’s proposal to change the British Agent at Sofia, seems to have made great efforts to bring his opinions nearer to those of his chief. On the 23rd he reports an interview with Count Hatzfeldt. ‘I told him that I had been thinking much over what had passed between us about the East of Europe, and that I had come to this conclusion as a member of the House of Commons and from a House of Commons point of view: Any anti-Russian policy which involved England taking the lead ostensibly on the side of Turkey, either about Bulgaria or even Constantinople, would probably place the Unionist party in great peril, might fail to receive the support of the constituencies, and would be savagely assaulted. An anti-Russian policy, however, in which Austria took the lead supported by Germany, we could, I thought, well fall in with, and hold our own easily in the House of Commons. He said: ‘That is all very well; but what will be wanting, will be Germany’s support of Austria. Our eyes are riveted on France.’ I said, if that was really so, of course we could not play; but that it occurred to me that it was not impossible that if Germany and Austria took thelead against Russian advance and in defence of Bulgarian independence, and we followed and joined loyally and thoroughly, I thought that would seem to entail logically action on our part, diplomatic or otherwise, against France if she tried to be nasty. He seemed much interested by this, and I impressed upon him at parting not to forget that it must be to Germany’s interest that the Unionist party and the Government should endure and remain strong; that foreign policy on our part which followed the lead of Germany and Austria would not try that strength too high, and might be carried far; but that foreign policy against Russia in the East of Europe which left the initiative to England would be a policy too dangerous, seeing the other great interests we had to defend, for us to contemplate. I told him these were mere House of Commons views, for his own private information for whatever they were worth, and that he was not to consider them in any other light.
‘I don’t know whether you will think this expression shows any change of views from what I have expressed to you recently. I do not think it does really....’
‘If Russia attacked Constantinople,’ wrote the Prime Minister in a letter approving generally of this discourse, ‘and all the other Powers refused to intervene, I am rather disposed to the idea that we should have to act in the Dardanelles; but I hope the contingency is too improbable to require us to trouble about it.’ The Chancellor of theExchequer replied meekly that he would be quite agreeable to ‘a piratical seizure of Gallipoli.’ ‘There is,’ he adds, ‘a practical flavour about such a step which would commend it to the most Radical and peace-loving House of Commons.’ Lord Salisbury detected a flavour of levity in this answer.
‘You are naturally sarcastic,’ he wrote on the 28th, ‘on my Dardanelles, and I hope the matter will not come up in our time. But the possession by Russia of Constantinople will be an awkward piece of news for the Minister who receives it. The prestige effect on the Asiatic populations will be enormous, and I pity the English party that has this item on their record. They will share the fate of Lord North’s party.
‘At the same time I know the great military objections there are to the Dardanelles scheme.’
Further activity at the Foreign Office renewed the correspondence. On the 30th Lord Randolph wrote again urgently to the Prime Minister:—
I have read with the utmost dismay Iddesleigh’s telegram to Lascelles instructing him to inform the Bulgarian Government that our Government approve of the reply sent by them to the Russian Note.What is the reason for this apparently isolated and certainly most risky action? I cannot make out that an opinion was ever asked for directly, which makes such instructions all the more strange. Have we any right to express approval in so pointed and uncalled for a manner, without at the same time letting those poor Bulgarians know that beyond the merest diplomatic action we cannot go? I thought, when you told me some days ago that Lascelles was to be changed that that meant a modification of policy. I see no use inchanging the agent in this case, if the policy to which objection has been taken is to be even more accentuated.Why cannot Iddesleigh consider the propriety of trying to act at Sofia in conjunction with the Austrian, German and Italian Governments, and, if joint action is for the moment impossible, abstaining from any action at all? We shall never get joint action while Iddesleigh keeps rushing in where Bismarck fears to tread. What I would like to see aimed at would be a Second Berlin Memorandum—this time addressed, not to Turkey, but to Russia, and England joining in. But all chance of such a document, which would imply irresistible forces, fades further and further into the distance.Our action with Austria means war with Russia. Our action with Austria and Germany means peace. But I feel sure that our present niggling, meddling, intriguing, fussy policy is gaining for us the contempt and dislike of Bismarck every day. I do pray you to consider these matters. It was supposed that Lord Iddesleigh would act under your direction. I feel certain that much that he has done has been done on his own account. After all, it is very fine for him now; but the day of trial will come when all this has to be explained and defended in the House of Commons.Now I have risked your wrath by inflicting this jeremiad upon you, but it is the last, for I go abroad Sunday and shall know no more till I return.
I have read with the utmost dismay Iddesleigh’s telegram to Lascelles instructing him to inform the Bulgarian Government that our Government approve of the reply sent by them to the Russian Note.
What is the reason for this apparently isolated and certainly most risky action? I cannot make out that an opinion was ever asked for directly, which makes such instructions all the more strange. Have we any right to express approval in so pointed and uncalled for a manner, without at the same time letting those poor Bulgarians know that beyond the merest diplomatic action we cannot go? I thought, when you told me some days ago that Lascelles was to be changed that that meant a modification of policy. I see no use inchanging the agent in this case, if the policy to which objection has been taken is to be even more accentuated.
Why cannot Iddesleigh consider the propriety of trying to act at Sofia in conjunction with the Austrian, German and Italian Governments, and, if joint action is for the moment impossible, abstaining from any action at all? We shall never get joint action while Iddesleigh keeps rushing in where Bismarck fears to tread. What I would like to see aimed at would be a Second Berlin Memorandum—this time addressed, not to Turkey, but to Russia, and England joining in. But all chance of such a document, which would imply irresistible forces, fades further and further into the distance.
Our action with Austria means war with Russia. Our action with Austria and Germany means peace. But I feel sure that our present niggling, meddling, intriguing, fussy policy is gaining for us the contempt and dislike of Bismarck every day. I do pray you to consider these matters. It was supposed that Lord Iddesleigh would act under your direction. I feel certain that much that he has done has been done on his own account. After all, it is very fine for him now; but the day of trial will come when all this has to be explained and defended in the House of Commons.
Now I have risked your wrath by inflicting this jeremiad upon you, but it is the last, for I go abroad Sunday and shall know no more till I return.
‘Like you,’ replied Lord Salisbury from Puys, on October 1, ‘I am not happy about foreign affairs, but not entirely for the same reason. I do not wholly take your view about our attitude towards Russia. I consider the loss of Constantinople would be the ruin of our party and a heavy blow to the country: and therefore I am anxious to delay by all means Russia’s advance to that goal. A pacific and economical policy is up to a certainpoint very wise: but it is evident that there is a point beyond which it is not wise either in a patriotic or party sense—and the question is where we shall draw the line. I draw it at Constantinople. My belief is that the main strength of the Tory party, both in the richer and poorer classes, lies in its association with the honour of the country. It is quite true that if, in order to save that honour, we have to run into expense, we shall suffer as a party—that is human nature. But what I contend is, that we shall suffer as a party more—much more—if the loss of Constantinople stands on our record.... I am therefore rather uneasy about foreign affairs—for I am afraid you are prepared to give up Constantinople: and foreign Powers will be quick enough to find that divergence out. On the other hand I sympathise with you in some uneasiness as to the course of the Foreign Office. Many things, I fear, are not done—and I am disquieted at the result ... when I get back to England I may be able to exert a stronger influence.’
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: October 3, 1886.Dear Lord Salisbury,—I was not able to write yesterday and thank you for your letter, as I had to go down to Dartford.You must not think that I in any way disagree from what you urge about Constantinople. It is only that I have a great doubt whether the particular method and scheme of policy which was carried out at the time of the Crimean War, and again to a great extent in 1876-78, is the best. I doubt whether the people will support that method; andit seems to have this enormous disadvantage, that it enables Austria to lie back.We can, I think, perfectly defend Constantinople by going in for the independence of Bulgaria; and we can best obtain that independence by persuading Austria to take the lead.But no doubt the proceedings of Lascelles, and the probable proceedings at Constantinople of Sir W. White, are more in accordance with the old policy, which I fear is now impracticable, than with a modification of that policy.Please do not suspect me of indifference to a matter on which you feel so strongly. My only business and object are to bring, in the best way I can, any policy which you wish carried out into favour with the House of Commons and the constituencies, so far as it may be possible for me to influence either. You must remember that you have not spoken on these matters either in the Lords or the country, and I am only anxious that you should find aterrainwell prepared.I am off to-morrow night and out of reach of everybody till 23rd.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.
Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: October 3, 1886.
Dear Lord Salisbury,—I was not able to write yesterday and thank you for your letter, as I had to go down to Dartford.
You must not think that I in any way disagree from what you urge about Constantinople. It is only that I have a great doubt whether the particular method and scheme of policy which was carried out at the time of the Crimean War, and again to a great extent in 1876-78, is the best. I doubt whether the people will support that method; andit seems to have this enormous disadvantage, that it enables Austria to lie back.
We can, I think, perfectly defend Constantinople by going in for the independence of Bulgaria; and we can best obtain that independence by persuading Austria to take the lead.
But no doubt the proceedings of Lascelles, and the probable proceedings at Constantinople of Sir W. White, are more in accordance with the old policy, which I fear is now impracticable, than with a modification of that policy.
Please do not suspect me of indifference to a matter on which you feel so strongly. My only business and object are to bring, in the best way I can, any policy which you wish carried out into favour with the House of Commons and the constituencies, so far as it may be possible for me to influence either. You must remember that you have not spoken on these matters either in the Lords or the country, and I am only anxious that you should find aterrainwell prepared.
I am off to-morrow night and out of reach of everybody till 23rd.
Lord Randolph Churchill’s speech at Dartford (October 2) was probably the most important of his life. Upwards of twenty thousand Conservatives were gathered to receive him. Nearly a hundred addresses from all parts of the country were presented to him by deputations. The town was bright with flags by day and fireworks by night. Standing upon an improvised platform among the picturesque glades of Oakfield Park, and backed by the solid phalanx of Conservative members which Kent had returned to Parliament, the Chancellor of the Exchequer unfolded to an audience, variously computed at from twelve to fourteen thousand persons, the futurelegislative programme of the Government. He extolled the loyalty of the Unionist Liberals. He reiterated the declarations upon Ireland which he had made to the House of Commons. In order that the Unionist party might legislate, as he described it, upon ascertained facts and not, like Mr. Gladstone, by intuition, he recounted the appointment of the four Royal Commissions on Irish Land, on Irish Development, on Currency and on Departmental Expenditure. He urged a complete reform of House of Commons procedure, including the institution of the Closure by a simple majority. He announced that the Government would introduce a Bill which should provide facilities, through the operation of local authorities, for the acquisition by the agricultural labourer of freehold plots and allotments of land. And in this connection he spoke gratefully of the pioneer work which Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Jesse Collings had performed. He held out the promise of an alteration in the law of tithe, so that payment should, in the first instance, be demanded of the landlord; and a threat to remodel railway rates so that the home producer should not be undercut by the foreigner. He mentioned a Land Bill for making the transfer of land easy and cheap; a broad reorganisation of Local Government with a new assessment and application of local taxation; and finally he said: ‘I will not conceal from you that my own special object, to which I hope to devote whatever energy and strength or influence I may possess, is to endeavour to attain some genuine and considerablereduction of public expenditure and consequent reduction of taxation. I shall be bitterly disappointed if it is not in my power after one year, or at any rate after two years, to show to the public that a very honest and a very earnest effort has been made in that direction.’ Such was the Tory Democratic programme. Nor should it be supposed that these were the unauthorised views of a single Minister. All these legislative projects had received the consent of the Cabinet. Nearly all have since been passed by Conservative Administrations into law.
Then the speaker turned to foreign affairs, and here he contrived, without doing violence to his own convictions, to support faithfully and effectively in its general tenor Lord Salisbury’s policy: but he used very different arguments from those which Conservative audiences were accustomed to applaud.
‘We had every reason to hope,’ he said, ‘that the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria under the sovereignty of Prince Alexander would develop a prosperous and independent nation, in the growing strength of which might ultimately be found a peaceful and true solution of the Eastern Question. Those hopes have been for the moment to a great extent dashed. A brutal and cowardly conspiracy, consummated before the young community had had time to consolidate itself, was successful in this—that it paralysed the governing authority of the Prince and deprived Bulgaria of an honoured and trusted leader. The freedom and independence ofBulgaria, as well as of the kingdoms of Servia and Roumania, would appear to be seriously compromised. It has been said by some, and even by persons of authority and influence, that in the issues which are involved England has no material interest. Such an assertion would appear to me to be far too loose and general. The sympathy of England with liberty and with the freedom and independence of communities and nationalities, is of ancient origin, and has become the traditional direction of our foreign policy. The policy based on this strong sympathy is not so purely sentimental as a careless critic might suppose. It would be more correct, indeed, to describe such a policy as particular, and, in a sense, as selfish; for the precious liberties which we enjoy, and the freedom of Europe from tyranny and despotism, are in reality indissolubly connected. To England Europe owes much of her modern popular freedom. It was mainly English effort which rescued Germany and the Netherlands from the despotism of King Philip of Spain, and after him from that of Louis XIV. of France. It was English effort which preserved the liberties of Europe from the desolating tyranny of Napoleon. In our own times our nation has done much, either by direct intervention or by energetic moral support, to establish upon firm foundations the freedom of Italy and of Greece.... A generation ago Germany and Austria were not so sensitive as they are now to the value of political liberty. Nor did they appreciate to its full extent the great stability of institutions which political libertyengenders; and on England devolved the duty—the honourable but dangerous duty—of setting an example and of leading the way. Those were the days of Lord Palmerston; but times have changed, and the freedom and the independence of the Danubian Principalities and of the Balkan nationalities are a primary and vital object in the policy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Those things being so, it may well be that England can honourably and safely afford to view with satisfaction that Power whose interests are most directly and vitally concerned, assuming the foremost part in this great international work. We must, of course, take it for granted, as I am doing, that the liberty-giving policy of the Treaty of Berlin will be carefully and watchfully protected. Whatever modification this great fact may enable us to make in our foreign policy, whatever diminution of isolated risk or sole responsibility this may enable us to effect, you may be certain of one thing—that there will be no sudden or violent departure by Her Majesty’s present Government from those main principles of foreign policy which I have before alluded to, and which for nearly three centuries mark in strong, distinct and clear lines the course of the British Empire among the nations of the world.
‘There are Powers in Europe who earnestly and honestly desire to avoid war and to preserve peace, to content themselves with their possessions and their frontiers and to concentrate their energies on commercial progress and on domestic development. There are other Powers who do not appear to beso fortunately situated, and who, from one cause or another which it is not necessary to analyse or examine, betray from time to time a regrettable tendency towards contentious and even aggressive action. It is the duty of any British Government to exhaust itself in efforts to maintain the best and the most friendly relations with all foreign States and to lose no opportunity of offering friendly and conciliatory counsels for the purpose of mitigating national rivalries and of peacefully solving international disputes. But should circumstances arise which, from their grave and dangerous nature, should force the Government of the Queen to make a choice, it cannot be doubted that the sympathy—and, if necessary, even the support—of England will be given to those Powers who seek the peace of Europe and the liberty of peoples, and in whose favour our timely adhesion would probably, and without the use of force, decide the issue.’
It would be hard to say whether this speech made more stir at home or abroad. For more than a week the declarations upon British foreign policy were the chief theme of the Continental press. And in Berlin, Vienna and Rome they received a measure of welcome which grew as their phrasing was more carefully examined. Lord Randolph’s outspoken condemnation of the Bulgarian kidnapping conspiracy was declared to give a satisfaction to the moral feelings of Christendom which had been looked for in vain in the late utterances of European statesmen. The announcement that Great Britain would take her part in the work of preserving internationalpeace, and that her influence would be exerted upon the side of the Central Powers—not for the sake of the old pro-Turkish policy, but in the name of the liberties of the Balkan peoples—was accepted with the utmost satisfaction in Berlin. The style of the declaration created an impression of calm authority; and ‘Palmerston Redivivus’ is an expression which repeatedly appears in the foreign despatches and articles of that time.
enlarge-imageReprinted by permission of the proprietors of ‘Punch.‘ ‘YOUTH ON THE PROW AND PLEASURE AT THE HELM!’ Punch, August 14. 1886.Reprinted by permission of the proprietors of ‘Punch.‘‘YOUTH ON THE PROW AND PLEASURE AT THE HELM!’Punch, August 14. 1886.
At home the Conservative party was too much astonished to give vent immediately to any effective opinion. The party newspapers generally applauded the proposals and tone of the speech as ‘temperate, reasonable, and practical.’ TheTimesobserved that the programme in its scope and fulness ‘recalled the palmy days of Mr. Gladstone.’ The Opposition, with evident disgust, denounced the Chancellor of the Exchequer as ‘an unscrupulous opportunist’ who had stolen the policies of his Radical opponents and had calmly appropriated their famous motto of ‘Peace, Retrenchment and Reform.’ It was not until some days had passed that the perplexed anxiety in Tory circles found expression in grumblings that the Prime Minister was being effaced by his lieutenant. But even then no sign could be discerned in any quarter of a wish or intention to repudiate the policy declared.
From all this buzzing, friendly and unfriendly alike, Lord Randolph fled secretly and silently. For more than a week he was lost to the public eye. It was rumoured that he had passed through Paris andBerlin on October 7; but it was not until the 12th that ‘Mr. Spencer,’ an English tourist, who with his friend Mr. Trafford had been looking at picture galleries, museums and theatres at Dresden and Prague, was identified with the orator of Dartford.
Few things were more remarkable in Lord Randolph Churchill’s brief career than the quickness with which he acquired a European reputation. All over the Continent he was already regarded as the future master of English politics. The tension in the East was unrelieved and the diplomatic skies were grey and shifting. Here was the second personage in the British Cabinet, fresh from a most important public statement, travellingincognitothrough Germany and Austria. What had he done in his passage through Berlin? Had he a mission to Bismarck? Had he been to Varzin or not? From this moment his movements were watched with the most minute and provoking curiosity and the fullest details were telegraphed to every capital. The press revived memories of Gambetta’s journey to Frankfort, and perhaps beyond, two years before his death. We learn from the foreign intelligence of theTimesof October 13 that ‘Mr. Spencer’ and Mr. Trafford, ‘the two travellers whose every step is watched by the European press,’ have been ‘residing at the Imperial Hotel [Vienna] since yesterday.’ They had been received by a crowd at the station, and several persons who had seen Lord Randolph Churchill in England had ‘maintained most positively’ that ‘Mr. Spencer’ was identical with the Chancellor of theExchequer. We are told that ‘Mr. Spencer’ looked somewhat fatigued, and retired to rest after telling the landlord ‘in emphatic terms’ that he had come to Vienna for nobody, and proposed without exception to receive no one; that he walked about the town both in the morning and afternoon, and visited among others the shop of Herr Weidmann ‘where the most exquisite Vienna leather goods are made’; that in the evening he had heard Millöcker’s operetta ‘The Vice-Admiral’ at the Theater an der Wien; and that he was everywhere dogged by journalists, who gave the public elaborate descriptions of his person, the shape of his hat and the colour of his coat.
‘I am hopelessly discovered,’ wrote Lord Randolph to his wife (October 12). ‘At the station yesterday I found a whole army of reporters, at whom I scowled in my most effective manner. Really it is almost intolerable that one cannot travel about without this publicity. How absurd the English papers are! Anything equal to the lies of theDaily NewsandPall MallI never read: thatPall Mallis most mischievous.... W. H. Smith is here, and we had a long talk last night. I have got him to go and see Paget—who wanted me to go and dine with him—and tell him that as I saw no one at Berlin I did not wish to see anyone here. The reporters have been besieging the hotel this morning, but I have sent them all away without a word. The weather is fine and bright, though there is an autumn chill in the air.... This pottering about Europede ville envillesuits me down to the ground, if it were not for the beastly newspapers.’
His holiday was a short one. On his way back through Paris he had an interview which would certainly have interested those curious folk who had pried so zealously upon his unguarded leisure:—
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Iddesleigh.Hôtel Bristol, Paris: October 19, 1886.Dear Lord Iddesleigh,—This morning Count d’Aunay called upon me. I think, from what he said, that he had been sent by Freycinet, I used to know D’Aunay very well when he was in London. I left him to begin what he had to say, and kept talking aboutla pluie et le beau temps. At last he rapped it out. He said the Egyptian Question was going to be ‘re-awakened.’I asked what question.He said the reorganisation of the administration, the tribunals, the customs, the army.I said I did not see that any of these pressed; that Wolff and Mukhtar had got to make their report, which would take some time to consider; that, in the meantime, everything was going on quietly; that the country was progressing; that the payment of the coupon in full would be resumed next year; and that I could not conceive what object there was in raising the Egyptian Question in a critical manner now.He said that the French were most desirous to co-operate with England in the re-establishment of Egypt; that they wished to be perfect friends with us, but that M. de Freycinet felt that Egypt was a continualpierre d’achoppement, and that there would always be great difficulties until it was got out of the way; that public opinion in France was now much agitated on the question; that they suspected we meant totake Egypt altogether; and that they must know what we intended to do about retiring.I replied that it was impossible to reconcile this great desire on M. de Freycinet’s part for friendship with the tone of the French Press on the proceedings of French agents at Constantinople; but that, in any case, of this he might be certain—that these things did not influence our policy in the least; that we did not intend to retire from Egypt until a stable Government had been constituted there, able to maintain itself and to pay its way; and that we should not ‘budge an inch’ from that resolutionpour quoi que ce soit, ni pour qui que ce soit; that the work would take a long time, perhaps three years, perhaps five years, or perhaps ten years, or longer; but that till it was done our occupation of Egypt would continue.He appeared much pained and upset by this, and argued for a long time that we could do nothing in Egypt on any question without French assistance.I said we were most anxious for French assistance, although up to now we had managed to rub along without it; but that if there was to be any understanding for the solution of Egyptian questions between the two Governments, it must be upon the basis of our continued occupation of Egypt until certain definite and practical results were obtained which would be a reward to us for all the loss of money, men, time and trouble which our occupation had entailed on us.He said we ought to fix a date for evacuation; that that would remove all suspicion of bad faith; that the French were obliged to press the point on account of their enormous interests and their numerous colony; that in the time of the ‘condominium’ they had occupied a perfectly satisfactory position, which they wished to regain.I reminded him that they had deliberately abdicated that position when M. de Freycinet was Minister before; that they had left us all the trouble and all the danger, and that they must accept the logical results of that policy; that Isaw no good in fixing a date for evacuation; that I did not think such a step would be honest, as we might not be able to abide by our pledge; that it was much better to define the work which had to be done, and to adjourn all questions of retirement until the completion of the work.He went on pressing about the date in a curiously imploring manner. He said that it might beaussi éloigné que vous voulez, but that if we would only fix a date M. de Freycinetsera parfaitement satisfait, that he would work loyally with us, and that all would go differently.I then said that this question of the date, to which he evidently attached so much importance, was a new one to me; that I could not tell what your opinions were, nor Lord Salisbury’s; that personally I saw immense and insuperable objections to such a course; that it would really introduce a new element of uncertainty, and probably lead to great trouble. In conclusion, I entreated him not to be under any illusion as to our determination to remain in Egypt and to pursue our work there steadily; that the present Government, unlike Mr. Gladstone’s, was very strong in Parliament, and would not yield to pressure; and that, till the French thoroughly grasped this fact, they would fail to understand the A B C of the Egyptian Question.He said he should tell M. de Freycinet all I had said. He asked me if I wished to see M. de Freycinet, to which I replied in the negative.I thought you would wish to know all this, and I hope you will approve of what I said. I return to town on Tuesday.Yours very truly,Randolph S. Churchill.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Iddesleigh.
Hôtel Bristol, Paris: October 19, 1886.
Dear Lord Iddesleigh,—This morning Count d’Aunay called upon me. I think, from what he said, that he had been sent by Freycinet, I used to know D’Aunay very well when he was in London. I left him to begin what he had to say, and kept talking aboutla pluie et le beau temps. At last he rapped it out. He said the Egyptian Question was going to be ‘re-awakened.’
I asked what question.
He said the reorganisation of the administration, the tribunals, the customs, the army.
I said I did not see that any of these pressed; that Wolff and Mukhtar had got to make their report, which would take some time to consider; that, in the meantime, everything was going on quietly; that the country was progressing; that the payment of the coupon in full would be resumed next year; and that I could not conceive what object there was in raising the Egyptian Question in a critical manner now.
He said that the French were most desirous to co-operate with England in the re-establishment of Egypt; that they wished to be perfect friends with us, but that M. de Freycinet felt that Egypt was a continualpierre d’achoppement, and that there would always be great difficulties until it was got out of the way; that public opinion in France was now much agitated on the question; that they suspected we meant totake Egypt altogether; and that they must know what we intended to do about retiring.
I replied that it was impossible to reconcile this great desire on M. de Freycinet’s part for friendship with the tone of the French Press on the proceedings of French agents at Constantinople; but that, in any case, of this he might be certain—that these things did not influence our policy in the least; that we did not intend to retire from Egypt until a stable Government had been constituted there, able to maintain itself and to pay its way; and that we should not ‘budge an inch’ from that resolutionpour quoi que ce soit, ni pour qui que ce soit; that the work would take a long time, perhaps three years, perhaps five years, or perhaps ten years, or longer; but that till it was done our occupation of Egypt would continue.
He appeared much pained and upset by this, and argued for a long time that we could do nothing in Egypt on any question without French assistance.
I said we were most anxious for French assistance, although up to now we had managed to rub along without it; but that if there was to be any understanding for the solution of Egyptian questions between the two Governments, it must be upon the basis of our continued occupation of Egypt until certain definite and practical results were obtained which would be a reward to us for all the loss of money, men, time and trouble which our occupation had entailed on us.
He said we ought to fix a date for evacuation; that that would remove all suspicion of bad faith; that the French were obliged to press the point on account of their enormous interests and their numerous colony; that in the time of the ‘condominium’ they had occupied a perfectly satisfactory position, which they wished to regain.
I reminded him that they had deliberately abdicated that position when M. de Freycinet was Minister before; that they had left us all the trouble and all the danger, and that they must accept the logical results of that policy; that Isaw no good in fixing a date for evacuation; that I did not think such a step would be honest, as we might not be able to abide by our pledge; that it was much better to define the work which had to be done, and to adjourn all questions of retirement until the completion of the work.
He went on pressing about the date in a curiously imploring manner. He said that it might beaussi éloigné que vous voulez, but that if we would only fix a date M. de Freycinetsera parfaitement satisfait, that he would work loyally with us, and that all would go differently.
I then said that this question of the date, to which he evidently attached so much importance, was a new one to me; that I could not tell what your opinions were, nor Lord Salisbury’s; that personally I saw immense and insuperable objections to such a course; that it would really introduce a new element of uncertainty, and probably lead to great trouble. In conclusion, I entreated him not to be under any illusion as to our determination to remain in Egypt and to pursue our work there steadily; that the present Government, unlike Mr. Gladstone’s, was very strong in Parliament, and would not yield to pressure; and that, till the French thoroughly grasped this fact, they would fail to understand the A B C of the Egyptian Question.
He said he should tell M. de Freycinet all I had said. He asked me if I wished to see M. de Freycinet, to which I replied in the negative.
I thought you would wish to know all this, and I hope you will approve of what I said. I return to town on Tuesday.
Yours very truly,Randolph S. Churchill.
‘You seem to have defended the pass well, and the position you hold is a sound one,’ replied Lord Iddesleigh in a letter which appears to be the last that passed between them.
Short as his absence from England had been, Lord Randolph found some difficulties aggravated on his return. The orthodox portions of the Conservative party had become articulate. Mr. Chaplin was denouncing the Closure by a simple majority as unconstitutional and improper. TheTimeshad made up its mind against such a change, which it regarded as ‘irreconcilably at variance with the fundamental principle of freedom of debate.’ It expressed itself anxious to know what would have been the opinion of the former leader of the Fourth Party on the proposals of the new Chancellor of the Exchequer. The ‘Dartford programme,’ as the principles and measures expounded in Kent had already come to be called, notwithstanding the full approval which it had previously received from the Cabinet, had been exposed to various attacks in quarters usually believed to derive their information from official sources. The Carlton Club was reported to be vexed and sulky. Everywhere the question was asked: What would the Chancellor of the Exchequer say to the conference of Conservative Associations at Bradford? Would he be discovered in retreat or standing to his guns? Would he enlarge upon the Dartford programme or would he explain it away?
The conference met at Bradford on October 26. Lord Randolph made three speeches during the day. At the evening meeting he said he was very sorry he had made the Dartford speech. ‘If I had not made it at Dartford three weeks ago, I might havemade it here to-night.’ He stood to the policy then declared in every detail. He welcomed Mr. Jesse Collings as an ally in the Allotments Bill. He asserted that Closure by a simple majority was the ‘motor muscle’[56]of any reform in Parliamentary Procedure. He ridiculed the complaints of the Liberal party. ‘All they can do apparently is to exclaim with impotent rage, "How unfair! how shameful! how unprincipled! You have stolen our programme." Why "their programme," I should like to know? Since 1880 they have been in office, and they did not make an attempt to carry out a single item. They tell us that the programme I sketched at Dartford is a Radical programme; that the Tory party have turned their coats and abandoned their principles and adopted the principles of the Radical party; and quantities of sentences of that kind and of equal stupidity. All I know about the programme of policy, foreign and domestic, which I endeavoured to outline at Dartford three weeks ago is this—that it was a mere repetition of the programme of Lord Salisbury at Newport in 1885. All I know about my speech at Dartford which I can say in reply to what I am told as to its being a total adoption of Radical principles and measures is this—that it was a mere reiteration and elaboration of the Queen’s Speech of January last, when Lord Salisbury’s first Government was in office, and of the speeches of the Ministers who supported the policy which was contained in that speech.’
These statements were greeted by the loud and continuous acclamations of an audience of Conservative delegates representing, it was calculated, fully a million and a half electors.
This determined speech and its thunderous endorsement silenced for the moment all hostile criticism. Some of Lord Randolph’s colleagues expressed to him their disapproval of the attacks upon him from within the Conservative ranks. Others assured him of their agreement. Even the Lord Chancellor was satisfied. ‘I have just finished reading your speech at Bradford,’ he wrote (October 27). ‘There is not a word that is not sound, good Toryism—aye, and old Toryism, too. The truth is that the enemy have been so long dressing up a lay figure which they have invested with their notions of what a Tory ought to be, that they do not recognise the genuine article when they see it.’
It is a pity not to end the story here. Lord Randolph Churchill seems at this time to have been separated only by a single step from a career of dazzling prosperity and fame. With a swiftness which in modern Parliamentary history had been excelled only by the younger Pitt, he had risen by no man’s leave or monarch’s favour from the station of a private gentleman to almost the first position under the Crown. Upon the Continent he was already regarded as the future master of English politics. His popularity among the people was unsurpassed. He was steadily gaining the confidence of the Sovereign and the respect and admirationof the most serious and enlightened men of his day. His natural gifts were still ripening and his mind expanding. The House of Commons had responded instinctively to the leadership of ‘a great member of Parliament.’ Alike in the glare and clatter of the platform and in the silent diligence of a public department he was found equal to all the varied tasks which are laid upon an English Minister. If he were thus armed and equipped at thirty-seven, what would he be at fifty? Who could have guessed that ruin, utter and irretrievable, was marching swiftly upon this triumphant figure; that the great party who had followed his lead so blithely, would in a few brief months turn upon him in abiding displeasure; and that the Parliament which had assembled to find him so powerful and to accept his guidance, would watch him creep away in sadness and alone?
Still, for an interval the sun shone fair. The clouds were parted to the right and to the left, and there stepped into the centre of the world’s affairs—amid the acclamations of the multitude and in the hush of European attention—the Grand Young Man.