India Office: July 11, 1885.Lord Randolph Churchill presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to submit the accompanying telegrams which have passed between the Viceroy of India and himself.There can hardly be any doubt, in view of the remarkable expressions made use of by Mr. Gladstone on Tuesday last in the House of Commons, giving such strong confirmation as to the absolute pledge given by the Government of Russia, that the pass of Zulficar should be ceded to the Amir. Your Majesty’s Government is in an exceptionally favourable position for taking up an unyielding attitude on this question. Parliament as a body is practically committed to the policy of faithful observance of pledges given to the Amir, and it may well be that so much Parliamentary unanimity on any large question of foreign policy may not occur again for a very long time. It is most earnestly to be hoped that this dispute with the Government of Russia, which really involves the whole Afghan Question as far as Russia is concerned, may be definitely decided one way or another before Parliament separates for the recess.The negotiations have been extremely protracted. Troops are being massed, both by Russians and Afghans, near the frontier; the strain on the finances of India, caused by the obligation of keeping our military preparations in a very advanced state, is evidently causing the Viceroy uneasiness; and the character and credit of this country cannot well sustain any further concessions to Russia at the expense of our ally the Amir.If this matter is not resolutely treated and definitely settled now, before Parliament separates, not only does the state of military emergency, so trying both to this country and to India, continue indefinitely, but there is great reason to believe that in September or October the Russians will make a further advance or aggression, just before the General Election here, causing the greatest alarm, confusion, excitement, and party feeling among the people, and consequently the greatest possible danger to the interests and security ofIndia. Lord Randolph Churchill would humbly submit that no possible precaution should be neglected now in order, if possible, to obviate such an eventuality.Lord Randolph Churchill humbly submits to your Majesty a memorandum he has drawn up on the subject of proposing to the Government of Russia and, if possible, concluding a comprehensive and to some extent permanent treaty, providing generally for the integrity of Afghanistan and the regulation of all frontier matters, and having appended to it a rough draft of the possible clauses of such a treaty.
India Office: July 11, 1885.
Lord Randolph Churchill presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to submit the accompanying telegrams which have passed between the Viceroy of India and himself.
There can hardly be any doubt, in view of the remarkable expressions made use of by Mr. Gladstone on Tuesday last in the House of Commons, giving such strong confirmation as to the absolute pledge given by the Government of Russia, that the pass of Zulficar should be ceded to the Amir. Your Majesty’s Government is in an exceptionally favourable position for taking up an unyielding attitude on this question. Parliament as a body is practically committed to the policy of faithful observance of pledges given to the Amir, and it may well be that so much Parliamentary unanimity on any large question of foreign policy may not occur again for a very long time. It is most earnestly to be hoped that this dispute with the Government of Russia, which really involves the whole Afghan Question as far as Russia is concerned, may be definitely decided one way or another before Parliament separates for the recess.
The negotiations have been extremely protracted. Troops are being massed, both by Russians and Afghans, near the frontier; the strain on the finances of India, caused by the obligation of keeping our military preparations in a very advanced state, is evidently causing the Viceroy uneasiness; and the character and credit of this country cannot well sustain any further concessions to Russia at the expense of our ally the Amir.
If this matter is not resolutely treated and definitely settled now, before Parliament separates, not only does the state of military emergency, so trying both to this country and to India, continue indefinitely, but there is great reason to believe that in September or October the Russians will make a further advance or aggression, just before the General Election here, causing the greatest alarm, confusion, excitement, and party feeling among the people, and consequently the greatest possible danger to the interests and security ofIndia. Lord Randolph Churchill would humbly submit that no possible precaution should be neglected now in order, if possible, to obviate such an eventuality.
Lord Randolph Churchill humbly submits to your Majesty a memorandum he has drawn up on the subject of proposing to the Government of Russia and, if possible, concluding a comprehensive and to some extent permanent treaty, providing generally for the integrity of Afghanistan and the regulation of all frontier matters, and having appended to it a rough draft of the possible clauses of such a treaty.
India Office: July 13, 1885.Lord Randolph Churchill presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to submit that, as is pointed out by your Majesty, it would be in the highest degree desirable to have some information as to the manner in which a proposal for a comprehensive treaty on the Afghan Frontier Question would be received by the Government of Russia.Lord Randolph Churchill has never supposed that a proposal of this kind would be favourably received by the Government of Russia unless it was known to that Power that such a proposal was favourably received by other European Powers, or that a refusal to view it in a friendly manner would place so singular an interpretation on Russian policy that the continuation of negotiations might become very difficult.Such a state of things, favourable to the proposal for a treaty the rough draft of which has been humbly submitted to your Majesty, does not exist at the present moment. Whether such a state of things may be brought into existence Lord Randolph Churchill would not venture to determine positively, but he has often expressed to Lord Salisbury the opinion that an effort in this direction could not well be at variance with sound policy, and would in no way conflict with public opinion.The observation which your Majesty graciously records, that under such a treaty as has been sketched your Majesty’sGovernment would become responsible for the acts of the Amir, is profoundly accurate; and it may well be that such a policy is liable to most searching criticism, and might lead to serious evils. The whole policy which is best known as ‘the buffer State policy’ is herein called in question, and Lord Randolph Churchill is possessed by the gravest doubts as to whether that policy is the best which could be adopted for the security of your Majesty’s Indian Empire.In its defence it may be urged, (1) That that policy has been adopted by this country for very many years; with short and abrupt intervals it was the policy pursued when Dost Mahomed and when Shere Ali Khan ruled in Afghanistan. (2) That it is a policy to which both political parties in this country are deeply committed, and therefore it is a policy which, if it does not actually unite public men, perhaps divides them the least. (3) Under that policy pledges of a very binding character have been given to the present Amir, on several occasions, that as long as he is guided by the advice of your Majesty’s Government in the conduct of his foreign relations your Majesty’s Government will hold themselves responsible for, and will protect him from, any dangers and evils arising from that advice being followed. (4) It is a policy which, if it can be carried out (a very large and wide assumption), undoubtedly has the merit of keeping Russian influence very remote from actual contact with India.The great danger of the policy alluded to is that it is dependent upon the caprice or the design of the Amir; that it may be upset at any moment by the revolt of the Governor of Badakshan in the north and of the Governor of Herat in the south-west of Afghanistan, by the escape of Ayoub Khan from Teheran, or by a decidedly aggressive movement of the Russian forces.It may be doubted whether there is any real solution of our difficulties and dangers except in the breaking-up by force of arms of the Russian Asiatic Empire, an enterprise far less hazardous and doubtful, in Lord Randolph Churchill’sopinion, than is generally supposed, but nevertheless an undertaking the responsibility of which would, except under extraordinary circumstances, terrify an Administration which at the present day has to face a House of Commons.Lord Randolph Churchill humbly submits that in acknowledging the great force of your Majesty’s observations graciously conveyed to him he has ventured to offer for your Majesty’s consideration views and opinions which have for long been upon his mind, and Lord Randolph Churchill earnestly hopes that he may not have transgressed your Majesty’s pleasure by too diffuse an exposition.No further action could well be taken with regard to a treaty until the opinion of the Viceroy has been fully ascertained.
India Office: July 13, 1885.
Lord Randolph Churchill presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to submit that, as is pointed out by your Majesty, it would be in the highest degree desirable to have some information as to the manner in which a proposal for a comprehensive treaty on the Afghan Frontier Question would be received by the Government of Russia.
Lord Randolph Churchill has never supposed that a proposal of this kind would be favourably received by the Government of Russia unless it was known to that Power that such a proposal was favourably received by other European Powers, or that a refusal to view it in a friendly manner would place so singular an interpretation on Russian policy that the continuation of negotiations might become very difficult.
Such a state of things, favourable to the proposal for a treaty the rough draft of which has been humbly submitted to your Majesty, does not exist at the present moment. Whether such a state of things may be brought into existence Lord Randolph Churchill would not venture to determine positively, but he has often expressed to Lord Salisbury the opinion that an effort in this direction could not well be at variance with sound policy, and would in no way conflict with public opinion.
The observation which your Majesty graciously records, that under such a treaty as has been sketched your Majesty’sGovernment would become responsible for the acts of the Amir, is profoundly accurate; and it may well be that such a policy is liable to most searching criticism, and might lead to serious evils. The whole policy which is best known as ‘the buffer State policy’ is herein called in question, and Lord Randolph Churchill is possessed by the gravest doubts as to whether that policy is the best which could be adopted for the security of your Majesty’s Indian Empire.
In its defence it may be urged, (1) That that policy has been adopted by this country for very many years; with short and abrupt intervals it was the policy pursued when Dost Mahomed and when Shere Ali Khan ruled in Afghanistan. (2) That it is a policy to which both political parties in this country are deeply committed, and therefore it is a policy which, if it does not actually unite public men, perhaps divides them the least. (3) Under that policy pledges of a very binding character have been given to the present Amir, on several occasions, that as long as he is guided by the advice of your Majesty’s Government in the conduct of his foreign relations your Majesty’s Government will hold themselves responsible for, and will protect him from, any dangers and evils arising from that advice being followed. (4) It is a policy which, if it can be carried out (a very large and wide assumption), undoubtedly has the merit of keeping Russian influence very remote from actual contact with India.
The great danger of the policy alluded to is that it is dependent upon the caprice or the design of the Amir; that it may be upset at any moment by the revolt of the Governor of Badakshan in the north and of the Governor of Herat in the south-west of Afghanistan, by the escape of Ayoub Khan from Teheran, or by a decidedly aggressive movement of the Russian forces.
It may be doubted whether there is any real solution of our difficulties and dangers except in the breaking-up by force of arms of the Russian Asiatic Empire, an enterprise far less hazardous and doubtful, in Lord Randolph Churchill’sopinion, than is generally supposed, but nevertheless an undertaking the responsibility of which would, except under extraordinary circumstances, terrify an Administration which at the present day has to face a House of Commons.
Lord Randolph Churchill humbly submits that in acknowledging the great force of your Majesty’s observations graciously conveyed to him he has ventured to offer for your Majesty’s consideration views and opinions which have for long been upon his mind, and Lord Randolph Churchill earnestly hopes that he may not have transgressed your Majesty’s pleasure by too diffuse an exposition.
No further action could well be taken with regard to a treaty until the opinion of the Viceroy has been fully ascertained.
India Office: July 15, 1885.Lord Randolph Churchill presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to submit that there can be little doubt that your Majesty’s apprehension that the Government of Russia will try to evade the half-promise they gave to cede the pass of Zulficar to the Afghan Amir is well founded. Lord Randolph Churchill would humbly submit to your Majesty whether the original pledge given by the Russians was not very full and unreserved, the difficulty about communications being raised subsequently. In the note to M. de Staal Lord Salisbury has taken this view very plainly. Colonel Ridgeway’s telegrams cannot well be regarded as at all reassuring, though there is reason to hope that the news in No. 97 may not be altogether so grave as at first seemed to appear. The sequence of events from day to day does not at all weaken the views on the whole boundary question which Lord Randolph Churchill has from time to time humbly submitted to your Majesty, and Lord Randolph Churchill is more than ever of opinion that a firm and resolute insistence on the faithful fulfilment of Russian pledges is not only vital to your Majesty’s interests, but perhaps in reality the best method of averting an eventual rupture of negotiations.
India Office: July 15, 1885.
Lord Randolph Churchill presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to submit that there can be little doubt that your Majesty’s apprehension that the Government of Russia will try to evade the half-promise they gave to cede the pass of Zulficar to the Afghan Amir is well founded. Lord Randolph Churchill would humbly submit to your Majesty whether the original pledge given by the Russians was not very full and unreserved, the difficulty about communications being raised subsequently. In the note to M. de Staal Lord Salisbury has taken this view very plainly. Colonel Ridgeway’s telegrams cannot well be regarded as at all reassuring, though there is reason to hope that the news in No. 97 may not be altogether so grave as at first seemed to appear. The sequence of events from day to day does not at all weaken the views on the whole boundary question which Lord Randolph Churchill has from time to time humbly submitted to your Majesty, and Lord Randolph Churchill is more than ever of opinion that a firm and resolute insistence on the faithful fulfilment of Russian pledges is not only vital to your Majesty’s interests, but perhaps in reality the best method of averting an eventual rupture of negotiations.
While Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office was rapidly gathering into his skilful hands the tense and tangled threads of British diplomacy, the Secretary of State for India took pains to secure an effective defence upon the spot. Until the advance of Russia had reached the borders of Afghanistan, the functions of the military forces of India had been limited to maintaining internal peace or to frontier operations against adversaries of limited power. Now that a great European Power, liable at any time to become hostile, was in close proximity to the Afghan border, it was evident that the existing military establishments must be strengthened. The British troops in India were accordingly increased by 11 batteries of artillery (30 guns and 1,373 men), by the addition of a fourth squadron to each British cavalry regiment (1,332 men), and by the addition of three battalions of infantry and the augmentation of each of those already serving by 100 rank and file, amounting to 196 officers and 10,567 men. The increase of the British garrison allowed an expansion—in recognised proportion—of the native army. Most of the cavalry regiments were raised to four squadrons each and three new native cavalry regiments were formed, making an increase of 56 British officers and 4,572 natives of all ranks. Nine new native infantry battalions were enlisted and the strength of the existing regiments was increased—a total addition of 63 British officers and 11,968 natives of all ranks. Various improvements were made in the position of the native soldier and a native ArmyReserve was formed of 23,000 men. The Ordnance and Commissariat Departments were reorganised and an Army Transport Department was formed. The construction of strategical railways, roads and bridges on the North-West Frontier was undertaken, and Karachi harbour was improved as part of a general scheme of defence. Although all these military preparations were rapidly pushed forward, this substantial increase of power was secured at an initial cost of about one and a half millions sterling and maintained at an annual charge of not much more than one million pounds a year. Lord Randolph also approved, shortly before he left the India Office, of a proposal for arming the native army with the best rifle available and placing it in this respect on an equal footing with British troops. This change, however, was long delayed.
Scarcely anything that Lord Randolph Churchill did as a Minister gave him more pleasure than the appointment of Sir Frederick Roberts to be Commander-in-Chief in India. It was almost the first important step which he took on coming into power. Very powerful influences supported the high claims of Lord Wolseley and, as the appointment of the Indian Commander-in-Chief rested according to practice with the Secretary of State for War, the matter hung for some days in suspense. But Lord Randolph was insistent. His long and friendly talks with Sir Frederick Roberts during his visit to India had made a great impression upon him. All his life he continued to assert that Roberts was the first soldierof his age. The Russian crisis and Sir Frederick’s unequalled service and experience in the theatre of possible war constituted in his eyes overwhelming qualifications. He won the agreement of Lord Salisbury; he persuaded the Queen. In less than five weeks after the Government had taken office, the appointment was announced and was received with general assent and satisfaction.
In conjunction with this appointment and with the military preparations, orders were given and money supplied for a Camp of Exercise to be prepared upon a much larger scale than had ever been held in India before. The troops were mobilised early in 1886 in two Army Corps. They assembled at Umballa and Gurgaon—towns 150 miles apart—and after a fortnight of brigade and divisional tactics, the opposing forces came into contact near the famous battle-ground of Panipat. This was the first occasion on which representatives from foreign armies had been invited to be present at Indian manœuvres. Lord Randolph Churchill arranged that the invitations should be sent through the Foreign Office; and Lord Dufferin, who was present during the closing days of the operations, was accompanied by twelve officers from the principal armies of Europe and America.
On August 6 the Secretary of State for India laid the Indian Budget before the House. This statement, coming as it does during the ‘Dog Days,’ at the end of the Session, is usually heard in its ponderous complexity with apathy by an empty andexhausted House. But the importance of public departments varies with the authority of the Minister who directs them. The Chamber was filled with members in all the interest and eagerness of a great Parliamentary occasion. Nor were they disappointed. Lord Randolph had no difficulty in holding their attention for upwards of an hour and three-quarters while he unfolded in stately language, but with the utmost simplicity and clearness, the wide scroll of Asia. Intricate and unfamiliar figures, facts and problems tangled with strange names and novel conditions, submitted themselves willingly to his interesting narration. The account was not cheering in its character. The confusion of Indian finances had permitted an astounding error in the Budget calculations of Lord Ripon’s Government and the new Minister had to announce to Parliament a heavy deficit, largely unforeseen. The Russian crisis, moreover, imposed upon India the necessity of extensive military preparations. Before he had spoken very long the House realised that Lord Randolph was developing an elaborate indictment of the late Viceroy.
‘The most unpardonable crime,’ he said, ‘of which the Governor-General of India can be guilty, is not to look ahead and make provision for the future. The Government of England cannot from its very nature look far ahead; its policy is always one of month to month, of week to week and sometimes of day to day; it is always more or less a policy of hand to mouth. The reason is, that our Governmentin England depends upon a Parliamentary majority which is violently assailed and swayed by an enlightened, but at the same time by a capricious public opinion. The Government of England has to think, in shaping its policy, of the state of Europe, of the Colonies and of Ireland; of the state of England; and last, not least, of the state of business in the House of Commons. It has to think of all those subjects, and the result is, that although we in England possess an unrivalled Constitution and unexampled freedom, yet for the purpose of that freedom we have to put up with the disadvantage of little stability and little continuity in our Government and hardly any forethought in our policy. The Government of India is exempt from all these disadvantages. It is a Government in its nature purely despotic, but it is not an hereditary despotism. We do our best to supply India from time to time with statesmen who shall exercise this tremendous power of government, but who shall at the same time be wise, experienced and courageous. In India it is not as in England. In India there is no public opinion to speak of, no powerful press, and hardly any trammels upon the Government of any sort or kind. For that reason I say that if the Governor-General of India does not look ahead and provide for the future, he not only commits a blunder but is guilty of a crime.
‘I am compelled to apply this general statement to the Government of Lord Ripon. Lord Ripon went out to India with a full knowledge of thestate of affairs; he knew of all the events which had occurred—of the Russo-Turkish War which led to the Treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin; he knew of all the events which had caused the great preparations of Russia for advancing on India. He must have had knowledge of the gradual but sure extension of the Russian Empire in Asia.... I say nothing of the abandonment of Candahar. I say little of the destruction of the Quetta Railway. I come rather to the acts of Lord Ripon’s Government which seriously affected the finances of this year. Lord Ripon had prosperous times to deal with and an increasing revenue. The sky overhead, to the careless observer, seemed very blue. All dangers apparently had passed away so far as foreign affairs were concerned and so far as they had any bearing upon Indian finances, and Lord Ripon and his counsellors laid themselves down and slept. All indirect taxation of any value was remitted, the Customs duty was almost totally abolished and the salt duty was reduced. In 1882-3 the Indian army was reduced by five cavalry regiments and sixteen infantry regiments. The British army was allowed to fall to 10,000 men below its proper strength. To bring it up to its full strength, which it has now nearly attained, has cost the Indian Government 100,000l.No frontier railways were commenced; no roads were begun; no preparations were made for the defence of a long and difficult frontier. Surely in prosperous times a wise man would have provided for the event of a rainy day. But Lord Ripon slept,lulled by the languor of the land of the lotus. Yet there was much which ought to have warned and to have roused him. In 1882 the Russian Government, with the frankest candour, called our attention to their proceedings in Central Asia and invited us to delimit the frontier of Afghanistan; but the only reply they received was a dull and sullen reply, as of a man under the influence of a narcotic. Our ally, the Amir of Afghanistan, also sent many warnings. It is most curious to observe, in the account of the interview of the Amir with Lord Dufferin at Rawul Pindi, how frequently we come across that familiar saying "I told you so." All this time the cloud grew bigger, the distant darkness nearer and blacker and the great military Power loomed larger and more distinct upon our borders; yet Lord Ripon and his counsellors slumbered and slept, never dreaming that any foreign danger could by any possibility come nigh those dominions which had been entrusted to their watchful care, taking no thought for the morrow, heedless and ignorant of the future which was shaping itself with the utmost clearness under their very eyes. Then, sir, there came a sharp and sudden awakening. Russia’s hosts absorbed the territory of Merv, rapidly filled up the vacuum to the south which had been so blindly left unprovided for by us, and Lord Ripon and his counsellors were found, like the foolish virgins, with no oil in their lamps. Then followed the fruitless frontier negotiations and Lord Ripon came home and Lord Dufferin went out, not one hour too soon for the safety of India and the tranquillity of the East.Next we see the lonely and unsupported British Commissioner endeavouring to stay the advance of the Russian troops—troops flushed with success and animated by the highest hopes of glory and of booty. Then came the incident of Penjdeh and, following that, the vote of credit of eleven millions. Next we see the hasty and hurried recommencement of the Quetta Railway which had been so foolishly abandoned. Then came the announcement of the frontier railways and roads too fatally postponed. And then came the additional military expenditure, from three to four millions; and the result of it all is now before the House in the deficit in the Indian accounts of a million and a half and in the permanent extra military charge of no less than two millions a year.[40]The good time has gone; the advantages which we had, have been thrown away. No economy whatever was practised by that Government. The expenditure on civil buildings was allowed to be increased by over one million a year. The Famine Insurance Fund, on which we prided ourselves, has been proved in time of trial to be illusory. I declare that I endeavoured to contemplate the action of the late Government of India without party passion. I found in it not one redeeming feature. Indian interests were so clumsily, so stupidly, handled that progress has been thrown back almost for a generation; and having to place those results before the House of Commons in the practical and matter-of-fact form of figures and finance, I disown and repudiate on behalf of thepresent Government all responsibility of any sort or kind for that policy and I hold up that Viceroyalty and the Government responsible for it to the censure and the condemnation of the British and Indian peoples.
‘This Parliament,’ he concluded, after a survey of many matters interesting in themselves, but too specialised for quotation here, ‘has done little or nothing for India. It would appear as if members of Parliament of the present generation considered Indian affairs to be either beneath their attention or above their comprehension, and India is apparently left to pursue its destiny alone—some might even think uncared for—as far as Parliament is concerned. That was not always the case. In the last century, when our Indian Empire was forming, the greatest men—Mr. Pitt and Mr. Burke and Mr. Fox—did not disdain to apply their minds to the most careful examination and exposition of the difficult and complicated Indian questions, and with great advantage. At the present time, when everything around is changing fast and when nothing seems secure or firm or free from assault and danger, as far as India is concerned, we shall act wisely if we revert to the more patriotic practice of earlier days. I would ask those who have been so kind as to listen to me, and those who possibly may not have concurred in many remarks I have made, to join with me in what I would call an appeal, or even, almost, a command, to those who will be our successors, some faint echo of which may possibly linger around these walls andinfluence the new Parliament so shortly to meet here: I would ask those who hear me to join in an appeal to the members of the new Parliament to shake themselves free from the lassitude, the carelessness, the apathy, which have too long characterised the attitude of Parliament towards India. I would appeal to them to watch with the most sedulous attention, to develop with the most anxious care, to guard with the most united and undying resolution, the land and the people of Hindostan, that most truly bright and precious gem in the crown of the Queen, the possession of which, more than that of all your Colonial dominions, has raised in power, in resource, in wealth and in authority this small island home of ours far above the level of the majority of nations and of States—has placed it on an equality with, perhaps even in a position of superiority over, every other Empire either of ancient or of modern times.’
With this impressive harangue the ‘Ministry of Caretakers’ may be said to have brought the Session and the Parliament to a close.
Upon Lord Randolph’s acceptance of office begins a constant, intimate and candid correspondence with Lord Salisbury, which ranges over the whole field of politics at home and abroad, continues with almost equal fulness in Opposition and in Government and ends abruptly in January 1887. Their letters were never more frequent than when Lord Randolph was at the India Office. The fortunes of India were at this time inseparably interwoven with the conduct of theForeign Office—at first in regard to Russia and Afghanistan, and later on in regard to France and China on account of Burma—and Lord Randolph was always most particular to consult the Prime Minister on any matter of importance and to take no serious step without his concurrence. Lord Salisbury, on the other hand, had much to give to an Indian Secretary. He possessed a vast knowledge of Indian affairs, gained during his prolonged administration of that department; and in all matters of official method, of procedure and etiquette, his guidance was especially valuable to a Minister altogether unversed in the details of administration.
Lord Salisbury was, like Lord Randolph Churchill, a prodigious letter-writer, and he seems to have written no fewer than 110 letters to his lieutenant—many of them very long ones—all in his beautiful running handwriting, during the seven months of his first Ministry. How he ever found time to write so many to a single Minister is a marvel. Often three letters passed between them in a day. On July 25, for instance, Lord Salisbury wrote four times to Lord Randolph on different subjects, all of considerable importance. Two of these letters cover between them five separate pieces of closely written notepaper. To a later generation, accustomed to shorthand writers and anticipating a time when it will be regarded as inconsiderate to address a person on business otherwise than in type, such manual energy is astounding. Whether elaborate letter-writing betweenMinisters is conducive to the facile conduct of public affairs is doubtful. Strength and time are consumed, difficulties are multiplied and differences only look wider and more formidable when marshalled by ink and paper. Many of the questions laboriously discussed on both sides of this correspondence could have been despatched immediately at an interview or even upon a telephone. But Lord Salisbury did not like political conversations. He felt that he could not do so much justice to himself or his opinions in an informal discussion as he could either in a letter or a speech. He belonged, moreover, to a formal, painstaking, old-fashioned school; and in Lord Randolph Churchill he had a pupil unexpectedly apt and energetic.
Whatever may have been lost at the time has been gained by posterity, for Lord Salisbury’s letters have a character and interest apart from and even superior to the important matters with which they deal. A wit at once shrewd and genial; an insight into human nature penetrating, comprehensive, rather cynical; a vast knowledge of affairs; the quick thoughts of a moody, fertile mind, expressed in language that always preserves a spice and flavour of its own, are qualities which must exert an attraction upon a generation to whom the politics of the ‘85 Government will be dust.
Throughout their association the letters of both men—whether in agreement or in sharpest dispute—are marked by personal goodwill; and Lord Randolph never for a moment drops the air of respect anddeference with which he invariably treated Lord Salisbury and which is never more pronounced than in moments of stress. Lord Salisbury’s counsels and comments are always instructive and so often amusing that I may be allowed to transcribe a few at random: ‘My dear Randolph,’ the letters begin (June 25), ‘(if I may venture to address a Secretary of State in such familiar fashion!),—So much has been made of Herat, that we must do more than is possible to defend it’ (July 25). ‘I quite agree with your doctrine that it is better to go at the principal offender rather than the instrument—with one important qualification—if you can’ (August 4). ‘It is curious to notice how the "buffer State" policy has gone down in the world. When first I had to do with India, nineteen years ago, it was the supremest orthodoxy: you might as well have impugned one of the doctrines of Free Trade’ (August 4). Upon a curious little question of Portuguese ecclesiastical establishments in India he writes (August 24): ‘I am glad to see you take the same view as on the first blush I was inclined to take. The Government of India by its nature must ignore religious questions, except so far as they take the secular form of furnishing a pretext for either robbery or riot.’ ‘I am inclined to think you underrate H——. He knows these odd people in a way we cannot do. I should be as much inclined to set up my opinion against that of the keeper of an asylum on the best way of keeping lunatics quiet’ (November 24). Again, in another letter on the same day:‘I am afraid F.O. and I.O. have hopelessly divergent opinions on H——’s trustworthiness. But I think that when Departments differ on a point which is not worthy of reference to the Cabinet, the best rule is that the Department should prevail which will have the trouble of dealing with the consequences of a mistake if a mistake is made. The India Office view should therefore prevail.’
‘Honours’ and promotions of various kinds prove a thorny business to handle, more especially after an episode soon to be recorded. ‘I was not aware that Mr. * * * had been disappointed. He bears a high character in the service, and I shall be glad to assist him if I have the opportunity. But it is perilous to go out of the beaten track in matters of promotion. I remember doing it in 1878, and I had a vote of censure moved on me in the House of Commons by a Conservative’ (January 8, 1886). ‘I am afraid that in the matter of honours I am as destitute as you are. The C.B.’s are all exhausted’ (June 20). And again (November 13): ‘My Baths are all run dry.’ ‘There can be no doubt that * * * is a very fit candidate for the Privy Council and I will submit his name at once. We may take more time to consider over the other two—who are less distinguished: it will be time enough to settle whenever a much-to-be-regretted accident befalls us. Unless * * * is very much changed, I doubt your getting him to resign for a Privy Councillorship. If I might follow the precedents of the early Church I should like to make * * * a Bishop’ (December 5). ‘Thatfountain which you desire to have turned on for the benefit of Birmingham is frozen up—and only runs with a dribble. It is very difficult to restore it to activity’ (November 13).
The pleasant flow of this correspondence was very soon disturbed by an interlude which might have broken up many other things as well. The Bombay command, which at that date was a post of much dignity and importance, carrying the title of Commander-in-Chief and giving the holder a seat on the Governor’s Council, became vacant about the same time that the new Government took office. In the prevailing uncertainty upon the frontier Lord Randolph Churchill desired that it should be filled at once. He agreed with Mr. Smith at the War Office upon an officer. The Queen, however, was anxious that the Duke of Connaught should serve in high command in India and Lord Salisbury strongly urged her wishes upon the Secretary of State. ‘Though I am quite ready to accept the responsibility of your decision,’ he wrote (July 25), ‘I cannot, speaking confidentially, take quite your view. I hold that in India the monarchy must seem to be as little constitutional as possible; that it is of great importance to obtrude upon the native Indian mind the personality of the Sovereign and her family; and that, therefore, the policy of giving high military command to one of the Queen’s sons is a step of political importance; and that its value is far from being outweighed by the more restricted considerations attaching to military susceptibilities or the detailsof military administration.... However, though my opinions on it are clear, the matter is one for your decision.’
Lord Randolph Churchill resisted the appointment with an obstinate determination. It need scarcely be said that his reasons were not based on any suggestion that the Duke of Connaught was not fully qualified to discharge the military duties of the office. They consisted entirely in the grave constitutional objections which exist to the employment of Royal Princes in positions, such as the Bombay command then was, which carry with them the necessity of speaking and voting constantly in Council, and where numerous and importantpoliticalfunctions, apart from military duty, may at any moment devolve upon the General officer in command. These reasons were unanimously accepted as decisive by the Cabinet on October 9. While the matter was still in suspense there occurred an incident which is, on various grounds, indispensable to the completeness of this story. The letters tell their own tale:—
Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill.(Very Confidential.)Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts:August 14, 1885.My dear Randolph,—About ten days ago the Queen wrote to me and told me to send a private telegram to Lord Dufferin in the following words:‘How would it be for the Duke of Connaught to succeed to the command at Bombay? I wish for your opinion by telegraph after you have consulted Sir Donald Stewart andSir Frederick Roberts, both of whom, I know, think very highly of the Duke of Connaught’s qualifications.’As it is quite regular for the Queen to communicate directly with the Viceroy, I simply cyphered and sent the telegram without note or comment on my part.At the beginning of this week I received from the Viceroy and forwarded to the Queen, also without any comment, the following reply:‘Secret and Personal. Please submit following to Her Majesty. Both Sir Frederick Roberts and the Commander-in-Chief entirely approve of the idea of the Duke of Connaught’s appointment to the command of the Bombay army. The Commander-in-Chief observes that the Duke was the best of his General officers, and he considers that he possesses great tact in dealing with the natives. Speaking from a political point of view, I have always considered it a very good thing that one of H.M.’s sons should be in India. The presence of the Duchess of Connaught also exercises a very wholesome effect upon Indian society. Personally I should welcome H.R.H.’s return with the greatest satisfaction.’The next day there came the following from the Viceroy, which was also sent on to the Queen:‘I conclude you know that in a despatch which will go home next week, or the week following, we are reiterating the proposals already made by the Indian Government for the amalgamation of the Presidential armies, in which case the command at Bombay would be that of a Lieutenant-General. Perhaps you will mention this to Her Majesty.’I then requested the Queen that I might be allowed to communicate these telegrams to you, which I have received permission to do.I have not offered her any advice on this matter since I last wrote to you about it—except to defer any public decision till after the election.My advice to you, however, would be to give way, so far as the Lieutenant-Generalship is concerned; that is to say,subject to the last telegram. It is probable that these three men are sincere in substance in what they recommend; and, if so, there is no doubt they are probably right—and our position (if we oppose them) will be a very difficult one to maintain. On the other hand, I think no declaration should be made before the elections.Believe meYours very truly,Salisbury.
Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill.
(Very Confidential.)
Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts:August 14, 1885.
My dear Randolph,—About ten days ago the Queen wrote to me and told me to send a private telegram to Lord Dufferin in the following words:
‘How would it be for the Duke of Connaught to succeed to the command at Bombay? I wish for your opinion by telegraph after you have consulted Sir Donald Stewart andSir Frederick Roberts, both of whom, I know, think very highly of the Duke of Connaught’s qualifications.’
As it is quite regular for the Queen to communicate directly with the Viceroy, I simply cyphered and sent the telegram without note or comment on my part.
At the beginning of this week I received from the Viceroy and forwarded to the Queen, also without any comment, the following reply:
‘Secret and Personal. Please submit following to Her Majesty. Both Sir Frederick Roberts and the Commander-in-Chief entirely approve of the idea of the Duke of Connaught’s appointment to the command of the Bombay army. The Commander-in-Chief observes that the Duke was the best of his General officers, and he considers that he possesses great tact in dealing with the natives. Speaking from a political point of view, I have always considered it a very good thing that one of H.M.’s sons should be in India. The presence of the Duchess of Connaught also exercises a very wholesome effect upon Indian society. Personally I should welcome H.R.H.’s return with the greatest satisfaction.’
The next day there came the following from the Viceroy, which was also sent on to the Queen:
‘I conclude you know that in a despatch which will go home next week, or the week following, we are reiterating the proposals already made by the Indian Government for the amalgamation of the Presidential armies, in which case the command at Bombay would be that of a Lieutenant-General. Perhaps you will mention this to Her Majesty.’
I then requested the Queen that I might be allowed to communicate these telegrams to you, which I have received permission to do.
I have not offered her any advice on this matter since I last wrote to you about it—except to defer any public decision till after the election.
My advice to you, however, would be to give way, so far as the Lieutenant-Generalship is concerned; that is to say,subject to the last telegram. It is probable that these three men are sincere in substance in what they recommend; and, if so, there is no doubt they are probably right—and our position (if we oppose them) will be a very difficult one to maintain. On the other hand, I think no declaration should be made before the elections.
Believe meYours very truly,Salisbury.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.Carlton Club: August 14, 1885.Dear Lord Salisbury,—I have just received your two letters; one about the succession to the Bombay Command, and the other about giving Mr. Gorst[41]a nomination for the examination for the F.O. I am very greatly obliged to you for your kindness in this latter matter.The first subject is very serious, to my mind. I cannot continue to hold with any advantage the high position which H.M. the Queen has conferred upon me unless I feel I have the confidence of the Sovereign and her principal advisers. This elementary qualification I am without. Some time ago I placed you in possession of the objections which I and others saw to the Bombay Command being conferred upon the Duke of Connaught. I was not aware that it was possible, under such circumstances, that communications should pass between the Prime Minister and the Viceroy, at the instance of H.M. the Queen, without the knowledge of the Secretary of State, on a matter on which the latter held very strong and deliberate opinions.I have for some time felt that the India Office, while I was there, had little influence with respect to other matters of great importance. But from what has passed between yourself and the Viceroy about the Duke of Connaught, it must be obvious to the Viceroy that I no longer possesseither the confidence of the Sovereign or of yourself, and, under these circumstances, I respectfully ask you to submit to H.M. the Queen my resignation of the office which I have now the honour to hold.Yours very sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.
Carlton Club: August 14, 1885.
Dear Lord Salisbury,—I have just received your two letters; one about the succession to the Bombay Command, and the other about giving Mr. Gorst[41]a nomination for the examination for the F.O. I am very greatly obliged to you for your kindness in this latter matter.
The first subject is very serious, to my mind. I cannot continue to hold with any advantage the high position which H.M. the Queen has conferred upon me unless I feel I have the confidence of the Sovereign and her principal advisers. This elementary qualification I am without. Some time ago I placed you in possession of the objections which I and others saw to the Bombay Command being conferred upon the Duke of Connaught. I was not aware that it was possible, under such circumstances, that communications should pass between the Prime Minister and the Viceroy, at the instance of H.M. the Queen, without the knowledge of the Secretary of State, on a matter on which the latter held very strong and deliberate opinions.
I have for some time felt that the India Office, while I was there, had little influence with respect to other matters of great importance. But from what has passed between yourself and the Viceroy about the Duke of Connaught, it must be obvious to the Viceroy that I no longer possesseither the confidence of the Sovereign or of yourself, and, under these circumstances, I respectfully ask you to submit to H.M. the Queen my resignation of the office which I have now the honour to hold.
Yours very sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill.Private.Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: August 14, 1885.My dear Randolph,—I am sorry you take such a view of a correspondence that is perfectly regular. The Queen has always written private letters to the Viceroy, and has always received private answers from him, both received and sent without any knowledge of any of her Ministers. She would have telegraphed in the same way, only the Viceroy did not happen to have her cypher. I did nothing else but cypher and decypher the message for her. I could no more inform you of her private telegram, without her leave, than I could inform you of a private letter, if I had been asked to copy it for her, without her leave.I regret very much that you should think I have not shown you confidence. I have done my best to give effect to your wishes as far as I possibly could. In this case I think you are really under a misapprehension. What has passed does not pledge your liberty of action, or decide the question in issue. The question is exactly where it would have been if the Queen, instead of telegraphing, had written to Lord Dufferin. It would still have remained to be decided by her responsible Ministers. The only effect of the telegraphing has been to ante-date the issue by five or six weeks.I trust I have removed from your mind all misapprehension of the character and effects of the Queen’s correspondence with Lord Dufferin.Believe meYours very truly,Salisbury.
Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill.
Private.
Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: August 14, 1885.
My dear Randolph,—I am sorry you take such a view of a correspondence that is perfectly regular. The Queen has always written private letters to the Viceroy, and has always received private answers from him, both received and sent without any knowledge of any of her Ministers. She would have telegraphed in the same way, only the Viceroy did not happen to have her cypher. I did nothing else but cypher and decypher the message for her. I could no more inform you of her private telegram, without her leave, than I could inform you of a private letter, if I had been asked to copy it for her, without her leave.
I regret very much that you should think I have not shown you confidence. I have done my best to give effect to your wishes as far as I possibly could. In this case I think you are really under a misapprehension. What has passed does not pledge your liberty of action, or decide the question in issue. The question is exactly where it would have been if the Queen, instead of telegraphing, had written to Lord Dufferin. It would still have remained to be decided by her responsible Ministers. The only effect of the telegraphing has been to ante-date the issue by five or six weeks.
I trust I have removed from your mind all misapprehension of the character and effects of the Queen’s correspondence with Lord Dufferin.
Believe meYours very truly,Salisbury.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Mr. Moore.Dear Mr. Moore,—Will you copy the enclosed letter to Lord S., and send it to Hatfield? A special messenger is not necessary.Yours very truly,Randolph S. C.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Mr. Moore.
Dear Mr. Moore,—Will you copy the enclosed letter to Lord S., and send it to Hatfield? A special messenger is not necessary.
Yours very truly,Randolph S. C.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.2 Connaught Place, W.: August 15.Dear Lord Salisbury,—You write to me, as usual, very kindly, for which I am indeed grateful; but the impressions with which I received your letter of yesterday remain as strong as ever. God forbid that I should allow myself for one moment to throw a shadow of a doubt upon the right of the Sovereign to communicate with the utmost freedom on any conceivable matter with any one of her subjects; but I submit that a very different question arises when a communication from the Queen to so high an official as the Viceroy of India on a matter of high State importance passes through the Prime Minister. Such a communication, so sent, acquires a character of responsibility which it would not otherwise possess.Moreover, the matter becomes complicated indeed when it happens to be the fact that it is in the knowledge of the Prime Minister that the Royal communication which he forwards contains a suggestion—or rather, I may say, makes a proposal—to which the responsible head of the Department chiefly concerned entertains the strongest possible objections.The communications from the Queen direct to the Viceroy may be frequent—I can see no reason why they should not be; but it would appear that telegraphic messages on matters of a very confidential and important nature have not been usual hitherto; otherwise surely the Viceroy would have been provided with a copy of the Queen’s cypher.Generally, I would further submit to you the following:My position in relation to Lord Dufferin is in many ways anomalous. He is old enough to be my father, has been all his life in public affairs, has acquired an immense reputation. Clearly, therefore, it is curious that I should be placed in a position of superiority over him—I who have had no experience of official life, a very short experience of public life, and have not acquired any reputation worth speaking of.Under the circumstances the relations between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy can be attended with no advantage to the public service, on the contrary must be attended with the utmost disadvantage, unless it is, more than usually even, obvious to the latter that the former possesses the full, complete and perfect confidence of the Prime Minister.Lord Dufferin is no ordinary man. He has a greater faculty for putting two and two together than most men. I have not the smallest doubts as to the nature of the impression left upon his mind by the Royal communication on the subject of the Duke of Connaught as it has reached him. In about a week he will get a letter from me in which I gave at great length, and with all the arguments that had occurred to me, my strong objections to the appointment in question. He will find that he has committed himself somewhat lightly, and after the manner of a courtier—influenced, no doubt, by the fact that the inquiry came through you—to an opinion diametrically at variance with that of the Secretary of State, and he will know that in so doing the Prime Minister is on his side. If you follow my argument and concur in the premises on which it is based, I think you will easily see that satisfactory and advantageous relations between me and Lord Dufferin, which under the best circumstances were difficult, will now have become impossible.The superiority of the Secretary of State over the Viceroy, as intended by the Constitution of the Indian Government, will exist only in name as far as I am concerned, and this must have a most unfortunate effect on all questions of Indian administration. I shall never know, moreover, whatcommunications may not be passing between the Queen, the Prime Minister and the Viceroy on matters of great and small importance; and this element of uncertainty and ignorance of events will prevent me from being of the smallest utility.The appointment of the Duke of Connaught to a high and very responsible military command in India is, as it appears to me, a question of the utmost importance. It is not my business to point out how largely is raised by it the constitutional position of Royal Princes in these days; though I infer that you are aware of the existence of objections of very considerable weight, from the stipulation which you make with the Queen that no public declaration of the appointment should be made till after the elections. I am concerned only with the matter as it affects India generally, and the Indian Army in particular. Although the Secretary of State is not solely responsible for such an appointment, he practically is the person most identified with it in the public mind: and if it was not for my inexperience of official life, I should have thought that it was absolutely impossible that the freedom of action of the Secretary of State on so important a matter could be so absolutely demolished as it has been in this case.I may add, to show the extreme inconvenience of allowing matters of this kind to be prematurely settled without the knowledge of the Department chiefly concerned, that the Viceroy’s proposal that the Duke of Connaught should have the command of a Corps d’Armée with the rank of Lieutenant-General is absolutely impracticable at the present time. Even assuming that the new proposals of the Government of India for the amalgamation of the Bombay and Madras Commands were approved of by the Secretary of State in Council, and this is very uncertain, they would require, before they could be entered upon, an Act of Parliament. A Bill introduced into the House of Commons for this purpose would lead to much debate; it would necessarily raise very large questions of Indian government, militaryand political; might easily fail to pass into law, and at the best would hardly receive the Royal Assent till the early autumn of next year. It cannot be supposed that all this while the Bombay Army could be left without a responsible chief.Under all these circumstances I remain of the opinion which I expressed to you yesterday. From the first I always had great doubts whether my being in the Government would be any advantage to the Government or to the party. All doubts on the point are now removed from my mind. A first-class question of Indian administration has been taken out of my hands, and at any moment this action may recur, and it is clear to the Viceroy that I do not occupy towards himself the position which the Secretary of State ought and is supposed to occupy.I therefore with much respect adhere to the views which I put before you yesterday.Believe me to beYours very sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.P.S.—I enclose for your consideration an extract from my letter to Lord Dufferin of July 31.His advice, which I asked for, will not be worth much now.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.
2 Connaught Place, W.: August 15.
Dear Lord Salisbury,—You write to me, as usual, very kindly, for which I am indeed grateful; but the impressions with which I received your letter of yesterday remain as strong as ever. God forbid that I should allow myself for one moment to throw a shadow of a doubt upon the right of the Sovereign to communicate with the utmost freedom on any conceivable matter with any one of her subjects; but I submit that a very different question arises when a communication from the Queen to so high an official as the Viceroy of India on a matter of high State importance passes through the Prime Minister. Such a communication, so sent, acquires a character of responsibility which it would not otherwise possess.
Moreover, the matter becomes complicated indeed when it happens to be the fact that it is in the knowledge of the Prime Minister that the Royal communication which he forwards contains a suggestion—or rather, I may say, makes a proposal—to which the responsible head of the Department chiefly concerned entertains the strongest possible objections.
The communications from the Queen direct to the Viceroy may be frequent—I can see no reason why they should not be; but it would appear that telegraphic messages on matters of a very confidential and important nature have not been usual hitherto; otherwise surely the Viceroy would have been provided with a copy of the Queen’s cypher.
Generally, I would further submit to you the following:My position in relation to Lord Dufferin is in many ways anomalous. He is old enough to be my father, has been all his life in public affairs, has acquired an immense reputation. Clearly, therefore, it is curious that I should be placed in a position of superiority over him—I who have had no experience of official life, a very short experience of public life, and have not acquired any reputation worth speaking of.
Under the circumstances the relations between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy can be attended with no advantage to the public service, on the contrary must be attended with the utmost disadvantage, unless it is, more than usually even, obvious to the latter that the former possesses the full, complete and perfect confidence of the Prime Minister.
Lord Dufferin is no ordinary man. He has a greater faculty for putting two and two together than most men. I have not the smallest doubts as to the nature of the impression left upon his mind by the Royal communication on the subject of the Duke of Connaught as it has reached him. In about a week he will get a letter from me in which I gave at great length, and with all the arguments that had occurred to me, my strong objections to the appointment in question. He will find that he has committed himself somewhat lightly, and after the manner of a courtier—influenced, no doubt, by the fact that the inquiry came through you—to an opinion diametrically at variance with that of the Secretary of State, and he will know that in so doing the Prime Minister is on his side. If you follow my argument and concur in the premises on which it is based, I think you will easily see that satisfactory and advantageous relations between me and Lord Dufferin, which under the best circumstances were difficult, will now have become impossible.
The superiority of the Secretary of State over the Viceroy, as intended by the Constitution of the Indian Government, will exist only in name as far as I am concerned, and this must have a most unfortunate effect on all questions of Indian administration. I shall never know, moreover, whatcommunications may not be passing between the Queen, the Prime Minister and the Viceroy on matters of great and small importance; and this element of uncertainty and ignorance of events will prevent me from being of the smallest utility.
The appointment of the Duke of Connaught to a high and very responsible military command in India is, as it appears to me, a question of the utmost importance. It is not my business to point out how largely is raised by it the constitutional position of Royal Princes in these days; though I infer that you are aware of the existence of objections of very considerable weight, from the stipulation which you make with the Queen that no public declaration of the appointment should be made till after the elections. I am concerned only with the matter as it affects India generally, and the Indian Army in particular. Although the Secretary of State is not solely responsible for such an appointment, he practically is the person most identified with it in the public mind: and if it was not for my inexperience of official life, I should have thought that it was absolutely impossible that the freedom of action of the Secretary of State on so important a matter could be so absolutely demolished as it has been in this case.
I may add, to show the extreme inconvenience of allowing matters of this kind to be prematurely settled without the knowledge of the Department chiefly concerned, that the Viceroy’s proposal that the Duke of Connaught should have the command of a Corps d’Armée with the rank of Lieutenant-General is absolutely impracticable at the present time. Even assuming that the new proposals of the Government of India for the amalgamation of the Bombay and Madras Commands were approved of by the Secretary of State in Council, and this is very uncertain, they would require, before they could be entered upon, an Act of Parliament. A Bill introduced into the House of Commons for this purpose would lead to much debate; it would necessarily raise very large questions of Indian government, militaryand political; might easily fail to pass into law, and at the best would hardly receive the Royal Assent till the early autumn of next year. It cannot be supposed that all this while the Bombay Army could be left without a responsible chief.
Under all these circumstances I remain of the opinion which I expressed to you yesterday. From the first I always had great doubts whether my being in the Government would be any advantage to the Government or to the party. All doubts on the point are now removed from my mind. A first-class question of Indian administration has been taken out of my hands, and at any moment this action may recur, and it is clear to the Viceroy that I do not occupy towards himself the position which the Secretary of State ought and is supposed to occupy.
I therefore with much respect adhere to the views which I put before you yesterday.
Believe me to beYours very sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
P.S.—I enclose for your consideration an extract from my letter to Lord Dufferin of July 31.
His advice, which I asked for, will not be worth much now.
Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill.
Private.Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: August 15, 1885.My dear Randolph,—I had no intention of taking any decision out of your hands, and I think in attributing it to me you do not put fairly the position in which I was placed. The Queen’s desire for privacy was very natural. The question she was asking about her son might have had an unfavourable answer: and then she would naturally wish that as few should know it as possible. I could not, therefore, do otherwise than I did—send the message, and urge her to communicate it to you as soon as I knew itcould be done satisfactorily. It would not have been honourable to communicate it before. Perhaps I might, if I had thought of it, have sent the cypher to Ponsonby—but that would hardly have been civil; and it did not occur to me that you would take this objection. As a matter of fact I did not communicate with the Viceroy otherwise than by transmitting that which was sent to me. But if I had done so I should not have done anything unusual. Lord Beaconsfield used to do it occasionally: and Lord Dufferin wrote to me and asked me to correspond with him. The Viceroy is nominated by the Prime Minister, not by the Secretary of State. I only say this because I am concerned to show that I have not behaved unfairly to you, or taken anything out of your hand. But I do not hold to this power of corresponding either by letter or wire with the Viceroy: and if you really feel that ‘you will never know what communications are passing between the Queen, the Prime Minister, and the Viceroy,’ I am quite ready to give up for myself the right of communicating with him.Of course, you must take what course you think right. I should be sorry if, out of mere suspicion of me, you took a step which will tend to break up the party at a critical time: and still more that you should do it on a matter which can hardly fail to make the Queen’s name and actions matter of public controversy. But, at all events, before you take any definite step I trust you will talk to me about it. I shall be going through town on Tuesday to Osborne. If you are still there, would you come to me at two o’clock?Yours very truly,Salisbury.
Private.
Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: August 15, 1885.
My dear Randolph,—I had no intention of taking any decision out of your hands, and I think in attributing it to me you do not put fairly the position in which I was placed. The Queen’s desire for privacy was very natural. The question she was asking about her son might have had an unfavourable answer: and then she would naturally wish that as few should know it as possible. I could not, therefore, do otherwise than I did—send the message, and urge her to communicate it to you as soon as I knew itcould be done satisfactorily. It would not have been honourable to communicate it before. Perhaps I might, if I had thought of it, have sent the cypher to Ponsonby—but that would hardly have been civil; and it did not occur to me that you would take this objection. As a matter of fact I did not communicate with the Viceroy otherwise than by transmitting that which was sent to me. But if I had done so I should not have done anything unusual. Lord Beaconsfield used to do it occasionally: and Lord Dufferin wrote to me and asked me to correspond with him. The Viceroy is nominated by the Prime Minister, not by the Secretary of State. I only say this because I am concerned to show that I have not behaved unfairly to you, or taken anything out of your hand. But I do not hold to this power of corresponding either by letter or wire with the Viceroy: and if you really feel that ‘you will never know what communications are passing between the Queen, the Prime Minister, and the Viceroy,’ I am quite ready to give up for myself the right of communicating with him.
Of course, you must take what course you think right. I should be sorry if, out of mere suspicion of me, you took a step which will tend to break up the party at a critical time: and still more that you should do it on a matter which can hardly fail to make the Queen’s name and actions matter of public controversy. But, at all events, before you take any definite step I trust you will talk to me about it. I shall be going through town on Tuesday to Osborne. If you are still there, would you come to me at two o’clock?
Yours very truly,Salisbury.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.2 Connaught Place, W.: August 16.Dear Lord Salisbury,—I feel I cannot persist easily in urging my view upon you after your letter received this morning, though it does appear to me that you have notallowed yourself to appreciate with perfect justice the consideration which I tried to convey to you. It can be no satisfaction to me to be the means of depriving Lord Dufferin of the advantage, instruction and pleasure which correspondence direct with you cannot fail to afford him, and I do not quite understand how you can think me capable of such a purpose.Further, I am much distressed that you should suppose that the step which I was anxious to take (and which I still firmly believe would be for the advantage of all concerned) could be animated by so unworthy a motive as ‘suspicion of you.’My argument was that, viewing all the surrounding circumstances together, the peculiar occurrence about which I wrote had seriously, if not irreparably, impaired my power of being useful to your Government.Perhaps, before finally putting aside what I have pressed upon you, you will kindly give Mr. Moore an interview. He understands and can explain the position as I regard it much better than I can make it clear by letter.I shall be happy to wait upon you on Tuesday in accordance with your desire, if I am allowed to leave the house, to which for the last two days I have been kept a prisoner.Yours very sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.
2 Connaught Place, W.: August 16.
Dear Lord Salisbury,—I feel I cannot persist easily in urging my view upon you after your letter received this morning, though it does appear to me that you have notallowed yourself to appreciate with perfect justice the consideration which I tried to convey to you. It can be no satisfaction to me to be the means of depriving Lord Dufferin of the advantage, instruction and pleasure which correspondence direct with you cannot fail to afford him, and I do not quite understand how you can think me capable of such a purpose.
Further, I am much distressed that you should suppose that the step which I was anxious to take (and which I still firmly believe would be for the advantage of all concerned) could be animated by so unworthy a motive as ‘suspicion of you.’
My argument was that, viewing all the surrounding circumstances together, the peculiar occurrence about which I wrote had seriously, if not irreparably, impaired my power of being useful to your Government.
Perhaps, before finally putting aside what I have pressed upon you, you will kindly give Mr. Moore an interview. He understands and can explain the position as I regard it much better than I can make it clear by letter.
I shall be happy to wait upon you on Tuesday in accordance with your desire, if I am allowed to leave the house, to which for the last two days I have been kept a prisoner.
Yours very sincerely,Randolph S. Churchill.
Note by Mr. Moore.