But, my Lords and gentlemen, our statesmen still assert that the country will never stand compulsory training. Is that so certain? I am persuaded it is by no means certain. On the other hand, it is certain that so long as our fellow-countrymen are soothed and flattered by their leaders into believing that the Territorial Force, as at present constituted, gives all the backing that is necessary to the Navy and Regular Army, they can see no need to consider compulsory training, and are not to be blamed for their belief. But if our leaders would have the honesty and courage to tell the people the truth—the truth being that we are on the eve of a great crisis—a crisis without parallel certainly during the past hundred years, and that our national forces are unfit to meet the strain that may be put upon us with any assurance of success—then I feel confident that the present generation of Britishers would willingly adopt the first necessary reform, the substitution of universal training—compulsory upon all, high and low, rich and poor, from the son of a duke to the son of a labourer—as the foundation of our Territorial Force, instead of the present foolish and unfair method of basing it on a voluntary enlistment. The real difficulty is to move our leaders to take the people into their confidence and tell them the truth about this vital matter.
My Lords and gentlemen, when I consider the certainty of the struggle in front of us, its probable nearness, and the momentous issues at stake, I am astounded that the nation should be kept in the dark as to the dangers we have to cope with, and for which we most certainly are not prepared. But if our political leaders will take no part in putting our true position before the people, all the more necessary is it for those who love their country, and who have great commercial interests at stake, to help us in our efforts to prevent Great Britain falling from her high estate, and to preserve for her the blessings of peace. With all the strength and earnestness I possess, I want to impress upon you, gentlemen of this great city, that this aim cannot be fulfilled unless we are to have a Navy strong enough to insure our supremacy at sea, and an Army strong enough to prevent invasion, and free the Navy from the necessity of being tied to these shores.
[1] In the course of the controversies raised by my Manchester speech the fallacy of the superiority of the volunteer to "the unwilling conscript" has once more reappeared. I must here repeat what I said in the House of Lords in April, 1911, that much of this talk about "one volunteer being worth two pressed men" is nonsensical. The truth is that one man, whether pressed or not, if well disciplined and carefully trained, is worth at least half a dozen undisciplined, insufficiently trained volunteers. No doubt, if I had to lead a forlorn hope requiring men determined to carry out the job, no matter what the odds against them might be, I would rather have half the number of men who volunteered than double the number ordered to perform it, provided all were equally well trained; but if it were a question of soldiers versus untrained volunteers, I would infinitely prefer to have ten well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers than fifty ill-trained and ill-disciplined volunteers.
I could give many instances from history in support of this view—the opinions of great commanders like Washington and Napoleon—but I will here cite only one incident from my own experience of war:
During the Franco-German War of 1870-71, the French, from having an army without any means of expansion, were forced, after the first few weeks, to employ hastily-raised levies. These levies, even in greatly superior numbers, were no match for the highly-trained German soldiers. On one occasion towards the end of the war, 35,000 German soldiers found themselves engaged with a force of these recently-raised levies, numbering between 140,000 and 150,000. They had been given such training as was possible while war was going on, for four and a half months. They were brave men fighting for their own country, and in their own country, and what happened? Within a month 60,000 of them were killed, wounded, prisoners, or missing, while the remaining 80,000 were driven over the Swiss frontier and there interned.
[2] And as regards the much-needed six months' training, supposing, for argument's sake, that we could calculate on being given six months' warning, can we feel absolutely certain that the few patriotic employers who have allowed their men to join the Territorial Army, and are good enough to spare them for a week's or fortnight's training yearly, would or could consent to their being taken away for six months, during which time their business would go to pieces, while their competitors in trade, who have refused to allow their men to serve their country, would be reaping great benefit from their selfishness and want of patriotism?
THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE AND THE WORKING CLASSES
INTRODUCTORY NOTE.
I here insert a letter on the political situation, which I wrote to theTimesa year ago. This letter, I hope, will serve to show that the National Service League has at least considered the effects which National Service in Arms would have upon the working men of this country.
The assertion advanced by Mr. Blatchford in criticizing my Manchester speech, that the working men of Great Britain will never hear of compulsory service because they distrust the ruling classes, rests upon a misconception of the English Constitution almost too obvious to require exposure. This subject has already been dealt with in Part III. of "Fallacies and Facts" (pp. 208-217), and to that work I must refer the reader. I shall only observe in this place that in a democratic nation the working classes are themselves the ruling classes, and that the interests of England and of the Empire are their interests. Does Mr. Blatchford really imagine that the working men are so blind that, rather than defend those interests like men, they will prefer tamely to hand them over to Germany or to any other foreign Power? For this, and this only, is the logical consequence of his assertion, that he and his fellow-workers prefer invasion to universal compulsory service.
In former times, when the ruling classes of this nation consisted in very deed of the men of birth and property, that class considered it as its sacred right and inalienable privilege to serve the nation in war. Now, in the twentieth century, when the working men of this country have by the gradual extension of the franchise succeeded to the political influence and supremacy of the old aristocratic class, is it too much to hope that, as their condition of life improves, they will seek in the same spirit to secure that right and that inalienable privilege—service in war? For such service is the only mark of the true and perfect citizenship.
Surely that were a greater path and to a nobler goal than the path and the goal prescribed to the workers of this nation by the criticism in theClarion, to which I have just referred.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE "TIMES."
SIR,
The notification in theTimesthat Lord Selborne will shortly address a meeting in London on Imperial unity has caused me to reflect very seriously on what Imperial unity means to us, and on the disastrous effects that must follow any diminution on the part of the oversea Dominions in the splendid feeling of loyalty to the Mother Country of which we have quite recently had such a convincing example.
Personally, I have had sufficient proof of the strength and practical value of that loyalty to make me feel that we should do all in our power to strengthen and foster it; and to this end, and in order that we may retain undiminished the confidence of our distant fellow-subjects, we must begin to put our own house in order, and show the peoples of the oversea Dominions that we are determined to grapple with the several problems with which we are confronted and with which they are immediately concerned—that our Government, for instance, is established on a firm and constitutional basis; that our fiscal policy is sound; and that our Navy and Army are strong enough to defend our own interests, and to give the Dominions such help as they may require in time of trouble.
Yet, what is the present condition of affairs in this country? We have just passed under the domination of a Single Chamber. Tariff Reform, which occupies the chief place in the Unionist programme, is supported only in a half-hearted manner by the leaders of the party, and is opposed by some of its most powerful members. Our Navy is being rapidly approached by other navies in the number, speed, and power of their warships. Our Army is quite unfitted to meet the demands that may at any moment be made upon it.
How and by whom is this all to be changed? It can hardly be changed by the party now in power. That party has declared openly enough its policy, alike in regard to a Second Chamber, to Tariff Reform, to the Army and Navy, and therefore also in regard to our position as a first-rate European Power. The men to whom, on account of their high public character and culture, the nation looked for a steadying influence on the ultra-Radical and Socialistic sections of the party, have not fulfilled those expectations, and seem prepared to make any concessions that their most advanced supporters may demand.
On the other hand, is the Unionist party in a condition to bring about the changes that are absolutely necessary before we can take up the question of Imperial unity in any practical manner? Has that party placed before the country a definite policy upon those primary and all-important problems to which I have referred? Is it doing anything to make clearer to the people of this country what these mean to them? Or is it endeavouring to deal with them in a business-like way? I confess I can detect no indications of such a policy, and am not surprised, therefore, that a large number of the most earnest and most thoughtful Unionists have become disheartened and discontented.
It seems to me that the only way the desired end can be attained is for the prominent members of the Unionist party at once to place before the country a constructive policy; above all, as to the two problems that are the most pressing and the most vital—Social Reform and National Defence. These two problems are intimately connected, and a satisfactory solution of them must precede any real strengthening of Imperial bonds.
The question of Social Reform has been very fully discussed in the public papers during the last few months, and one of the writers on this subject has happily explained it as meaning "securing for the slum-dwellers good air, good housing, good food, good clothes, and good education." The conditions amid which millions of our people are living appear to me to make it natural that they should not care a straw under what rule they may be called upon to dwell, and I can quite understand their want of patriotic feeling.
Again, by Social Reform I mean a reform which includes essential changes in our primary schools. No other civilized nation leaves its young boys and girls to shift for themselves, as we leave ours when they are thirteen or fourteen years of age. Nor is the education they receive an education calculated to make them lovers of their country. They are never told anything of its history, or taught to be proud of their country and its past. They are not given any idea of what their duty is to their country or what they owe to it. In some schools, indeed, it is even forbidden to hoist the Union Jack. Much of the teaching has no bearing upon actual life, and it comes to an end at the very age at which boys are most receptive of tuition, be it good or evil, and most require to be under some kind of control. Our oversea Dominions are wiser in this respect than we are. By means of Cadet Corps the boys are looked after until they reach the age of manhood, and the ground is thus prepared for the formation of a reliable Citizen Army.
The same excellent results are obtained to some small extent in this country by training-ships, homes such as the Gordon Boys' Home, schools like the Duke of York's and the Royal Hibernian Military Schools, and societies like the Church Lads' and Boys' Brigades. Why are the failures in after-life amongst the lads brought up in these institutions so remarkably few? It is simply owing to the habits of order, obedience, and discipline they have been taught in their youth. And the Scout movement has already produced remarkable results. But such organizations are too limited in scope and too few in number, and, with the exception of the two Royal schools, they depend almost entirely upon private enterprise, and to a serious Government or a serious nation they are only signposts to the true policy. They should be an integral part of our national education.
Social Reform is a preliminary to any thorough system of national defence. "My country right or wrong; and right or wrong my country!" is the sentiment most treasured in the breast of anyone worthy of the name of man. Nevertheless, with how much more confidence should we be able to appeal to the young men of this nation and the Empire to do their duty as citizen soldiers if we had the certainty that they regarded England, not as a harsh stepmother, but as a true motherland, sedulously nurturing its youth, and not indifferent to their welfare in manhood or in age, and if we could further appeal to them to defend the nation and the Empire, because within its bounds they can live nobler and fuller lives than on any other spot on earth! Yet recent unimpeachable evidence makes it clear that, to tens of thousands of Englishmen engaged in daily toil, the call to "sacrifice" themselves for their country must seem an insult to their reason; for those conditions amid which they live make their lives already an unending sacrifice.
Will the Unionist party realize the gravity of this state of affairs? The Liberal party, by the Act for Payment of Members, has fulfilled to the letter the trust committed to it by the rising democracies of the 'forties. That Act, the last of the five points of the Charter, ends an epoch of which I can remember the beginnings more than sixty years ago. But the Radical-Liberal party has no longer a policy of construction; it seems only to have given the democracy enfranchisement in order to lead it to the disintegration of a time-honoured Constitution and the gradual dismemberment of a great Empire.
Is it too late to hope that the Unionist party will come forward to lead the millions that wait for a leader?
No party can long continue in power which relies for its prestige solely upon fomenting class hatreds—that is, by dividing the State against itself. But before a great national sacrifice to patriotism can fitly be demanded, a great act of national justice must be performed. The Unionist party missed its opportunity with respect to granting old-age pensions on a contributory basis. Now in 1911 it is confronted by larger issues; by problems affecting the industrial life of the entire nation, and touching, so to speak, the very fountain-head of the Empire's life.
Is it too late?
I am, Sir, your obedient servant,ROBERTS, F.M.
ADDRESS AT THE ANNUAL DINNER OF THEKENTISH MEN AND MEN OF KENT
INTRODUCTORY NOTE.
Whilst seeing the present little book through the press an opportunity unexpectedly offered itself to me of speaking to some officers of the existing Territorial Force in regard to the dilemma in which they are placed between their duty as patriotic citizens and their growing conviction of the inadequacy of the Territorial Force to perform the task imposed upon it in the event of war.
I therefore subjoin the address which, on the invitation of the officers themselves, I delivered at the annual dinner of the Kentish Men and the Men of Kent, on November 27, 1912.
In that address I was able to state more fully than at Manchester my reasons for criticizing the Territorial Force with regard to discipline, numbers, equipment, and energy.
ADDRESS AT THE ANNUAL DINNER OF THEKENT TERRITORIAL ASSOCIATION,LONDON
NOVEMBER 27, 1912.
GENTLEMEN,
Words fail me when I try to tell you what a great pleasure it was to me to be able to accept the invitation of the Kentish Men and the Men of Kent to their annual dinner. I was more than gratified by their invitation, for I felt that I should not have been asked to be their guest had they interpreted my comments on the Territorial Force in my Manchester speech in the way some people have done, as an attack upon the members of the Force. Indeed, I am profoundly grateful for this opportunity having been given to me to explain my views about the Force more fully than it was possible for me to do at Manchester.
Well, gentlemen, if I am right in feeling that you acquit me of any desire to disparage the officers and men who compose the Territorial Force, and that you will believe me when I repeat, what I have often said before, that I am second to none in my admiration of the patriotism and self-sacrifice displayed by them in their endeavour to make Lord Haldane's scheme a success—you will not, I am sure, misunderstand me if I now express my views quite frankly to you.
At the Manchester meeting I gave it as my opinion that the Territorial Force is afailure in discipline, afailure in numbers, afailure in equipment, and afailure in energy. Let me say a few words on each of these supremely important points.
Failure in Discipline.—Gentlemen, only those who have taken part in war, or have carefully studied the history of wars, can, I am persuaded, realize to its full extent the significance of discipline as applied to war. They alone can know that it is by discipline, and discipline alone, that bodies of men can be relied upon to work together in times of great difficulty and danger, and to withstand the disintegrating effect of war; for they have learnt that it is discipline alone which prevents panic seizing upon men when unforeseen circumstances arise. They alone know that amongst untrained or ill-trained troops panic spreads with lightning rapidity, and that when there is no sense of discipline to be appealed to and to keep the men together, defeat is the inevitable result.
It is discipline alone which gives the soldier confidence in himself, reliance on his comrades, and belief in his officers. It is discipline alone which gives him the courage to face vastly superior numbers; to continue marching, though worn out with fatigue and want of food, ready to fight again, and yet again. It is discipline alone that supports him under the strain of lying still for successive hours in the punishing fire zone—one of the most trying of the many exacting conditions of modern warfare. It is discipline alone which makes the soldier obey the word of command, even under such circumstances as I have described. Clear understanding of and prompt obedience to an order become an instinct to the properly trained soldier, whereas the imperfectly trained man, when he finds himself in an unfamiliar and trying position, frequently misunderstands the word of command, and, when matters become acute, he does not heed or even hear it.
Gentlemen, when I tell you that discipline is the backbone of an army, I ask you whether it is possible for that essential quality to be instilled into the ranks of the Territorial Force with the amount of training that is given to them.
Failure in Numbers.—Gentlemen, despite the untiring efforts of the Territorial Associations—a large proportion of whose members are staunch supporters of the National Service League—the Territorial Force is still far short of its established strength of 315,000 men. Possibly this is a blessing in disguise, for if men had come forward in sufficient numbers to bring the Force up to its establishment, politicians would have assured the country, even more fervently than they do now, that our Home Defence Army is in all respects what is needed. The truth is that the number 315,000 has no relation to our real requirements. It was fixed upon because the experience of fifty years had proved that a larger number could never be forthcoming under the voluntary system. As with the Regular Army, so with the Home Defence Army, the strength is governed by what is known to be the limit obtainable by voluntary effort. It has no relation to the requirements of war. It solves no known problem. Again, therefore, gentlemen, I ask you whether it is possible to regard the Territorial Force as fitted, in respect to numbers, for the defence of the United Kingdom.
Failure in Equipment.—In common with the Regular Army the Territorial Force is armed with a rifle inferior to the rifle possessed by foreign nations, and with a less deadly bullet than is used by them. But the Territorial rifle is even inferior to the present Regular Army rifle in range, in trajectory, and in stopping power.
Then the gun in use with the Territorial Artillery is a mere makeshift. It is distinctly inferior in power, range, and rapidity of fire to the gun of any first-rate State, and it is not too much to say that, if our Regular soldiers were armed as the Territorials are armed, they could not keep the field against the troops of any European nation. If this is so, how unfair, how disastrous, it would be to ask Territorial troops to undertake a task which their seasoned and disciplined comrades of the Regular Army could not face.
Then as regards mobilization arrangements, supply and transport services, ammunition columns, trains, horses, vehicles, harness, even boots for the men—in none of these essentials are the Territorials, as a Force, complete. I therefore repeat thatfailure in equipmentis not an unfair statement.
Failure in Energy.—By failure in energy, I do not for a moment mean to imply that individual members of the Territorial Force are wanting in energy. I know how earnestly many of them have striven to learn and to do their duty under adverse circumstances. My criticism applies to the Force itself—to its corporate energy—if I may use such an expression. And even those who are the firmest believers in the Force must, I think, admit that, under existing conditions, it is not practicable for it to attain that combined action, that alertness, that intensity and vitality, all of which are essential to success in war.
But, gentlemen, in addition to the shortcomings of the Territorial Force which I have enumerated, there is one defect in its conception which would alone show its unfitness for what you all know is its primary duty—that is, to defend these shores from invasion. That defect lies in the strange condition which is an essential factor in this scheme—a condition unprecedented with any army in the world—namely, that the Force is to receive six months' training, after war has broken out, before it is even supposed to be capable of dealing with an invading army. Can any scheme for the defence of any nation be more madly conceived? We have been given an object lesson in the Near East as to the insanity of the idea that our Citizen Army will be given six months to prepare after war has been declared. On October 8 Montenegro declared war, and in four weeks the Turks were beaten in all directions and were making their last stand within a few miles of Constantinople.
Gentlemen, I am told by my opponents that it is unpatriotic of me to express these opinions, and that by doing so I am discouraging the Territorial Force. But which is really the more unpatriotic course, to tell the truth about the Force, so that the people of this country may insist upon its terrible deficiencies being remedied, or to gloss over these deficiencies and thus to expose to certain disaster the few patriotic men who have joined it, and who are asked to be prepared with a Force untrained, under-officered, and under-manned to cope with a highly-trained enemy.
I venture to think, gentlemen, that I am doing you no disservice in speaking plainly about the Territorial Force. My hope is that when its grave condition is no longer concealed from our countrymen, they will realize the folly of trusting the defence of these shores to a make-believe Army, that they will take to heart the false position in which the patriotic members of the Force are placed, and that they will insist upon a law being passed by which all able-bodied men must be prepared to take their place in the Citizen Army. The Territorial Force must either be made efficient in all respects, or it will speedily cease to be a Force even in name.
I hope, gentlemen, you will understand that I am thinking and speaking of the Territorial Force as a Force that must be prepared to move and live, to march and fight as an army. I am not thinking of individual men, or companies, or batteries, or squadrons, but of a Force which, if it is ever called upon to take the field, will have to deal as a whole with highly-trained picked troops.
What, then, gentlemen, is right for the Territorial officers to do? It seems to me that a tremendous responsibility rests upon those officers. If they agree with me that neither they themselves, nor the men they command, are sufficiently trained to take the field against first-class soldiers; if they agree with me that neither in discipline nor in numbers, neither in equipment nor in vital energy, can the Territorial Force be reckoned as a modern army; if they agree with me that no great improvement either in efficiency or numbers can ever be reached under the conditions necessarily imposed upon all citizens who enter a voluntary force; if they agree with me that the safety of these islands, and therefore of our Empire, is endangered by this state of affairs—then their course of action is clear. While still giving of their best to the Force to which they belong, while still setting the fine example which they have consistently done, they should make the Government and the nation distinctly understand that, in their opinion, they are unable to carry out the duties entrusted to them, and that unless they are given the trained assistance of the manhood of the country, they can never guarantee the safety of these islands and the integrity of the Empire.
Such a warning, coming from such men, will awaken the country in a way that I can never hope to do. Such an announcement, coming from the men who alone in the country have obeyed the call of duty, and who, at the cost of convenience, time, and money, have tried to fit themselves for the defence of their country and the security of the Empire—such a summons, I say, will arouse the People, and they themselves will call upon the Government to enact a law which shall impose upon all citizens of a military age the noble duty of defending the country and the Empire to which they have the glory to belong.
THE END
BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD.