CHAPTER V.HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE EARLY YEARS OF LORENZO’S GOVERNMENT.‘Onthe second day after my father’s death,’ so we read in Lorenzo de’ Medici’s memoirs, ‘the most distinguished men of the State and of the ruling party came to our house to express their condolence, and at the same time to request me to undertake the conduct of affairs in the city and government, as my father and grandfather had done. As such a responsibility seemed too great for my inexperience (I was only twenty-one), and involved so much labour and so many dangers, I accepted it unwillingly and only for the sake of our friends and fortune, for those who are shut out from political influence have a bad position in Florence. Hitherto (the beginning of 1471) all has succeeded to the general honour and satisfaction, not in consequence of my wisdom, but by God’s grace and by reason of the wise measures of my predecessors.’These words show clearly how the matter stood, and justify the opinion which Francesco Guicciardini[181]puts into the mouth of one of his interlocutors. ‘The government of the Medici,’ says Bernardo del Nero, ‘was a party government, usurped by the party, preserved by tyranny, neither violent nor cruel, except in a few cases in which they were constrained by necessity, but founded upon the policy of favouring the lower classes, uniting the interests of thestronger with their own interests, and suppressing all who seemed inclined to go their own way. As the power passed from father to son, the memory of ancient rivalry and enmity lived on. The Medici had always more their private advantage at heart than the general good. But as they had neither any position nor Signoria abroad, their interest was generally one with that of the commonwealth, whose glory and fame were likewise theirs. But even with so keen-sighted a man as Lorenzo, such a position might easily lead to errors, and we shall see what mistakes he did make in important cases to the great disadvantage of the State, either by allowing himself to be carried away by passion or by regarding only his personal position and advantage, always under the pretext that his greatness and that of his family was necessary to the common good.Lorenzo had taken so large a share in the conduct of affairs in his father’s last years, and displayed such capabilities, that we need not be surprised if, after the authority of the Medici had been acknowledged now for two generations, all eyes should have been directed towards him, notwithstanding his youth, which excluded him from offices of State. Without an understanding between the heads of the party, however, he could not have been offered the responsible position of which he has told us. Piero had, on his death-bed, recommended his two sons to his brother-in-law, Tommaso Soderini, on whose prudence and attachment he placed great reliance. Since Tommaso had essentially contributed to save the cause of the Medici in the conspiracy of 1466, he had been in constant activity. He had not been able to persuade the Venetians to hinder Colleone’s proceedings, but, as member of the magistracy of war, and during the fourth year that he was elected Gonfaloniere in 1467, he had exercised a favourable influence on the conduct of affairs, and honestly exerted himself for the restoration of peace with Borso d’Este, first in Venice and afterwards in Milan. The opinion of him was so high in Florence that he couldeasily have raised himself to the leadership of the ruling party. But whether it was that he would not betray the confidence reposed in him, or that he was of opinion that the preservation of this family in the position they had held now for thirty-five years was at the same time the preservation of the peace and safety of the State at home, as well as of its connections with foreign states, he abstained from following Diotisalvi Neroni’s example. Immediately after Piero’s death, on the evening of the day when he had been interred, Soderini summoned to him all the distinguished citizens attached to the existing government. More than six hundred, ‘the flower of the city,’ assembled in the convent of Sant’Antonio, in the neighbourhood of Porta Faenza. It was here determined to preserve unity and the present state of affairs, and to leave Piero’s sons in their father’s position. ‘Messer Tommaso Soderini,’ writes the Ferrarese ambassador, ‘took the word as eldest, and explained how Piero had left his sons already grown up and gifted with good judgment and intellect. Out of regard for their predecessors, and especially Cosimo and Piero, who had always been friends, protectors, and preservers of the commonwealth and benefactors of the State, for which reason they had taken the first rank and borne the whole weight of government wisely and with dignity, always displaying courage and mature judgment, it seemed to him that they should leave to Piero’s family and sons, notwithstanding their youth, the honourable position which he himself and Cosimo had enjoyed. He added that he saw the two no less considerate and desirous of winning the good opinion of the commune, and of all the Florentine citizens, than their grandfather and father. This was confirmed by three or four of those present, by Messer Manno, son-in-law of Messer Luca Pitti, who was not himself present, by Messer Giannozzo Pitti, and Domenico Martelli. The last two remarked that a master and a head was needed to give the casting-vote in publicaffairs.[182]The whole city,’ adds Guicciardini, ‘agreed to this, chiefly through the exertions of Messer Tommaso Soderini, who at that time enjoyed more authority than any other citizen, and was, perhaps, the wisest of all. He thought that Lorenzo, on account of his youth, and because he owed his position to him, so to speak, would allow himself to be guided by him; in this, however, he was mistaken.’[183]That Lorenzo considered the favourable opinion of himself as by no means sufficient to secure his authority, shows on the one hand how he, young as he was, had sounded the unsteady basis on which the whole fabric of the State rests in a commonwealth of this kind, and on the other hand, how his thoughts were immediately directed to gaining a position no longer dependent upon internal agitation, such as had disturbed his grandfather’s administration and endangered the life of his father. A report of the Ferrarese ambassador plainly shows how the heads of the ruling party hoped to conduct affairs after Piero’s death. ‘They are agreed that the private affairs of the Signoria shall pass through Lorenzo’s hands in the same manner as previously through those of his father, for which purpose his friends will take care to procure him credit and reputation from the beginning. They can easily do so, for they have the government in their hands, and the ballot-boxes at their disposal. Others with whom I have spoken are of a different opinion, and think that within a few days all affairs will again be disposed of in the palace (i.e.by the magistrates themselves). If, however, they guide the bark rightly at the beginning, and while they can influence the election of the magistrates, I believethey will reach the desired haven, for the philosopher says, “Principium est plus quam dimidium totius.”’ The ambassador was right; he could not, however, foresee the measure of Lorenzo’s personal share in this gradual change of a republican constitution into one that was guided by the will of a single man. He had scarcely attained the head of the State when he began the work which he brought to a termination ten years later, after the violent storm which had threatened his life.The deliberation of September 6, 1466, had placed the election of the highest magistrates for ten years in the hands of electors appointed by the Council of a Hundred. The heads of the party were accustomed to decide upon the names of these electors in an extraordinary meeting, and to lay them before the said council, which usually accepted them without further scruple, since only those not unfavourable to the party, even if they did not belong to its actual partizans, sat in this council. Sometimes, however, it occurred that the candidates were not all accepted, so that anxiety arose in the minds of Lorenzo and his confidants lest electors disagreeable to them might some day be appointed, and their influence over the Signoria and other high magistrates be thus limited. This seemed serious to them. However large, too, and constantly increasing an authority might be which was independent of the responsible magistrates forming the fabric of the State, the respect for forms was equally great, and is indeed a characteristic feature of these Italian communes; and their endeavour was to give to measures which gradually destroyed the spirit of the constitution the appearance of legality. In the summer of 1470, the Signoria, which was entirely subject to the Medici, made the first attempt in this direction. They proposed to the Council of a Hundred to form out of all the electors from the year 1434 who were still living, forty in number, and five new ones, a College of Electors. From this for the next sixteen years five might be annually drawn, with power to appoint the Signoriand Gonfaloniere out of the lists or ballot-boxes containing the names of the citizens capable of office. The opposition to a measure which would have placed forty-five tyrants over the people was, however, so strong that the Signoria judged it advisable to withdraw the proposal. Six months later, in January 1471, something similar was, nevertheless, carried out. Instead of leaving the electors to be appointed by the Council of a Hundred, the Signoria sitting in July and August, together with the electors acting for the current year, agreed that they should appoint the new ones, the Council of a Hundred only confirm them, and a single voice above the half of the members present should give the casting-vote, whereas a majority of two-thirds of voices had previously been requisite. The same thing happened in the following July, and when the votes were collected it naturally followed that only the names of persons considered reliable came upon the electing tickets, so that the threads of the whole administration were more than ever confined to a few hands. Immediately after Piero de’ Medici’s death, under the plausible pretext that the war occasioned by the Malatesta affair was not yet at an end, an extraordinary tax of 300,000 gold florins was levied, so that the government was provided with funds for all emergencies.‘By such measures,’ remarks Francesco Guicciardini, ‘Lorenzo de’ Medici began to gain firm footing in Florence. The prevailing party strengthened itself, and he obtained influence and reputation. So he began to wish to be lord and master. Instead of allowing himself to be guided by others, he took care that Messer Tommaso and the others who enjoyed high influence, and had a large number of relations to support them, should not become too strong. Although he never refused to send them on embassies, and confer on them the highest honours and offices, he held them within bounds, frustrated their intentions in several cases, and brought forward others who caused him no anxiety, as at first Messer Bernardo Buongirolami and Antonio Pucci,afterwards Messer Agnolo Niccolini, Bernardo del Nero, Pier Filippo Pandolfini, &c. He was accustomed to say that if his father had done so, and somewhat restrained Messer Diotisalvi and his companions, he would not have been in danger of losing his position in 1466.’ Another measure was taken with the evident intention of withdrawing the government of the city by degrees from all other influences than those of the Medici and their confidants. This time it concerned the lower classes, as that just mentioned did the higher. On September 20, 1471, the Balia appointed in July to superintend the new elections, reduced the number of smaller guilds from fourteen to five, so that there should be altogether only twelve guilds; but the property of the dissolved corporations should serve to form a new credit-fund for the salaries of the officials. But this measure, which had a wider significance than people seemed inclined to attribute to it in the first moment, was never carried into practice.[184]When Piero died, foreign affairs were by no means secure. The dispute about Rimini was not terminated. Pope Paul II. was extremely indignant at the assistance which Florence and Naples had given his disobedient vassal, and by means of which this vassal had been able to oppose him successfully. He indulged in the most violent expressions against the Medici, even before the assembled Consistorium. His rage against Ferrante even led to action. The old quarrel between Rome and Naples on account of the feudal relation injurious to both, but still legal, had also come to an outbreak between Ferrante and Paul. The king did not pay the tribute, and, when enjoined to do so, was always ready with one excuse or another. Now it was the embarrassment into which troubles at home had plunged him, now it was the expenses for the aid granted to the Church in the contest with the restless counts of Anguillara. If pressed, he answered by claiming Benevento and Terracina and placesin the Abruzzi, claims which were not always unfounded, in consequence of the complicated and wavering connections of the empire with the Church. At last, when all seemed to be peacefully settled, a quarrel broke out between the Pope and the Orsini, on account of the rights claimed by the latter over the Alum district of Tolfa, which Paul had contested with force of arms, while the king defended them in like manner. It went so far that Ferrante threatened to league himself with the Turks; the Pope, however, answered him by not only threatening to drive him from Naples, but by actually planning a new campaign against the Aragonese with John of Anjou. This happened just after the affair with Malatesta had ended, and who knows what intrigues would have been begun, had not the war of the Catalans against the Aragonese, in which Anjou commanded, occupied him till a higher hand interfered?Under circumstances of this kind, the necessity of attaching themselves as firmly as possible to Naples and Milan was made clear to the people of Florence, and as long as Lorenzo lived this necessity always remained uppermost with him, even through momentary fluctuations. The conviction that no firm reliance was to be placed upon the two other great powers of Italy, Venice and the Pope, made the Florentines regard such an alliance as the salvation of Italy. Venice could not be trusted because her thirst for Italian conquest was proportionate to the danger of her Levantine possessions; nor the Pope, because the papal policy changed with every new ruler, nay, it altered several times under the same ruler. When the Pope, displeased with the Venetians, began to lean towards reconciliation, these natural allies determined to agree beforehand on the position to assume towards him. Plenipotentiaries from Naples and Milan came in the spring of 1470 to Florence for this purpose. But when difficulties arose, the consultation was transferred to Naples, whither Otto Niccolini went on behalf of Florence. On July 12 the news reached Florence that the alliance betweenthe three states was prolonged for fifteen years, reserving the power of bringing about a general alliance of the Italian powers beside this special one—a piece of news which was celebrated with festivals and bonfires. It was indeed high time to unite. On the same July 12, the Turks took Negroponte. The besiegers suffered severe losses, but they avenged themselves by a fearful slaughter among the inhabitants and the garrison, and the Venetians had to expiate heavily their neglect in defending one of their most important fortresses. On August 7, they heard of the sad event through an announcement of King Ferrante’s. From all sides unity was now urged, in order to resist the formidable enemy, before whom the whole Archipelago, the Ionian Sea, and the entrance to the Adriatic, lay open. The Pope summoned an assembly of plenipotentiaries of all the Italian States to Rome, while at the same time he determined to compose the Malatesta contest by mediation. To effect an understanding was, however, difficult, because the three powers reserved their separate alliance, and Paul consented to this very unwillingly. Nevertheless, the treaty was concluded at Rome on December 22, express emphasis being laid on the article that the new league should rest on the basis of that which had been agreed upon at Venice at the end of August 1454, by the active mediation of Pope Nicholas V., when the conquest of Constantinople had first brought the threatened danger home to all. During the seventeen years which had elapsed since then, affairs had only grown worse. The Pope, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, the Republics of Venice and Florence, and Borso of Este, to whom the title of Duke of Ferrara had not long been granted, joined the alliance, which was to be extended over all Christendom, for which purpose Paul II. appointed the Cardinal of Siena, Francesco Todeschini Piccolomini, as legate to the Emperor and Empire. Jacopo Guicciardini had concluded the treaty on the part of Florence.But this time also the result by no means correspondedto the general expectation. Sforza did not ratify the treaty, because the purport of the document did not suit his wishes in some important particulars. Although the Signoria of Florence sent in their ratification, Guicciardini suppressed it, because Lorenzo de’ Medici, who wished to hold with Milan, had given him secret instructions not to sign, so that things remained unsettled. In Germany and Hungary, where the Pope and Venice placed their chief hopes on King Mathias Corvinus, it was not much better. After the sanguinary Bohemian war, which the latter had waged against George Podiebrad, had weakened their strength on both sides, and the Turks, pressing on from Bosnia through Croatia and Carniola, had already set foot on the soil of the empire, and roused Emperor Frederick from his sleep, still nothing could be really effected by the Ratisbon Congress in the spring of 1471. As the princes here were dilatory and the towns disinclined for action, quarrels began anew in Italy. Not to mention the contest between Pope and King, disagreeable communications passed between the former and Florence. The Florentines were willing indeed to furnish subsidies for the Turkish war, but insisted upon including the clergy in the taxes, which the Pope refused to permit.While this was proceeding, Paul II. died in the night between July 25 and 26, not fifty-four years old, and apparently in the enjoyment of perfect health. At a time when Christendom was everywhere torn by factions and threatened from without, when Italy saw herself exposed to the attacks of the infidels, as in the ninth century, the unity of her states being always problematical, the election of a Pope was of more importance than ever. Shortly before, several princes had passed away who had exercised more or less influence on the course of affairs—George Podiebrad, King of Bohemia, Borso of Este, John of Anjou, who concluded a life more eventful than successful at Barcelona, having only attained the age of forty-five years, and carrying with him to the grave the hopes of his old father René, and of his house. In him,a still numerous party in the south of Italy lost their head; yet they could not make up their minds to give in their allegiance decidedly to the Aragonese government, which seemed daily to grow stronger by its activity, talents, and alliances.
CHAPTER V.HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE EARLY YEARS OF LORENZO’S GOVERNMENT.‘Onthe second day after my father’s death,’ so we read in Lorenzo de’ Medici’s memoirs, ‘the most distinguished men of the State and of the ruling party came to our house to express their condolence, and at the same time to request me to undertake the conduct of affairs in the city and government, as my father and grandfather had done. As such a responsibility seemed too great for my inexperience (I was only twenty-one), and involved so much labour and so many dangers, I accepted it unwillingly and only for the sake of our friends and fortune, for those who are shut out from political influence have a bad position in Florence. Hitherto (the beginning of 1471) all has succeeded to the general honour and satisfaction, not in consequence of my wisdom, but by God’s grace and by reason of the wise measures of my predecessors.’These words show clearly how the matter stood, and justify the opinion which Francesco Guicciardini[181]puts into the mouth of one of his interlocutors. ‘The government of the Medici,’ says Bernardo del Nero, ‘was a party government, usurped by the party, preserved by tyranny, neither violent nor cruel, except in a few cases in which they were constrained by necessity, but founded upon the policy of favouring the lower classes, uniting the interests of thestronger with their own interests, and suppressing all who seemed inclined to go their own way. As the power passed from father to son, the memory of ancient rivalry and enmity lived on. The Medici had always more their private advantage at heart than the general good. But as they had neither any position nor Signoria abroad, their interest was generally one with that of the commonwealth, whose glory and fame were likewise theirs. But even with so keen-sighted a man as Lorenzo, such a position might easily lead to errors, and we shall see what mistakes he did make in important cases to the great disadvantage of the State, either by allowing himself to be carried away by passion or by regarding only his personal position and advantage, always under the pretext that his greatness and that of his family was necessary to the common good.Lorenzo had taken so large a share in the conduct of affairs in his father’s last years, and displayed such capabilities, that we need not be surprised if, after the authority of the Medici had been acknowledged now for two generations, all eyes should have been directed towards him, notwithstanding his youth, which excluded him from offices of State. Without an understanding between the heads of the party, however, he could not have been offered the responsible position of which he has told us. Piero had, on his death-bed, recommended his two sons to his brother-in-law, Tommaso Soderini, on whose prudence and attachment he placed great reliance. Since Tommaso had essentially contributed to save the cause of the Medici in the conspiracy of 1466, he had been in constant activity. He had not been able to persuade the Venetians to hinder Colleone’s proceedings, but, as member of the magistracy of war, and during the fourth year that he was elected Gonfaloniere in 1467, he had exercised a favourable influence on the conduct of affairs, and honestly exerted himself for the restoration of peace with Borso d’Este, first in Venice and afterwards in Milan. The opinion of him was so high in Florence that he couldeasily have raised himself to the leadership of the ruling party. But whether it was that he would not betray the confidence reposed in him, or that he was of opinion that the preservation of this family in the position they had held now for thirty-five years was at the same time the preservation of the peace and safety of the State at home, as well as of its connections with foreign states, he abstained from following Diotisalvi Neroni’s example. Immediately after Piero’s death, on the evening of the day when he had been interred, Soderini summoned to him all the distinguished citizens attached to the existing government. More than six hundred, ‘the flower of the city,’ assembled in the convent of Sant’Antonio, in the neighbourhood of Porta Faenza. It was here determined to preserve unity and the present state of affairs, and to leave Piero’s sons in their father’s position. ‘Messer Tommaso Soderini,’ writes the Ferrarese ambassador, ‘took the word as eldest, and explained how Piero had left his sons already grown up and gifted with good judgment and intellect. Out of regard for their predecessors, and especially Cosimo and Piero, who had always been friends, protectors, and preservers of the commonwealth and benefactors of the State, for which reason they had taken the first rank and borne the whole weight of government wisely and with dignity, always displaying courage and mature judgment, it seemed to him that they should leave to Piero’s family and sons, notwithstanding their youth, the honourable position which he himself and Cosimo had enjoyed. He added that he saw the two no less considerate and desirous of winning the good opinion of the commune, and of all the Florentine citizens, than their grandfather and father. This was confirmed by three or four of those present, by Messer Manno, son-in-law of Messer Luca Pitti, who was not himself present, by Messer Giannozzo Pitti, and Domenico Martelli. The last two remarked that a master and a head was needed to give the casting-vote in publicaffairs.[182]The whole city,’ adds Guicciardini, ‘agreed to this, chiefly through the exertions of Messer Tommaso Soderini, who at that time enjoyed more authority than any other citizen, and was, perhaps, the wisest of all. He thought that Lorenzo, on account of his youth, and because he owed his position to him, so to speak, would allow himself to be guided by him; in this, however, he was mistaken.’[183]That Lorenzo considered the favourable opinion of himself as by no means sufficient to secure his authority, shows on the one hand how he, young as he was, had sounded the unsteady basis on which the whole fabric of the State rests in a commonwealth of this kind, and on the other hand, how his thoughts were immediately directed to gaining a position no longer dependent upon internal agitation, such as had disturbed his grandfather’s administration and endangered the life of his father. A report of the Ferrarese ambassador plainly shows how the heads of the ruling party hoped to conduct affairs after Piero’s death. ‘They are agreed that the private affairs of the Signoria shall pass through Lorenzo’s hands in the same manner as previously through those of his father, for which purpose his friends will take care to procure him credit and reputation from the beginning. They can easily do so, for they have the government in their hands, and the ballot-boxes at their disposal. Others with whom I have spoken are of a different opinion, and think that within a few days all affairs will again be disposed of in the palace (i.e.by the magistrates themselves). If, however, they guide the bark rightly at the beginning, and while they can influence the election of the magistrates, I believethey will reach the desired haven, for the philosopher says, “Principium est plus quam dimidium totius.”’ The ambassador was right; he could not, however, foresee the measure of Lorenzo’s personal share in this gradual change of a republican constitution into one that was guided by the will of a single man. He had scarcely attained the head of the State when he began the work which he brought to a termination ten years later, after the violent storm which had threatened his life.The deliberation of September 6, 1466, had placed the election of the highest magistrates for ten years in the hands of electors appointed by the Council of a Hundred. The heads of the party were accustomed to decide upon the names of these electors in an extraordinary meeting, and to lay them before the said council, which usually accepted them without further scruple, since only those not unfavourable to the party, even if they did not belong to its actual partizans, sat in this council. Sometimes, however, it occurred that the candidates were not all accepted, so that anxiety arose in the minds of Lorenzo and his confidants lest electors disagreeable to them might some day be appointed, and their influence over the Signoria and other high magistrates be thus limited. This seemed serious to them. However large, too, and constantly increasing an authority might be which was independent of the responsible magistrates forming the fabric of the State, the respect for forms was equally great, and is indeed a characteristic feature of these Italian communes; and their endeavour was to give to measures which gradually destroyed the spirit of the constitution the appearance of legality. In the summer of 1470, the Signoria, which was entirely subject to the Medici, made the first attempt in this direction. They proposed to the Council of a Hundred to form out of all the electors from the year 1434 who were still living, forty in number, and five new ones, a College of Electors. From this for the next sixteen years five might be annually drawn, with power to appoint the Signoriand Gonfaloniere out of the lists or ballot-boxes containing the names of the citizens capable of office. The opposition to a measure which would have placed forty-five tyrants over the people was, however, so strong that the Signoria judged it advisable to withdraw the proposal. Six months later, in January 1471, something similar was, nevertheless, carried out. Instead of leaving the electors to be appointed by the Council of a Hundred, the Signoria sitting in July and August, together with the electors acting for the current year, agreed that they should appoint the new ones, the Council of a Hundred only confirm them, and a single voice above the half of the members present should give the casting-vote, whereas a majority of two-thirds of voices had previously been requisite. The same thing happened in the following July, and when the votes were collected it naturally followed that only the names of persons considered reliable came upon the electing tickets, so that the threads of the whole administration were more than ever confined to a few hands. Immediately after Piero de’ Medici’s death, under the plausible pretext that the war occasioned by the Malatesta affair was not yet at an end, an extraordinary tax of 300,000 gold florins was levied, so that the government was provided with funds for all emergencies.‘By such measures,’ remarks Francesco Guicciardini, ‘Lorenzo de’ Medici began to gain firm footing in Florence. The prevailing party strengthened itself, and he obtained influence and reputation. So he began to wish to be lord and master. Instead of allowing himself to be guided by others, he took care that Messer Tommaso and the others who enjoyed high influence, and had a large number of relations to support them, should not become too strong. Although he never refused to send them on embassies, and confer on them the highest honours and offices, he held them within bounds, frustrated their intentions in several cases, and brought forward others who caused him no anxiety, as at first Messer Bernardo Buongirolami and Antonio Pucci,afterwards Messer Agnolo Niccolini, Bernardo del Nero, Pier Filippo Pandolfini, &c. He was accustomed to say that if his father had done so, and somewhat restrained Messer Diotisalvi and his companions, he would not have been in danger of losing his position in 1466.’ Another measure was taken with the evident intention of withdrawing the government of the city by degrees from all other influences than those of the Medici and their confidants. This time it concerned the lower classes, as that just mentioned did the higher. On September 20, 1471, the Balia appointed in July to superintend the new elections, reduced the number of smaller guilds from fourteen to five, so that there should be altogether only twelve guilds; but the property of the dissolved corporations should serve to form a new credit-fund for the salaries of the officials. But this measure, which had a wider significance than people seemed inclined to attribute to it in the first moment, was never carried into practice.[184]When Piero died, foreign affairs were by no means secure. The dispute about Rimini was not terminated. Pope Paul II. was extremely indignant at the assistance which Florence and Naples had given his disobedient vassal, and by means of which this vassal had been able to oppose him successfully. He indulged in the most violent expressions against the Medici, even before the assembled Consistorium. His rage against Ferrante even led to action. The old quarrel between Rome and Naples on account of the feudal relation injurious to both, but still legal, had also come to an outbreak between Ferrante and Paul. The king did not pay the tribute, and, when enjoined to do so, was always ready with one excuse or another. Now it was the embarrassment into which troubles at home had plunged him, now it was the expenses for the aid granted to the Church in the contest with the restless counts of Anguillara. If pressed, he answered by claiming Benevento and Terracina and placesin the Abruzzi, claims which were not always unfounded, in consequence of the complicated and wavering connections of the empire with the Church. At last, when all seemed to be peacefully settled, a quarrel broke out between the Pope and the Orsini, on account of the rights claimed by the latter over the Alum district of Tolfa, which Paul had contested with force of arms, while the king defended them in like manner. It went so far that Ferrante threatened to league himself with the Turks; the Pope, however, answered him by not only threatening to drive him from Naples, but by actually planning a new campaign against the Aragonese with John of Anjou. This happened just after the affair with Malatesta had ended, and who knows what intrigues would have been begun, had not the war of the Catalans against the Aragonese, in which Anjou commanded, occupied him till a higher hand interfered?Under circumstances of this kind, the necessity of attaching themselves as firmly as possible to Naples and Milan was made clear to the people of Florence, and as long as Lorenzo lived this necessity always remained uppermost with him, even through momentary fluctuations. The conviction that no firm reliance was to be placed upon the two other great powers of Italy, Venice and the Pope, made the Florentines regard such an alliance as the salvation of Italy. Venice could not be trusted because her thirst for Italian conquest was proportionate to the danger of her Levantine possessions; nor the Pope, because the papal policy changed with every new ruler, nay, it altered several times under the same ruler. When the Pope, displeased with the Venetians, began to lean towards reconciliation, these natural allies determined to agree beforehand on the position to assume towards him. Plenipotentiaries from Naples and Milan came in the spring of 1470 to Florence for this purpose. But when difficulties arose, the consultation was transferred to Naples, whither Otto Niccolini went on behalf of Florence. On July 12 the news reached Florence that the alliance betweenthe three states was prolonged for fifteen years, reserving the power of bringing about a general alliance of the Italian powers beside this special one—a piece of news which was celebrated with festivals and bonfires. It was indeed high time to unite. On the same July 12, the Turks took Negroponte. The besiegers suffered severe losses, but they avenged themselves by a fearful slaughter among the inhabitants and the garrison, and the Venetians had to expiate heavily their neglect in defending one of their most important fortresses. On August 7, they heard of the sad event through an announcement of King Ferrante’s. From all sides unity was now urged, in order to resist the formidable enemy, before whom the whole Archipelago, the Ionian Sea, and the entrance to the Adriatic, lay open. The Pope summoned an assembly of plenipotentiaries of all the Italian States to Rome, while at the same time he determined to compose the Malatesta contest by mediation. To effect an understanding was, however, difficult, because the three powers reserved their separate alliance, and Paul consented to this very unwillingly. Nevertheless, the treaty was concluded at Rome on December 22, express emphasis being laid on the article that the new league should rest on the basis of that which had been agreed upon at Venice at the end of August 1454, by the active mediation of Pope Nicholas V., when the conquest of Constantinople had first brought the threatened danger home to all. During the seventeen years which had elapsed since then, affairs had only grown worse. The Pope, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, the Republics of Venice and Florence, and Borso of Este, to whom the title of Duke of Ferrara had not long been granted, joined the alliance, which was to be extended over all Christendom, for which purpose Paul II. appointed the Cardinal of Siena, Francesco Todeschini Piccolomini, as legate to the Emperor and Empire. Jacopo Guicciardini had concluded the treaty on the part of Florence.But this time also the result by no means correspondedto the general expectation. Sforza did not ratify the treaty, because the purport of the document did not suit his wishes in some important particulars. Although the Signoria of Florence sent in their ratification, Guicciardini suppressed it, because Lorenzo de’ Medici, who wished to hold with Milan, had given him secret instructions not to sign, so that things remained unsettled. In Germany and Hungary, where the Pope and Venice placed their chief hopes on King Mathias Corvinus, it was not much better. After the sanguinary Bohemian war, which the latter had waged against George Podiebrad, had weakened their strength on both sides, and the Turks, pressing on from Bosnia through Croatia and Carniola, had already set foot on the soil of the empire, and roused Emperor Frederick from his sleep, still nothing could be really effected by the Ratisbon Congress in the spring of 1471. As the princes here were dilatory and the towns disinclined for action, quarrels began anew in Italy. Not to mention the contest between Pope and King, disagreeable communications passed between the former and Florence. The Florentines were willing indeed to furnish subsidies for the Turkish war, but insisted upon including the clergy in the taxes, which the Pope refused to permit.While this was proceeding, Paul II. died in the night between July 25 and 26, not fifty-four years old, and apparently in the enjoyment of perfect health. At a time when Christendom was everywhere torn by factions and threatened from without, when Italy saw herself exposed to the attacks of the infidels, as in the ninth century, the unity of her states being always problematical, the election of a Pope was of more importance than ever. Shortly before, several princes had passed away who had exercised more or less influence on the course of affairs—George Podiebrad, King of Bohemia, Borso of Este, John of Anjou, who concluded a life more eventful than successful at Barcelona, having only attained the age of forty-five years, and carrying with him to the grave the hopes of his old father René, and of his house. In him,a still numerous party in the south of Italy lost their head; yet they could not make up their minds to give in their allegiance decidedly to the Aragonese government, which seemed daily to grow stronger by its activity, talents, and alliances.
HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE EARLY YEARS OF LORENZO’S GOVERNMENT.
‘Onthe second day after my father’s death,’ so we read in Lorenzo de’ Medici’s memoirs, ‘the most distinguished men of the State and of the ruling party came to our house to express their condolence, and at the same time to request me to undertake the conduct of affairs in the city and government, as my father and grandfather had done. As such a responsibility seemed too great for my inexperience (I was only twenty-one), and involved so much labour and so many dangers, I accepted it unwillingly and only for the sake of our friends and fortune, for those who are shut out from political influence have a bad position in Florence. Hitherto (the beginning of 1471) all has succeeded to the general honour and satisfaction, not in consequence of my wisdom, but by God’s grace and by reason of the wise measures of my predecessors.’
These words show clearly how the matter stood, and justify the opinion which Francesco Guicciardini[181]puts into the mouth of one of his interlocutors. ‘The government of the Medici,’ says Bernardo del Nero, ‘was a party government, usurped by the party, preserved by tyranny, neither violent nor cruel, except in a few cases in which they were constrained by necessity, but founded upon the policy of favouring the lower classes, uniting the interests of thestronger with their own interests, and suppressing all who seemed inclined to go their own way. As the power passed from father to son, the memory of ancient rivalry and enmity lived on. The Medici had always more their private advantage at heart than the general good. But as they had neither any position nor Signoria abroad, their interest was generally one with that of the commonwealth, whose glory and fame were likewise theirs. But even with so keen-sighted a man as Lorenzo, such a position might easily lead to errors, and we shall see what mistakes he did make in important cases to the great disadvantage of the State, either by allowing himself to be carried away by passion or by regarding only his personal position and advantage, always under the pretext that his greatness and that of his family was necessary to the common good.
Lorenzo had taken so large a share in the conduct of affairs in his father’s last years, and displayed such capabilities, that we need not be surprised if, after the authority of the Medici had been acknowledged now for two generations, all eyes should have been directed towards him, notwithstanding his youth, which excluded him from offices of State. Without an understanding between the heads of the party, however, he could not have been offered the responsible position of which he has told us. Piero had, on his death-bed, recommended his two sons to his brother-in-law, Tommaso Soderini, on whose prudence and attachment he placed great reliance. Since Tommaso had essentially contributed to save the cause of the Medici in the conspiracy of 1466, he had been in constant activity. He had not been able to persuade the Venetians to hinder Colleone’s proceedings, but, as member of the magistracy of war, and during the fourth year that he was elected Gonfaloniere in 1467, he had exercised a favourable influence on the conduct of affairs, and honestly exerted himself for the restoration of peace with Borso d’Este, first in Venice and afterwards in Milan. The opinion of him was so high in Florence that he couldeasily have raised himself to the leadership of the ruling party. But whether it was that he would not betray the confidence reposed in him, or that he was of opinion that the preservation of this family in the position they had held now for thirty-five years was at the same time the preservation of the peace and safety of the State at home, as well as of its connections with foreign states, he abstained from following Diotisalvi Neroni’s example. Immediately after Piero’s death, on the evening of the day when he had been interred, Soderini summoned to him all the distinguished citizens attached to the existing government. More than six hundred, ‘the flower of the city,’ assembled in the convent of Sant’Antonio, in the neighbourhood of Porta Faenza. It was here determined to preserve unity and the present state of affairs, and to leave Piero’s sons in their father’s position. ‘Messer Tommaso Soderini,’ writes the Ferrarese ambassador, ‘took the word as eldest, and explained how Piero had left his sons already grown up and gifted with good judgment and intellect. Out of regard for their predecessors, and especially Cosimo and Piero, who had always been friends, protectors, and preservers of the commonwealth and benefactors of the State, for which reason they had taken the first rank and borne the whole weight of government wisely and with dignity, always displaying courage and mature judgment, it seemed to him that they should leave to Piero’s family and sons, notwithstanding their youth, the honourable position which he himself and Cosimo had enjoyed. He added that he saw the two no less considerate and desirous of winning the good opinion of the commune, and of all the Florentine citizens, than their grandfather and father. This was confirmed by three or four of those present, by Messer Manno, son-in-law of Messer Luca Pitti, who was not himself present, by Messer Giannozzo Pitti, and Domenico Martelli. The last two remarked that a master and a head was needed to give the casting-vote in publicaffairs.[182]The whole city,’ adds Guicciardini, ‘agreed to this, chiefly through the exertions of Messer Tommaso Soderini, who at that time enjoyed more authority than any other citizen, and was, perhaps, the wisest of all. He thought that Lorenzo, on account of his youth, and because he owed his position to him, so to speak, would allow himself to be guided by him; in this, however, he was mistaken.’[183]
That Lorenzo considered the favourable opinion of himself as by no means sufficient to secure his authority, shows on the one hand how he, young as he was, had sounded the unsteady basis on which the whole fabric of the State rests in a commonwealth of this kind, and on the other hand, how his thoughts were immediately directed to gaining a position no longer dependent upon internal agitation, such as had disturbed his grandfather’s administration and endangered the life of his father. A report of the Ferrarese ambassador plainly shows how the heads of the ruling party hoped to conduct affairs after Piero’s death. ‘They are agreed that the private affairs of the Signoria shall pass through Lorenzo’s hands in the same manner as previously through those of his father, for which purpose his friends will take care to procure him credit and reputation from the beginning. They can easily do so, for they have the government in their hands, and the ballot-boxes at their disposal. Others with whom I have spoken are of a different opinion, and think that within a few days all affairs will again be disposed of in the palace (i.e.by the magistrates themselves). If, however, they guide the bark rightly at the beginning, and while they can influence the election of the magistrates, I believethey will reach the desired haven, for the philosopher says, “Principium est plus quam dimidium totius.”’ The ambassador was right; he could not, however, foresee the measure of Lorenzo’s personal share in this gradual change of a republican constitution into one that was guided by the will of a single man. He had scarcely attained the head of the State when he began the work which he brought to a termination ten years later, after the violent storm which had threatened his life.
The deliberation of September 6, 1466, had placed the election of the highest magistrates for ten years in the hands of electors appointed by the Council of a Hundred. The heads of the party were accustomed to decide upon the names of these electors in an extraordinary meeting, and to lay them before the said council, which usually accepted them without further scruple, since only those not unfavourable to the party, even if they did not belong to its actual partizans, sat in this council. Sometimes, however, it occurred that the candidates were not all accepted, so that anxiety arose in the minds of Lorenzo and his confidants lest electors disagreeable to them might some day be appointed, and their influence over the Signoria and other high magistrates be thus limited. This seemed serious to them. However large, too, and constantly increasing an authority might be which was independent of the responsible magistrates forming the fabric of the State, the respect for forms was equally great, and is indeed a characteristic feature of these Italian communes; and their endeavour was to give to measures which gradually destroyed the spirit of the constitution the appearance of legality. In the summer of 1470, the Signoria, which was entirely subject to the Medici, made the first attempt in this direction. They proposed to the Council of a Hundred to form out of all the electors from the year 1434 who were still living, forty in number, and five new ones, a College of Electors. From this for the next sixteen years five might be annually drawn, with power to appoint the Signoriand Gonfaloniere out of the lists or ballot-boxes containing the names of the citizens capable of office. The opposition to a measure which would have placed forty-five tyrants over the people was, however, so strong that the Signoria judged it advisable to withdraw the proposal. Six months later, in January 1471, something similar was, nevertheless, carried out. Instead of leaving the electors to be appointed by the Council of a Hundred, the Signoria sitting in July and August, together with the electors acting for the current year, agreed that they should appoint the new ones, the Council of a Hundred only confirm them, and a single voice above the half of the members present should give the casting-vote, whereas a majority of two-thirds of voices had previously been requisite. The same thing happened in the following July, and when the votes were collected it naturally followed that only the names of persons considered reliable came upon the electing tickets, so that the threads of the whole administration were more than ever confined to a few hands. Immediately after Piero de’ Medici’s death, under the plausible pretext that the war occasioned by the Malatesta affair was not yet at an end, an extraordinary tax of 300,000 gold florins was levied, so that the government was provided with funds for all emergencies.
‘By such measures,’ remarks Francesco Guicciardini, ‘Lorenzo de’ Medici began to gain firm footing in Florence. The prevailing party strengthened itself, and he obtained influence and reputation. So he began to wish to be lord and master. Instead of allowing himself to be guided by others, he took care that Messer Tommaso and the others who enjoyed high influence, and had a large number of relations to support them, should not become too strong. Although he never refused to send them on embassies, and confer on them the highest honours and offices, he held them within bounds, frustrated their intentions in several cases, and brought forward others who caused him no anxiety, as at first Messer Bernardo Buongirolami and Antonio Pucci,afterwards Messer Agnolo Niccolini, Bernardo del Nero, Pier Filippo Pandolfini, &c. He was accustomed to say that if his father had done so, and somewhat restrained Messer Diotisalvi and his companions, he would not have been in danger of losing his position in 1466.’ Another measure was taken with the evident intention of withdrawing the government of the city by degrees from all other influences than those of the Medici and their confidants. This time it concerned the lower classes, as that just mentioned did the higher. On September 20, 1471, the Balia appointed in July to superintend the new elections, reduced the number of smaller guilds from fourteen to five, so that there should be altogether only twelve guilds; but the property of the dissolved corporations should serve to form a new credit-fund for the salaries of the officials. But this measure, which had a wider significance than people seemed inclined to attribute to it in the first moment, was never carried into practice.[184]
When Piero died, foreign affairs were by no means secure. The dispute about Rimini was not terminated. Pope Paul II. was extremely indignant at the assistance which Florence and Naples had given his disobedient vassal, and by means of which this vassal had been able to oppose him successfully. He indulged in the most violent expressions against the Medici, even before the assembled Consistorium. His rage against Ferrante even led to action. The old quarrel between Rome and Naples on account of the feudal relation injurious to both, but still legal, had also come to an outbreak between Ferrante and Paul. The king did not pay the tribute, and, when enjoined to do so, was always ready with one excuse or another. Now it was the embarrassment into which troubles at home had plunged him, now it was the expenses for the aid granted to the Church in the contest with the restless counts of Anguillara. If pressed, he answered by claiming Benevento and Terracina and placesin the Abruzzi, claims which were not always unfounded, in consequence of the complicated and wavering connections of the empire with the Church. At last, when all seemed to be peacefully settled, a quarrel broke out between the Pope and the Orsini, on account of the rights claimed by the latter over the Alum district of Tolfa, which Paul had contested with force of arms, while the king defended them in like manner. It went so far that Ferrante threatened to league himself with the Turks; the Pope, however, answered him by not only threatening to drive him from Naples, but by actually planning a new campaign against the Aragonese with John of Anjou. This happened just after the affair with Malatesta had ended, and who knows what intrigues would have been begun, had not the war of the Catalans against the Aragonese, in which Anjou commanded, occupied him till a higher hand interfered?
Under circumstances of this kind, the necessity of attaching themselves as firmly as possible to Naples and Milan was made clear to the people of Florence, and as long as Lorenzo lived this necessity always remained uppermost with him, even through momentary fluctuations. The conviction that no firm reliance was to be placed upon the two other great powers of Italy, Venice and the Pope, made the Florentines regard such an alliance as the salvation of Italy. Venice could not be trusted because her thirst for Italian conquest was proportionate to the danger of her Levantine possessions; nor the Pope, because the papal policy changed with every new ruler, nay, it altered several times under the same ruler. When the Pope, displeased with the Venetians, began to lean towards reconciliation, these natural allies determined to agree beforehand on the position to assume towards him. Plenipotentiaries from Naples and Milan came in the spring of 1470 to Florence for this purpose. But when difficulties arose, the consultation was transferred to Naples, whither Otto Niccolini went on behalf of Florence. On July 12 the news reached Florence that the alliance betweenthe three states was prolonged for fifteen years, reserving the power of bringing about a general alliance of the Italian powers beside this special one—a piece of news which was celebrated with festivals and bonfires. It was indeed high time to unite. On the same July 12, the Turks took Negroponte. The besiegers suffered severe losses, but they avenged themselves by a fearful slaughter among the inhabitants and the garrison, and the Venetians had to expiate heavily their neglect in defending one of their most important fortresses. On August 7, they heard of the sad event through an announcement of King Ferrante’s. From all sides unity was now urged, in order to resist the formidable enemy, before whom the whole Archipelago, the Ionian Sea, and the entrance to the Adriatic, lay open. The Pope summoned an assembly of plenipotentiaries of all the Italian States to Rome, while at the same time he determined to compose the Malatesta contest by mediation. To effect an understanding was, however, difficult, because the three powers reserved their separate alliance, and Paul consented to this very unwillingly. Nevertheless, the treaty was concluded at Rome on December 22, express emphasis being laid on the article that the new league should rest on the basis of that which had been agreed upon at Venice at the end of August 1454, by the active mediation of Pope Nicholas V., when the conquest of Constantinople had first brought the threatened danger home to all. During the seventeen years which had elapsed since then, affairs had only grown worse. The Pope, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, the Republics of Venice and Florence, and Borso of Este, to whom the title of Duke of Ferrara had not long been granted, joined the alliance, which was to be extended over all Christendom, for which purpose Paul II. appointed the Cardinal of Siena, Francesco Todeschini Piccolomini, as legate to the Emperor and Empire. Jacopo Guicciardini had concluded the treaty on the part of Florence.
But this time also the result by no means correspondedto the general expectation. Sforza did not ratify the treaty, because the purport of the document did not suit his wishes in some important particulars. Although the Signoria of Florence sent in their ratification, Guicciardini suppressed it, because Lorenzo de’ Medici, who wished to hold with Milan, had given him secret instructions not to sign, so that things remained unsettled. In Germany and Hungary, where the Pope and Venice placed their chief hopes on King Mathias Corvinus, it was not much better. After the sanguinary Bohemian war, which the latter had waged against George Podiebrad, had weakened their strength on both sides, and the Turks, pressing on from Bosnia through Croatia and Carniola, had already set foot on the soil of the empire, and roused Emperor Frederick from his sleep, still nothing could be really effected by the Ratisbon Congress in the spring of 1471. As the princes here were dilatory and the towns disinclined for action, quarrels began anew in Italy. Not to mention the contest between Pope and King, disagreeable communications passed between the former and Florence. The Florentines were willing indeed to furnish subsidies for the Turkish war, but insisted upon including the clergy in the taxes, which the Pope refused to permit.
While this was proceeding, Paul II. died in the night between July 25 and 26, not fifty-four years old, and apparently in the enjoyment of perfect health. At a time when Christendom was everywhere torn by factions and threatened from without, when Italy saw herself exposed to the attacks of the infidels, as in the ninth century, the unity of her states being always problematical, the election of a Pope was of more importance than ever. Shortly before, several princes had passed away who had exercised more or less influence on the course of affairs—George Podiebrad, King of Bohemia, Borso of Este, John of Anjou, who concluded a life more eventful than successful at Barcelona, having only attained the age of forty-five years, and carrying with him to the grave the hopes of his old father René, and of his house. In him,a still numerous party in the south of Italy lost their head; yet they could not make up their minds to give in their allegiance decidedly to the Aragonese government, which seemed daily to grow stronger by its activity, talents, and alliances.