CHAPTER V.FLORENCE AND HER ALLIES. LODOVICO IL MORO.Themoment for decision had arrived. It was acknowledged in Florence that matters must come to a crisis one way or the other. A considerable part of the territory was in the enemy’s power, the valleys of the Chiana and Elsa terribly wasted. The chief portion of the army, demoralised by the late losses, was driven back the small distance of seven miles from the city. From one of the allies no active help could be expected, and the other was already in treaty with the enemy.Since the defeat of Poggibonzi, Lorenzo could no longer deceive himself respecting the position of the Republic or his own. He knew that all sources of help were exhausted. He knew also that Florence could obtain peace without any difficulty if she would consent to sacrifice him, and he understood the position of affairs too well not to foresee the result of the struggle. During the whole course of the war, in which, being no warrior, he naturally held aloof, the best of the illustrious citizens who were devoted to him went as commissaries to the army, and gave him ample opportunities of studying the state of feeling at home, and the possibility of a compromise.His industry had been great and various. On account of the sickness prevailing in Florence, which swept away thousands, he had, soon after the outbreak of hostilities, sent his wife and children first to Pistoja, and then to his villa Cafaggiuolo, under the protection of his uncle GiovanniTornabuoni. This left him free to act as he liked, and he did not quit the city, where there was enough for him to do. Since the conspiracy, the administration of affairs was more than ever in his hands, for a constitution which had such a complicated machinery made a safe and consistent guidance more necessary than ever in those stormy times. During the first year of the war, notwithstanding the greater numbers of the enemy, they could still hope for success from the languid manner in which the contest was carried on. The second spring brought no decision, for the successful skirmish at Trasimene was more than outweighed by the occurrences in the Elsa valley. Lorenzo was forced to think of negotiation, if he would not expose himself to the danger of having to conclude a treaty disadvantageous to himself. For while so little was accomplished with weapons, there was not much more to be hoped for from diplomatic arrangements. The slight advance negotiations had made in Rome we have already seen. It was not to be expected that a more favourable result would occur, when the allies were at such decided disadvantage from a military point of view. They had never ceased to intrigue with Louis XI.; Milan through Carlo Visconti and Giovann’Andrea Cagnola, Florence through Francesco Gaddi, who belonged to a family which had always remained in friendly relations with the Medici. The French king was the only one who received these two members of the alliance with warmth—he had often differences with Venice. But he had other things to disturb his peace of mind, and the war in Picardy and in the Franche Comté with the heiress of Burgundy, and partly, also, the feuds in Milan and Piedmont, afforded him the wished-for opportunity of allowing his own intriguing spirit full play, whatever might be the end of negotiations with the Pope. During those negotiations he had a real pleasure in expressing his grudge against Sixtus IV. and King Ferrante. At the end of December 1478 he said to the Milanese ambassadors that he would himself head an enterprise against the Turks (theusual assurance and bait of princes in the fifteenth century) if Italy were in peace, ‘and especially if they had a Pope as he should be.’ ‘Upon this he indulged in a flood of evil words against the Pope, King Ferrante, and Count Girolamo, speaking for two hours with such a flow of words, that we were obliged to restrict ourselves to listening, and it seemed unadvisable to us to touch upon anything else.’ Even in the presence of Don Federigo d’Aragona, who was then in France, the king did not moderate his expressions ‘de mala natura’ against the Pope and Ferrante, the latter of whom he spared no humiliation. After having once said to the Neapolitan ambassador that his master interfered in matters more than he ought, he asked, ‘Your king, such as he is, do you then believe him to be King Alfonso’s son?’[283]Such things certainly could not surprise a sovereign who before a foreign ambassador could insult his own good and patient mother by saying he did not know whose son he was.Nevertheless Louis XI. was resolved not to leave Milan and Florence to the will of their opponents. He remained firm to his old affection for the Medici. Even after he had resolved to leave the hands of Cecco Simonetta’s enemies free, whereby those who caballed with King Ferrante must cling to the rudder, he held firmly to Lorenzo. ‘For nothing in the world,’ wrote Philippe de Commines on October 3, 1479, from Plessis to an agent of the king in Italy, Pietro Palmieri, at a time when the Milanese affairs were still undecided—‘would the king allow the Florentines, and especially Lorenzo de’ Medici’s person, to come to harm. If they decided in the enemy’s favour at Milan, the king would assist the Florentines and Lorenzo with all the means in his power.’ In June the Pope had proposed to the French ambassador, who was still staying with him, to leave the settlement of their differences to a council composed of Edward IV., king of England, and a legatealatere. A courier was despatched to France, where an ambassador of Girolamo Riario was active against Lorenzo de’ Medici. The Milanese ambassador suspected that the French diplomatists in Rome were to be won by gold. But Louis XI. would know nothing of the matter; he answered that in case the position of umpire were offered to him, in conjunction with king Edward, he would perhaps accept it, although he was occupied enough. The joy at the advantage gained by the Florentines at Trasimene was cooled by the loss of the battle of Guinegate, near St. Omer, where, on August 7, Maximilian of Austria defeated the French. The president of the Toulouse parliament and head of the Roman embassy had returned shortly before. The king had received him very badly; Commines and others were obliged to mediate to obtain a hearing for him. The Pope represented himself as not disinclined for mediation, and Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere confirmed this, but for the present those in Rome attempted to prolong the matter in order to tire the Florentines. At the end of August a Papal plenipotentiary, Giovan Batista of Imola, came to the French court. Philippe de Commines received him by command of the king, who at first would hear nothing from him. The conference took place in the presence of Don Federigo d’Aragona.Sixtus enumerated once more all the complaints which he had against Florence and Lorenzo. The principal cause of war, he said in the brief he had given to his ambassadors, was not to be sought for in the events of April 1478, but in what had preceded them, in the affairs of Città di Castello and Faenza, in the personal position of Lorenzo de’ Medici. He could not agree to the proposals of accommodation hitherto made. The restitution of the places taken would imply a self-accusation, as though he had begun an unjust war. He must demand a guarantee for the Sienese before his troops and those of the Neapolitans could evacuate the Florentine territory. A treaty respecting Genoa couldonly begin with the consent of the Genoese themselves. The Pope was nevertheless inclined to leave the decision to the king, with a reservation of the aforesaid points, and deliver up to him the occupied castles. Louis XI., by whom the ambassador was personally disliked on account of matters which had taken place formerly, received these advances very coldly. He suspected that the Pope wished to sow discord between him and the English king, who had already been publicly designated as umpire. He repeated his former demands, a formal abrogation of the spiritual interdicts, evacuation of the territory, and restitution of the fortresses.[284]The Papal negotiator departed with this unsatisfactory demand. Francesco Gaddi had been present at the whole of this interview; the Milanese ambassadors, summoned to Orleans from Paris, had arrived too late, but were acquainted with all that had taken place. Then followed the events unfavourable to the allies in the Elsa valley. Even if the Pope and Ferrante had intended to resume negotiations with France, it would have been impossible to expect any good result from them. Lorenzo de’ Medici was obliged to make a direct compromise with at least one of his enemies.The choice of this one could not be difficult. If the Pope himself had been personally less irritated, the hatred of Girolamo Riario against the Medici, a hatred which still found vent in low intrigues[285]in the summer of 1479, would have made a negotiation difficult. It was otherwise with King Ferrante. He had done everything, military and diplomatic, to conduct the war with energy. The Duke of Calabria, who had hoped to fix himself as firmly in Tuscany as the Angevins once had done, had supplied the majority of the troops; the rising in Genoa, the attack on Pisa and theLunigiana, were his work. In France no less than four Neapolitan ambassadors were active in persuading Louis XI., in which, however, they did not succeed. But Ferrante was acute enough to see that nothing but an agreement with Florence could calm Italy, and only the authority of a capable man, which Lorenzo showed himself to be more and more, could give permanence to this agreement, while the Papal policy was too changeful to offer security. Lorenzo had known for some time of the king’s inclination to treat. But it was distasteful to him to meet his advances, not because he suspected personal danger therein, but because he saw that an agreement with King Ferrante would have political results for Florentine affairs which must have seemed important to him. He said to himself that his position would be quite different if he could begin the treaty from a more favourable point, and only the powerful support of his allies could help him in this, especially the mediation of Lodovico Sforza, who, since he had become Duke of Bari, had entered into still closer connections with the ruling family in Naples, to which his sister belonged. With Lodovico, who was daily obtaining greater influence in Milan, Lorenzo now stood in constant communication direct and indirect. His opinion on the position of affairs is expressed most clearly in a letter which he sent to Girolamo Morelli at Milan, on September 25.[286]‘The observations made,’ he says in this letter, after mentioning the proposals in regard to the Pazzi, ‘can only proceed from an ill opinion which is held there of our affairs; and although what has happened partly justifies that opinion, the matter does not stand as is believed there, but the unfavourable opinion is explained by a misunderstanding which you yourself hint at. I wish to impress this truth on Lord Lodovico, when I show him how our position will be strong or weak at his lordship’s will. For here at home there is not one who will raise a finger; and even if they doleave us there in the lurch, I have little fear respecting the direction of affairs. But I fear that if our forces cannot make head against the enemy, it will be necessary to take steps contrary to our freedom, and allow to others an influence in our government which will first of all be injurious to us, and then give others cause of alarm. If, therefore, apart from old friendship and good services, his lordship is of opinion that our preservation is of use to himself, he might take measures to this end, for I do not doubt for one instant that we shall only thus attain what we desire, if our enemies perceive that they can do nothing against us, while we have proofs enough of their will. Although I have received many friendly words from the Duke of Calabria for many months, and much encouragement to throw myself into the king’s arms, he attempting to show me that only in this manner can I save myself and the state, a penny from you would be worth more than a florin from the others. It is good that Lord Lodovico should know these things, and that if he wish to save us, he must take up the matter with more energy and act with more decision. If he does this, I have no anxiety respecting affairs here; if this, however, does not happen, he will see how it will be with our cause, and partly also with his own. For if nothing else should occur he will give into other people’s hands the reins of Italy, which are now in his, as I wrote to you in my long letter, which is so long that I do not believe he has read it in the midst of his many employments, and which I beg you to deliver to him again, for I have continually more than enough to do.’In this letter the position of affairs was clearly indicated. But Lorenzo deceived himself when he hoped that Lodovico Sforza would agree to his views and seek to withdraw him from the necessity ‘of throwing himself into the king’s arms.’ Whether the will or ability were here wanting may remain a question. Lodovico approached the goal of his desires. His nephew, Gian Galeazzo, was crowned duke with great solemnity while yet in exile, on April 24, 1478,but the government had of course remained with his mother, from whose hands Lodovico now took it more completely, having at first employed a favourite of the duchess, a Ferrarese named Antonio Tassino, to make her agree to his plans. He soon became even to foreigners the lord of Milan. From his early years his subtle nature showed itself, although his character was only fully developed under the influences of the changing fortunes of his busy life.Lodovico il Moro—a name which Sforza received in youth on account of his dark complexion, and continued to bear in later years, so that it became the war-cry of his partisans—was no ordinary man. Born at Vigevano on August 3, 1451, after his father had ascended the ducal throne, a circumstance from which he seemed inclined to claim a right of succession to the prejudice of an elder brother and his son, he was in his eight-and-twentieth year when he attained to power in Milan. Galeazzo Maria had never trusted his restless ambition, for indeed he never ceased to conspire in one way or the other till he was lord of Milan; and even then he continued to weave intrigues against enemies when he could not reach them otherwise, against friends when his plans crossed theirs. He could not live without plotting. An ally was never safe with him, and in time he wove a net which not only extended through Italy but through Europe, and in which he himself was taken. Of moral courage he was exceedingly destitute. ‘The aforesaid Lord Lodovico,’ says Philippe de Commines, ‘was very clever but very timid, and extremely subservient when afraid, of which I can speak fully from personal knowledge, as I have had much to do with him. He was besides destitute of truth and faith where he thought to gain an advantage by breaking his word.’ This passion for intrigue became his own ruin and that of his country and Italy, for the confidence which inspired him, his reliance upon fortune, whose son he called himself, and his measurement of matters according to a mere calculation of their advantage, darkened in time a perception which wasotherwise not deficient in acuteness, while his entire want of moral consciousness falsified his judgment. This confidence he had never so naively expressed as in 1496, when, after Italy had been evacuated by the French, the Emperor Maximilian married to his niece, Venice allied to him, and Florence crippled, he fancied he held the fate of Italy in his hand. ‘The Duke of Milan boasts of having at present a chaplain, acondottiere, a chamberlain, and a courier, who are all at his service. The chaplain is Pope Alexander, thecondottiereMaximilian, the chamberlain the Signoria of Venice, which freely expends what he orders, the courier the French king, who comes and goes at his good pleasure.’[287]‘It is terrible to think of,’ adds our informant. He knew no scruples where there was a question of satisfying his selfishness. The slow torture inflicted on his unhappy nephew, and his treatment of his consort, are among the most fearful episodes of a time which abounded in wickedness. In order to attain to power he had employed other rebels; when his end was attained he discarded them, especially Roberto Sanseverino, and sought to make friends with the opposite party, hoping thus to render them harmless.As a ruler, not to speak of his vivid interest in art and intellectual efforts generally, which he shared with most princes good or bad of his time, Lodovico Sforza had some praiseworthy qualities. He was neither a profligate like Galeazzo Maria, nor cruel from an inhuman pleasure in other people’s sufferings, nor a wild spendthrift like him. He was active, watchful, clever, considerate of the material welfare of the country which he carefully governed, fostering rather than exhausting her resources, while his own treasuries were always filled, so that he could dispose of considerable sums for political and military purposes. Commines, it is true, accuses him of fiscal oppression, and traces the popular discontent to this. ‘I have never seen more beautifuland fertile land than this duchy. If its master were content with drawing 500,000 ducats from it annually, his subjects would remain wealthy and the master would live in security, but Lord Lodovico makes from 650,000 to 700,000, which is a real piece of tyranny, so that the people only long for change.’[288]This is, however, only applicable to later times, and even then il Moro had always a strong party, which the misgovernment of the French strengthened, though they succeeded in expelling him with the help of his enemies from Milan. Giovan Pietro Cagnola, who belonged, indeed, to the unconditional adherents of the Sforzas, and dedicated his history to il Moro, is never tired of praising his wisdom and ripe judgment—how he had brought the state into such excellent order, how he had enlarged and enriched it in extent and respect, had cherished peace, regained Genoa without arms, and protected the country on the side of Switzerland.[289]He was vain, not of mere show like his brother, but of position and name, and he sunned himself in deceptive appearances of good fortune, when his praise resounded day and night in the people’s voice and the poet’s mouth as that of the dictator of the fate of Italy. His own unscrupulousness caused him to judge all others in the same light, and the times were such that he did not always deceive himself. He bought people in Rome as well as in France. Can we blame him from his point of view when a man like Commines, of so much higher intellectual standing, though stained with many of the sins of his century, mentions the bribing of Etienne de Vescq and other councillors of Charles VIII. with 8,000 ducats, with the cold remark, ‘If they were obliged to take money, they might have demanded more.’ Commines apparently was of the opinion that perjury was only wrong when it was unprofitable.Many years afterwards, when his equally ambitious and no less clever consort, Beatrice d’Este, had been taken fromhim in the bloom of life—a loss which he felt severely even in political affairs—Lodovico il Moro drew up a political testament for his son and successor in case he should come to the government in early youth, respecting all branches of the administration.[290]‘As our first command since all power and dominion are given by God, we wish and appoint that those who have to conduct the government after us, and be entrusted with the education of our son, should instruct him in religion and teach him to recognise his Creator as the giver of all good bestowed on him upon earth, as also that they should show him that, with the reservation of the respect due to his Papal Holiness as vicegerent of Christ, he has to consider the Holy Roman Empire as the authority set over him in all devotion and affection, especially the person of the Most Serene and unconquered Lord Maximilian, the Roman king, or in case he should no longer live, he who has succeeded him, for so commands our duty to His Majesty and the Holy Empire, through whose goodness we have obtained our dukedom.’Such was the man who was then but at the commencement of his great political career, and to whom Lorenzo de’ Medici, a little older than he, and connected with the house of Sforza by inherited ties, saw himself principally referred by the conjunctures of the time. Lodovico had on November 12 caused Niccolo Martelli,[291]then in Milan, and a friend of Lorenzo’s, to disclose to him Ferrante’s inclination to treat, and to impress on him not to refuse the proffered hand. He was to take the whole situation of affairs into consideration, forget the past, and seize the opportunity without delay. It would be important to decide what conditions the Republic would make or accept respecting the places occupied, the dynasties of Romagna, and Count Girolamo. It might be good to send his eldest son to Naples (Piero was then onlyeight years old). Above all he advised him to hasten the matter; ‘for the hand of dark fate hovers between cup and lip.’ He might cast the die. Ten days later Lodovico renewed his representations to the ambassador of the Republic, Piero Filippo Pandolfini. They would accomplish nothing by persisting in the beaten course at Florence, as announced by the Milanese ambassador, Filippo Sagramoro. They should look into the matter closely and not irritate the king by defiance. They must not rely on Venice, for when she could defend her own interests, she would not think of Florence. From Milan little was to be expected on account of its own troubles: he said so openly that they might not have to rue it too late. If they agreed, he was ready to mediate in Naples, but if they should not come to a resolution, or should make unacceptable conditions, he must lay the responsibility on the Republic.[292]It was clear that Sforza acted in concert with Ferrante. The offer of the truce, which followed two days afterwards, showed that the king was in earnest in his wish for reconciliation. We shall soon see that Sixtus IV. did not deceive himself in respect to the feeling of his allies, however displeasing to himself.On the same day on which the trumpeter of the Duke of Calabria entered Florence, a distinguished Florentine set out on a confidential mission to Naples. It was Filippo Strozzi, who had long lived in business at Naples, and whose connections with King Ferrante were known. In his memoirs of the events connected with the Pazzi conspiracy he mentions this mission.[293]‘The situation of affairs appeared serious to all, especially to Lorenzo de’ Medici, on whose account, as they said, war was made. The aforesaid Lorenzo sent me to Naples. On November 24 I set out, to say tothe king’s majesty, he threw himself entirely into his arms, and would willingly agree to that which his majesty wished, whether the king should decide on high or low, within or without, provided he restored peace to the city and gave up the places he had taken. I found the king hunting at Arnone (at the mouth of the Volturno). After I had delivered my message, he answered me that he had later news: Lorenzo would come in person, and so we must wait to see what will result from his visit.’ Shortly after Filippo’s departure, Lorenzo made up his mind to go himself, a determination to which the revelations of Lodovico Sforza, which took away all hopes of a powerful support from Milan and Venice, undoubtedly contributed. He acted quite independently, and though he took counsel with his confidants, he only imparted the matter to the official representatives of the Republic when he was himself resolved.On December 5 he caused an assembly to be summoned by the magistracy of Ten, of about forty of the most respected citizens, in the palace of the Signoria. He said he had called them together in order to inform them of a resolution he had taken without asking their advice. He had considered how much the city needed peace, as it would be impossible to defend her alone against such powerful opponents while her allies would not fulfil their obligations. But as these opponents always asserted they had more to do with him personally than with the city, and the king in especial always declared he was no enemy to the latter, but loved her and desired her liberty, and sought to secure her friendship by redressing her wrongs if every other way were closed to him, he had determined to go to Naples. This seemed to him the best in all cases. If the enemy wished for him only, they should have him in their hands and need not molest the city further. If they did not wish for him, but the friendship of the city, this would be the means of coming to an understanding sooner, and obtaining more favourable conditions. If they wished something else, he should learn it and obtain the possibilityof protecting their freedom and the city better. He knew that he was going into danger, but he considered his own welfare less than the common good, and the duty of any citizens to the fatherland less than his duty, for none had attained to favour and respect as he had. But he hoped the citizens here present would preserve his position for him, and commended himself, his family, and his house to them. But, above all, he hoped that God, in consideration of the justice of his cause and his good intentions, would promote his purposes, and that a war begun with the murder of his brother would be ended by his endeavours.[294]Lorenzo had announced from the first that his resolution was taken. Many might think this resolve daring, but they knew that persuasion would avail nothing. It was natural that King Ferrante’s reserved character, which had not yet revealed itself as it did in the second barons’ war, should frighten many who remembered the fate of Jacopo Piccinino, whose bleeding ghost pursued the king to his end. But Lorenzo, though he might not be quite without anxiety, appreciated too well the distinction between his position and that of a wanderingcondottiere, and trusted also to the real love of peace of the Aragonese. The armistice offered by the Duke of Calabria was a favourable sign.[295]He set out without delay. From San Miniato on December 7 he informed the Signoria of his resolution, which he founded on the same reasons which he had given to the assembly before his departure.[296]He added that if he had not revealed his intention before, this was not from pride, but because it seemed to him that in the straits in which the city now was, action wasmore necessary than speech. As the city needed peace, and the means employed for attaining the same had proved ineffective, it seemed better to him that one should run into danger than that the whole people should be exposed to it. On the preceding day he had already sent a confidential man, Baccio Ugolino, to the Duke of Ferrara, to give him information of his resolution,[297]and at the same time announced his approaching departure to the Dukes of Calabria and Urbino, and told them that M. Francesco Gaddi would present himself before them, and if they thought fit would proceed to Naples.[298]At Pisa he received a letter from the Signoria which empowered him to act as ambassador to King Ferrante. Bartolommeo Scala, who had drawn it up, on sending it to him, added, ‘All rely upon your wisdom and your authority. But they do not judge of the king’s inclination by the present condition of things, but looking back on our former relations by the sympathy which he once showed to us and the service he already has rendered us.’[299]
CHAPTER V.FLORENCE AND HER ALLIES. LODOVICO IL MORO.Themoment for decision had arrived. It was acknowledged in Florence that matters must come to a crisis one way or the other. A considerable part of the territory was in the enemy’s power, the valleys of the Chiana and Elsa terribly wasted. The chief portion of the army, demoralised by the late losses, was driven back the small distance of seven miles from the city. From one of the allies no active help could be expected, and the other was already in treaty with the enemy.Since the defeat of Poggibonzi, Lorenzo could no longer deceive himself respecting the position of the Republic or his own. He knew that all sources of help were exhausted. He knew also that Florence could obtain peace without any difficulty if she would consent to sacrifice him, and he understood the position of affairs too well not to foresee the result of the struggle. During the whole course of the war, in which, being no warrior, he naturally held aloof, the best of the illustrious citizens who were devoted to him went as commissaries to the army, and gave him ample opportunities of studying the state of feeling at home, and the possibility of a compromise.His industry had been great and various. On account of the sickness prevailing in Florence, which swept away thousands, he had, soon after the outbreak of hostilities, sent his wife and children first to Pistoja, and then to his villa Cafaggiuolo, under the protection of his uncle GiovanniTornabuoni. This left him free to act as he liked, and he did not quit the city, where there was enough for him to do. Since the conspiracy, the administration of affairs was more than ever in his hands, for a constitution which had such a complicated machinery made a safe and consistent guidance more necessary than ever in those stormy times. During the first year of the war, notwithstanding the greater numbers of the enemy, they could still hope for success from the languid manner in which the contest was carried on. The second spring brought no decision, for the successful skirmish at Trasimene was more than outweighed by the occurrences in the Elsa valley. Lorenzo was forced to think of negotiation, if he would not expose himself to the danger of having to conclude a treaty disadvantageous to himself. For while so little was accomplished with weapons, there was not much more to be hoped for from diplomatic arrangements. The slight advance negotiations had made in Rome we have already seen. It was not to be expected that a more favourable result would occur, when the allies were at such decided disadvantage from a military point of view. They had never ceased to intrigue with Louis XI.; Milan through Carlo Visconti and Giovann’Andrea Cagnola, Florence through Francesco Gaddi, who belonged to a family which had always remained in friendly relations with the Medici. The French king was the only one who received these two members of the alliance with warmth—he had often differences with Venice. But he had other things to disturb his peace of mind, and the war in Picardy and in the Franche Comté with the heiress of Burgundy, and partly, also, the feuds in Milan and Piedmont, afforded him the wished-for opportunity of allowing his own intriguing spirit full play, whatever might be the end of negotiations with the Pope. During those negotiations he had a real pleasure in expressing his grudge against Sixtus IV. and King Ferrante. At the end of December 1478 he said to the Milanese ambassadors that he would himself head an enterprise against the Turks (theusual assurance and bait of princes in the fifteenth century) if Italy were in peace, ‘and especially if they had a Pope as he should be.’ ‘Upon this he indulged in a flood of evil words against the Pope, King Ferrante, and Count Girolamo, speaking for two hours with such a flow of words, that we were obliged to restrict ourselves to listening, and it seemed unadvisable to us to touch upon anything else.’ Even in the presence of Don Federigo d’Aragona, who was then in France, the king did not moderate his expressions ‘de mala natura’ against the Pope and Ferrante, the latter of whom he spared no humiliation. After having once said to the Neapolitan ambassador that his master interfered in matters more than he ought, he asked, ‘Your king, such as he is, do you then believe him to be King Alfonso’s son?’[283]Such things certainly could not surprise a sovereign who before a foreign ambassador could insult his own good and patient mother by saying he did not know whose son he was.Nevertheless Louis XI. was resolved not to leave Milan and Florence to the will of their opponents. He remained firm to his old affection for the Medici. Even after he had resolved to leave the hands of Cecco Simonetta’s enemies free, whereby those who caballed with King Ferrante must cling to the rudder, he held firmly to Lorenzo. ‘For nothing in the world,’ wrote Philippe de Commines on October 3, 1479, from Plessis to an agent of the king in Italy, Pietro Palmieri, at a time when the Milanese affairs were still undecided—‘would the king allow the Florentines, and especially Lorenzo de’ Medici’s person, to come to harm. If they decided in the enemy’s favour at Milan, the king would assist the Florentines and Lorenzo with all the means in his power.’ In June the Pope had proposed to the French ambassador, who was still staying with him, to leave the settlement of their differences to a council composed of Edward IV., king of England, and a legatealatere. A courier was despatched to France, where an ambassador of Girolamo Riario was active against Lorenzo de’ Medici. The Milanese ambassador suspected that the French diplomatists in Rome were to be won by gold. But Louis XI. would know nothing of the matter; he answered that in case the position of umpire were offered to him, in conjunction with king Edward, he would perhaps accept it, although he was occupied enough. The joy at the advantage gained by the Florentines at Trasimene was cooled by the loss of the battle of Guinegate, near St. Omer, where, on August 7, Maximilian of Austria defeated the French. The president of the Toulouse parliament and head of the Roman embassy had returned shortly before. The king had received him very badly; Commines and others were obliged to mediate to obtain a hearing for him. The Pope represented himself as not disinclined for mediation, and Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere confirmed this, but for the present those in Rome attempted to prolong the matter in order to tire the Florentines. At the end of August a Papal plenipotentiary, Giovan Batista of Imola, came to the French court. Philippe de Commines received him by command of the king, who at first would hear nothing from him. The conference took place in the presence of Don Federigo d’Aragona.Sixtus enumerated once more all the complaints which he had against Florence and Lorenzo. The principal cause of war, he said in the brief he had given to his ambassadors, was not to be sought for in the events of April 1478, but in what had preceded them, in the affairs of Città di Castello and Faenza, in the personal position of Lorenzo de’ Medici. He could not agree to the proposals of accommodation hitherto made. The restitution of the places taken would imply a self-accusation, as though he had begun an unjust war. He must demand a guarantee for the Sienese before his troops and those of the Neapolitans could evacuate the Florentine territory. A treaty respecting Genoa couldonly begin with the consent of the Genoese themselves. The Pope was nevertheless inclined to leave the decision to the king, with a reservation of the aforesaid points, and deliver up to him the occupied castles. Louis XI., by whom the ambassador was personally disliked on account of matters which had taken place formerly, received these advances very coldly. He suspected that the Pope wished to sow discord between him and the English king, who had already been publicly designated as umpire. He repeated his former demands, a formal abrogation of the spiritual interdicts, evacuation of the territory, and restitution of the fortresses.[284]The Papal negotiator departed with this unsatisfactory demand. Francesco Gaddi had been present at the whole of this interview; the Milanese ambassadors, summoned to Orleans from Paris, had arrived too late, but were acquainted with all that had taken place. Then followed the events unfavourable to the allies in the Elsa valley. Even if the Pope and Ferrante had intended to resume negotiations with France, it would have been impossible to expect any good result from them. Lorenzo de’ Medici was obliged to make a direct compromise with at least one of his enemies.The choice of this one could not be difficult. If the Pope himself had been personally less irritated, the hatred of Girolamo Riario against the Medici, a hatred which still found vent in low intrigues[285]in the summer of 1479, would have made a negotiation difficult. It was otherwise with King Ferrante. He had done everything, military and diplomatic, to conduct the war with energy. The Duke of Calabria, who had hoped to fix himself as firmly in Tuscany as the Angevins once had done, had supplied the majority of the troops; the rising in Genoa, the attack on Pisa and theLunigiana, were his work. In France no less than four Neapolitan ambassadors were active in persuading Louis XI., in which, however, they did not succeed. But Ferrante was acute enough to see that nothing but an agreement with Florence could calm Italy, and only the authority of a capable man, which Lorenzo showed himself to be more and more, could give permanence to this agreement, while the Papal policy was too changeful to offer security. Lorenzo had known for some time of the king’s inclination to treat. But it was distasteful to him to meet his advances, not because he suspected personal danger therein, but because he saw that an agreement with King Ferrante would have political results for Florentine affairs which must have seemed important to him. He said to himself that his position would be quite different if he could begin the treaty from a more favourable point, and only the powerful support of his allies could help him in this, especially the mediation of Lodovico Sforza, who, since he had become Duke of Bari, had entered into still closer connections with the ruling family in Naples, to which his sister belonged. With Lodovico, who was daily obtaining greater influence in Milan, Lorenzo now stood in constant communication direct and indirect. His opinion on the position of affairs is expressed most clearly in a letter which he sent to Girolamo Morelli at Milan, on September 25.[286]‘The observations made,’ he says in this letter, after mentioning the proposals in regard to the Pazzi, ‘can only proceed from an ill opinion which is held there of our affairs; and although what has happened partly justifies that opinion, the matter does not stand as is believed there, but the unfavourable opinion is explained by a misunderstanding which you yourself hint at. I wish to impress this truth on Lord Lodovico, when I show him how our position will be strong or weak at his lordship’s will. For here at home there is not one who will raise a finger; and even if they doleave us there in the lurch, I have little fear respecting the direction of affairs. But I fear that if our forces cannot make head against the enemy, it will be necessary to take steps contrary to our freedom, and allow to others an influence in our government which will first of all be injurious to us, and then give others cause of alarm. If, therefore, apart from old friendship and good services, his lordship is of opinion that our preservation is of use to himself, he might take measures to this end, for I do not doubt for one instant that we shall only thus attain what we desire, if our enemies perceive that they can do nothing against us, while we have proofs enough of their will. Although I have received many friendly words from the Duke of Calabria for many months, and much encouragement to throw myself into the king’s arms, he attempting to show me that only in this manner can I save myself and the state, a penny from you would be worth more than a florin from the others. It is good that Lord Lodovico should know these things, and that if he wish to save us, he must take up the matter with more energy and act with more decision. If he does this, I have no anxiety respecting affairs here; if this, however, does not happen, he will see how it will be with our cause, and partly also with his own. For if nothing else should occur he will give into other people’s hands the reins of Italy, which are now in his, as I wrote to you in my long letter, which is so long that I do not believe he has read it in the midst of his many employments, and which I beg you to deliver to him again, for I have continually more than enough to do.’In this letter the position of affairs was clearly indicated. But Lorenzo deceived himself when he hoped that Lodovico Sforza would agree to his views and seek to withdraw him from the necessity ‘of throwing himself into the king’s arms.’ Whether the will or ability were here wanting may remain a question. Lodovico approached the goal of his desires. His nephew, Gian Galeazzo, was crowned duke with great solemnity while yet in exile, on April 24, 1478,but the government had of course remained with his mother, from whose hands Lodovico now took it more completely, having at first employed a favourite of the duchess, a Ferrarese named Antonio Tassino, to make her agree to his plans. He soon became even to foreigners the lord of Milan. From his early years his subtle nature showed itself, although his character was only fully developed under the influences of the changing fortunes of his busy life.Lodovico il Moro—a name which Sforza received in youth on account of his dark complexion, and continued to bear in later years, so that it became the war-cry of his partisans—was no ordinary man. Born at Vigevano on August 3, 1451, after his father had ascended the ducal throne, a circumstance from which he seemed inclined to claim a right of succession to the prejudice of an elder brother and his son, he was in his eight-and-twentieth year when he attained to power in Milan. Galeazzo Maria had never trusted his restless ambition, for indeed he never ceased to conspire in one way or the other till he was lord of Milan; and even then he continued to weave intrigues against enemies when he could not reach them otherwise, against friends when his plans crossed theirs. He could not live without plotting. An ally was never safe with him, and in time he wove a net which not only extended through Italy but through Europe, and in which he himself was taken. Of moral courage he was exceedingly destitute. ‘The aforesaid Lord Lodovico,’ says Philippe de Commines, ‘was very clever but very timid, and extremely subservient when afraid, of which I can speak fully from personal knowledge, as I have had much to do with him. He was besides destitute of truth and faith where he thought to gain an advantage by breaking his word.’ This passion for intrigue became his own ruin and that of his country and Italy, for the confidence which inspired him, his reliance upon fortune, whose son he called himself, and his measurement of matters according to a mere calculation of their advantage, darkened in time a perception which wasotherwise not deficient in acuteness, while his entire want of moral consciousness falsified his judgment. This confidence he had never so naively expressed as in 1496, when, after Italy had been evacuated by the French, the Emperor Maximilian married to his niece, Venice allied to him, and Florence crippled, he fancied he held the fate of Italy in his hand. ‘The Duke of Milan boasts of having at present a chaplain, acondottiere, a chamberlain, and a courier, who are all at his service. The chaplain is Pope Alexander, thecondottiereMaximilian, the chamberlain the Signoria of Venice, which freely expends what he orders, the courier the French king, who comes and goes at his good pleasure.’[287]‘It is terrible to think of,’ adds our informant. He knew no scruples where there was a question of satisfying his selfishness. The slow torture inflicted on his unhappy nephew, and his treatment of his consort, are among the most fearful episodes of a time which abounded in wickedness. In order to attain to power he had employed other rebels; when his end was attained he discarded them, especially Roberto Sanseverino, and sought to make friends with the opposite party, hoping thus to render them harmless.As a ruler, not to speak of his vivid interest in art and intellectual efforts generally, which he shared with most princes good or bad of his time, Lodovico Sforza had some praiseworthy qualities. He was neither a profligate like Galeazzo Maria, nor cruel from an inhuman pleasure in other people’s sufferings, nor a wild spendthrift like him. He was active, watchful, clever, considerate of the material welfare of the country which he carefully governed, fostering rather than exhausting her resources, while his own treasuries were always filled, so that he could dispose of considerable sums for political and military purposes. Commines, it is true, accuses him of fiscal oppression, and traces the popular discontent to this. ‘I have never seen more beautifuland fertile land than this duchy. If its master were content with drawing 500,000 ducats from it annually, his subjects would remain wealthy and the master would live in security, but Lord Lodovico makes from 650,000 to 700,000, which is a real piece of tyranny, so that the people only long for change.’[288]This is, however, only applicable to later times, and even then il Moro had always a strong party, which the misgovernment of the French strengthened, though they succeeded in expelling him with the help of his enemies from Milan. Giovan Pietro Cagnola, who belonged, indeed, to the unconditional adherents of the Sforzas, and dedicated his history to il Moro, is never tired of praising his wisdom and ripe judgment—how he had brought the state into such excellent order, how he had enlarged and enriched it in extent and respect, had cherished peace, regained Genoa without arms, and protected the country on the side of Switzerland.[289]He was vain, not of mere show like his brother, but of position and name, and he sunned himself in deceptive appearances of good fortune, when his praise resounded day and night in the people’s voice and the poet’s mouth as that of the dictator of the fate of Italy. His own unscrupulousness caused him to judge all others in the same light, and the times were such that he did not always deceive himself. He bought people in Rome as well as in France. Can we blame him from his point of view when a man like Commines, of so much higher intellectual standing, though stained with many of the sins of his century, mentions the bribing of Etienne de Vescq and other councillors of Charles VIII. with 8,000 ducats, with the cold remark, ‘If they were obliged to take money, they might have demanded more.’ Commines apparently was of the opinion that perjury was only wrong when it was unprofitable.Many years afterwards, when his equally ambitious and no less clever consort, Beatrice d’Este, had been taken fromhim in the bloom of life—a loss which he felt severely even in political affairs—Lodovico il Moro drew up a political testament for his son and successor in case he should come to the government in early youth, respecting all branches of the administration.[290]‘As our first command since all power and dominion are given by God, we wish and appoint that those who have to conduct the government after us, and be entrusted with the education of our son, should instruct him in religion and teach him to recognise his Creator as the giver of all good bestowed on him upon earth, as also that they should show him that, with the reservation of the respect due to his Papal Holiness as vicegerent of Christ, he has to consider the Holy Roman Empire as the authority set over him in all devotion and affection, especially the person of the Most Serene and unconquered Lord Maximilian, the Roman king, or in case he should no longer live, he who has succeeded him, for so commands our duty to His Majesty and the Holy Empire, through whose goodness we have obtained our dukedom.’Such was the man who was then but at the commencement of his great political career, and to whom Lorenzo de’ Medici, a little older than he, and connected with the house of Sforza by inherited ties, saw himself principally referred by the conjunctures of the time. Lodovico had on November 12 caused Niccolo Martelli,[291]then in Milan, and a friend of Lorenzo’s, to disclose to him Ferrante’s inclination to treat, and to impress on him not to refuse the proffered hand. He was to take the whole situation of affairs into consideration, forget the past, and seize the opportunity without delay. It would be important to decide what conditions the Republic would make or accept respecting the places occupied, the dynasties of Romagna, and Count Girolamo. It might be good to send his eldest son to Naples (Piero was then onlyeight years old). Above all he advised him to hasten the matter; ‘for the hand of dark fate hovers between cup and lip.’ He might cast the die. Ten days later Lodovico renewed his representations to the ambassador of the Republic, Piero Filippo Pandolfini. They would accomplish nothing by persisting in the beaten course at Florence, as announced by the Milanese ambassador, Filippo Sagramoro. They should look into the matter closely and not irritate the king by defiance. They must not rely on Venice, for when she could defend her own interests, she would not think of Florence. From Milan little was to be expected on account of its own troubles: he said so openly that they might not have to rue it too late. If they agreed, he was ready to mediate in Naples, but if they should not come to a resolution, or should make unacceptable conditions, he must lay the responsibility on the Republic.[292]It was clear that Sforza acted in concert with Ferrante. The offer of the truce, which followed two days afterwards, showed that the king was in earnest in his wish for reconciliation. We shall soon see that Sixtus IV. did not deceive himself in respect to the feeling of his allies, however displeasing to himself.On the same day on which the trumpeter of the Duke of Calabria entered Florence, a distinguished Florentine set out on a confidential mission to Naples. It was Filippo Strozzi, who had long lived in business at Naples, and whose connections with King Ferrante were known. In his memoirs of the events connected with the Pazzi conspiracy he mentions this mission.[293]‘The situation of affairs appeared serious to all, especially to Lorenzo de’ Medici, on whose account, as they said, war was made. The aforesaid Lorenzo sent me to Naples. On November 24 I set out, to say tothe king’s majesty, he threw himself entirely into his arms, and would willingly agree to that which his majesty wished, whether the king should decide on high or low, within or without, provided he restored peace to the city and gave up the places he had taken. I found the king hunting at Arnone (at the mouth of the Volturno). After I had delivered my message, he answered me that he had later news: Lorenzo would come in person, and so we must wait to see what will result from his visit.’ Shortly after Filippo’s departure, Lorenzo made up his mind to go himself, a determination to which the revelations of Lodovico Sforza, which took away all hopes of a powerful support from Milan and Venice, undoubtedly contributed. He acted quite independently, and though he took counsel with his confidants, he only imparted the matter to the official representatives of the Republic when he was himself resolved.On December 5 he caused an assembly to be summoned by the magistracy of Ten, of about forty of the most respected citizens, in the palace of the Signoria. He said he had called them together in order to inform them of a resolution he had taken without asking their advice. He had considered how much the city needed peace, as it would be impossible to defend her alone against such powerful opponents while her allies would not fulfil their obligations. But as these opponents always asserted they had more to do with him personally than with the city, and the king in especial always declared he was no enemy to the latter, but loved her and desired her liberty, and sought to secure her friendship by redressing her wrongs if every other way were closed to him, he had determined to go to Naples. This seemed to him the best in all cases. If the enemy wished for him only, they should have him in their hands and need not molest the city further. If they did not wish for him, but the friendship of the city, this would be the means of coming to an understanding sooner, and obtaining more favourable conditions. If they wished something else, he should learn it and obtain the possibilityof protecting their freedom and the city better. He knew that he was going into danger, but he considered his own welfare less than the common good, and the duty of any citizens to the fatherland less than his duty, for none had attained to favour and respect as he had. But he hoped the citizens here present would preserve his position for him, and commended himself, his family, and his house to them. But, above all, he hoped that God, in consideration of the justice of his cause and his good intentions, would promote his purposes, and that a war begun with the murder of his brother would be ended by his endeavours.[294]Lorenzo had announced from the first that his resolution was taken. Many might think this resolve daring, but they knew that persuasion would avail nothing. It was natural that King Ferrante’s reserved character, which had not yet revealed itself as it did in the second barons’ war, should frighten many who remembered the fate of Jacopo Piccinino, whose bleeding ghost pursued the king to his end. But Lorenzo, though he might not be quite without anxiety, appreciated too well the distinction between his position and that of a wanderingcondottiere, and trusted also to the real love of peace of the Aragonese. The armistice offered by the Duke of Calabria was a favourable sign.[295]He set out without delay. From San Miniato on December 7 he informed the Signoria of his resolution, which he founded on the same reasons which he had given to the assembly before his departure.[296]He added that if he had not revealed his intention before, this was not from pride, but because it seemed to him that in the straits in which the city now was, action wasmore necessary than speech. As the city needed peace, and the means employed for attaining the same had proved ineffective, it seemed better to him that one should run into danger than that the whole people should be exposed to it. On the preceding day he had already sent a confidential man, Baccio Ugolino, to the Duke of Ferrara, to give him information of his resolution,[297]and at the same time announced his approaching departure to the Dukes of Calabria and Urbino, and told them that M. Francesco Gaddi would present himself before them, and if they thought fit would proceed to Naples.[298]At Pisa he received a letter from the Signoria which empowered him to act as ambassador to King Ferrante. Bartolommeo Scala, who had drawn it up, on sending it to him, added, ‘All rely upon your wisdom and your authority. But they do not judge of the king’s inclination by the present condition of things, but looking back on our former relations by the sympathy which he once showed to us and the service he already has rendered us.’[299]
FLORENCE AND HER ALLIES. LODOVICO IL MORO.
Themoment for decision had arrived. It was acknowledged in Florence that matters must come to a crisis one way or the other. A considerable part of the territory was in the enemy’s power, the valleys of the Chiana and Elsa terribly wasted. The chief portion of the army, demoralised by the late losses, was driven back the small distance of seven miles from the city. From one of the allies no active help could be expected, and the other was already in treaty with the enemy.
Since the defeat of Poggibonzi, Lorenzo could no longer deceive himself respecting the position of the Republic or his own. He knew that all sources of help were exhausted. He knew also that Florence could obtain peace without any difficulty if she would consent to sacrifice him, and he understood the position of affairs too well not to foresee the result of the struggle. During the whole course of the war, in which, being no warrior, he naturally held aloof, the best of the illustrious citizens who were devoted to him went as commissaries to the army, and gave him ample opportunities of studying the state of feeling at home, and the possibility of a compromise.
His industry had been great and various. On account of the sickness prevailing in Florence, which swept away thousands, he had, soon after the outbreak of hostilities, sent his wife and children first to Pistoja, and then to his villa Cafaggiuolo, under the protection of his uncle GiovanniTornabuoni. This left him free to act as he liked, and he did not quit the city, where there was enough for him to do. Since the conspiracy, the administration of affairs was more than ever in his hands, for a constitution which had such a complicated machinery made a safe and consistent guidance more necessary than ever in those stormy times. During the first year of the war, notwithstanding the greater numbers of the enemy, they could still hope for success from the languid manner in which the contest was carried on. The second spring brought no decision, for the successful skirmish at Trasimene was more than outweighed by the occurrences in the Elsa valley. Lorenzo was forced to think of negotiation, if he would not expose himself to the danger of having to conclude a treaty disadvantageous to himself. For while so little was accomplished with weapons, there was not much more to be hoped for from diplomatic arrangements. The slight advance negotiations had made in Rome we have already seen. It was not to be expected that a more favourable result would occur, when the allies were at such decided disadvantage from a military point of view. They had never ceased to intrigue with Louis XI.; Milan through Carlo Visconti and Giovann’Andrea Cagnola, Florence through Francesco Gaddi, who belonged to a family which had always remained in friendly relations with the Medici. The French king was the only one who received these two members of the alliance with warmth—he had often differences with Venice. But he had other things to disturb his peace of mind, and the war in Picardy and in the Franche Comté with the heiress of Burgundy, and partly, also, the feuds in Milan and Piedmont, afforded him the wished-for opportunity of allowing his own intriguing spirit full play, whatever might be the end of negotiations with the Pope. During those negotiations he had a real pleasure in expressing his grudge against Sixtus IV. and King Ferrante. At the end of December 1478 he said to the Milanese ambassadors that he would himself head an enterprise against the Turks (theusual assurance and bait of princes in the fifteenth century) if Italy were in peace, ‘and especially if they had a Pope as he should be.’ ‘Upon this he indulged in a flood of evil words against the Pope, King Ferrante, and Count Girolamo, speaking for two hours with such a flow of words, that we were obliged to restrict ourselves to listening, and it seemed unadvisable to us to touch upon anything else.’ Even in the presence of Don Federigo d’Aragona, who was then in France, the king did not moderate his expressions ‘de mala natura’ against the Pope and Ferrante, the latter of whom he spared no humiliation. After having once said to the Neapolitan ambassador that his master interfered in matters more than he ought, he asked, ‘Your king, such as he is, do you then believe him to be King Alfonso’s son?’[283]Such things certainly could not surprise a sovereign who before a foreign ambassador could insult his own good and patient mother by saying he did not know whose son he was.
Nevertheless Louis XI. was resolved not to leave Milan and Florence to the will of their opponents. He remained firm to his old affection for the Medici. Even after he had resolved to leave the hands of Cecco Simonetta’s enemies free, whereby those who caballed with King Ferrante must cling to the rudder, he held firmly to Lorenzo. ‘For nothing in the world,’ wrote Philippe de Commines on October 3, 1479, from Plessis to an agent of the king in Italy, Pietro Palmieri, at a time when the Milanese affairs were still undecided—‘would the king allow the Florentines, and especially Lorenzo de’ Medici’s person, to come to harm. If they decided in the enemy’s favour at Milan, the king would assist the Florentines and Lorenzo with all the means in his power.’ In June the Pope had proposed to the French ambassador, who was still staying with him, to leave the settlement of their differences to a council composed of Edward IV., king of England, and a legatealatere. A courier was despatched to France, where an ambassador of Girolamo Riario was active against Lorenzo de’ Medici. The Milanese ambassador suspected that the French diplomatists in Rome were to be won by gold. But Louis XI. would know nothing of the matter; he answered that in case the position of umpire were offered to him, in conjunction with king Edward, he would perhaps accept it, although he was occupied enough. The joy at the advantage gained by the Florentines at Trasimene was cooled by the loss of the battle of Guinegate, near St. Omer, where, on August 7, Maximilian of Austria defeated the French. The president of the Toulouse parliament and head of the Roman embassy had returned shortly before. The king had received him very badly; Commines and others were obliged to mediate to obtain a hearing for him. The Pope represented himself as not disinclined for mediation, and Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere confirmed this, but for the present those in Rome attempted to prolong the matter in order to tire the Florentines. At the end of August a Papal plenipotentiary, Giovan Batista of Imola, came to the French court. Philippe de Commines received him by command of the king, who at first would hear nothing from him. The conference took place in the presence of Don Federigo d’Aragona.
Sixtus enumerated once more all the complaints which he had against Florence and Lorenzo. The principal cause of war, he said in the brief he had given to his ambassadors, was not to be sought for in the events of April 1478, but in what had preceded them, in the affairs of Città di Castello and Faenza, in the personal position of Lorenzo de’ Medici. He could not agree to the proposals of accommodation hitherto made. The restitution of the places taken would imply a self-accusation, as though he had begun an unjust war. He must demand a guarantee for the Sienese before his troops and those of the Neapolitans could evacuate the Florentine territory. A treaty respecting Genoa couldonly begin with the consent of the Genoese themselves. The Pope was nevertheless inclined to leave the decision to the king, with a reservation of the aforesaid points, and deliver up to him the occupied castles. Louis XI., by whom the ambassador was personally disliked on account of matters which had taken place formerly, received these advances very coldly. He suspected that the Pope wished to sow discord between him and the English king, who had already been publicly designated as umpire. He repeated his former demands, a formal abrogation of the spiritual interdicts, evacuation of the territory, and restitution of the fortresses.[284]The Papal negotiator departed with this unsatisfactory demand. Francesco Gaddi had been present at the whole of this interview; the Milanese ambassadors, summoned to Orleans from Paris, had arrived too late, but were acquainted with all that had taken place. Then followed the events unfavourable to the allies in the Elsa valley. Even if the Pope and Ferrante had intended to resume negotiations with France, it would have been impossible to expect any good result from them. Lorenzo de’ Medici was obliged to make a direct compromise with at least one of his enemies.
The choice of this one could not be difficult. If the Pope himself had been personally less irritated, the hatred of Girolamo Riario against the Medici, a hatred which still found vent in low intrigues[285]in the summer of 1479, would have made a negotiation difficult. It was otherwise with King Ferrante. He had done everything, military and diplomatic, to conduct the war with energy. The Duke of Calabria, who had hoped to fix himself as firmly in Tuscany as the Angevins once had done, had supplied the majority of the troops; the rising in Genoa, the attack on Pisa and theLunigiana, were his work. In France no less than four Neapolitan ambassadors were active in persuading Louis XI., in which, however, they did not succeed. But Ferrante was acute enough to see that nothing but an agreement with Florence could calm Italy, and only the authority of a capable man, which Lorenzo showed himself to be more and more, could give permanence to this agreement, while the Papal policy was too changeful to offer security. Lorenzo had known for some time of the king’s inclination to treat. But it was distasteful to him to meet his advances, not because he suspected personal danger therein, but because he saw that an agreement with King Ferrante would have political results for Florentine affairs which must have seemed important to him. He said to himself that his position would be quite different if he could begin the treaty from a more favourable point, and only the powerful support of his allies could help him in this, especially the mediation of Lodovico Sforza, who, since he had become Duke of Bari, had entered into still closer connections with the ruling family in Naples, to which his sister belonged. With Lodovico, who was daily obtaining greater influence in Milan, Lorenzo now stood in constant communication direct and indirect. His opinion on the position of affairs is expressed most clearly in a letter which he sent to Girolamo Morelli at Milan, on September 25.[286]‘The observations made,’ he says in this letter, after mentioning the proposals in regard to the Pazzi, ‘can only proceed from an ill opinion which is held there of our affairs; and although what has happened partly justifies that opinion, the matter does not stand as is believed there, but the unfavourable opinion is explained by a misunderstanding which you yourself hint at. I wish to impress this truth on Lord Lodovico, when I show him how our position will be strong or weak at his lordship’s will. For here at home there is not one who will raise a finger; and even if they doleave us there in the lurch, I have little fear respecting the direction of affairs. But I fear that if our forces cannot make head against the enemy, it will be necessary to take steps contrary to our freedom, and allow to others an influence in our government which will first of all be injurious to us, and then give others cause of alarm. If, therefore, apart from old friendship and good services, his lordship is of opinion that our preservation is of use to himself, he might take measures to this end, for I do not doubt for one instant that we shall only thus attain what we desire, if our enemies perceive that they can do nothing against us, while we have proofs enough of their will. Although I have received many friendly words from the Duke of Calabria for many months, and much encouragement to throw myself into the king’s arms, he attempting to show me that only in this manner can I save myself and the state, a penny from you would be worth more than a florin from the others. It is good that Lord Lodovico should know these things, and that if he wish to save us, he must take up the matter with more energy and act with more decision. If he does this, I have no anxiety respecting affairs here; if this, however, does not happen, he will see how it will be with our cause, and partly also with his own. For if nothing else should occur he will give into other people’s hands the reins of Italy, which are now in his, as I wrote to you in my long letter, which is so long that I do not believe he has read it in the midst of his many employments, and which I beg you to deliver to him again, for I have continually more than enough to do.’
In this letter the position of affairs was clearly indicated. But Lorenzo deceived himself when he hoped that Lodovico Sforza would agree to his views and seek to withdraw him from the necessity ‘of throwing himself into the king’s arms.’ Whether the will or ability were here wanting may remain a question. Lodovico approached the goal of his desires. His nephew, Gian Galeazzo, was crowned duke with great solemnity while yet in exile, on April 24, 1478,but the government had of course remained with his mother, from whose hands Lodovico now took it more completely, having at first employed a favourite of the duchess, a Ferrarese named Antonio Tassino, to make her agree to his plans. He soon became even to foreigners the lord of Milan. From his early years his subtle nature showed itself, although his character was only fully developed under the influences of the changing fortunes of his busy life.
Lodovico il Moro—a name which Sforza received in youth on account of his dark complexion, and continued to bear in later years, so that it became the war-cry of his partisans—was no ordinary man. Born at Vigevano on August 3, 1451, after his father had ascended the ducal throne, a circumstance from which he seemed inclined to claim a right of succession to the prejudice of an elder brother and his son, he was in his eight-and-twentieth year when he attained to power in Milan. Galeazzo Maria had never trusted his restless ambition, for indeed he never ceased to conspire in one way or the other till he was lord of Milan; and even then he continued to weave intrigues against enemies when he could not reach them otherwise, against friends when his plans crossed theirs. He could not live without plotting. An ally was never safe with him, and in time he wove a net which not only extended through Italy but through Europe, and in which he himself was taken. Of moral courage he was exceedingly destitute. ‘The aforesaid Lord Lodovico,’ says Philippe de Commines, ‘was very clever but very timid, and extremely subservient when afraid, of which I can speak fully from personal knowledge, as I have had much to do with him. He was besides destitute of truth and faith where he thought to gain an advantage by breaking his word.’ This passion for intrigue became his own ruin and that of his country and Italy, for the confidence which inspired him, his reliance upon fortune, whose son he called himself, and his measurement of matters according to a mere calculation of their advantage, darkened in time a perception which wasotherwise not deficient in acuteness, while his entire want of moral consciousness falsified his judgment. This confidence he had never so naively expressed as in 1496, when, after Italy had been evacuated by the French, the Emperor Maximilian married to his niece, Venice allied to him, and Florence crippled, he fancied he held the fate of Italy in his hand. ‘The Duke of Milan boasts of having at present a chaplain, acondottiere, a chamberlain, and a courier, who are all at his service. The chaplain is Pope Alexander, thecondottiereMaximilian, the chamberlain the Signoria of Venice, which freely expends what he orders, the courier the French king, who comes and goes at his good pleasure.’[287]‘It is terrible to think of,’ adds our informant. He knew no scruples where there was a question of satisfying his selfishness. The slow torture inflicted on his unhappy nephew, and his treatment of his consort, are among the most fearful episodes of a time which abounded in wickedness. In order to attain to power he had employed other rebels; when his end was attained he discarded them, especially Roberto Sanseverino, and sought to make friends with the opposite party, hoping thus to render them harmless.
As a ruler, not to speak of his vivid interest in art and intellectual efforts generally, which he shared with most princes good or bad of his time, Lodovico Sforza had some praiseworthy qualities. He was neither a profligate like Galeazzo Maria, nor cruel from an inhuman pleasure in other people’s sufferings, nor a wild spendthrift like him. He was active, watchful, clever, considerate of the material welfare of the country which he carefully governed, fostering rather than exhausting her resources, while his own treasuries were always filled, so that he could dispose of considerable sums for political and military purposes. Commines, it is true, accuses him of fiscal oppression, and traces the popular discontent to this. ‘I have never seen more beautifuland fertile land than this duchy. If its master were content with drawing 500,000 ducats from it annually, his subjects would remain wealthy and the master would live in security, but Lord Lodovico makes from 650,000 to 700,000, which is a real piece of tyranny, so that the people only long for change.’[288]This is, however, only applicable to later times, and even then il Moro had always a strong party, which the misgovernment of the French strengthened, though they succeeded in expelling him with the help of his enemies from Milan. Giovan Pietro Cagnola, who belonged, indeed, to the unconditional adherents of the Sforzas, and dedicated his history to il Moro, is never tired of praising his wisdom and ripe judgment—how he had brought the state into such excellent order, how he had enlarged and enriched it in extent and respect, had cherished peace, regained Genoa without arms, and protected the country on the side of Switzerland.[289]He was vain, not of mere show like his brother, but of position and name, and he sunned himself in deceptive appearances of good fortune, when his praise resounded day and night in the people’s voice and the poet’s mouth as that of the dictator of the fate of Italy. His own unscrupulousness caused him to judge all others in the same light, and the times were such that he did not always deceive himself. He bought people in Rome as well as in France. Can we blame him from his point of view when a man like Commines, of so much higher intellectual standing, though stained with many of the sins of his century, mentions the bribing of Etienne de Vescq and other councillors of Charles VIII. with 8,000 ducats, with the cold remark, ‘If they were obliged to take money, they might have demanded more.’ Commines apparently was of the opinion that perjury was only wrong when it was unprofitable.
Many years afterwards, when his equally ambitious and no less clever consort, Beatrice d’Este, had been taken fromhim in the bloom of life—a loss which he felt severely even in political affairs—Lodovico il Moro drew up a political testament for his son and successor in case he should come to the government in early youth, respecting all branches of the administration.[290]‘As our first command since all power and dominion are given by God, we wish and appoint that those who have to conduct the government after us, and be entrusted with the education of our son, should instruct him in religion and teach him to recognise his Creator as the giver of all good bestowed on him upon earth, as also that they should show him that, with the reservation of the respect due to his Papal Holiness as vicegerent of Christ, he has to consider the Holy Roman Empire as the authority set over him in all devotion and affection, especially the person of the Most Serene and unconquered Lord Maximilian, the Roman king, or in case he should no longer live, he who has succeeded him, for so commands our duty to His Majesty and the Holy Empire, through whose goodness we have obtained our dukedom.’
Such was the man who was then but at the commencement of his great political career, and to whom Lorenzo de’ Medici, a little older than he, and connected with the house of Sforza by inherited ties, saw himself principally referred by the conjunctures of the time. Lodovico had on November 12 caused Niccolo Martelli,[291]then in Milan, and a friend of Lorenzo’s, to disclose to him Ferrante’s inclination to treat, and to impress on him not to refuse the proffered hand. He was to take the whole situation of affairs into consideration, forget the past, and seize the opportunity without delay. It would be important to decide what conditions the Republic would make or accept respecting the places occupied, the dynasties of Romagna, and Count Girolamo. It might be good to send his eldest son to Naples (Piero was then onlyeight years old). Above all he advised him to hasten the matter; ‘for the hand of dark fate hovers between cup and lip.’ He might cast the die. Ten days later Lodovico renewed his representations to the ambassador of the Republic, Piero Filippo Pandolfini. They would accomplish nothing by persisting in the beaten course at Florence, as announced by the Milanese ambassador, Filippo Sagramoro. They should look into the matter closely and not irritate the king by defiance. They must not rely on Venice, for when she could defend her own interests, she would not think of Florence. From Milan little was to be expected on account of its own troubles: he said so openly that they might not have to rue it too late. If they agreed, he was ready to mediate in Naples, but if they should not come to a resolution, or should make unacceptable conditions, he must lay the responsibility on the Republic.[292]It was clear that Sforza acted in concert with Ferrante. The offer of the truce, which followed two days afterwards, showed that the king was in earnest in his wish for reconciliation. We shall soon see that Sixtus IV. did not deceive himself in respect to the feeling of his allies, however displeasing to himself.
On the same day on which the trumpeter of the Duke of Calabria entered Florence, a distinguished Florentine set out on a confidential mission to Naples. It was Filippo Strozzi, who had long lived in business at Naples, and whose connections with King Ferrante were known. In his memoirs of the events connected with the Pazzi conspiracy he mentions this mission.[293]‘The situation of affairs appeared serious to all, especially to Lorenzo de’ Medici, on whose account, as they said, war was made. The aforesaid Lorenzo sent me to Naples. On November 24 I set out, to say tothe king’s majesty, he threw himself entirely into his arms, and would willingly agree to that which his majesty wished, whether the king should decide on high or low, within or without, provided he restored peace to the city and gave up the places he had taken. I found the king hunting at Arnone (at the mouth of the Volturno). After I had delivered my message, he answered me that he had later news: Lorenzo would come in person, and so we must wait to see what will result from his visit.’ Shortly after Filippo’s departure, Lorenzo made up his mind to go himself, a determination to which the revelations of Lodovico Sforza, which took away all hopes of a powerful support from Milan and Venice, undoubtedly contributed. He acted quite independently, and though he took counsel with his confidants, he only imparted the matter to the official representatives of the Republic when he was himself resolved.
On December 5 he caused an assembly to be summoned by the magistracy of Ten, of about forty of the most respected citizens, in the palace of the Signoria. He said he had called them together in order to inform them of a resolution he had taken without asking their advice. He had considered how much the city needed peace, as it would be impossible to defend her alone against such powerful opponents while her allies would not fulfil their obligations. But as these opponents always asserted they had more to do with him personally than with the city, and the king in especial always declared he was no enemy to the latter, but loved her and desired her liberty, and sought to secure her friendship by redressing her wrongs if every other way were closed to him, he had determined to go to Naples. This seemed to him the best in all cases. If the enemy wished for him only, they should have him in their hands and need not molest the city further. If they did not wish for him, but the friendship of the city, this would be the means of coming to an understanding sooner, and obtaining more favourable conditions. If they wished something else, he should learn it and obtain the possibilityof protecting their freedom and the city better. He knew that he was going into danger, but he considered his own welfare less than the common good, and the duty of any citizens to the fatherland less than his duty, for none had attained to favour and respect as he had. But he hoped the citizens here present would preserve his position for him, and commended himself, his family, and his house to them. But, above all, he hoped that God, in consideration of the justice of his cause and his good intentions, would promote his purposes, and that a war begun with the murder of his brother would be ended by his endeavours.[294]
Lorenzo had announced from the first that his resolution was taken. Many might think this resolve daring, but they knew that persuasion would avail nothing. It was natural that King Ferrante’s reserved character, which had not yet revealed itself as it did in the second barons’ war, should frighten many who remembered the fate of Jacopo Piccinino, whose bleeding ghost pursued the king to his end. But Lorenzo, though he might not be quite without anxiety, appreciated too well the distinction between his position and that of a wanderingcondottiere, and trusted also to the real love of peace of the Aragonese. The armistice offered by the Duke of Calabria was a favourable sign.[295]He set out without delay. From San Miniato on December 7 he informed the Signoria of his resolution, which he founded on the same reasons which he had given to the assembly before his departure.[296]He added that if he had not revealed his intention before, this was not from pride, but because it seemed to him that in the straits in which the city now was, action wasmore necessary than speech. As the city needed peace, and the means employed for attaining the same had proved ineffective, it seemed better to him that one should run into danger than that the whole people should be exposed to it. On the preceding day he had already sent a confidential man, Baccio Ugolino, to the Duke of Ferrara, to give him information of his resolution,[297]and at the same time announced his approaching departure to the Dukes of Calabria and Urbino, and told them that M. Francesco Gaddi would present himself before them, and if they thought fit would proceed to Naples.[298]At Pisa he received a letter from the Signoria which empowered him to act as ambassador to King Ferrante. Bartolommeo Scala, who had drawn it up, on sending it to him, added, ‘All rely upon your wisdom and your authority. But they do not judge of the king’s inclination by the present condition of things, but looking back on our former relations by the sympathy which he once showed to us and the service he already has rendered us.’[299]