CHAPTER V.SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN INNOCENT VIII. AND FERRANTE OF NAPLES.Duringall this time the quarrel between the Pope and the king was assuming serious dimensions. One could hardly expect otherwise when the characters of the two men are taken into consideration. The one combined a full conception of lofty dignity with the consciousness of very little real power, was very excitable, wanting in perseverance, and continually going from one extreme to another; the other was slily calculating, practised in all the arts of unprincipled cunning, and disposed to undervalue his opponent when the tide seemed to have turned in his own favour. When the king thought he had rid himself of all enemies and suspicious persons in his own country, he did not hesitate to disregard the stipulations agreed upon in August 1486, and defy the Pope. The dispute went on through 1488 even to the proclamation of ecclesiastical censures. This was unpleasant to Lorenzo for many reasons: ‘I fear,’ he wrote to Lanfredini, September 3,[509]‘people will think it is meal out of my tub, though you know that the Pope has acted not only without me but against my advice. Not only is the king ready and inclined to attempt aggression, but the Pope is utterly unprepared; in fact, his affairs are in such disorder that a most disastrous war may arise out of this.’ Lorenzo’s son-in-law begged him to go to Rome in the autumn, but herefused, waiting to see whether the Pope and the king would come to terms. In the spring of 1489 the Spanish court made an effort at mediation through ambassadors in Rome. Ferrante’s object seemed to be to increase the Pope’s anger by personal attacks on him and his, so as to produce an immediate rupture. This conduct can be explained only on one of two suppositions: he either thought that he could treat his adversary as he chose without danger to himself, or he was determined to let things come to a pass which might, indeed, easily bring him to the gates of Rome, but might also just as easily call other nations to the rescue. All the misfortunes that befell Ferrante’s family and dynasty in 1495 were provoked by his self-will of six years before. It was no thanks to him nor to his son, who was worse than he, nor to the Pope, that they were not overtaken then by the misfortune of which both parties—the one in his ambitious, tyrannical stubbornness, the other in his inconsiderate weakness—seemed to have no foreboding. That it was avoided for a time was chiefly owing to Lorenzo de’ Medici, a fact the merit of which ought to cover many of his sins.After the fruitless Spanish attempt at mediation, and while Ferrante was doing all he could to stir up the King of the Romans against the Pope, the latter resolved to act. On June 27, 1489, Niccolò Orsini, Count of Pitigliano, arrived in Rome. A dispute between this excellent soldier and the Republic of Siena had, in the previous April, resulted in his dismissal from the Florentine service; whereupon the Pope offered him the post of Captain-General of the Church. As the astrologers pronounced the constellations favourable, on the very day of the count’s arrival the Pope presented him with his insignia of office, tunic, hat, sword, and commander’s staff, and blessed the two standards, while Orsini knelt before him. On the following Sunday the new captain-general made his triumphal entry into Rome from Monte Mario. He was then forty-eight years of age, but can be best imagined as he is represented on his monument in SS. Giovannie Paolo at Venice, erected twenty years later, when he had fallen a victim to his exertions during the war of the League of Cambrai. He appears there as a fine-looking stately horseman with waving plume and rich scarf; his head is slightly bent as if in thought, and turned towards the right; he holds in his hand the commander’s staff, and stands between allegorical statues of Prudence and Faith. On the 30th, after high mass, the citation of the King of Naples took place. He was allowed three months’ grace to fulfil his duty as a vassal; that he would submit was not to be expected. The most zealous preparations were made for the war which seemed inevitable. Cardinal Sforza, on behalf of Lodovico, and Lanfredini, who was ill, sought to restrain the Pope from taking an extreme step. On the part of the Florentines, at least, this mediation was honestly meant.Lorenzo went in July to the baths, whence, according to the new Ferrarese ambassador Manfredo Manfredi,[510]he came back refreshed and well on August 6. Scarcely was he home when he set to work at the Roman affair. ‘As to the deliberations yonder,’ he wrote on the 8th to Lanfredini,[511]‘I am of opinion that in considering my Lord Lodovico’s proposals you must always keep in view that he can be a turncoat on occasion and may very likely have private aims, as the quarrel between the Pope and the king may be very convenient to him in many respects. Considering his nature, therefore, we must not rely on him too much, but must follow his example in profiting by his proceedings when they answer our purposes, but keeping the upper hand if he takes it into his head to change. First of all I wish the Holy Father to let the Venetians know that both Lord Lodovico and ourselves have induced him to conceal from the Republic nothing that concerns his relations with the king. This I say because in any case it seems to me important that thePope should at least keep the Venetians in their present mind until we all see our way clearer. There is no real trust to be placed in those people, but their authority is useful; and it is quite possible to keep on tolerable terms with them without causing my Lord Lodovico to take fright. But above all I wish to be assured whether the Pope is determined to abide by the conditions already settled, or whether he thinks of agreeing to some modifications. As to the tribute-money, I think a compromise possible; as for the barons, I see no means, as the king has gone too far to be able to draw back. With regard to spiritual matters an arrangement will be easy, for the king will hardly raise difficulties where he has only to give promises. When it comes to keeping them they must just wink at each other, as all popes and all kings have done. The point therefore is to know exactly what we have to abide by before taking a decision which, according to my view, must depend on what the Pope really intends; and his will cannot be forced, particularly if peace is established in France. Endeavour therefore to give me sure information if possible. In any case it is my fixed opinion that the Pope’s honour must be kept unstained, if my Lord Lodovico agrees with me, who, however, as before said, is not much to be trusted. A good understanding must be maintained with the Venetians, for the sake of having something to fall back upon. I think you must decline with thanks his Holiness’ proposal to confide the negotiations in question to me. It would be a distinction for me, but would scarcely answer his Holiness’ purposes. I, however, prefer his Holiness’ advantage to that which would be an honour to me personally. In any future agreement with the king, the conditions of the last peace will have to be modified in some particulars, and stronger shoulders than mine will be needed to bear that burthen. I shall consider myself honoured enough if the interests of his Holiness are secured with honour.’ Lorenzo’s unwillingness to take part in negotiations between the Popeand Venice was partly founded on the knowledge that the latter power was anything but well-disposed towards him. Two years after this his friend Guidoni, the Ferrarese ambassador, who had exchanged his post at Florence for the more difficult one in the city of the lagoons, wrote to him: ‘The Venetians detest your name more than Satan does the Cross.’As Ferrante showed no sign of returning from his ways, Innocent continued to proceed against him. On September 11, 1489, in presence of the Neapolitan ambassador Antonio d’Alessandri, the kingdom of Naples was solemnly declared to have lapsed to the Holy See through non-fulfilment of homage.[512]The ambassador protested and appealed to the Council. The next day he appeared in the Sixtine Chapel with the other ambassadors, to celebrate the anniversary of the Pope’s coronation, just as if nothing had happened. But he was startled on the 13th, when a French envoy, Guillaume de Poitiers, of the family of the Counts of St. Vallier, arrived with great pomp at the Vatican.[513]For a long time past the Pope had been negotiating with France, and the French showed their desire for a good understanding with Rome by delivering up the Turkish Prince Dschem to Innocent at the end of the winter. It was already suspected that as soon as affairs were settled in Brittany, where resistance was already broken, whose last duke was dead, and where union with the crown was in progress, the French king, now nineteen, would turn his eyes towards Italy. Rome, conscious of her own weakness, reckoned on foreign aid, thinking she had two strings to her bow—France and Spain—both of whom were supposed to be displeased with Ferrante. But the prospect of war in Italy and interference from abroad, no matter whence it came or what the resultmight be, was highly displeasing to Lorenzo, and he renewed his efforts to change the mind of the Pope.‘From your despatch of October 13,’ thus he begins a letter to Lanfredini four days later,[514]‘I perceive that his Holiness has taken some little offence at my remonstrances against proceeding with the citations. Any offence to the Holy Father grieves me; but it would grieve me very much if he thought my counsel and actions were determined by anything but zeal for his good. I repeat, the Pope must make up his mind about three things. Either he must get justice from the king by force; or he must make as good terms as he can with him; or, lastly, if this cannot be done with honour, he must temporise and wait for more favourable circumstances. The first would be the most honourable plan; but I consider it dangerous and expensive, and think it cannot be executed without calling in a foreign power to Naples. Thereto three things are needful: first, the consent of Venice and Milan; secondly, sufficient independent means, both in men and money, on the part of the said power; and thirdly, very great expenditure on the part of the Pope. For the point is to over-match the king, whom Milan may perhaps assist should Venice declare against him; so that Milan, too, must be kept in check. An understanding with the barons and those of similar rank would be useful in such a case. Now I may be mistaken, but I cannot see the possibility of realising all these presuppositions, and therefore I have dissuaded his Holiness. Of the foreign powers only Spain and France can be taken into consideration. Spain seems to me at this moment incapable of either acting or paying,[515]and how France is to be relied upon I do not see. Supposing, however, that she changed her nature, I would agree with his Holiness, provided that in an expedition against Naples the person to be benefited should be the Duke of Lorraine (as heir of Anjou), which would be the least dangerous thing; for the Duke ofLorraine is not King of France, and his relationship to the royal house is of no great importance. Naples and Spain are much nearer relatives, and yet not friends; and when a man is once King of Naples he will go his own way.‘All these reasons, it seems to me, ought to dissuade the Pope from any undertaking of the kind. In such circumstances it is of no use exasperating the king by citations and suchlike. Nay, even if one was armed and ready, I should still think it advisable to let such challenges alone, in order to avoid the danger of the king’s proceeding from words to deeds—a danger not to be under-rated. Better arm in silence than excite others to the attack by expressing hostility. As for the second case, that of an accommodation, I am perhaps, speaking without an exact knowledge of the state of affairs; and possibly conditions are being fixed in consequence of which the citation may be an useful measure. But from what I know, I believe that such a proceeding, instead of facilitating an accommodation, only serves to irritate, and will lead to a rupture. As for temporising, I will say nothing, because an immediate agreement on the most honourable terms possible seems to me far more to the purpose than waiting for some favourable conjuncture; the more so that, as you know better than I, the king has plenty of means of doing harm. I can say no more at present, not being sufficiently conversant with the details. If the Pope’s fearlessness rests on any secure ground, take care to let me know it, that I may be relieved from this anxiety. For though I am not exactly faint-hearted, yet, from the confidence placed in me by the Pope, his affairs cause me more anxiety than my own. So long as I know of no better foundation for his security, I cannot possibly be easy. On the subject of my lord Lodovico and his nature, I have spoken my mind freely. I am conscious that I am walking uprightly, and have only the Pope’s interest in view. So I repeat what I have said often before: I think an honourable accommodation better than a successful war. If thatis impossible, he must temporise, provided the supposed possible favourable conditions do not exist. But if this should be the case, the king too would show himself more yielding, for he knows very well where he can be touched.’Lorenzo’s remonstrances were not entirely ineffectual. Innocent, who had been informed that the Neapolitan exiles, especially the Sanseverini, had been well received at the French court, and that the young king had promised to restore them to their homes, went cautiously to work at least with regard to foreign allies. Without making any engagements, he tried to keep on good terms with France and Spain. Remonstrances were also made on the part of France, through special ambassadors, to King Ferrante; but he never ceased defending at foreign courts what he called the justice of his cause, and calculating that the French had their hands full, he showed no disposition to yield. Letters from the Duke of Saxony, King Maximilian, and the Emperor, produced just as little effect.[516]The Duke of Calabria told the Florentine ambassador that his father would accede to reasonable demands from the Pope, but not to things that were against his honour. He would send the palfrey as a token of the feudal relation; but not one soldo of tribute would he pay, and not one guilty baron would he pardon.[517]So the matter dragged on. In May 1490, Florence was visited by a Neapolitan ambassador on his way to Milan, Messer Camillo Seruciati.[518]The king instructed him to inform the Signoria and Lorenzo that he had hitherto endured many wrongs and insults from the Pope. If, however, the latter persisted in his wrongful obstinacy and hostility and did not leave off his threats of citation and excommunication, his majesty was not minded to endure such offences any longer. Without wasting any more words, the kingmeant to appear in Rome, with lance in rest, and answer the Pope in such a way as to make him see his error. The Neapolitan ambassador, being refused admission to the Pope’s chapel on Whitsun-eve, threatened to make his way in by force. To avoid scandal it was arranged that none of the diplomatic body should appear on that day.[519]But the affair seems to have been rather more seriously taken into consideration by France than Ferrante expected. On June 8, the Pope said to Lanfredini’s successor[520]that if he were not peaceable by nature and a good Italian, he held in his hand the means of avenging himself on the king; for months ago Madame de Beaujeu had caused a proposal to be made to him for conferring Naples as a fief on the Duke of Lorraine, in exchange for which the latter should cede his claims to Provence and other territories to her husband, the Duke of Bourbon,[521]the King of France in return assisting him to obtain Naples. This proposal had recently been renewed; he, the Pope, had said but little in reply, in order not to draw down the French into Italy. He wished that Lorenzo should be informed of the matter.The situation was growing worse every day. There were already some hostile dealings on the frontiers. Papal couriers, carrying briefs that were never answered, were searched and roughly treated; people sent by the Pope to Benevento, and inhabitants of Pontecorvo going to Montecassino to perform their devotions, were seized.[522]Innocent complained that the indulgence he had shown towards the king on account of the representations of the other Italian powers had only made the former more insolent; and the powers stood and looked on while he was being insulted. If the Italians cared so little about his honour, he must turn to foreigners. Pandolfini adds that he had never seen thePope so excited. The ambassador did what he could to soothe him, representing to him that the moderation shown towards the king had benefited his cause, and that he could depend on the support of Florence, Milan, and Venice. The Pope cut him short. He was always put off with fine speeches. Real support was to be expected from Florence alone. On account of Sforza’s changeableness, Milan was not to be reckoned on; and Venice never proceeded to action. He was determined to make an end of it. He would excommunicate the king, declare him guilty of heresy, and lay the kingdom under interdict. He had a perfect right to do so. He would give notice of everything to the allied States. If the king, in pursuance of his threat, made war upon him, and no assistance was afforded him, he would go abroad, where he would be received with open arms and helped to get back his own again, to the shame and loss of others. He could not remain in Italy otherwise than with the dignity befitting a Pope; if they all left him in the lurch, resistance to the king was impossible, on account of the Church’s want of military power and the untrustworthiness of the barons, who would only rejoice at his embarrassment. He considered himself fully justified in going abroad if the honour of the Holy See could not be saved otherwise. Other popes had done it, and had come back with honour and glory.‘I saw,’ says Pandolfini, ‘that he had thoroughly considered the matter, and was not talking merely to get something out of me, as he could have no doubt of our attachment and fidelity. I pointed out to him that he should deliberate well, and not take a resolution which might bring discredit upon him, perhaps without serving his purpose. Foreign lands were full of strife, and the relations of Church and State were all very different from what they had been in the times of Innocent IV. and other popes, who had sought refuge beyond the mountains.’ But the Pope was not to be persuaded. He announced that he should summonthe ambassadors of all the powers, declare his resolve and the grounds which compelled him to it, and proceed against the king. The Neapolitan ambassador was sent away. The Pope said also to Pandolfini: ‘If I go with the court to France, of all the Italian powers you will get the most advantage thereby, not only for your trade, but because I shall have all possible regard to you, and shall consult over everything with Lorenzo. Tell him these my words.’It might have been thought that a conclusion was imminent. But after the lapse of a year matters were at exactly the same point. At the feast of SS. Peter and Paul, 1491, the king’s ambassador again presented the palfrey by way of tribute, was again sent away, and again protested.[523]Shortly after, the Florentine ambassador at Naples, Piero Nasi, had an interview with Giovanni Pontano, who was at that time Ferrante’s chief counsellor in political affairs, and had concluded the treaty with Rome in August 1486.[524]Pontano certainly must have felt that he was personally concerned, especially if, as is said, Innocent, having during his negotiations with him been warned of the king’s faithlessness, answered, ‘How can I be distrustful in dealing with a man who has never broken his word?’ ‘Ambassador,’ said Pontano to Nasi, ‘I most earnestly desire the termination of this strife, both for the sake of your Signoria and for my own sake. If the matter worries you in Florence, it worries me twice as much. Blame is laid on me which I do not deserve. What I promised in those days at Rome I had a right to promise; and it would have been kept; but no sooner was I away (would to God I had not gone in such a hurry!) than Cardinal della Rovere arrived from Genoa, and thereupon they re-arranged the conditions according to their pleasure. I certainly promised payment of the tribute, but the Pope himself gave me to understand that he would not insist upon it, and said: “I will come to an understandingwith the king on that point.” But Ascanio (Sforza) and the other cardinals laughed and said I might promise off-hand, nothing would be kept.’ Pontano then went on to the affair of the barons, whose misfortunes he attributed to their own want of head. The king, he said, had not thought of taking them prisoners, after he had made them harmless by occupying their strongholds, and taken into his own hands the administration of justice within their territories. But they themselves had compelled him to proceed against them. For after the Prince of Salerno had gone to Rome and deluded the Pope with many things, he drew the barons into the plot, all of which became known to the king. Notwithstanding, the latter gave them plenty of time to place themselves in safety; but they were determined to wait for the end, and so it went ill with them at the last. The very man from whom proceeded this apology for the king, afterwards himself accused Ferrante and Alfonso of cruelty and covetousness![525]Nasi thought the Pope cared far more about this affair than for the money question. King Alfonso had once paid 30,000 ducats to Pope Pius II. It was indeed maintained that this was not tribute-money; but yet such another sum would surely be granted. For the investiture to be extended to the Duke of Calabria they would be willing to pay 50,000. The Pope could then confirm the bull of Sixtus IV. and content himself during the rest of his pontificate with the gaily adorned palfrey. Lorenzo should carefully consider the matter.In the autumn of 1491 Pontano was sent to Rome to arrange a compromise. The hint that Naples was willing to pay seems to have had its effect. On reflection it is easy to see in what financial difficulties Innocent had placed himself. Lorenzo had to lend him money and redeem his pawned valuables; as Lanfredini had said, he was applying to all the sovereigns for tithes, and had made debts to the amount of300,000 ducats.[526]But further hindrances kept cropping up, chiefly through the double-dealing of Ferrante, whom no one dared trust even when he, perhaps, really did mean honestly. It was said both at Rome and at Florence that he was stirring up troubles for the Pope in the States of the Church, and confirming the inhabitants of Ascoli in their rebellion against the Holy See, for which purpose he kept a numerous body of troops on the Tronto.[527]Lorenzo never ceased advising a reconciliation. Many things were done by the soldiers, he wrote to Innocent, which it was not becoming a wise prince and thoughtful Pope to leave unhindered, and the peace of all Italy would be in danger if an end were not put to the quarrel.[528]In the middle of November the king expressed his sense of obligation to Lorenzo, who was showing himself a true friend and mediator in these differences. He hoped, he said, soon to arrive at a settlement.[529]In the beginning of December they did arrive at one; and two months later peace was announced in the Consistory.[530]In the investiture to be given to the Duke of Calabria, for which the sum before mentioned was to be paid, his son, the Prince of Capua, was included. The new treaty was to be the only one in force. To the barons released from prison the king promised to pay a certain sum yearly. ‘How much,’ adds the Ferrarese ambassador, ‘is not known; and it is supposed to have been agreed upon merely for the sake of the Pope’s honour. Whether it will be kept, the future will show.’ The future, and no very distant one, brought on the Neapolitan king far other troubles than those caused by his quarrel with the Pope. Scarcely was that quarrel ended, scarcely was the settlement effected for which Pontano went to Rome,[531]when the king exhausted himself in demonstrationsof gratitude and friendship towards the Pope, to whose blessing he attributed his own prosperity and that of all belonging to him, to whom he sent hippocras and twenty-four casks of choice Neapolitan wines, and with whom he formed a connection by betrothing his grandson, the Marquis of Gerace, to Battistina Usodimare, daughter of Teodorina Cybò.[532]Ferrante must have felt that the time was pressing for a reconciliation. French affairs gave him subjects for consideration. Charles VIII. had not only—thanks to his sister—overcome a dangerous opposition, but had reconciled the Duke of Orleans to himself and his house, and won Britanny, whose heiress gave him her hand on December 4, 1491. A double Papal dispensation was needed; for Charles was betrothed to Margaret of Austria, and Anne of Britanny already bore the title of Queen of the Romans as the bride of Margaret’s brother Maximilian; besides which the newly-married couple were near relations. Doubtless with a view to what was coming, a French embassy consisting of ten persons, headed by Jean de Villiers et La Groslaye, Bishop of Lombes and Abbot of St. Denis (afterwards highly influential at Rome), had been sent to Rome and received there on November 16. On December 3, a courier brought tidings of the marriage, which gave great offence, but for which the dispensations were given afterwards.[533]Another struggle with Maximilian was inevitable. But France was united and peaceful within, the last great fief was joined to the crown, and the work begun by Louis XI. was accomplished. Italy had reason to fear that the young king, whose ambition was greater than his intellectual capacity, would again take up claims which had never been really set at rest. In the very same year which closed with the agreement between Innocent and Ferrante the declaration of Charles VIII.’s rights to thecrown worn by the latter was formulated. Five years before, the Duke of Orleans had put forward the claims to Milan which he afterwards enforced as king.[534]If it was to the interest of France to stand well with the Pope, Ferrante had more than one motive for doing so. His daughter Beatrice, the widow of Matthias Corvinus, was threatened with dissolution of marriage by her second husband, the Polish Prince Ladislas, to whose elevation to the throne of Hungary she had greatly contributed; and it cost her father much trouble and anxiety to avert a decision which touched his own honour and that of his house. But the king, now growing old, was occupied with another family matter. The marriage of his granddaughter with the young Duke of Milan was the immediate, if not the principal, cause of a disagreement which sowed the seeds of ruin far beyond palaces and dynasties. The ambassador, whose arrival at Florence in the beginning of May 1490 has already been mentioned, was to go to Milan ‘to find out in what relation the lady duchess stood towards her most illustrious consort.’[535]The bad reports of Gian Galeazzo’s state of health proved unfounded, and Isabella soon after had hopes of becoming a mother. But matters remained unchanged. Gian Galeazzo at one and twenty was duke only in name. The government was still as it always had been, in the hands of his uncle, who had filled up all state-offices and military commands with confidants of his own. Connected with this last fact was the circumstance that in June 1488, Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, being apparently suspected by the Moro of taking Gian Galeazzo’s part, left the Milanese service and accepted acondottaoffered him by King Ferrante.[536]The case became worse when, in January 18, 1491, Lodovico married. His bride, Beatrice of Este, was a near relative of Isabella of Aragon, for her mother was the sister of Isabella’s father; but the relations between the two young wives soon became unbearable. Beatrice, the younger by five years, handsome, clever, ambitious, and proud, soon acquired great influence over her husband, now a man of forty; she went hand-in-hand with him in all his far-reaching plans, and induced him to yield to her desires with regard to outward position more than the cunning reserved man perhaps at first intended. She and Isabella soon came to open strife. The Duchess of Milan very naturally claimed the first place; the Duchess of Bari had no intention of contenting herself with the second. Lodovico’s authority made it easy for her to satisfy her passion for ruling. Isabella bore with growing impatience daily insults to herself and the unworthy position of her husband; of him too little is known to furnish grounds for a decided judgment of his character and capabilities. At last she appealed to her father, representing to him her position and begging for his intervention.[537]There had been no love lost between Alfonso and Lodovico ever since the Ferrara war. Although in the disputes between the Pope and the king, the Sforza had not furthered the views of France against Ferrante, still the Moro’s attitude had been questionable. If the Duke of Calabria had had his way, at the time when the treaty was concluded with the Pope, Italy would have been in flames; for his counsel was to cross the Tronto with an army and force Lodovico to lay down his usurped power. But the old king was afraid of a step which threatened to bring incalculable consequences; particularly as the Moro’s intimate relations with France—relationswhose first fruits were the complete abandonment in favour of Milan of the French claims to Genoa—and certain events in Florence which will be mentioned presently, gave him every motive for extreme caution. Instead of arms he tried negotiation. A Neapolitan embassy was sent to Milan,[538]but it had no answer but empty phrases. Lodovico replied that his nephew was Duke and enjoyed all the privileges of his rank. He himself had for years only borne the burthen of affairs, which he would lay down as soon as circumstances permitted. The only result of the application was that the good understanding between the house of Naples and the Sforza, already much endangered, notwithstanding the continued ostensible alliance, received a very severe shock. There was, indeed, no lack of friendly protestations on either side; and on February 8, 1492,[539]not long before the departure of the embassy above-mentioned, Ferrante wrote to his ambassador in Milan that he regarded the Duke of Bari as his own son (it is true the latter married his granddaughter) and his interests as his own, and congratulated him on his good understanding with France. Lodovico, to secure the maintenance of a power which he knew he was in danger of losing sooner or later, used all the means supplied by his versatile and inventive genius, and deluded himself with the increasing consciousness of his superiority over all other Italian rulers, only to involve himself irretrievably in the machinations which brought to ruin the edifice of Italian polity.
CHAPTER V.SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN INNOCENT VIII. AND FERRANTE OF NAPLES.Duringall this time the quarrel between the Pope and the king was assuming serious dimensions. One could hardly expect otherwise when the characters of the two men are taken into consideration. The one combined a full conception of lofty dignity with the consciousness of very little real power, was very excitable, wanting in perseverance, and continually going from one extreme to another; the other was slily calculating, practised in all the arts of unprincipled cunning, and disposed to undervalue his opponent when the tide seemed to have turned in his own favour. When the king thought he had rid himself of all enemies and suspicious persons in his own country, he did not hesitate to disregard the stipulations agreed upon in August 1486, and defy the Pope. The dispute went on through 1488 even to the proclamation of ecclesiastical censures. This was unpleasant to Lorenzo for many reasons: ‘I fear,’ he wrote to Lanfredini, September 3,[509]‘people will think it is meal out of my tub, though you know that the Pope has acted not only without me but against my advice. Not only is the king ready and inclined to attempt aggression, but the Pope is utterly unprepared; in fact, his affairs are in such disorder that a most disastrous war may arise out of this.’ Lorenzo’s son-in-law begged him to go to Rome in the autumn, but herefused, waiting to see whether the Pope and the king would come to terms. In the spring of 1489 the Spanish court made an effort at mediation through ambassadors in Rome. Ferrante’s object seemed to be to increase the Pope’s anger by personal attacks on him and his, so as to produce an immediate rupture. This conduct can be explained only on one of two suppositions: he either thought that he could treat his adversary as he chose without danger to himself, or he was determined to let things come to a pass which might, indeed, easily bring him to the gates of Rome, but might also just as easily call other nations to the rescue. All the misfortunes that befell Ferrante’s family and dynasty in 1495 were provoked by his self-will of six years before. It was no thanks to him nor to his son, who was worse than he, nor to the Pope, that they were not overtaken then by the misfortune of which both parties—the one in his ambitious, tyrannical stubbornness, the other in his inconsiderate weakness—seemed to have no foreboding. That it was avoided for a time was chiefly owing to Lorenzo de’ Medici, a fact the merit of which ought to cover many of his sins.After the fruitless Spanish attempt at mediation, and while Ferrante was doing all he could to stir up the King of the Romans against the Pope, the latter resolved to act. On June 27, 1489, Niccolò Orsini, Count of Pitigliano, arrived in Rome. A dispute between this excellent soldier and the Republic of Siena had, in the previous April, resulted in his dismissal from the Florentine service; whereupon the Pope offered him the post of Captain-General of the Church. As the astrologers pronounced the constellations favourable, on the very day of the count’s arrival the Pope presented him with his insignia of office, tunic, hat, sword, and commander’s staff, and blessed the two standards, while Orsini knelt before him. On the following Sunday the new captain-general made his triumphal entry into Rome from Monte Mario. He was then forty-eight years of age, but can be best imagined as he is represented on his monument in SS. Giovannie Paolo at Venice, erected twenty years later, when he had fallen a victim to his exertions during the war of the League of Cambrai. He appears there as a fine-looking stately horseman with waving plume and rich scarf; his head is slightly bent as if in thought, and turned towards the right; he holds in his hand the commander’s staff, and stands between allegorical statues of Prudence and Faith. On the 30th, after high mass, the citation of the King of Naples took place. He was allowed three months’ grace to fulfil his duty as a vassal; that he would submit was not to be expected. The most zealous preparations were made for the war which seemed inevitable. Cardinal Sforza, on behalf of Lodovico, and Lanfredini, who was ill, sought to restrain the Pope from taking an extreme step. On the part of the Florentines, at least, this mediation was honestly meant.Lorenzo went in July to the baths, whence, according to the new Ferrarese ambassador Manfredo Manfredi,[510]he came back refreshed and well on August 6. Scarcely was he home when he set to work at the Roman affair. ‘As to the deliberations yonder,’ he wrote on the 8th to Lanfredini,[511]‘I am of opinion that in considering my Lord Lodovico’s proposals you must always keep in view that he can be a turncoat on occasion and may very likely have private aims, as the quarrel between the Pope and the king may be very convenient to him in many respects. Considering his nature, therefore, we must not rely on him too much, but must follow his example in profiting by his proceedings when they answer our purposes, but keeping the upper hand if he takes it into his head to change. First of all I wish the Holy Father to let the Venetians know that both Lord Lodovico and ourselves have induced him to conceal from the Republic nothing that concerns his relations with the king. This I say because in any case it seems to me important that thePope should at least keep the Venetians in their present mind until we all see our way clearer. There is no real trust to be placed in those people, but their authority is useful; and it is quite possible to keep on tolerable terms with them without causing my Lord Lodovico to take fright. But above all I wish to be assured whether the Pope is determined to abide by the conditions already settled, or whether he thinks of agreeing to some modifications. As to the tribute-money, I think a compromise possible; as for the barons, I see no means, as the king has gone too far to be able to draw back. With regard to spiritual matters an arrangement will be easy, for the king will hardly raise difficulties where he has only to give promises. When it comes to keeping them they must just wink at each other, as all popes and all kings have done. The point therefore is to know exactly what we have to abide by before taking a decision which, according to my view, must depend on what the Pope really intends; and his will cannot be forced, particularly if peace is established in France. Endeavour therefore to give me sure information if possible. In any case it is my fixed opinion that the Pope’s honour must be kept unstained, if my Lord Lodovico agrees with me, who, however, as before said, is not much to be trusted. A good understanding must be maintained with the Venetians, for the sake of having something to fall back upon. I think you must decline with thanks his Holiness’ proposal to confide the negotiations in question to me. It would be a distinction for me, but would scarcely answer his Holiness’ purposes. I, however, prefer his Holiness’ advantage to that which would be an honour to me personally. In any future agreement with the king, the conditions of the last peace will have to be modified in some particulars, and stronger shoulders than mine will be needed to bear that burthen. I shall consider myself honoured enough if the interests of his Holiness are secured with honour.’ Lorenzo’s unwillingness to take part in negotiations between the Popeand Venice was partly founded on the knowledge that the latter power was anything but well-disposed towards him. Two years after this his friend Guidoni, the Ferrarese ambassador, who had exchanged his post at Florence for the more difficult one in the city of the lagoons, wrote to him: ‘The Venetians detest your name more than Satan does the Cross.’As Ferrante showed no sign of returning from his ways, Innocent continued to proceed against him. On September 11, 1489, in presence of the Neapolitan ambassador Antonio d’Alessandri, the kingdom of Naples was solemnly declared to have lapsed to the Holy See through non-fulfilment of homage.[512]The ambassador protested and appealed to the Council. The next day he appeared in the Sixtine Chapel with the other ambassadors, to celebrate the anniversary of the Pope’s coronation, just as if nothing had happened. But he was startled on the 13th, when a French envoy, Guillaume de Poitiers, of the family of the Counts of St. Vallier, arrived with great pomp at the Vatican.[513]For a long time past the Pope had been negotiating with France, and the French showed their desire for a good understanding with Rome by delivering up the Turkish Prince Dschem to Innocent at the end of the winter. It was already suspected that as soon as affairs were settled in Brittany, where resistance was already broken, whose last duke was dead, and where union with the crown was in progress, the French king, now nineteen, would turn his eyes towards Italy. Rome, conscious of her own weakness, reckoned on foreign aid, thinking she had two strings to her bow—France and Spain—both of whom were supposed to be displeased with Ferrante. But the prospect of war in Italy and interference from abroad, no matter whence it came or what the resultmight be, was highly displeasing to Lorenzo, and he renewed his efforts to change the mind of the Pope.‘From your despatch of October 13,’ thus he begins a letter to Lanfredini four days later,[514]‘I perceive that his Holiness has taken some little offence at my remonstrances against proceeding with the citations. Any offence to the Holy Father grieves me; but it would grieve me very much if he thought my counsel and actions were determined by anything but zeal for his good. I repeat, the Pope must make up his mind about three things. Either he must get justice from the king by force; or he must make as good terms as he can with him; or, lastly, if this cannot be done with honour, he must temporise and wait for more favourable circumstances. The first would be the most honourable plan; but I consider it dangerous and expensive, and think it cannot be executed without calling in a foreign power to Naples. Thereto three things are needful: first, the consent of Venice and Milan; secondly, sufficient independent means, both in men and money, on the part of the said power; and thirdly, very great expenditure on the part of the Pope. For the point is to over-match the king, whom Milan may perhaps assist should Venice declare against him; so that Milan, too, must be kept in check. An understanding with the barons and those of similar rank would be useful in such a case. Now I may be mistaken, but I cannot see the possibility of realising all these presuppositions, and therefore I have dissuaded his Holiness. Of the foreign powers only Spain and France can be taken into consideration. Spain seems to me at this moment incapable of either acting or paying,[515]and how France is to be relied upon I do not see. Supposing, however, that she changed her nature, I would agree with his Holiness, provided that in an expedition against Naples the person to be benefited should be the Duke of Lorraine (as heir of Anjou), which would be the least dangerous thing; for the Duke ofLorraine is not King of France, and his relationship to the royal house is of no great importance. Naples and Spain are much nearer relatives, and yet not friends; and when a man is once King of Naples he will go his own way.‘All these reasons, it seems to me, ought to dissuade the Pope from any undertaking of the kind. In such circumstances it is of no use exasperating the king by citations and suchlike. Nay, even if one was armed and ready, I should still think it advisable to let such challenges alone, in order to avoid the danger of the king’s proceeding from words to deeds—a danger not to be under-rated. Better arm in silence than excite others to the attack by expressing hostility. As for the second case, that of an accommodation, I am perhaps, speaking without an exact knowledge of the state of affairs; and possibly conditions are being fixed in consequence of which the citation may be an useful measure. But from what I know, I believe that such a proceeding, instead of facilitating an accommodation, only serves to irritate, and will lead to a rupture. As for temporising, I will say nothing, because an immediate agreement on the most honourable terms possible seems to me far more to the purpose than waiting for some favourable conjuncture; the more so that, as you know better than I, the king has plenty of means of doing harm. I can say no more at present, not being sufficiently conversant with the details. If the Pope’s fearlessness rests on any secure ground, take care to let me know it, that I may be relieved from this anxiety. For though I am not exactly faint-hearted, yet, from the confidence placed in me by the Pope, his affairs cause me more anxiety than my own. So long as I know of no better foundation for his security, I cannot possibly be easy. On the subject of my lord Lodovico and his nature, I have spoken my mind freely. I am conscious that I am walking uprightly, and have only the Pope’s interest in view. So I repeat what I have said often before: I think an honourable accommodation better than a successful war. If thatis impossible, he must temporise, provided the supposed possible favourable conditions do not exist. But if this should be the case, the king too would show himself more yielding, for he knows very well where he can be touched.’Lorenzo’s remonstrances were not entirely ineffectual. Innocent, who had been informed that the Neapolitan exiles, especially the Sanseverini, had been well received at the French court, and that the young king had promised to restore them to their homes, went cautiously to work at least with regard to foreign allies. Without making any engagements, he tried to keep on good terms with France and Spain. Remonstrances were also made on the part of France, through special ambassadors, to King Ferrante; but he never ceased defending at foreign courts what he called the justice of his cause, and calculating that the French had their hands full, he showed no disposition to yield. Letters from the Duke of Saxony, King Maximilian, and the Emperor, produced just as little effect.[516]The Duke of Calabria told the Florentine ambassador that his father would accede to reasonable demands from the Pope, but not to things that were against his honour. He would send the palfrey as a token of the feudal relation; but not one soldo of tribute would he pay, and not one guilty baron would he pardon.[517]So the matter dragged on. In May 1490, Florence was visited by a Neapolitan ambassador on his way to Milan, Messer Camillo Seruciati.[518]The king instructed him to inform the Signoria and Lorenzo that he had hitherto endured many wrongs and insults from the Pope. If, however, the latter persisted in his wrongful obstinacy and hostility and did not leave off his threats of citation and excommunication, his majesty was not minded to endure such offences any longer. Without wasting any more words, the kingmeant to appear in Rome, with lance in rest, and answer the Pope in such a way as to make him see his error. The Neapolitan ambassador, being refused admission to the Pope’s chapel on Whitsun-eve, threatened to make his way in by force. To avoid scandal it was arranged that none of the diplomatic body should appear on that day.[519]But the affair seems to have been rather more seriously taken into consideration by France than Ferrante expected. On June 8, the Pope said to Lanfredini’s successor[520]that if he were not peaceable by nature and a good Italian, he held in his hand the means of avenging himself on the king; for months ago Madame de Beaujeu had caused a proposal to be made to him for conferring Naples as a fief on the Duke of Lorraine, in exchange for which the latter should cede his claims to Provence and other territories to her husband, the Duke of Bourbon,[521]the King of France in return assisting him to obtain Naples. This proposal had recently been renewed; he, the Pope, had said but little in reply, in order not to draw down the French into Italy. He wished that Lorenzo should be informed of the matter.The situation was growing worse every day. There were already some hostile dealings on the frontiers. Papal couriers, carrying briefs that were never answered, were searched and roughly treated; people sent by the Pope to Benevento, and inhabitants of Pontecorvo going to Montecassino to perform their devotions, were seized.[522]Innocent complained that the indulgence he had shown towards the king on account of the representations of the other Italian powers had only made the former more insolent; and the powers stood and looked on while he was being insulted. If the Italians cared so little about his honour, he must turn to foreigners. Pandolfini adds that he had never seen thePope so excited. The ambassador did what he could to soothe him, representing to him that the moderation shown towards the king had benefited his cause, and that he could depend on the support of Florence, Milan, and Venice. The Pope cut him short. He was always put off with fine speeches. Real support was to be expected from Florence alone. On account of Sforza’s changeableness, Milan was not to be reckoned on; and Venice never proceeded to action. He was determined to make an end of it. He would excommunicate the king, declare him guilty of heresy, and lay the kingdom under interdict. He had a perfect right to do so. He would give notice of everything to the allied States. If the king, in pursuance of his threat, made war upon him, and no assistance was afforded him, he would go abroad, where he would be received with open arms and helped to get back his own again, to the shame and loss of others. He could not remain in Italy otherwise than with the dignity befitting a Pope; if they all left him in the lurch, resistance to the king was impossible, on account of the Church’s want of military power and the untrustworthiness of the barons, who would only rejoice at his embarrassment. He considered himself fully justified in going abroad if the honour of the Holy See could not be saved otherwise. Other popes had done it, and had come back with honour and glory.‘I saw,’ says Pandolfini, ‘that he had thoroughly considered the matter, and was not talking merely to get something out of me, as he could have no doubt of our attachment and fidelity. I pointed out to him that he should deliberate well, and not take a resolution which might bring discredit upon him, perhaps without serving his purpose. Foreign lands were full of strife, and the relations of Church and State were all very different from what they had been in the times of Innocent IV. and other popes, who had sought refuge beyond the mountains.’ But the Pope was not to be persuaded. He announced that he should summonthe ambassadors of all the powers, declare his resolve and the grounds which compelled him to it, and proceed against the king. The Neapolitan ambassador was sent away. The Pope said also to Pandolfini: ‘If I go with the court to France, of all the Italian powers you will get the most advantage thereby, not only for your trade, but because I shall have all possible regard to you, and shall consult over everything with Lorenzo. Tell him these my words.’It might have been thought that a conclusion was imminent. But after the lapse of a year matters were at exactly the same point. At the feast of SS. Peter and Paul, 1491, the king’s ambassador again presented the palfrey by way of tribute, was again sent away, and again protested.[523]Shortly after, the Florentine ambassador at Naples, Piero Nasi, had an interview with Giovanni Pontano, who was at that time Ferrante’s chief counsellor in political affairs, and had concluded the treaty with Rome in August 1486.[524]Pontano certainly must have felt that he was personally concerned, especially if, as is said, Innocent, having during his negotiations with him been warned of the king’s faithlessness, answered, ‘How can I be distrustful in dealing with a man who has never broken his word?’ ‘Ambassador,’ said Pontano to Nasi, ‘I most earnestly desire the termination of this strife, both for the sake of your Signoria and for my own sake. If the matter worries you in Florence, it worries me twice as much. Blame is laid on me which I do not deserve. What I promised in those days at Rome I had a right to promise; and it would have been kept; but no sooner was I away (would to God I had not gone in such a hurry!) than Cardinal della Rovere arrived from Genoa, and thereupon they re-arranged the conditions according to their pleasure. I certainly promised payment of the tribute, but the Pope himself gave me to understand that he would not insist upon it, and said: “I will come to an understandingwith the king on that point.” But Ascanio (Sforza) and the other cardinals laughed and said I might promise off-hand, nothing would be kept.’ Pontano then went on to the affair of the barons, whose misfortunes he attributed to their own want of head. The king, he said, had not thought of taking them prisoners, after he had made them harmless by occupying their strongholds, and taken into his own hands the administration of justice within their territories. But they themselves had compelled him to proceed against them. For after the Prince of Salerno had gone to Rome and deluded the Pope with many things, he drew the barons into the plot, all of which became known to the king. Notwithstanding, the latter gave them plenty of time to place themselves in safety; but they were determined to wait for the end, and so it went ill with them at the last. The very man from whom proceeded this apology for the king, afterwards himself accused Ferrante and Alfonso of cruelty and covetousness![525]Nasi thought the Pope cared far more about this affair than for the money question. King Alfonso had once paid 30,000 ducats to Pope Pius II. It was indeed maintained that this was not tribute-money; but yet such another sum would surely be granted. For the investiture to be extended to the Duke of Calabria they would be willing to pay 50,000. The Pope could then confirm the bull of Sixtus IV. and content himself during the rest of his pontificate with the gaily adorned palfrey. Lorenzo should carefully consider the matter.In the autumn of 1491 Pontano was sent to Rome to arrange a compromise. The hint that Naples was willing to pay seems to have had its effect. On reflection it is easy to see in what financial difficulties Innocent had placed himself. Lorenzo had to lend him money and redeem his pawned valuables; as Lanfredini had said, he was applying to all the sovereigns for tithes, and had made debts to the amount of300,000 ducats.[526]But further hindrances kept cropping up, chiefly through the double-dealing of Ferrante, whom no one dared trust even when he, perhaps, really did mean honestly. It was said both at Rome and at Florence that he was stirring up troubles for the Pope in the States of the Church, and confirming the inhabitants of Ascoli in their rebellion against the Holy See, for which purpose he kept a numerous body of troops on the Tronto.[527]Lorenzo never ceased advising a reconciliation. Many things were done by the soldiers, he wrote to Innocent, which it was not becoming a wise prince and thoughtful Pope to leave unhindered, and the peace of all Italy would be in danger if an end were not put to the quarrel.[528]In the middle of November the king expressed his sense of obligation to Lorenzo, who was showing himself a true friend and mediator in these differences. He hoped, he said, soon to arrive at a settlement.[529]In the beginning of December they did arrive at one; and two months later peace was announced in the Consistory.[530]In the investiture to be given to the Duke of Calabria, for which the sum before mentioned was to be paid, his son, the Prince of Capua, was included. The new treaty was to be the only one in force. To the barons released from prison the king promised to pay a certain sum yearly. ‘How much,’ adds the Ferrarese ambassador, ‘is not known; and it is supposed to have been agreed upon merely for the sake of the Pope’s honour. Whether it will be kept, the future will show.’ The future, and no very distant one, brought on the Neapolitan king far other troubles than those caused by his quarrel with the Pope. Scarcely was that quarrel ended, scarcely was the settlement effected for which Pontano went to Rome,[531]when the king exhausted himself in demonstrationsof gratitude and friendship towards the Pope, to whose blessing he attributed his own prosperity and that of all belonging to him, to whom he sent hippocras and twenty-four casks of choice Neapolitan wines, and with whom he formed a connection by betrothing his grandson, the Marquis of Gerace, to Battistina Usodimare, daughter of Teodorina Cybò.[532]Ferrante must have felt that the time was pressing for a reconciliation. French affairs gave him subjects for consideration. Charles VIII. had not only—thanks to his sister—overcome a dangerous opposition, but had reconciled the Duke of Orleans to himself and his house, and won Britanny, whose heiress gave him her hand on December 4, 1491. A double Papal dispensation was needed; for Charles was betrothed to Margaret of Austria, and Anne of Britanny already bore the title of Queen of the Romans as the bride of Margaret’s brother Maximilian; besides which the newly-married couple were near relations. Doubtless with a view to what was coming, a French embassy consisting of ten persons, headed by Jean de Villiers et La Groslaye, Bishop of Lombes and Abbot of St. Denis (afterwards highly influential at Rome), had been sent to Rome and received there on November 16. On December 3, a courier brought tidings of the marriage, which gave great offence, but for which the dispensations were given afterwards.[533]Another struggle with Maximilian was inevitable. But France was united and peaceful within, the last great fief was joined to the crown, and the work begun by Louis XI. was accomplished. Italy had reason to fear that the young king, whose ambition was greater than his intellectual capacity, would again take up claims which had never been really set at rest. In the very same year which closed with the agreement between Innocent and Ferrante the declaration of Charles VIII.’s rights to thecrown worn by the latter was formulated. Five years before, the Duke of Orleans had put forward the claims to Milan which he afterwards enforced as king.[534]If it was to the interest of France to stand well with the Pope, Ferrante had more than one motive for doing so. His daughter Beatrice, the widow of Matthias Corvinus, was threatened with dissolution of marriage by her second husband, the Polish Prince Ladislas, to whose elevation to the throne of Hungary she had greatly contributed; and it cost her father much trouble and anxiety to avert a decision which touched his own honour and that of his house. But the king, now growing old, was occupied with another family matter. The marriage of his granddaughter with the young Duke of Milan was the immediate, if not the principal, cause of a disagreement which sowed the seeds of ruin far beyond palaces and dynasties. The ambassador, whose arrival at Florence in the beginning of May 1490 has already been mentioned, was to go to Milan ‘to find out in what relation the lady duchess stood towards her most illustrious consort.’[535]The bad reports of Gian Galeazzo’s state of health proved unfounded, and Isabella soon after had hopes of becoming a mother. But matters remained unchanged. Gian Galeazzo at one and twenty was duke only in name. The government was still as it always had been, in the hands of his uncle, who had filled up all state-offices and military commands with confidants of his own. Connected with this last fact was the circumstance that in June 1488, Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, being apparently suspected by the Moro of taking Gian Galeazzo’s part, left the Milanese service and accepted acondottaoffered him by King Ferrante.[536]The case became worse when, in January 18, 1491, Lodovico married. His bride, Beatrice of Este, was a near relative of Isabella of Aragon, for her mother was the sister of Isabella’s father; but the relations between the two young wives soon became unbearable. Beatrice, the younger by five years, handsome, clever, ambitious, and proud, soon acquired great influence over her husband, now a man of forty; she went hand-in-hand with him in all his far-reaching plans, and induced him to yield to her desires with regard to outward position more than the cunning reserved man perhaps at first intended. She and Isabella soon came to open strife. The Duchess of Milan very naturally claimed the first place; the Duchess of Bari had no intention of contenting herself with the second. Lodovico’s authority made it easy for her to satisfy her passion for ruling. Isabella bore with growing impatience daily insults to herself and the unworthy position of her husband; of him too little is known to furnish grounds for a decided judgment of his character and capabilities. At last she appealed to her father, representing to him her position and begging for his intervention.[537]There had been no love lost between Alfonso and Lodovico ever since the Ferrara war. Although in the disputes between the Pope and the king, the Sforza had not furthered the views of France against Ferrante, still the Moro’s attitude had been questionable. If the Duke of Calabria had had his way, at the time when the treaty was concluded with the Pope, Italy would have been in flames; for his counsel was to cross the Tronto with an army and force Lodovico to lay down his usurped power. But the old king was afraid of a step which threatened to bring incalculable consequences; particularly as the Moro’s intimate relations with France—relationswhose first fruits were the complete abandonment in favour of Milan of the French claims to Genoa—and certain events in Florence which will be mentioned presently, gave him every motive for extreme caution. Instead of arms he tried negotiation. A Neapolitan embassy was sent to Milan,[538]but it had no answer but empty phrases. Lodovico replied that his nephew was Duke and enjoyed all the privileges of his rank. He himself had for years only borne the burthen of affairs, which he would lay down as soon as circumstances permitted. The only result of the application was that the good understanding between the house of Naples and the Sforza, already much endangered, notwithstanding the continued ostensible alliance, received a very severe shock. There was, indeed, no lack of friendly protestations on either side; and on February 8, 1492,[539]not long before the departure of the embassy above-mentioned, Ferrante wrote to his ambassador in Milan that he regarded the Duke of Bari as his own son (it is true the latter married his granddaughter) and his interests as his own, and congratulated him on his good understanding with France. Lodovico, to secure the maintenance of a power which he knew he was in danger of losing sooner or later, used all the means supplied by his versatile and inventive genius, and deluded himself with the increasing consciousness of his superiority over all other Italian rulers, only to involve himself irretrievably in the machinations which brought to ruin the edifice of Italian polity.
SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN INNOCENT VIII. AND FERRANTE OF NAPLES.
Duringall this time the quarrel between the Pope and the king was assuming serious dimensions. One could hardly expect otherwise when the characters of the two men are taken into consideration. The one combined a full conception of lofty dignity with the consciousness of very little real power, was very excitable, wanting in perseverance, and continually going from one extreme to another; the other was slily calculating, practised in all the arts of unprincipled cunning, and disposed to undervalue his opponent when the tide seemed to have turned in his own favour. When the king thought he had rid himself of all enemies and suspicious persons in his own country, he did not hesitate to disregard the stipulations agreed upon in August 1486, and defy the Pope. The dispute went on through 1488 even to the proclamation of ecclesiastical censures. This was unpleasant to Lorenzo for many reasons: ‘I fear,’ he wrote to Lanfredini, September 3,[509]‘people will think it is meal out of my tub, though you know that the Pope has acted not only without me but against my advice. Not only is the king ready and inclined to attempt aggression, but the Pope is utterly unprepared; in fact, his affairs are in such disorder that a most disastrous war may arise out of this.’ Lorenzo’s son-in-law begged him to go to Rome in the autumn, but herefused, waiting to see whether the Pope and the king would come to terms. In the spring of 1489 the Spanish court made an effort at mediation through ambassadors in Rome. Ferrante’s object seemed to be to increase the Pope’s anger by personal attacks on him and his, so as to produce an immediate rupture. This conduct can be explained only on one of two suppositions: he either thought that he could treat his adversary as he chose without danger to himself, or he was determined to let things come to a pass which might, indeed, easily bring him to the gates of Rome, but might also just as easily call other nations to the rescue. All the misfortunes that befell Ferrante’s family and dynasty in 1495 were provoked by his self-will of six years before. It was no thanks to him nor to his son, who was worse than he, nor to the Pope, that they were not overtaken then by the misfortune of which both parties—the one in his ambitious, tyrannical stubbornness, the other in his inconsiderate weakness—seemed to have no foreboding. That it was avoided for a time was chiefly owing to Lorenzo de’ Medici, a fact the merit of which ought to cover many of his sins.
After the fruitless Spanish attempt at mediation, and while Ferrante was doing all he could to stir up the King of the Romans against the Pope, the latter resolved to act. On June 27, 1489, Niccolò Orsini, Count of Pitigliano, arrived in Rome. A dispute between this excellent soldier and the Republic of Siena had, in the previous April, resulted in his dismissal from the Florentine service; whereupon the Pope offered him the post of Captain-General of the Church. As the astrologers pronounced the constellations favourable, on the very day of the count’s arrival the Pope presented him with his insignia of office, tunic, hat, sword, and commander’s staff, and blessed the two standards, while Orsini knelt before him. On the following Sunday the new captain-general made his triumphal entry into Rome from Monte Mario. He was then forty-eight years of age, but can be best imagined as he is represented on his monument in SS. Giovannie Paolo at Venice, erected twenty years later, when he had fallen a victim to his exertions during the war of the League of Cambrai. He appears there as a fine-looking stately horseman with waving plume and rich scarf; his head is slightly bent as if in thought, and turned towards the right; he holds in his hand the commander’s staff, and stands between allegorical statues of Prudence and Faith. On the 30th, after high mass, the citation of the King of Naples took place. He was allowed three months’ grace to fulfil his duty as a vassal; that he would submit was not to be expected. The most zealous preparations were made for the war which seemed inevitable. Cardinal Sforza, on behalf of Lodovico, and Lanfredini, who was ill, sought to restrain the Pope from taking an extreme step. On the part of the Florentines, at least, this mediation was honestly meant.
Lorenzo went in July to the baths, whence, according to the new Ferrarese ambassador Manfredo Manfredi,[510]he came back refreshed and well on August 6. Scarcely was he home when he set to work at the Roman affair. ‘As to the deliberations yonder,’ he wrote on the 8th to Lanfredini,[511]‘I am of opinion that in considering my Lord Lodovico’s proposals you must always keep in view that he can be a turncoat on occasion and may very likely have private aims, as the quarrel between the Pope and the king may be very convenient to him in many respects. Considering his nature, therefore, we must not rely on him too much, but must follow his example in profiting by his proceedings when they answer our purposes, but keeping the upper hand if he takes it into his head to change. First of all I wish the Holy Father to let the Venetians know that both Lord Lodovico and ourselves have induced him to conceal from the Republic nothing that concerns his relations with the king. This I say because in any case it seems to me important that thePope should at least keep the Venetians in their present mind until we all see our way clearer. There is no real trust to be placed in those people, but their authority is useful; and it is quite possible to keep on tolerable terms with them without causing my Lord Lodovico to take fright. But above all I wish to be assured whether the Pope is determined to abide by the conditions already settled, or whether he thinks of agreeing to some modifications. As to the tribute-money, I think a compromise possible; as for the barons, I see no means, as the king has gone too far to be able to draw back. With regard to spiritual matters an arrangement will be easy, for the king will hardly raise difficulties where he has only to give promises. When it comes to keeping them they must just wink at each other, as all popes and all kings have done. The point therefore is to know exactly what we have to abide by before taking a decision which, according to my view, must depend on what the Pope really intends; and his will cannot be forced, particularly if peace is established in France. Endeavour therefore to give me sure information if possible. In any case it is my fixed opinion that the Pope’s honour must be kept unstained, if my Lord Lodovico agrees with me, who, however, as before said, is not much to be trusted. A good understanding must be maintained with the Venetians, for the sake of having something to fall back upon. I think you must decline with thanks his Holiness’ proposal to confide the negotiations in question to me. It would be a distinction for me, but would scarcely answer his Holiness’ purposes. I, however, prefer his Holiness’ advantage to that which would be an honour to me personally. In any future agreement with the king, the conditions of the last peace will have to be modified in some particulars, and stronger shoulders than mine will be needed to bear that burthen. I shall consider myself honoured enough if the interests of his Holiness are secured with honour.’ Lorenzo’s unwillingness to take part in negotiations between the Popeand Venice was partly founded on the knowledge that the latter power was anything but well-disposed towards him. Two years after this his friend Guidoni, the Ferrarese ambassador, who had exchanged his post at Florence for the more difficult one in the city of the lagoons, wrote to him: ‘The Venetians detest your name more than Satan does the Cross.’
As Ferrante showed no sign of returning from his ways, Innocent continued to proceed against him. On September 11, 1489, in presence of the Neapolitan ambassador Antonio d’Alessandri, the kingdom of Naples was solemnly declared to have lapsed to the Holy See through non-fulfilment of homage.[512]The ambassador protested and appealed to the Council. The next day he appeared in the Sixtine Chapel with the other ambassadors, to celebrate the anniversary of the Pope’s coronation, just as if nothing had happened. But he was startled on the 13th, when a French envoy, Guillaume de Poitiers, of the family of the Counts of St. Vallier, arrived with great pomp at the Vatican.[513]For a long time past the Pope had been negotiating with France, and the French showed their desire for a good understanding with Rome by delivering up the Turkish Prince Dschem to Innocent at the end of the winter. It was already suspected that as soon as affairs were settled in Brittany, where resistance was already broken, whose last duke was dead, and where union with the crown was in progress, the French king, now nineteen, would turn his eyes towards Italy. Rome, conscious of her own weakness, reckoned on foreign aid, thinking she had two strings to her bow—France and Spain—both of whom were supposed to be displeased with Ferrante. But the prospect of war in Italy and interference from abroad, no matter whence it came or what the resultmight be, was highly displeasing to Lorenzo, and he renewed his efforts to change the mind of the Pope.
‘From your despatch of October 13,’ thus he begins a letter to Lanfredini four days later,[514]‘I perceive that his Holiness has taken some little offence at my remonstrances against proceeding with the citations. Any offence to the Holy Father grieves me; but it would grieve me very much if he thought my counsel and actions were determined by anything but zeal for his good. I repeat, the Pope must make up his mind about three things. Either he must get justice from the king by force; or he must make as good terms as he can with him; or, lastly, if this cannot be done with honour, he must temporise and wait for more favourable circumstances. The first would be the most honourable plan; but I consider it dangerous and expensive, and think it cannot be executed without calling in a foreign power to Naples. Thereto three things are needful: first, the consent of Venice and Milan; secondly, sufficient independent means, both in men and money, on the part of the said power; and thirdly, very great expenditure on the part of the Pope. For the point is to over-match the king, whom Milan may perhaps assist should Venice declare against him; so that Milan, too, must be kept in check. An understanding with the barons and those of similar rank would be useful in such a case. Now I may be mistaken, but I cannot see the possibility of realising all these presuppositions, and therefore I have dissuaded his Holiness. Of the foreign powers only Spain and France can be taken into consideration. Spain seems to me at this moment incapable of either acting or paying,[515]and how France is to be relied upon I do not see. Supposing, however, that she changed her nature, I would agree with his Holiness, provided that in an expedition against Naples the person to be benefited should be the Duke of Lorraine (as heir of Anjou), which would be the least dangerous thing; for the Duke ofLorraine is not King of France, and his relationship to the royal house is of no great importance. Naples and Spain are much nearer relatives, and yet not friends; and when a man is once King of Naples he will go his own way.
‘All these reasons, it seems to me, ought to dissuade the Pope from any undertaking of the kind. In such circumstances it is of no use exasperating the king by citations and suchlike. Nay, even if one was armed and ready, I should still think it advisable to let such challenges alone, in order to avoid the danger of the king’s proceeding from words to deeds—a danger not to be under-rated. Better arm in silence than excite others to the attack by expressing hostility. As for the second case, that of an accommodation, I am perhaps, speaking without an exact knowledge of the state of affairs; and possibly conditions are being fixed in consequence of which the citation may be an useful measure. But from what I know, I believe that such a proceeding, instead of facilitating an accommodation, only serves to irritate, and will lead to a rupture. As for temporising, I will say nothing, because an immediate agreement on the most honourable terms possible seems to me far more to the purpose than waiting for some favourable conjuncture; the more so that, as you know better than I, the king has plenty of means of doing harm. I can say no more at present, not being sufficiently conversant with the details. If the Pope’s fearlessness rests on any secure ground, take care to let me know it, that I may be relieved from this anxiety. For though I am not exactly faint-hearted, yet, from the confidence placed in me by the Pope, his affairs cause me more anxiety than my own. So long as I know of no better foundation for his security, I cannot possibly be easy. On the subject of my lord Lodovico and his nature, I have spoken my mind freely. I am conscious that I am walking uprightly, and have only the Pope’s interest in view. So I repeat what I have said often before: I think an honourable accommodation better than a successful war. If thatis impossible, he must temporise, provided the supposed possible favourable conditions do not exist. But if this should be the case, the king too would show himself more yielding, for he knows very well where he can be touched.’
Lorenzo’s remonstrances were not entirely ineffectual. Innocent, who had been informed that the Neapolitan exiles, especially the Sanseverini, had been well received at the French court, and that the young king had promised to restore them to their homes, went cautiously to work at least with regard to foreign allies. Without making any engagements, he tried to keep on good terms with France and Spain. Remonstrances were also made on the part of France, through special ambassadors, to King Ferrante; but he never ceased defending at foreign courts what he called the justice of his cause, and calculating that the French had their hands full, he showed no disposition to yield. Letters from the Duke of Saxony, King Maximilian, and the Emperor, produced just as little effect.[516]The Duke of Calabria told the Florentine ambassador that his father would accede to reasonable demands from the Pope, but not to things that were against his honour. He would send the palfrey as a token of the feudal relation; but not one soldo of tribute would he pay, and not one guilty baron would he pardon.[517]So the matter dragged on. In May 1490, Florence was visited by a Neapolitan ambassador on his way to Milan, Messer Camillo Seruciati.[518]The king instructed him to inform the Signoria and Lorenzo that he had hitherto endured many wrongs and insults from the Pope. If, however, the latter persisted in his wrongful obstinacy and hostility and did not leave off his threats of citation and excommunication, his majesty was not minded to endure such offences any longer. Without wasting any more words, the kingmeant to appear in Rome, with lance in rest, and answer the Pope in such a way as to make him see his error. The Neapolitan ambassador, being refused admission to the Pope’s chapel on Whitsun-eve, threatened to make his way in by force. To avoid scandal it was arranged that none of the diplomatic body should appear on that day.[519]But the affair seems to have been rather more seriously taken into consideration by France than Ferrante expected. On June 8, the Pope said to Lanfredini’s successor[520]that if he were not peaceable by nature and a good Italian, he held in his hand the means of avenging himself on the king; for months ago Madame de Beaujeu had caused a proposal to be made to him for conferring Naples as a fief on the Duke of Lorraine, in exchange for which the latter should cede his claims to Provence and other territories to her husband, the Duke of Bourbon,[521]the King of France in return assisting him to obtain Naples. This proposal had recently been renewed; he, the Pope, had said but little in reply, in order not to draw down the French into Italy. He wished that Lorenzo should be informed of the matter.
The situation was growing worse every day. There were already some hostile dealings on the frontiers. Papal couriers, carrying briefs that were never answered, were searched and roughly treated; people sent by the Pope to Benevento, and inhabitants of Pontecorvo going to Montecassino to perform their devotions, were seized.[522]Innocent complained that the indulgence he had shown towards the king on account of the representations of the other Italian powers had only made the former more insolent; and the powers stood and looked on while he was being insulted. If the Italians cared so little about his honour, he must turn to foreigners. Pandolfini adds that he had never seen thePope so excited. The ambassador did what he could to soothe him, representing to him that the moderation shown towards the king had benefited his cause, and that he could depend on the support of Florence, Milan, and Venice. The Pope cut him short. He was always put off with fine speeches. Real support was to be expected from Florence alone. On account of Sforza’s changeableness, Milan was not to be reckoned on; and Venice never proceeded to action. He was determined to make an end of it. He would excommunicate the king, declare him guilty of heresy, and lay the kingdom under interdict. He had a perfect right to do so. He would give notice of everything to the allied States. If the king, in pursuance of his threat, made war upon him, and no assistance was afforded him, he would go abroad, where he would be received with open arms and helped to get back his own again, to the shame and loss of others. He could not remain in Italy otherwise than with the dignity befitting a Pope; if they all left him in the lurch, resistance to the king was impossible, on account of the Church’s want of military power and the untrustworthiness of the barons, who would only rejoice at his embarrassment. He considered himself fully justified in going abroad if the honour of the Holy See could not be saved otherwise. Other popes had done it, and had come back with honour and glory.
‘I saw,’ says Pandolfini, ‘that he had thoroughly considered the matter, and was not talking merely to get something out of me, as he could have no doubt of our attachment and fidelity. I pointed out to him that he should deliberate well, and not take a resolution which might bring discredit upon him, perhaps without serving his purpose. Foreign lands were full of strife, and the relations of Church and State were all very different from what they had been in the times of Innocent IV. and other popes, who had sought refuge beyond the mountains.’ But the Pope was not to be persuaded. He announced that he should summonthe ambassadors of all the powers, declare his resolve and the grounds which compelled him to it, and proceed against the king. The Neapolitan ambassador was sent away. The Pope said also to Pandolfini: ‘If I go with the court to France, of all the Italian powers you will get the most advantage thereby, not only for your trade, but because I shall have all possible regard to you, and shall consult over everything with Lorenzo. Tell him these my words.’
It might have been thought that a conclusion was imminent. But after the lapse of a year matters were at exactly the same point. At the feast of SS. Peter and Paul, 1491, the king’s ambassador again presented the palfrey by way of tribute, was again sent away, and again protested.[523]Shortly after, the Florentine ambassador at Naples, Piero Nasi, had an interview with Giovanni Pontano, who was at that time Ferrante’s chief counsellor in political affairs, and had concluded the treaty with Rome in August 1486.[524]Pontano certainly must have felt that he was personally concerned, especially if, as is said, Innocent, having during his negotiations with him been warned of the king’s faithlessness, answered, ‘How can I be distrustful in dealing with a man who has never broken his word?’ ‘Ambassador,’ said Pontano to Nasi, ‘I most earnestly desire the termination of this strife, both for the sake of your Signoria and for my own sake. If the matter worries you in Florence, it worries me twice as much. Blame is laid on me which I do not deserve. What I promised in those days at Rome I had a right to promise; and it would have been kept; but no sooner was I away (would to God I had not gone in such a hurry!) than Cardinal della Rovere arrived from Genoa, and thereupon they re-arranged the conditions according to their pleasure. I certainly promised payment of the tribute, but the Pope himself gave me to understand that he would not insist upon it, and said: “I will come to an understandingwith the king on that point.” But Ascanio (Sforza) and the other cardinals laughed and said I might promise off-hand, nothing would be kept.’ Pontano then went on to the affair of the barons, whose misfortunes he attributed to their own want of head. The king, he said, had not thought of taking them prisoners, after he had made them harmless by occupying their strongholds, and taken into his own hands the administration of justice within their territories. But they themselves had compelled him to proceed against them. For after the Prince of Salerno had gone to Rome and deluded the Pope with many things, he drew the barons into the plot, all of which became known to the king. Notwithstanding, the latter gave them plenty of time to place themselves in safety; but they were determined to wait for the end, and so it went ill with them at the last. The very man from whom proceeded this apology for the king, afterwards himself accused Ferrante and Alfonso of cruelty and covetousness![525]Nasi thought the Pope cared far more about this affair than for the money question. King Alfonso had once paid 30,000 ducats to Pope Pius II. It was indeed maintained that this was not tribute-money; but yet such another sum would surely be granted. For the investiture to be extended to the Duke of Calabria they would be willing to pay 50,000. The Pope could then confirm the bull of Sixtus IV. and content himself during the rest of his pontificate with the gaily adorned palfrey. Lorenzo should carefully consider the matter.
In the autumn of 1491 Pontano was sent to Rome to arrange a compromise. The hint that Naples was willing to pay seems to have had its effect. On reflection it is easy to see in what financial difficulties Innocent had placed himself. Lorenzo had to lend him money and redeem his pawned valuables; as Lanfredini had said, he was applying to all the sovereigns for tithes, and had made debts to the amount of300,000 ducats.[526]But further hindrances kept cropping up, chiefly through the double-dealing of Ferrante, whom no one dared trust even when he, perhaps, really did mean honestly. It was said both at Rome and at Florence that he was stirring up troubles for the Pope in the States of the Church, and confirming the inhabitants of Ascoli in their rebellion against the Holy See, for which purpose he kept a numerous body of troops on the Tronto.[527]Lorenzo never ceased advising a reconciliation. Many things were done by the soldiers, he wrote to Innocent, which it was not becoming a wise prince and thoughtful Pope to leave unhindered, and the peace of all Italy would be in danger if an end were not put to the quarrel.[528]In the middle of November the king expressed his sense of obligation to Lorenzo, who was showing himself a true friend and mediator in these differences. He hoped, he said, soon to arrive at a settlement.[529]In the beginning of December they did arrive at one; and two months later peace was announced in the Consistory.[530]In the investiture to be given to the Duke of Calabria, for which the sum before mentioned was to be paid, his son, the Prince of Capua, was included. The new treaty was to be the only one in force. To the barons released from prison the king promised to pay a certain sum yearly. ‘How much,’ adds the Ferrarese ambassador, ‘is not known; and it is supposed to have been agreed upon merely for the sake of the Pope’s honour. Whether it will be kept, the future will show.’ The future, and no very distant one, brought on the Neapolitan king far other troubles than those caused by his quarrel with the Pope. Scarcely was that quarrel ended, scarcely was the settlement effected for which Pontano went to Rome,[531]when the king exhausted himself in demonstrationsof gratitude and friendship towards the Pope, to whose blessing he attributed his own prosperity and that of all belonging to him, to whom he sent hippocras and twenty-four casks of choice Neapolitan wines, and with whom he formed a connection by betrothing his grandson, the Marquis of Gerace, to Battistina Usodimare, daughter of Teodorina Cybò.[532]Ferrante must have felt that the time was pressing for a reconciliation. French affairs gave him subjects for consideration. Charles VIII. had not only—thanks to his sister—overcome a dangerous opposition, but had reconciled the Duke of Orleans to himself and his house, and won Britanny, whose heiress gave him her hand on December 4, 1491. A double Papal dispensation was needed; for Charles was betrothed to Margaret of Austria, and Anne of Britanny already bore the title of Queen of the Romans as the bride of Margaret’s brother Maximilian; besides which the newly-married couple were near relations. Doubtless with a view to what was coming, a French embassy consisting of ten persons, headed by Jean de Villiers et La Groslaye, Bishop of Lombes and Abbot of St. Denis (afterwards highly influential at Rome), had been sent to Rome and received there on November 16. On December 3, a courier brought tidings of the marriage, which gave great offence, but for which the dispensations were given afterwards.[533]Another struggle with Maximilian was inevitable. But France was united and peaceful within, the last great fief was joined to the crown, and the work begun by Louis XI. was accomplished. Italy had reason to fear that the young king, whose ambition was greater than his intellectual capacity, would again take up claims which had never been really set at rest. In the very same year which closed with the agreement between Innocent and Ferrante the declaration of Charles VIII.’s rights to thecrown worn by the latter was formulated. Five years before, the Duke of Orleans had put forward the claims to Milan which he afterwards enforced as king.[534]
If it was to the interest of France to stand well with the Pope, Ferrante had more than one motive for doing so. His daughter Beatrice, the widow of Matthias Corvinus, was threatened with dissolution of marriage by her second husband, the Polish Prince Ladislas, to whose elevation to the throne of Hungary she had greatly contributed; and it cost her father much trouble and anxiety to avert a decision which touched his own honour and that of his house. But the king, now growing old, was occupied with another family matter. The marriage of his granddaughter with the young Duke of Milan was the immediate, if not the principal, cause of a disagreement which sowed the seeds of ruin far beyond palaces and dynasties. The ambassador, whose arrival at Florence in the beginning of May 1490 has already been mentioned, was to go to Milan ‘to find out in what relation the lady duchess stood towards her most illustrious consort.’[535]The bad reports of Gian Galeazzo’s state of health proved unfounded, and Isabella soon after had hopes of becoming a mother. But matters remained unchanged. Gian Galeazzo at one and twenty was duke only in name. The government was still as it always had been, in the hands of his uncle, who had filled up all state-offices and military commands with confidants of his own. Connected with this last fact was the circumstance that in June 1488, Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, being apparently suspected by the Moro of taking Gian Galeazzo’s part, left the Milanese service and accepted acondottaoffered him by King Ferrante.[536]
The case became worse when, in January 18, 1491, Lodovico married. His bride, Beatrice of Este, was a near relative of Isabella of Aragon, for her mother was the sister of Isabella’s father; but the relations between the two young wives soon became unbearable. Beatrice, the younger by five years, handsome, clever, ambitious, and proud, soon acquired great influence over her husband, now a man of forty; she went hand-in-hand with him in all his far-reaching plans, and induced him to yield to her desires with regard to outward position more than the cunning reserved man perhaps at first intended. She and Isabella soon came to open strife. The Duchess of Milan very naturally claimed the first place; the Duchess of Bari had no intention of contenting herself with the second. Lodovico’s authority made it easy for her to satisfy her passion for ruling. Isabella bore with growing impatience daily insults to herself and the unworthy position of her husband; of him too little is known to furnish grounds for a decided judgment of his character and capabilities. At last she appealed to her father, representing to him her position and begging for his intervention.[537]
There had been no love lost between Alfonso and Lodovico ever since the Ferrara war. Although in the disputes between the Pope and the king, the Sforza had not furthered the views of France against Ferrante, still the Moro’s attitude had been questionable. If the Duke of Calabria had had his way, at the time when the treaty was concluded with the Pope, Italy would have been in flames; for his counsel was to cross the Tronto with an army and force Lodovico to lay down his usurped power. But the old king was afraid of a step which threatened to bring incalculable consequences; particularly as the Moro’s intimate relations with France—relationswhose first fruits were the complete abandonment in favour of Milan of the French claims to Genoa—and certain events in Florence which will be mentioned presently, gave him every motive for extreme caution. Instead of arms he tried negotiation. A Neapolitan embassy was sent to Milan,[538]but it had no answer but empty phrases. Lodovico replied that his nephew was Duke and enjoyed all the privileges of his rank. He himself had for years only borne the burthen of affairs, which he would lay down as soon as circumstances permitted. The only result of the application was that the good understanding between the house of Naples and the Sforza, already much endangered, notwithstanding the continued ostensible alliance, received a very severe shock. There was, indeed, no lack of friendly protestations on either side; and on February 8, 1492,[539]not long before the departure of the embassy above-mentioned, Ferrante wrote to his ambassador in Milan that he regarded the Duke of Bari as his own son (it is true the latter married his granddaughter) and his interests as his own, and congratulated him on his good understanding with France. Lodovico, to secure the maintenance of a power which he knew he was in danger of losing sooner or later, used all the means supplied by his versatile and inventive genius, and deluded himself with the increasing consciousness of his superiority over all other Italian rulers, only to involve himself irretrievably in the machinations which brought to ruin the edifice of Italian polity.