The effect of this conception of man and his destiny is to place the State and its associations in their true position as not ultimate but secondary, as means and not ends. Alongside of the earthly kingdom, with its wealth, its honours, its ambitions, its wide and far-reaching influence, it sets another kingdom, the City of God, with its own standards, its own principles, its own glory, its own blessedness, as the end of mankind, the goal of history. 'The nations shall walk amidst the light thereof, and the kings of the earth do bring their glory into it[454].' And, in so doing, it judges and corrects the splendour of earthly States.
In thus contrasting the earthly State with the City of God, Christianity is no doubt exposed to the old accusation, that itmakes men bad citizens. And the old answer is still true, 'let those who think that the doctrine of Jesus Christ cannot contribute to the happiness of the State, give us soldiers and officers such as it bids them to be, subjects and citizens as faithful as Jesus Christ commands, husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, children, masters, servants, kings, judges, living according to the laws of religion, men as punctual in their payment of taxes, as pure in their handling of public funds as are the true Christians: they will be soon forced to admit that the maxims of the Gospel when practised cannot but give a State great happiness and great prosperity[455].' It is not too much but too little Christianity which destroys States; for passion and wilfulness are the great disintegrating forces of the world, and everything which strengthens individuals to resist them, so far strengthens the bonds of social union. But the service which Christianity renders to States goes far beyond this negative result. If the true meaning of progress be moral, and not material, there can be no greater contribution to the well-being of society than that of maintaining the Christian type of character with its humility, its purity, its sincerity, and again its strong and beneficent activity.
In the present discussion the State has been put first and the Church second. In order of time the State is first. And what has been attempted has been to shew how starting with the State and its institutions, the higher order which was initiated by the historical Incarnation (though not without preparatory and imperfect anticipations in earlier and especially in Jewish history), comes in to mould, to purify, and to supplement. But these words only express partial aspects of the whole process by which a higher order acts on a lower. It interpenetrates far more deeply than can be expressed in any classification of the modes of its operation. The Christian religion has been acting on the group of States which we call Christendom from the first days when stable organizations formed themselves after the entrance of the new life of the Germanic races into the remains of the dying Roman Empire. It has been the strongest of all the influences thathave moulded them throughout their history. It has pierced and penetrated the life of individuals, the life of families, the life of guilds, as well as the laws and institutions, the writings and works of art in which they have embodied their thoughts and hopes. They are in a sense its children. It is impossible to regard them as S. Augustine regarded pagan Rome. But deep and penetrating as has been her influence and manifold her consequent implications with the existing national and social life of mankind, the Church is essentially Catholic, and only incidentally national. It is their Catholic character so far as it remains, at least their Catholic ideal, which gives to the different fragments of the Church their strength and power. The 'Church of England' is a peculiarly misleading term. The Church of Christ in England is, as Coleridge pointed out, the safer and truer phrase. And this fundamental Catholicism, this correspondence not to one or another nation, but to humanity, rests on the appeal to deeper and more permanent needs than those on which the State rests. It is thus that the true type of the Church is rather in the family than in the State, because the family is the primitive unit of organized social life. Not in the order of time, but in the order of reason, the Church is prior to the State, for man is at once inherently social and inherently religious. And therefore it is only in the Church that he can be all that it is his true nature to be.
[407]Law,Third letter to the Bishop of Bangor, second edition, 1762, p. 66.[408]Martensen,Christian Ethics, special part, second division, Eng. Transl. p. 98.[409]Church, Oxford House Papers, No. xvii,The Christian Church, p. 10.[410]Holland,Creed and Character, first edition, 1887, p. 156.[411]xix. 17.[412]i. 6.[413]Immortale Dei.[414]Aug.De Civ. Dei, xix. 14, 15.[415]S. T. Coleridge,Church and State, edited by H. N. Coleridge, 1839, P. 24.[416]A. C. Bradley, 'Aristotle's Conception of the State,' inHellenica, 1880, p. 243.[417]'Metu coercet,' Aug.De lib. Arb.i. 15.[418]Compare Aug.De lib. Arb.i. 5.[419]Art. on 'Future Retribution,'Church Quarterly, July, 1888.[420]S. Matt. v. 48.[421]Eph. iv. 13.[422]S. Matt. v. 5, 11, 39, 40.[423]S. Matt. xxii. 21.[424]Rom. xiii. 1-10. Compare S. Peter's teaching in 1 S. Pet. ii. 13-17.[425]Ad Scap.II.[426]Oratio in Auxentium de basilicis tradendis.[427]Aug.De Civ. Dei, v. 17, but cp.De bono Conj.16, for a recognition of the possibility of the unjust use of legitimate power.[428]Hom.xxiii. onRom.xiii. 1.[429]Tyrannicide was defended by some of the more extreme opponents of the temporal power, like John of Salisbury, the secretary of Thomas Becket (PolicraticusVIII. 17, 'Tyrannus pravitatis imago; plerumque etiam occidendus'). But it was condemned by the sounder judgment of Aquinas (De Reg. Princ.I. 6, 'Hoc apostolicae doctrinae non congruit').[430]Thomas Aquinas,Comm. Sent.XLIV. q. 2 a. 2; q. 1 a. 2. InComm. Pol.v. 1 § 2 he goes so far as to make Insurrection in certain cases a duty.[431]Janet,Histoire de la Science politique, third edition, 1887, vol. i. p. 330.[432]Hooker,Eccl. Pol.VIII. ii. 5, 9. Cp. I. x. 4.[433]Eccl. Pol.VIII. ii. 11.[434]Eccl. Pol.VIII. App. No. I. (ed. Keble.) Cp. I. x. 8.[435]Acts iv. 34, 35.[436]Especially in S. Ambrose; the passages are collected in Dubief,Essai sur les idées politiques de S. Augustin, 1859, ch. vi. S. Augustine himself opposed the obligatory Communism, advocated by Pelagianism; cp.Ep.157 (Ed. Bened.) to Hilary, quoted by Dubief.[437]Sen.De vita beata, 24.[438]Uhlhorn,Christian Charity in the Ancient Church, Eng. Transl. 1883, Bk. I. ch. i. pp. 18-21, 41, 42.[439]Pater,Marius the Epicurean, Vol. II. ch. xxii. p. 127.[440]1 Cor. xiii. 3 (R.V.).[441]Acts xi. 26-29; cp. also Acts iv. 34, 35, quoted above.[442]Dubief, p. 11.[443]II. 15.[444]Overton,Life in the English Church, 1660-1714, Ch. v.[445]Hooker,Eccl. Pol.VIII. i. 4. In all commonwealths, things spiritual ought above temporal to be provided for. And of things spiritual, the chiefest is religion. Cp. V. i. 2.[446]We have already shewn reasons for thinking that though no doubt the State hasagreat co-ordinating and regulative function in regard to human life, it is not fitted for the part ofthemoral guide of mankind.[447]Dicey,Law of the Constitution, second edition, 1886, lecture ii. p. 36, 'The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English Constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.'[448]Westcott,Social Aspects of Christianity, ch. v. p. 76.[449]The State in its relations with the Church, p. 41.[450]Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission, Vol. II. p. 601. Answers to questions,—Scotland, Established Church.'No appeal lies to a Civil Court in matters of discipline or on the ground of excess of punishment. But if under the form of discipline the Church Courts were to inflict Church censures (involving civil consequences) on a minister fore.g.obeying the law of the land, a question ... might be brought before the Civil Court on the ground of excess of jurisdiction. It is believed that in no case would the Civil Court entertain an appeal from a judgement of an Ecclesiastical Court on a question of doctrine, or enter on an examination of the soundness of such a judgement before enforcing its civil consequences.'Any questions which have arisen on points of ritual ... have hitherto been decided exclusively by the Church Courts.' (A qualifying sentence follows as to possible extreme cases justifying, on the failure to obtain redress from the General Assembly, an appeal to the Civil Court.)[451]Report of Eccl. Courts Commission, Vol. II. p. 605. Answers to questions,—France.'The State remainslay, and does not interpose, except when the acts of the clergy are offences at Common Law, or when there is acas d'abusin which either the public order or individual interests are injured. In which case the Council of State is summoned at the instance of the Government, or on the complaint of the citizens, to repress abuses and annul theacts of abuse(actes d'abus) on the part of the clergy.'To recapitulate, the minister, as citizen, has to submit to the Common Law; as priest, he belongs entirely to the jurisdiction of the Church, with which the Statedoes not interfere, and with which it has not to interfere, for it is solely in the domain of conscience.'[452]Martensen,Christian Ethics, special part, second division, English Translation, p. 100.[453]Cp. Aug.De Civ. Dei, v. 24, of Christian Emperors, 'we think them happy if they remember themselves to bemen.'[454]Rev. xxi. 24 (R.V.).[455]Aug.Ep. ad Marcellinum, 138, 15.
[407]Law,Third letter to the Bishop of Bangor, second edition, 1762, p. 66.
[408]Martensen,Christian Ethics, special part, second division, Eng. Transl. p. 98.
[409]Church, Oxford House Papers, No. xvii,The Christian Church, p. 10.
[410]Holland,Creed and Character, first edition, 1887, p. 156.
[411]xix. 17.
[412]i. 6.
[413]Immortale Dei.
[414]Aug.De Civ. Dei, xix. 14, 15.
[415]S. T. Coleridge,Church and State, edited by H. N. Coleridge, 1839, P. 24.
[416]A. C. Bradley, 'Aristotle's Conception of the State,' inHellenica, 1880, p. 243.
[417]'Metu coercet,' Aug.De lib. Arb.i. 15.
[418]Compare Aug.De lib. Arb.i. 5.
[419]Art. on 'Future Retribution,'Church Quarterly, July, 1888.
[420]S. Matt. v. 48.
[421]Eph. iv. 13.
[422]S. Matt. v. 5, 11, 39, 40.
[423]S. Matt. xxii. 21.
[424]Rom. xiii. 1-10. Compare S. Peter's teaching in 1 S. Pet. ii. 13-17.
[425]Ad Scap.II.
[426]Oratio in Auxentium de basilicis tradendis.
[427]Aug.De Civ. Dei, v. 17, but cp.De bono Conj.16, for a recognition of the possibility of the unjust use of legitimate power.
[428]Hom.xxiii. onRom.xiii. 1.
[429]Tyrannicide was defended by some of the more extreme opponents of the temporal power, like John of Salisbury, the secretary of Thomas Becket (PolicraticusVIII. 17, 'Tyrannus pravitatis imago; plerumque etiam occidendus'). But it was condemned by the sounder judgment of Aquinas (De Reg. Princ.I. 6, 'Hoc apostolicae doctrinae non congruit').
[430]Thomas Aquinas,Comm. Sent.XLIV. q. 2 a. 2; q. 1 a. 2. InComm. Pol.v. 1 § 2 he goes so far as to make Insurrection in certain cases a duty.
[431]Janet,Histoire de la Science politique, third edition, 1887, vol. i. p. 330.
[432]Hooker,Eccl. Pol.VIII. ii. 5, 9. Cp. I. x. 4.
[433]Eccl. Pol.VIII. ii. 11.
[434]Eccl. Pol.VIII. App. No. I. (ed. Keble.) Cp. I. x. 8.
[435]Acts iv. 34, 35.
[436]Especially in S. Ambrose; the passages are collected in Dubief,Essai sur les idées politiques de S. Augustin, 1859, ch. vi. S. Augustine himself opposed the obligatory Communism, advocated by Pelagianism; cp.Ep.157 (Ed. Bened.) to Hilary, quoted by Dubief.
[437]Sen.De vita beata, 24.
[438]Uhlhorn,Christian Charity in the Ancient Church, Eng. Transl. 1883, Bk. I. ch. i. pp. 18-21, 41, 42.
[439]Pater,Marius the Epicurean, Vol. II. ch. xxii. p. 127.
[440]1 Cor. xiii. 3 (R.V.).
[441]Acts xi. 26-29; cp. also Acts iv. 34, 35, quoted above.
[442]Dubief, p. 11.
[443]II. 15.
[444]Overton,Life in the English Church, 1660-1714, Ch. v.
[445]Hooker,Eccl. Pol.VIII. i. 4. In all commonwealths, things spiritual ought above temporal to be provided for. And of things spiritual, the chiefest is religion. Cp. V. i. 2.
[446]We have already shewn reasons for thinking that though no doubt the State hasagreat co-ordinating and regulative function in regard to human life, it is not fitted for the part ofthemoral guide of mankind.
[447]Dicey,Law of the Constitution, second edition, 1886, lecture ii. p. 36, 'The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English Constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.'
[448]Westcott,Social Aspects of Christianity, ch. v. p. 76.
[449]The State in its relations with the Church, p. 41.
[450]Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission, Vol. II. p. 601. Answers to questions,—Scotland, Established Church.
'No appeal lies to a Civil Court in matters of discipline or on the ground of excess of punishment. But if under the form of discipline the Church Courts were to inflict Church censures (involving civil consequences) on a minister fore.g.obeying the law of the land, a question ... might be brought before the Civil Court on the ground of excess of jurisdiction. It is believed that in no case would the Civil Court entertain an appeal from a judgement of an Ecclesiastical Court on a question of doctrine, or enter on an examination of the soundness of such a judgement before enforcing its civil consequences.
'Any questions which have arisen on points of ritual ... have hitherto been decided exclusively by the Church Courts.' (A qualifying sentence follows as to possible extreme cases justifying, on the failure to obtain redress from the General Assembly, an appeal to the Civil Court.)
[451]Report of Eccl. Courts Commission, Vol. II. p. 605. Answers to questions,—France.
'The State remainslay, and does not interpose, except when the acts of the clergy are offences at Common Law, or when there is acas d'abusin which either the public order or individual interests are injured. In which case the Council of State is summoned at the instance of the Government, or on the complaint of the citizens, to repress abuses and annul theacts of abuse(actes d'abus) on the part of the clergy.
'To recapitulate, the minister, as citizen, has to submit to the Common Law; as priest, he belongs entirely to the jurisdiction of the Church, with which the Statedoes not interfere, and with which it has not to interfere, for it is solely in the domain of conscience.'
[452]Martensen,Christian Ethics, special part, second division, English Translation, p. 100.
[453]Cp. Aug.De Civ. Dei, v. 24, of Christian Emperors, 'we think them happy if they remember themselves to bemen.'
[454]Rev. xxi. 24 (R.V.).
[455]Aug.Ep. ad Marcellinum, 138, 15.
ROBERT OTTLEY.
Thestudy of early Church History suggests the conclusion that the Christian religion was recognised as a rule, or fashion of life, before it was discovered to be a philosophy and a creed. To be complete, therefore, any account of Christianity must include the presentation of it as a Divine 'way of life'—a coherent system of practical ethics, marked by characteristic conceptions of freedom, duty, the moral standard, the highest end of life, and the conditions of human perfection. Such is the task we are about to attempt. To the necessary limitations of a sketch in outline, the reader may ascribe a general avoidance of controversial, and a preference for positive, statements; as also the fact that some large and interesting branches of the subject are dismissed with no more than a passing allusion.
It may be admitted, at the outset, that non-religious ethical speculation has in a measure paved the way for a re-statement of the Christian theory, by its inquiries into the source and nature—the rational basis and binding force—of moral obligation. For it may be maintained that in Christianity, rightly understood, is to be found an adequate answer to the question which all schools of thought agree in regarding as fundamental—the question 'Whymust I do right?'
On the other hand, the Christian Church claims to meet the plain needs of average human nature by her answer to the question, 'Howam I to do right?' She claims to have at command practical means of solving a problem which is admittedly abandoned as hopeless by the ethics of naturalism.If Jesus Christ gave profound extension to the ideas of duty and obligation, He was also the first who pointed humanity to the unfailing source of moral power. In this respect Christianity presents a favourable contrast to other systems, the tendency of which is to be so concerned with the Ideal as to underrate the importance and pressure of the Actual. Christianity claims to be in contact with facts; such facts as sin, moral impotence, perverted will, the tyranny of habit. And while she is large-hearted and eagle-spirited in her scope—dealing with all possible relationships in which a human being may stand, whether to God above him, his fellow-men about him, or the sum of physical life below him; the Church is none the less definite and practical in method and aim; witness the importance she attaches to the individual character, the recreation of which is at least a step towards a regeneration of society.
The chief point of distinction, however, between Christian and non-Christian ethics is to be found in a difference of view as to the relation existing between morality and religion. A system which so closely connects the idea of Good with the doctrine of God, must needs at every point present conduct as inseparably related to truth, and character to creed. It has been noticed indeed that Pliny's letter to Trajan—the earliest record we possess of the impression produced on an intelligent Pagan by the new religion—testifies to the intimate connection of morals with dogma and worship. What the Christian consciousness accepted as truth for the intellect, it embraced also as law for the will. Whether then we have regard to the practical purpose, or the wide outlook of the Christian system, we shall feel the difficulty of giving even a fair outline of so vast a subject in so limited a space. If the idea of Good corresponds in any sense to the conception of God, that idea must have an infinite depth of significance, and range of application. If the recreation of human nature be a practicable aim, no department of anthropology or psychology can be without its interest for ethics. It must suffice to indicate, rather than unfold, the points which seem to be of primary importance.
Christian Morals are based on dogmatic postulates. The foundation of our science is laid, not merely in the study of man's nature, his functions and capacities, but in revealed truths as to the nature and character of God, His creative purpose, His requirement of His creatures. We believe that Christ came to liberate human thought from systems of morality having their centre or source in man[456].
Man is not God, but hath God's end to serve;A Master to obey, a course to take,Somewhat to cast off, somewhat to become....How could man have progression otherwise?
Man is not God, but hath God's end to serve;A Master to obey, a course to take,Somewhat to cast off, somewhat to become....How could man have progression otherwise?
Man is not God, but hath God's end to serve;
A Master to obey, a course to take,
Somewhat to cast off, somewhat to become....
How could man have progression otherwise?
The postulates may conveniently be distributed under three main heads: the doctrine of God, of Man, of Christ.
For the purpose of ethics, two simple truths as to the Being of God require attention.
God is an Infinite, butPersonalBeing; existing from eternity in the completeness of His own blessedness, yet willing to become the centre of a realm of personalities. To this end He called into existence a world of personal beings, in a sense independent of Himself, but destined, in communion and intercourse with Himself, to find and fulfil the law of their creaturely perfection. To these free and rational beings, Almighty God deigns to stand in self-imposed relations.
Again, God is anEthicalBeing: He is essentially Holy and Loving.
He is Holy; and appoints that for the entire realm of personality, as for Himself, holiness should be the absolute law. He alone can communicate to His creatures the idea of holiness; of a supreme, eternal, ethical Good. The Good exists only in Him; is the essential expression of His Nature, the reflected light of His Personality. The idea of ethical Good is not therefore due to a natural process by which the accumulated social traditions of our race are invested with the name, and sanction, of moral Law. The idea is communicated, derived from the living Source of Good freely acting on the faculties of intelligent creatures who arecapable of receiving such communications 'in divers parts and in divers manners[457].'
The apprehension of moral Law thus appears to correspond with a progressive apprehension of God. Along with the idea of the unity and absoluteness of God, heathendom lost the sense of an absolute moral Law[458]; and conversely, in proportion as the Divine Nature manifests Itself more fully to human intelligence, the idea of moral Good gains expansion and depth.
God is also Love: a truth which as it helps our thought to a more profound and consistent view of His mysterious Being, so implies that God must needs will His rational creature to be what He Himself is, 'holy and blameless before Him[459];' to engage itself in activities resembling His own; to be free with His Freedom; enlightened by His Light[460]. Nor can we think that Divine Love is content with a bare revelation of moralrequirement. We believe that what God requires, He is ready and able to impart; He will empower man to render what His righteousness exacts. Finally, if His purpose for man be interrupted or thwarted, He will 'devise means' for its final and victorious fulfilment. He, the Author of Creation, will in due time provide for a recreation, not less potent and complete in its effects than the evil power which has invaded and marred the first creation[461]. For we can form no idea of Love other than that of an active, energizing principle by which a personal Being reveals Himself; a Being tenacious of His purpose, multiform in His expedients, supremely patient in His beneficent activity. The God presupposed in Christian Ethics is One who displays holiness combined with power, love controlled by wisdom: in a word, He is the God of redemptive history. Thus morality finds its starting-point in theology[462].
The Christian account ofMannext engages attention. Weconfine ourselves to an inquiry into three points: what is man's essential nature, his ideal destiny, his present condition?
We have already observed that in Christian Ethics man is not the central object of study. The moral universe tends towards a more comprehensive end than the perfection of humanity. Nevertheless Christianity is specially marked by a particular conception of man. Regarding him as a being destined for union with, capable of likeness to God, she offers an account of man's failure to fulfil his true destiny, and witnesses to a Divine remedy for his present condition. The familiar contrast between humanity as it might become, and as it is, gives significance to the peculiarly Christian doctrine of sin. It is the dignity of the sufferer that makes the mischief so ruinous; it is the greatness of the issue at stake that makes a Divine movement towards man for his recovery at once credible, and worthy of God[463].
First, then, we presuppose a certain view of man's nature. Christianity lays stress on the principle ofpersonality, with its determining elements, will and self-consciousness. It is for psychology to accurately define personality. For ethics it is simply an ultimate, all-important fact. It is that element in man which makes him morally akin to God, and capable of holding communion with Him; that which places him in conscious relation to Law; gives him a representative character as God's vice-gerent on earth, and conveys the right to dominion over physical nature. If religion consists in personal relations between man and God, religious ethics must be concerned with the right culture and development of personality.
But in virtue of his creaturely position, man's personality cannot be an end to itself[464]. The tendency of Greek thought was to regard man as a self-centred being; to look for the springs of moral action, and the power of progress, within human nature itself. Thus Aristotle's ideal is the self-developmentof the individual under the guidance of reason, and in accordance with the law of his being. The question is, what is this law, and what the ground of its obligation? Personality, we answer, marked man from the first as a being destined for communion with, and free imitation of God[465]. Personality enables man to be receptive of a message and a call from God. It confers on each possessor of it an absolute dignity and worth.Personality—here is our crucial fact; enabling us to take a just measure of man, and of our duty towards him. One of the deepest truths brought to light by the Gospel was the value of the personal life, of the single soul, in God's sight. Man is great, not merely because he thinks, and can recognise moral relationships and obligations; but chiefly because he was created for union with God; and was destined to find blessedness and perfection in Him alone. Christianity therefore rates highly the worth of the individual; and her task is to develop each human personality—to bring each into contact with the Personality of God[466].
For, secondly, man has an ideal destiny[467]—life in union with God, a destiny which, as it cannot be realized under present conditions of existence, postulates the further truth of personal immortality[468]. Man is capable of progressive assimilation to God of ever deeper spiritual affinity to Him[469]. Such must be the ideal end of a being of whom it is revealed that he was made 'in the image of God.'
But the thought of the 'Divine image' leads us a step further. Whatever be the precise import of the expression, it at least implies that the Good, which is the essence of theDivine, is also a vital element in the perfection ofHumannature. It remains to indicate the way in which man is capable of recognising Good as the law of his being, and embodying it in a character. Christianity, as a moral system, offers an account ofconscienceand offreedom.
The Scriptural doctrine of conscience represents it as the faculty which places man in conscious relation to moral Law, as the expression of the Divine nature and requirement. In a brief sketch it is enough to lay stress on two points.
1. Conscience appears to be an original and constant principle in human nature. To assign to it a merely empirical origin—to derive it from social evolution, from the circumstances, prevalent beliefs, traditional customs of a human community, is inadequate, inasmuch as no such supposed origin will satisfactorily account for the authoritativeness, the spontaneity, the 'categorical imperative' of conscience[470]. Further, the functions attributed to this faculty in Scripture, e.g. 'judging,' 'accusing,' 'witnessing,' 'legislating'—all convey the idea that man stands in relation to moral Law as something outside and independent of himself, yet laying an unconditional claim on his will. In the Christian system the existence of conscience in some form is regarded as a primary and universal fact. Its permanent character is everywhere the same; its function, that of persistently witnessing to man that he stands in necessary relation to ethical Good.
2. The language of the Bible throughout implies that conscience in its earliest stage is an imperfect organ, capable like other faculties of being cultivated and developed. Our Lord's reference to the inward 'eye' (S. Matt. vi. 22) suggests a fruitful analogy in studying the growth of conscience. In its germ, conscience is like an untrained sense, exercising itself on variable object-matter, and hence not uniform in the quality of its dictates. It is enough to point out that this fact is amply recognised by New Testament writers. S. Paul speaks more than once of progress in knowledge and perception as a feature of the Christian mind, and the faculty of discerning the Good is said to grow by exercising itself on concrete material[471]. So again, the moral faculty is impaired by unfaithfulness to its direction; the moral chaos in which the heathen world was finally plunged resulted from suchunfaithfulness on a wide scale. The Gentiles knew God, but did not act on their knowledge. They 'became darkened;' they lost the power of moral perception[472].
To enlarge on this subject forms no part of our present plan. It is fair, however, to cordially acknowledge that Christian thought is indebted to psychological research for deeper and more accurate conceptions of the moral faculty; and the possibility of large variation both in the dictates of conscience, and the certainty of its guidance, may be freely admitted. And yet it has been justly observed that the question of the origin of this faculty is not one with which ethics are primarily concerned. That inquiry is wholly distinct from the question of its capacities and functionswhen in a developed state[473]. The unconditional claim of conscience—this is the constant factor which meets us amid all variations of standard and condition. It is enough that conscience is that organ of the soul by which it apprehends moral truth, and is laid under obligation to fulfil it. A Christian is content to describe it as God's voice; or, in a poet's words,
God's most intimate presence in the soulAnd His most perfect image in the world.
God's most intimate presence in the soulAnd His most perfect image in the world.
God's most intimate presence in the soul
And His most perfect image in the world.
For Conscience, while making an absolute claim on man's will, appeals to him as a being endowed with a power of choice: and thus we pass to the subject offreedom. What is freedom, in the Christian sense? In the New Testament freedom is connected with truth. 'The truth,' it is said, 'shall make you free.' If man stands in a real relation to the Good, his true freedom can only mean freedom to correspond with, and fulfil the law of his nature[474]. The formal power of choice with which man is born—a power which in fact is seen to be extremely limited[475]—is only the rudimentary stage of freedom. Will is as yet subject to numberless restrictions, such that they seem utterly to preclude an unfettered choice. It is limited, for example, by the influenceof heredity to an extent which often appears to determine unconditionally the choice between different courses of action. 'Determinism' has at least liberated our thinking from the crude idea of freedom as man's power 'to do as he likes.' True liberty can only mean freedom from false dependence, emancipation of the will from the undue pressure of external forces, or inherited tendencies. The condition of 'perfect freedom' is that in which man yields an unforced accord to the Good—his correspondence with it as the law of life. And as his formal power of choice becomes by habit more and more determined towards a fixed adherence to the Good, he begins to taste the 'glorious liberty' of a right relation to God and His Law. He becomes free with the liberty which is 'freedom not to sin,' he finds himself 'under the sole rule of God most free[476].'
Lastly, Christianity as a moral system is distinguished by her view of man's present condition. His upward development has been interrupted. In theological language he is a 'fallen' being, and the path of ethical progress is a way ofrecovery[477]. Man's capacity of corresponding with the ideal, of free self-conformity to it, though not destroyed, is at least seriously impaired. His spiritual capacities are not what they were once in a fair way to be; they are weakened and depraved, and man's advance towards a free power of self-determination is in fact hindered by a radical defect of will—in Christian language by the principle of Sin. The Bible gives an account of sin, its first cause, its consequences in human history. Christian Ethics make allowance for this factor; systems which overlook it or minimize it inevitably lose contact with the actual problem to be solved, with life as it is. Their tendency at best is to treat moral, as on a level with physical, evil: as an obstruction, a hindrance, but not a vital defect inherent in human nature. Not such is the Christian view of sin. For sin conditions thework of the Incarnate Son Himself. Not only does Christ set Himself to re-erect the true standard of character. He devotes Himself also to dealing with the actual ravages of moral evil. He teaches its intrinsic nature, its source in the will, the inviolable law of its retribution; He reveals the destructive potency of its effects; He labours as the Good Physician to remove its temporal penalties; He provides, in His atoning Sacrifice of Himself, the one and only countervailing remedy[478].
Such postulates respecting the Nature of God and of Man find their complement and point of contact in the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation. As to the Person of Christ, it is enough to premise that the Christian system of ethics is intelligible only on the basis of a complete recognition of all that our Lord claimed to be. He came to reveal among men the nature, the ways, the will of the All-Holy; to present the true pattern of human goodness; to be the perfect representative of man before God[479]. He is the Revealer of God, as being Himself in the fullest sense One with God; He is the pattern of humanity, in virtue of His sinless manhood; the representative, through His organic union with our race. His Resurrection and Ascension together are the condition of His recreative action as a quickening Spirit on the entire nature of man. In a word His Person, His work, His character form the central point of ethical inquiry and contemplation[480]. To arrive at the truedifferentiaeof Christian morals we need to study more profoundly the character and purpose of Jesus Christ.
To the Christian moralist the entire universe presents itself in the light of a revealed purpose as capable of receiving aspiritual impress, and as moving towards an ethical consummation. For although man is the crown of the physical creation, he cannot be independent of it in his advance towards the proper perfection of his being. The destiny of nature is bound up with that of humanity, in so far as nature tends towards some form of ethical consciousness, presents the material conditions of moral action, is capable of being appropriated or modified by moral forces—will and personality. Thus an inquiry into the Highest Good for man gives to ethics a natural point of contact with metaphysics[481].
Christ Himself points our thought to this ideal region by presenting to us as the Highest Good, as the ultimate object of moral effort,the kingdom of God[482]. A precise definition of this expression may be left to a formal treatise; but a certain complexity in the idea may be briefly elucidated.
In the first instance the kingdom of God is spoken of by our Lord as a Good to be appropriated byman, through conscious and disciplined moral effort. In this sense the kingdom is already 'within' men[483], though not in its mature, or perfected stage. It is an actual state, spiritual and moral; an inward process or movement; a present possession. The attainment of this state involves 'Blessedness'—a word the true meaning of which is open to misconception. 'Blessedness' is not 'a mere future existence of imaginary beatitude[484];' not a bare independence of natural necessities; nor is it identical with, though it may include, 'happiness.' The instinct in human nature to which Christ appealed is more fundamental than the desire of 'happiness.' The word employed by Him to convey His meaning had by ancient usage been connected with supposed conditions and modes of the Divine existence. 'Blessedness' in fact consists in a living relation to God, in a progressive likeness to Him; in its final stage itis nothing less than the possession of God. God is the Highest Good[485].
The kingdom of God is also to be conceived as the goal of the entire movement of the universe: but while nature tends blindly towards some ideal end, the history of mankind is the record of a Divinely-directed movement carried on through free human agency[486]. For an ethical world two factors are required; physical nature, the sphere of force and necessity; rational personality, conscious of freedom and of the claim of authority. The goal of the universe is therefore a kingdom in which each element, physical nature and personality, finds its appropriate sphere, the one subordinate, the other dominant. We discern a prophecy of this result in Bacon's great conception of a 'regnum hominis' attainable by intelligent obedience to nature. The Bible is full of a greater thought. It foresees a kingdom of intelligent beings whose law is the service of God; a state in which the inner harmony of man's restored nature will be reflected in a worthy outward environment. This ideal kingdom, however, has its preparatory stage on earth. Though the present condition of it only faintly foreshadows the promised glory of the future, it has nevertheless been in fact set up among men, 'not in word, but in power.' For the main factor that makes such a kingdom ideally possible, already operates—namely, creaturely life realizing its true dependence on God, human will and human character responding to the will and purpose of God[487].
Such is the kingdom for which we look, and its Centre and Head is the living Christ[488]. He is the type after which the new personality is to be fashioned. He who unveils this world of spiritual beings and powers, is Himself the sourceof its movement, the centre of its attraction, the surety of its final triumph.
There cannot but result from this hope a particular view of the present world. It is characteristic of the Christian spirit frankly to recognise the natural world in its due subordination to personality, in its subserviency to ethical ends. An absolute idealism is not less alien to this standpoint than a crude materialism. The Christian is not blind to the tokens of interdependence between the worlds of matter and spirit; the fact indeed of such relation gives peculiar colour to the Christian regard for nature. Nature is precious as the sphere in which a Divine Life is manifested, as the object of Divine Love[489]. And yet, in the light of revelation, the universe cannot be contemplated without mingled emotions. The Christian knows something of the pain, and of the satisfaction which in their unchastened form we call Pessimism and Optimism. For there must be sorrow in the recollection of the causal link that unites physical to moral evil. Though pain has value as the condition of nobler phases of life, and heightened spirituality of character, it is nevertheless an evil producing in a healthy nature something more than a transient disturbance. Pain is the sensible, even if remote, outcome of moral perversity, of misdirected desire. It pervades impartially the physical universe, but seems in manifold instances to point beyond itself to its source in human sin.
And yet there is a Christian optimism—a thankful joy even amid present conditions. There is the joy of at least a rudimentary realization of the chief Good; the joy of setting a seal, as it were, to the truth of God[490]. The 'powers of the world to come' are already within reach; they can be set in motion, felt, tested, enjoyed. There is a known end of creation by the light of which all forms and products of human enterprize can be judged. Thus even the growth and organized strength of evil does not dismay the Christian; for he knows that the advance of the kingdom is certain, whatever be the hindrances opposed to it, and that God'sinvincible will controls and overrules all that seems most lawless, and hostile to His purpose. 'The city of God,' says S. Augustine, 'is a pilgrim sojourning by faith among evil men, abiding patiently the day when righteousness shall turn to judgment, and victory bring peace.' In his assurance that 'all things work together for good to them that love God,' that the end is certain, and human fears are blind, the Christian can be free from illusions or extravagant hopes, yet not cast down, 'sorrowful, yet alway rejoicing,' 'perplexed, but not in despair[491].'
On the place and meaning of freedom in Christian Ethics we have already touched. Our formal freedom is the ground of moral responsibility—that element in us to which Law makes its authoritative appeal. From the thought of freedom in relation to a moral universe we pass naturally to that of Law.
And first, it is convenient to inquire what is therevealed basis of obligationin general?
The most conspicuous feature of the Sermon on the Mount—that first great outline of Christian morality—is its authoritative tone. We instinctively turn to it in searching for a fundamental principle of obligation, a ground of authority for Law. Nor are we disappointed, for our question is met by the consideration that this great discourse is primarily a revelation of the personal God in His holy relation to mankind. It is with this personal relationship that the claim of moral Good on man's will is seen to be uniformly connected. The Good in fact presents itself to man in the shape of apersonal appeal: 'Be ye holy, for I am holy.' Morality appears as God's exhortation to man to embrace and fulfil the true law of his nature. 'Be ye perfect,' it is said, 'even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect[492].' The Good isthus at once the explicit declaration of the Divine will, and the condition of human perfection. Already the coldness of abstract Law begins to disappear. Law is seen to be not an abstraction merely, but inseparably connected with the living Personality behind it. It is the self-revelation of a loving Being, appealing to the object of His Love, and seeking its highest welfare. Obligation is transformed, and is seen to be the tie of vital relationship between persons[493].
Further, it must be borne in mind that Christ's teaching as to obligation was accompanied by the promise of a supernatural gift—the gift of a new capacity to fulfil the Law. The Good had hitherto been known, howsoever imperfectly, as requirement. Ethical progress before Christ's coming could only tend to deepen this knowledge. We know indeed what was the object of that long providential discipline of humanity which culminated in the Incarnation: how it ended by driving man to look and long for a condition of things which should no longer be marked by hopeless severance of the actual from the obligatory. With the advent of the Redeemer, a new joy dawned on the world—the possibility of goodness.
We learn then that the ground of obligation is God's will for the perfection of His creatures—His desire that they should be like Himself[494]. The sense of obligation is indeed never absent from the consciousness of Christ Himself. 'We must work,' He says, 'the works of Him that sent Me while it is day.' 'My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me, and to finish His work[495]:'—in which utterances we discern the principle we need. Only when duty presents itself in the form of personal appeal, only when obedience is kindled and enriched by feeling, can law become a bond, not of constraint, but of love.
It follows that obligation, thus founded on personal relationship to God, is absolute and independent of variation in the specific demands of Law. Human goodness will consist incorrespondence to the will of God, and the degree of clearness with which a man apprehends that will is the measure of his obligation. This principle seems to preclude any idea of 'supererogatory works,' and tends to neutralise for the individual conscience the distinction between 'commands' and 'counsels of perfection,' the spirit in which Law is ideally fulfilled being that of sonship, eager, loyal, and generous[496].
The universal obligation of moral Law is by Christ connected for practical purposes with a system ofsanctions. As to the Christian doctrine of rewards and punishments it is only necessary to observe, that any ethical system which has regard to the condition of manas he is, finds itself constrained, for disciplinary ends, to lay a certain stress on this point. Further, it should be noticed that the nature of these sanctions is seldom clearly understood. They occupy a place in Christ's teaching, because it is His wont to deal with human nature as He finds it: He points, however, not so much to a future state, as to a present spiritual sphere in which conduct is indissolubly linked to consequence, and there operate 'the searching laws of a spiritual kingdom[497].' The sanctions with which Christ enforces His doctrine may thus be regarded as pointing to a reign of Law in the spiritual realm which He reveals to mankind. He seems indeed to recognise the occasional need of appeals to fear, as likely to rouse the conscience and will. He sets before us the prospect of spiritual judgments acting, at least partially, in the sphere of the present life. His more frequent appeal, however, is to what may be called the enlightened self-interest of men. Their true life, He tells them, is to be found or acquired in a consecration, a sacrifice of the natural life to the claims and calls of the Divine kingdom[498]. Such sacrifice, such co-operation with God, is its own ineffable reward.
What then, it may be asked, are themotives, the inducements to action, appealed to by Christianity? how far are imperfect motives recognised? and in view of the fact that no mere sense of relation to Law is in general likely to move the human will, where does the Gospel find its 'moral dynamic'—its highest motive?
We have seen that Christianity in a peculiar degree combines the presentation of duty with an appeal to feeling. In the same way by connecting obligation to obey God with a revelation of His Love, Jesus Christ solves the most difficult problem of ethics. The highest motive isLove to God, kindled not only by the contemplation of His Perfections, but also by a passionate sense of what He has wrought in order to make possible the fulfilment of His Law. 'We love Him,' says S. John, 'because He first loved us.' We do not, however, expect the motive of actions to be in all cases identical, or uniformly praiseworthy. A practical system must recognise very different stages of maturity in character; and the possibility of imperfect or mixed motives is frankly allowed by Christian thinkers, and seems to be sanctioned by our Lord Himself[499]. It may be said on the whole that while the Gospel ever appeals to man's desire for his own good, it adapts itself and condescends to widely varying forms and degrees of that desire, by way of educating it to greater disinterestedness and purity[500]. We may fittingly speak of 'a hierarchy of motives,' and can view with equanimity those attacks on Christianity which represent it as a thinly-disguised appeal to selfishness. For the reward promised to man is one which will only appeal to him in so far as he has parted with his old self, and has made the Divine purpose his own. The reward is joy—the 'joy of the Lord;' thejoy of a worthy cause embraced and advanced; of a task achieved, of labour crowned by nobler and wider service. Such joy could only be an inspiring motive to self-forgetful love, which finds the fulfilment of every aspiration, the satisfaction of every desire in God and in His work[501].
Christian duty, the content of the Law, demands somewhat larger treatment. It has been suggested that the conception of morality as a Divine code, as 'the positive law of a theocratic community,' which seems characteristic of early Christian writings on morals—is a legacy from Judaism[502]. Be this as it may—thedistinctivefeature of Christianity is that henceforth the Law is not contemplated apart from the Personality of God. The Law is 'holy, just, and good,' because it reflects His character. Obedience to it is acknowledged to be the indispensable condition of true union between God and His creatures. For Jesus Christ teaches us to discern in the Law the self-unveiling of a Being whose holiness and love it reflects, as well as His purpose for man.
The revealed Law is comprised in the Decalogue. It seems needless to vindicate at length the paramount place which this fundamental code occupies in Christian thought[503]. Suffice it to say that in broad outline it defines the conditions of a right relation to God, and to all that He has made. And the Law is 'spiritual[504].' Though for educative purposes primarily concerned with action, it makes reference to inward disposition, and thereby anticipates the main characteristic of Christian goodness. It also recalls the great landmarks of God's redemptive action; it sets forth His gracious acts, partly as an incentive to gratitude, partly as a ground of obligation.
In our Lord's teaching we find two truths implied:(1) The absolute priority and permanence of the Decalogue in relation to all other precepts of the Jewish Law. (2) Its essential unity viewed as a Law of love. This latter aspect is anticipated in the book of Deuteronomy, and is explicitly set forth by our Lord. There are, He tells us, two commandments: the first and greatest, love to God; the second 'like unto it,' love to man, with the limitation annexed, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.'
Thus guided by precedent, a Christian, in examining the Law'scontent, may take the Decalogue as a natural basis of division. It may be shortly analysed as embracing a comprehensive outline of man's duty towards (i) God, (ii) his fellow-men, and implicitly towards himself and non-personal creatures.
First stand duties towards God, resulting directly from the personal contact assumed to be possible between God and man. The all-embracing command which involves the fulfilling of the Law is contained in the words, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind[505].' In this 'great commandment' we find the widest point of divergence from Pagan ethics. Man's true centre is God. His perfection is to be sought in creaturely subjection and free conformity to the Divine purpose[506]. The general sphere of God-ward duty is defined in the first four commandments, which are seen to give moral sanction, not only to the outward expression, but to the actual substance of belief; the distinctive duties enjoined therein have been summarily described as faith, reverence, service[507]. The fourth precept lays down the principle that man is bound to honour God by consecrating a definite portion of time to His worship, and by providing space for the due recreation of that human nature which by creative right is God's, and is destined for union with Him.
The duty of love to our fellow-men follows upon that oflove to God. Every man's personality gives him absolute and equal worth in God's sight, and therefore lays us under obligation towards him. Heathen moralists confined the sphere of obligation to a few simple relationships, e.g. family-life, friendship, civic duty. But the revealed law of love to man embraceseveryrelationship. 'Every man is neighbour to every man[508].' It is clear that any adequate outline of this precept involves the whole treatment of social duty. Men have theirrights, i.e. lay us under obligation, both individually and collectively. The individual has his 'duty' to fulfil to the family, the association, the class, the city, the state, the Church which claims him. The immense field of our possible duties towards society, and towards each individual, so far as he comes in contact with us, may be regarded as embraced in the second table of the Decalogue. Thus the fifth commandment lends important sanction not only to the parental claim, but also to the authority of fundamental moral communities—the family, the state, the Church. The following precepts regulate the security of life and personality, of marriage and sexual distinctions, of property, honour, and good name. The tenth commandment anticipates that 'inwardness' which constitutes the special feature of Christian morality. 'It is the commandment,' says an ethical writer, 'which perhaps beyond any of the rest was likely to deepen in the hearts of devout and thoughtful men in the old Jewish times, that sense of their inability to do the will of God, and to fulfil the Divine idea of what human life ought to be, which is indispensable to the surrender of the soul to God[509].'
But according to the Christian theory there are duties toself, which seem to follow from the relation in which man stands to God, and form the true measure of his regard for others: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.' There is a right self-love, a right care of the personality as being itself an object of God's Love, and so included in the category of things ethically good. What the Christianought to love, however, is not the old natural self, but the 'new man,' the true image of himself which has absolute worth[510]. A moral complexion is thus given to all that concerns the personal life—the care of health, the culture of faculties, the occasions of self-assertion. Every moment of conscious existence, and every movement of will,—all in fact, that relates to the personality—is brought within the domain of Law. Christianity 'claims to rule the whole man, and leave no part of his life out of the range of its regulating and transforming influence[511].' For in every situation, transaction, or display of feeling, will is required to declare itself: moral activity takes place. Duties to self, as loved by God, are thus implied in the 'great commandment.' For God therein requires of man a consecration of the entireself, an inward self-devotion, a reasonable, heartfelt service: He asks for love. From this point of view, sin—the false claim to independence—is simply wrong self-love.
Some would even class all shapes of sin as falling under two main forms of self-assertion, arrogance and sensuality. And S. Augustine suggests a profound view of the development of the true, as compared with the false society, when he says: 'The two cities owe their being to two forms of love; the earthly, to self-love; the heavenly, to the love of God[512].'
It remains to extend the principle of love to the non-personal sphere with which man is in contact. We have seen that absolute worth belongs only to personality. But man's relation to the creatures below him in the scale of development, implies a field of duties of which ethics must take cognizance. The non-personal part of nature is ordained for subjugation by man. It is included in his dominion:terram dedit filiis hominum. Yet even in the Mosaic Law we find respect enjoined for certain distinctions of nature, which are not to be overridden or confounded. The physicalorder, like the moral, was to be regarded as sacred[513]. Duties, then, of this kind exist: and they are apparently comprehended in the fourth commandment, which expresses God's creative claim on typical orders of living creatures, ordaining that 'cattle' are to share the benefit of the Sabbath rest. The sixth and eighth commandments again imply the sanctity of physical life, and of personal property. And if we pass behind the decalogue, we find animals included in a sense within God's original and irreversible covenant[514]. The control therefore of human will over nature, animate and inanimate, though comparatively absolute, is yet subject to the restrictions which love suggests. For the natural world also displays the omnipresent control, and watchful providence of a Being 'Whose mercy is over all His works.' Physical life in this sphere may be treated as a means; but it must also be dealt with 'in harmony with the creative Thought[515].'
In quitting the subject of duty, we do well to mark the infinite extension given to the idea by the treatment of it in connection with the doctrine of an Infinite and Holy God. Our Lord, illustrating His exposition of the ancient Law by a few significant examples, not only opened to His hearers the possibility of a spiritual, transcendent morality, but also laid down a far-reaching principle of obligation. The self-unveiling of the Infinite Being evidently makes an infinite claim on the will and affection of intelligent creatures.
With this extension of morality we might compare a somewhat parallel feature in the aesthetic sphere.
Into the arts also, notably into architecture and music, the Christian spirit introduced the element of mystery, and found expression in them for the idea of infinity—an idea so alien to the Greek genius, which had ever contemplated beauty, and therefore ethical Good, as something essentially limited, measurable, symmetrical, exact[516]. Such a thoughtmight suggest a line of abstract discussion; but practical needs remind us that the true range of obligation is best interpreted to us by a living ideal. As the writer ofEcce Homoremarks, 'The law which Christ gave was not only illustrated, but infinitely enlarged, by His deeds. For every deed was itself a precedent to be followed, and therefore to discuss thelegislationof Christ is to discuss His character; for it may be justly said thatChrist Himself is the Christian Law[517].'
The transition from the discussion of moral Law to that of Christian character seems at this point natural and simple.