WAR ESTABLISHMENTS OF NEW ARMIES, 1915.

[Clamps]

The illustration is practically self-explanatory. The large round clamps fit on the water jacket of the machine gun and the small clamps hold the rifle, which can be adjusted to hit at exactly the same mark as the machine gun barrel is aimed at.

The trigger of the rifle is connected to the machine gun by the adjustable chain device shown.

The apparatus is in constant use at the Schools of Musketry, and is the invention of Armourer Sergeant-Major Hiscock, of the Motor Machine Gun Section.

The G.S. limbered wagons contain:—

4 guns with tripods.7,000 rounds of ammunition in belts, and4 ammunition pack saddles for lead horses.

4 guns with tripods.7,000 rounds of ammunition in belts, and4 ammunition pack saddles for lead horses.

4 guns with tripods.7,000 rounds of ammunition in belts, and4 ammunition pack saddles for lead horses.

4 guns with tripods.

7,000 rounds of ammunition in belts, and

4 ammunition pack saddles for lead horses.

1 pick-axe, 1 shovel, and 1 billhook are carried with each machine gun tripod as part of its equipment. 60 sandbags per infantry battalion are carried for use with machine guns.

NOTES FROM THE FRONT.

Conceal guns and men.Select best position to achieve the object you hope to achieve.Have alternative positions prepared.Provide effective obstacles.Keep guns and belts free from dirt.Give out any preparatory orders necessary.Be always ready to fire when wanted.Study the ground all round the position.Remember the value of cross fire.Keep your fire for the proper moment.

Conceal guns and men.Select best position to achieve the object you hope to achieve.Have alternative positions prepared.Provide effective obstacles.Keep guns and belts free from dirt.Give out any preparatory orders necessary.Be always ready to fire when wanted.Study the ground all round the position.Remember the value of cross fire.Keep your fire for the proper moment.

Conceal guns and men.Select best position to achieve the object you hope to achieve.Have alternative positions prepared.Provide effective obstacles.Keep guns and belts free from dirt.Give out any preparatory orders necessary.Be always ready to fire when wanted.Study the ground all round the position.Remember the value of cross fire.Keep your fire for the proper moment.

Conceal guns and men.

Select best position to achieve the object you hope to achieve.

Have alternative positions prepared.

Provide effective obstacles.

Keep guns and belts free from dirt.

Give out any preparatory orders necessary.

Be always ready to fire when wanted.

Study the ground all round the position.

Remember the value of cross fire.

Keep your fire for the proper moment.

The choice of a gun position must be governed by the following considerations:—

Enfilade fire, against the enemy and against ourselves.Overhead fire, to support our own troops.Long-range fire, against enemy’s supports.Fire against houses, etc., in rear of enemy’s line.Fire against likely places for enemy’s machine guns.Concealment from enemy’s artillery.Alternative positions.Lines of advance and retreat.Covered approach for ammunition carriers, etc.Facilities for control of guns.Avoid:—Obvious positions.Positions easy to describe. } Either from surroundingsPositions easy to arrange upon. } or maps.Positions near prominent objects or aiming-points.Ground which will facilitate observation of fire by the enemy.

Enfilade fire, against the enemy and against ourselves.Overhead fire, to support our own troops.Long-range fire, against enemy’s supports.Fire against houses, etc., in rear of enemy’s line.Fire against likely places for enemy’s machine guns.Concealment from enemy’s artillery.Alternative positions.Lines of advance and retreat.Covered approach for ammunition carriers, etc.Facilities for control of guns.Avoid:—Obvious positions.Positions easy to describe. } Either from surroundingsPositions easy to arrange upon. } or maps.Positions near prominent objects or aiming-points.Ground which will facilitate observation of fire by the enemy.

Enfilade fire, against the enemy and against ourselves.Overhead fire, to support our own troops.Long-range fire, against enemy’s supports.Fire against houses, etc., in rear of enemy’s line.Fire against likely places for enemy’s machine guns.Concealment from enemy’s artillery.Alternative positions.Lines of advance and retreat.Covered approach for ammunition carriers, etc.Facilities for control of guns.Avoid:—Obvious positions.Positions easy to describe. } Either from surroundingsPositions easy to arrange upon. } or maps.Positions near prominent objects or aiming-points.Ground which will facilitate observation of fire by the enemy.

Enfilade fire, against the enemy and against ourselves.

Overhead fire, to support our own troops.

Long-range fire, against enemy’s supports.

Fire against houses, etc., in rear of enemy’s line.

Fire against likely places for enemy’s machine guns.

Concealment from enemy’s artillery.

Alternative positions.

Lines of advance and retreat.

Covered approach for ammunition carriers, etc.

Facilities for control of guns.

Avoid:—

Obvious positions.

Positions easy to describe. } Either from surroundings

Positions easy to arrange upon. } or maps.

Positions near prominent objects or aiming-points.

Ground which will facilitate observation of fire by the enemy.

The fire of well-concealed machine guns may often be directed against:—

Windows, doors, roofs, etc., of houses thought to be occupied.

Areas of bush, crops, etc.

Open spaces across which the enemy are dribbling in small parties in order to concentrate at another point.

The enemy’s firing-line.

It may happen that machine guns are forced to open fire in self-defence, or to assist the advance of the infantry in spite of the target offered not being a suitable one for machine guns.

Any tendency, however, to open fire with machine guns without good reason must be suppressed.

Every effort must be made to prevent machine guns being located by artillery.

If guns are shelled they must either:—

Change their Position at once.—This would be the usual proceeding. A movement of quite a short distance—say 50 yards—is quite sufficient in many cases; or—

Cease fire while detachments take cover until the shelling stops.—If this be done, the hostile artillery may think that the machine guns have been put out of action.

Good targets may then present themselves, and the guns may be able to reopen fire with good effect from the same position.

There have been several cases of machine guns firing against artillery with great success. The following instances are quoted:—

(a) A section of machine guns worked forward to a concealed position 900 yards away from a German field battery in action. The section brought oblique fire to bear on the battery and completely silenced it.

(b) A section took a German field battery in enfilade at 2,400 yards. The battery was firing at the time, the gunners fled from their guns, and the battery was silenced.

Note.—Frontal fire by machine guns against shielded artillery can only be expected to produce moral effect. This moral effect may, however, be considerable; and, in addition, the machine gun fire may greatly hamper the supply of ammunition to the guns, etc.

The Occupation of Various Positions by Machine Guns.

Barricades.—When barricading roads, bridges, streets, etc., machine guns should not be placed on the barricade itself if equally good effect can be obtained by placing the guns in positions commanding the approaches to the barricade.

Banks.—The banks of rivers, canals, streams, etc., can be made use of for gun positions, or covered lines of advance or retreat.

Crops.—Standing crops often form useful cover for guns and concealed lines of advance, etc.

Ditches.—These can often be used to enable machine guns to be pushed forward, so as to bring oblique or enfilade fire to bear on the enemy.

Great care must be taken not to show above the banks of the ditch.

A few men should be pushed along the ditch on the exposed flank as a protection against snipers, counterattacks, etc.

Houses.—Houses may be used as follows:—

Place the gun in the back of a room, firing through an open window, or a window from which a few panes of glass have been removed.

Remove a few tiles from the roof, and fire through the opening thus made.

Should a house have two doors or two windows, directly behind one another, the gun may be placed in rear of the house, and fire through these doors or windows.

Place the gun in rear of the house, so that oblique or enfilade fire can be brought to bear on the enemy.

If the house possesses a cellar, the gun may be placed in the cellar, a few bricks being removed, so as to enable the gun to be fired from the ground-level.

In whatever position the gun is placed some protection should, if possible, be provided for the numbers, such as an emplacement of sandbags, stones, bricks, etc.

It should be remembered that if the gun is located in a building by the enemy’s artillery, it may be necessary to evacuate the building quickly; arrangements must therefore be made to meet this contingency.

Folds in the Ground.—Great use can be made of folds in the ground for the concealment of machine guns.

The gun should be placed so as to enable the bullets to clear the crest, while the gun and detachment are concealed as much as possible.

Haystacks.—These can be made use of as follows:—

Hollow out front of haystack.

No. 1 sits in this hollow, with his back against the hay.

The loose hay is piled up in front of the gun.

Cut out a place for the gun on top of the haystack.

If possible, make a rough platform of boards.

The gun then fires over the top of the ridge of the stack.

Place the gun behind the haystack in such a manner that oblique or enfilade fire may be brought to bear on the enemy.

The gun is then entirely concealed from the front.

This is, as a rule, the best method of using a haystack.

Hedges.—Can often be used as a covered approach and as fire positions giving cover from view.

A few men should be placed along the hedge, on the exposed flank, for protection.

Mounds of Earth, Roots, etc.—These may be used as follows:—

Hollow out the mound from the rear, so that the gun can fire from the hollow while it is concealed from the front.

Planks, sandbags, etc., can be used to support the earth.

Fire over the top of the mound, using the mound as a parapet.

Place the gun behind the mound, using the mound as a cover from the front, while oblique or enfilade fire is brought to bear against the enemy.

Stacks of Wood.—The stack may be hollowed out from the rear, so that the gun can be placed inside the stack, and fire to the front, while being perfectly concealed from view.

The position can be strengthened by using sandbags inside the stack.

Stooks of Corncan also be used to provide cover from view.

Trees.—Trees, when in leaf, may be used as possible gun positions.

Trees with strong branches are necessary, and a platform for the gun must be built in the branches.

Tree-trunks can also be used to provide cover from view.

Trenches.—When guns are not used in trenches they should, when possible, be placed so as to bring oblique or enfilade fire against:—

The enemy’s trenches.

The ground over which the enemy must pass, should he attack.

Our own front line trenches in case the enemy penetrates into them.

To achieve these objects guns may be placed:—

In a salient.

At the base of a re-entrant.

At the horns of a re-entrant.

At a bend in the trench.

In an emplacement jutting out from the general line of the trench.

In all cases the gun should, if possible, be covered from fire from the front, and should be able to sweep the front of the entrenched line with cross fire.

Thus, although each gun may be firing to its flank, its front is swept by the fire of a neighbouring gun.

Arrangements should be made so that guns so placed may be able to fire to their front, should an emergency make this desirable.

This can be done by:—

Arranging that some sandbags can be removed and the gun fired to the front through the loophole thus made.

In this connection it must be remembered that:—

Training the gunners to:—

Note.—Both these methods require much practice.

Every endeavour should be made to conceal the position of the gun from the front.

Gun emplacements must therefore be made to appear exactly like the remainder of the trench or breastwork.

Several emplacements should be made for each gun, and practice should be made in moving guns quickly from one emplacement to another.

Guns may be placed—In the Front Line of Trenches.—This may be taken as the general rule.

In Support Trenches.—There are occasions when it may be advisable to place guns in the support trenches.

Here they may be arranged so as to:—

Prevent a further advance of the enemy should they capture the front line.

Enfilade the front line should it be captured.

Sweep the communication trenches.

In Positions in Rear.—If the ground is favourable it may be possible to place guns, in concealed positions, in rear of the entrenched line.

They can be arranged so as to:—

Fire over the trenches and sweep the ground in front.

Fire through gaps in the defensive line.

Command positions where the enemy may concentrate prior to the assault.

Command positions likely to be occupied by the enemy’s machine guns.

Command covered approaches on the defensive line.

Enable guns to fire on enemy’s trenches with greater effect.

Give overhead covering fire in case of an advance by our own troops.

If guns are often used, the positions from which they are fired should frequently be changed.

Thus the enemy may be deceived as to the number and position of the guns.

Emplacements should be numbered, and range cards placed in each.

When taking over a line of trenches the machine gun officer must make careful arrangements for controlling the fire of his guns.

The machine gun officer must:—

Towers, windmills and other high buildingsmay often be used with advantage:—

Woods, especially when in leaf, are often most valuable for concealing the position of guns.

Care must be taken that the guns are not placed too near the edge of the wood or individual men expose themselves.

All communications between guns should be made in the wood, well in rear of the guns.

Alternative positions should be selected, so that theguns may be moved rapidly from one to another if desired, with as little loss of time as possible.

Lines of retirement through the woods must be arranged and also lines of communication between guns and limbers thought out.

The Attack.—The guns should be dug in whenever it is possible to do so without giving away their position.

It is often impossible to see anything of the enemy. Therefore likely positions for him to occupy must be looked for.

Surprise, obtained by a concealed advance, is essential to the successful handling of machine guns.

The progress of the infantry must be carefully watched, with a view to pushing on a certain number of guns and to closely support them whenever possible.

The usual methods of supporting the infantry attack will be:—

Every opportunity for the use of overhead fire should be seized.

All suitable ground, buildings, etc., that may enable this kind of fire to be used should be looked for.

The enemy’s machine guns are the weapons that are most likely to hold up the attack.

Therefore every effort should be made to locate them, and to concentrate the fire of our own machine guns upon them.

It may sometimes be possible to use machine guns to search systematically all places in the area of attack likely to be held by the enemy.

This searching fire has undoubtedly considerable moral effect on the troops subjected to it, and may greatly assist the subsequent infantry advance. It requires, however, a large expenditure of ammunition.

If the preliminary reconnaissance is properly carried out, it is quite possible for the guns employed for this purpose to remain undetected, even though pushed well forward.

The general rules as to position of machine guns in attack are as follows:—

It may be possible, and advantageous, to move forward a proportion of the guns with the attacking lines of the infantry.

The guns allotted to this duty will not take part in the covering fire, but will keep themselves fresh and their ammunition intact, in readiness for the advance.

Their duties will be to:—

As enemy snipers are a particular source of annoyance to machine gunners, they should be watched for.

The defence of prepared positions has been already dealt with under the heading of Machine Guns in Trenches.

Machine guns in any defensive position must be so organized that they can support each other mutually throughout any given section of the defensive line.

It must be remembered that the best positions for machine guns are not always the same by night and day.

It will often be necessary to move the guns from the night position to the day position before dawn.

Rearguard Action.—The following points must be considered:—

A wide field of fire.

Guns must be carefully concealed in the least obvious places.

Covered lines of retreat must be carefully reconnoitred.

Limbers must be close up, to facilitate hasty retirement.

Positions in rear must be chosen before the guns leave the position they are holding.

A proportion of the guns should occupy the position in rear, before all guns retire from the forward position, thus the retirement of the last guns can be covered.

Village Fighting.—As soon as the infantry have made good one edge of the village, the guns will be brought up as close to the firing-line as possible.

They will then search windows, doorways, roofs, etc., likely to be held by the enemy.

Guns will be used to command cross-streets, etc., so as to guard against attacks on the flanks or rear of the infantry.

Guns should also be posted on the edges of the village, to prevent flank attacks.

During village fighting every use should be made of windows, doors, etc., as machine gun positions (see page102).

Co-operation.—The necessity for co-operation between the machine guns taking part in any particular action cannot be overestimated.

Not only should the individual gun of a particular unit work upon some definite plan for mutual support, but the sections of all units that are operating together should co-operate with a view to obtaining the best results from their combined action.

This cannot be done in action unless it has been previously practised.

Therefore great attention should be paid to training a number of guns to operate together for some specific purpose.

The following notes from overseas on machine guns, compiled by Capt. E. Feilder (Attached Gen. Staff, A.T.C.), are of considerable value:—

1. The Machine Gun Officer should have a complete knowledge of the nature of the action and the plans of the Commander.

2. The Commanding Officer should inform the M.G. Officer generally of the part he expects the guns to play, and the particular assistance he requires from him.

3. The M.G. Officer should then be allowed to form and carry out his own plan of action in such a way as best meets the requirements of the C.O. and the situation generally.

4. When possible, ample time should be given the M.G. Officer to make his arrangements.

5. He should not be given hurried orders at the last moment; such a proceeding is very seldom necessary.

1. The whole of the machine guns must be organised under the command of one Officer.

2. This Officer, in conjunction with the Section Officers, must make detailed plans for the employment of the guns.

3. In this manner each gun or group of guns will have a specific task allotted to it. Before the action commences all concerned will thoroughly understand their duties.

4. It must be clearly understood by all Officers of the Brigade that the machine guns have definite tasks allotted to them. That they are under the command of the Brigade Machine Gun Officer, and are therefore not to be given orders or otherwise interfered with by other Officers.

5. The plans of the B.M.G.O. will have been made in consultation with the Brigade Commander, who will have explained to him the course that the action is expected to take.

All guns must be in their allotted places before the preliminary bombardment commences.

6. The Machine Guns will be allotted as follows:—

These guns should not open fire until the infantry advance takes place.

Their role will be to make good the ground gained by the infantry against counter attack.

They should advance in such a manner as to ensure their reaching the position gained by the infantry in safety.

The locality in which the guns will be mounted in the captured lines should be settled before the advance.

The possibility of using guns for this purpose and their positions if used depends on:—

1. The lie of the ground.

2. The position of your own and the enemy’s trenches.

When their role of covering fire is completed they should automatically come again under the control of the B.M.G.O., who will give them further orders.

These may possibly go forward with the attacking Infantry. This will depend on the nature of the ground, action, etc.

These should be retained as a real reserve and not pushed too early into the fight.

If the attack is to consist of more than one phase, that is to say, of two or more distinct advances, separate plans must be made for each.

Arrangements for the supply of ammunition, belt fittings, ammunition depôts, etc., must be made before the action commences. One Officer should be placed in charge of these arrangements.

The B.M.G.O. should remain with the Brigadier. He should provide himself with a suitable number of orderlies.

CO-OPERATION.

The necessity for co-operation between the machine guns taking part in any particular action cannot be overestimated.

Not only should the individual guns of a particular unit work upon some definite plan for mutual support, but the sections of all units that are operating together should co-operate with a view to obtaining the best results from their combined actions. This cannot be done in action unless previously practised. Therefore attention should be paid to training numbers of guns to operate together for some specific purpose.

The ranges fired at have varied from 15 yards (at which, in one instance, a German rush was stopped), to 2,800 yds., at which range a battery of the enemy’s field artillery was silenced. This brings out the importance of:—

1. The allowance for wind at long ranges.

2. The importance of range-taking, range cards, judging distance, visual training, reference points, etc.

3. Practice of the “Swinging Traverse” for stopping rushes and dealing with dense targets at very close range.

4. Practice of traversing by means of the “Automatic Tap” for medium and long ranges.

Targets have been of all kinds, such as:—

1. Dense masses at all ranges.

2. Extended lines at all ranges.

3. Artillery on the move and in action.

4. Edges of woods, hedges, ditches, etc., where enemy’s firing-line was known to be, but in many cases could not be seen.

5. Enemy machine guns in all manner of positions, usually invisible to the eye or even with glasses.

6. Hollows, wood, and other cover under which the enemy was known to be concentrating.

7. Searching fire to try and locate and beat down hostile fire that was being delivered from concealed positions.

The varied nature of the targets that the machine gunner may have to engage brings out the fact that the machinegunner must be very thoroughly trained, and emphasizes the points brought out under “Ranges, Fire Orders, Indication and Recognition.”

While in a large number of instances it has been possible to give fire orders by word of mouth, this will, as a rule, be only possible under exceptionally favourable circumstances.

Thus the successful co-operation of the guns working under one leader will very largely depend on the mutual understanding that exists between the Officer and his Gun Commanders.

Therefore the Officer must ensure that all those under him clearly understand:—

1. The part the machine guns are intended to play.

2. The plans of the Machine Gun Officer.

3. The objects in view and the methods by which the Machine Gun Officer hopes to attain them.

In this way, even when individual control by the Officer has been lost, the desired effect will most likely be obtained, for each Gun Commander will be striving to attain that effect, though, perhaps, by different means.

The following have been the usual methods:—

1. Fire orders by word of mouth.

2. Signals (including flashlights, etc.).

3. Telephones (in one or two cases in trenches).

4. Orderlies.

But whatever method is employed, a thorough understanding between the Officer and those under him is essential.

One Officer to a 4–Gun Section is not sufficient. Whether the guns are grouped under the supreme command of one Senior Officer, or whether they work in sections, there should always be one Officer to each pair of guns.

ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS ARRANGED FOR.

The great importance of alternative positions being arranged for cannot be overestimated. The best way of moving the gun from one position to another without being seen should be studied. If guns are located and shelled, either:—

1. Move guns at once to an alternative position or right away.

2. Let the gunners cease fire and get under cover until the shelling ceases.

The first will be the more useful proceeding, but success has been obtained several times with the second. For example:—

On one occasion, after shelling for some time, the artillery ceased, thinking, no doubt, that they had “knocked out” the machine guns. Massed enemy infantry then advanced, the machine guns opening fire again from their old position with great effect.

The great importance of concealed approach in occupying positions must be impressed on Machine Gun Officers.

1. Lack of any organised method of using machine guns. Young and inexperienced Officers are left in many cases to do what they think best with their sections, without any previous consultation or plan as to how guns can be most usefully employed.

2. Lack of any attempt at co-operation between the sections of the units working together in any particular action.

3. Lack of initiative and push. This is usually due to want of knowledge. Though the machine gun is a weapon of opportunity, opportunities seldom occur to those who passively await them.

A good Machine Gun Officer, by keeping himself thoroughly in touch with the situation, must have an opportunity to use his guns with effect.

4. This lack of co-operation is seen both in the open and in trench work. All this points to the fact that co-operation between the whole of the machine guns taking part in any action is not sufficiently studied.

GUNS BRIGADED IN ACTION.

On many of the occasions brought to notice in which machine guns have been brigaded they have achieved marked success, but on the whole not sufficient use has been made of this method of obtaining the combined action of a number of guns.

“Brigading” guns does not mean “massing” them. It means the “brigaded” guns are employed with some definite plan under the direction of one Officer.

In all cases where the action of brigade guns has been successful there has been:—

1. A thorough understanding of the plans of the Brigadier by the B.M.G.O.

2. Conference between the B.M.G.O. and the Section Officers at which the arrangements for the employment of the machine guns were fully discussed.

3. Definite orders to the Section Officers.

4. A proportion of the guns held in reserve under the B.M.G.O.

But when the sections have been hastily collected together and placed under the B.M.G.O., without time for making the above arrangements, the result has usually been that sections have been dispersed without definite orders or a complete understanding of the situation, and effect has been lost.

In trench warfare the successful co-operation of the machine guns assisting in the defence of any particular section of the entrenched line has been obtained by:—

1. A previous reconnaissance of the whole line by the B.M.G.O.

2. Diagrams made of own and enemy’s trenches.

3. The number of emplacements.

This has enabled rapid concentration of the requisite number of guns only on any one portion of the enemy’s line, and has prevented unnecessary opening of fire and the consequent waste of ammunition.

In many cases, however, Officers in command of troops in sections of trench line have considered they are also in command of the machine guns placed in that portionof the trench occupied by their troops. This has led to:—

1. The disadvantage of dual control.

2. The guns being placed in the same emplacement day after day.

3. The arrangements of Machine Gun Officer being interfered with.

4. The guns being located by the enemy through an unnecessary opening of fire ordered by an Officer who is not an expert in machine gun tactics.

The system of fire orders as taught at Hythe previous to the war has been most successful.

Machine Gun Officers are also of opinion that, though it has often been impossible to give orders by word of mouth, the systematic training of all ranks in this system tends to ease of control under difficult circumstances, and when a number of guns are being employed for combined action.

This training forms a basis from which other methods of control can most easily be evolved, and inculcates into the men the necessity for assuring themselves that any orders received by them are passed on by some means to those concerned.

The methods of “indication and recognition,” as taught at Hythe before the war, have proved most useful. This fact has been brought out in the accounts of the most successful machine gun actions, as has also the great value of the use of range cards and indication points. Targets are generally easy to indicate, as men are more alert than in peace-time.

Training in indication, recognition, fire orders, and judging distance, can be given at any time, as no apparatus is required.

This is also valuable, as it trains all ranks in a quick understanding of directions given, study of ground, and trains the eye in quick observation.

WORKING GUNS IN PAIRS AND INTERVALS BETWEEN GUNS.

The necessity of using guns in pairs for mutual support in case of mechanical trouble no longer holds good. Guns in the open have usually been placed not less than 50 yards apart. This enables the best use to be made of the ground as protection against artillery fire and for concealment. In trench warfare guns should usually be placed singly, arrangements being made for “cross fire” and mutual support between the guns of any particular section of the defensive line.

Observation of fire has usually been obtainable up to 900 yards, and in favourable circumstances at even longer ranges.

Even when the ground has been unfavourable, observation has often been obtainable on water, walls of houses, enemy’s parapet, etc.

During the fighting on the Marne and on the Aisne, guns were often able to support the infantry advance to within 100 yards of the enemy’s position.

Even on flat ground frequent instances are given where overhead fire has been used, with excellent effect, from buildings.

On the whole it would appear that not enough use is made of this fire.

This is a question that should be carefully studied by all Machine Gun Officers.

All the suggested methods have been used, and in some cases compasses and maps as well. Effect has been obtained in the open and on enemy’s concentrations at long ranges, and in trench warfare on working parties, ration parties, communications, etc., behind the enemy’slines. A great deal more could be done in this way if all guns were not almost invariably placed in trenches, instead of a proportion being placed in suitable positions in rear, and long-range fire employed. All this points to the fact that a Machine Gun Officer should be acquainted with all methods of employing indirect fire, in order that he may be in a position to make the best of any opportunities that may occur.

Very little information has been given on this subject, but co-operation seems to have been very poor; but this co-operation is made very difficult in many cases by:—

1. Inability of the M.G. sections to keep pace with the attacking infantry.

2. The visibility of the methods employed of carrying the gun. This leads to many casualties.

3. Lack of tactical knowledge on the part of many of the more junior M.G.Os.

4. Lack of definite plans as to the role of the M.Gs. before the action commences.

The two following examples serve to illustrate some of the above:—

1. In a recent attack, owing to lack of any previous understanding between M.G.Os., eight M.Gs. converged into one small section of a captured trench. Owing to lack of space only two of these guns were able to come into action.

2. In another instance during an attack, six guns converged into one small house. Owing to lack of space, etc., only two of these guns were able to come into action.

Before an attack a certain M.G. Officer was told to await orders from his Commanding Officer. He was forgotten and left behind.

In this case, as soon as the Officer realized that he had been forgotten, he should have used his own initiative.

All these point to the fact that some arrangements for concerted action should be made.

N. B.—See “Guns Brigaded in Action.”


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