APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.OUTLINES AND NOTES.BY GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY.LA METTRIE’S RELATION TO HIS PREDECESSORS AND TO HIS SUCCESSORS.I.The Historical Relation of La Mettrie toRenéDescartes(1596–1650).The most direct source of La Mettrie’s work, if the physiological aspect of his system is set aside, is found in the philosophy of Descartes. In fact it sometimes seems as if La Mettrie’s materialism grew out of his insistence on the contradictory character of the dualistic system of Descartes. He criticises Descartes’s statement that the body and soul are absolutely independent, and takes great pains to show the dependence of the soul on the body. Yet though La Mettrie’s system may be opposed to that of Descartes1from one point of view, from another point of view it seems to be a direct consequence of it. La Mettrie himself recognizes this relationship and feels that his doctrine that man is a machine, is a natural inference from Descartes’s teaching that animals are mere machines.2Moreover La Mettrie carries on Descartes’s conception of the body as a machine, and many of his detailed discussions of the machinery of the body seem to have been drawn from Descartes.It should be noted that La Mettrie did justice to Descartes, and realized how much all philosophers owed to him. He insisted moreover that Descartes’s errors were due to his failure to follow his own method.3Yet La Mettrie’s method was different from that of Descartes, for La Mettrie was an empiricist4without rationalistic leaning. As regards doctrine: La Mettrie differed from Descartes in his opinion of matter. Since he disbelieved in any spiritual reality, he gave matter the attributes of motion and thought, while Descartes insisted that the one attribute of matter is extension.5It was a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s disbelief in spiritual substance that he could throw doubt on the existence of God.6On the other hand the belief in God was one of the foundations of Descartes’s system. La Mettrie tried to show that Descartes’s belief in a soul and in God was merely designed to hide his true thought from the priests, and to save himself from persecution.7IIa.The Likeness of La Mettrie to the English Materialists, Thomas Hobbes(1588–1679) andJohn Toland(1670–1721).The influence of Descartes upon La Mettrie cannot be questioned but it is more difficult to estimate the influence upon him of materialistic philosophers.Hobbes published “The Leviathan” in 1651 and “De Corpore” in 1655. Thus he wrote about a century before La Mettrie, and since the eighteenth century was one in which the influence of England upon France was very great, it is easy to suppose that La Mettrie had read Hobbes. If so, he must have gained many ideas from him. The extent of this influence is, however, unknown, for La Mettrie rarely if ever quotes from Hobbes, or attributes any of his doctrines to Hobbes.In the first place, both Hobbes and La Mettrie are thoroughgoing materialists. They both believe that body is the only reality, and that anything spiritual is unimaginable.8Furthermore their conceptions of matter are very similar. According to La Mettrie, matter contains the faculty of sensation and the power of motion as well as the quality of extension.9This same conception of matter is held by Hobbes, for he specifically attributes extension and motion to matter, and then reduces sensation to a kind of internal motion.10Thus sensation also may be an attribute of matter. Moreover Hobbes and La Mettrie are in agreement on many smaller points, and La Mettrie elaborates much that is suggested in Hobbes. They both believe that the passions are dependent on bodily conditions.11They agree in the belief that all the differences in men are due to differences in the constitution and organizationof their bodies.12They both discuss the nature and importance of language.13Hobbesdiffersfrom La Mettrie in holding that we can be sure that God exists as the cause of this world.14However even though he thinks that it is possible to know that God exists, he does not believe that we can know his nature.La Mettrie’s system may be regarded as the application of a system like that of Hobbes to the special problem of the relation of soul and body in man; for if there is nothing in the universe but matter and motion, it inevitably follows that man is merely a very complicated machine.There is great similarity also between the doctrine of La Mettrie and that of Toland. It is interesting to note the points of resemblance and of difference. Toland’s “Letters to Serena,” which contain much of his philosophical teaching, were published in 1704. There is a possibility therefore that La Mettrie read them and gained some suggestions from them.The point most emphasized in Toland’s teaching15is that motion is an attribute of matter. He argues for this belief on the ground that matter must be essentially active in order to undergo change,16and that the conception of the inertness of matter is based on the conception of absolute rest, and that this absolute rest is nowhere to befound.17Since motion is essential to matter, there is no need, Toland believes, to account for the beginning of motion. Those who have regarded matter as inert have had to find some efficient cause for motion, and to do this, they have held that all nature is animated. But this pretended animation is utterly useless, since matter is itself endowed with motion.18The likeness to La Mettrie is evident. La Mettrie likewise opposes the doctrine of the animation of matter, and the belief in any external cause of motion.19Yet he feels the need of postulating some beginning of motion,20and although he uses the conception so freely, he does not agree with Toland that the nature of motion is known. He believes that it is impossible to know the nature of motion,21while Toland believes that the nature of motion is self-evident.22Another point of contrast between Toland and La Mettrie is in their doctrines of God. Toland believes that God, “a pure spirit or immaterial being,” is necessary for his system,23while La Mettrie questions God’s existence and insists that immateriality and spirituality are fine words that no one understands.It must be admitted, in truth, that La Mettrie and Toland have different interests and different points of view. Toland is concerned to discover the essential nature of matter, while La Mettrie’s problemis to find the specific relation of body and mind. On this relation, he builds his whole system.b.The Relation of La Mettrie to an English Sensationalist: John Locke(1632–1704).Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” was published in 1690, and La Mettrie, like most cultured Frenchmen of the Enlightenment, was influenced by his teaching. The main agreement between Locke and La Mettrie is in their doctrine that all ideas are derived from sensation. Both vigorously oppose the belief in innate ideas,24teaching that even our most complex and our most abstract ideas are gained through sensation. But La Mettrie does not follow Locke in analyzing these ideas and in concluding that many sensible qualities of objects—such as colors, sounds, etc.—have no existence outside the mind.25He rejects Locke’s doctrine of spiritual substances,26and opposes Locke’s theistic teaching, laying stress, on the other hand, upon Locke’s admission of the possibility that “thinking being may also be material.”27IIIa.The Likeness, probable but unacknowledged, to La Mettrie, of the French Sensationalists, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac(1715–1780)and Claude Adrien Helvetius(1715–1771).Condillac’s “Traité des sensations” was published about ten years after La Mettrie’s “L’histoire naturellede l’âme,” and therefore it is probable that Condillac had read this work, and gained some ideas from it. Yet Condillac never mentions La Mettrie’s name nor cites his doctrines. This omission may be accounted for by the fact that the works of La Mettrie had been so condemned that later philosophers wished to conceal the similarity of their doctrines to his. Whether the sensationalists were influenced by his teachings or not, there is such a profound likeness in their teachings, that La Mettrie may well be regarded as one of the first French sensationalists as well as one of the leading French materialists of the time.Condillac and La Mettrie agree that experience is the source of all knowledge. As Lange suggests,28La Mettrie’s development of reason from the imagination may have suggested to Condillac the way to develop all the faculties from the soul. La Mettrie asserts that reason is but the sensitive soul contemplating its ideas, and that imagination plays all the rôles of the soul, while Condillac elaborates the same idea, and shows in great detail how all the faculties of the soul are but modifications of sensation.29Both La Mettrie and Condillac believe that there is no gulf between man and the lower animals; but this leads to a point of disagreement between the two philosophers, for Condillac absolutely denies that animals can be mere machines,30and we must suppose that he would the more ardently oppose the teaching that man is merely a complicated machine!Condillac finally, unlike La Mettrie, believes in the existence of God. A final point of contrast also concerns the theology of the two writers. La Mettrie insists that we can not be sure that there is any purpose in the world, while Condillac affirms that we can discern intelligence and design throughout the universe.31Like La Mettrie and Condillac, Helvetius teaches that all the faculties of the mind can be reduced to sensation.32Unlike La Mettrie, he specifically distinguishes the mind from the soul, and describes the mind as a later developed product of the soul or faculty of sensation.33This idea may have been suggested by La Mettrie’s statement that reason is a modification of sensation. Helvetius, however, unlike La Mettrie, does not clearly decide that sensation is but a result of bodily conditions, and he admits that sensation may be a modification of a spiritual substance.34Moreover, he claims that climate and food have no effect on the mind, and that the superiority of the understanding is not dependent on the strength of the body and its organs.35La Mettrie and Helvetius resemble each other in ethical doctrine. Both make pleasure and pain the ruling motives of man’s conduct. They claim that all the emotions are merely modifications of corporeal pleasure and pain, and that therefore the only principle of action in man is the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain.36b.The Likeness to La Mettrie of the French Materialist, Baron Paul Heinrich Dietrich von Holbach(1723–1789).As Condillac and Helvetius emphasize the sensationalism taught by La Mettrie, so Holbach’s book is a reiteration and elaboration of the materialism set forth in La Mettrie’s works. The teaching of Holbach is so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be a coincidence.La Mettrie regards experience as the only teacher. Holbach dwells on this same idea, and insists that experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters.37Holbach likewise teaches that man is a purely material being. He disbelieves in any spiritual reality whatsoever, and makes matter the only substance in the world. He lays stress, also, on one thought which is a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s teaching. La Mettrie has limited the action of the will and has insisted that the will is dependent on bodily conditions. Holbach goes further and declares repeatedly that all freedom is a delusion, and that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity.38This teaching seems to be the natural outcome of the belief that man is a machine.Holbach’s atheistic theology is more extreme than his predecessor’s, for La Mettrie admits that God may exist, while Holbach vigorously opposes the possibility. Moreover Holbach holds the opinion, barely suggested by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would ameliorate the condition of mankind.39He insists that the idea of God has hindered the progress of reason and interfered with natural law. Holbach is indeed the only one of the philosophers here discussed, who frankly adopts a fatalistic and atheistic doctrine of the universe. In these respects, his teaching is the culmination of French materialism.1“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” chapters XI, VIII.↑2“Man a Machine,” p. 142. Cf. La Mettrie’s commentary on Descartes’s teaching in “Abrégé des systèmes philosophiques,”Œuvres, Tome 2.↑3“Abrégé des systèmes, Descartes,” p. 6,Œuvres Philosophiques, Tome 2.↑4“Man a Machine,” page 89. Cf. “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme” (or “Traité de l’âme”),Œuvres, 1746, p. 229.↑5Descartes, “Principles,” Part II, Prop. 4.↑6“Man a Machine,” pp. 122–126.↑7Ibid., p. 142.↑8Hobbes, “Leviathan,” Part III, Chap. 34; Part I, Chap. XII, Open Court Edition, p. 169.↑9“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chapters III, V, and VI.↑10“Leviathan,”Part I, Chap. I. Cf. “Concerning Body,” Part IV, Chap. XXV, 2.↑11“Man a Machine,” pp. 90–91.↑12“Leviathan,” Part I, Chap. VI, Molesworth Ed., p. 40. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 90.↑13Ibid., Part I, Chap. IV. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 103.↑14Ibid., Part I, Chap. XII.↑15“Letters to Serena,” V, p. 168.↑16Ibid., p. 196.↑17Ibid., p. 203.↑18Ibid., p. 199.↑19“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. V, p. 94.↑20“Man a Machine,” p. 139.↑21“Man a Machine,”p. 140.↑22“Letters to Serena,” V, p. 227.↑23Ibid., V, p. 234.↑24John Locke, “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book I, Book II, Chap. I.↑25Locke, “Essay,” Book II, Chap. 8.↑26Ibid., Book II, Chap. 23.↑27Ibid., Book IV, Chap. 10. For La Mettrie’s summary of Locke, cf. his “Abrégé des systèmes,”Œuvres, Tome 2.↑28F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. II, Chap. II.↑29“Traité des sensations,” Part I.↑30“Traité des animaux,” Chap. I, p. 454.↑31“Traité des animaux,” Chap. VI, p. 577 ff.↑32“Treatise on Man,” Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 96.↑33Ibid., Sect. II, Chap. II, p. 108.↑34“Essays on the Mind,” Essay II, Chap. I,p. 35.↑35“Treatise on Man,” Chap. XII, p. 161.↑36Ibid., Chap. IX, p. 146; Chap. VII, p. 129.↑37“Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 6.↑38“Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VI, p. 94.↑39Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451, and Chap. XXVI, p. 485. Cf. “Man a Machine,” pp. 125–126.↑OUTLINE OF LA METTRIE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE.PAGES1I.Insistence on the Empirical Standpoint16f.; 88f.; 72, 142II.Arguments in Favor of Materialism:a.The “Soul” is Affected,1.By Disease18f.; 90f.2.By Sleep19f.; 91f.3.By Drugs20; 924.By Food21f.; 93ff.5.By Age and Sex23f.; 95f.6.By Temperature and Climate24f.; 96ff.b.There is No Sharp Distinction Between Men and Animals (Machines)28f., 100ff.; 41ff., 113ff.; 75f., 142f.c.Bodily Movements are Due to the “Motive Power” of the Body51ff., 129ff.III.Conception of Matter.a.Matter is Extended154f.b.Matter Has the Power of Motion70, 140; 156ff.c.Matter Has the Faculty of Feeling159ff.IV.Conception of Man:a.Man is a Machine17, 89; 21, 93; 56, 128; 69, 140f.; 73, 143; 80, 148b.All Man’s Faculties Reduce to Sense and Imagination35ff., 107ff.c.Man is Like Animals in Being Capable of Education38, 110d.Man is Ignorant of His Destiny79, 147V.Theological Doctrine:a.The Existence of God is Unproved and Practically Unimportant50, 122b.The Argument from Design is Ineffective Against the Hypothesis of Mechanical Causality51ff., 124ff.c.Atheism Makes for Happiness55, 126f.1The references are to pages of this book.↑

APPENDIX.OUTLINES AND NOTES.BY GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY.

APPENDIX.

OUTLINES AND NOTES.BY GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY.

OUTLINES AND NOTES.

BY GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY.

LA METTRIE’S RELATION TO HIS PREDECESSORS AND TO HIS SUCCESSORS.I.The Historical Relation of La Mettrie toRenéDescartes(1596–1650).The most direct source of La Mettrie’s work, if the physiological aspect of his system is set aside, is found in the philosophy of Descartes. In fact it sometimes seems as if La Mettrie’s materialism grew out of his insistence on the contradictory character of the dualistic system of Descartes. He criticises Descartes’s statement that the body and soul are absolutely independent, and takes great pains to show the dependence of the soul on the body. Yet though La Mettrie’s system may be opposed to that of Descartes1from one point of view, from another point of view it seems to be a direct consequence of it. La Mettrie himself recognizes this relationship and feels that his doctrine that man is a machine, is a natural inference from Descartes’s teaching that animals are mere machines.2Moreover La Mettrie carries on Descartes’s conception of the body as a machine, and many of his detailed discussions of the machinery of the body seem to have been drawn from Descartes.It should be noted that La Mettrie did justice to Descartes, and realized how much all philosophers owed to him. He insisted moreover that Descartes’s errors were due to his failure to follow his own method.3Yet La Mettrie’s method was different from that of Descartes, for La Mettrie was an empiricist4without rationalistic leaning. As regards doctrine: La Mettrie differed from Descartes in his opinion of matter. Since he disbelieved in any spiritual reality, he gave matter the attributes of motion and thought, while Descartes insisted that the one attribute of matter is extension.5It was a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s disbelief in spiritual substance that he could throw doubt on the existence of God.6On the other hand the belief in God was one of the foundations of Descartes’s system. La Mettrie tried to show that Descartes’s belief in a soul and in God was merely designed to hide his true thought from the priests, and to save himself from persecution.7IIa.The Likeness of La Mettrie to the English Materialists, Thomas Hobbes(1588–1679) andJohn Toland(1670–1721).The influence of Descartes upon La Mettrie cannot be questioned but it is more difficult to estimate the influence upon him of materialistic philosophers.Hobbes published “The Leviathan” in 1651 and “De Corpore” in 1655. Thus he wrote about a century before La Mettrie, and since the eighteenth century was one in which the influence of England upon France was very great, it is easy to suppose that La Mettrie had read Hobbes. If so, he must have gained many ideas from him. The extent of this influence is, however, unknown, for La Mettrie rarely if ever quotes from Hobbes, or attributes any of his doctrines to Hobbes.In the first place, both Hobbes and La Mettrie are thoroughgoing materialists. They both believe that body is the only reality, and that anything spiritual is unimaginable.8Furthermore their conceptions of matter are very similar. According to La Mettrie, matter contains the faculty of sensation and the power of motion as well as the quality of extension.9This same conception of matter is held by Hobbes, for he specifically attributes extension and motion to matter, and then reduces sensation to a kind of internal motion.10Thus sensation also may be an attribute of matter. Moreover Hobbes and La Mettrie are in agreement on many smaller points, and La Mettrie elaborates much that is suggested in Hobbes. They both believe that the passions are dependent on bodily conditions.11They agree in the belief that all the differences in men are due to differences in the constitution and organizationof their bodies.12They both discuss the nature and importance of language.13Hobbesdiffersfrom La Mettrie in holding that we can be sure that God exists as the cause of this world.14However even though he thinks that it is possible to know that God exists, he does not believe that we can know his nature.La Mettrie’s system may be regarded as the application of a system like that of Hobbes to the special problem of the relation of soul and body in man; for if there is nothing in the universe but matter and motion, it inevitably follows that man is merely a very complicated machine.There is great similarity also between the doctrine of La Mettrie and that of Toland. It is interesting to note the points of resemblance and of difference. Toland’s “Letters to Serena,” which contain much of his philosophical teaching, were published in 1704. There is a possibility therefore that La Mettrie read them and gained some suggestions from them.The point most emphasized in Toland’s teaching15is that motion is an attribute of matter. He argues for this belief on the ground that matter must be essentially active in order to undergo change,16and that the conception of the inertness of matter is based on the conception of absolute rest, and that this absolute rest is nowhere to befound.17Since motion is essential to matter, there is no need, Toland believes, to account for the beginning of motion. Those who have regarded matter as inert have had to find some efficient cause for motion, and to do this, they have held that all nature is animated. But this pretended animation is utterly useless, since matter is itself endowed with motion.18The likeness to La Mettrie is evident. La Mettrie likewise opposes the doctrine of the animation of matter, and the belief in any external cause of motion.19Yet he feels the need of postulating some beginning of motion,20and although he uses the conception so freely, he does not agree with Toland that the nature of motion is known. He believes that it is impossible to know the nature of motion,21while Toland believes that the nature of motion is self-evident.22Another point of contrast between Toland and La Mettrie is in their doctrines of God. Toland believes that God, “a pure spirit or immaterial being,” is necessary for his system,23while La Mettrie questions God’s existence and insists that immateriality and spirituality are fine words that no one understands.It must be admitted, in truth, that La Mettrie and Toland have different interests and different points of view. Toland is concerned to discover the essential nature of matter, while La Mettrie’s problemis to find the specific relation of body and mind. On this relation, he builds his whole system.b.The Relation of La Mettrie to an English Sensationalist: John Locke(1632–1704).Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” was published in 1690, and La Mettrie, like most cultured Frenchmen of the Enlightenment, was influenced by his teaching. The main agreement between Locke and La Mettrie is in their doctrine that all ideas are derived from sensation. Both vigorously oppose the belief in innate ideas,24teaching that even our most complex and our most abstract ideas are gained through sensation. But La Mettrie does not follow Locke in analyzing these ideas and in concluding that many sensible qualities of objects—such as colors, sounds, etc.—have no existence outside the mind.25He rejects Locke’s doctrine of spiritual substances,26and opposes Locke’s theistic teaching, laying stress, on the other hand, upon Locke’s admission of the possibility that “thinking being may also be material.”27IIIa.The Likeness, probable but unacknowledged, to La Mettrie, of the French Sensationalists, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac(1715–1780)and Claude Adrien Helvetius(1715–1771).Condillac’s “Traité des sensations” was published about ten years after La Mettrie’s “L’histoire naturellede l’âme,” and therefore it is probable that Condillac had read this work, and gained some ideas from it. Yet Condillac never mentions La Mettrie’s name nor cites his doctrines. This omission may be accounted for by the fact that the works of La Mettrie had been so condemned that later philosophers wished to conceal the similarity of their doctrines to his. Whether the sensationalists were influenced by his teachings or not, there is such a profound likeness in their teachings, that La Mettrie may well be regarded as one of the first French sensationalists as well as one of the leading French materialists of the time.Condillac and La Mettrie agree that experience is the source of all knowledge. As Lange suggests,28La Mettrie’s development of reason from the imagination may have suggested to Condillac the way to develop all the faculties from the soul. La Mettrie asserts that reason is but the sensitive soul contemplating its ideas, and that imagination plays all the rôles of the soul, while Condillac elaborates the same idea, and shows in great detail how all the faculties of the soul are but modifications of sensation.29Both La Mettrie and Condillac believe that there is no gulf between man and the lower animals; but this leads to a point of disagreement between the two philosophers, for Condillac absolutely denies that animals can be mere machines,30and we must suppose that he would the more ardently oppose the teaching that man is merely a complicated machine!Condillac finally, unlike La Mettrie, believes in the existence of God. A final point of contrast also concerns the theology of the two writers. La Mettrie insists that we can not be sure that there is any purpose in the world, while Condillac affirms that we can discern intelligence and design throughout the universe.31Like La Mettrie and Condillac, Helvetius teaches that all the faculties of the mind can be reduced to sensation.32Unlike La Mettrie, he specifically distinguishes the mind from the soul, and describes the mind as a later developed product of the soul or faculty of sensation.33This idea may have been suggested by La Mettrie’s statement that reason is a modification of sensation. Helvetius, however, unlike La Mettrie, does not clearly decide that sensation is but a result of bodily conditions, and he admits that sensation may be a modification of a spiritual substance.34Moreover, he claims that climate and food have no effect on the mind, and that the superiority of the understanding is not dependent on the strength of the body and its organs.35La Mettrie and Helvetius resemble each other in ethical doctrine. Both make pleasure and pain the ruling motives of man’s conduct. They claim that all the emotions are merely modifications of corporeal pleasure and pain, and that therefore the only principle of action in man is the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain.36b.The Likeness to La Mettrie of the French Materialist, Baron Paul Heinrich Dietrich von Holbach(1723–1789).As Condillac and Helvetius emphasize the sensationalism taught by La Mettrie, so Holbach’s book is a reiteration and elaboration of the materialism set forth in La Mettrie’s works. The teaching of Holbach is so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be a coincidence.La Mettrie regards experience as the only teacher. Holbach dwells on this same idea, and insists that experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters.37Holbach likewise teaches that man is a purely material being. He disbelieves in any spiritual reality whatsoever, and makes matter the only substance in the world. He lays stress, also, on one thought which is a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s teaching. La Mettrie has limited the action of the will and has insisted that the will is dependent on bodily conditions. Holbach goes further and declares repeatedly that all freedom is a delusion, and that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity.38This teaching seems to be the natural outcome of the belief that man is a machine.Holbach’s atheistic theology is more extreme than his predecessor’s, for La Mettrie admits that God may exist, while Holbach vigorously opposes the possibility. Moreover Holbach holds the opinion, barely suggested by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would ameliorate the condition of mankind.39He insists that the idea of God has hindered the progress of reason and interfered with natural law. Holbach is indeed the only one of the philosophers here discussed, who frankly adopts a fatalistic and atheistic doctrine of the universe. In these respects, his teaching is the culmination of French materialism.1“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” chapters XI, VIII.↑2“Man a Machine,” p. 142. Cf. La Mettrie’s commentary on Descartes’s teaching in “Abrégé des systèmes philosophiques,”Œuvres, Tome 2.↑3“Abrégé des systèmes, Descartes,” p. 6,Œuvres Philosophiques, Tome 2.↑4“Man a Machine,” page 89. Cf. “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme” (or “Traité de l’âme”),Œuvres, 1746, p. 229.↑5Descartes, “Principles,” Part II, Prop. 4.↑6“Man a Machine,” pp. 122–126.↑7Ibid., p. 142.↑8Hobbes, “Leviathan,” Part III, Chap. 34; Part I, Chap. XII, Open Court Edition, p. 169.↑9“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chapters III, V, and VI.↑10“Leviathan,”Part I, Chap. I. Cf. “Concerning Body,” Part IV, Chap. XXV, 2.↑11“Man a Machine,” pp. 90–91.↑12“Leviathan,” Part I, Chap. VI, Molesworth Ed., p. 40. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 90.↑13Ibid., Part I, Chap. IV. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 103.↑14Ibid., Part I, Chap. XII.↑15“Letters to Serena,” V, p. 168.↑16Ibid., p. 196.↑17Ibid., p. 203.↑18Ibid., p. 199.↑19“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. V, p. 94.↑20“Man a Machine,” p. 139.↑21“Man a Machine,”p. 140.↑22“Letters to Serena,” V, p. 227.↑23Ibid., V, p. 234.↑24John Locke, “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book I, Book II, Chap. I.↑25Locke, “Essay,” Book II, Chap. 8.↑26Ibid., Book II, Chap. 23.↑27Ibid., Book IV, Chap. 10. For La Mettrie’s summary of Locke, cf. his “Abrégé des systèmes,”Œuvres, Tome 2.↑28F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. II, Chap. II.↑29“Traité des sensations,” Part I.↑30“Traité des animaux,” Chap. I, p. 454.↑31“Traité des animaux,” Chap. VI, p. 577 ff.↑32“Treatise on Man,” Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 96.↑33Ibid., Sect. II, Chap. II, p. 108.↑34“Essays on the Mind,” Essay II, Chap. I,p. 35.↑35“Treatise on Man,” Chap. XII, p. 161.↑36Ibid., Chap. IX, p. 146; Chap. VII, p. 129.↑37“Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 6.↑38“Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VI, p. 94.↑39Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451, and Chap. XXVI, p. 485. Cf. “Man a Machine,” pp. 125–126.↑

LA METTRIE’S RELATION TO HIS PREDECESSORS AND TO HIS SUCCESSORS.I.The Historical Relation of La Mettrie toRenéDescartes(1596–1650).The most direct source of La Mettrie’s work, if the physiological aspect of his system is set aside, is found in the philosophy of Descartes. In fact it sometimes seems as if La Mettrie’s materialism grew out of his insistence on the contradictory character of the dualistic system of Descartes. He criticises Descartes’s statement that the body and soul are absolutely independent, and takes great pains to show the dependence of the soul on the body. Yet though La Mettrie’s system may be opposed to that of Descartes1from one point of view, from another point of view it seems to be a direct consequence of it. La Mettrie himself recognizes this relationship and feels that his doctrine that man is a machine, is a natural inference from Descartes’s teaching that animals are mere machines.2Moreover La Mettrie carries on Descartes’s conception of the body as a machine, and many of his detailed discussions of the machinery of the body seem to have been drawn from Descartes.It should be noted that La Mettrie did justice to Descartes, and realized how much all philosophers owed to him. He insisted moreover that Descartes’s errors were due to his failure to follow his own method.3Yet La Mettrie’s method was different from that of Descartes, for La Mettrie was an empiricist4without rationalistic leaning. As regards doctrine: La Mettrie differed from Descartes in his opinion of matter. Since he disbelieved in any spiritual reality, he gave matter the attributes of motion and thought, while Descartes insisted that the one attribute of matter is extension.5It was a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s disbelief in spiritual substance that he could throw doubt on the existence of God.6On the other hand the belief in God was one of the foundations of Descartes’s system. La Mettrie tried to show that Descartes’s belief in a soul and in God was merely designed to hide his true thought from the priests, and to save himself from persecution.7IIa.The Likeness of La Mettrie to the English Materialists, Thomas Hobbes(1588–1679) andJohn Toland(1670–1721).The influence of Descartes upon La Mettrie cannot be questioned but it is more difficult to estimate the influence upon him of materialistic philosophers.Hobbes published “The Leviathan” in 1651 and “De Corpore” in 1655. Thus he wrote about a century before La Mettrie, and since the eighteenth century was one in which the influence of England upon France was very great, it is easy to suppose that La Mettrie had read Hobbes. If so, he must have gained many ideas from him. The extent of this influence is, however, unknown, for La Mettrie rarely if ever quotes from Hobbes, or attributes any of his doctrines to Hobbes.In the first place, both Hobbes and La Mettrie are thoroughgoing materialists. They both believe that body is the only reality, and that anything spiritual is unimaginable.8Furthermore their conceptions of matter are very similar. According to La Mettrie, matter contains the faculty of sensation and the power of motion as well as the quality of extension.9This same conception of matter is held by Hobbes, for he specifically attributes extension and motion to matter, and then reduces sensation to a kind of internal motion.10Thus sensation also may be an attribute of matter. Moreover Hobbes and La Mettrie are in agreement on many smaller points, and La Mettrie elaborates much that is suggested in Hobbes. They both believe that the passions are dependent on bodily conditions.11They agree in the belief that all the differences in men are due to differences in the constitution and organizationof their bodies.12They both discuss the nature and importance of language.13Hobbesdiffersfrom La Mettrie in holding that we can be sure that God exists as the cause of this world.14However even though he thinks that it is possible to know that God exists, he does not believe that we can know his nature.La Mettrie’s system may be regarded as the application of a system like that of Hobbes to the special problem of the relation of soul and body in man; for if there is nothing in the universe but matter and motion, it inevitably follows that man is merely a very complicated machine.There is great similarity also between the doctrine of La Mettrie and that of Toland. It is interesting to note the points of resemblance and of difference. Toland’s “Letters to Serena,” which contain much of his philosophical teaching, were published in 1704. There is a possibility therefore that La Mettrie read them and gained some suggestions from them.The point most emphasized in Toland’s teaching15is that motion is an attribute of matter. He argues for this belief on the ground that matter must be essentially active in order to undergo change,16and that the conception of the inertness of matter is based on the conception of absolute rest, and that this absolute rest is nowhere to befound.17Since motion is essential to matter, there is no need, Toland believes, to account for the beginning of motion. Those who have regarded matter as inert have had to find some efficient cause for motion, and to do this, they have held that all nature is animated. But this pretended animation is utterly useless, since matter is itself endowed with motion.18The likeness to La Mettrie is evident. La Mettrie likewise opposes the doctrine of the animation of matter, and the belief in any external cause of motion.19Yet he feels the need of postulating some beginning of motion,20and although he uses the conception so freely, he does not agree with Toland that the nature of motion is known. He believes that it is impossible to know the nature of motion,21while Toland believes that the nature of motion is self-evident.22Another point of contrast between Toland and La Mettrie is in their doctrines of God. Toland believes that God, “a pure spirit or immaterial being,” is necessary for his system,23while La Mettrie questions God’s existence and insists that immateriality and spirituality are fine words that no one understands.It must be admitted, in truth, that La Mettrie and Toland have different interests and different points of view. Toland is concerned to discover the essential nature of matter, while La Mettrie’s problemis to find the specific relation of body and mind. On this relation, he builds his whole system.b.The Relation of La Mettrie to an English Sensationalist: John Locke(1632–1704).Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” was published in 1690, and La Mettrie, like most cultured Frenchmen of the Enlightenment, was influenced by his teaching. The main agreement between Locke and La Mettrie is in their doctrine that all ideas are derived from sensation. Both vigorously oppose the belief in innate ideas,24teaching that even our most complex and our most abstract ideas are gained through sensation. But La Mettrie does not follow Locke in analyzing these ideas and in concluding that many sensible qualities of objects—such as colors, sounds, etc.—have no existence outside the mind.25He rejects Locke’s doctrine of spiritual substances,26and opposes Locke’s theistic teaching, laying stress, on the other hand, upon Locke’s admission of the possibility that “thinking being may also be material.”27IIIa.The Likeness, probable but unacknowledged, to La Mettrie, of the French Sensationalists, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac(1715–1780)and Claude Adrien Helvetius(1715–1771).Condillac’s “Traité des sensations” was published about ten years after La Mettrie’s “L’histoire naturellede l’âme,” and therefore it is probable that Condillac had read this work, and gained some ideas from it. Yet Condillac never mentions La Mettrie’s name nor cites his doctrines. This omission may be accounted for by the fact that the works of La Mettrie had been so condemned that later philosophers wished to conceal the similarity of their doctrines to his. Whether the sensationalists were influenced by his teachings or not, there is such a profound likeness in their teachings, that La Mettrie may well be regarded as one of the first French sensationalists as well as one of the leading French materialists of the time.Condillac and La Mettrie agree that experience is the source of all knowledge. As Lange suggests,28La Mettrie’s development of reason from the imagination may have suggested to Condillac the way to develop all the faculties from the soul. La Mettrie asserts that reason is but the sensitive soul contemplating its ideas, and that imagination plays all the rôles of the soul, while Condillac elaborates the same idea, and shows in great detail how all the faculties of the soul are but modifications of sensation.29Both La Mettrie and Condillac believe that there is no gulf between man and the lower animals; but this leads to a point of disagreement between the two philosophers, for Condillac absolutely denies that animals can be mere machines,30and we must suppose that he would the more ardently oppose the teaching that man is merely a complicated machine!Condillac finally, unlike La Mettrie, believes in the existence of God. A final point of contrast also concerns the theology of the two writers. La Mettrie insists that we can not be sure that there is any purpose in the world, while Condillac affirms that we can discern intelligence and design throughout the universe.31Like La Mettrie and Condillac, Helvetius teaches that all the faculties of the mind can be reduced to sensation.32Unlike La Mettrie, he specifically distinguishes the mind from the soul, and describes the mind as a later developed product of the soul or faculty of sensation.33This idea may have been suggested by La Mettrie’s statement that reason is a modification of sensation. Helvetius, however, unlike La Mettrie, does not clearly decide that sensation is but a result of bodily conditions, and he admits that sensation may be a modification of a spiritual substance.34Moreover, he claims that climate and food have no effect on the mind, and that the superiority of the understanding is not dependent on the strength of the body and its organs.35La Mettrie and Helvetius resemble each other in ethical doctrine. Both make pleasure and pain the ruling motives of man’s conduct. They claim that all the emotions are merely modifications of corporeal pleasure and pain, and that therefore the only principle of action in man is the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain.36b.The Likeness to La Mettrie of the French Materialist, Baron Paul Heinrich Dietrich von Holbach(1723–1789).As Condillac and Helvetius emphasize the sensationalism taught by La Mettrie, so Holbach’s book is a reiteration and elaboration of the materialism set forth in La Mettrie’s works. The teaching of Holbach is so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be a coincidence.La Mettrie regards experience as the only teacher. Holbach dwells on this same idea, and insists that experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters.37Holbach likewise teaches that man is a purely material being. He disbelieves in any spiritual reality whatsoever, and makes matter the only substance in the world. He lays stress, also, on one thought which is a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s teaching. La Mettrie has limited the action of the will and has insisted that the will is dependent on bodily conditions. Holbach goes further and declares repeatedly that all freedom is a delusion, and that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity.38This teaching seems to be the natural outcome of the belief that man is a machine.Holbach’s atheistic theology is more extreme than his predecessor’s, for La Mettrie admits that God may exist, while Holbach vigorously opposes the possibility. Moreover Holbach holds the opinion, barely suggested by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would ameliorate the condition of mankind.39He insists that the idea of God has hindered the progress of reason and interfered with natural law. Holbach is indeed the only one of the philosophers here discussed, who frankly adopts a fatalistic and atheistic doctrine of the universe. In these respects, his teaching is the culmination of French materialism.

I.The Historical Relation of La Mettrie toRenéDescartes(1596–1650).The most direct source of La Mettrie’s work, if the physiological aspect of his system is set aside, is found in the philosophy of Descartes. In fact it sometimes seems as if La Mettrie’s materialism grew out of his insistence on the contradictory character of the dualistic system of Descartes. He criticises Descartes’s statement that the body and soul are absolutely independent, and takes great pains to show the dependence of the soul on the body. Yet though La Mettrie’s system may be opposed to that of Descartes1from one point of view, from another point of view it seems to be a direct consequence of it. La Mettrie himself recognizes this relationship and feels that his doctrine that man is a machine, is a natural inference from Descartes’s teaching that animals are mere machines.2Moreover La Mettrie carries on Descartes’s conception of the body as a machine, and many of his detailed discussions of the machinery of the body seem to have been drawn from Descartes.It should be noted that La Mettrie did justice to Descartes, and realized how much all philosophers owed to him. He insisted moreover that Descartes’s errors were due to his failure to follow his own method.3Yet La Mettrie’s method was different from that of Descartes, for La Mettrie was an empiricist4without rationalistic leaning. As regards doctrine: La Mettrie differed from Descartes in his opinion of matter. Since he disbelieved in any spiritual reality, he gave matter the attributes of motion and thought, while Descartes insisted that the one attribute of matter is extension.5It was a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s disbelief in spiritual substance that he could throw doubt on the existence of God.6On the other hand the belief in God was one of the foundations of Descartes’s system. La Mettrie tried to show that Descartes’s belief in a soul and in God was merely designed to hide his true thought from the priests, and to save himself from persecution.7

I.The Historical Relation of La Mettrie toRenéDescartes(1596–1650).

The most direct source of La Mettrie’s work, if the physiological aspect of his system is set aside, is found in the philosophy of Descartes. In fact it sometimes seems as if La Mettrie’s materialism grew out of his insistence on the contradictory character of the dualistic system of Descartes. He criticises Descartes’s statement that the body and soul are absolutely independent, and takes great pains to show the dependence of the soul on the body. Yet though La Mettrie’s system may be opposed to that of Descartes1from one point of view, from another point of view it seems to be a direct consequence of it. La Mettrie himself recognizes this relationship and feels that his doctrine that man is a machine, is a natural inference from Descartes’s teaching that animals are mere machines.2Moreover La Mettrie carries on Descartes’s conception of the body as a machine, and many of his detailed discussions of the machinery of the body seem to have been drawn from Descartes.It should be noted that La Mettrie did justice to Descartes, and realized how much all philosophers owed to him. He insisted moreover that Descartes’s errors were due to his failure to follow his own method.3Yet La Mettrie’s method was different from that of Descartes, for La Mettrie was an empiricist4without rationalistic leaning. As regards doctrine: La Mettrie differed from Descartes in his opinion of matter. Since he disbelieved in any spiritual reality, he gave matter the attributes of motion and thought, while Descartes insisted that the one attribute of matter is extension.5It was a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s disbelief in spiritual substance that he could throw doubt on the existence of God.6On the other hand the belief in God was one of the foundations of Descartes’s system. La Mettrie tried to show that Descartes’s belief in a soul and in God was merely designed to hide his true thought from the priests, and to save himself from persecution.7

The most direct source of La Mettrie’s work, if the physiological aspect of his system is set aside, is found in the philosophy of Descartes. In fact it sometimes seems as if La Mettrie’s materialism grew out of his insistence on the contradictory character of the dualistic system of Descartes. He criticises Descartes’s statement that the body and soul are absolutely independent, and takes great pains to show the dependence of the soul on the body. Yet though La Mettrie’s system may be opposed to that of Descartes1from one point of view, from another point of view it seems to be a direct consequence of it. La Mettrie himself recognizes this relationship and feels that his doctrine that man is a machine, is a natural inference from Descartes’s teaching that animals are mere machines.2Moreover La Mettrie carries on Descartes’s conception of the body as a machine, and many of his detailed discussions of the machinery of the body seem to have been drawn from Descartes.

It should be noted that La Mettrie did justice to Descartes, and realized how much all philosophers owed to him. He insisted moreover that Descartes’s errors were due to his failure to follow his own method.3Yet La Mettrie’s method was different from that of Descartes, for La Mettrie was an empiricist4without rationalistic leaning. As regards doctrine: La Mettrie differed from Descartes in his opinion of matter. Since he disbelieved in any spiritual reality, he gave matter the attributes of motion and thought, while Descartes insisted that the one attribute of matter is extension.5It was a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s disbelief in spiritual substance that he could throw doubt on the existence of God.6On the other hand the belief in God was one of the foundations of Descartes’s system. La Mettrie tried to show that Descartes’s belief in a soul and in God was merely designed to hide his true thought from the priests, and to save himself from persecution.7

IIa.The Likeness of La Mettrie to the English Materialists, Thomas Hobbes(1588–1679) andJohn Toland(1670–1721).The influence of Descartes upon La Mettrie cannot be questioned but it is more difficult to estimate the influence upon him of materialistic philosophers.Hobbes published “The Leviathan” in 1651 and “De Corpore” in 1655. Thus he wrote about a century before La Mettrie, and since the eighteenth century was one in which the influence of England upon France was very great, it is easy to suppose that La Mettrie had read Hobbes. If so, he must have gained many ideas from him. The extent of this influence is, however, unknown, for La Mettrie rarely if ever quotes from Hobbes, or attributes any of his doctrines to Hobbes.In the first place, both Hobbes and La Mettrie are thoroughgoing materialists. They both believe that body is the only reality, and that anything spiritual is unimaginable.8Furthermore their conceptions of matter are very similar. According to La Mettrie, matter contains the faculty of sensation and the power of motion as well as the quality of extension.9This same conception of matter is held by Hobbes, for he specifically attributes extension and motion to matter, and then reduces sensation to a kind of internal motion.10Thus sensation also may be an attribute of matter. Moreover Hobbes and La Mettrie are in agreement on many smaller points, and La Mettrie elaborates much that is suggested in Hobbes. They both believe that the passions are dependent on bodily conditions.11They agree in the belief that all the differences in men are due to differences in the constitution and organizationof their bodies.12They both discuss the nature and importance of language.13Hobbesdiffersfrom La Mettrie in holding that we can be sure that God exists as the cause of this world.14However even though he thinks that it is possible to know that God exists, he does not believe that we can know his nature.La Mettrie’s system may be regarded as the application of a system like that of Hobbes to the special problem of the relation of soul and body in man; for if there is nothing in the universe but matter and motion, it inevitably follows that man is merely a very complicated machine.There is great similarity also between the doctrine of La Mettrie and that of Toland. It is interesting to note the points of resemblance and of difference. Toland’s “Letters to Serena,” which contain much of his philosophical teaching, were published in 1704. There is a possibility therefore that La Mettrie read them and gained some suggestions from them.The point most emphasized in Toland’s teaching15is that motion is an attribute of matter. He argues for this belief on the ground that matter must be essentially active in order to undergo change,16and that the conception of the inertness of matter is based on the conception of absolute rest, and that this absolute rest is nowhere to befound.17Since motion is essential to matter, there is no need, Toland believes, to account for the beginning of motion. Those who have regarded matter as inert have had to find some efficient cause for motion, and to do this, they have held that all nature is animated. But this pretended animation is utterly useless, since matter is itself endowed with motion.18The likeness to La Mettrie is evident. La Mettrie likewise opposes the doctrine of the animation of matter, and the belief in any external cause of motion.19Yet he feels the need of postulating some beginning of motion,20and although he uses the conception so freely, he does not agree with Toland that the nature of motion is known. He believes that it is impossible to know the nature of motion,21while Toland believes that the nature of motion is self-evident.22Another point of contrast between Toland and La Mettrie is in their doctrines of God. Toland believes that God, “a pure spirit or immaterial being,” is necessary for his system,23while La Mettrie questions God’s existence and insists that immateriality and spirituality are fine words that no one understands.It must be admitted, in truth, that La Mettrie and Toland have different interests and different points of view. Toland is concerned to discover the essential nature of matter, while La Mettrie’s problemis to find the specific relation of body and mind. On this relation, he builds his whole system.b.The Relation of La Mettrie to an English Sensationalist: John Locke(1632–1704).Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” was published in 1690, and La Mettrie, like most cultured Frenchmen of the Enlightenment, was influenced by his teaching. The main agreement between Locke and La Mettrie is in their doctrine that all ideas are derived from sensation. Both vigorously oppose the belief in innate ideas,24teaching that even our most complex and our most abstract ideas are gained through sensation. But La Mettrie does not follow Locke in analyzing these ideas and in concluding that many sensible qualities of objects—such as colors, sounds, etc.—have no existence outside the mind.25He rejects Locke’s doctrine of spiritual substances,26and opposes Locke’s theistic teaching, laying stress, on the other hand, upon Locke’s admission of the possibility that “thinking being may also be material.”27

IIa.The Likeness of La Mettrie to the English Materialists, Thomas Hobbes(1588–1679) andJohn Toland(1670–1721).

The influence of Descartes upon La Mettrie cannot be questioned but it is more difficult to estimate the influence upon him of materialistic philosophers.Hobbes published “The Leviathan” in 1651 and “De Corpore” in 1655. Thus he wrote about a century before La Mettrie, and since the eighteenth century was one in which the influence of England upon France was very great, it is easy to suppose that La Mettrie had read Hobbes. If so, he must have gained many ideas from him. The extent of this influence is, however, unknown, for La Mettrie rarely if ever quotes from Hobbes, or attributes any of his doctrines to Hobbes.In the first place, both Hobbes and La Mettrie are thoroughgoing materialists. They both believe that body is the only reality, and that anything spiritual is unimaginable.8Furthermore their conceptions of matter are very similar. According to La Mettrie, matter contains the faculty of sensation and the power of motion as well as the quality of extension.9This same conception of matter is held by Hobbes, for he specifically attributes extension and motion to matter, and then reduces sensation to a kind of internal motion.10Thus sensation also may be an attribute of matter. Moreover Hobbes and La Mettrie are in agreement on many smaller points, and La Mettrie elaborates much that is suggested in Hobbes. They both believe that the passions are dependent on bodily conditions.11They agree in the belief that all the differences in men are due to differences in the constitution and organizationof their bodies.12They both discuss the nature and importance of language.13Hobbesdiffersfrom La Mettrie in holding that we can be sure that God exists as the cause of this world.14However even though he thinks that it is possible to know that God exists, he does not believe that we can know his nature.La Mettrie’s system may be regarded as the application of a system like that of Hobbes to the special problem of the relation of soul and body in man; for if there is nothing in the universe but matter and motion, it inevitably follows that man is merely a very complicated machine.There is great similarity also between the doctrine of La Mettrie and that of Toland. It is interesting to note the points of resemblance and of difference. Toland’s “Letters to Serena,” which contain much of his philosophical teaching, were published in 1704. There is a possibility therefore that La Mettrie read them and gained some suggestions from them.The point most emphasized in Toland’s teaching15is that motion is an attribute of matter. He argues for this belief on the ground that matter must be essentially active in order to undergo change,16and that the conception of the inertness of matter is based on the conception of absolute rest, and that this absolute rest is nowhere to befound.17Since motion is essential to matter, there is no need, Toland believes, to account for the beginning of motion. Those who have regarded matter as inert have had to find some efficient cause for motion, and to do this, they have held that all nature is animated. But this pretended animation is utterly useless, since matter is itself endowed with motion.18The likeness to La Mettrie is evident. La Mettrie likewise opposes the doctrine of the animation of matter, and the belief in any external cause of motion.19Yet he feels the need of postulating some beginning of motion,20and although he uses the conception so freely, he does not agree with Toland that the nature of motion is known. He believes that it is impossible to know the nature of motion,21while Toland believes that the nature of motion is self-evident.22Another point of contrast between Toland and La Mettrie is in their doctrines of God. Toland believes that God, “a pure spirit or immaterial being,” is necessary for his system,23while La Mettrie questions God’s existence and insists that immateriality and spirituality are fine words that no one understands.It must be admitted, in truth, that La Mettrie and Toland have different interests and different points of view. Toland is concerned to discover the essential nature of matter, while La Mettrie’s problemis to find the specific relation of body and mind. On this relation, he builds his whole system.b.The Relation of La Mettrie to an English Sensationalist: John Locke(1632–1704).Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” was published in 1690, and La Mettrie, like most cultured Frenchmen of the Enlightenment, was influenced by his teaching. The main agreement between Locke and La Mettrie is in their doctrine that all ideas are derived from sensation. Both vigorously oppose the belief in innate ideas,24teaching that even our most complex and our most abstract ideas are gained through sensation. But La Mettrie does not follow Locke in analyzing these ideas and in concluding that many sensible qualities of objects—such as colors, sounds, etc.—have no existence outside the mind.25He rejects Locke’s doctrine of spiritual substances,26and opposes Locke’s theistic teaching, laying stress, on the other hand, upon Locke’s admission of the possibility that “thinking being may also be material.”27

The influence of Descartes upon La Mettrie cannot be questioned but it is more difficult to estimate the influence upon him of materialistic philosophers.Hobbes published “The Leviathan” in 1651 and “De Corpore” in 1655. Thus he wrote about a century before La Mettrie, and since the eighteenth century was one in which the influence of England upon France was very great, it is easy to suppose that La Mettrie had read Hobbes. If so, he must have gained many ideas from him. The extent of this influence is, however, unknown, for La Mettrie rarely if ever quotes from Hobbes, or attributes any of his doctrines to Hobbes.

In the first place, both Hobbes and La Mettrie are thoroughgoing materialists. They both believe that body is the only reality, and that anything spiritual is unimaginable.8Furthermore their conceptions of matter are very similar. According to La Mettrie, matter contains the faculty of sensation and the power of motion as well as the quality of extension.9This same conception of matter is held by Hobbes, for he specifically attributes extension and motion to matter, and then reduces sensation to a kind of internal motion.10Thus sensation also may be an attribute of matter. Moreover Hobbes and La Mettrie are in agreement on many smaller points, and La Mettrie elaborates much that is suggested in Hobbes. They both believe that the passions are dependent on bodily conditions.11They agree in the belief that all the differences in men are due to differences in the constitution and organizationof their bodies.12They both discuss the nature and importance of language.13

Hobbesdiffersfrom La Mettrie in holding that we can be sure that God exists as the cause of this world.14However even though he thinks that it is possible to know that God exists, he does not believe that we can know his nature.

La Mettrie’s system may be regarded as the application of a system like that of Hobbes to the special problem of the relation of soul and body in man; for if there is nothing in the universe but matter and motion, it inevitably follows that man is merely a very complicated machine.

There is great similarity also between the doctrine of La Mettrie and that of Toland. It is interesting to note the points of resemblance and of difference. Toland’s “Letters to Serena,” which contain much of his philosophical teaching, were published in 1704. There is a possibility therefore that La Mettrie read them and gained some suggestions from them.

The point most emphasized in Toland’s teaching15is that motion is an attribute of matter. He argues for this belief on the ground that matter must be essentially active in order to undergo change,16and that the conception of the inertness of matter is based on the conception of absolute rest, and that this absolute rest is nowhere to befound.17Since motion is essential to matter, there is no need, Toland believes, to account for the beginning of motion. Those who have regarded matter as inert have had to find some efficient cause for motion, and to do this, they have held that all nature is animated. But this pretended animation is utterly useless, since matter is itself endowed with motion.18The likeness to La Mettrie is evident. La Mettrie likewise opposes the doctrine of the animation of matter, and the belief in any external cause of motion.19Yet he feels the need of postulating some beginning of motion,20and although he uses the conception so freely, he does not agree with Toland that the nature of motion is known. He believes that it is impossible to know the nature of motion,21while Toland believes that the nature of motion is self-evident.22

Another point of contrast between Toland and La Mettrie is in their doctrines of God. Toland believes that God, “a pure spirit or immaterial being,” is necessary for his system,23while La Mettrie questions God’s existence and insists that immateriality and spirituality are fine words that no one understands.

It must be admitted, in truth, that La Mettrie and Toland have different interests and different points of view. Toland is concerned to discover the essential nature of matter, while La Mettrie’s problemis to find the specific relation of body and mind. On this relation, he builds his whole system.

b.The Relation of La Mettrie to an English Sensationalist: John Locke(1632–1704).Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” was published in 1690, and La Mettrie, like most cultured Frenchmen of the Enlightenment, was influenced by his teaching. The main agreement between Locke and La Mettrie is in their doctrine that all ideas are derived from sensation. Both vigorously oppose the belief in innate ideas,24teaching that even our most complex and our most abstract ideas are gained through sensation. But La Mettrie does not follow Locke in analyzing these ideas and in concluding that many sensible qualities of objects—such as colors, sounds, etc.—have no existence outside the mind.25He rejects Locke’s doctrine of spiritual substances,26and opposes Locke’s theistic teaching, laying stress, on the other hand, upon Locke’s admission of the possibility that “thinking being may also be material.”27

b.The Relation of La Mettrie to an English Sensationalist: John Locke(1632–1704).

Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” was published in 1690, and La Mettrie, like most cultured Frenchmen of the Enlightenment, was influenced by his teaching. The main agreement between Locke and La Mettrie is in their doctrine that all ideas are derived from sensation. Both vigorously oppose the belief in innate ideas,24teaching that even our most complex and our most abstract ideas are gained through sensation. But La Mettrie does not follow Locke in analyzing these ideas and in concluding that many sensible qualities of objects—such as colors, sounds, etc.—have no existence outside the mind.25He rejects Locke’s doctrine of spiritual substances,26and opposes Locke’s theistic teaching, laying stress, on the other hand, upon Locke’s admission of the possibility that “thinking being may also be material.”27

Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” was published in 1690, and La Mettrie, like most cultured Frenchmen of the Enlightenment, was influenced by his teaching. The main agreement between Locke and La Mettrie is in their doctrine that all ideas are derived from sensation. Both vigorously oppose the belief in innate ideas,24teaching that even our most complex and our most abstract ideas are gained through sensation. But La Mettrie does not follow Locke in analyzing these ideas and in concluding that many sensible qualities of objects—such as colors, sounds, etc.—have no existence outside the mind.25He rejects Locke’s doctrine of spiritual substances,26and opposes Locke’s theistic teaching, laying stress, on the other hand, upon Locke’s admission of the possibility that “thinking being may also be material.”27

IIIa.The Likeness, probable but unacknowledged, to La Mettrie, of the French Sensationalists, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac(1715–1780)and Claude Adrien Helvetius(1715–1771).Condillac’s “Traité des sensations” was published about ten years after La Mettrie’s “L’histoire naturellede l’âme,” and therefore it is probable that Condillac had read this work, and gained some ideas from it. Yet Condillac never mentions La Mettrie’s name nor cites his doctrines. This omission may be accounted for by the fact that the works of La Mettrie had been so condemned that later philosophers wished to conceal the similarity of their doctrines to his. Whether the sensationalists were influenced by his teachings or not, there is such a profound likeness in their teachings, that La Mettrie may well be regarded as one of the first French sensationalists as well as one of the leading French materialists of the time.Condillac and La Mettrie agree that experience is the source of all knowledge. As Lange suggests,28La Mettrie’s development of reason from the imagination may have suggested to Condillac the way to develop all the faculties from the soul. La Mettrie asserts that reason is but the sensitive soul contemplating its ideas, and that imagination plays all the rôles of the soul, while Condillac elaborates the same idea, and shows in great detail how all the faculties of the soul are but modifications of sensation.29Both La Mettrie and Condillac believe that there is no gulf between man and the lower animals; but this leads to a point of disagreement between the two philosophers, for Condillac absolutely denies that animals can be mere machines,30and we must suppose that he would the more ardently oppose the teaching that man is merely a complicated machine!Condillac finally, unlike La Mettrie, believes in the existence of God. A final point of contrast also concerns the theology of the two writers. La Mettrie insists that we can not be sure that there is any purpose in the world, while Condillac affirms that we can discern intelligence and design throughout the universe.31Like La Mettrie and Condillac, Helvetius teaches that all the faculties of the mind can be reduced to sensation.32Unlike La Mettrie, he specifically distinguishes the mind from the soul, and describes the mind as a later developed product of the soul or faculty of sensation.33This idea may have been suggested by La Mettrie’s statement that reason is a modification of sensation. Helvetius, however, unlike La Mettrie, does not clearly decide that sensation is but a result of bodily conditions, and he admits that sensation may be a modification of a spiritual substance.34Moreover, he claims that climate and food have no effect on the mind, and that the superiority of the understanding is not dependent on the strength of the body and its organs.35La Mettrie and Helvetius resemble each other in ethical doctrine. Both make pleasure and pain the ruling motives of man’s conduct. They claim that all the emotions are merely modifications of corporeal pleasure and pain, and that therefore the only principle of action in man is the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain.36b.The Likeness to La Mettrie of the French Materialist, Baron Paul Heinrich Dietrich von Holbach(1723–1789).As Condillac and Helvetius emphasize the sensationalism taught by La Mettrie, so Holbach’s book is a reiteration and elaboration of the materialism set forth in La Mettrie’s works. The teaching of Holbach is so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be a coincidence.La Mettrie regards experience as the only teacher. Holbach dwells on this same idea, and insists that experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters.37Holbach likewise teaches that man is a purely material being. He disbelieves in any spiritual reality whatsoever, and makes matter the only substance in the world. He lays stress, also, on one thought which is a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s teaching. La Mettrie has limited the action of the will and has insisted that the will is dependent on bodily conditions. Holbach goes further and declares repeatedly that all freedom is a delusion, and that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity.38This teaching seems to be the natural outcome of the belief that man is a machine.Holbach’s atheistic theology is more extreme than his predecessor’s, for La Mettrie admits that God may exist, while Holbach vigorously opposes the possibility. Moreover Holbach holds the opinion, barely suggested by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would ameliorate the condition of mankind.39He insists that the idea of God has hindered the progress of reason and interfered with natural law. Holbach is indeed the only one of the philosophers here discussed, who frankly adopts a fatalistic and atheistic doctrine of the universe. In these respects, his teaching is the culmination of French materialism.

IIIa.The Likeness, probable but unacknowledged, to La Mettrie, of the French Sensationalists, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac(1715–1780)and Claude Adrien Helvetius(1715–1771).

Condillac’s “Traité des sensations” was published about ten years after La Mettrie’s “L’histoire naturellede l’âme,” and therefore it is probable that Condillac had read this work, and gained some ideas from it. Yet Condillac never mentions La Mettrie’s name nor cites his doctrines. This omission may be accounted for by the fact that the works of La Mettrie had been so condemned that later philosophers wished to conceal the similarity of their doctrines to his. Whether the sensationalists were influenced by his teachings or not, there is such a profound likeness in their teachings, that La Mettrie may well be regarded as one of the first French sensationalists as well as one of the leading French materialists of the time.Condillac and La Mettrie agree that experience is the source of all knowledge. As Lange suggests,28La Mettrie’s development of reason from the imagination may have suggested to Condillac the way to develop all the faculties from the soul. La Mettrie asserts that reason is but the sensitive soul contemplating its ideas, and that imagination plays all the rôles of the soul, while Condillac elaborates the same idea, and shows in great detail how all the faculties of the soul are but modifications of sensation.29Both La Mettrie and Condillac believe that there is no gulf between man and the lower animals; but this leads to a point of disagreement between the two philosophers, for Condillac absolutely denies that animals can be mere machines,30and we must suppose that he would the more ardently oppose the teaching that man is merely a complicated machine!Condillac finally, unlike La Mettrie, believes in the existence of God. A final point of contrast also concerns the theology of the two writers. La Mettrie insists that we can not be sure that there is any purpose in the world, while Condillac affirms that we can discern intelligence and design throughout the universe.31Like La Mettrie and Condillac, Helvetius teaches that all the faculties of the mind can be reduced to sensation.32Unlike La Mettrie, he specifically distinguishes the mind from the soul, and describes the mind as a later developed product of the soul or faculty of sensation.33This idea may have been suggested by La Mettrie’s statement that reason is a modification of sensation. Helvetius, however, unlike La Mettrie, does not clearly decide that sensation is but a result of bodily conditions, and he admits that sensation may be a modification of a spiritual substance.34Moreover, he claims that climate and food have no effect on the mind, and that the superiority of the understanding is not dependent on the strength of the body and its organs.35La Mettrie and Helvetius resemble each other in ethical doctrine. Both make pleasure and pain the ruling motives of man’s conduct. They claim that all the emotions are merely modifications of corporeal pleasure and pain, and that therefore the only principle of action in man is the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain.36b.The Likeness to La Mettrie of the French Materialist, Baron Paul Heinrich Dietrich von Holbach(1723–1789).As Condillac and Helvetius emphasize the sensationalism taught by La Mettrie, so Holbach’s book is a reiteration and elaboration of the materialism set forth in La Mettrie’s works. The teaching of Holbach is so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be a coincidence.La Mettrie regards experience as the only teacher. Holbach dwells on this same idea, and insists that experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters.37Holbach likewise teaches that man is a purely material being. He disbelieves in any spiritual reality whatsoever, and makes matter the only substance in the world. He lays stress, also, on one thought which is a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s teaching. La Mettrie has limited the action of the will and has insisted that the will is dependent on bodily conditions. Holbach goes further and declares repeatedly that all freedom is a delusion, and that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity.38This teaching seems to be the natural outcome of the belief that man is a machine.Holbach’s atheistic theology is more extreme than his predecessor’s, for La Mettrie admits that God may exist, while Holbach vigorously opposes the possibility. Moreover Holbach holds the opinion, barely suggested by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would ameliorate the condition of mankind.39He insists that the idea of God has hindered the progress of reason and interfered with natural law. Holbach is indeed the only one of the philosophers here discussed, who frankly adopts a fatalistic and atheistic doctrine of the universe. In these respects, his teaching is the culmination of French materialism.

Condillac’s “Traité des sensations” was published about ten years after La Mettrie’s “L’histoire naturellede l’âme,” and therefore it is probable that Condillac had read this work, and gained some ideas from it. Yet Condillac never mentions La Mettrie’s name nor cites his doctrines. This omission may be accounted for by the fact that the works of La Mettrie had been so condemned that later philosophers wished to conceal the similarity of their doctrines to his. Whether the sensationalists were influenced by his teachings or not, there is such a profound likeness in their teachings, that La Mettrie may well be regarded as one of the first French sensationalists as well as one of the leading French materialists of the time.

Condillac and La Mettrie agree that experience is the source of all knowledge. As Lange suggests,28La Mettrie’s development of reason from the imagination may have suggested to Condillac the way to develop all the faculties from the soul. La Mettrie asserts that reason is but the sensitive soul contemplating its ideas, and that imagination plays all the rôles of the soul, while Condillac elaborates the same idea, and shows in great detail how all the faculties of the soul are but modifications of sensation.29

Both La Mettrie and Condillac believe that there is no gulf between man and the lower animals; but this leads to a point of disagreement between the two philosophers, for Condillac absolutely denies that animals can be mere machines,30and we must suppose that he would the more ardently oppose the teaching that man is merely a complicated machine!Condillac finally, unlike La Mettrie, believes in the existence of God. A final point of contrast also concerns the theology of the two writers. La Mettrie insists that we can not be sure that there is any purpose in the world, while Condillac affirms that we can discern intelligence and design throughout the universe.31

Like La Mettrie and Condillac, Helvetius teaches that all the faculties of the mind can be reduced to sensation.32Unlike La Mettrie, he specifically distinguishes the mind from the soul, and describes the mind as a later developed product of the soul or faculty of sensation.33This idea may have been suggested by La Mettrie’s statement that reason is a modification of sensation. Helvetius, however, unlike La Mettrie, does not clearly decide that sensation is but a result of bodily conditions, and he admits that sensation may be a modification of a spiritual substance.34Moreover, he claims that climate and food have no effect on the mind, and that the superiority of the understanding is not dependent on the strength of the body and its organs.35

La Mettrie and Helvetius resemble each other in ethical doctrine. Both make pleasure and pain the ruling motives of man’s conduct. They claim that all the emotions are merely modifications of corporeal pleasure and pain, and that therefore the only principle of action in man is the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain.36

b.The Likeness to La Mettrie of the French Materialist, Baron Paul Heinrich Dietrich von Holbach(1723–1789).As Condillac and Helvetius emphasize the sensationalism taught by La Mettrie, so Holbach’s book is a reiteration and elaboration of the materialism set forth in La Mettrie’s works. The teaching of Holbach is so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be a coincidence.La Mettrie regards experience as the only teacher. Holbach dwells on this same idea, and insists that experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters.37Holbach likewise teaches that man is a purely material being. He disbelieves in any spiritual reality whatsoever, and makes matter the only substance in the world. He lays stress, also, on one thought which is a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s teaching. La Mettrie has limited the action of the will and has insisted that the will is dependent on bodily conditions. Holbach goes further and declares repeatedly that all freedom is a delusion, and that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity.38This teaching seems to be the natural outcome of the belief that man is a machine.Holbach’s atheistic theology is more extreme than his predecessor’s, for La Mettrie admits that God may exist, while Holbach vigorously opposes the possibility. Moreover Holbach holds the opinion, barely suggested by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would ameliorate the condition of mankind.39He insists that the idea of God has hindered the progress of reason and interfered with natural law. Holbach is indeed the only one of the philosophers here discussed, who frankly adopts a fatalistic and atheistic doctrine of the universe. In these respects, his teaching is the culmination of French materialism.

b.The Likeness to La Mettrie of the French Materialist, Baron Paul Heinrich Dietrich von Holbach(1723–1789).

As Condillac and Helvetius emphasize the sensationalism taught by La Mettrie, so Holbach’s book is a reiteration and elaboration of the materialism set forth in La Mettrie’s works. The teaching of Holbach is so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be a coincidence.La Mettrie regards experience as the only teacher. Holbach dwells on this same idea, and insists that experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters.37Holbach likewise teaches that man is a purely material being. He disbelieves in any spiritual reality whatsoever, and makes matter the only substance in the world. He lays stress, also, on one thought which is a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s teaching. La Mettrie has limited the action of the will and has insisted that the will is dependent on bodily conditions. Holbach goes further and declares repeatedly that all freedom is a delusion, and that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity.38This teaching seems to be the natural outcome of the belief that man is a machine.Holbach’s atheistic theology is more extreme than his predecessor’s, for La Mettrie admits that God may exist, while Holbach vigorously opposes the possibility. Moreover Holbach holds the opinion, barely suggested by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would ameliorate the condition of mankind.39He insists that the idea of God has hindered the progress of reason and interfered with natural law. Holbach is indeed the only one of the philosophers here discussed, who frankly adopts a fatalistic and atheistic doctrine of the universe. In these respects, his teaching is the culmination of French materialism.

As Condillac and Helvetius emphasize the sensationalism taught by La Mettrie, so Holbach’s book is a reiteration and elaboration of the materialism set forth in La Mettrie’s works. The teaching of Holbach is so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be a coincidence.

La Mettrie regards experience as the only teacher. Holbach dwells on this same idea, and insists that experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters.37Holbach likewise teaches that man is a purely material being. He disbelieves in any spiritual reality whatsoever, and makes matter the only substance in the world. He lays stress, also, on one thought which is a natural consequence of La Mettrie’s teaching. La Mettrie has limited the action of the will and has insisted that the will is dependent on bodily conditions. Holbach goes further and declares repeatedly that all freedom is a delusion, and that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity.38This teaching seems to be the natural outcome of the belief that man is a machine.

Holbach’s atheistic theology is more extreme than his predecessor’s, for La Mettrie admits that God may exist, while Holbach vigorously opposes the possibility. Moreover Holbach holds the opinion, barely suggested by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would ameliorate the condition of mankind.39He insists that the idea of God has hindered the progress of reason and interfered with natural law. Holbach is indeed the only one of the philosophers here discussed, who frankly adopts a fatalistic and atheistic doctrine of the universe. In these respects, his teaching is the culmination of French materialism.

1“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” chapters XI, VIII.↑2“Man a Machine,” p. 142. Cf. La Mettrie’s commentary on Descartes’s teaching in “Abrégé des systèmes philosophiques,”Œuvres, Tome 2.↑3“Abrégé des systèmes, Descartes,” p. 6,Œuvres Philosophiques, Tome 2.↑4“Man a Machine,” page 89. Cf. “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme” (or “Traité de l’âme”),Œuvres, 1746, p. 229.↑5Descartes, “Principles,” Part II, Prop. 4.↑6“Man a Machine,” pp. 122–126.↑7Ibid., p. 142.↑8Hobbes, “Leviathan,” Part III, Chap. 34; Part I, Chap. XII, Open Court Edition, p. 169.↑9“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chapters III, V, and VI.↑10“Leviathan,”Part I, Chap. I. Cf. “Concerning Body,” Part IV, Chap. XXV, 2.↑11“Man a Machine,” pp. 90–91.↑12“Leviathan,” Part I, Chap. VI, Molesworth Ed., p. 40. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 90.↑13Ibid., Part I, Chap. IV. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 103.↑14Ibid., Part I, Chap. XII.↑15“Letters to Serena,” V, p. 168.↑16Ibid., p. 196.↑17Ibid., p. 203.↑18Ibid., p. 199.↑19“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. V, p. 94.↑20“Man a Machine,” p. 139.↑21“Man a Machine,”p. 140.↑22“Letters to Serena,” V, p. 227.↑23Ibid., V, p. 234.↑24John Locke, “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book I, Book II, Chap. I.↑25Locke, “Essay,” Book II, Chap. 8.↑26Ibid., Book II, Chap. 23.↑27Ibid., Book IV, Chap. 10. For La Mettrie’s summary of Locke, cf. his “Abrégé des systèmes,”Œuvres, Tome 2.↑28F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. II, Chap. II.↑29“Traité des sensations,” Part I.↑30“Traité des animaux,” Chap. I, p. 454.↑31“Traité des animaux,” Chap. VI, p. 577 ff.↑32“Treatise on Man,” Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 96.↑33Ibid., Sect. II, Chap. II, p. 108.↑34“Essays on the Mind,” Essay II, Chap. I,p. 35.↑35“Treatise on Man,” Chap. XII, p. 161.↑36Ibid., Chap. IX, p. 146; Chap. VII, p. 129.↑37“Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 6.↑38“Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VI, p. 94.↑39Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451, and Chap. XXVI, p. 485. Cf. “Man a Machine,” pp. 125–126.↑

1“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” chapters XI, VIII.↑2“Man a Machine,” p. 142. Cf. La Mettrie’s commentary on Descartes’s teaching in “Abrégé des systèmes philosophiques,”Œuvres, Tome 2.↑3“Abrégé des systèmes, Descartes,” p. 6,Œuvres Philosophiques, Tome 2.↑4“Man a Machine,” page 89. Cf. “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme” (or “Traité de l’âme”),Œuvres, 1746, p. 229.↑5Descartes, “Principles,” Part II, Prop. 4.↑6“Man a Machine,” pp. 122–126.↑7Ibid., p. 142.↑8Hobbes, “Leviathan,” Part III, Chap. 34; Part I, Chap. XII, Open Court Edition, p. 169.↑9“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chapters III, V, and VI.↑10“Leviathan,”Part I, Chap. I. Cf. “Concerning Body,” Part IV, Chap. XXV, 2.↑11“Man a Machine,” pp. 90–91.↑12“Leviathan,” Part I, Chap. VI, Molesworth Ed., p. 40. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 90.↑13Ibid., Part I, Chap. IV. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 103.↑14Ibid., Part I, Chap. XII.↑15“Letters to Serena,” V, p. 168.↑16Ibid., p. 196.↑17Ibid., p. 203.↑18Ibid., p. 199.↑19“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. V, p. 94.↑20“Man a Machine,” p. 139.↑21“Man a Machine,”p. 140.↑22“Letters to Serena,” V, p. 227.↑23Ibid., V, p. 234.↑24John Locke, “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book I, Book II, Chap. I.↑25Locke, “Essay,” Book II, Chap. 8.↑26Ibid., Book II, Chap. 23.↑27Ibid., Book IV, Chap. 10. For La Mettrie’s summary of Locke, cf. his “Abrégé des systèmes,”Œuvres, Tome 2.↑28F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. II, Chap. II.↑29“Traité des sensations,” Part I.↑30“Traité des animaux,” Chap. I, p. 454.↑31“Traité des animaux,” Chap. VI, p. 577 ff.↑32“Treatise on Man,” Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 96.↑33Ibid., Sect. II, Chap. II, p. 108.↑34“Essays on the Mind,” Essay II, Chap. I,p. 35.↑35“Treatise on Man,” Chap. XII, p. 161.↑36Ibid., Chap. IX, p. 146; Chap. VII, p. 129.↑37“Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 6.↑38“Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VI, p. 94.↑39Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451, and Chap. XXVI, p. 485. Cf. “Man a Machine,” pp. 125–126.↑

1“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” chapters XI, VIII.↑

2“Man a Machine,” p. 142. Cf. La Mettrie’s commentary on Descartes’s teaching in “Abrégé des systèmes philosophiques,”Œuvres, Tome 2.↑

3“Abrégé des systèmes, Descartes,” p. 6,Œuvres Philosophiques, Tome 2.↑

4“Man a Machine,” page 89. Cf. “L’histoire naturelle de l’âme” (or “Traité de l’âme”),Œuvres, 1746, p. 229.↑

5Descartes, “Principles,” Part II, Prop. 4.↑

6“Man a Machine,” pp. 122–126.↑

7Ibid., p. 142.↑

8Hobbes, “Leviathan,” Part III, Chap. 34; Part I, Chap. XII, Open Court Edition, p. 169.↑

9“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chapters III, V, and VI.↑

10“Leviathan,”Part I, Chap. I. Cf. “Concerning Body,” Part IV, Chap. XXV, 2.↑

11“Man a Machine,” pp. 90–91.↑

12“Leviathan,” Part I, Chap. VI, Molesworth Ed., p. 40. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 90.↑

13Ibid., Part I, Chap. IV. Cf. “Man a Machine,” p. 103.↑

14Ibid., Part I, Chap. XII.↑

15“Letters to Serena,” V, p. 168.↑

16Ibid., p. 196.↑

17Ibid., p. 203.↑

18Ibid., p. 199.↑

19“L’histoire naturelle de l’âme,” Chap. V, p. 94.↑

20“Man a Machine,” p. 139.↑

21“Man a Machine,”p. 140.↑

22“Letters to Serena,” V, p. 227.↑

23Ibid., V, p. 234.↑

24John Locke, “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Book I, Book II, Chap. I.↑

25Locke, “Essay,” Book II, Chap. 8.↑

26Ibid., Book II, Chap. 23.↑

27Ibid., Book IV, Chap. 10. For La Mettrie’s summary of Locke, cf. his “Abrégé des systèmes,”Œuvres, Tome 2.↑

28F. A. Lange, “History of Materialism,” Vol. II, Chap. II.↑

29“Traité des sensations,” Part I.↑

30“Traité des animaux,” Chap. I, p. 454.↑

31“Traité des animaux,” Chap. VI, p. 577 ff.↑

32“Treatise on Man,” Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 96.↑

33Ibid., Sect. II, Chap. II, p. 108.↑

34“Essays on the Mind,” Essay II, Chap. I,p. 35.↑

35“Treatise on Man,” Chap. XII, p. 161.↑

36Ibid., Chap. IX, p. 146; Chap. VII, p. 129.↑

37“Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 6.↑

38“Système de la nature,” Vol. I, Chap. VI, p. 94.↑

39Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451, and Chap. XXVI, p. 485. Cf. “Man a Machine,” pp. 125–126.↑

OUTLINE OF LA METTRIE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE.PAGES1I.Insistence on the Empirical Standpoint16f.; 88f.; 72, 142II.Arguments in Favor of Materialism:a.The “Soul” is Affected,1.By Disease18f.; 90f.2.By Sleep19f.; 91f.3.By Drugs20; 924.By Food21f.; 93ff.5.By Age and Sex23f.; 95f.6.By Temperature and Climate24f.; 96ff.b.There is No Sharp Distinction Between Men and Animals (Machines)28f., 100ff.; 41ff., 113ff.; 75f., 142f.c.Bodily Movements are Due to the “Motive Power” of the Body51ff., 129ff.III.Conception of Matter.a.Matter is Extended154f.b.Matter Has the Power of Motion70, 140; 156ff.c.Matter Has the Faculty of Feeling159ff.IV.Conception of Man:a.Man is a Machine17, 89; 21, 93; 56, 128; 69, 140f.; 73, 143; 80, 148b.All Man’s Faculties Reduce to Sense and Imagination35ff., 107ff.c.Man is Like Animals in Being Capable of Education38, 110d.Man is Ignorant of His Destiny79, 147V.Theological Doctrine:a.The Existence of God is Unproved and Practically Unimportant50, 122b.The Argument from Design is Ineffective Against the Hypothesis of Mechanical Causality51ff., 124ff.c.Atheism Makes for Happiness55, 126f.1The references are to pages of this book.↑

OUTLINE OF LA METTRIE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE.PAGES1I.Insistence on the Empirical Standpoint16f.; 88f.; 72, 142II.Arguments in Favor of Materialism:a.The “Soul” is Affected,1.By Disease18f.; 90f.2.By Sleep19f.; 91f.3.By Drugs20; 924.By Food21f.; 93ff.5.By Age and Sex23f.; 95f.6.By Temperature and Climate24f.; 96ff.b.There is No Sharp Distinction Between Men and Animals (Machines)28f., 100ff.; 41ff., 113ff.; 75f., 142f.c.Bodily Movements are Due to the “Motive Power” of the Body51ff., 129ff.III.Conception of Matter.a.Matter is Extended154f.b.Matter Has the Power of Motion70, 140; 156ff.c.Matter Has the Faculty of Feeling159ff.IV.Conception of Man:a.Man is a Machine17, 89; 21, 93; 56, 128; 69, 140f.; 73, 143; 80, 148b.All Man’s Faculties Reduce to Sense and Imagination35ff., 107ff.c.Man is Like Animals in Being Capable of Education38, 110d.Man is Ignorant of His Destiny79, 147V.Theological Doctrine:a.The Existence of God is Unproved and Practically Unimportant50, 122b.The Argument from Design is Ineffective Against the Hypothesis of Mechanical Causality51ff., 124ff.c.Atheism Makes for Happiness55, 126f.

1The references are to pages of this book.↑

1The references are to pages of this book.↑

1The references are to pages of this book.↑


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