APPENDICES
APPENDIX AIntelligence Ratings in the Army
Reprinted from The Personnel Manual(Vol. II of The Personnel System of the United States Army)
Reprinted from The Personnel Manual(Vol. II of The Personnel System of the United States Army)
Reprinted from The Personnel Manual
(Vol. II of The Personnel System of the United States Army)
Purpose of the Intelligence Tests.—Under the direction of the Division of Psychology, Medical Department, and in accordance with provisions of General Order No. 74, mental tests are given all recruits during the two-weeks detention period. These tests provide an immediate and reasonably dependable classification of the men according togeneral intelligence. Their specific purposes are to aid:—
(1) In the discovery of men whose superior intelligence suggests their consideration for advancement;
(2) In the prompt selection and assignment to Development Battalions of men who are so inferior mentally that they are suited only for selected assignments;
(3) In forming organizations of uniform mental strength where such uniformity is desired;
(4) In forming organizations of superior mental strength where such superiority is demanded by the nature of the work to be performed;
(5) In selecting suitable men for various army duties or for special training in colleges or technical schools;
(6) In the early formation of training groups within a company in order that each man may receive instruction and drill according to his ability to profit thereby;
(7) In the early recognition of slow-thinking minds which might otherwise be mistaken for stubborn or disobedient characters;
(8) In eliminating from the army those men whose low-grade intelligence renders them either a burden or a menace to the service.
Nature of the Tests.—The tests were prepared by a special committee of the American Psychological Association. Before being ordered into general use they were thoroughly tried out in four National Army Cantonments, and from time to time have undergone revision to increase their practical usefulness.Between May 1 and October 1, 1918, approximately one million three hundred thousand men were tested.
Three systems of test are now in use:—
(1)Alpha.This is a group test for men who read and write English. It requires only fifty minutes, and can be given to groups as large as 500. The test material is so arranged that each of its 212 questions may be answered without writing, merely by underlining, crossing out, or checking. The papers are later scored by means of stencils, so that nothing is left to the personal judgment of those who do the scoring. The mental rating which results is therefore wholly objective.
(2)Beta.This is a group test for foreigners and illiterates. It may be given to groups of from 75 to 300 and requires approximately fifty minutes. Success in Beta does not depend upon knowledge of English, as the instructions are given entirely by pantomime and demonstration. Like Alpha, it measures general intelligence, but does so through the use of concrete or picture material instead of by the use of printed language. It is also scored by stencils and yields an objective rating.
(3)Individual Tests.Three forms of individual tests are used: The Yerkes-Bridges Point Scale, the Stanford-Binet Scale, and the Performance Scale. An individual test requires from fifteen to thirty minutes. The instructions for the Performance Scale are given by means of gestures and demonstration, and a high score may be earned in it by an intelligent recruit who does not know a word of English.
All enlisted men are given either Alpha or Beta according to their degree of literacy. Those who fail in Alpha are given Beta, and those who fail to pass Test Beta are given an individual test.
As a result of the tests, each man is rated as A, B, C+, C, C−, D, D− or E. The letter ratings are reported to the Interviewing Section of the Personnel Office, and are there copied on the Qualification Cards (in the square marked Intelligence). The Psychological Report, after the grades have been copied on the Qualification Cards, is forwarded from the Interviewing Section to the Mustering Section of the Personnel Office, where each soldier’s letter rating is copied on the second page of his Service Record. A copy of the Psychological Report is also sent by the Psychological Examiner to the Company Commander, who uses it in the organization of his company. In some camps the entering of Intelligence Grades on Service Records has been left to company commanders, but accuracy and uniformity is secured by having these grades entered in the Mustering Section of the Personnel Office when the Service Records are being started.
The psychological staff in a camp is ordinarily able to test 2,000 men per day and to report the ratings to the Personnel Office within 24 hours. Personnel Adjutants will coöperate in arranging the schedule of psychological examinationsso as to secure from them maximum value (See Chapter IV for the proper coördination of the work of the Psychological Examiner with the work of other officers in a camp.)
Explanation of letter ratings.—The rating a man earns furnishes a fairly reliable index of hisability to learn,to think quickly and accurately,to analyze a situation,to maintain a state of mental alertness,and to comprehend and follow instructions. The score is little influenced by schooling. Some of the highest records have been made by men who had never completed the eighth grade. The meaning of the letter ratings is as follows:
A.Very Superior Intelligence.This grade is earned by only four or five soldiers out of a hundred. The “A” group is composed of men of marked intellectuality. “A” men are of high officer type when they are also endowed with leadership and other necessary qualities.
B.Superior Intelligence.“B” intelligence is superior, but less exceptional than that represented by “A.” The rating “B” is obtained by eight to ten soldiers out of a hundred. The group contains a good many men of the commissioned officer type and a large amount of non-commissioned officer material.
C+.High Average Intelligence.This group includes about fifteen to eighteen per cent. of all soldiers and contains a large amount of non-commissioned officer material with occasionally a man whose leadership and power to command fit him for commissioned rank.
C.Average Intelligence.Includes about twenty-five per cent. of soldiers. Excellent private type with a certain amount of fair non-commissioned officer material.
C−.Low Average Intelligence.Includes about twenty per cent. While below average in intelligence, “C−” men are usually good privates and satisfactory in work of routine nature.
D.Inferior Intelligence.Includes about fifteen per cent. of soldiers. “D” men are likely to be fair soldiers, but are usually slow in learning and rarely go above the rank of private. They are short on initiative and so require more than the usual amount of supervision. Many of them are illiterate or foreign.
D− and E.Very Inferior Intelligence.This group is divided into two classes (1) “D−” men, who are very inferior in intelligence but are considered fit for regular service; and (2) “E” men, those whose mental inferiority justifies their recommendation for Development Battalion, Special Service Organization, rejection, or discharge. The majority of “D−” and “E” men are below ten years in “mental age.”
The immense contrast between “A” and “D−” intelligence is shown by the fact that men of “A” intelligence have the ability to make a superior record in college or university, while “D−” men are of such inferior mentality that they arerarely able to go beyond the third or fourth grade of the elementary school, however long they attend. In fact, most “D−” and “E” men are below the “mental age” of ten years and at best are on the border-line of mental deficiency. Most of them are of the “moron” grade of feeble-mindedness. “B” intelligence is capable of making an average record in college, “C+” intelligence cannot do so well, while mentality of the “C” grade is rarely equal to high school graduation.
Evidence that the Tests Measure Military Value.—It has been thoroughly demonstrated that the intelligence ratings are very useful in indicating practical military value. The following investigations are typical:
1. Commanding officers of ten different organizations representing various arms in a camp were asked to designate:
(a) The most efficient men in the organization;
(b) Men of average value;
(c) Men so inferior that they were “barely able” to perform their duties.
The officers of these organizations had been with their men from six to twelve months and knew them exceptionally well. The total number of men rated was 965, about equally divided among “best,” “average,” and “poorest.” After the officers’ ratings had been made, the men were given the usual psychological test. Comparison of test results with officers’ ratings showed:
Considering that low military value may be caused by many things besides inferior intelligence, the above findings are very significant.
2. In an infantry regiment of another camp were 765 men (Regulars) who hadbeen with their officers for several months. The company commanders were asked to rate these men as 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 according to “practical soldier value,” “1” being highest, and “5” lowest. The men were then tested, with the following results:
3. In another camp the company officers of a regiment were asked to designate the ten “best” and ten “poorest” privates in each company. The officers had been with their men long enough to know them thoroughly. Comparison of the officers’ estimates with the results of intelligence tests brought out the following facts:
4. The same experiment was made in still another camp. Officers of 36 different companies picked the ten “best” and the ten “poorest” men in each company. Of the “poorest,” 62.22 per cent. tested below C− and only 3.06 per cent. above C+. Of the “best,” 38 per cent. tested above C+ and only 9.72 per cent. below C−. According to this investigation, a man below C− is 6.4 times as likely to be “poorest” as to be “best.” A man above C+ is 12.5 times as likely to be “best” as to be “poorest.” A man rating A is 62 times as likely to be “best” as to be “poorest.” A man rating D− is 29.3 times as likely to be “poorest” as to be “best.”
5. Where commissioned officers are selected on the basis of trying out and “survival of the fittest” it is ordinarily found that about 80 per cent. are of the A or B grade, and only about 5 per cent. below the C+ grade. Of non-commissioned officers chosen by this method, about 75 per cent. are found tograde A, B, or C+, and only 5 per cent. below C. Moreover, there is a gradual rise in average score as we go from privates up through the ranks of privates first class, corporals, sergeants first class, O. T. S. candidates, and commissioned officers. This is seen in the following table:
6. Experience shows that “D” candidates admitted to Officers’ Training Schools almost never make good, and that the per cent. of elimination among the “C−” and “C” students is several times as high as among “A” students. For example, in one of the Fourth Officers’ Training Schools 100 per cent. of the “D” men were eliminated as unsatisfactory, 55 per cent. of the “C−” men, 14.8 per cent. of the “B” men, but only 2.7 per cent. of the “A” men. In another Fourth Officers’ Training School 76.2 per cent. of the men rating below C were eliminated in the first six weeks, 51.5 per cent. of the “C” men, and none at all of the “A” or “B” men. These findings are typical.
The psychological ratings are valuable not so much because they make a better classification than would come about in the course of time through natural selection, but chiefly because they greatly abbreviate this process by indicatingimmediatelythe groups in which suitable officer material will be found, and at the same time those men whose mental inferiority warrants their elimination from regular units in order to prevent the retardation of training. Speed counts in a war that costs fifty million dollars per day and requires the minimum period of training.
Directions for the Use of Intelligence Ratings.—In using the intelligence ratings the following points should be borne in mind:
1. The mental tests are not intended to replace other methods of judging a man’s value to the service. It would be a mistake to assume that they tell us infallibly what kind of soldier a man will make. They merelyhelpto do this by measuring one important element in a soldier’s equipment, namely, intelligence. They do not measure loyalty, bravery, power to command, or the emotional traits that make a man “carry on.” However, in the long run these qualities are far more likely to be found in men of superior intelligence than in men who are intellectually inferior. Intelligence is perhaps the most important single factor in soldier efficiency apart from physical fitness.
2. Commissioned officer material is found chiefly in the A and B groups, although of course not all high-score men have the other qualifications necessary for officers. Men below C+ should not be accepted as students in Officers’ Training Schools unless the score on the Officers’ Rating Scale indicates exceptional power of leadership and ability to command.
3. Since more than one fourth of enlisted men rate as high as C+, there is rarely justification for going below this grade in choosing non-commissioned officers. This is especially the case in view of the likelihood of promotion from non-commissioned rank. Even apart from considerations of promotion, it is desirable to avoid the appointment of mentally inferior men (below C) as non-commissioned officers. Several careful studies have shown that “C−” and “D” sergeants and corporals are extremely likely to be found unsatisfactory. The fact that a few make good does not justify the risk taken in their appointment.
4. Men below C+ are rarely equal to complicated paper work.
5. In selecting men for tasks of special responsibility the preference should be given to those of highest intelligence ratingwho also have the other necessary qualifications. If they make good they should be kept on the work or promoted; if they fail they should be replaced by men next on the list.
To aid in selecting men for occupational assignment, extensive data have been gathered on the range of intelligence scores found in various occupations. This material has been placed in the hands of the Personnel Officers for use in making assignments. It is suggested that those men who have an intelligence rating above the average in an occupation should be the first to be assigned to meet requirements in that occupation, and after that men with lower ratings should be considered.
6. In making assignments from the Depot Brigade to permanent organizations it is important to give each unit its proportion of superior, average, and inferior men. If this matter is left to chance there will inevitably be “weak links” in the army chain.
Exceptions to this rule should be made in favour of certain arms of the service which require more than the ordinary number of mentally superior men; e. g., Signal Corps, Machine Gun, Field Artillery and Engineers. These organizations ordinarily have about twice the usual proportion of “A” and “B” men and very much less than the usual proportion of “D” and “D−” men.
The first two columns in the following table illustrate the distribution of intelligence grades typical of infantry regiments and also the extreme differences in the mental strength of organizations which are built up without regard tointelligence ratings. The last column to the right shows a balanced distribution of intellectual strength which might have been made to each of these two regiments.
Unless intelligence is wisely distributed certain regiments and companies will take training much more slowly than others and thus delay the programme of the whole organization.
7. “D” and “D−” men are rarely suited for tasks which require special skill, resourcefulness, or sustained alertness. It is also unsafe to expect “D,” “D−” or “E” men to read or understand written directions.
8. Only high-score men should be selected for tasks that require quick learning or rapid adjustments.
9. It should not be supposed that men who receive the same mental rating are necessarily of equal military worth.A man’s value to the service should not be judged by his intelligence alone.
10. The intelligence rating is one of the most important aids to the Personnel Office in the rapid sorting of the masses of men in the Depot Brigade.In no previous war has so much depended on the prompt and complete utilization of the mental ability of the individual soldier.It is expected, therefore, that the psychological ratings will be regularly used as an aid in the selection, assignment, and classification of men.