Letter 3.
The annexation of Texas, the unavoidable cause of war—The energetic prosecution of the war the only way to obtain peace.
September, 1846.
Sir: If the editor of the “Commercial Journal,” will look over his files he will find, that two years ago I gave my opinion, that the annexation of Texas would not merelyleadto war, but would be war—that it would be a long war, and that if we carried the war into Mexico, would require an addition to our regular force of at least thirty thousand men, and an annual expenditure of thirty millions of dollars. I ask you whether my prediction has not been fulfilled? Yet, you must suppose, that I say this from friendship to Mexico; I have no sympathy with either her people or her military despotism. Ifeel interested in the honor of my own country, and all my hopes and wishes are for the success of her arms.
I do, moreover, honestly believe, that as respects Mexico, our cause is just. Whether it was within the scope of possibility for the Government, (I mean the whole Government, not the Executive branch alone,) by prudent measures, and by forbearance, to avoid hostilities, is a question which I do not choose to discuss at present. But I contend, that Texas had a right to annex herself to the United States, if she chose; that we neither violated any right of Mexico nor any treaty stipulation in accepting the offer, although, there is no doubt that, looking at things as they actually exist, the joint resolution of Congress annexing Texas would, inevitably be followed by war.
Mexico has rejected, and continues to reject, all overtures of peace, excepting on the condition of our retiring beyond the Sabine, and making compensation for the wrong alleged to have been done her, by the annexation and military occupation of her province of Texas. Having thus got into war in consequence of this step, the war has become the act of the nation, and there is no hope of peace without concessions, which we cannot make. It is useless for highly sublimated moralists, and highly honorable statesman, to propose such concessions—every one knows, as a matter of mere fact, that the nation will not consent to them. We are in for the war, and must fight it out. Judging of nations and men as they are, and not, perhaps, as they ought to be, there is no other course.
Besides, there are points in which we are bound by positive obligations, not by mere abstract morality. We are bound to maintain the right of Texas to the boundary of the Rio Grande, and we are bound to secure the amount of spoliations due by the Mexican Government to our own citizens. As we are now at war, (and it is not material as to this, whether by our act, or that of Mexico,) the payment of that debt must be secured by sequestration of California or other territory, and at the sametime, there must be indemnity for the expenses of the war. As to the prospects ahead, that is, as to the results of the war, they do not appear to me encouraging, and as to the prospects of peace, they are still more gloomy.
I believe there is no nation on the Globe more powerful for defence, than we are. But our power for warlike conquest, is an idea which ought not to be encouraged, and no people had ever less necessity for it. In order to be conquerors, we must have regular standing armies; we must have tributary provinces as Rome had, and, consequently, a system incompatible with our simple democratic republican institutions. Unoccupied countries, like California, may be conquered by our settlements, as Texas and some of our States were conquered. In the course of time, the whole of North America, and, perhaps South America, will gradually and imperceptibly, yield to this kind of conquest. But at present, the countries beyond the Rio Grande are inhabited by a different race of people, too numerous to be at once absorbed or displaced, and whose habits and character do not fit them to become integral portions of our confederacy. Mere dependencies and colonies do not suit the spirit of our free institutions.
The western side of the Rio Grande presents a very different case from that of Texas, settled by our own people, and which but a few years ago was little better than a wilderness, a frontier to Mexico, as well as to us. The States of New Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas, contain half a million of people, have been settled two hundred years, and contain ancient cities and towns. They are spread over a surface as large as Virginia and the Carolinas, and backed by other more extensive States towards Mexico. If the struggle lay only between the Mexican military and our armies, a few decisive battles might end the contest. But we have to overcome the prejudices, ignorance, and antipathies of the population, a conquest a thousand times more difficult than that of arms. And are we certain that the people ofthose States will remain perfectly passive, and that their countrymen beyond the Sierra Madre, cannot be rendered formidable as guerrillas? Our estimate of them may be too low. In case of some severe reverse, their numbers, should they riseen masse, may overwhelm detached bodies of our troops. The proclamation of Ampudia, denouncing as traitors, all who will hold intercourse with our people, has had its effect. The people will become exasperated at the outrages which will, in all probability, be committed by our irregular troops, and the guerrilla warfare will bristle over the whole country. Few among us are aware of its vast extent. It is for the greater part composed of barren mountains and arid plains, interspersed with fertile valleys, and entirely unlike our western States. We will have to guard a frontier of two thousand miles, from Santa Fee to Matamoras, without mentioning California. We will have to garrison all the principal towns between the Rio Grande and the Sierra Madre. If we attempt to advance beyond Monterey, we must force our way through a population of several millions, after crossing a desert of several hundred miles. Conquests are easy enough, when people are willing to be conquered, but when they determine to resist, it is a very different matter. When Napoleon attempted the conquest of Spain, after the manner that Edward I undertook that of Scotland, he had possession of Madrid and all the principal cities, with five hundred thousand of the best troops in the world, and yet, in less than three years, his Generals were driven out with a remnant of thirty thousand men! The capture of Burgoyne and of Cornwallis, show what a critical thing it is for an invading army to penetrate an enemy’s country, with the wave of an unconquered people closing behind them. Our armies are about to operate in a country without roads, without supplies or resources, through defiles, over deserts without water, and under a burning sun. I have great confidence in them, and I believe that whatever can be done, they will do, but shall notexpect impossibilities of them. They may reach and take Monterey, after hard fighting and much suffering, and then be compelled, by superior numbers, to fall back on the Rio Grande, and fortifying themselves, carry on a war of detachments with little prospect of any definitive result. There is no hope of bringing the war to a speedy close without putting in the field at least twenty thousand regulars and thirty thousand volunteers, and their advancing from Monterey and Vera Cruz, after taking those places. The advance on the capital ought to be made at the same time, so as to compel Santa Anna to divide his force.
A good deal has been said about the extension of slavery beyond the Rio Grande. My design in these letters is simply to state facts and give honest opinions. I am not an abolitionist, nor interested in the question of slavery, nor will I suffer my party feelings to bias my judgment in relation to Mr. Polk and the democratic administration. The idea of negro slavery beyond the Rio Grande, is, in my opinion, erroneous. The climate is doubtless, adapted to the culture of sugar and cotton; but then negro slaves cannot be retained on the Mexican frontier longer than they shall think proper to remain in slavery. They would escape into Mexican territory when they pleased; and there being but few negroes in that country, and none having been held in slavery, they would enjoy a consideration there, unknown even in the free States of the Union. The wealthy Mexicans would not want their services, as they have already a cheaper kind of servitude in their peons, or half indian laborers. Negro slavery was once attempted to be introduced into Mexico for the culture and manufacture of the sugar cane, but failed, and the slaves set free. The peons, with a nominal freedom, are actually slaves. They receive trifling wages, scarcely sufficient to provide them with the bare necessaries of life. It is even doubtful, whether a slave population can be placed nearer than the Nueces, on account of their facilities for escape.A large proportion of Southern Texas presents the same objection to the removal of the Southern planter. These Mexican acquisitions, or proposed acquisitions, are greatly overrated in the slave holding States, and the danger is equally magnified in the minds of those who are opposed to the further extension of slavery. Neither of these parties are disposed to view the subject in a practical light; it is like the dispute in the fable about the color of the Chameleon—one asserted that it was black, and the other that it was white, but when exposed to view, it proved to be green!