Letter 5.
Capitulation of Monterey—Ideas of conquests in Mexico.
Capitulation of Monterey—Ideas of conquests in Mexico.
Capitulation of Monterey—Ideas of conquests in Mexico.
October 26, 1846
Sir: When I wrote my last letter I had not seen the capitulation of Monterey, at least the official report. It appears, that the terms were conditional, and allow no more time than is absolutely requisite for Gen. Taylor to make his arrangements for ulterior movements. The city was taken by a forced march, with only a part of the troops. The attempt to cast censure, by indirection, on this meritorious officer, betrays a jealousy of his growing popularity. The capture of Monterey is of immense importance, as well on account of its being one of the keys of Mexico, as on account of the vast amount of public property, in arms and munitions captured, which Mexico is in no condition to replace. That city was a stronghold underthe Spaniards before the Mexican revolution, and contained a great quantity of cannon, transported with immense difficulty and expense, from the city of Mexico. It was in fact, the metropolis of the provinces of the Rio Grande; and if a new confederacy should be formed by those States, it would be the seat of the federal Government. In a few weeks, the sickly season will be over; the surviving sick will be again fit for duty, the commissariat will be enabled to complete its supplies, and transportation for the army, considerable reinforcements will reach the seat of war, and then we may expect an onward movement.
General Taylor having now gained a safe footing, must go to work to consolidate his occupation, or if you will, his conquest of the country between the Rio Grande, the mountains, and the Gulf. This extensive tract of country, as large as Italy, and resembling it in scenery, climate, and soil, is now cut off by our arms and by its natural boundary, from the rest of Mexico. It ought to be completely occupied, by fortifying the principal points on the Rio Grande, the mountain passes of the Sierra Madre, and also by the occupation of the chief towns of New Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas. Tampico, of course, must be taken by a combined land and naval attack. It has a shallow sea coast from Tampico to the mouth of the Rio Grande, of four hundred miles, whilst it stretches east and west, between the mountains and the river, nearly double that distance. Here is an extent of surface equal to that from the Potomac to the Savannah and east of the Appalachian chain. It is capable of containing four millions of souls, and in the hands of Americans, would be rapidly filled up by them and European emigrants. The climate is said to be delightful, and much more temperate than might be expected from its latitude. I have rated its population at five hundred thousand; this estimate may be too high; but it is possible, that the common estimatemay be too low. The following is that given by a recent pamphlet, including Chewawa:
New Leon,100,000Monterey,15,000Tamaulipas,150,000Tampico,6,000Coawilla,125,000Monclova,3,000Chewawa,112,000Chewawa,30,000──────487,000
This population, it is true, is scattered over a very large space, and more occupied in pastoral, than in agricultural pursuits, with little trade or manufactures. Their flocks of sheep and horned cattle, are immense, while they raise vast numbers of horses and mules. Being shut out from all communication with the Southern provinces, they can be conquered by our arms, and made to stay conquered, by the American emigrants who will immediately pour into every habitable district. A small, well appointed regular army of five thousand men, with an equal number of volunteers, replacing each other at intervals, will be sufficient for the purpose.
The occupation of this important country, should be complete before attempting any thing further. By grasping at too much, we may fail to realize any thing. If our object beconquest, it will be one of the greatest (even thus circumscribed) ever effected by the same numerical force. After consolidating this splendid acquisition, instead of marching on the city of Mexico, I would take the course to Durango, and thence to Mazatlan, on the Pacific, thus cutting off one half of the mine district, and giving us a direct communication with that ocean, of such immense importance to us in a commercial as well as political point of view. If, however, the object be merely toconquer a peacewith Mexico, the fear of losing at least one half of the territory of the Republic, and the hope of regaining possession of it, would be an inducement to treat, which nothing but the most brutish stupidity can resist. I fear she will persist in the same arrogant folly which induced her to declare,that shewould be satisfied with no boundary short of the Sabine. She will not consent to receive back her territory by treaty, to the Rio Grand—her wounded pride must be appeased by regaining it by arms—and she will not consent under any circumstances, to yield up California and Santa Fee! We shall be compelled, if she persists in the determination, to hold to the line of the Sierra Madre, and make our boundary from Tampico to Mazatlan. There is no doubt that the administration would now gladly treat for the boundary of the Rio Grand and a portion of Upper California. But if Mexico persists in her obstinacy, we cannot retreat with safety or honor; we may possibly be compelled to adopt the tropic of Cancer, as the line from ocean to ocean, and thus add to our confederacy a region as extensive as Europe.
But will England and France look with indifference on this vast acquisition of territory? And suppose they shall be displeased, what can they allege against us? The necessity of the conquest will have been forced upon us by the refusal of Mexico to treat. It is probable, that to the boundary of the Rio Grand, and to the acquisition of a portion of California, with the barren mountains and plains of New Mexico, they may be, comparatively, indifferent. Not so with respect to the wholesale acquisition just mentioned. But what can they say—what can they do? They must address themselves to Mexico, and compel her to negotiate with us, which she still persists in refusing, except on terms which she knows it is impossible for us to concede. In the meantime, let us not follow the example of our proud and arrogant enemy, and refuse all friendly mediation which may lead to an amicable adjustment on reasonable terms.
If, for the next three months, there should be no treaty of peace with Mexico, I shall begin to fear we have entered upon an experiment which may be attended with momentous consequences. It will be a new and fearful career of conquest. Icannot agree with those who propose a retreat; and I know that the American people will never consent to it! Yet, I am well aware of the danger to our confederacy, from such a conquest as that of all Mexico. We must follow the war wherever it may lead; and if it lead to victory it must end in conquest or a magnanimous peace, when Mexico shall be at our feet.