Note.—These historical sketches of the late war with Mexico are designed to present a rapid view of the chiefeventsandmotivesof the international conflict rather than to portray the separate actions of civil and military men who were engaged in it. We have, therefore, not been as minute as might be desired either by ourself or by interested individuals. This, however, will be remedied in the general "History of the War between Mexico and the United States," which we design publishing.In narrating the battles we have sketched themaccording to the published plans of the commanders on both sides. This is the fair system of describing and judging; but whether those planswere always the most judicious, is a matter for military criticism in which we have not present space to indulge. Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, Buena Vista, Vera Cruz, Molino del Rey, Chapultepec, and thetimeas well as themodeof capturing the capital, have all been discussed and condemned by the prolific class of fault finders—most of whose judgments, when at all correct, are founded upon knowledge acquired or assured subsequently to the actions, and which was entirely inaccessible to the commanders when they fought the battles that are criticised. One thing, however, should gratify our Generals exceedingly, and it is that in truth theydidfight andwinthe several actions in question, notwithstanding their blunders and notwithstanding the fact that their junior civil and military critics could have fought them so much better! They had, it seems, a double triumph—one over their own stupid ignorance and another over the enemy!
Note.—These historical sketches of the late war with Mexico are designed to present a rapid view of the chiefeventsandmotivesof the international conflict rather than to portray the separate actions of civil and military men who were engaged in it. We have, therefore, not been as minute as might be desired either by ourself or by interested individuals. This, however, will be remedied in the general "History of the War between Mexico and the United States," which we design publishing.
In narrating the battles we have sketched themaccording to the published plans of the commanders on both sides. This is the fair system of describing and judging; but whether those planswere always the most judicious, is a matter for military criticism in which we have not present space to indulge. Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, Buena Vista, Vera Cruz, Molino del Rey, Chapultepec, and thetimeas well as themodeof capturing the capital, have all been discussed and condemned by the prolific class of fault finders—most of whose judgments, when at all correct, are founded upon knowledge acquired or assured subsequently to the actions, and which was entirely inaccessible to the commanders when they fought the battles that are criticised. One thing, however, should gratify our Generals exceedingly, and it is that in truth theydidfight andwinthe several actions in question, notwithstanding their blunders and notwithstanding the fact that their junior civil and military critics could have fought them so much better! They had, it seems, a double triumph—one over their own stupid ignorance and another over the enemy!
Footnotes[77]In his letter to the Secretary of War on the 1st of February from Cascatlan, he says: "to enable me to live out of the way of the banditti travelling about here in large parties, I have had to spend more than two thousand dollars, necessary to maintain a small escort, when, through the scarcity of means in the treasury,I served my country without pay." This is a singular illustration of Santa Anna's characteristic avarice. Perhaps no man ever served his country for more liberal and certain pay than this chieftain. We have been informed by one of our highest officers, who was in the capital after its occupation by our troops, and had access to the Mexican archives, that, amid all Santa Anna's political and military distresses he never forgot his pecuniary interests. The books of the treasury showed that, at the moment when the city was about to fall and when there was scarcely money enough to maintain the troops,he paid himself the whole of his salary as President up to that date, and all the arrears which he claimed as due to him, as President also, during the period of his residence in exile at Havana![78]See page 91, vol. 1, and Mexico as it was and as it is, p 207.[79]See vol. 2, chapter xii, p. 155. Reflections upon the Republic.
[77]In his letter to the Secretary of War on the 1st of February from Cascatlan, he says: "to enable me to live out of the way of the banditti travelling about here in large parties, I have had to spend more than two thousand dollars, necessary to maintain a small escort, when, through the scarcity of means in the treasury,I served my country without pay." This is a singular illustration of Santa Anna's characteristic avarice. Perhaps no man ever served his country for more liberal and certain pay than this chieftain. We have been informed by one of our highest officers, who was in the capital after its occupation by our troops, and had access to the Mexican archives, that, amid all Santa Anna's political and military distresses he never forgot his pecuniary interests. The books of the treasury showed that, at the moment when the city was about to fall and when there was scarcely money enough to maintain the troops,he paid himself the whole of his salary as President up to that date, and all the arrears which he claimed as due to him, as President also, during the period of his residence in exile at Havana!
[78]See page 91, vol. 1, and Mexico as it was and as it is, p 207.
[79]See vol. 2, chapter xii, p. 155. Reflections upon the Republic.
Transcriber's NoteObvious punctuation and spelling errors repaired.Footnotes moved to end of respective chapters.Notes moved to end of respective paragraphs.Notes normalized to include — (Example: Note.—)Hyphenation of words normalized.Pg226: "1512" changed to "1712" in "In 1512, Philip V. found himself...."