RAILWAY FROM VERA CRUZ TO THE CITY OF MEXICO.Note.—In relation to the various modes of transit across the Isthmus of Panama or Tehuantepec, we do not deem it advisable to offer any speculations, at present, (April, 1850.) Whenreconnoissancesof both routes have been completed and published, under the sanction of able and disinterested engineers, the world, which is so largely concerned in this subject, will be better able to decide as to their relative advantages. Both routes may ultimately be required, when the augmented commerce of the west coast of North and South America and the East Indies demands a speedy access to those regions. In the meantime, however, I subjoin the following extract from a report made by an officer of our army, during the war with Mexico, whilst our forces were still occupying the capital, in March, 1848. It apparently demonstrates at least the practicability of a railway from Vera Cruz to the valley:"Of the different routes proposed, the one following the ridge which separates the towns or the two rivers of Tomepa and Obatejua, passing near or through the towns or villages of Acanisica, St. Bartolomé, St. Martin, Nopalpica, and Tlascala, is not only the shortest and most level, but offers the fewest difficulties to overcome. This route does not offer the slightest obstruction, with the exception of crossing the river San Juan, till you reach the Boca del Monte, seventeen leagues from Vera Cruz; thence pursuing its course along the sides of the same almost continuous ridge, with an ascent of not more than one upon fifty, till you reach the deep Barranca of Chichiquila, twenty-three leagues from Vera Cruz; the road is thence across the Barranca, on embankments and stone walls, the materials for this purpose being plentiful and on the ground; the ten leagues from the Barranca of Chichiquila to the highest point of elevation, form the most difficult and costly section of the road. It must, however, be here taken into consideration, that at this very point of the road there are found in the immediate vicinity twelve Indian villages, capable of furnishing a large number of efficient workmen, who would bewilling and even anxious to labor at the very low price of 371/2cents per day, in the most healthy climate of the country."From this point of highest elevation, the route followed, reduces the distance to the city of Mexico to 37 leagues—making the whole distance from Vera Cruz to the capital not more than 73 leagues."It must be borne in mind, that in making the following estimate, we have taken into consideration the extreme low rate of wages in the country, as compared with the wages of the journeymen laborers in the United States; and this alone must make an immense difference in cost of works of the kind executed in Mexico, whenever we base our estimates upon the costs of similar works in England or in our own country.
RAILWAY FROM VERA CRUZ TO THE CITY OF MEXICO.
Note.—In relation to the various modes of transit across the Isthmus of Panama or Tehuantepec, we do not deem it advisable to offer any speculations, at present, (April, 1850.) Whenreconnoissancesof both routes have been completed and published, under the sanction of able and disinterested engineers, the world, which is so largely concerned in this subject, will be better able to decide as to their relative advantages. Both routes may ultimately be required, when the augmented commerce of the west coast of North and South America and the East Indies demands a speedy access to those regions. In the meantime, however, I subjoin the following extract from a report made by an officer of our army, during the war with Mexico, whilst our forces were still occupying the capital, in March, 1848. It apparently demonstrates at least the practicability of a railway from Vera Cruz to the valley:
"Of the different routes proposed, the one following the ridge which separates the towns or the two rivers of Tomepa and Obatejua, passing near or through the towns or villages of Acanisica, St. Bartolomé, St. Martin, Nopalpica, and Tlascala, is not only the shortest and most level, but offers the fewest difficulties to overcome. This route does not offer the slightest obstruction, with the exception of crossing the river San Juan, till you reach the Boca del Monte, seventeen leagues from Vera Cruz; thence pursuing its course along the sides of the same almost continuous ridge, with an ascent of not more than one upon fifty, till you reach the deep Barranca of Chichiquila, twenty-three leagues from Vera Cruz; the road is thence across the Barranca, on embankments and stone walls, the materials for this purpose being plentiful and on the ground; the ten leagues from the Barranca of Chichiquila to the highest point of elevation, form the most difficult and costly section of the road. It must, however, be here taken into consideration, that at this very point of the road there are found in the immediate vicinity twelve Indian villages, capable of furnishing a large number of efficient workmen, who would bewilling and even anxious to labor at the very low price of 371/2cents per day, in the most healthy climate of the country.
"From this point of highest elevation, the route followed, reduces the distance to the city of Mexico to 37 leagues—making the whole distance from Vera Cruz to the capital not more than 73 leagues.
"It must be borne in mind, that in making the following estimate, we have taken into consideration the extreme low rate of wages in the country, as compared with the wages of the journeymen laborers in the United States; and this alone must make an immense difference in cost of works of the kind executed in Mexico, whenever we base our estimates upon the costs of similar works in England or in our own country.
P. O. HÉBERT,Lieut. Col. 14th Infantry"
DISORDER OF MEXICAN FINANCES—ENORMOUS USURY.—CHARACTER OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS.—EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATIONS.—ANALYSIS OF MEXICAN DEBT—COMPARISON OF INCOME AND OUTLAY—DEFICIT.
DISORDER OF MEXICAN FINANCES—ENORMOUS USURY.—CHARACTER OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS.—EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATIONS.—ANALYSIS OF MEXICAN DEBT—COMPARISON OF INCOME AND OUTLAY—DEFICIT.
THEdistracted political condition of Mexico since 1809, has contributed largely to the proverbial impoverishment and financial discredit of a country, which, nevertheless, has during the whole intervening period, been engaged in furnishing an important share of the world's circulating medium. The revolutionary and factious state of parties; the unrestrained ambition of leaders; the violence with which they displaced rivals; their short tenure of office when they attained power and the consequent impossibility of maturing any permanent scheme of finance; the ordinary reliance of statesmen upon a large army, and the immense cost of its support; the continual and habitual recourse to loans at ruinous rates of usury; the comparative ignorance of domestic resources and their failure of development in consequence either of intestine broils or the ignorance and slothfulness of the population, together with the plunder of the treasury by unprincipled demagogues and despots, may all be regarded as the basis of Mexican misrule and pecuniary misfortune. For nearly forty years every minister of finance has been taxed to discover means for daily support. Let us illustrate the system commonly pursued.
On the 20th of September, fifteen days before the treaty of Estansuela, the administration of president Bustamante offered the following terms for a loan of $1,200,000. It proposed to receive the sum of $200,000 incash, and $1,000,000 represented in thepaperorcreditsof the government. These credits or paper were worth, in the market, nine per cent. About one-half of the loan was taken, and the parties obtained orders on the several maritime custom houses, receivable in payment of duties.
The revenues of the custom house of Matamoros, had been always appropriated to pay the army on the northern frontier of the republic, but during the administration of General Bustamante, the commandant of Matamoros issued bonds or drafts against that customhouse for $150,000, receivable for all kinds of duties as cash. He disposed of these bonds to the merchants of that port for $100,000—and, in addition to thebonusof $50,000, allowed them interest on the $100,000, at the rate of three per cent. per month, until they had duties to pay which they could extinguish by the drafts.
Another transaction, of a singular nature, developes the character of the government's negotiations, and can only be accounted for by the receipt of some advantages which the act itself does not disclose to the public.
The mint at Guanajuato, or the right to coin at that place, was contracted for, in 1842, by a most respectable foreign house in Mexico, for $71,000cash, for the term offourteen years, at the same time that another offer was before the government, stipulating for the payment of $400,000 for the same period, payable in annual instalments of $25,000 each. The $71,000 in hand, were, however, deemed of more value than the prospective four hundred thousand. This mint yielded a net annual income of $60,000.
These are a few examples presented in illustration of the spendthrift abandonment of the real resources of the country; and the character of the transactions at once discloses the true origin and continuance of national discredit. The demand of the hour was irresistible, and if the minister or the president was unable to comply with it, his political fate was sealed, perhaps forever. Theisolatedgood or evil measures adopted by financiers, have only tended to augment the confusion. Each government, of the thirty or more which have swayed Mexico since her independence, has been forced to contend not only with its own errors but with those of its predecessors; and hence the public has naturally lost faith and hope in politicians as soon as they assumed the helm of state. No matter what the personal character, or what the financial talents of ministers might be, the people believed them to be immediately compromised or paralized by circumstances and political necessity.
We will present the reader a view of Mexicannational expenses, according to ministerial estimates during a series of years between the establishment of the federal constitution in 1824 and the war with the United States. This statement, in regard to a country which has been stationary in population and industry, with an augmenting outlay of money, is somewhat remarkable:
These dates, it will be observed comprehend epochs in which the country has been governed by the federal system as well as those in which extraordinary powers were conferred on national magistrates. In the preceding yearly amounts, it should be recollected, that a few of them comprise occasional sums paid on account of the foreign and domestic debt; but, on an average, thirteen millions of dollars may be considered as the annual outlay.
In consequence of this costly government of so small a nation, a large foreign and domestic debt has been created, in addition to the liabilities of New Spainpriorto independence, which are calculated at nearly forty-two millions.
In considering this interesting subject we have taken pains to obtain the best authorities from Mexico, and, from the reports of the ministers of finance, we reach the following results in regard to that republic's financial condition in the year 1850. Her foreign debt amounts to $58,889,487; her home-debt to $48,934,610; and her debt, prior to independence, to $41,983,096, making a total of pecuniary liabilities, with interest, to the 1st of July, 1849, of one hundred and forty-nine millions, eight hundred and seven thousand, one hundred and ninety-three dollars;—the annual interest on which, alone, amounts to nearly nine millions of dollars.
Inasmuch as the clearincomeof Mexico in 1849, was not calculated at more than five millions five hundred and forty thousand one hundred and twelve dollars, while theexpenseswere rated at thirteen millions seven hundred and sixty-five thousand four hundred and thirty-five dollars, there would necessarily be an annual deficit, in the merecurrentfinances, of eight millions two hundred and twenty-five thousand three hundred and twenty-three dollars. This sum, added to the actualintereston the national debt, shows the total yearlydeficitin Mexico, of seventeen millions two hundred and thirteen thousand seven hundred and fifty-four dollars;—a sum larger than the present yield of all the mints in the republic.
This frightful picture of national finances is now absorbing the attention of the Mexican people and congress; and it is to be hoped that some wise plan may be devised to extricate the nation fromruin and that the government may be sufficiently strong and enduring to carry it into effect.
The foreign debt of Mexico, or the liability of the national treasury to citizens or subjects of other countries, according to the statement made and approved by the meeting ofbondholdersin London on the 24th of June, 1846, was £10,241,650, or, in Mexican currency, at $5 the £, to
This capital, according to agreement with the bondholders, bears an annual interest of 5 per cent. from the 1st of July, 1846, which amounts yearly to $2,560,412, and, up to the 1st July, 1849,—to the sum of
Total foreign debt to 1st July, 1849,
The debt, the liquidation of which is founded upon an assignment of 26 per cent. of the income from mercantile duties, amounts to
Interest on this sum to 1st July, 1849,
Debt created for the redemption of the old copper currency of Mexico,
Interest due to 1st July, 1849,
Due for indemnities, credits and contracts,
Due to civil and militaryemployéesand pensioners, 25,000,000 Total home debt, 1st July, 1849,
National debt anterior to independence, interest to}1st July, 1849, } $41,983,096
Estimate of the Income of Mexico from the 1st July, 1848, to 1st July, 1849, according to the calculation of the Mexican minister of Finance.
Income fromMaritime Duties,
"fromInternal Duties,Taxes, &c., &c.,
Total,
Deduct from this the cost of collecting this revenue and for various prior partial assignments of it,
Total income for the year,
Deduct from this the sums that may be saved by economical administration of the departments and by the improved condition or reduction of the army, say,
TABLE OF COTTON FACTORIES IN MEXICO—CONSUMPTION—PRODUCTION.—INCREASE OF FACTORIES—DAY AND NIGHT WORK.—DEFICIT OF MATERIAL—WATER AND STEAM POWER—MEXICAN MANUFACTURES GENERALLY.
TABLE OF COTTON FACTORIES IN MEXICO—CONSUMPTION—PRODUCTION.—INCREASE OF FACTORIES—DAY AND NIGHT WORK.—DEFICIT OF MATERIAL—WATER AND STEAM POWER—MEXICAN MANUFACTURES GENERALLY.
From this summary it appears that the total number of spindles in operation and in course of erection in the republic in the year 1844,—anterior to the war and during a period of comparative progress,—amounted to 125,362, together with 2609 looms in the fifty-nine factories of cotton stuffs and twist. These factories consumed, weekly, 2038 quintals of cotton, and gave, according to the table, a weekly product of 161,654 lbs. of cotton twist, a portion of which they converted into 6535 pieces of cotton cloth, the remainder being sold for the consumption of private and scattered hand looms throughout the country. An intelligent and experienced manufacturer, acquainted with Mexican factories, and at present residing in this country, calculates with apparent justice, that 2038quintals of cotton, allowing fairly for waste, will yield, 183,420 lbs. of twist and filling, and that the weekly product of cotton cloth will be 8479 pieces of 32 varas each, from 2609 looms, each loom averaging about three and one quarter pieces per week. But allowing this correction of the above table of theJunta de Fomento, and adhering to its data in other respects in which it appears to be entirely faithful, we attain some important results. By comparing the number of spindles actually in Mexico at that epoch, with the number known to be there in 1842, viz: 131,280, and adding to the number now stated 8050 which are in the various factories closed in the interval but whose machinery is still in existence, we show an increase of 2132 according to the most accurate accessible information. Since the war the number has been no doubt largely augmented if we may judge by the numerous shipments of machinery to Mexico from Europe and North America.
In order to show the importance to Mexico of allowing the liberal importation of cotton from the United States, inasmuch as it is not likely she will become a cotton growing country in proportion to the increase of her manufacturing population, we have prepared the following comparative estimates. In our chapters on the agriculture of the republic we have endeavored, and we hope successfully, to demonstrate the impracticability of inducing the Indians to produce sufficient for present purposes, or to devote themselves to the labor of extensive cotton plantations for the benefit of the future.
Workingby dayalone the Mexican factories consume yearly 105,976 quintals, or 10,597,600 lbs. of raw cotton, whilst the whole cotton crop of the republic according to recent estimates, is not more than 60,000, or, 70,000 quintals, equal to 7,000,000 lbs.; but if they workedby day and night, they would use 18,545,800 lbs. of the raw material, allowing three-fourths of the day consumption for night work. From these calculations we derive the following imtant results, as to deficiency:
Cotton varies, as we have seen in price according to demand, at Tepic, Mazatlan, Vera Cruz, Tampico, Puebla, Durango, the valley of Mexico, &c., from fifteen dollars, per quintal, to forty-eight. If we rate it, on an average, at twenty-five dollars per quintal, the value of the deficit ondayconsumption will be $899,400, and onday and nightconsumption, $2,886,450, all of which must necessarily, be made up by importation.
We have prepared the preceding table in order to attract the attention of cottonproducingcountries, and to demonstrate the fact that Mexico, in all likelihood, may become amanufacturingnation, inasmuch as the surplus population of towns, the women and children, may be successfully employed in this branch of human industry, when they have no agricultural district from which they may easily derive support with the least labor. There is reason to believe that water power, for the use of factories is abundant all over the republic. The natural drainage of a mountain country will at once prove this fact. Innumerable small streams, falling from the crests and sides of thesierras, pour through the ravines and barrancas; but in consequence of the scarcity of wood and the costliness of its transportation, it is not probable that steam power can be advantageously used. Factories of paper near the capital, at Puebla and in Guadalajara are working with success, but they do not produce enough for the consumption of the republic. At Puebla and Mexico there are several factories of the ordinary kinds of glass and tumblers, whilst woollen blankets, baizes, and, at present,finecloths, are yielded by several establishments erected before andsince the war. The well known Mexicanserape, orponcho,—an oblong garment, pierced in the centre to allow the passage of the head, and which falls in graceful folds from the shoulders of a horseman over his person—is one of the most generally demanded fabrics from native looms. These blankets are often of beautiful texture, composed of the richest materials and colors, and, according to the fineness of their wool and weaving, vary in cost from twenty-five to five hundred dollars. Theserapeis an indispensable article, both for use and luxury, for theleperoas well as thecaballero, and being as much needed by men as thereboso, or long cotton shawl, is by the women, it may readily be conceived how great is the consumption of these two articles of domestic manufacture alone. There are between five and six thousand hand looms throughout the several states, and these are continually engaged in the fabrication ofrebososandserapes, the latter of which are most exquisitely dyed and woven in tasteful patterns in the neighborhood of Saltillo.[26]
INDIAN HUT IN THE TIERRA CALIENTE.INDIAN HUT IN THE TIERRA CALIENTE.
THE MILITARY IN MEXICO BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION—CONFIRMATION OF ARMY—ITS POLITICAL USE.—CHARACTER OF MEXICAN SOLDIERS—RECRUITING—TACTICS—OFFICERS.—DRAMATIC CHARACTER OF ARMY—RECRIMINATIONS.—CONDITION OF THE ARMY AT THE PEACE.—ARMY ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER—MILITARY COLONIES.—CHARACTER OF THE TRIBES.—FORTRESSES—PEROTE—ACAPULCO—SAN JUAN DE ULUA.—REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY—TABULAR VIEW OF MEN AND MATERIEL.—NAVY—EXTENT OF COAST ON BOTH SEAS.—NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT—VESSELS AND OFFICERS.—EXPENSES OF WAR AND NAVY.
THE MILITARY IN MEXICO BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION—CONFIRMATION OF ARMY—ITS POLITICAL USE.—CHARACTER OF MEXICAN SOLDIERS—RECRUITING—TACTICS—OFFICERS.—DRAMATIC CHARACTER OF ARMY—RECRIMINATIONS.—CONDITION OF THE ARMY AT THE PEACE.—ARMY ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER—MILITARY COLONIES.—CHARACTER OF THE TRIBES.—FORTRESSES—PEROTE—ACAPULCO—SAN JUAN DE ULUA.—REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY—TABULAR VIEW OF MEN AND MATERIEL.—NAVY—EXTENT OF COAST ON BOTH SEAS.—NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT—VESSELS AND OFFICERS.—EXPENSES OF WAR AND NAVY.
WEhave already alluded, in the historical portion of this work to some of the fostering sources of the Mexican army and to the evil results its importance has produced in the country. The colonial forces designed for the maintenance of order and due subjection in New Spain, were chiefly sent from the old world until the wars in Europe required the mother country to hoard its military resources. These foreign stipendiaries for a long time sufficed to secure the loyalty of the emigrants; but as the country grew in importance and numbers, and as the Indians revolted against their task-masters, it became necessary from time to time to call out reinforcements from the colonists; and when foreign invasion was dreaded, these levies, as we have seen, were largely augmented from all parts of the viceroyalty.
The idea of military service was, accordingly, not altogether unfamiliar to the Mexican mind when the first insurrectionary movements occurred under the lead of Hidalgo; but when the violent outbreak threatened to degenerate into a war ofcastes, and to array the Indians against all in whose veins circulated Castilian blood, it became the duty of the settlers to cultivate that spirit and discipline which would, at least, preserve them from utter destruction. The succeeding war of independence converted the whole country for eleven years into a camp, and when the strife terminated in success, it was found that a people, whose natural temperament addicted them to military spectacles, had become habituated and enured to a military career.
When the war was over and the power of Spain effectually broken, the contest was transferred from a foreign enemy to domesticfoes. Men who had been accustomed for so long a period to military rule did not immediately acquire the habit of self-government. National police required a national army. Officers who had distinguished themselves in an epoch when laws were silent and the only authorities recognized wore the insignia of military life, did not forsake willingly the power they enjoyed. Indeed, they were the only authentic personages capable of enforcing obedience; and their adherents were soon armed against each other in all the contentions for political position which vexed the republic during the dawn of its national existence. Civil wars became habitual. An army was an element of strength and success which no military chieftain thought proper to crush. Rallying his disciplined partizans, as long as his friends or his fortune supplied their support, he was ready at a moment to take the field either for the maintenance of a leader's cause or to secure his own elevation. Nor was this mode of life disagreeable to the body of the army and inferior officers who were lodged and fed at the public expense during a period when it was difficult to find easy or agreeable civil employments in the distracted realm. Each petty subaltern and even every common soldier, clad in the livery of the state and carrying arms, was regarded by the unshodleperosand homeless vagrants as a personage of superior position; and thus, whilst the army became at that epoch popular with the people it had liberated from Spanish bondage, it ripened into a necessity of the aspiring politicians who craved a speedier access to power than by the slow and toilsome process of a republican canvass. The state, itself, perceiving these manifold causes of military favor, utility, and supposed need, preserved the army from all assaults by patriotic congressmen, and thus the greatest curse and burthen of the nation,—the origin and means of all its woes and all its despots,—was, from the first, riveted to the body politic of Mexico.
It must not be supposed, however, that in speaking of the Mexican army we design to compare it, either in detail or as an organized body, with the troops of this country or of Europe. Neither in the mass of itsmateriel, nor in its officers, does it vie with the trained and disciplined forces of other civilized countries. Soldiers in Mexico are rather actors in a political drama,—dressed and decorated for imposing display,—than efficient warriors whose instruction and power make them irresistible in the field. In all the engagements, or attempts to engage, which occurred in Mexico since the termination of the war of independence, there has been a laudable desire, at least among the troops, to avoid the shedding ofblood. Cities have been besieged and bombarded; magnificent arrays of forces have been made on adjacent fields; large camps have been formed and held in readiness; cannons, loaded with cannister and grape, have been discharged along the crowded highways of towns; marksmen have been placed in towers, steeples, andazoteas, to pick off unwary passengers; divisions have been reviewed and manœuvred in sight of each other, but, in all these revolts orpronunciamientos, no pitched battles were fought which actually terminated the contest by the gun and sword. The aspirant chief, or the hero he designed to displace, managed to secure themajorityof the neighboring military forces, and as soon as the fact was unequivocally ascertained, the one who was in theminorityfled from the scene without provoking a trial by battle. In 1840, 1841, and 1844, during the administrations of Bustamante and Santa Anna, there were various exhibitions of these sham contests; but, in all of them, we have reason to believe that the innocent non-combatant people were the greatest sufferers, and that the army escaped comparatively unscathed.
These observations are not designed to impugn the military nerve or spirit of the Mexicans, for the war with the United States and the war of their revolution, demonstrated that they unite both in quite an eminent degree. Our officers believe that the Mexican possesses the elements of a good soldier, but that he is neither trained, disciplined, nor led, so as to make him a dangerous foe. This is demonstrated by the result of the recent war and of every action fought during it. A brave show and a bold assault were not stubbornly followed up with pertinacious resolution, in spite of all resistance. The Mexicans were fighting on their own soil, for their own country, against a hated foe, yet they failed in every conflict, and with every conceivable disparity of numbers.
The great body of the army is of course composed either of Indians or mixed breeds, and the idea of nationality in its high love of a loveable country, does not in all probability, animate or inspire these classes in the hour of danger. They did not fight with a common or an understood purpose. They were rather forced mercenaries than patriots. It was not a war of enthusiasm. Every effort was made by grandiloquent proclamations and false allegations to rally and nerve them; but whenever they crossed arms with our forces, if they failed in the onset, like lions foiled in their spring, they retreated to their lair. Nevertheless, throughout the contest, there were repeated instances of courage, constancy, endurance, and persistence which satisfied our officers that under a differentsystem of education and command, the Mexicans would make excellent soldiers. Their horsemen, probably the best riders on the continent, paid more attention to the management of their animals than to the use of their horse's force in the charge; while their infantry and artillery avoided those close quarters which make the bayonet so powerful a weapon when directed by intrepid, unquailing arms in the presence and under the lead of unflinching company officers. Their lancers did more damage to dismounted victims than to erect and fighting foes.
With the majority of the rank and file, the army is, in all likelihood, not a profession of choice. Enlistment is now scarcely ever voluntary. When men are required for a new regiment or to fill companies thinned by death or desertion, a sergeant is despatched with his guard to recruit among the Indians andpeonsof the neighborhood. The subaltern probably finds these individuals laboring in the fields, and without even the formality of a request, selects the best men from the group and orders them into the ranks. If they resist or attempt to escape, they are immediatelylazo'd, and, at nightfall the gang is marched, bound in pairs, to the nearest barrack, where the wretched victims of military oppression are pursued by a mournful procession of wives and children who henceforth follow their husbands or parents during the whole period of service. From the hands of the recruiting sergeant the conscript passes into those of the drill sergeant. The chief duty of this personage is to teach him to march, countermarch, and to handle an unserviceable weapon. From the drill sergeant he succeeds to the company officer, and here, perhaps, he encounters the worst foe of his ultimate efficiency.
Officers in Mexico have no thorough military and scientific education. There is a military school at Chapultepec, near the capital, but it has never been carefully and completely organized, nor has it furnished many men who have distinguished themselves in the field. The politicians, relying on the dramatic power of the army, made that army the means of reward and influence in civil life, by selecting its officers of all grades from every employment or occupation. Merchants, tradespeople, professional men, children of wealthy or ambitious families, all attained rank in the army by this unwise means, and the consequence has been that the majority of company, and perhaps even of field officers, was rather fitted to display the magnificent uniforms to which their grades entitle them than to discipline the rank and file when organized in battalions, regiments and divisions.
The picturesque and scenic efficiency of such an army will be easily admitted, and the causes of its failure in the late war will be quite as easily understood. What can be more deplorable in battle, even for the victors, than to behold an undisciplined man badly led or driven into conflict? What can be more disastrous for an officer than to stand in the midst of blood and carnage, without knowing what to do in the moment of trial when knowledge and presence of mind are imperatively needed? Can it be surprising, therefore, to observe that the columns of Mexican gazettes and pages of Mexican pamphlets published during the war, are filled with the basest crimination and recrimination or the lamest attempts at exculpation from disgraceful defeat?
A writer in the Monitor Republicano, speaking of the Mexican army, says, you have nothing to do but to read the writings of its generals from the commencement of the campaign, through the different actions and skirmishes in chronological order, and it will be seen that they have mutually called one another traitors, cowards, and imbeciles. He gives the following list of recriminations:—"Arista accused Torrejon, Ampudia and others; Torrejon Ampudia, while Uraga charged Arista; Jarregui accused Carrasco and various chiefs; Carrasco accused Jarregui and other generals; Mejia brought charges against Ampudia; Ampudia against him and several leaders, as Carrasco, Enciso and others, principal officers of the army. Urrea and others charged Parrodi with cowardice and treason; Parrodi accused Urrea and Romero, and Romero accused the famous Miramon of Mazatlan, the speculator in the goods taken by the troops of Urrea from those of Gen. Taylor.
Requena accused Santa Anna; Santa Anna in his turn, Requena; Torrejon and Juvera recriminate Requena; Requena, in his turn, Torrejon, Juvera and Portilla. Santa Anna accused Miñon; Miñon accused Santa Anna and his confederates. Santa Anna brought charges against Valencia, in Ciudad Victoria; Valencia in his turn, accused Santa Anna. Viscayno accused Heredia and Garcia Conde; these in turn, Viscayno. Santa Anna recriminates against Canalizo, Uraga and others at Cerro Gordo; Canalizo, Uraga, Gaona and others against Santa Anna. Santa Anna again accuses Valencia in Padierna; Valencia accuses Santa Anna, Salas and others, and Salas accuses Valencia, Torrejon and others. Santa Anna, in the first actions in the valley, accuses everybody; he accuses Rincon, Anaya, and the National Guard at Churubusco; in the other actions of September, Terrés, Bravo and others. Bravo, Terrés and others in turn, recriminate Santa Anna, Perdigon andSimeon Ramirez. Perdigon accuses Simeon Ramirez and Terrés himself. Alvarez accuses Don Manuel Andrade, and Andrade in turn accuses him. Alcorta accuses the Andrade of the hussars, while he accuses Alcorta;—and in fine, we have before us the letters and despatches of the whole of them—we have before us their actions and skirmishes, from the battle of San Jacinto up to the ignominious capture of Gaona and Torrejon by the Poblano robber, Dominguez."
We have quoted these passages, to prove, by Mexican authority, that our remarks upon the army are not made in a captious spirit or with a desire to undervalue its officers ungenerously.
Bad as had been the organization and conduct of the army, they were not, of course, improved by the results of the war. Themoraleand thematerielwere both destroyed, so that when our troops withdrew during the summer of 1848, little more than a skeleton of the regiments remained to preserve order. This was, indeed, one of the greatest sources of dread to orderly Mexicans, for they feared that when all foreign restraint was suddenly removed, the country would be given up to anarchy. Without men and without means, the government justly apprehended the uprising of the mob, nor were there demagogues wanting to excite the evil passions of the masses by an outcry against the treaty. At the head of this disgraceful movement was General Paredes, who had returned from exile, but had not been trusted by the government during the conflict. The payment of the first instalment of the sum agreed upon in the treaty, however, enabled the authorities to maintain tranquillity, and as soon as comparative order was enforced by a new administration, the army was reorganized under a law passed on the 4th of November, 1848. By this act, the military establishment was greatly reduced, even on paper, and, in 1849, not more than five thousand two hundred, rank and file, were in actual service.
If there were, in reality, no need of an army in Mexico to oppose a foreign enemy, or, to preserve domestic peace, one would still be required to secure the Northern Frontier against the incursions of Indians. From the earliest periods, the Spaniards were vexed by their savage assaults, and, since the establishment of independence, the Mexicans have every year seen their people and property carried off by the robber tribes, whilst their villages,ranchosandhaciendaswere totally destroyed or partially ravaged.
Mexican engineers have calculated that the new boundary line, following the course of the Rio Grande and the Gila and includinga mathematical line of seventy leagues between these streams, is six hundred and forty-six leagues or about nineteen hundred miles in length. Three-fourths of this line pass through an uninhabited region, and, consequently, the savages have free access across it to the few and small settlements on the border. Such an extent of frontier, though considerably reduced from the former line anterior to the treaty, became at once an object of concern to the government, especially as the people of the United States immediately opened communications through the Indian country with the Pacific, and would probably soon control the important passes through the whole region north of the boundary. Accordingly on the 20th of July, 1848, it was decreed that eighteenMilitary Coloniesshould be created, and placed within easy communication, so as to protect the southern settlers in some degree, or to encounter and punish the savages in their forays. The greater portions of the most warlike tribes were transferred by the treaty to the United States, and, by one of its articles, we bound ourselves to aid, at least, in saving the Mexicans from their plunder if we could not totally destroy their inimical power. In the neighborhood of the boundary, from near the mouth of the Gila to the commencement of the mathematical line, before alluded to, we find the tribes known as Coyotes, Mimbreños and Gileños, the former of whom wage war against Sonora, whilst the latter attack Chihuahua. The Apaches and Cumanches spread their numerous hordes from the vicinity of Chihuahua to the sources of the Nueces, twenty-five leagues beyond the Rio Grande. Besides these, there are, throughout this district many savage bands, supporting themselves entirely by the chase, and it is probable, according to the opinion of soldiers and captives, who have been among the tribes, that all these clans can unite thirty thousand warriors, whilst they still leave a sufficient number to protect their wigwams and villages.
Fortunately for the white races, these barbarians are not able to maintain peace among themselves. The Apaches and Cumanches are in continual strife, and never return from the "war path" without serious losses. It is not to be feared, therefore, that they will voluntarily join in a general rising against our pioneers; yet a common danger, or a common attack, might soon cement their hatred against the supposed usurper, and, directed by a man of capacity, produce even a more disastrous war than that with the Seminoles of Florida.
The Cumanches are numerous and active. They are dividedinto Caihuas, Yamparicas, and Llaneros. The Apaches are braver than the Cumanches, and are known as Meselaros and Lipanes. These barbarians arm themselves with guns, rifles, lances, bows and arrows. They manage their weapons admirably, are agile horsemen, and shoot with unerring aim. Tall and majestic in figure; muscular and capable of enduring fatigue; accustomed to live on the simplest food of the forest and to win it when necessary by the arrow alone; uniting the sagacity of men with the instinct of animals, these knights of the southern wilderness realize perfectly our ideas of the daring aborigines who peopled this continent before it was subdued by the white man. Their hatred of the Mexicans and the savage fury with which they pursue their male captives of adult age, appear to denote even a stronger, if not a worthier motive than robbery in their attacks. At least six hundred women and children are borne off by them every year from the settlements to their mountain fastnesses, and they openly confess that they are not unwilling to improve their race by mingling it with the white.
In order to maintain the southern frontier intact from these savages, Mexico designs the establishment of these military colonies, and will, in all probability, support them by a second or rear line of troops from the regular army as well as by forts and strongholds erected in positions affording easy access from the wilderness to inhabited regions. A frontier so open, and thronged with such barbarous hordes, could not be protected by military colonies alone.
The principalFortressesand strongholds of Mexico have hitherto been those of Perote, Acapulco, Ulua, and the citadels at Mexico and Monterey. The present government has ordered the citadel of Mexico, situated a short distance out of the town to be abandoned, as it only formed a nucleus for the assemblage of the military factionists who have constantly disturbed the peace of the republic. The citadel of Monterey is to be maintained and suitably supported.
The castle at Acapulco, an extremely important point on the southern or Pacific coast, is greatly impaired, and will require at least a hundred thousand dollars to adapt it for defence. The fortress of Perote was designed originally by the Spanish government as a depot for the treasure intended for shipment from Vera Cruz, in which the gold and silver would be safer than at an exposed sea port during that dangerous period of Castilian history, when all the nations of Europe were anxious to plunder her colonies.Situated far in the interior of the country and in the midst of a wide plain, it does not absolutely command any of the approaches either from the coast to the inner states, or to the coast from the capital. It is, however, well placed as a military arsenal, and demands an expenditure of about thirty thousand dollars to render it useful to the nation.
The Castle of San Juan de Ulua, built on a reef opposite the town of Vera Cruz, is in so ruinous a state that scarcely a million and a half of dollars will suffice to restore it to its ancient splendor and power. The one hundred and twenty-four guns now within its walls are all more or less injured or dismounted. "To garrison this Castle properly," said General Arista in his report as Minister of War in 1849, "two thousand men will be required at a yearly cost of four hundred thousand dollars. If this immense treasure is squandered on the Castle, it will surely be wasted alone to preserve a vain luxury; for, as Mexico has no hope of becoming a maritime power, San Juan de Ulua must always fall into the possession of such a naval nation whenever it makes war upon us. Experienced Spanish officers have recommended the dismantling of San Juan, and they now urge it more strongly than ever, as there is far greater reason to believe that it neither defends the nation nor even the city of Vera Cruz. The French, and recently the Americans, have convinced us of this fact; the first possessed themselves early of the Castle, and the latter took the town without hindrance from the Castle." Such is the opinion of one of the most experienced Mexican generals in regard to a fortress which has hitherto been deemed impregnable, and, although we do not agree with him in regard to its entire worthlessness in the hands of abler engineers, we doubt whether its use is not greater in checking the city of Vera Cruz itself, than in commanding the approaches to it from the sea. It must be remembered that the lee of this very Castle is the only comparatively safe harbor on the gulf at present, and that until amoleor breakwater shall be erected elsewhere, it is only in certain seasons and under favorable circumstances that large bodies of troops may be prudently disembarked on the adjacent shores. The landing of General Scott, in 1847, was singularly fortunate in time and circumstances, for, soon after, a furious norther arose and prevented all communication between the land and the squadron. These violent gales are sudden and terrific in their rise and action at Vera Cruz, and the dreadful havoc they made among the American shipping on the coast during the war, attests the value of a military defence whose protective duties are seconded by the veryspirit of the storm. The introduction of steam power into the national marine must of course greatly modify the character of coast defences; but we would deem it not only unwise but imbecile to abandon altogether a work which at least makes, if it does not perfectly protect, an important harbor. The city of Vera Cruz, itself, is a regular fortification, and with some important improvements and repairs, may not ultimately require San Juan de Ulua to defend it from assault. These two strongholds, combined, under the command of skilful generals and garrisoned with efficient soldiers, would offer a churlish welcome to any modern power either maritime or military. Their seizure, during the winter months of tempest, would be almost impossible, and their occupation, during the summer would be as fatal, as was unfortunately proved by our troops in the June, July, and August, after the brilliant siege and inglorious surrender.
The following tabular sketch prepared from Ministerial reports, exhibits the condition of the Mexican forces at this epoch.
Total number ofprojectiles, 52,019.
The field artillery consists of 16 batteries.
The coast of the republic, now greatly reduced by the treaty of Guadalupe, extends on the Gulf of Mexico, from the Rio Grande or Rio Bravo del Norte, to the port of Bacalar on the east of the peninsula of Yucatan, and comprehends in this distance, about five hundred and eighty-four leagues. The Pacific coast begins one league from San Diego in Lower California, and terminates at the Barra de Ocos in the Gulf of Tehuantepec, a distance of one thousand five hundred and twenty leagues, including the coasts of the Gulf of California, or sea of Cortéz. Consequently the coasts of the republic extend, in all, two thousand one hundred and four leagues, demonstrating the admirable situation of this country for commerce with all the world. The ports which are open for foreign trade in the Mexican Gulf, are Matamoros, Tampico, Vera Cruz Campeché, Sisal, and the island of Carmen; while, on the Pacific, there are the ports of Guayamas, Mazatlan, San Blas, Manzanillo, and Acapulco, the latter of these being the best in the possession of Mexico, on the great western ocean. Its harbor is excellent; its distance from the capital is comparatively short; its population is larger than that of other towns on the coast, and in consequence of the difficulty of landing elsewhere than in the actual port, the government is effectually secured against illicit trade. It is a sitewhich should unquestionably be protected and fostered, not only on account of the advantages we have mentioned, but because it will become a source of riches to the new state of Guerrero, whose government will contribute to cement the peace and tend to establish the permanent dominion of good order in that quarter.
The navy of all countries originates in their commerce, but Mexico, although situated as we have shown most advantageously for trade, has hitherto possessed but few merchantmen and a small marine. The vessels of war owned by the republic, previous to the conflict with the United States, were either sold, or disarmed, dismantled and laid up, when the nation was menaced with an attack. It was evident to the Mexican cabinet, that the navy could not cope with ours, and in order to prevent its total loss, the few vessels were voluntarily withdrawn from the sea. The officers, however, were generally employed in land duties during the contest, and most of them remained in service until the summer of 1848, when the most efficient were permanently confirmed in their employments, whilst the rest were allowed to retire on unlimited leave.
In considering the actual condition of the national trade and treasury, the government did not believe, on the re-establishment of peace, that it would be justified in creating at once an extensive naval establishment, nevertheless it was convinced that the security of the coasts, the protection of its own small trade, and the interest of its maritime custom houses, rendered the creation of aflotillaindispensable. With this view the minister of war and marine recommended in 1849 the naval establishment which is shown in the following table.
The actual naval force consists at present of 1 schooner only; but the secretary of war recommended, in addition, the construction of: