FOOTNOTES:

That this doctrine is at direct variance with the universal convictions of mankind, is too evident to require the slightest proof. That it isunphilosophical, as well asunpopular, may be made apparent by two very simple considerations. Thefirstis, that it assumes without proof the only point in question, namely, that the objects of our knowledge are nothing but the ideas of our own minds; whereas it is affirmed, on the other side, and surely with at least an equal amount of apparent reason, that we are so constituted as to have a direct perception of external objects as well as of internal mental states. Thesecondis, that the very formula of Idealism, which represents the "Non-ego" as a mere modification of the conscious "Ego," seems to involve a palpable contradiction; since it recognizes, in a certain sense,the difference between the "Ego and the Non-ego,"and yet, in the same breath, annihilatesthat difference, and proclaims their "identity."[138]Fichte admits, indeed, that we have the idea of something which isnot-self; but instead of ascribing it to an external object, he accounts for it by a law of our mental nature, which constrains us tocreate a limit, so as to give a determinate character to our thought. The three technical formulas, therefore, which are said[139]to express, respectively,—the affirmation of self,—the affirmation of not-self,—and the determination of the one by the other,—are all equally the products of our own mental laws, and do not necessarily require the supposition of any external object; and hence it follows that Self is the one only absolute principle, and that everything else that is conceived of is constructed out of purely subjective materials. The question whether the "object" be the generative principle of the "idea," orvice versâ, is thus superseded; for there is no longer any distinction between "object" and "subject;" existence is identified with thought; theEgoand theNon-egounite in one absolute existence; and Self becomes the sole Subject-object, the percipient and the perceived, the knowing and the known.

Of course, on this theory, there is no knowledge of God, just as there can be no knowledge of Nature, and no knowledge of our fellow-men, as distinct objective realities; it is a system of pure Idealism, which, if consistently followed out, must terminate in utterskepticismin regard to many of the most familiar objects of human knowledge; or, rather, in the hands of a thoroughly consequent reasoner, it must issue, as Jacobi endeavored to show, in absoluteNihilism; since we can have no better reason for believing in the existence of Self thanwe have for believing in the reality of an external world, and the coexistence of our fellow-men. Each of these beliefs is equally the spontaneous product of certain mental laws, which are just as trustworthy, and need as little to be proved, in the one case as in the other.

Fichte seems to have become aware of this fundamental defect of his system; and, at a later period, he attempted to give it a firmer basis by representingself, not as individual, but as Divine, that is, as the Absolute manifesting itself in Man. He now admitted what, if he had not denied, he had overlooked before, an essential reality as the substratum both of theEgoandNon-ego;a reality of which all things, whether within or without, are only so many "modes" or manifestations. And it is at this point that his subjective Idealism passes into Pantheism, and that we mark the close affinity between his speculations and those of Spinoza. There is, in some respects, a wide difference between the two; Spinoza assumed, Fichte denied, the existence of matter; the former affirmed Substance to be the absolute and infinite Essence; the latter proclaimed a spiritual universe, whose essence was the infinite reason, or the Divine idea: but still, with these and other points of difference, there existed a real, radical affinity between the two systems, that of Fichte, not less than that of Spinoza, being based onthe identity of existence and thought; and both systems being directed to show that there is but one Absolute Being, of which all phenomena, whether material or mental, are only so many modes or manifestations.

3. The philosophy of "the absolute," as applied in support of German Pantheism, depends on the doctrine of "Identity," and must stand or fall along with it.[140]The "absolute" isdescribed as being at onceidealandreal, purebeingand purethought, and as developing itself in a great variety of forms. The philosophy of the "absolute" is represented as theonly science, properly so called: it is assumed that there can be no science of the finite, the variable, the contingent, the relative, but only of the absolute, the unchangeable, and the infinite. To constitutethisscience, the doctrine of "identity" is indispensable; the subject and the object of thought, knowledge and being, must be reduced to scientific unity. Realism and Idealism are thus blended together, or rather identified in the philosophy of the "absolute." The idea of the "absolute," in whichbeingandthoughtare identical, is the only foundation of science, and the ultimate ground of all certitude. And Pantheism is inferred from this idea; for the "absolute," in whichbeingandthoughtare identified, is properlythe sole existence, which develops and manifests itself in a great variety of finite forms.

We are not disposed to treat the philosophy of the "absolute" either with levity or with scorn. We feel that it brings us into contact with some of the most profound and most deeply mysterious problems of human thought. Finite as we are, we are so constituted that we cannot avoid framing theidea, although we can never attain to acomprehension, of the Infinite. There are absolute truths, and necessary truths, among the elements of human knowledge. Account for them as we may, their reality cannot be reasonably denied, nor their importance disparaged. There is a tendency—and a most useful one—in the human mind, to seek unity in all things, to trace effects to causes, to reduce phenomena to laws, to resolve the complex into the simple, and to rise from the contingent to the absolute, from the finite to the infinite. There are few more interesting inquiries in the department of Psychology than that which seeks to investigate the nature, the origin, and the validity of those ideas which introduce us into the regionof absolute, eternal, and immutable Truth; and it were a lamentable result of the erratic speculations of Germany did they serve to cast discredit on this inquiry, or even to excite a prejudice against it, in the more sober, but not less profound, minds of our own countrymen. But there need be little apprehension on this score, if it be clearly understood and carefully remembered, that the philosophy of the absolute, as taught in Germany and applied in support of Pantheism, rests ultimately on the theory of Idealism and the doctrine of Identity, by which all is resolved into one absolute "subject-object," andexistenceis identified withthought.Thissystem may be discarded, and yet there may still remain a sound, wholesome, and innocuous philosophy of the "absolute;" a philosophy which does not seek to identify things so generically different asexistenceandthought, or to reduce mind and matter, the finite and the infinite, to the same category; but which, recognizing the differences subsisting between the various objects of thought, seeks merely to investigate the nature and sources of that part of human knowledge which relates to absolute or necessary truths. The former of these rival systems may be favorable to Pantheism, the latter will be found to be in entire accordance with Christian Theism.

The fundamental principle of philosophical Pantheism is eitherthe unity of substance, as taught by Spinoza, orthe identity of existence and thought, as taught, with some important variations, by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The Absolute is conceived of, not as a living Being to whom a proper personality and certain intelligible attributes may be ascribed, but as a vague, indeterminatesomewhat, which has no distinctive character, and of which, in the first instance, or prior to its development, almost nothing can be either affirmed or denied. But this absolute existence, by some unknown, inherent necessity, develops, determines, and limits itself: it becomes being, and constitutes all being: the infinite passes into the finite, theabsolute into the relative, the necessary into the contingent, the one into the many; all other existences are only so many modes or forms of its manifestation. Here is a theory which, to say the very least, is neither more intelligible, nor less mysterious, than any article of the Christian faith. And what are the proofs to which it appeals, what the principles on which it rests? Its two fundamental positions are these; that finite things have no distinct existence as realities in nature, and that there exists only one Absolute Being, manifesting itself in a variety of forms. And how are they demonstrated? Simply by the affirmation of universal "Identity." But what if this affirmation be denied? What if, founding on the clearest data of consciousness, we refuse to acknowledge thatexistenceis identical withthought?[141]What if we continue to believe that there are objects of thought which are distinct from thought itself, and which must bepresentedto the mind before they can berepresentedby the mind? What if, while we recognize the idea both of the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute, the contingent and the necessary, we cannot, by the utmost effort of our reason, obliterate the difference between them, so as to reduce them to one absolute essence? Then the whole superstructure of Pantheism falls along with the Idealism on which it depends; and it is found to be, not a solid and enduring system of truth, but a frail edifice, ingeniously constructed out of the mere abstractions of the human mind.

The advocates of this system assume that the relations which subsist betweenbeingsare the same as the relations which subsist between ourideas, and infer thatlogicis sufficient to construct a system ofmetaphysic. But Professor Nicolas has well said, that "while it is certain we cannot know things but by the notions which we have of them, and a certain parallelism may thus be established betweenwhat existsandwhat we thinkof that which exists, yet from this to theidentity of being and thought, such as Pantheism requires, there is a vast distance, and we have no ground for believing that thelogical relationsof our ideas are identical with thereal relationsof beings. Speculative Pantheism is wholly built on this assumption. It describes the relations of being according to the logical relations of our thought; and it takeslogicfor a kind ofmetaphysic. It confounds the laws of thought with the laws of being. It seeks to solve the question, What is the first Being, and what are its relations to other beings? That Being must necessarily be the condition of all other beings, and must virtually contain them all; nay, it must be capable of becoming all things. It must therefore be simple, indeterminate, indifferent, possessing no essential character, resembling nothing that we actually know. All this is true of ourideas, but not ofbeings. The highest idea,—that which is the logical condition of all others, and also the most general, the most abstract, the most indeterminate,—this idea contains all others, and by receiving this or that determination, it becomes this or that particular idea. But what is true of theideais not true of thebeing; no such vague, indeterminate, indifferent being exists; and yet Pantheism confoundsthe ideawiththe being, and rests entirely on that confusion of thought."

In bringing our review of Modern Pantheism to a close, we may offer a few remarks illustrative of itsnature and tendency, whether considered as a system of speculative thought, or as a substitute for religious belief.

In this view, it is important to observe, first of all, that the theory of "Idealism," and the doctrine of "Identity," which constitute the groundwork of the more spiritual form of Pantheism, are not more adverse to our belief in the existence and personality of God, than they are to our belief in the reality of an external world, or in the existence and personality of manhimself. They stand equally related to each of thesethreetopics; and, if they be accepted at all, they must be impartially applied, and consistently carried out into all their legitimate consequences, as the only philosophical solution of the whole question of Ontology. Perhaps this is not understood; certainly it has not been duly considered by the more superficiallitterateurs, who have been slightly tinctured with Pantheism; but it will be acknowledged at once by every consistent Idealist, who understands his own philosophy, and who is honest or bold enough to carry it out into all its practical applications. He knows very well, and, if sufficiently candid, he will frankly confess, that the principles on which he founds, if they be conclusive against the existence of a living, personal God, are equally conclusive against the reality of an external world, and against the doctrine of our own personality or that of our fellow-men. With most minds, this consideration would be of itself a powerful counteractive to all that is most dangerous in the theory of Idealism, were it only clearly apprehended and steadily kept in view; for an argument which proves too much is justly held to prove nothing, and that theory which leaves us no right to believe in the existence of Nature, or in the distinct personality of our fellow-men, can scarcely be held sufficient to disprove the existence of God.

It may be observed, further, that Ideal Pantheism has a strong tendency to engender a spirit either of Mysticism, on the one hand, or of Skepticism on the other. It terminates in Mysticism when, seeking to avoid Skepticism, it takes refuge in the doctrine of an "intellectual intuition," such as gives an immediate knowledge of the Absolute: and it terminates in Skepticism when, seeking to avoid Mysticism, it rejects the doctrine of "intellectual intuition," and discovers that it has no other and no higher claims to our confidence than such as are equally possessed by any one of our common faculties, whose testimony the Idealist has been taught to distrust and doubt.

It is further worthy of remark, that the philosophy of the Absolute, as taught in the German schools, has been applied to the whole circle of the Sciences, not less than to Theology, and that it has given birth to numerous speculative systems, in Physics, in Chemistry, in Ethics, in History, and in Politics, all strongly marked by the same characteristic feature—the substitution ofà priori and deductivespeculation for the more sober and legitimate method of Inductive inquiry. The province of Natural Science, in which, if anywhere, we should be guided by the light of experience and observation, has been rudely invaded by this transcendental philosophy, which offers to construct a theory of universal knowledge on the basis of a certain self-development of the Absolute. We are indebted to Mr. Morell for a specimen,[142]alike amusing and instructive, of Schelling's speculations on this subject. We shall not attempt to interpret its meaning, for, in sooth, we do not pretend to understand it: but one thing is clear, the laws of Matter, of Dynamics, of Organic structure and life, the laws of Knowledge, of Action, and of Art, are all exhibited as mere deductions or corollaries from the "idea of the Absolute;" and in the name of Natural Science, not less than on behalf of Theology, we protest against this vicious method of Philosophy, and do most earnestly deprecate the substitution of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in the place of our own Bacon, and Boyle, and Newton, as models of scientific thought.

Thepractical influenceof Pantheism, in so far as its peculiar tendencies are not restrained or counteracted by more salutary beliefs, must be deeply injurious, both to the individual and social welfare of mankind. In its Ideal or Spiritual form it may be seductive to some ardent, imaginative minds; but it is a wretched creed notwithstanding; and it will be found, when calmly examined, to be fraught with the most serious evils. Ithas been commended, indeed, in glowing terms, as a creed alike beautiful and beneficent,—as a source of religious life nobler and purer than any that can ever spring from the more gloomy system of Theism: for, on the theory of Pantheism, God is manifest to all, everywhere, and at all times; Nature, too, is aggrandized and glorified, and everything in Nature is invested with a new dignity and interest; above all, Man is conclusively freed from all fantastic hopes and superstitious fears, so that his mind can now repose, with tranquil satisfaction, on the bosom of the Absolute, unmoved by the vicissitudes of life, and unscared even by the prospect of death. For what is death? The dissolution of any living organism is but one stage in the process of its further development; and whether it passes into a new form of self-conscious life, or is reabsorbed into the infinite, it still forms an indestructible element in the vast sum of Being. We may, therefore, or, rather, we must, leave our future state to be determined by Nature's inexorable laws, and we need, at least, fear no Being higher than Nature, to whose justice we are amenable, or whose frown we should dread.[143]But, even as it is thus exhibited by some of its warmest partisans, it appears to us, we own, to be a dreary and cheerless creed, when compared with that faith which teaches us to regard God as our "Father in heaven," and that "hope which is full of immortality." It is worse, however, than dreary; it is destructive of all religion and of all morality. If it be an avowed antagonist to Christianity, it is not less hostile to Natural Theology and to Ethical Science. It consecrates error and vice, as being, equally with truth and virtue, necessary and beneficial manifestations of the "infinite." It is a system of Syncretism, founded on the idea that error is only anincomplete truth, and maintaining that truth must necessarily be developed by error, and virtue by vice. According to this fundamental law of "human progress," Atheism itself may be providential; and the axiom of a Fatalistic Optimism—"Whatever is, is best"—must be admitted equally in regard to truth and error, to virtue and vice.

It may be further observed, that modern Pantheism, whether in its Material or Ideal form, is nothing else than the revival of some of the earliest and most inveterate Principles of Paganism,—the same Paganism which still flourishes among the "theosophic" dreamers of India, and which exhibits its practical fruits in the horrors of Hindoo superstition. For Pantheism, although repeatedly revived and exhibited in new forms, has made no real progress since the time when it was first taught in the Vedanta system, and sublimed in the schools of Alexandria. Christianity, which encountered and triumphed over it in her youth, can have nothing to fear from it in her mature age,[144]provided only that she be faithful to herself, and spurn every offered compromise. But there must be no truce, and no attempt at conciliation between the two. The Pantheists of Germany have made the most impudent claims to the virtual sanction of Christianity; they have even dared to make use of Bible terms in a new sense, and have spoken of Revelation, Inspiration, Incarnation, Redemption, Atonement, and Regeneration, in such a way as to adapt them to the Pantheistic hypothesis. Common honesty is outraged, and the conscience of universal humanity offended, by the conduct of individuals—some of them wearing the robes of the holy ministry—who have substituted the dreams of Pantheism for the doctrines of Jesus Christ, and assailed, both from the pulpit and the press, the sacred cause which they had solemnly vowed tomaintain. But even in Germany itself a powerful reaction has commenced; and the learning and labors of such men as Olshausen, and Tholuck, and Hengstenberg, may be hailed as the dawn of a better and brighter day.

It may be observed,finally, that Pantheism stands directly opposed to Christian Theism in several distinct respects. The following are the principal points of collision between the two:

1. Pantheism denies,—Christian Theism affirms, the existence of aliving, personal God, distinct from Nature, and superior to it.

2. Pantheism supersedes,—Christian Theism reveals, the doctrine of a real creation.

3. Pantheism contests,—Christian Theism confirms, the doctrine of the constant providence and moral government of God.

4. Pantheism disowns,—Christian Theism declares, the doctrine ofa conscious, personal immortality.

5. Pantheism rejects,—Christian Theism receives, the whole scheme of Revelation, considered as a supernatural code of Divine truth. The one accounts for its origin on the principle of natural development, the other on that of supernatural interposition.

6. Pantheism has no living, self-conscious, personal God, no loving Father, no watchful Providence, no Hearer of Prayer, no Object of confiding trust, no Redeemer, no Sanctifier, no Comforter: it leaves us with nothing higher than Nature as our portion here, and nothing beyond its eternal vicissitudes as our prospect hereafter.

FOOTNOTES:[103]Amand Saintes, "Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza, Fondateur de l'Exegése et de la Philosophie Modernes."[104]M. Cousin, "Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie,"I.403. See also "Fragmens Philosophiques," Preface, second edition, p.XXVII.; "Nouveaux Fragments," pp. 9, 160.[105]M. Ad. Franck, "De la Certitude," Preface, p.XXI.[106]M. A. Javari, "De la Certitude," p. 509.[107]Amand Saintes, "Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza," pp. 208, 210.[108]Abbé Maret, "Essai sur le Panthéisme dans les Sociétés Modernes," pp. 6, 11, 31. Ibid., "Theodicée Chretiénne," pp. 437, 444, 449.[109]Mr. Morell's"Historical and Critical View,"II.104, 153.[110]Pierre Leroux, "De l'Humanité,"I.vi. 3, 295.[111]L. D. Crousse, "Des Principes, ou Philosophie Première," 2d Edition, Paris, 1846.[112]Abbé Maret, "Theodicée Chretienne," p. 94.[113]Abbé Goschler, sur "l'Histoire du Pantheisme."Abbé Maret, "Essai," chap.IV.[114]Pierre Leroux, "De l'Humanité,"I.249.M. Crousse, "Des Principes," pp. 199, 211, 296.Bayle, "Pensées,"III.67. The well-known lines of the sixth Æneid, "Principio cœlum, ac terras, camposque liquentes," &c. are thus applied.[115]Abbé Maret, "Essai," pp. 152, 156, 221.[116]Dr. Merle D'Aubigné, "History of Reformation,"V.84.[117]Abbé Maret, "Essai," p. 89; "Theodicée," p. 368.[118]Fred. von Schlegel, "Philosophy of Life," p. 417. See, also,Dr. Tholuck'sremarks on the same point in the "Princeton Theological Essays,"I.555.[119]Musæus, "Tractatus Theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen examinatus," 1674.Regneri a Mansvelt, "Adversus anonymum Theologico-politicum, Liber singularis," 1674.Francois Cuyper, "Arcana Atheismi Revelata," 1676.John Bredenbourg, "Enervatio Tractatus Theol.-polit."Christ. Wittichii, "Anti-Spinoza, sive Examen," 1690.Pierre Poiret, "Fundamenta Atheismi Eversa, sive Specimen Absurditatis Spinozianæ."Fenelon, "De l'Existence de Dieu," p.II., c.III., "Refutation du Spinozisme."Huet, "La Conformité de la Raison avec la Foi," 1692.Howe, "Living Temple,"I.262.S. Clarke, "Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God," pp. 25, 44, 58, 80.[120]Jean Colerus, "Vie de Spinoza," reprinted by Saisset, p. 4.[121]Spinoza, "Ethica," DefinitionsIII.,IV.,V.[122]"Il construit le systéme entiere des êtres avec ces trois seuls elements; la substance, l'attribut, et le mode."—"Voila l'idée mere de la metaphysique de Spinoza."—Saisset.[123]Saisset, "Introduction," p.XXXIX.[124]Spinoza, "De Intellectus Emendatione." This treatise contains the exposition of his method.[125]M. F. Perron, "Essai d'une Nouvelle Theorie sur les Idées Fondamentales," 1843.[126]"Ici, a prendre les mots dans le sens ordinaire, il semble qu'il soit demontré quila Creation est impossible, principe justement cher au Pantheisme; tandis qu'au fond, tout ce qui est demontré, c'est quel'Etre en soi est necessairement incréé,—verité incontestable, dontle Pantheisme n'a rien a tirer."—Prof. Saisset, Introduction, p.XLII.[127]M. l'Abbé de Condillac, "Traité des Sensations," 2 vols.[128]TheHon. Robert Boyle, "Theological Works,"II.79.—"A Free Inquiry into the Received Notion of Nature."[129]"Systême de la Nature,"II.75, 110, 115.[130]"Tout est toujours dans l'ordre rélativement à la Nature, où tous les êtres ne font que suivre les loix qui leur sont imposées. Il est entrédans son plansque de certaines terres produiroient des fruits delicieux, tandis que d'autres ne fourniroient que des épines, des vegetaux dangereux.Elle a voluquequelquessocietés produise des sages," &c.—Vol.I.265, also 267.[131]"Systême de la Nature,"II.102.[132]M. Crousse, "Des Principes," Paris, 1846, pp. 81, 93: "Pour qui sait voir, le Monde sent, se ment, parle, et pense."[133]"The Purpose of Existence," pp. 85, 89. London, 1850.[134]"Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development." ByH. G. AtkinsonandHarriet Martineau. London, 1852.[135]Mr. Morell, "History of Philosophy,"II.71.[136]Sir Wm. Hamilton'sEdition ofDr. Reid's"Works," p. 129.[137]Mr. Morell, "History of Philosophy,"II.127.M. Maret, "Essai sur le Pantheisme," pp. 129, 133, 143, 192, 276. Ibid., "Theodicée," pp. 5, 123, 192, 199.[138]Sir William Hamilton'sedition ofReid's"Works," p. 281. Sir William does not seem to admit that there is a contradiction such as I have noted.[139]1. "Theegoormoiaffirmsitself." 2. "Theegoormoiaffirms anon-egoornon-moi." 3. "Theegoormoiaffirms itself to be determined by thenon-egoornon-moi."[140]M. Maret, "Essai," pp. 129, 142, 146, 175, 192, 225, 276. Ibid., "Theodicée," pp. 193, 366, 378, 386, 394.Mr. Morell, "History,"II.127, 138.[141]Professor Nicolas, "Quelques Considerations sur le Pantheisme," pp. 20-31.[142]Mr. Morell, "History of Philosophy,"II.129.[143]M. Crousse, "Des Principes."M. Maret, "Essal," pp. 69, 86, 150; "Theodicée" pp. 311, 314.Valroger, "Etudes Critiques," pp. 97, 101, 115, 151, 412.[144]M. Maret, "Essai sur Pantheisme," p. 107. "Le Christianisme saura vaincre dans son âge mûr l'ennemi qu'il a terrassé en naissant."

[103]Amand Saintes, "Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza, Fondateur de l'Exegése et de la Philosophie Modernes."

[104]M. Cousin, "Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie,"I.403. See also "Fragmens Philosophiques," Preface, second edition, p.XXVII.; "Nouveaux Fragments," pp. 9, 160.

[105]M. Ad. Franck, "De la Certitude," Preface, p.XXI.

[106]M. A. Javari, "De la Certitude," p. 509.

[107]Amand Saintes, "Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza," pp. 208, 210.

[108]Abbé Maret, "Essai sur le Panthéisme dans les Sociétés Modernes," pp. 6, 11, 31. Ibid., "Theodicée Chretiénne," pp. 437, 444, 449.

[109]Mr. Morell's"Historical and Critical View,"II.104, 153.

[110]Pierre Leroux, "De l'Humanité,"I.vi. 3, 295.

[111]L. D. Crousse, "Des Principes, ou Philosophie Première," 2d Edition, Paris, 1846.

[112]Abbé Maret, "Theodicée Chretienne," p. 94.

[113]Abbé Goschler, sur "l'Histoire du Pantheisme."Abbé Maret, "Essai," chap.IV.

[114]Pierre Leroux, "De l'Humanité,"I.249.M. Crousse, "Des Principes," pp. 199, 211, 296.Bayle, "Pensées,"III.67. The well-known lines of the sixth Æneid, "Principio cœlum, ac terras, camposque liquentes," &c. are thus applied.

[115]Abbé Maret, "Essai," pp. 152, 156, 221.

[116]Dr. Merle D'Aubigné, "History of Reformation,"V.84.

[117]Abbé Maret, "Essai," p. 89; "Theodicée," p. 368.

[118]Fred. von Schlegel, "Philosophy of Life," p. 417. See, also,Dr. Tholuck'sremarks on the same point in the "Princeton Theological Essays,"I.555.

[119]Musæus, "Tractatus Theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen examinatus," 1674.Regneri a Mansvelt, "Adversus anonymum Theologico-politicum, Liber singularis," 1674.Francois Cuyper, "Arcana Atheismi Revelata," 1676.John Bredenbourg, "Enervatio Tractatus Theol.-polit."Christ. Wittichii, "Anti-Spinoza, sive Examen," 1690.Pierre Poiret, "Fundamenta Atheismi Eversa, sive Specimen Absurditatis Spinozianæ."Fenelon, "De l'Existence de Dieu," p.II., c.III., "Refutation du Spinozisme."Huet, "La Conformité de la Raison avec la Foi," 1692.Howe, "Living Temple,"I.262.S. Clarke, "Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God," pp. 25, 44, 58, 80.

[120]Jean Colerus, "Vie de Spinoza," reprinted by Saisset, p. 4.

[121]Spinoza, "Ethica," DefinitionsIII.,IV.,V.

[122]"Il construit le systéme entiere des êtres avec ces trois seuls elements; la substance, l'attribut, et le mode."—"Voila l'idée mere de la metaphysique de Spinoza."—Saisset.

[123]Saisset, "Introduction," p.XXXIX.

[124]Spinoza, "De Intellectus Emendatione." This treatise contains the exposition of his method.

[125]M. F. Perron, "Essai d'une Nouvelle Theorie sur les Idées Fondamentales," 1843.

[126]"Ici, a prendre les mots dans le sens ordinaire, il semble qu'il soit demontré quila Creation est impossible, principe justement cher au Pantheisme; tandis qu'au fond, tout ce qui est demontré, c'est quel'Etre en soi est necessairement incréé,—verité incontestable, dontle Pantheisme n'a rien a tirer."—Prof. Saisset, Introduction, p.XLII.

[127]M. l'Abbé de Condillac, "Traité des Sensations," 2 vols.

[128]TheHon. Robert Boyle, "Theological Works,"II.79.—"A Free Inquiry into the Received Notion of Nature."

[129]"Systême de la Nature,"II.75, 110, 115.

[130]"Tout est toujours dans l'ordre rélativement à la Nature, où tous les êtres ne font que suivre les loix qui leur sont imposées. Il est entrédans son plansque de certaines terres produiroient des fruits delicieux, tandis que d'autres ne fourniroient que des épines, des vegetaux dangereux.Elle a voluquequelquessocietés produise des sages," &c.—Vol.I.265, also 267.

[131]"Systême de la Nature,"II.102.

[132]M. Crousse, "Des Principes," Paris, 1846, pp. 81, 93: "Pour qui sait voir, le Monde sent, se ment, parle, et pense."

[133]"The Purpose of Existence," pp. 85, 89. London, 1850.

[134]"Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development." ByH. G. AtkinsonandHarriet Martineau. London, 1852.

[135]Mr. Morell, "History of Philosophy,"II.71.

[136]Sir Wm. Hamilton'sEdition ofDr. Reid's"Works," p. 129.

[137]Mr. Morell, "History of Philosophy,"II.127.M. Maret, "Essai sur le Pantheisme," pp. 129, 133, 143, 192, 276. Ibid., "Theodicée," pp. 5, 123, 192, 199.

[138]Sir William Hamilton'sedition ofReid's"Works," p. 281. Sir William does not seem to admit that there is a contradiction such as I have noted.

[139]1. "Theegoormoiaffirmsitself." 2. "Theegoormoiaffirms anon-egoornon-moi." 3. "Theegoormoiaffirms itself to be determined by thenon-egoornon-moi."

[140]M. Maret, "Essai," pp. 129, 142, 146, 175, 192, 225, 276. Ibid., "Theodicée," pp. 193, 366, 378, 386, 394.Mr. Morell, "History,"II.127, 138.

[141]Professor Nicolas, "Quelques Considerations sur le Pantheisme," pp. 20-31.

[142]Mr. Morell, "History of Philosophy,"II.129.

[143]M. Crousse, "Des Principes."M. Maret, "Essal," pp. 69, 86, 150; "Theodicée" pp. 311, 314.Valroger, "Etudes Critiques," pp. 97, 101, 115, 151, 412.

[144]M. Maret, "Essai sur Pantheisme," p. 107. "Le Christianisme saura vaincre dans son âge mûr l'ennemi qu'il a terrassé en naissant."

The doctrine of Materialism stands equally related to the "mechanical" form of Atheism, and to the "hylozoic" form of Pantheism. It is subsumed in both, and is the fundamental postulate on which they respectively depend.

It has no natural affinity with the more "ideal" or "spiritual" form of Pantheism. We must not conclude, however, that it has no historical connection with it. For it is instructive to mark, in tracing the history of philosophic speculation, that its course resembles not so much the uniform current of a stream, as the alternate flowing and ebbing of the tide; or, if we may change the figure, that its movement may be likened to the oscillation of a pendulum, which no sooner reaches its highest elevation on the one side, than it acquires a tendency to rush to the opposite extreme on the other. There can be little doubt that the recent revival of speculative "Idealism" was the result, at least in part, of a strong reaction against the "sensational" philosophy, which had degenerated in the school of Priestley at home, and in that of Condillac abroad, into a system of gross and revolting Materialism. For the same reason, we may now, I think, anticipate a speedy reaction the other way,—a reaction against the extravagances of "idealistic" and "transcendental" speculation, and a tendency towards a more practical and matter-of-fact philosophy. This tendency,if guided by the true spirit of the Baconian method, may give a powerful impulse to Inductive Science in all its departments; but, if biased by partial and one-sided views, may issue either in the temporary ascendancy of the Positive School, or the partial revival of some other form of Materialism.

Some such tendency might have been expected to arise as soon as Idealism should have reached its culminating point. For, on a comprehensive view of the whole history of speculative thought, we find that there are justfourgreat systems of Metaphysics, which are perpetually recurring, as it were, in cycles. The first is the system of Dualism,—not the Dualism of Christian Theology, which speaks of God and nature, the Creator and the creature,—but the Dualism of ancient Paganism, which held Matter and Spirit to be equally uncreated and eternal: the second is Materialism, which resolves all into Matter and its laws: the third is Idealism, which resolves all into Mind and its modifications: and the fourth is Pantheism, which identifies Existence with Thought, and resolves all into the Absolute.[145]In the present age, Idealism is in the ascendant, and has risen to the height of Pantheism; but, by a natural reaction, many are beginning to desiderate a more substantial and practical philosophy, while the rapid progress of physical science is directing their thoughts more and more to the wonders of the material world. In these circumstances, there may be a tendency to relapse into the Materialism of the last century, which attempted to explain the whole theory of the universe by the laws ofmatterandmotion; or at least to embrace some modification of the Positive Philosophy, which excludes allcauses, whether efficient or final, from the field of human knowledge, and confines our inquiries to the mere phenomena and laws of material nature.

There are not wanting various significant indications of theexistence of this tendency at the present day. It is sufficiently indicated, in some quarters, by the mere omission of all reference to Mind or Spirit as distinct from Matter; and, in others, by elaborate attempts to explain all the phenomena of life and thought by means of physical agencies and organic laws. The writings of Comte, Crousse, Cabanis, and Broussais,[146]afford ample evidence of its growing prevalence in France; and although it has been said by a recent historian of Philosophy that in England there has been no formal avowal, or at least no recognized school, of Materialism, since the publication of Dr. Thomas Brown's reply to Darwin's Zoönomia, yet there is too much reason to believe that it was all along cherished by not a few private thinkers, who had imbibed the spirit of Hobbes and Priestley; and now it is beginning to speak out, in terms too unambiguous to be misunderstood, in such works as "The Purpose of Existence" and the "Letters" of Atkinson and Martineau. But apart from the opinions of individual inquirers, it must be remembered that there is a tendency in certain studies, when exclusively pursued, to generate a frame of mind which will tempt men either to adopt the theory of Materialism, or at least to attach undue importance to physical agencies and organic laws. This tendency may be observed in the study of Physiology, especially when it is combined with that of Phrenology and Animal Magnetism; not that there is any necessary or strictly logical connection between these studies and Materialism, for some of their ablest expounders, including Cabanis, Gall, and Spurzheim, have explicitly disavowed that theory; but simply that, in prosecuting such inquiries, the mind is insensibly led to bestow an undue, if not exclusive, attention on the phenomena and lawsof our material organization, so as to become comparatively unmindful of what is mental, moral, and spiritual in the constitution of man. For these reasons, and considering, especially, the close connection of Materialism both with the mechanical Atheism of the past, and the hylozoic Pantheism of the present age, we deem it necessary to subject its claims to a rigorous scrutiny, in connection with the subject of our present inquiry.

What, then, is the doctrine of Materialism? What are the forms in which it has appeared, and what the ground on which it rests? How does it stand related to the question concerning the nature and existence of God, or the constitution and destiny of Man? A brief answer to these questions will be sufficient to show that this theory cannot be safely disregarded in any attempt to construct a comprehensive and conclusive argument on the first principles of Natural Theology.

The doctrine of Materialism has assumed several distinct phases or forms in the hands of its different advocates; and these must be carefully discriminated from each other, if we would either estimate aright their respective merits, or do justice to the parties by whom they have been severally maintained.

The grossest and most revolting form of Materialism is that whichidentifies mind with matter, andthought with motion. It denies that there is any real or radical difference between physical and moral phenomena, and affirms that life and thought are so entirely dependent on material organization, that the dissolution of the body must necessarily be the destruction of conscious existence, and that death can only be aneternal sleep. This is the doctrine of Materialism which was taught in a former age, by the author of the "Systême de la Nature," and which has recently been revived by M. Comte in France, and by Atkinson and Martineau in England. A few extracts will sufficiently illustrate its character and tendency. "Men have evidently abused the distinction," says Baron D'Holbach, "which is so often made betweenman physicalandman moral: man moral is nothing else than that physical being considered in a certain point of view, that is, with reference to some modes of action which belong to his peculiar organization."—"The universe—that vast assemblage of everything that exists—exhibits nowhere anything else thanmatter and motion."—"If we are asked, what is man? we reply, that he is a material being, organized or framed so as to feel, to think, and to be affected in certain ways peculiar to himself, according to his organization."[147]More recently, M. Comte has affirmed that "the subject of all our researches isone," and that "all natural phenomena are the necessary results either of the laws of extension or of the laws of motion;" while M. Crousse is quite clear that "intelligence is a property or effect of matter," and that "body and spirit together constitute matter." In our own country, Atkinson and Martineau have not shrunk from the avowal of the same doctrine, or the adoption of the most revolting consequences that can be deduced from it. "Instinct, passion, thought, are effects of organized substances."—"Mind is the consequence or product of the material man; it is not a thing having a seat or home in the brain, but it is the manifestation or expression ofthe brain in action,as heat and light are of fire, and fragrance of the flower."[148]

The doctrine of Materialism, as formerly taught by Dr. Priestley and his followers, is in some respects similar to that which we have just noticed, but in other respects differs from it, if not in its essential nature, at least in its collateral adjuncts and its practical applications. It resembles the theory of D'Holbach and Comte, in so far as it affirms the doctrine ofunisubstancisme, and rejects the idea of adualismsuch as is implied in the common doctrine of Matter and Spirit. But it differs from that theory, inasmuch as it is combined, whether consistently or otherwise, with the recognition of a personal God, a resurrection from the dead, and a future state of reward and punishment. Dr. Priestley seems to have fluctuated for a time between two opposite extremes,—that ofspiritualizingMatter, and that ofmaterializingMind; for, in a very remarkable passage, we find him saying, "This scheme ofthe immateriality of Matter, as it may be called, or rather,the mutual penetration of Matter, first occurred to my friend Mr. Mitchell on reading 'Baxter on the Immateriality of the Soul.'"[149]But at length he settled down in the fixed belief of Materialism, as he had always held the principle ofunisubstancisme. He held throughout that "Man does not consist of two principles so essentially different from each other as Matter and Spirit, but the whole man is ofone uniform composition; and that either the material or the immaterial part of the universal system is superfluous."[150]He attempts, therefore, to show, that sensation, perception, and thought,—the common properties ofmind,—are not incompatible with extension, attraction, and repulsion,which he conceives to be the only essential properties ofmatter;that both classes of properties may possibly belong to the same subject; and that hence no second substance is necessary to account for and explain any of the phenomena of human nature. In this respect, his theory is precisely the same with that which has been already noticed; but the peculiarity by which it is distinguished from the Atheistic and Antichristian speculations of D'Holbach and Comte is twofold. In thefirstplace, while he ascribes to mere matter the power of sensation, thought, and volition, he admits that these powers, and all others belonging to matter, were communicated to it at the first, and are still continued, by the Divine will, thus recognizing the doctrine both of Creation and Providence; and in thesecondplace, while he denies the natural immortality of the soul, and even the possibility of its conscious existence in a state of separation from the body, he does not deny the immortality of man, but receives it, as well as the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, on the authority of that Divine Revelation which speaks of "the resurrection of the dead," and of "a judgment to come." In these respects, his theory is widely different from that of the "Systême de la Nature," while the two are substantially the same in so far as they relate simply to the constitution of human nature. He is not an Atheist, but a Theist, and a Theist, too, who, believing in Revelation, admits the immortality of man, and a future state of retribution. But it must be evident that as in these respects he founds entirely on the authority of Scripture, so he may be confronted with the same authority when he denies the spirituality of the soul; and in that case the question would resolve itself into one of Biblical exegesis, and would fall to be decided, not by metaphysical reasoning, but by Scriptural proofs.

Another variety of the theory is presented by Dr. Good in his "Life of Lucretius." It agrees with the doctrine of Priestley in representing the soul as material; but differs from it inholding the possible existence of the soul in a separate state, during the interval between the dissolution and resurrection of the body. It speaks of the body as being composed of gross material particles; and of the soul as consisting of more subtle, refined, and ethereal matter. This modification of the theory may be illustrated by the following extract: "Perception, consciousness, cognition, we continue to be told, are qualities which cannot appertain to matter; there must hence be a thinking and an immaterial principle; and man must still be a compound being. Yet, why thus degrade matter, the plastic and prolific creature of the Deity, beyond what we are authorized to do? Why may it not perceive, why not think, why not become conscious? What eternal and necessary impediment prevents? or what self-contradiction and absurdity is hereby implied? Let us examine Nature as she presents herself to us in her most simple and inorganized forms; let us trace her through her gradual and ascending stages of power and perfection. In its simplest form, matter evinces the desire of reciprocal union, or, as it is commonly called, the attraction of gravitation. Increase its mass, arrange it in other modifications, and it immediately evinces other powers or attractions; and these will be perpetually, and almost infinitely, varied, in proportion as we vary its combinations. If arranged, therefore, in one mode, it discloses the power of magnetism; in another, that of electricity or galvanism; in a third, that of chemical affinities; in a fourth, that of mineral assimilations. Pursue its modifications into classes of a more complex, or rather, perhaps, of a more gaseous or attenuate nature, and it will evince the power of vegetable or fibrous irritability: ascend through the classes of vegetables, and you will at length reach the strong stimulative perfection, the palpable vitality of themimosa pudica, or thehedysarum gyrans,the former of which shrinks from the touch with the most bashful coyness, while the latter perpetually dances beneaththe jocund rays of the sun. And when we have thus attained the summit of vegetable powers and vegetable life, it will require, I think, no great stretch of the imagination to conceive that the fibrous irritability of animals, as well as vegetables, is the mere result of a peculiar arrangement of simple and unirritable material atoms."—"Hence, then, animal sensation, and hence, necessarily and consequently, ideas, and a material soul or spirit, rude and confined, indeed, in its first and simplest mode of existence, but, like every other production of Nature, beautifully and progressively advancing from power to power, from faculty to faculty, from excellence to excellence, till at length it terminate in the perfection of the human mind."[151]

According to this theory, the mind is supposed to have a real existence, as a substance distinct from the grosser forms of matter, and capable even of surviving its separation from them. It is supposed to be "a combination of the most volatile auras or gases, diffused over the whole body, though traced in a more concentrate form in some organs than in others;" and it is described as "the very texture of that separate state of existence which the infallible page of Revelation clearly indicates will be ours."

A form of the theory very nearly resembling this has been recently reproduced. It consists in representing the Mind or Spirit of man, not as a mere fleeting phenomenon of the brain, or an evanescent effect of its organization, but as a distinct substantive product, generated, indeed, from matter, and partaking, therefore, of its nature, but so exquisitely subtle and ethereal that it has no resemblance to the grosser materials of the body, and admits only of being compared with the Dynamides—the imponderable elements and forces of Nature. This "spirit" is generated in man by his peculiar organization, and especially by the action of the brain; it is capable of survivingthe dissolution of the body, of retaining its individual consciousness after death, of passing into new spheres of being, and of rising from lower to higher states, according to a law of eternal progression. Such is the theory of Davis, the "Poughkeepsie Seer;" and such also, with some variations, is that of the author of "The Purpose of Existence."

"Matter and Spirit," says Davis, "have heretofore been supposed to constitute two distinct and independent substances, the latter not having any material origin." ... "Instead of making material and spiritual existence totally disconnected, the object and intention of the foregoing has been to prove, by acknowledged laws and principles of matter,the production of intelligence,the perfection of which isspirit;" to show that "the Organizer uses Nature and all things therein as an effect, to producespiritas an end and designed ultimate." The author of "The Purpose of Existence" adopts a similar view. He tells us, indeed, that "the first simple forms or states of existence are admitted to betwo, spirit and matter,—the first the moving power, the second the moved substance;" that of the positive essence of either we can arrive at no knowledge; and that "whether spirit be a refined, etherealized portion of matter, or a distinct dynamic principle, we cannot ascertain." And yet, one of the leading objects of his work is to account for "the origin and development of the human mind;" and this he does by ascribing it to "a self-dynamic spirit which is resident in matter," and which he denominates "the spirit of vitality." The spirit exists in vegetables, and is extracted by means of the organs of the animals which feed upon them, and then, "by a delicate work of distillation, it is converted intospirit!"—"Nature proclaims one of her great working principles to be, thatspirit is evolved out of matter, and outlives the body in which it is educated."—"Matter is full of spirit. This spirit is brought out of matter by vegetation. By means of vegetation, it is conveyed into animal frames, in which itspurest essence centres in the brain.... This is no idle theory," he adds, "no vain hypothesis, for making matter think. It is a clear proposition, showing how matter is employed by the Supreme Intelligence for evolving, training, and educating spirit."—"We conclude that Progression is the great law of the universe, the purpose for which its present arrangement was ordained; and that the object of this progression isthe evolvement of mind out of matter."

This is a new and very singular phase of Materialism. It is widely different from the doctrine which was taught by the infidel writers of the last century. They had recourse to the theory of Materialism chiefly with the view of excluding a world of spirits, and of undermining the doctrine of a future state: here it is applied to prove the constant development and indestructible existence of minds generated from matter, but destined to survive the dissolution of the body; nay, every particle of matter in the universe is supposed to be advancing, in one magnificent progression, towards the spiritual state. The danger now is, not that Religion may be undermined by Materialism, but that it may be supplanted by a fond and foolish superstition, in which the facts of Mesmerism and the fictions of Clairvoyance are blended into one ghostly system, fitted to exert a powerful but pernicious influence on over-credulous minds.[152]

On a review of the various forms which the theory of Materialism has assumed, it must be evident that we should bedoing great injustice to their respective advocates, did we place them all on the same level in relation to Theology, or pronounce upon them one indiscriminate censure. In the hands of D'Holbach and Comte, it was associated with the avowal of Atheism, and the denial of a future state: in the hands of Priestley, it was associated with the recognition of a God, and the Christian doctrine of a resurrection: in the hands of Dr. Good, it was combined with the principles of Theism, and even with the revealed doctrine of the separate existence of the soul during the interval between death and the resurrection: and in the hands of Davis and the author of the "Purpose of Existence," it is exhibited in connection with a theory of Progression, widely different, indeed, from the doctrine of Scripture, but equally different from the infidel speculations of the last century. Still, with all these shades of difference, there isthat common to allthe forms in which it can be presented which shows that they are radically one and the same:they all deny the existence of any generic difference between Matter and Mind.

Confining our attention to this common element, and omitting the consideration of minor diversities, we may now inquire into the grounds on which the theory rests, and the most plausible reasons which have been urged in support of it.

To some minds it has been recommended by itsapparent simplicity. It speaks only ofonesubstance as existing in Nature under various modifications. It represents the universe, so far as created being is concerned, as entirely composed ofmatter, more or less refined; and thus excludes the complication which must necessarily arise from the supposition of two substances, generically different, yet intimately and indissolubly related. The principle, therefore, which prompts us to seek unity in diversity, and to reduce, by some comprehensive generalization, a multitude of phenomena under one general law, has led some to adopt the theory ofunisubstancismein preference to the opposite doctrine ofdualism. Not content with thegeneralization, alike safe and legitimate, which ranks both mind and matter under the generic head ofsubstance, they have sought to reduce them to the same category, and to give to matter a monopoly of the universe, at least of created being. In support of their views, they remind us of the fundamental principle of philosophy as laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, that "we are to admit no more causes of things than are sufficient to explain appearances."[153]The principle is a sound one; and the only question is, whether matter alone is sufficient to account for mental phenomena? Onthisquestion the two parties are at irreconcilable variance; and the controversy cannot be determined,brevi manû, by the mere assumption of the simplicity and uniform composition of everything in Nature; it can be settled only by an appeal to the facts as they are known to exist. It is the aim of science, undoubtedly, to reduce all compound substances to the smallest possible number of constituent elements, and all complex phenomena to the smallest possible number of general laws. But we feel that, desirable as this simplification may be, we are not warranted in identifying light with heat, or even electricity with magnetism, however closely connected with each other, simply because there are certain observed differences between them, which could not be explained, in the present state of our knowledge, consistently with any such theory of their absolute identity: and so, there are such manifest differences between Mental and Material phenomena, that we cannot yield to the temptation of ascribing them to one cause or origin, until it has been satisfactorily proved that the same cause is sufficient to account for appearances so diverse. It should be considered, too, in connection with this pretence of greater simplicity, that even if we could succeed in getting rid of thedualismof Mind and Matter in the constitution of man, we never can get rid of it withreference to the universe at large, otherwise than by denyingthe spirituality of God himself: for the grand, the indestructible, the eternaldualismwould still remain,—the distinction between God and His works,—between the Creator and the universe which He has called into being,—between the finite, contingent, and transitory, and the infinite, necessary, and eternal. And this is a distinction that cannot be obliterated, although it may be obscured, by the speculations of Pantheism.

Another reason which has induced some to adopt, or at least to regard with favor, the theory of Materialism, is—the difficulty of conceiving of the union of two substances so incongruous as Mind and Matter are supposed to be,—and still more the difficulty of explaining how they could have any mutual action on each other. Dr. Priestley largely insists on this, as well as on the former reason, as one of the main inducements which led him to abandon the commonly-received doctrine. "Many doubts occurred to me," he says, "on the subject ofthe intimate union of two substances so entirely heterogeneousas the soul and body were represented to be." And he was led to conclude, that "man does not consist of two principles so essentially different from one another as matter and spirit, which are always described as havingno one common propertyby means of which they can affect or act upon each other." In the "Systême de la Nature," the same argument is often urged. It is boldly and repeatedly affirmed that "an immaterial cause cannot produce motion;" and this is applied equally to the soul and to God. "How can we form an idea of a substance destitute of extension, and yet acting on our senses, that is, on material organs which are extended? How can a being without extension be capable of motion, and of putting matter into motion?"—"It is as impossible that spirit or thought should produce matter, as that matter should produce spirit or thought."[154]

Now, it is not denied by any,—it is admitted on all hands,—that the union between the soul and the body is a great mystery, and that we are not able, in the present state of our knowledge, to explain either the action of matter on mind, or the action of mind on matter. The mode of the union between them, and the nature of the influence which they mutually exercise, are to us inscrutable: butthe factsof our most familiar experience are not the less certain, because they depend on causes to us unknown, or stand connected with mysteries which we cannot solve. Besides, the theory ofunisubstancismeitself, were it adopted, would still leave many facts unexplained, and the inmost nature of man would continue to be as inscrutable as before. There is nothing inconceivable, impossible, or self-contradictory in the supposition of a non-material or spiritual substance; nor is there any reasona priorito conclude that such a substance could not be united to a material frame, although the nature of their union, and the mode of their reciprocal action, might be to us inexplicable.

There is still another reason which is urged by some, derived fromthe dependence of the mind on the body, and its liability to be affected, beneficially or injuriously, by mere physical influences. "The faculty of thinking," says Dr. Priestley, "in general ripens and comes to maturity with the body; it is also observed to decay with it,"—"If the brain be affected, as by a blow on the head, by actual pressure within the skull, by sleep, or by inflammation, the mental faculties are universally affected in proportion. Likewise, as the mind is affected in consequence of the affections of the body and brain, so the body is liable to be reciprocally affected by the affections of the mind, as is evident in the visible effects of all-strong passions,—hope or fear, love or anger, joy or sorrow, exultation or despair. These are certainly irrefragable arguments that it is properly no other thanone and the same thingthat is subject to these affections."[155]Mr. Atkinson urges the same reason. "The proof that mind holds the same relation to the body that all other phenomena do to material conditions, may be found," he tells us, "in the whole circumstances of man's existence, his origin and growth; the faculties following the development of the body in man and other animals; the direction of the faculties being influenced by surrounding circumstances; the desires, the will, the hopes, the fears, the habits, and the opinions, being effects traceable to causes,—to natural causes,—and becoming the facts of History and Statistics. We observe the influence of climate, of sunshine and damp, of wine and opium and poison, of health and disease." ... "When a glass of wine turns a wise man into a fool, is it not clear that the result is the consequence of a change in the material conditions?"[156]

Now, these facts are sufficient to show that, in the present life, there is a very close and intimate union between the soul and the body, and that they exert a reciprocal and very powerful influence. This is admitted by the firmest advocates ofSpiritualism; nay, it is necessarily involved in the doctrine which they maintain, relative tothe unionof two distinct, but mutually dependent, principles in the present constitution of human nature. But it is far, very far, from affording any ground or warrant for the idea, that Matter may be identified with Mind, or Thought with Motion.

There are certain Theological considerations which, if they have not been pleaded as reasons, may yet have been felt as inducements, to the adoption of the theory of Materialism. Not to speak of the difficulty which has been felt in explaining "the traduction or propagation of human souls," occasionally referred to in this controversy, it is plain that many Deists in the last century, and that not a few Atheists still, have been induced to embrace and avow Materialism, with the view of underminingthe doctrine of man's immortality, and of a future state of rewards and punishments. It is equally certain that Dr. Priestley was influenced by his peculiar views as a Socinian; for he tells us himself that the doctrine of Materialism commended itself to his mind as a sure and effectual means of disprovingthe preëxistence of Christ. "The consideration," he says with singular candor, "that biases me as a Christian, exclusive of philosophical considerations, against the doctrine of a separate soul, is, that it has been the foundation of what appears to me to be the very grossest corruptions of Christianity, and even of that very Antichristianism that began to work in the apostles' times, and which extended itself so amazingly and dreadfully afterwards. I mean the Oriental philosophy of the 'preëxistence of souls,' which drew after it the belief of the preëxistence and divinity of Christ, the worship of Christ and of dead men, and the doctrine of Purgatory, with all the Popish doctrines and practices that are connected with them, and supported by them."—"This doctrine (of the preëxistence of Christ) is the point to which all that I have written tends, it being the capital inference that I make from the doctrine of Materialism." There is also abundant reason to believe that both Atheists and Pantheists have had recourse to the theory of Materialism with the view of excluding the doctrine of a living, personal God, and explaining all the phenomena of Nature by the eternal laws of matter and motion. Now, if the question stands related in any way to such themes as these,—the immortality of man, the preëxistence and divinity of Christ, and the personality and spirituality of God,—it must be confessed to have at least a very highrelativeimportance, as it bears on some of the most momentous articles of ourreligious faith; and the question naturally arises, What relation it bears to the fundamental principles of Theism, and how far it comports with right views of God, as the Creator and Governor of the world?

We cannot, in the face of direct evidence to the contrary, bring an indiscriminate charge of Atheism, or even of irreligion, against all the advocates of Materialism. It is true that it has often, perhaps most generally, been associated with infidel opinions, and that in the hands of D'Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson, it has been applied in support of Atheism; but it is equally true, that in the hands of Dr. Priestley and Dr. Good, it is combined with the professed, and, as we believe, the sincere recognition of a personal God and of a future state. In point of fact, then, all Materialists have not been Atheists; and even were we convinced that Materialists professing religion were illogical or inconsequent reasoners, we should not be justified in ascribing to them those consequences of their system which they explicitly disclaim and disavow. Still it is competent, and it may be highly useful, to entertain the question, What are the grounds on which the theory of Materialism rests? And whether, if these grounds be valid, they would not lead, in strict logic, to conclusions at variance with some of the most vital and fundamental articles of the Christian faith?

In attempting to discuss the merits of that theory, we propose to state, confirm, and illustrate a few propositions which are sufficient, in our opinion, to show that the grounds on which it rests, and the reasons to which it appeals, are not such as to warrant or justify any prejudice against the articles of Natural or Revealed Religion.

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