SECTION IV.

M. Comte's theory is liable to another objection, the force of which he seems, in some measure, although inadequately, to have felt and acknowledged. The three states or stages, which he describes as necessarilysuccessive, are, in point of fact,simultaneous. They do not mark so many different eras in the course of human progress,—they denote the natural products of man's intelligence, the constituent elements of his knowledge inallstates of society. The Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Scientific elements have always coëxisted. Diverse as they may be in other respects, they resemble each other in this,—they are all the natural and spontaneous products of man's intelligent activity. That they were, to a certain extent,simultaneousat first, and that they aresimultaneousstill, is actually admitted by M. Comte, while he conceives, nevertheless, that they are radically incompatible with each other;[86]and their coexistence hitherto is felt by him to be a serious objection to his fundamental law, which represents them not only asnecessarily successive, but also asmutually exclusive. The fact is admitted, and that fact is fatal to his whole theory. For if the three methods have coexisted hitherto, why may they not equally coexist hereafter? And what ground is left for the reckless prediction that Theology is doomed, andmustfall before the onward march of Positive Science? If man was able from the beginning to observe, to compare, to abstract, and to generalize, and if the fundamental laws of human thought have been ever the same, it follows that there must have been a tendency, coeval with the origin of the race, towards Theological, Metaphysical, and Inductive Speculation, and that the same tendency must continue as long as his powers remain unchanged. It can only, therefore, be apreponderance, more or less complete, of one of the three methods over the other two, that we should be warranted in expecting,even under the operation of M. Comte's favorite law; and yet he boldly proclaims the utter exclusion of Metaphysics, and the entire and everlasting elimination of Theology, as branches of human knowledge!

M. Comte's theory is still more vulnerable at another point. The fundamental assumption on which it is based is utterly groundless. It amounts to this, that all knowledge of causes, whether efficient or final, is interdicted to man, and incapable of being reached by any exertion of his faculties.[87]He tells us that Theology is impossible, for this reason, that, in the viewof the Positive Philosophy, all knowledge of causes is absolutely excluded; nay, he admits that Theology is inevitable if we inquire into causes at all. We know of no simpler or more effectual method of dealing with his specious sophistry on this subject, than by showing that, if his general principle be conclusive against the knowledge of God, it is equally conclusive against the knowledge of any other being or cause; just as Sir James Mackintosh dealt with the skeptical philosophy of Hume, when, with admirable practical sagacity, he said: "As those dictates of experience which regulate conduct must be the objects of belief, all objections which attack them, in common with the principles of reasoning, must be utterly ineffectual. Whatever attacks every principle of belief, can destroy none. As long as the foundations of knowledge are allowed to remain on the same level with the maxims of life, the whole system of human conviction must continue undisturbed.... Skepticism has practical consequences of a very mischievous nature. This is because itsuniversalityis not steadily kept in view and constantly borne in mind. If it were, the above short and plain remark would be an effectual antidote to the poison. But, in practice, it is an armory from which weapons are taken to be employed againstsomeopinions, while it is hidden from notice that the same weapons would equally cut downevery otherconviction. It is thus that Mr. Hume'stheory of causationis used as an answer to arguments for the existence of the Deity, without warning the reader that it would equally lead him to expect—thatthe sun will not rise to-morrow."[88]

The exclusion of all knowledge of causes is so indispensable to M. Comte's theory that he admits "the inevitable tendency of our intelligence towards a philosophy radically Theological, as often as we seek to penetrate, on whatever pretext, into theintimate nature of the phenomena."[89]The exclusion of such knowledge would, of course, be fatal to Theology, since, without taking some account of causes, efficient and final, we cannot rise to God as the author of the universe. But did it never occur to M. Comte that the self-same principle may possibly be destructive of his present, or, at least, of his posthumous fame, as the author of the Positive Philosophy? For, if we can know nothing ofefficient causes, in what sense, or on what ground, shall any one presume to ascribe the authorship of this system to M. Comte? True, it may be said,—Here is an effect which exhibits manifest signs of intelligence, order, and scientific skill; its parts are regularly adjusted and all directed to a common end; and, reasoning after theteleologicalmethod, we must infer that it proceeded from a very clever, but somewhat eccentric mind; but, unfortunately,final causesare as expressly interdicted as efficient ones; and, on the principles of his own theory, the "Course of Positive Philosophy" can never be warrantably ascribed to the authorship of M. Comte.

A still more serious objection to M. Comte's theory respecting the law of human development arises from the false view which it exhibits ofthe nature and history of Truth, considered as the object of human knowledge. It is a favorite opinion with him, that man can have noabsoluteknowledge; that truth is not fixed, but fluctuating; that what was believed in one age, and believednecessarily, according to the fundamental laws of thought, is as necessarily disbelieved in the next; and that there is no standard of truth at any time better or surer than the public opinion, or general consent, of the most advanced classes of society.[90]This theory of Truth, as necessarily mobile and fluctuating, has a tendency, we think, to engender universal skepticism, even when it is stated, with various important modifications, by such writers as Lamennais and Morell;but, in the hands of M. Comte, it becomes more dangerous still, since it represents the human race as having been from the beginning, through a long series of ages, subject to a law of development which not onlypermitted, but actuallycompelledthem to believe a lie; and thus casts a dark shade of suspicion both on the constitution of man and on the government of God.

Such a theory would seem also to preclude all rational calculations respecting the future progress and prospects of the race. For what ground can exist for any prognostication in regard to the ulterior advancement or ultimate destiny of man, if it be true that, in his past history, Fetishism has passed into Polytheism, and Polytheism into Monotheism, without any extraneous instruction, and by the mere action of those inherent laws to which humanity is subject? And, still more, if it be further true that even now the human mind is in a state of transition, passing through the crisis of Metaphysical doubt towards the goal of Positive Atheism, who shall assure us that this will be its last and final metamorphosis? It does appear to us to be one of the most singular and perplexing anomalies of his elaborate system, that he can dogmatize so confidently on theterminus ad quemof human progress, when from theterminus a quothere has been, according to his own account, a series of variations so wonderful, and a succession of states so diverse and opposite, as those which he describes. And yet he pronounces oracularly that Positive Science is the ultimate landing-place of human thought, and that universal Atheism is the final barrier which must needs close and terminate the long series of developments.

We have spoken sternly of his system; we have no wish to speak harshly of the man. Had we any disposition to do so, there is more than enough in the personal explanation, prefixed to the closing volume of his work, effectually to disarm us. We have too much sympathy with the trials of a vigorousbut eccentric mind, struggling in untoward circumstances, and against an adverse tide, to maintain a position of honorable independence, to say a word that could wound the feelings or injure the prospects of a man of science. But it is not unkind to add that his life might have been a more prosperous one had he devoted himself to the pursuits of Science, without assailing the truths of Religion; and that his fame would have been at once more extensive and more enduring had it been left to repose on his Classification or Hierarchy of the Sciences, without being associated with the more doubtful merits of his fundamental law of Man's Development.

This particular phase of the general theory bears less directly on the subject of our present inquiry than either of thethreewhich have already passed under review, and yet it has recently been applied in such a way as may entitle it to a passing notice.

For while the theory of Ecclesiastical Development has adirectrelation only to the question in regard to the Rule of Faith, it has also anindirectorcollateralrelation to the truths of Natural as well as of Revealed Religion; and this relation demands for it, especially in the existing state of theological speculation, the earnest attention of all who are concerned for the maintenance even of the simplest and most elementary articles of Divine truth.

The most elaborate and systematic exposition of this theory is exhibited in the "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, byJohn Henry Newman;" an Essay primarily directed to the discussion of the points of difference betweenthe Popish and the Protestant Churches, but which will be found to have an important bearing, also, on some doctrines which are common to both, and especially on the fundamental articles of Natural Religion itself.

It is thus stated by Mr. Newman:[91]"That the increase and expansion of the Christian Creed and Ritual, and the variations which have attended the process in the case of individual writers and churches, are the necessary attendants on any philosophy or polity which takes possession of the intellect and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion; that, from the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and perfection of great ideas; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, though communicated to the world once for all by inspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at once by the recipients, but, as received and transmitted by minds not inspired, and through media which were human, have required only the longer time and deeper thought for their full elucidation. This may be calledthe Theory of Developments."

It is further illustrated as follows: "It is sometimes said that the stream is clearest near the spring. Whatever use may fairly be made of this image, it does not apply to the history of a philosophy or sect, which, on the contrary, is more equable, and purer, and stronger, when its bed has become deep, and broad, and full. It necessarily rises out of an existing state of things, and, for a time, savors of the soil. Its vital element needs disengaging from what is foreign and temporary, and is employed in efforts after freedom, more vigorous and hopeful as its years increase. Its beginnings are no measures of its capabilities, nor of its scope. At first, no one knows what it is, or what it is worth. It remains, perhaps, for a time, quiescent; it tries, as it were, its limbs, and provesthe ground under it, and feels its way. From time to time it makes essays which fail, and are, in consequence, abandoned. It seems in suspense which way to go; it wavers, and, at length, strikes out in one definite direction. In time it enters upon strange territory; points of controversy alter their bearing; parties rise and fall about it; dangers and hopes appear in new relations, and old principles reappear under new forms; it changes with them, in order to remain the same. In a higher world it is otherwise; but here belowto live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often."[92]

In answer to the objection, "that inspired documents, such as the Holy Scriptures, at once determine the doctrines which we should believe," it is replied, "that they were intended to create an idea, and that idea is not in the sacred text, but in the mind of the reader; and the question is, whether that idea is communicated to him, in its completeness and minute accuracy, on its first apprehension, or expands in his heart and intellect, and comes to perfection in the course of time. Nor could it be maintained without extravagance that the letter of the New Testament, or of any assignable number of books, comprises a delineation of all possible forms which a Divine message will assume when submitted to a multitude of minds."[93]

What relation, it may be asked, can this theory respecting the development of revealed or Christian truth bear to the question of the being and perfections of God? We answer, that it is founded on a general philosophical principle which may affect the truths of natural as well as those of revealed Religion; and that it is applied in such a way as to show that, as it has already led to the worship of angels and saints, so it may hereafter issue in the deification of Nature, which is Pantheism, or in the separate worship of its component parts, which is Polytheism; and, in either case, the personality andsupremacy of the one only, the living and the true God, would be effectually superseded, if not explicitly denied.

But, is there any real danger of such a disastrous consummation? We answer, that the mere coexistence of the theory of Ecclesiastical Development with the infidel speculations on the doctrine of Human Progress is of itself an ominous symptom; and, further, that the mutual interchange of complimentary acknowledgments between the Infidel and Popish parties is another, especially when both are found to coincide in some of the main grounds of their opposition to Scripture as the supreme rule of faith, and when the homage which the advocates of Development render to the theory of progress is responded to by glowing eulogiums from the infidel camp on the genius of Catholicism as the masterpiece of human policy. But there are other grounds of apprehension, arising more directly out of the very nature of the theory of Development itself.

That theory has been described by Dr. Brownson—himself a convert to Catholicism—as the product of "aschoolformed, at first, outside of the Church, but now brought within her communion," and compared, in regard to its dangerousness, with the speculations of Hermes and Lamennais.[94]And a still more competent judge—Professor Sedgwick, of Cambridge[95]—has characterized it as "a monstrous compound of Popery and Pantheism," according to which "the Catholic faith is not a religion revealed to us in the Sacred Books we call canonical, and in the works of the Fathers which are supposed to contain the oral traditions of the Apostles and their followers; but a new Pantheistic element is to be fastened on the faith of men,—a principle of Development which may overshadow both theverbum Dei scriptumand theverbum Deinon scriptumof the Romish Church, and change both the form and substance of primitive Christianity."

It is only justice to Mr. Newman to say that he appears to have been aware of this possible objection to his theory, and that he makes an attempt to obviate it. Speaking of the difficulty which the Church experienced in keeping "Paganism out of her pale," he adverts to "thehazard which attended on the developmentof the Catholic ritual,—such as the honors publicly assigned to saints and martyrs, the formal veneration of their relics, and the usages and observances which followed." And he asks: "What was to hinder the rise of a sort of refined Pantheism, and the overthrow of Dogmatismpari passuwith the multiplication of heavenly intercessors and patrons? If what is called in reproach 'Saint-worship' resembled the Polytheism which it supplanted, or was a corruption, how did Dogmatism survive? Dogmatism is a religious profession of its own reality as contrasted with other systems; but Polytheists are liberals, and hold that one religion is as good as another. Yet the theological system was developing and strengthening, as well as the monastic rule, all the while the ritual was assimilating itself, as Protestants say, to the Paganism of former ages."[96]

It seems to be admitted in these words, that, in thepasthistory of the Church, the development of the Catholic ritualwasattended with some danger of infection from Paganism or Pantheism; and there may be equal reason to fear that, in thefuturehistory of the Church, still working on the principle of development, that danger may be very considerably aggravated by the general prevalence of theories utterly inconsistent with the faith of primitive times. What the Church has already done in the exercise of her developing power may be only a specimen of what she may hereafter accomplish. She hasalready developed Christianity into a system which bears a striking resemblance to Polytheism; she may yet develop it more fully, so as to bring it into accordance with philosophical Pantheism; or, retaining both forms,—for they are not necessarily exclusive of each other,—she may use the first in dealing with the ignorant, and reserve the second as a sort of esoteric doctrine for minds of higher culture. Nor let it be said that we are either unjust or uncharitable towards the Romish Church, in suggesting the possibility of some such development; for what she has already done, and what she still claims the power of doing, afford very sufficient ground for our remarks. When Dr. Conyers Middleton published his celebrated "Letter from Rome," showing an exact conformity between Popery and Paganism, and that "the religion of the present Romans is derived from that of their Heathen ancestors," many liberal Catholics resented the imputation as an insult to their faith; but now Mr. Newman not only admits the fact that the Church didassimilateits ritual to the Paganism of former ages, but vindicates her right to do so, and ascribes to hera power of assimilationto which it seems impossible to assign any limits. "There is, in truth," says this writer, "a certain virtue or grace in the Gospel, which changes the quality of doctrines, opinions, usages, actions, and personal characters, which become incorporated with it, and makes them right and acceptable to its Divine Author, when before they were either contrary to truth, or, at best, but shadows of it."—"Confiding, then, in the power of Christianity to resist the infection of evil, and totransmute the very instruments and appendages of demon worship to an Evangelical use, ... the rulers of the Church from early times were prepared, should the occasion arise, to adopt, or imitate, or sanctionthe existing rites and customs of the populace, as well asthe philosophy of the educated class."—"The Church can extract good from evil, or, at least, gets no harm from it. She inherits the promise made tothe disciples, that they should take up serpents, and, if they drank any deadly thing, it should not hurt them."—"It has borne, and can bear, principles or doctrines which, in other systems of religion, quickly degenerate intofanaticism or infidelity." This marvellous power of assimilation, which made "those observances pious in Christianity" that were "superstitions in Paganism," advanced, rapidly in its work, and successively introduced the deification of man, thecultusof angels and saints, and the beatification of Mary as Queen of heaven and earth. The sanctification, or ratherthe deification of the nature of Man, is one of these developments. Christ "is in them, because He is in human nature; and He communicates to them that nature, deified by becoming His, that it maydeifythem." The worship of saints is another of these developments: "Those who are known to be God's adopted sons in Christ are fit objects of worship on account of Him who is in them.... Worship is the necessary correlative of glory; and, in the same sense in which created nature can share in the Creator's incommunicable glory, do they also share in that worship which is His property alone." But a "new sphere" was yet to be discovered in the realms of light, to which the Church had not yet assigned its inhabitant. "There was 'a wonder in heaven;' a throne was seen, far above all created powers, mediatorial, intercessory; a title archetypal; a crown bright as the morning star; a glory issuing from the Eternal Throne; robes pure as the heavens; and a sceptre over all. And who was the predestined heir of that Majesty? Who was that Wisdom, and what was her name?—'the Mother of fair love, and fear, and holy hope,' exalted like a palm-tree in Engaddi and a rose-plant in Jericho, created from the beginning before the world in God's counsels, and 'in Jerusalem was her power.' The vision is found in the Apocalypse, a Woman clothed with the Sun, and the Moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars." TheDeificationof Maryis decreed. The doctrine of her Immaculate Conception is a furtherdevelopmentat the present moment, and who can tell what other developments may be in store for the future?

We advert to this form of the theory only in so far as it stands related to our great theme,—the existence, perfections, and prerogatives of the one only, the living and the true God; and it can scarcely be questioned, we think, that it has already introduced doctrines and practices into the Church which have a manifest tendency to obscure the lustre and impair the evidence of some of the most fundamental articles of Natural Religion. Let it still advance in the same direction, and who shall assure us that it may not develop into still grosser idolatry, or even into Pantheism? Why should it not develop, for example, into Sun worship? "On the new system," says Professor Butler, "a modern growth of Christian Guebres might make out no feeble case; the public religious recognition of this great visible type of the True Light is but a fair development of 'the typical principle;' the justifiable imitation of the guilt of heathens in its adoration is but an instance of the transforming powers of 'the sacramental principle;' while it requires but the most moderate use of the great instrument of orthodoxy, 'mystical interpretation,' to find the duty hinted (clearly enough for watchful faith, though obscurely to the blinded or undevout) in those passages that speak of a 'tabernacle for the Sun,' or Deity itself being 'a Sun,' or the rising of 'the Sun of righteousness.'... Indeed, the whole body of the righteous are promised to 'shine as the Sun' in the heavenly kingdom,—an expression which, though it appear superficially to refer to a period not yet arrived, the Church has correctively developed into an assurance of their present beatification, and consequent right to worship; while it must be at once manifest that, if any representative emblem of the Deity may demand religious prostration in our Churches, the analogous emblem of the 'deified,' in the great temple of the Material Universe, mayfairly expect a participation in that honor. It is true there is an express command, 'Take heed lest, when thou seest the Sun, ... thou shouldst be driven to worship them;' but so there is a command, at least as distinct and imperative, against the worship ofImages, which, Mr. Newman instructs us, has been repealed under the Gospel, and was never more than a mere Judaic prohibition, 'intended for mere temporary observance in the letter.'"[97]

If it be said that, in the case of the Church of Rome, there is not only a process of development, but an infallible developing power, and that this affords a guaranty, strong as the Divine promise itself, against that risk of error which is attendant on the ordinary methods of human teaching,—we answer, that this is a mere assumption, which requires to be proved, and that it cannot be proved in the face of the facts which attest the historical variations of the Romish Creed, as these are admitted and defended by Mr. Newman himself. For some of these variations are not consistent developments of the primitive articles of faith, but involve either a corruption or a contradiction of these very principles; and if her infallibility has not preserved her from the deification of saints, what security have we that it will preserve her from the deification of Nature? If it has already introduced a Christian Polytheism, why may it not issue in aChristianPantheism?

Admit the principle of development, and it may lead to the deification of man, as well as to the worship of Mary; to a sacred Calendar of Heroes, as well as of Saints.[98]It may terminate either in Infidelity or in Superstition, according to the mental temperament of the individual by whom it is adoptedand applied. "An organ of investigation being introduced, which may be employed for any purpose indifferently, the tendency of such a theory of religious inquiry will just tell according to the spirit in which it acts. A skeptic will develop the principle into Infidelity, a believer into Superstition; but the principle itself remains accurately the same in both."[99]The connection between the theory of Ecclesiastical Development and the infidel theory of Progress has not escaped the notice of many acute and profound thinkers in recent times, nor the danger resulting from it to the most fundamental articles of faith. "Modern Spiritualists tell us that Christianity is a development, as the Papists also assert, and the New Testament is its first and rudimentary product; only, unhappily, as the development, it seems, may be things so different as Popery and Infidelity, we are as far as ever from any criterium as to which, out of the ten thousand possible developments, is the true; but it is a matter of the less consequence, since it will, on such reasoning, bealways something future."[100]One of the most pernicious tenets of the Neologists beyond the Rhine is thus expressed by themselves: "Christianity renews itself in the human heart, and followsthe developmentof the human mind, and invests itself with new forms of thought and language, and adopts new systems of Church organization, to which it gives expression and life." ... "But are these teachers theonlydestroyers of Faith and Morals? Are nottheyalso chargeable with precisely the same offence who command us to submit implicitly to the so-called divinely-inspired Spirit of 'oneliving Infallible Judge' or 'Developing Power'? Can we havefixedarticles of faith and morals in this system, any more than in the other? No. 'Unus utrisque error, sed variis illūdet partibus.' There is the same evil in both, but it operates in different ways; in the former, every one developsfor himself; in the latter, the Pope develops for every one. You look with fear on the progress of Rationalism; and what hope can any man derive from that of Romanism?"[101]

We have examined, each on its own peculiar merits, the various forms of the Theory of Development which have been propounded in modern times, and applied to account for the origin of planets and astral systems, of vegetable and animal races, and of the different successive systems of human opinion and belief. We have found that, imposing as it may seem to be, and high as its pretensions are, that theory has no claim to the character of a scientific doctrine; that it is a mere hypothesis, and nothing more; a speculative figment, which may be injurious to those who thoughtlessly dally with it, but which can have no power to hurt any one who will resolutely lay hold of it, and examine its claims.

"Gently, softly, touch a nettle,And it stings you for your pains;Grasp it, like a man of mettle,And it soft as silk remains."

It is only necessary to add, thatthe same general principleseems to be involved inallthe forms of this theory,—the principle, namely, that we are bound to account for the pastonlyby causes known to be in actual operation at the present day. M. Comte lays it down in the following terms: "Our conjectures on the origin, or formation of our world should evidently be subjected to this indispensable condition,—not to allow of the interposition of any other natural agents than those whose influence we clearly discern in our ordinary phenomena, and whose operations,then, would only be on a greater scale. Without this rule, our work can have no truly scientificcharacter, and we shall fall into the inconvenience, so justly made a ground of reproach to the greater number of geological hypotheses,—that of introducing, for the purpose of explaining the ancient revolutions of the globe, agencies which do not exist at the present day, and whose influence it is impossible, for that very reason, to verify or even to comprehend." The same principle is strongly stated, but with due limitation, by Sir Charles Lyell, who insists on the explanation of all terrestrial changes bymeans of causes and according to laws known to be in operation at the present day: "During the progress of Geology, there have been great fluctuations of opinion respecting the nature of the causes to which all former changes in the earth's surface are referable. The first observers conceived that the monuments which the Geologist endeavors to decipher relate to a period when the physical constitution of the earth differed entirely from the present, and that, even after the creation of living beings, there have been causes in action distinct in kind or degree from these now forming part of the economy of nature. These views have been gradually modified, and some of them entirely abandoned."[102]

The general principle which is involved in these and similar statements may be perfectly sound, when it is applied merely tonatural events, occurring in the ordinary course, and according to the established constitution of the material and moral world; but it is manifestly inapplicable tosupernatural events, such as the creation of the world, or the revelation of Divine truth, since these events cannot be accounted for by any known natural cause, and must be ascribed to the immediate agency of a Higher Power. Without some such limitation, the general principle cannot be admitted, since it would involve an egregious fallacy. We must not limit Omnipotence by circumscribing the range of its possible exercise within the narrowbounds of the existing economy, or of our actual experience. We are not warranted to assume that the origin of the world, on the one hand, or the establishment of Christianity on the other, may be accounted for bynatural causesstill known to be in actual operation. In regard tonatural eventsthe principle is sound, and it is rigorously adhered to by the expounder of Natural Theology; in regard tosupernatural eventsit can have no legitimate application, except in so far as it is combined with the doctrine of efficient and final causes, which leads us up to the recognition of a Higher Power. It might be safe and legitimate enough, when we find a fossil organism imbedded in the earth, to ascribe its production to the ordinary law of generation, even although we had not witnessed the fact of its birth, provided the same species is known to have existed previously; but when we findnew racescoming into being, for which the ordinary law of derivation cannot account, we are not at liberty to apply the same rule to a case so essentially different, and still less to postulatea spontaneous generation, or atransmutation of species, for which we have no experience at all. In such a case, we can only reason on the principle thatlikeeffects must havelikecauses, that marks ofdesignimply adesigningcause, and that events which cannot be accounted for bynatural causesmust be ascribed to a Power distinct from nature, and superior to it. It is manifestly unreasonable to assume that nothing can be brought to pass in the Universe otherwise than by the operation of the same natural laws which are now in action; or that, in the course of our limited and partial experience, we must necessarily know all the agencies that may have been at work during the long flow of time. And, in accordance with these views, Sir Charles Lyell expressly limits the general principle tonatural events, and shows that "Geology differs as widely from Cosmogony as speculations concerning theCreation of Mandiffer from hisHistory."

FOOTNOTES:[28]"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," p. 17.[29]Auguste Comte, "Cours de Philosophic Positive,"II.363, 376. The merits of this attempt are very differently estimated by two competent authorities; byProfessor Sedgwickin the "Edinburgh Review," No. 82, p. 22; and bySir David Brewsterin the "North British Review," No. 3, p. 476.[30]"Vestiges," p. 11, 23.[31]Whewell, "Indications of a Creator."Sedgwick's"Discourse," 5th edition. "Edinburgh Review," No. 82.Sir D. Brewster, "North British Review," No. 3.Professor Dod, "Princeton Theological Essays," second series.H. Miller, "Footprints of the Creator."T. Monck Mason, "Creation by the Immediate Agency of God."[32]Thomas Monck Mason, "Creation by the Immediate Agency of God, as opposed to Creation by Natural Law; being a Refutation of 'The Vestiges,'" &c., p. 34.[33]Sir John Herschell, "Memoir on Nebulæ and Clusters of Stars," London Philosophical Transactions, 1833. "Edinburgh Review," No. 82, p. 19.[34]"North British Review," No. 3, p. 477.[35]Professor Nichol, "The System of the World," Preface,VI., and 108.[36]Ecclesiastes 12: 1.[37]Lorenz Oken, M. D., "Elements of Physio-philosophy,"—reprinted (unfortunately) under the auspices of the Ray Society, London, 1847.[38]Dr. John Barclay, "Inquiry concerning Life and Organization," pp. 33, 36. See also pp. 177, 235, 413, 526.[39]"Telliamed; ou, Entretiens d'un Philosophe Indien avec un Missionaire François, sur la Diminution de la Mer, la Formation de la Terre, l'Origine de l'Homme," 2 vols., 1748.[40]"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," 6th edition, p. 90.[41]Mr. Hugh Miller, "Footprints of the Creator," p. 226.[42]"North British Review," 1845, p. 483.[43]"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," p. 92.[44]"The Vestiges," p. 104.[45]Ibid.[46]Todd, "Cyclopædia of Anatomy and Physiology," article, Generation.[47]Mr. Hugh Miller, "Footprints of the Creator," p. 233.T. Monck Mason, "Creation by the Immediate Agency of God." "Princeton Theological Essays," Second Series, p. 422.[48]Cuvier, "Ossemens Fossiles," p. 61.[49]Mr. Hugh Miller, "Footprints," p. 254.[50]Dr. Whewell's"Indications," p. 54.[51]"Footprints of the Creator," p. 19.[52]"The Vestiges," p. 105.[53]"The Vestiges," pp. 91, 96.[54]"The Vestiges," p. 9.[55]Hugh Miller, "Footprints," pp. 13, 15.Professor Dod, "Princeton Theological Essays,"II.432.[56]Cicero, "De Naturâ Deorum,"L.II.[57]M. Comte, "Cours de Philosophie Positive,"I.3, 6, 14;IV.viii., 653, 656, 708, 711, 723;V.1, 9.[58]M. Comte, "Cours de la Philosophie Positive,"I.3.[59]Ibid.,V.30, 42, 50, 96, 98, 101.[60]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.37, 75, 91, 101.[61]Ibid.,V.58, 87, 94, 105, 125, 278.[62]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.107, 115, 119, 124, 136, 148, 162, 167, 207, 224, 229.[63]Ibid.,V.128, 164, 268, 279, 281, 290.[64]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.297, 325, 461, 470;VI.231.[65]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.479, 487, 496, 505;VI.2.[66]Comte, "Cours,"I.4, 10;IV.664, 669, 676, 702.[67]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.299, 326, 345;VI.62, 72, 157, 234, 503, 864.[68]Abbé Maret, "Theodicée Chretienne," p. 218.[69]M.Comte, "Cours,"V.327, 344, 369, 538, 582, 684;VI.137.[70]Ibid.,V.428, 597, 684, 836;VI.419, 521, 860.[71]M.Comte, "Cours,"I.44, 141;IV.673;V.45, 303.[72]Victor Cousin, "Introduction a l'Histoire de la Philosophie,"I.121. Ibid., "Cours de la Philosophie,"III.2, 464.[73]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.3, 5, 22;VI.32, 481.[74]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.382, "Premier fondateur,réel ou ideal, de ce grand systéme religieux."[75]"Encyc. Britan.," articles "Augury" and "Divination."Dr. Thomson's"History of Chemistry."[76]Mr. H. Miller's"Scenes and Legends of the North of Scotland."[77]M. Comte, "Cours,"I.13;V.461, 470;VI.86, 126, 148.[78]Dr. Cudworth, "Intellectual System,"I.33.[79]"Westminster Confession of Faith," chap.V.§ 2, 3.[80]Strauss, "Life of Jesus,"I.88.Henry Rogers, "Reason and Faith," Appendix, p. 96.[81]Dr. Chalmers'Works,I."Natural Theology."[82]M. Comte, "Cours,"I.7.[83]Montaigne, "Apology for Raimond de Sebonde," Essays,II.148.[84]Comte, "Cours,"VI., Preface,IX.[85]Dr. Andrew Thomson, "Sermons on Infidelity," p. 62.[86]M. Comte, "Cours,"IV.709: "Je puis affirmer n'avoir jamais trouvé d'argumentation sérieuse en opposition à cette loi, depuis dix-sept ans que j'ai eu le bonheur de la decouvrir, si ce n'est celle que l'on fondait sur la consideration de lasimultaneité jusq'ici necessairement très commune, des trois philosophies chez les mêmes intelligences." "Cours,"I.27, 50, 10: "L'emploisimultanédes trois philosophies radicalement incompatibles,"—"lacoëxistencede ces trois philosophies opposées." See alsoIV.683, 694;V.28, 39, 41, 57, 171;VI.26, 31, 34, 155.[87]M. Comte, "Cours,"I.14: "En considerant commeabsolument inaccessible et vide de sens pour nousla recherche de ce qu'on appelle lescauses, soit premières, soit finales."[88]Sir James Mackintosh, "Encyc., Britan.," Preliminary Dissertation, p. 354.[89]M. Comte, "Cours,"IV.664.[90]Ibid.,VI.728, 730, 760, 826, 835, 866.[91]Newman's"Essay on Development," p. 27.[92]Newman's"Essay on Development," p. 38.[93]Ibid., p. 95.[94]Brownson's"Quarterly Review," No. 1, p. 43.[95]Sedgwick's"Discourse," Fourth Edition. Preface,CCCXCIII.[96]Newman's"Essay," p. 447.[97]Letters of Rev.W. A. Butleron the "Development of Christian Doctrine," p. 116.[98]Pierre Leroux, "Sur l'Humanite."Augustus Comte, "Positive Calendar." The author gave some account of this in an article contributed to the "North British Review," May, 1851.[99]Professor Butler's"Letters," p. 87.[100]"Eclipse of Faith," p. 13.[101]Dr. Wordsworth, "Letters to M. Gondon," p. 153.[102]Lyell, "Principles of Geology,"I.75.

[28]"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," p. 17.

[29]Auguste Comte, "Cours de Philosophic Positive,"II.363, 376. The merits of this attempt are very differently estimated by two competent authorities; byProfessor Sedgwickin the "Edinburgh Review," No. 82, p. 22; and bySir David Brewsterin the "North British Review," No. 3, p. 476.

[30]"Vestiges," p. 11, 23.

[31]Whewell, "Indications of a Creator."Sedgwick's"Discourse," 5th edition. "Edinburgh Review," No. 82.Sir D. Brewster, "North British Review," No. 3.Professor Dod, "Princeton Theological Essays," second series.H. Miller, "Footprints of the Creator."T. Monck Mason, "Creation by the Immediate Agency of God."

[32]Thomas Monck Mason, "Creation by the Immediate Agency of God, as opposed to Creation by Natural Law; being a Refutation of 'The Vestiges,'" &c., p. 34.

[33]Sir John Herschell, "Memoir on Nebulæ and Clusters of Stars," London Philosophical Transactions, 1833. "Edinburgh Review," No. 82, p. 19.

[34]"North British Review," No. 3, p. 477.

[35]Professor Nichol, "The System of the World," Preface,VI., and 108.

[36]Ecclesiastes 12: 1.

[37]Lorenz Oken, M. D., "Elements of Physio-philosophy,"—reprinted (unfortunately) under the auspices of the Ray Society, London, 1847.

[38]Dr. John Barclay, "Inquiry concerning Life and Organization," pp. 33, 36. See also pp. 177, 235, 413, 526.

[39]"Telliamed; ou, Entretiens d'un Philosophe Indien avec un Missionaire François, sur la Diminution de la Mer, la Formation de la Terre, l'Origine de l'Homme," 2 vols., 1748.

[40]"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," 6th edition, p. 90.

[41]Mr. Hugh Miller, "Footprints of the Creator," p. 226.

[42]"North British Review," 1845, p. 483.

[43]"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," p. 92.

[44]"The Vestiges," p. 104.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Todd, "Cyclopædia of Anatomy and Physiology," article, Generation.

[47]Mr. Hugh Miller, "Footprints of the Creator," p. 233.T. Monck Mason, "Creation by the Immediate Agency of God." "Princeton Theological Essays," Second Series, p. 422.

[48]Cuvier, "Ossemens Fossiles," p. 61.

[49]Mr. Hugh Miller, "Footprints," p. 254.

[50]Dr. Whewell's"Indications," p. 54.

[51]"Footprints of the Creator," p. 19.

[52]"The Vestiges," p. 105.

[53]"The Vestiges," pp. 91, 96.

[54]"The Vestiges," p. 9.

[55]Hugh Miller, "Footprints," pp. 13, 15.Professor Dod, "Princeton Theological Essays,"II.432.

[56]Cicero, "De Naturâ Deorum,"L.II.

[57]M. Comte, "Cours de Philosophie Positive,"I.3, 6, 14;IV.viii., 653, 656, 708, 711, 723;V.1, 9.

[58]M. Comte, "Cours de la Philosophie Positive,"I.3.

[59]Ibid.,V.30, 42, 50, 96, 98, 101.

[60]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.37, 75, 91, 101.

[61]Ibid.,V.58, 87, 94, 105, 125, 278.

[62]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.107, 115, 119, 124, 136, 148, 162, 167, 207, 224, 229.

[63]Ibid.,V.128, 164, 268, 279, 281, 290.

[64]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.297, 325, 461, 470;VI.231.

[65]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.479, 487, 496, 505;VI.2.

[66]Comte, "Cours,"I.4, 10;IV.664, 669, 676, 702.

[67]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.299, 326, 345;VI.62, 72, 157, 234, 503, 864.

[68]Abbé Maret, "Theodicée Chretienne," p. 218.

[69]M.Comte, "Cours,"V.327, 344, 369, 538, 582, 684;VI.137.

[70]Ibid.,V.428, 597, 684, 836;VI.419, 521, 860.

[71]M.Comte, "Cours,"I.44, 141;IV.673;V.45, 303.

[72]Victor Cousin, "Introduction a l'Histoire de la Philosophie,"I.121. Ibid., "Cours de la Philosophie,"III.2, 464.

[73]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.3, 5, 22;VI.32, 481.

[74]M. Comte, "Cours,"V.382, "Premier fondateur,réel ou ideal, de ce grand systéme religieux."

[75]"Encyc. Britan.," articles "Augury" and "Divination."Dr. Thomson's"History of Chemistry."

[76]Mr. H. Miller's"Scenes and Legends of the North of Scotland."

[77]M. Comte, "Cours,"I.13;V.461, 470;VI.86, 126, 148.

[78]Dr. Cudworth, "Intellectual System,"I.33.

[79]"Westminster Confession of Faith," chap.V.§ 2, 3.

[80]Strauss, "Life of Jesus,"I.88.Henry Rogers, "Reason and Faith," Appendix, p. 96.

[81]Dr. Chalmers'Works,I."Natural Theology."

[82]M. Comte, "Cours,"I.7.

[83]Montaigne, "Apology for Raimond de Sebonde," Essays,II.148.

[84]Comte, "Cours,"VI., Preface,IX.

[85]Dr. Andrew Thomson, "Sermons on Infidelity," p. 62.

[86]M. Comte, "Cours,"IV.709: "Je puis affirmer n'avoir jamais trouvé d'argumentation sérieuse en opposition à cette loi, depuis dix-sept ans que j'ai eu le bonheur de la decouvrir, si ce n'est celle que l'on fondait sur la consideration de lasimultaneité jusq'ici necessairement très commune, des trois philosophies chez les mêmes intelligences." "Cours,"I.27, 50, 10: "L'emploisimultanédes trois philosophies radicalement incompatibles,"—"lacoëxistencede ces trois philosophies opposées." See alsoIV.683, 694;V.28, 39, 41, 57, 171;VI.26, 31, 34, 155.

[87]M. Comte, "Cours,"I.14: "En considerant commeabsolument inaccessible et vide de sens pour nousla recherche de ce qu'on appelle lescauses, soit premières, soit finales."

[88]Sir James Mackintosh, "Encyc., Britan.," Preliminary Dissertation, p. 354.

[89]M. Comte, "Cours,"IV.664.

[90]Ibid.,VI.728, 730, 760, 826, 835, 866.

[91]Newman's"Essay on Development," p. 27.

[92]Newman's"Essay on Development," p. 38.

[93]Ibid., p. 95.

[94]Brownson's"Quarterly Review," No. 1, p. 43.

[95]Sedgwick's"Discourse," Fourth Edition. Preface,CCCXCIII.

[96]Newman's"Essay," p. 447.

[97]Letters of Rev.W. A. Butleron the "Development of Christian Doctrine," p. 116.

[98]Pierre Leroux, "Sur l'Humanite."Augustus Comte, "Positive Calendar." The author gave some account of this in an article contributed to the "North British Review," May, 1851.

[99]Professor Butler's"Letters," p. 87.

[100]"Eclipse of Faith," p. 13.

[101]Dr. Wordsworth, "Letters to M. Gondon," p. 153.

[102]Lyell, "Principles of Geology,"I.75.

At the commencement of the present century, Pantheism might have been justly regarded and safely treated as an obsolete and exploded error,—an error which still prevailed, indeed, in the East as one of the hereditary beliefs of Indian superstition, but which, when transplanted to Western Europe by the daring genius of Spinoza, was found to be an exotic too sickly to take root and grow amidst the fresh and bracing air of modern civilization.

But no one who has marked the recent tendencies of speculative thought, and who is acquainted, however slightly, with the character of modern literature, can have failed to discern a remarkable change in this respect within the last fifty years. German philosophy, always prolific, and often productive of monstrous births, has given to the world many elaborate systems, physical and metaphysical, whose most prominent feature is the deification of Nature or of Man. France, always alert and lively, has appropriated the ideas of her more ponderous neighbors, and has given them currency through educated Europe on the wings of her lighter literature. And even in England and America there are not wanting some significant tokens of a disposition to cherish a kind of speculation which, if it be not formally and avowedly Pantheistic, has much of the same dreamy and mystic character, and little, if any, harmonywith definite views of God, or of the relations which He bears to man.

One of the most significant symptoms of a reaction in favor of Pantheism may be seen in the numerous republications and versions of the writings of Spinoza which have recently appeared, in the public homage which has been paid to his character and genius, and in the more than philosophic tolerance—the kindly indulgence—which has been shown to his most characteristic principles. He is now recognized by many as the real founder both of the Philosophic and of the Exegetic Rationalism, which has been applied, with such disastrous effect, to the interpretation alike of the volume of Nature and of the records of Revelation. In Germany his works have been edited by Paulus (1803) and by Gfrörer (1830); in France they have been translated by Emile Saisset, Professor of Philosophy in the Royal College; while a copious account of his life and writings has been published by Amand Saintes, the historian of Rationalism in Germany.[103]All this might be accounted for by ascribing it simply to the admiration of philosophical thinkers for the extraordinary talents of the man; and it might be said that his writings have been reprinted, just as those of Hobbes have been recently reproduced in England, more as a historical monument of the past than as a mirror that reflects the sentiments of the present age. But it is more difficult to explain the eulogiums with which the reappearance of Spinoza has been greeted, and the cordiality with which his daring speculations have been received. He has not only been exculpated from the charge of Atheism, but even panegyrized as a saint and martyr! "That holy and yet outcast man," exclaimed Schleiermacher,—"he who was fully penetrated by the universal Spirit,—for whom the Infinite was the beginning and the end, and the Universe his only and everlasting love,—he who, in holy innocence and profound peace, delighted to contemplate himself in the mirror of an eternal world, where, doubtless, he saw himself reflected as its most lovely image,—he who was full of the sentiment of religion, because he was filled with the Holy Spirit!" "Instead of accusing Spinoza of Atheism," says M. Cousin, "he should rather be subjected to the opposite reproach."[104]"He has been loudly accused," says Professor Saisset, "of Atheism and impiety.... The truth is that never did a man believe in God with a faith more profound, with a soul more sincere, than Spinoza. Take God from him, and you take from him his system, his thought, his life." "Spinoza, although a Jew," says the Abbé Sabatier, a member of the Catholic clergy, "always lived as a Christian, and was as well versed in our divine Testament as in the books of the ancient Law. If he ended, as we cannot doubt he did, in embracing Christianity, he ought to beenrolled in the rank of saints, instead of being placed at the head of the enemies of God."

Contrast the language in which Spinoza is now compared to Thomas á Kempis, and proposed as a fit subject for canonization itself, with the terms in which he was wont to be spoken of by men of former times; and the startling difference will sufficiently indicate a great change in the current of European thought. And if we add to this the contemporaneous reappearance of such writers as Bruno and Vanini, whose works have been reprinted by the active philosophical press of Paris, we may be well assured that it is not by overlooking or despising such speculations, but by boldly confronting and closely grappling with them, that we shall best protect the mind of the thinking community from their insidious and pestilent influence.

But we are not left toinferthe existence, in many quarters, of a prevailing tendency towards Pantheism, from such facts as have been stated, significant as they are; we have explicit testimonies on the point, in a multitude of writings, philosophical and popular, which have recently issued from the Continental press. In a report presented to the Academy of Sciences, M. Franck, a member of the Institute, represents Pantheism as the last and greatest of all the Metaphysical systems which have come into collision with Revelation; and describes it as a theory, "according to which spirit and matter, thought and extension, the phenomena of the soul and of the body, are all equally related, either as attributes or modes, to the same substance or being, at onceoneandmany, finite and infinite,—Humanity, Nature, God." Conceiving that the older forms of error—Dualism and Materialism—have all but disappeared; and that Atheism, in its gross mechanical form, cannot now, as Broussais himself said, "find entrance into a well-made head which has seriously meditated on nature," M. Franck concludes that Pantheism alone, such as has been conceived and developed in Germany, is likely to have the power of seducing serious minds, and that it may for a season exert considerable influence as an antagonist to Christianity.[105]M. Javari gives a similar testimony. He tells us that "that great lie, which is called Pantheism (ce grand mensonge qu'on appelle le Pantheisme), has dragged German philosophy into an abyss; that it is fascinating a large number of minds among his own countrymen; and that it is this doctrine, rather than any other, which will soon gather around it all those who do not know or who reject the truth."[106]The Biographer of Spinoza, referring to the recent progress and prospective prevalence of these views, affirms that "the tendency of the age, in matters of Philosophy, Morals, andReligion, seems to incline towards Pantheism;" that "the time is come when every one who will not frankly embrace the pure and simple Christianity of the Gospel will be obliged to acknowledge Spinoza as his chief, unless he be willing to expose himself to ridicule;" that "Germany is already saturated with his principles;" that "his philosophy domineers over all the contemporary systems, and will continue to govern them until men are brought to believe that word, 'No man hath seen God at any time, but He who was in the bosom of the Father hath revealed Him;'" that it is this "Pantheistic philosophy, boldly avowed, towards which the majority of those writers who have the talent of commanding public interest are gravitating at the present day;" and that "the ultimate struggle will be, not between Christianity and Philosophy, but between Christianity and Spinozism, its strongest and most inveterate antagonist."[107]And the critical reviewer of Pantheism, whose Essay is said to have been the first effective check to its progress in the philosophical schools of Paris, gives a similar testimony. He tells us that it was his main object to point out "the Pantheistic tendencies of the age;" to show that Germany and France are deeply imbued with its spirit; that both Philosophy and Poetry have been infected by it; that this is "the veritable heresy of the nineteenth century; and that, when the most current beliefs are analyzed, they resolve themselves into Pantheism, avowed or disguised."[108]

A fewspecimensof this mode of thinking may be added in confirmation of these statements. Lessing, as reported by Jacobi, expressed his satisfaction with the poem "Prometheus," saying: "This poet's point of view is my own; the orthodox ideas on the Divinity no longer suit me; I derive noprofit from them:ἓν καὶ παν,—(un et tout, the oneandthe all),—I know no other." Schelling, in his earlier writings, while he was Professor at Jena, and before the change of sentiment which he avowed at Berlin, represented God as the one only true and really absolute existence; as nothing more or less than Being, filling the whole sphere of reality; as the infinite Being (Seyn) which is the essence of the Universe, and evolves all things from itself by self-development. Hegel seeks unity in every thing and every where. This unity he discovers in the identity of existence and thought, in the one substance which exists and thinks, in God who manifests and develops himself in many forms. "The Absolute produces all and absorbs all; it is the essence of all things. The life of the Absolute is never consummated or complete. God does not properly exist, but comes into being: 'Gott ist in werden.'—Deus est in fieri. With him God is not a Person, but Personality, which realizes itself in every human consciousness as so many thoughts of one eternal Mind.... Apart from, and out of the world, therefore, there is no God; and so, also, apart from the universal consciousness of man, there is no Divine consciousness or personality. God is with him the whole process of thought, combining in itself the objective movement, as seen in Nature, with the subjective, as seen in Logic; and fully realizing itself only in—the universal spirit of Humanity."[109]

We select only two specimens from the recent literature of France; they might be multiplied indefinitely. Pierre Leroux, the editor of the "Encyclopedie Nouvelle," says, in his "Essay on Humanity," dedicated to the poet Beranger:—"It is the God immanent in the Universe, in Humanity, in each Man, that I adore."—"The worship of Humanity was the worship of Voltaire."—"What, is Humanity considered as comprehending allmen? Is it something, or is it nothing but an abstraction of our mind? Is Humanity a collective being, or is it nothing but a series of individual men?"—"Being, or the soul, is eternal by its nature. Being, or the soul, is infinite by its nature. Being, or the soul, is permanent and unchangeable by its nature. Being, or the soul, is one by its nature. Being, or the soul, is God by its nature."—"Socrates has proved our eternity and the divinity of our nature."[110]The next specimen is a singular but very instructive one. It is derived from the treatise of M. Crousse, who holds that "intelligence is a property or an effect of matter;" "that the world is a great body, which has sense, spirit, and reason;" that "matter, in appearance the most cold and insensible, is in reality animated, and capable of engendering thought." It might be amusing, were it not melancholy, to refer to one of his proofs of this position: "Une horologe mesure le temps; certes, c'est là un effet intellectuel produit par une cause physique!"[111]His grand principle is the doctrine of what he calls "Unisubstancisme," and it is applied equally to the nature of God and the soul of man. God is admitted, but it is the God of Pantheism,—Nature, including matter and mind, but excluding any higher power. "God is the self-existent Being, which includes all, and beyond which no other can be imagined. The Infinite is identical with the Universe."—"God is and can only be the whole of that which exists. Let us proclaim it aloud, that the echoes may repeat it, God, the Great Being, is the All, and the All is One. God is every thing that exists; the Universe, that is the supreme Being. In it are life eternal, power, wisdom, knowledge, perfect organization, all the qualities, in a word, that are inseparable from the Divinity. Beyond the universe,or apart from it, there is nothing (neant); above the visible world and its laws there is for man—nullité."

It is deeply humbling to think that, in the light of the nineteenth century, and in the very centre of European civilization, speculations such as these should have found authors to publish, and readers to purchase them. Need we wonder that several Catholic writers on the continent, conversant with the works which are daily issuing from the press, and familiar with the state of society in which they live, have publicly expressed their apprehension that, unless some seasonable and effective check can be given to the progress of this fearful system, we may yet witness the restoration of Polytheistic worship and the revival of Paganism in Europe?[112]

The most cursory review ofthe history of Pantheism[113]will serve to convince every reflecting reader that it must have its origin in some natural but strangely perverted principle of the human mind; and that its recent reappearance in Europe affords an additional and very unexpected proof that, like the weeds which spring up, year after year, in the best cultivated field, it must have its roots or seeds deep in the soil. In the annals of our race, we find it exhibited in two distinct forms;first, as a Religious doctrine, and,secondly, as a Philosophical system. It had its birthplace in the East, where the gorgeous magnificence of Nature was fitted to arrest the attention and to stimulate the imagination of a subtle, dreamy, and speculative people. The primitive doctrine of Creation was soon supplanted by the pagan theory of Emanation. The Indian Brahm is the first and only Substance, infinite, absolute, indeterminate Being, from which all is evolved, manifested, developed, and to which all returns and is reabsorbed. The Vedanta philosophy is based on this fundamental principle, and it hasbeen well described as "the most rigorous system of Pantheism which has ever appeared."

We learn from the writings of Greece that a similar system prevailed in Egypt, different, indeed, in form, and expressed in other terms, but resting on the same ultimate ground; and we know that Christianity found one of its earliest and most formidable antagonists in the philosophical school of Alexandria, which was deeply imbued with a Pantheistic spirit, and which, perhaps for that reason, has recently become an object of much interest to speculative minds in France and Germany. The Gnostic and the Neoplatonic sects maintained, and the writings of Plotinus and Proclus still exhibit, many principles the same in substance with those which have been recently revived in Continental Europe. In the earlier as well as the later literature of Greece we find traces of Pantheism, while the Polytheistic worship, which universally prevailed, was its natural product and appropriate manifestation. The ancient Orphic doctrines, which were taught in the Mysteries, seem to have been based on the oriental idea of Emanation. Even in the masculine literature of Rome we find numerous passages which are still quoted, with glowing admiration, by the Pantheists of modern times.[114]There is, indeed, but too much reason to believe that the numerous references which occur in the Classics to the existence of one absolute and supreme Being, and which Dr. Cudworth has so zealously collected, with the view of proving "the naturality of the idea of God," must be interpreted, at least in many instances, in a Pantheistic sense, and that they imply nothing more than the recognition of one parent Substance, from which all other beings have been successively developed.

We find some lingering remains of Pantheism in the writings of the middle age. Scot Erigena, in his work, "De Divisione Naturæ," sums up his theory by saying: "All is God, and God is all." Amaury de Chartres made use of similar language. And it must have been more widely diffused in these times than many may be ready to believe, if it be true, as the Abbé Maret affirms, and as M. de Hammer offers to prove, that the Knights of the Order of the Temple were affiliated to secret societies in which the doctrines of Gnosticism and the spirit of Pantheism were maintained and cherished.[115]It reappeared in the philosophical schools of Italy before the dawn, and during the early progress, of the revival of letters and the Reformation of Religion;[116]and even now, after three centuries of scientific progress and social advancement, it is once more rising into formidable strength, and aspiring to universal ascendancy.

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