“That it is of the last importance that the modifications in existing types of men-of-war which the committee have been invited to suggest should be calculated not merely to effectually meet the necessities of naval warfare now and in the immediate future, but in full view of the probable necessities of naval warfare in the more remote future.”
“That it is of the last importance that the modifications in existing types of men-of-war which the committee have been invited to suggest should be calculated not merely to effectually meet the necessities of naval warfare now and in the immediate future, but in full view of the probable necessities of naval warfare in the more remote future.”
It must be a source of satisfaction to these gallant officers to observe in some designs of the present day a confirmation of their forecast in many particulars.
The following extracts from a letter bearing upon the present controversy, by Admiral Elliot, appeared in theTimes(London) of April 24, 1885, and contain the pith of his oft-quoted arguments:
“My first impression on reading these letters in theTimesis one of disappointment that the point at issue between these two experts has not been more closely confined to the comparative merits of side-armorversuscellular-deck armor, but that their attentionhas been directed to this feature of design only as connected with a particular type of ship, namely, theCollingwood, which vessel is a hybrid, or cross between the two systems of protection to buoyancy, and therefore not truly representative of either. Mr. White’s defence of the unarmored ends of theCollingwoodis so far unsatisfactory that it treats of a very imperfect development of the cellular-deck mode of protection, and therefore he is not an exponent of the real merits of this system.“I am quite aware that the main point at issue between these two distinguished naval architects has been more closely confined to the question of stability than to that of flotation as displayed in the design of theCollingwood, and in this scientific view of the case I do not feel competent to offer any opinion, except to point out that the cellular-deck principleper sedoes not involve any such danger as regards stability as is produced by the top weight of a central citadel. Mr. White acknowledges that this top weight will capsize his ship if deprived of the buoyancy afforded by the unarmored ends, and on this danger point Sir Edward Reed fixes his sharpest weapon of attack.“The great issue at stake is how the weights available for the protection of buoyancy and for gun defence are to be distributed to the best advantage for defensive purposes, and in order to discuss Sir Edward Reed’s opinions in a concise form I will deal with the question solely as concerning the use of side-armor of less than twelve inches, beyond which limit of thickness I will, for the sake of argument, admit its practical advantages; and looking to the demand for increased speed and coal-carrying capacity, it does not appear probable that if combined with adequate gun protection, and if of sufficient depth, an all-round belt of thicker than ten inches can be carried by any vessels of war except those of much greater displacement than theCollingwoodclass. I feel justified, however, in discussing the question on this basis, because Sir Edward Reed includes in his category of approved armored ships our recent belted cruisers, having a narrow belt of ten inches maximum thickness, and takes credit for having induced the Admiralty to abandon their original intention of cellular-deck water-line protection in this class of war-ship in favor of this thin armor-belt.“The relative value of these two systems of water-line protection, namely, an all-round beltversusa raft body, must not only be ruled by the displacement decided upon for each class of vessel, and by the power of the gun which has to be encountered, but by such tactical expedients as can be resorted to in battle, as being those best suited to the known offensive and defensive properties of the combatants.“Looking at this disputed question entirely from the point of view of an artillerist and a practical seaman, I can perceive very great tactical advantages to be obtained by the adoption of the mode of protection proposed as a substitute for obsolete armor, and I view with much regret the one-sidedness of the conclusions arrived at by the opponents of this system, and the disparaging terms in which it is sought to turn it into ridicule, such as ‘doubtful devices’ and ‘useless contrivances,’ etc., because they indicate prejudice and a want of mature consideration of the incidents of naval battles. I cannot, also, help observing that while, on the one side, prophesying the most fatal consequences to ensue from what is called ‘stripping ships of armor,’ on the other side no admission is made of the disastrous results which must follow from placing reliance on such a delusive defensive agency as an armor-plate known to be penetrable by guns certain to be encountered; and in order to support this theory we are called upon to believe that gunners will be so excited in action or so unskilful that in no case will they hit the large object aimed at, namely, the water-line of an adversary passing even at close quarters on their beam, but I shall refer to this feature of assumed impunity hereafter.“Sir Edward Reed’s comparative remarks on the effect of shot-holes as between the two systems of defence are of the same one-sided character, notwithstanding the evidence of the fractured condition of armor-plates subjected to experimental firing; and it is almost apparent that in decrying the one mode of protection he has lost sight of the fact that a ten-inch armor-plate is all that will stand between the life and death of a ship—thatis to say, between one well-directed shell and the magazines and boilers—which plate can be easily penetrated and smashed up by the guns which similar vessels will assuredly carry if so invited. Also, in referring to the baneful effects of raking fire and shell explosion inboard, the assumed inferiority is misplaced because one prominent advantage of the cellular-deck system is that by economizing weight at the water-line it enables the bow and stern to be armor-plated—a matter of the highest tactical importance as a defence against raking fire, which is unobtainable in a belted ship of the same displacement, at least without entailing a considerable reduction of the thickness of armor on the belt. This feature of end-on defence is not only an essential element of safety, but must prove most effective as enabling a combatant to close his adversary at an advantage, and enforce the bow-to-bow ram encounter, or compel him to resort to a stern fight, or otherwise to pass him at such close quarters as will insure direct hits and depressed fire at the water-line belt, and by these tactics the opportunities for riddling the raft body will be few and far between.“I may also express the opinion that for repairing damages in a raft-bodied ship at the water-line far more efficacious means can be resorted to than the ordinary shot-plugs, and that the use of cork bags for closing shot-holes in the coffer-dam sides, if they are open at the top, is far from being an unreasonable or ‘stupid contrivance,’ as it is called, considering that, as a general rule, the perforations through thin plating would not be ragged or extensive. Sir Edward Reed’s wise suggestion to make the outer skin of the coffer-dam of two-inch steel plates would render machine-gun fire of little avail. The injurious effects of shell fire would, I reckon, be far more fatal if the projectile exploded in passing through the ten-inch belt than if it burst at some distance inboard after penetrating thin plating. I think it will be admitted without dispute that this feature of design must be governed to a great extent by tactical considerations, the object sought for being to secure out of a given weight of steel the greatest amount of fighting vitality consistent with the power of manœuvring available between skilful antagonists. This view of the case is especially applicable to single actions at sea, when a clever tactician will select his mode of fighting according to the offensive and defensive properties known to be possessed by his opponent, and in this respect an armor-plated bow and stern will afford enormous advantages, both for attack and defence, if the plating is extended as high as the upper deck.“In fleet actions the ram and torpedo will require more attention than the gun attack, and that feature of battle introduces another disputed point, namely, the limit of size of ship; but that question is outside the scope of the present discussion, and I shall conclude my arguments by a strong expression of opinion that, as gunpowder has so completely mastered the pretensions of outside armor protection, the direction in which prudence leans towards defensive properties in future designs for ships-of-war is that of deflection rather than of direct resistance, and that in this respect science has not reached its utmost limit of invention.“The prevailing disposition to regulate the power of the gun by the size of the vessel is, I consider, a great mistake, seeing that the additional weight of a powerful gun is not inadmissible, even in such vessels as our belted cruisers, and looking to the strong inducement held out by the continued use of armor-plating, even of such moderate thickness as ten inches. In the splendid steamers purchased from the mercantile marine, which are being armed with light guns only, one 25-ton gun would greatly add to their fighting power, but the cause of this omission may probably be found in the answer to the question, Where are the guns?”
“My first impression on reading these letters in theTimesis one of disappointment that the point at issue between these two experts has not been more closely confined to the comparative merits of side-armorversuscellular-deck armor, but that their attentionhas been directed to this feature of design only as connected with a particular type of ship, namely, theCollingwood, which vessel is a hybrid, or cross between the two systems of protection to buoyancy, and therefore not truly representative of either. Mr. White’s defence of the unarmored ends of theCollingwoodis so far unsatisfactory that it treats of a very imperfect development of the cellular-deck mode of protection, and therefore he is not an exponent of the real merits of this system.
“I am quite aware that the main point at issue between these two distinguished naval architects has been more closely confined to the question of stability than to that of flotation as displayed in the design of theCollingwood, and in this scientific view of the case I do not feel competent to offer any opinion, except to point out that the cellular-deck principleper sedoes not involve any such danger as regards stability as is produced by the top weight of a central citadel. Mr. White acknowledges that this top weight will capsize his ship if deprived of the buoyancy afforded by the unarmored ends, and on this danger point Sir Edward Reed fixes his sharpest weapon of attack.
“The great issue at stake is how the weights available for the protection of buoyancy and for gun defence are to be distributed to the best advantage for defensive purposes, and in order to discuss Sir Edward Reed’s opinions in a concise form I will deal with the question solely as concerning the use of side-armor of less than twelve inches, beyond which limit of thickness I will, for the sake of argument, admit its practical advantages; and looking to the demand for increased speed and coal-carrying capacity, it does not appear probable that if combined with adequate gun protection, and if of sufficient depth, an all-round belt of thicker than ten inches can be carried by any vessels of war except those of much greater displacement than theCollingwoodclass. I feel justified, however, in discussing the question on this basis, because Sir Edward Reed includes in his category of approved armored ships our recent belted cruisers, having a narrow belt of ten inches maximum thickness, and takes credit for having induced the Admiralty to abandon their original intention of cellular-deck water-line protection in this class of war-ship in favor of this thin armor-belt.
“The relative value of these two systems of water-line protection, namely, an all-round beltversusa raft body, must not only be ruled by the displacement decided upon for each class of vessel, and by the power of the gun which has to be encountered, but by such tactical expedients as can be resorted to in battle, as being those best suited to the known offensive and defensive properties of the combatants.
“Looking at this disputed question entirely from the point of view of an artillerist and a practical seaman, I can perceive very great tactical advantages to be obtained by the adoption of the mode of protection proposed as a substitute for obsolete armor, and I view with much regret the one-sidedness of the conclusions arrived at by the opponents of this system, and the disparaging terms in which it is sought to turn it into ridicule, such as ‘doubtful devices’ and ‘useless contrivances,’ etc., because they indicate prejudice and a want of mature consideration of the incidents of naval battles. I cannot, also, help observing that while, on the one side, prophesying the most fatal consequences to ensue from what is called ‘stripping ships of armor,’ on the other side no admission is made of the disastrous results which must follow from placing reliance on such a delusive defensive agency as an armor-plate known to be penetrable by guns certain to be encountered; and in order to support this theory we are called upon to believe that gunners will be so excited in action or so unskilful that in no case will they hit the large object aimed at, namely, the water-line of an adversary passing even at close quarters on their beam, but I shall refer to this feature of assumed impunity hereafter.
“Sir Edward Reed’s comparative remarks on the effect of shot-holes as between the two systems of defence are of the same one-sided character, notwithstanding the evidence of the fractured condition of armor-plates subjected to experimental firing; and it is almost apparent that in decrying the one mode of protection he has lost sight of the fact that a ten-inch armor-plate is all that will stand between the life and death of a ship—thatis to say, between one well-directed shell and the magazines and boilers—which plate can be easily penetrated and smashed up by the guns which similar vessels will assuredly carry if so invited. Also, in referring to the baneful effects of raking fire and shell explosion inboard, the assumed inferiority is misplaced because one prominent advantage of the cellular-deck system is that by economizing weight at the water-line it enables the bow and stern to be armor-plated—a matter of the highest tactical importance as a defence against raking fire, which is unobtainable in a belted ship of the same displacement, at least without entailing a considerable reduction of the thickness of armor on the belt. This feature of end-on defence is not only an essential element of safety, but must prove most effective as enabling a combatant to close his adversary at an advantage, and enforce the bow-to-bow ram encounter, or compel him to resort to a stern fight, or otherwise to pass him at such close quarters as will insure direct hits and depressed fire at the water-line belt, and by these tactics the opportunities for riddling the raft body will be few and far between.
“I may also express the opinion that for repairing damages in a raft-bodied ship at the water-line far more efficacious means can be resorted to than the ordinary shot-plugs, and that the use of cork bags for closing shot-holes in the coffer-dam sides, if they are open at the top, is far from being an unreasonable or ‘stupid contrivance,’ as it is called, considering that, as a general rule, the perforations through thin plating would not be ragged or extensive. Sir Edward Reed’s wise suggestion to make the outer skin of the coffer-dam of two-inch steel plates would render machine-gun fire of little avail. The injurious effects of shell fire would, I reckon, be far more fatal if the projectile exploded in passing through the ten-inch belt than if it burst at some distance inboard after penetrating thin plating. I think it will be admitted without dispute that this feature of design must be governed to a great extent by tactical considerations, the object sought for being to secure out of a given weight of steel the greatest amount of fighting vitality consistent with the power of manœuvring available between skilful antagonists. This view of the case is especially applicable to single actions at sea, when a clever tactician will select his mode of fighting according to the offensive and defensive properties known to be possessed by his opponent, and in this respect an armor-plated bow and stern will afford enormous advantages, both for attack and defence, if the plating is extended as high as the upper deck.
“In fleet actions the ram and torpedo will require more attention than the gun attack, and that feature of battle introduces another disputed point, namely, the limit of size of ship; but that question is outside the scope of the present discussion, and I shall conclude my arguments by a strong expression of opinion that, as gunpowder has so completely mastered the pretensions of outside armor protection, the direction in which prudence leans towards defensive properties in future designs for ships-of-war is that of deflection rather than of direct resistance, and that in this respect science has not reached its utmost limit of invention.
“The prevailing disposition to regulate the power of the gun by the size of the vessel is, I consider, a great mistake, seeing that the additional weight of a powerful gun is not inadmissible, even in such vessels as our belted cruisers, and looking to the strong inducement held out by the continued use of armor-plating, even of such moderate thickness as ten inches. In the splendid steamers purchased from the mercantile marine, which are being armed with light guns only, one 25-ton gun would greatly add to their fighting power, but the cause of this omission may probably be found in the answer to the question, Where are the guns?”
The following reply appeared in theTimes(London) of May 1, 1885:
“Sir.—The letter of Admiral Sir George Elliot ... deals ably and candidly with a subject of such fundamental importance to our navy that I venture to offer a few observations upon it.“I am glad to see that the gallant admiral separates his case and the cellular or raft-deck system from any connection with theCollingwoodorAdmiraltype of ship, but Iregret that he has treated my criticisms of that kind of ship just as if I had applied them in the abstract to the system which he advocates. This is not fair either to the gallant officer himself or to me, as will presently appear.“If Sir George Elliot will remove the cellular or raft-deck question completely away from the very unsatisfactory and unpleasant region of Admiralty practice, and let it be treated upon its merits, while I shall still have to respectfully submit to him some cautionary considerations, I shall also be prepared to make to him some very considerable concessions. One thing I should find it desirable to press upon him is the absolute necessity of giving closer attention to the provision of stability. He treats the subject mainly as a question of ‘buoyancy,’ and wisely so from his point of view; but ‘stability,’ or the power of resisting capsizing, comes first, and on this he declines to offer an opinion. Again, when the gallant officer speaks of a ‘raft’ deck, I would point out that this may be a very different thing from a cellular-deck. The characteristic of a raft is that it is usually formed of solid buoyant materials; you may make it of cellular steel if you please, but in that case wherever injury lets in water the steel so far ceases to be a raft, which helps to float its load, and becomes a weight to help sink it. Now, cells formed of thin steel do not upon the face of the matter appear to be safe materials for a raft which is to be subject to the multitudinous fire of small guns and the explosions of shells of all sizes. It needs a very skilful artificer to build a safe floating raft of thin steel for such a purpose, especially when regard is had to the dangers of raking fire, against which bow and stern armor would not sufficiently provide.“Having expressed these cautions, I will go on to say that in my opinion the main idea of your gallant correspondent, which he has so long and so steadily developed, is nevertheless a sound one, and one which has a great future. I do not, of course, for a moment admit with him that the gun has yet mastered the armor. I believe theDreadnought, though of old design, would still fight a good action against all ships now ready for sea, and have to fear only a very exceptional, and therefore either a very skilful or very fortunate, shot. The recent Admiralty ships, where they are armored, are practically proof against almost every gun afloat. Further, I have satisfied myself that if the existing restrictions imposed upon us by the absence of floating docks adapted to receive ships of great breadth were removed (these restrictions crippling us to a most unfortunate degree), and if certain professional conventionalities as to the forms of ships were set aside, it would be perfectly practicable to build war-ships no larger and no more costly than theInflexible, with enough side-armor more than a yard (three feet) thick to preserve their stability, and at the same time made ram-proof and torpedo-proof. Meanwhile, of all the vulnerable objects afloat, the recent guns themselves, by reason of their absurdly long and slender barrels, left fully exposed to all fire, are among the most vulnerable.“Still, the raft-deck system has a wide field before it, and I am quite prepared to admit that I believe in its practicability and in its sufficient security for certain classes of vessels if properly carried out. This it has not yet been in any single instance. Even in the case of the great Italian ships, as in our own, there are elements of weakness which would be fatal to the system in action, but which arenotunavoidable. Allow me to assure Sir George Elliot that I have largely and closely studied this subject, and that my main objections to it are not objections of principle.“If the raft-deck system is to be adopted, it must in my opinion be carried out in a much fuller and more satisfactory manner than hitherto, and with the aid of arrangements which I have for a long time past seen the necessity of, and been engaged upon.“To my mind the Admiralty, while protecting certain parts and contents of their largest ships from injury from shell fire, have made the fatal error of failing to protect the ship itself, which contains them all, from being too readily deprived of stability and made to capsize. The advocates of the alternative system must not repeat this error, or, if they do, they must not expect me to become their ally. On the other hand, if they will join me in despising what are merely specious elements of safety, and in demanding those which are real, if they will insist that our principal and most costly ships at least shall beso constructed as to keep afloat and upright for a reasonable length of time in battle, in spite of any form of attack, so as to give their gallant crews a fair chance of achieving their objects, they will not find me averse to any improvement whatever. When a suitable opportunity offers I shall be happy to show to Admiral Sir George Elliot that he has not been alone in seeking to develop the cellular or raft-deck system, and that it has, in fact, capabilities which possibly he himself may not yet have fully realized.”
“Sir.—The letter of Admiral Sir George Elliot ... deals ably and candidly with a subject of such fundamental importance to our navy that I venture to offer a few observations upon it.
“I am glad to see that the gallant admiral separates his case and the cellular or raft-deck system from any connection with theCollingwoodorAdmiraltype of ship, but Iregret that he has treated my criticisms of that kind of ship just as if I had applied them in the abstract to the system which he advocates. This is not fair either to the gallant officer himself or to me, as will presently appear.
“If Sir George Elliot will remove the cellular or raft-deck question completely away from the very unsatisfactory and unpleasant region of Admiralty practice, and let it be treated upon its merits, while I shall still have to respectfully submit to him some cautionary considerations, I shall also be prepared to make to him some very considerable concessions. One thing I should find it desirable to press upon him is the absolute necessity of giving closer attention to the provision of stability. He treats the subject mainly as a question of ‘buoyancy,’ and wisely so from his point of view; but ‘stability,’ or the power of resisting capsizing, comes first, and on this he declines to offer an opinion. Again, when the gallant officer speaks of a ‘raft’ deck, I would point out that this may be a very different thing from a cellular-deck. The characteristic of a raft is that it is usually formed of solid buoyant materials; you may make it of cellular steel if you please, but in that case wherever injury lets in water the steel so far ceases to be a raft, which helps to float its load, and becomes a weight to help sink it. Now, cells formed of thin steel do not upon the face of the matter appear to be safe materials for a raft which is to be subject to the multitudinous fire of small guns and the explosions of shells of all sizes. It needs a very skilful artificer to build a safe floating raft of thin steel for such a purpose, especially when regard is had to the dangers of raking fire, against which bow and stern armor would not sufficiently provide.
“Having expressed these cautions, I will go on to say that in my opinion the main idea of your gallant correspondent, which he has so long and so steadily developed, is nevertheless a sound one, and one which has a great future. I do not, of course, for a moment admit with him that the gun has yet mastered the armor. I believe theDreadnought, though of old design, would still fight a good action against all ships now ready for sea, and have to fear only a very exceptional, and therefore either a very skilful or very fortunate, shot. The recent Admiralty ships, where they are armored, are practically proof against almost every gun afloat. Further, I have satisfied myself that if the existing restrictions imposed upon us by the absence of floating docks adapted to receive ships of great breadth were removed (these restrictions crippling us to a most unfortunate degree), and if certain professional conventionalities as to the forms of ships were set aside, it would be perfectly practicable to build war-ships no larger and no more costly than theInflexible, with enough side-armor more than a yard (three feet) thick to preserve their stability, and at the same time made ram-proof and torpedo-proof. Meanwhile, of all the vulnerable objects afloat, the recent guns themselves, by reason of their absurdly long and slender barrels, left fully exposed to all fire, are among the most vulnerable.
“Still, the raft-deck system has a wide field before it, and I am quite prepared to admit that I believe in its practicability and in its sufficient security for certain classes of vessels if properly carried out. This it has not yet been in any single instance. Even in the case of the great Italian ships, as in our own, there are elements of weakness which would be fatal to the system in action, but which arenotunavoidable. Allow me to assure Sir George Elliot that I have largely and closely studied this subject, and that my main objections to it are not objections of principle.
“If the raft-deck system is to be adopted, it must in my opinion be carried out in a much fuller and more satisfactory manner than hitherto, and with the aid of arrangements which I have for a long time past seen the necessity of, and been engaged upon.
“To my mind the Admiralty, while protecting certain parts and contents of their largest ships from injury from shell fire, have made the fatal error of failing to protect the ship itself, which contains them all, from being too readily deprived of stability and made to capsize. The advocates of the alternative system must not repeat this error, or, if they do, they must not expect me to become their ally. On the other hand, if they will join me in despising what are merely specious elements of safety, and in demanding those which are real, if they will insist that our principal and most costly ships at least shall beso constructed as to keep afloat and upright for a reasonable length of time in battle, in spite of any form of attack, so as to give their gallant crews a fair chance of achieving their objects, they will not find me averse to any improvement whatever. When a suitable opportunity offers I shall be happy to show to Admiral Sir George Elliot that he has not been alone in seeking to develop the cellular or raft-deck system, and that it has, in fact, capabilities which possibly he himself may not yet have fully realized.”
The same number of theTimescontains a reply to Mr. Reed’s letter of April 8, 1885, by Mr. White, mainly devoted to a refutation of certain charges of no interest to us, but containing the following paragraphs:
“I must refer to the passage in which Sir Edward Reed quotes a description of the damage done to theHuascarin her action with the two Chilian iron-clads.“This description seems to me one of the best possible illustrations of a remark in my previous letter, that ‘themitraillewhich is driven back into a ship when armor is penetrated is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile can be.’ Had theHuascarnot had weak armor, but light sides only, the local injuries might have been less. The other case cited of a shell which entered the unarmored stern of theCochraneshows how little damage may be done when a projectile passes through thin plating. At the bombardment of Alexandria there were many such examples on board our ships, although it must be frankly admitted that the engagement is no sufficient indication of what shell fire may do. A good deal of use has been made of the single case where a shell in bursting blew a hole ten by four feet in the thin side-plating of theSuperb. The case was quite exceptional, whether it be compared with the other hits on the same ship or with the injuries done to the unarmored sides of other ships. Moreover, in that case exceptional injury is traceable to special structural arrangements at the embrasure near the battery port, where the shell struck. These cases do not prove that the light unarmored structures in theAdmiralclass are likely to be destroyed in such a rapid and wholesale manner as has been asserted. Nor, on the other hand, do they indicate conclusively what damage shell-fire may do in future actions. On these points, as I have before remarked, experiment might be made with advantage. But, on the other hand, there is good evidence that armor so thin as to be readily penetrable to many guns may be a serious danger, and that armor over the vital parts of ships should be strong if it is to be a real defence.“In matters of ship design the constructors of the navy are only the servants of the Board, and while they must take sole responsibility for professional work, the governing features in the designs are determined by higher authorities, among whom are officers of large experience, both as seamen and gunners. And it is certainly not the practice of the constructive department to intrude themselves or their advice into matters for which neither their training nor their experience fits them to give an opinion.“I make no attempt to be either a sailor or a gunner, but am content to seek information from the best authorities in both branches. As the result of this study of tactics and gunnery, I have been led to the belief that the sea-fights of the future are not likely to be settled altogether or chiefly by the effects of gun-fire. This is not quite the same thing as Sir Edward Reed attributes to me when he says that ‘Mr. White thinks and speaks as if naval warfare henceforth were to be merely a matter of dodging, getting chance shots, and keeping out of an enemy’s way.’“Nor do I think that the designers of the Italian war-ships will indorse the description of their views and intentions, with which Sir Edward Reed has favored us in his letter and elsewhere. I have the honor of knowing his excellency Signor Brin (now Minister of Marine) and other members of the constructive corps of the Italian navy, and from their statements, including the powerful publications of Signor Brin, ‘La Nostra Marina Militaire,’ I have no hesitation in saying that in spending larger sums on single ships than have ever before been spent, the Italian authorities think, and are not alone in thinking, that they are producing the most powerful fighting-ships afloat.”
“I must refer to the passage in which Sir Edward Reed quotes a description of the damage done to theHuascarin her action with the two Chilian iron-clads.
“This description seems to me one of the best possible illustrations of a remark in my previous letter, that ‘themitraillewhich is driven back into a ship when armor is penetrated is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile can be.’ Had theHuascarnot had weak armor, but light sides only, the local injuries might have been less. The other case cited of a shell which entered the unarmored stern of theCochraneshows how little damage may be done when a projectile passes through thin plating. At the bombardment of Alexandria there were many such examples on board our ships, although it must be frankly admitted that the engagement is no sufficient indication of what shell fire may do. A good deal of use has been made of the single case where a shell in bursting blew a hole ten by four feet in the thin side-plating of theSuperb. The case was quite exceptional, whether it be compared with the other hits on the same ship or with the injuries done to the unarmored sides of other ships. Moreover, in that case exceptional injury is traceable to special structural arrangements at the embrasure near the battery port, where the shell struck. These cases do not prove that the light unarmored structures in theAdmiralclass are likely to be destroyed in such a rapid and wholesale manner as has been asserted. Nor, on the other hand, do they indicate conclusively what damage shell-fire may do in future actions. On these points, as I have before remarked, experiment might be made with advantage. But, on the other hand, there is good evidence that armor so thin as to be readily penetrable to many guns may be a serious danger, and that armor over the vital parts of ships should be strong if it is to be a real defence.
“In matters of ship design the constructors of the navy are only the servants of the Board, and while they must take sole responsibility for professional work, the governing features in the designs are determined by higher authorities, among whom are officers of large experience, both as seamen and gunners. And it is certainly not the practice of the constructive department to intrude themselves or their advice into matters for which neither their training nor their experience fits them to give an opinion.
“I make no attempt to be either a sailor or a gunner, but am content to seek information from the best authorities in both branches. As the result of this study of tactics and gunnery, I have been led to the belief that the sea-fights of the future are not likely to be settled altogether or chiefly by the effects of gun-fire. This is not quite the same thing as Sir Edward Reed attributes to me when he says that ‘Mr. White thinks and speaks as if naval warfare henceforth were to be merely a matter of dodging, getting chance shots, and keeping out of an enemy’s way.’
“Nor do I think that the designers of the Italian war-ships will indorse the description of their views and intentions, with which Sir Edward Reed has favored us in his letter and elsewhere. I have the honor of knowing his excellency Signor Brin (now Minister of Marine) and other members of the constructive corps of the Italian navy, and from their statements, including the powerful publications of Signor Brin, ‘La Nostra Marina Militaire,’ I have no hesitation in saying that in spending larger sums on single ships than have ever before been spent, the Italian authorities think, and are not alone in thinking, that they are producing the most powerful fighting-ships afloat.”