There is no rigorous law by which a universal naval policy may be formulated, for a nation’s environment, geographical and political, defines the conditions that must be obeyed. Underneath all, however, the immutable principle exists that the first and supreme duty of a navy is to protect its own coasts. The measures required to achieve this end are as various as a country’s necessities, resources, opportunities, and temperament. England, for example, has always guarded her homes, not at the hearth-stone nor the threshold, but within gunshot of her enemy’s territory; her defence has been an attack upon his inner line, and her vessels have been, not corsairs preying upon merchantmen, but battle-ships, ready for duel or for fleet engagement, whether they had the odds against them or not. This is the true sailor instinct; this has made England’s greatness.
To-day the question is so much governed by the complexities of modern progress that the details must be altered to suit the new demands; for it is not the England of the British Islands nor of the sparsely settled colonies that is now to be defended—it is a Greater Britain. The trade and commerce of England have increased so enormously in late years that no figures are necessary to show the interests she has afloat; but as proof of her growth in territory and in population outside of the mother-country, these statistics, taken from a late number of theNineteenth Century, may perhaps be quoted:
FIFTY YEARS’ GROWTH OF INDIA AND THE COLONIES.
INDIA.
COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES.
That is to say, in fifty years England has added 7,260,000 square miles to her territory, and nearly trebled the population she controls in India and her colonies. Is it necessary to add that with all this at stake the ocean highways which her ships traverse must be held toll free; that the nations which she has peopled and owns must be protected; that the enemy’s squadrons which will seek to cut off her food supply, destroy her commerce, and burn her coaling stations, must be chased and captured; or that in the line of battle her ships must meet his and conquer? Sea-going and sea-keeping fleets and their auxiliaries must always be ready; transferable forts for protection abroad, and coast-defence ships for safety at home, must be kept afloat; and, in a word, every means must be employed which, through successful sea-war, will maintain her integrity as a nation. Her navy must be eclectic in types, the exact instrument for any expected operation being always at hand; her maritime administration must be comprehensive; and her preparation ever such as will anticipate and surpass that of all her rivals. Enormously armored battle-ships may be economically wrong, but while other countries build them so must she; for her immunity depends not upon treaties nor the friendly but false protestations of rivals, but upon the fear of her unassailable superiority. A mistaken naval policy is to any nation a grave disaster, but to England it means ruin. “We cannot allow,” wrote Lord Brassey, “any foreign power to possess vessels which we cannot overhaul, or to carry guns at sea which may inflict a damaging blow to which it is impossible for us to reply. We must have ships as fast as the fastest, and guns at least equal to the most powerful which are to be found in the hands of any possible enemy.”
Knowing, then, the interests imperilled, English designers are keen to achieve the best results; and when, as they believe, this has been accomplished, is it a wonder that they fall tooth and nail in a white-heat of positive assertion and flat contradiction upon all who differ from them? All are striving so honestly for the common good of the great country which they love with such intense and insular patriotism that even their imbittered differences of belief command the respect of right-thinking men everywhere. But in these variant faiths where is thetruth? The question has run the gamut of experiment without being solved, the pendulum has swung from side to side and found no point of rest, and to-day there is a fixed agreement only as to the dangers which threaten.
The most marked tendencies, however, in all modern design are the diminution of side armor, the increase of deck protection, and the development of speed. The public mind is so familiar with the great speed of the large mail-boats that a common question, often put as an inquiry of disparaging comparison, is why war-vessels do not steam as fast. The simplest answer to this is that they do, and in types which, like the big steamers, are special, the boasted achievements have been surpassed. Of course the number of vessels that can make nineteen knots is limited, because the man-of-war is hampered by necessities of space, weight, and safety, which do not obtain with the others. Mr. White, who has been so often, and, it is to be hoped, so advantageously, quoted in this editing, says: “The necessity for giving protection to the engines and boilers of war-ships introduces special restrictions and difficulties in the design which are not known in merchant-ships, wherever in war-ships the overshadowing necessities of fighting power compel the acceptance in many cases of limited space and other inconveniences.... Merchant-steamers of all classes are built and engined for the purpose of steaming continuously at certain maximum speeds, and making fairly uniform passages; they consequently possess a considerable reserve of boiler power to meet adverse conditions of wind and sea. War-ships, on the contrary, ordinarily cruise at very low speeds, and yet must be capable of reaching very high speeds when required in action or chasing. A war-ship, for instance, that attained about sixteen knots on the measured mile, and could steam continuously at sea, as long as her coal lasted, at a speed of about fifteen knots, would ordinarily have to cruise at from nine to ten knots. At this low speed she would require, say, onlyone-seventhof the indicated horse-power which would be developed at her full sea speed, or sayone-tenthof what would be developed on the measured mile. This obviously introduces conditions of a character entirely different from those of the merchant-ship. The war-ship’s machinery must be so designed that the power necessary to give her high speed at long intervals and for short periods should be secured with the least expenditure of weight consistent with insuring the maximum performance when required, and with the provision of proper strength and durability.”
The very vague ideas existing as to the cost of increased speed maybe illustrated by a statement of the penalty this imposes in a 10,000 ton armored vessel. If at 10 knots this ship develops 1700 horse-power, there will be required at 15 knots, not one-third more, but 6200 horse-power—that is, over three times as much—and for 17 knots 12,000 horse-power, or an increase of 10,300 must be developed. This also demonstrates how much the ratio between speed and power falls; because if at 2000 horse-power 2.3 knots are gained for an increase of 1000 horse-power, at 12,000 for a similar increment of 1000 only one-quarter of a knot is obtained. In 1830 the steam pressure carried was from two to three pounds, and the coal expenditure each hour for every horse-power reached nine pounds; in 1886 the pressure had increased to 150 pounds, and the fuel consumption had fallen to 1.5 pounds, and to-day pressures of 200 pounds are to be utilized. As the swifter vessel with the higher economy is enabled to choose its range and position, and keep the sea for longer periods, it is easily seen that this question of speed is universally accepted as vital.
A parliamentary statement made in February shows that the following additions to the English fleet will be passed this year into the first-class reserve, and held ready for sea service at forty-eight hours’ notice.
At the end of 1887-88 one armored ship, theCamperdown, and one protected cruiser, theForth, will be nearly finished, theAnsonwill be approaching completion, and the new belted cruisers of theOrlandoclass will be far advanced. The armored battle-shipsVictoriaandSanspareil, of 10,470 tons displacement, are to be delivered according to contract in October, 1888, and theTrafalgarandNile, the largest war-vessels yet laid down in England, are being pushed rapidly. Out of the thirty-seven ships building or incomplete at the commencement of 1887-88, twenty-six will be completed by the end of the year, thus leaving only nine of those specified, and two others not ordered, in the programme of 1885 to be finished subsequently. The ships projected for this year include:
Besides the ships that have been or will be finished in 1886-87, it is believed that thirty-five of the fifty-five first-class torpedo-boats (125 to 150 feet in length) will be added to the twenty which were completed in June.
In addition to the vessels mentioned above there are others not described nor noticed in the text. The two battle-ships referred to uponpage 55are theSanspareiland theVictoria, the latter formerly known as theRenown, but named anew in April last. These ships are to carry 1180 tons of coal, and under forced draught are expected to develop 12,000 horse-power and a speed of 16.75 knots. The 9.2-inch 18-ton stern pivot gun originally intended for these vessels has been replaced by a 10-inch 26-ton rifle, and the secondary battery now includes twenty-one 6 and 3-pounder rapid fire guns. The other prominent departures from the central-citadel type are theNileandTrafalgar. These 11,940-ton ships are the largest war machines ever laid down for the British service. They are to carry revolving turrets on the fore and aft line amidships, and will have an intermediate broadside battery mounted in a superstructure which covers the full width of the ship between the turrets. A water-belt line 230 feet in length rises in the waist for a distance of 193 feet, and both belt and citadel are covered by a three-inch steel deck, which is curved forward and aft to strengthen the ram and protect the steering gear. The armor is compound—eighteen inches thick on the turret and twenty inches thick as a maximum on the water-line—and to support the backing there is an inner skin two inches thick. The armament consists of four 13½-inch 68-ton breech-loading rifles, two in each turret; of eight 5-inch guns in broadside on a covered deck protected by three inches of vertical armor, and of eight 6-pounder rapid fire, ten 3-pounder Maxim, and four Gardner guns. The horse-power under forced draft is to be 12,000, and the estimated speed is 16½ knots. The main battery originally designed for these ships included only one 68-ton breech-loading rifle for each turret; subsequently this plan was rejected, and the armament stated above wasadopted. “The economy of mounting the heavy guns in pairs arises not only from the increased power thus obtained from a given weight of guns, but from the fact that it requires but little more armor to protect two guns than to protect one. It also requires more machinery to work two guns separately than in pairs, and the magazine and ammunition supply arrangements of guns mounted separately are necessarily more complicated, and require more men to operate them than those mounted in pairs.
“The French idea in mounting their heavy guns singly in three or four armored barbettes is evidently so to distribute the gun-power as to leave a reserve of heavy guns in event of damage to one or more. But the demands for economy in weight are so great that two armored structures widely separated would seem to furnish as satisfactory a scattering of the heavy gun-power as is justifiable. Guns mounted on the middle line suffer less disturbance in rolling than those mounted either in the waist oren échelon, and their fire should be correspondingly more accurate.”[18]
TheImpérieuseandWarspitehave powerful ram bows, a steel protective deck, and a belt of compound armor which is 139 feet in length on the water-line, 8 feet in width, and 10 inches thick. The engines were designed to develop 7500 horse-power and a speed of 16 knots, but on her trial theImpérieuseattained with forced draft a maximum speed of 18.2 knots and 10,344 horse-power, and a mean speed, after four runs on the measured mile, of 17.21 knots. In September, 1886, with all guns and stores in place, and with 900 tons of coal in the bunkers, theImpérieusedeveloped a mean speed of 16 knots. The armament is composed of four 9.2-inch guns, mounted in four 8-inch plated circular barbettes, and situated one forward, one aft, and two in the waist; on the gun-deck there are six 6-inch guns, and the secondary battery is made up of twelve 6-pounder rapid fire, ten1-inch Nordenfeldt, and four Gardner guns, and of four above-water and two submerged torpedo-tubes. Owing to the increased weights of the armament, stores, machinery, and equipments put in these vessels since they were first designed, the draught of water is now found to be nearly three feet greater than was intended. It is only fair to state that they were originally expected to carry but 400 tons of coal, though curiously enough, when this fuel capacity was subsequently increased to 1200 tons, no allowance was made for the additional armored surface required.
The armored free-board was to have been 3 feet 3 inches at a draught of 25 feet, but the supplementary weights increased the draught 11½ inches and reduced this free-board to 2 feet 3½ inches; and later, when the full bunker capacity of 900 tons was utilized, the draught was again increased 14 inches, and the free-board lowered to 1 foot 1½ inches. Finally it was for a time determined to carry 1200 tons of coal, though this would result, when the ship was fully equipped for sea, in bringing the top of the armored belt nearly flush with the water.
“As four of the torpedo tubes are above water, and have ports cut through the armor-belt, this decrease of free-board rendered them useless, it having been shown during an experimental cruise on theImpérieusein December, 1886, with but 800 tons of coal on board and in a calm sea, that in attempting to discharge the broadside torpedoes they jammed in the tubes, and altered shape to a dangerous degree. In order to make them of any use they will have to be restored to their intended height above the water-line. It is believed this can be accomplished by removing part of the superstructure, by dispensing with all top-hamper and its attendant supply of stores, equipments, etc., and by limiting the maximum coal supply to the bunker capacity of 900 tons. The masts are accordingly being removed from both vessels, leaving them but one signal mast stepped between the funnels, and fitted with a military top.”[19]
In May, 1886, theWarspite, when very light, developed with natural draft 7451 horse-power and a speed of 15½ knots on a consumption of 2.69 pounds of coal each hour per horse-power; and with forced draft 10,242 horse-power and a speed of 17¼ knots were obtained on a similar consumption of 2.9 pounds of coal.
In the minority report of the 1871 Committee on Designs Admiral Elliot and Rear-Admiral Ryder “strongly advocated the use of a protective deck in conjunction with other features, instead of side-armor, for protection to stability. The idea as regards cruisers was first carried out in the full-rigged ships of the EnglishComusclass of 2380 tons displacement and 13 knots speed, launched in 1878, in which the engines, boilers, and magazines were covered by a horizontal 1½-inch steel deck placed below the water-line, the space immediately above containing cellular subdivisions.
“Then followed, in 1882, theLeanderand her three sister bark-rigged vessels, which are a compromise between the speed of theIrisand the protection of theComus. They are of 3750 tons displacementand 17 knots maximum speed; they carry ten 6-inch 4-ton B. L. R., and 725 tons of coal, and have a ‘partial protective deck,’ covering engines, boilers, and magazines, which is 1½ inches thick, and which bends down below the load water-line at the sides. Our new cruisers, theChicago,Boston, andAtlanta, bear a closer resemblance to this type than they do to any other in respect of their protection. About this time the Chilian cruiserEsmeralda, of 3000 tons, appeared, having a protective deck complete from stem to stern-post, carrying an exceptionally heavy battery and coal supply, and withal attaining the unprecedented speed of 18.28 knots. Italy was not slow to perceive the advantages of this type, and accordingly bought an improvedEsmeralda, theGiovanni Bausan, and at once commenced to build four others, theVesuvio,Stromboli,Etna, andFieramosca, each of 3530 tons. Japan ordered two improvedEsmeraldas, the sister shipsNaniwa-KanandTacachiho-Kan, from Armstrong, in England, and a similar vessel, theUnebi, in France, while England laid down a similar class, theMerseyand three others, and France a similar cruiser, theSfax, of 4400 tons.”[20]TheUnebiwas a bark-rigged, twin-screw, protected steel cruiser of 3651 tons. Her armament consisted of four 9.45-inch breech-loaders on sponsons, six 5.9-inch breech-loaders in broadside, one 5.9-inch bow pivot, twelve rapid fire and two Nordenfeldt machine guns, and a supply of Whitehead torpedoes. In September, 1886, she developed with forced draft 7000 horse-power and an average speed of 18.5 knots during four runs over the measured mile. She sailed for Japan in November, 1886, with a French crew numbering seventy-eight men, left Singapore for Yokohama on December 3, 1886, and has never been seen nor heard of since. She is said to have been top-heavy, and to have rolled dangerously in a sea way.
TheNaniwa-Kan, a steel cruiser, 300 feet in length and 46 feet in beam, has on an extreme draught of 19 feet 6 inches a displacement of 3730 tons; the steel hull is fitted with a double bottom under the engines and boilers, and has a strong protective deck, two to three inches thick, which extends from the ram to the stern-post, and carries its edges four feet below, and its crown one inch above, the load water-line. There are ten complete transverse and several partial water-tight bulkheads; the space between the protective and the main deck is minutely subdivided into compartments, which are utilized as coal-bunkers, store-rooms, chain-lockers, and torpedo-rooms; the conning-tower is protectedby two inches of steel armor; and two ammunition hoists, three inches thick, lead from the shell-rooms to the loading towers at the breech of the two heavy guns. The armament consists of two 10-inch 28-ton breech-loading rifles on central pivots, with 2-inch steel screens, and of six 6-inch guns, with a secondary battery of two 6-pounder rapid fire, eight 1-inch Nordenfeldt, four Gardner guns, and four above-water torpedo tubes. The engines are of the horizontal compound type, situated in two compartments, one abaft the other, and there are six single-ended locomotive three-furnace boilers in two separate compartments, with athwartship fire-rooms; the indicated horse-power under a forced draft was 7650, and the maximum speed 18.9 knots. This has since been exceeded. TheMerseyand her class—theSevern,Thames, andForth—like theNaniwaare unarmored steel cruisers, with a complete protective deck, the horizontal portion of which is one foot above, and the inclined three inches below, the water-line. The main battery of these ships consists of two 8-inch guns, mounted on central pivots forward and abaft a covered deck which carries ten 6-inch guns; the secondary battery has ten 1-inch Nordenfeldt and two Gardner machine guns, and there are six above-water torpedo-tubes in broadside.
“The development of theMerseydesign has resulted in the new English ‘belted cruisers,’ in which, to satisfy the demand for a water-line belt of armor, the displacement has been increased to 5000 tons.”
The five originally projected—theOrlando,Narcissus,Australia,Galatea, andUndaunted—together with theImmortalité, subsequently laid down, have already been launched, and an additional cruiser of the same type, theAurora, is well advanced. The general construction is similar to theNaniwaandMersey, the larger tonnage being given in order to carry a water-line belt, which is ten inches thick, stretches for 190 feet amidships, and was intended to extend from 1½ feet above to four feet below the load water-line. The armored deck is from two to three inches thick, and the conning-tower is thirteen inches. The triple-expansion engines are planned to develop 8500 horse-power and a speed of 18 knots. Like theImpérieuseandWarspite, these vessels are found to draw much more water than was originally proposed. When designed in 1884 they were expected to have, with all weights on board, a mean draught of twenty-one feet, and to carry above water eighteen inches of the five feet six inch armor-belt. But a fever for improvement set in so valorously that the changes made in armament and machinery added one hundred and eighty-six tons to the displacement and increased the draught seven inches—that is, an amount which left thetop of the protective belt only eleven inches above the smooth water-line. This submersion did not, however, cool the ardor of the Admiralty officials, for it has been decided that the nine hundred tons of coal originally fixed as the fuel supply must be carried; the immediate result of this is said to be an increase in the draught of eighteen inches, and a disappearance of the armor-belt to a point nearly six inchesbelowthe water-line. Subsequent improvements will be awaited with great interest, especially by those American journalists of inquiring tendencies who envyingly detect between the promise and performance of these ships opportunities which, had they occurred at home, would have enabled them to swamp our naval service and its administration in billows of pitiless ink.
The most popular naval event of the year was the review in July of the British fleet assembled at Spithead. The one hundred and twenty-eight war-vessels participating included three squadrons of armored vessels and cruisers, aggregating thirty-four ships, seventy-five torpedo-boats and gun-boats, divided into five flotillas, six training brigs, and thirteen troop-ships. Besides these there were the troop-ships appointed to carry the distinguished visitors, and the small vessels and dockyard craft allotted to the corporation of Portsmouth.
The war-ships were drawn up in four lines, facing up channel, the starboard column lying opposite the Isle of Wight, and the port column off Portsmouth. The ships were two cables and the columns three cables apart. The flotillas were ranged in double columns between the port line of the armored vessels and the main-land, and the troop-ships were placed in single column between the starboard line and the Isle of Wight. This made four lines of vessels on one side of the channel and three on the other, extending from South Sea Castle to the Rye Middle Shoals, or a distance of two miles. No such fleet was ever seen before in time of peace, for every class of the British navy was so well represented that the review of the Crimean fleet by the Queen and the Prince Consort, thirty-one years ago, suffered by comparison. Some of the wooden ships which figured at that time were present, and the wide differences in everything bore strong testimony to the developments which have been made within a generation. Nelson’s old ship, theVictory, was a conspicuous object, and her timbers echoed again and again with cheers as boat after boat passed her. More than that, the old ship mounted a gun or two and joined in the universal salute to the Queen. Shortly after two o’clock theEuphrates,Crocodile, andMalabarhove to off Osborne as an escort to the royal yachts when the Queen embarked.
The Queen left Osborne House a few minutes before three o’clock, went aboard the royal yachtVictoria and Albert, and left the buoy in the bay promptly at the hour fixed. She was preceded by theTrinityyacht and followed by the royal yachtsOsborneandAlberta, and by the war-vesselsEnchantress,Helicon,Euphrates,Crocodile, andMalabar. The royal procession proceeded straight to its destination and passed between the lines, leaving the coast-defence ships, gun-boats, and torpedo-boats on the port hand. After steaming as far as the Horse Elbow buoy theVictoria and Albertturned to starboard, passed between the two columns of large ships, and then between the lines of the foreign war-vessels. As the yacht steamed slowly by the war-ships the crews cheered loudly, but it was not until the Queen had gone through the double line that the royal salute was fired. On board such vessels as had no masts the turrets, breastworks, and decks were lined with the crews, and the spectacle was as splendid as it was potent with an earnest evidence of mighty power. Altogether the fleet extended over four miles, and even this length was added to by the great troop-ships which steamed into line and saluted the Queen as she made her progress.
The jubilee week was not without its accidents, for theAjaxandDevastationcollided at the rendezvous, and subsequently theAgincourtandBlack Princehad a similar experience. These mishaps evoked much hostile criticism, and among other things gave currency to an extract from a speech made by Lord Randolph Churchill several weeks before. Speaking of the navy, he had declared that, “In the last twelve or thirteen years eighteen ships have been either completed or designed by the Admiralty to fulfil certain purposes, and on the strength of the Admiralty statements Parliament has faithfully voted the money. The total amount which either has been or will be voted for these ships is about ten millions, and it is now discovered and officially acknowledged that in respect of the purposes for which these ships were designed, and for the purposes for which these ten millions either have been or will be spent, the whole of the money has been absolutely misapplied, utterly wasted and thrown away.”
Sir Charles Dilke does not agree with this pessimism of his political opponent, though he, too, has something to say of the British fleet, in relation to its influence upon the present position of European politics, which is well worth quoting.
“There is less to be said in a hostile sense with regard to the present position of the navy,” he concedes, “than may be said, or must be said,about the army. Clever German officers may write their ‘Great Naval War of 1888,’ and describe the destruction of the British fleet by the French torpedo-boats, but on the whole we are not ill-satisfied with the naval progress that has been made in the last three years. There is plenty of room for doubt as to whether we get full value for our money; but at all events our navy is undoubtedly and by universal admission the first navy in the world, and relatively to the French we appear to show of ships built and building a number proportionate to our expenditure. The discovery of the comparative uselessness of automatic torpedoes is an advantage to this country, and no great change in the opposite direction has recently occurred. M. Gabriel Charmes has pointed out to France the manner to destroy our sea-borne trade, but excellent steps have been taken since his book appeared to meet the danger which he obligingly made clear to us. It remains a puzzle to my civilian mind how Italy can manage to do all that in a naval sense she does for her comparatively small expenditure, and how, spending only from a fourth to a sixth what we spend upon our navy, she can nevertheless produce so noble a muster of great ships. But our naval dangers are, no doubt, dangers chiefly caused rather by military than by naval defects. Our navy is greatly weakened for the discharge of its proper duties by the fact that duties are thrown upon it which no navy can efficiently discharge. As Admiral Hoskins has said, it is the duty of the commander of the British fleet to drive the hostile squadrons from the seas, and to shut up the enemy’s ships in his different ports; but, on the other hand, he has a right to expect that our own ports and coaling stations shall be protected by batteries and by land forces. This is exactly what has not yet been done, although the defence of our coaling stations by fortresses and by adequate garrisons is essential to the sustaining of our maritime supremacy in time of war.
“It is only, however, by comparison with our army that I think our navy in a sound position. In other words, our military situation is so alarming that it is for a time desirable to concentrate our attention upon that, rather than upon the less pressing question of the condition of the navy. I must not be thought, however, to admit, for one single instant, that our navy should give us no anxiety. As long as France remains at peace, and spends upon her navy such enormous sums as she has been spending during the last few years, she will be sufficiently near to us in naval power to make our position somewhat doubtful; make it depend, that is, upon how the different new inventions may turn out in time of war. Our navy is certainly none too large (evenwhen the coaling stations and commercial ports have been fortified, and made for the first time a source of strength rather than of weakness to the navy) for the duties which it has to perform. It would be as idle for us, with our present naval force, to hope to thoroughly command the Mediterranean and the Red Sea against the French without an Italian alliance, as to try to hold our own in Turkey or in Belgium with our present army. Just as the country seems now to have made up its mind to abandon not only the defence of Turkey against Russia, but also the defence of the neutrality of Belgium, so it will have to make up its mind, unless it is prepared to increase the navy, to resort only to the Cape route in time of war. Italy being neutral, and we at war with France, we could not at present hope to defend the whole of our colonies and trade against attack, and London against invasion, and yet to so guard the Mediterranean and the Red Sea as to make passage past Toulon and Algiers, Corsica and Biserta, safe. Our force is probably so superior to the French as to enable us to shut up their iron-clads; but it would probably be easier to shut in their Mediterranean iron-clads by holding the Straits of Gibraltar than to attempt to blockade them in Toulon. I confess that I cannot understand those Jingoes who think that it is enough to shriek for Egypt, without seeing that Egypt cannot be held in time of war, or the Suez route made use of with the military and naval forces that we possess at present.
“As against a French and Russian combination of course we are weaker still. Englishmen are hardly aware of the strength of Russia in the Pacific, where, if we are to attack at all, we must inevitably fight her, and where, if we are to adopt the hopeless policy of remaining only on the defensive, we shall still have to meet her for the protection of our own possessions. Just as the reduction of the horse artillery, comparatively unimportant in itself, has shown that the idea of the protection of Belgian neutrality has been completely given up, so the abandonment of Port Hamilton, instead of its fortification as a protection for our navy, seems to show that we have lost all hope of being able to hold our own against Russia in the North Pacific. On the 1st of August Russia will have upon her North Pacific station—cruising, that is, between Vladivostock and Yokohama—three new second-class protected ships—theVladimir,Monomakh, and theDmitri Donsköi, of nearly six thousand tons apiece, and theDuke of Edinburgh, of four thousand six hundred tons; one older protected ship, theVitiaz, of three thousand tons; four fast-sailing cruisers—theNaïezdnik, theRazboïnik, theOpritchnik, and theDjighite; and four gun-boats, of which two arebrand-new this year. While talking about their European fleets, the Russians are paying no real attention to them, and are more and more concentrating their strength in the North Pacific.”
“The British navy,” says another writer,[21]“is not in danger, and the British navy, whatever its shortcomings, is relatively far stronger than its thoughtless detractors would have us believe. Our ships do steer and our ships do steam—at least as well as those of other powers; and, what is more, our ships will ‘fight’ and our ships will ‘win,’ in spite of the dismal forebodings of interested panic-mongers.
“With the resources at our command, our armaments afloat admit of a rapid development, in which no other country can compete with us. A French writer has truly said, ‘La puissance d’une marine est moins dans son matériel à flot, que dans l’outillage de ses arsenaux, et dans la puissance productive de ses chantiers.’
“As a maritime power we are unequalled, and if we be true to ourselves we shall remain so.”
In 1886 the fighting-ships of the British navy were summarized as follows:
During the last year thirty-seven vessels of the following classes were stricken from the list, viz., five armored ships, seven cruisers of the third class, sixteen gun-vessels, one despatch-boat, and eighteen special servicegun-boats. The total net value, excluding ordnance equipments, of the fleet when it is kept at a normal war strength is $191,568,720, and the annual ship-building expenditures required to sustain this standard of efficiency is $8,793,440. This is a very cheap insurance upon the property, material and moral, which is at stake.
The following table shows the armored and partially protected ships now under construction or lately finished:
In the notes upon the next chapter, additional data referring to gun-boats and torpedo-boats will be found.