(b) There is positive concealment of the truth, when one gives a reply in language that is obscure to the listener or obscure in itself. If the listener has no right to the truth, it is not wrong to speak to him in words which he will not understand (e.g., in technical or scientific terms); for if he is deceived, he can blame only his own impertinence or dullness. The case is more difficult, however, if the reply is obscure in itself, that is, if use is made of ambiguity or mental reservation.
2399. Mental Reservation.—Mental reservation is an act of the mind by which a speaker restricts or limits his words to a meaning which they do not naturally or clearly convey; or it is an internal modification of an external speech delivered without any or without clear external modification. There are two kinds of mental reservation.
(a) Strict mental reservation is that in which the internal modification is manifested by nothing external, neither by the natural sense of the words (i.e., the meaning that ordinarily attaches to them) nor by their accidental sense (i.e., the meaning they receive from their context, such as the circumstances of time, place, usage, person who questions, person who is questioned, etc.). Example: Titus, who struck Balbus with a club, denies that he hit him, meaning that it was the club which hit Balbus directly.
(b) Broad mental reservation is that in which the internal modification can be perceived, at least by a prudent person, either from the natural sense of the words (because they are known to be capable of different meanings), or from the context (because circumstances indicate that the words are not to be taken in their obvious sense). Example: Claudius accidentally ran against and wounded Sempronius and the latter thinks that someone struck him a blow. Claudius denies that he struck Sempronius, or declares to those who have no right to ask that he knows nothing about the matter.
2400. Lawfulness of Mental Reservation.—(a) Strict mental reservation is unlawful and has been condemned by the Church (see Denzinger, nn. 1174-1178). The reasons are, first, that it is a lie, since it employs words that do not at all express what the speaker has in mind, and his mental reservation cannot give them a significance they do not possess; secondly, that, if it were lawful, every dishonest person could easily escape the guilt of lying and yet deceive at will. According to Scripture the sophistical speaker is hateful (Ecclus., xxxvii. 23), but the just man speaks and swears without guile (Ps. xxxiii. 14, xxiii. 4).
(b) Broad mental reservation is unlawful when there is a reason that forbids its use, or when there is no sufficient reason to justify its use. Reservation is forbidden when a questioner has the right to an answer free from all ambiguity, for example, when a pastor questions parties preparing for marriage, when a person who is about to be inducted into office is asked about his freedom from disqualifications, when a witness in court is interrogated about matters on which he can testify, when one party to a contract seeks from the other necessary knowledge about the contract; for in all these cases injury is done by concealment of the truth. Reservation is not justified, unless it is necessary in order to secure some good or avoid some evil, whether spiritual or temporal, whether for self or for another, and the end compensates by its importance for the deception that may be caused. Apart from such necessity mental reservation is, to say the least, a departure from the virtue of Christian sincerity or simplicity, which pertains to truthfulness and which forbids one to conceal the truth from others when there is no good reason for concealment (Matt, v. 37). Moreover, the friendly relations of mankind would be impaired if it were lawful to speak equivocally even when trifling things are discussed or when there is no reason to be secretive.
(c) Broad mental reservation is lawful when there is a sufficient reason for it, such as the public welfare (e. g., the preservation of state secrets or of military plans), spiritual welfare (e.g., the prevention of blasphemy or intoxication), bodily welfare (e.g., the prevention of death or murder), or financial welfare (e.g., the prevention of robbery). But the reservation must be necessary, as being the only lawful means that will secure the end (e.g., one should not use reservation when evasion or silence will suffice); and it should not be injurious to the rights of another (e.g., it should not be employed against the common good, in favor of a private good). The reason for the present conclusion is found in the principle of double result (see 103 sqq.) and in the fact that a broad mental reservation is not intrinsically evil, since it contains no lie or insincerity and causes no injury to individuals or society. There is no lie, because the words correspond with the thought, either from their natural signification (in case of double-meaning words), or from their accidental signification (in case of words whose meaning is varied by the context); there is no insincerity, for the aim is only to conceal a truth that should not be made known; there is no injury to the listener or questioner, since, if he is deceived, this is due to his own heedlessness or dullness or unjustified curiosity; there is no injury to society, since the general welfare demands that there be some honest means of eluding unjust inquiries and of protecting important secrets. Our Lord Himself, who is infinitely above all suspicion of duplicity or insincerity, may have used broad mental reservations when He declared (John, vii. 8-10) that He would not go up to Jerusalem, that the daughter of Jairus was not dead but sleeping (Matt., ix. 24). Other cases of mental reservation in Scripture are found in Eliseus (IV Kings, vi. 19).
2401. When Is Broad Mental Reservation Lawful?—There is general agreement that broad mental reservation is lawful in the following cases:
(a) it is lawful and obligatory when one is bound to keep the truth from the person who asks it. Hence, those who are questioned about secrets which sacramental or professional confidence forbids them to disclose (e.g., confessors, doctors, lawyers, statesmen, and secretaries) should deny knowledge, or, if hard-pressed, even the facts. The answer, “I do not know” or “No,” in these cases simply means: “I have no personal or communicable knowledge.” In war time a government has the right to censor the news in order to keep information from the enemy. A reason of charity might also make it obligatory to disguise the truth by mental reservation (e.g., when a clear reply given to the question of a sick person would only weaken a slender hope of saving his life, or when exact information given to a gunman would enable him to overtake an intended victim);
(b) it is lawful when a reasonable local custom permits one to withhold the truth. Thus, an accused person, even though guilty, has the right to plead not guilty, which means that he does not confess guilt; a person who has a visitor at an unseasonable hour may send word that he is not at home, which means that she is not at home to visitors, a person who is asked for an alms or a loan which he cannot conveniently grant may answer, according to many, that he has not the money, which means that he has no money to spare for those purposes (see 2251).
2402. Ambiguous Answers.—Are ambiguous answers which are not given according to the questioner’s mind, and for which there are no reasonable justifications, to be classed as lies?
(a) If the answer, even in the setting of its context, retains its ambiguity or can be interpreted in two ways, there is not strictly speaking a lie, for the words signify, though obscurely, what is in the speaker’s mind. But this is a form of insincerity known as equivocation or quibbling, which many regard almost as disreputable as plain lying. The pagan oracles that made predictions that would suit any turn of events and politicians who so word themselves as to be on opposite sides at the same time are examples of equivocation.
(b) If the answer, though verbally susceptible of two senses, is contextually limited to one sense, it is a lie; for it does not express the speaker’s mind. Thus, if Titus knows that Balbus is good physically or mentally but not morally, he equivocates by answering that Balbus is good, if from the circumstances this indicates only that in some way or other Balbus is good; but Titus lies by answering that Balbus is good and restricting his meaning to physical goodness or industry, if the question propounded referred to moral goodness.
2403. Simulation or Pretence.—A special form of untruthfulness is simulation or pretence, which uses external deeds or things to signify the contrary of what one thinks or intends internally.
(a) Simulation uses external deeds or things, and thus there is an accidental difference between lying and simulation, the one being untruthfulness in word and the other untruthfulness in deed (see 1678 sqq.).
(b) It employs deeds or things to signify. Unlike words, deeds and things were not meant principally to signify, and hence not all conduct at variance with one’s ideas is simulation. One may act without any thought of the impression the act makes on others (e.g., when one keeps sober, not from wish, but from necessity). And even when an act is done with the intention to influence others by it, the purpose may be, not to signify, but to conceal something (e.g., Josue fled from the troops of Hai to keep them from a knowledge of his plans, Jos., viii. 1 sqq.; David feigned insanity to conceal his identity, I Kings, xxi. 11. sqq.). Thus, simulation teaches error, and dissimulation hides truth from those who have no right to it. That dissimulation is generally recognized as lawful is seen from such examples as stratagems, ambushes, camouflage in war, disguises in detective work, and concealment of marriage by couples not ready for housekeeping.
(c) It signifies the contrary of what one has in mind, as when one who is sad laughs and jokes to make others think he is happy, or one who is well apes the actions of a sick man so as to appear unwell, or when one who hates his neighbor treats him as a friend in public. A special form of simulation is hypocrisy, which makes a show of virtue that one does not possess at all or in the degree pretended. There is no simulation if the exterior corresponds with what one has is mind, for example, at Emmaus Christ made as though He would go farther (Luke, xxiv. 28), but He meant not to stop without an invitation.
2404. The Sinfulness of Simulation.—(a) In general, simulation is a sin, since it is nothing else than an acted lie. But deeds, with the few exceptions of bows, nods, gestures and the like, are not from their nature signs of thoughts, and those employed to serve as signs are more indeterminate and equivocal than words; hence, it is not always as easy to decide that an act is simulatory as to decide that a word is a lie. Thus, it is not simulation to make use of false hair, false teeth, or false jewelry as means of protection or of adornment, there being no intention to mislead; neither is it simulation for a wicked cleric to wear the clerical garb, for the dress signifies primarily his state, and not necessarily his personal moral character.
(b) In particular, simulation by hypocrisy and treachery is detestable; for hypocrisy prostitutes works of virtue to the ignoble ends of applause or lucre or worse, while treachery uses the intimacy or marks of friendship as means for betrayal. The most stinging rebukes of Our Lord were given the hypocritical Pharisees (“Blind guides, whited sepulchres, serpents, generation of vipers,” Matt., xxiii. 23 sqq.), and among the saddest words of Christ are those addressed to Judas (“Dost thou betray the Son of man with a kiss?” Luke, xxii. 48). Against the former he pronounced woes, and He declared that it were better if the latter had never been born (Matt., xxvi. 24).
2405. Sinfulness of Hypocrisy.—(a) Hypocrisy in its strictest sense is the simulation of one who wishes to seem but not to be virtuous. This sin is mortal, since it cares nothing for virtue, and its external pretense is but a mockery. It is this hypocrisy that is so scathingly denounced in Scripture.
(b) Hypocrisy in a less strict sense is the simulation of one who is in mortal sin, but wishes for some reason to appear virtuous or to lead a double life. The sin is mortal or venial according to the motive; for example, to act the hypocrite in order to seduce another is a mortal sin, though, if the motive is only vanity, the sin is venial. It should be noted that it is not hypocrisy for a just cause to conceal one’s sin by dissimulation; indeed, Isaias severely blames those who scandalize others by flaunting their wickedness before the public (Is, iii. 9).
(c) Hypocrisy in the widest sense assumes the appearance of a high degree of sanctity above that requisite for salvation, as when a person of ordinary goodness tries to gain the reputation of miracle-worker, or to pass as one better than others in faith, zeal, humility, etc. This sin is not mortal in itself, but it may become mortal on account of some motive, some means, or some other circumstance. There is no hypocrisy at all, however, in showing oneself for the virtue one really has; on the contrary, he lies, who being good pretends that he is not good, or who being free of a vice pretends that he is guilty of it.
2406. Self-Glorification and Self-Depreciation.—Two forms of lying about self are self-glorification and self-depreciation.
(a) Braggadocio is untruthful self-glorification, as when one pretends to be of royal descent, or makes a display of wealth beyond one’s means, or poses as an authority on matters of which one is ignorant, or tries by bluff to make one’s defects seem perfections. This sin is mortal when the lie is seriously injurious to God or others (Ezech., xxviii. 2, Luke, xviii. 11), or when the motive is gravely sinful, such as grave arrogance, ambition, or avarice.
(b) Feigning of defects (irony) is untruthful self-depreciation, as when one falsely denies a good quality which one possesses (e.g., an excessively humble man denies the good deeds that others ascribe to him, though he knows they are real), or when one falsely admits a bad quality which one lacks (e.g., a person who wishes to curry favor accuses himself of misdeeds which he knows never happened). This sin is usually less than braggadocio, since as a rule its purpose is to avoid offense to others; but it may be serious sin on account of some circumstance, as when one speaks ill of self in order to scandalize or seduce another. At times the feigning of defects is a concealed braggadocio, as when one dresses in rags, hoping by this expedient to acquire repute as a person of great spirituality (Prov., xxvi, 25; Matt., vi. 16; Ecclus., xix. 23).
2407. Infidelity and Violation of a Secret.—It remains to speak of the vices of infidelity and violation of secret (see 2388 a). As to the former, since it has been discussed elsewhere (1877 sqq., 1888, 1889; see also the matter on Promissory Oaths), it will suffice here to ask the question: Is the breach of a promise freely given a sin?
(a) If observance of the promise is due from fidelity only, there is no legal fault, but there is moral fault, and hence the breach of the promise is a sin. The malice is essentially the same as that of untruthfulness (see 2395), for both the liar and the promise-breaker show themselves unreliable, the former because his words do not square with his mind and the latter because his deeds do not live up to his plighted word. Breach of promise, then, seems _per se_ to be a venial sin, though there are often circumstances (such as damage done) that make it mortal.
(b) If observance of the promise is not due even from fidelity, on account of the presence of some defect, there is no moral obligation to keep the promise and no sin is committed by not keeping it. The defects referred to are such as make the promise lack force from the beginning (e.g., if it was immoral or extorted by force), or deprive it of the force it had (i.e., inability on the part of the promisor or loss of right on the part of the promisee). The promisor is unable to keep the promise, if the thing promised has become physically impossible (e.g., he no longer has the strength or the means to perform what he promised), or morally impossible (e.g., the thing promised has become unlawful, or a notable change has taken place which, could it have been foreseen, would have prevented the promise). The promisee loses his right if the sole or principal reason that dictated the promise has ceased, or if the promise has become useless to the promisee, or if the promisor has been released, or if the promisee forfeits his claim by his own perfidy towards the promisor (see 2256 sqq., 1889).
2408. Definition of a Secret.—A secret is a matter (e.g., an invention, valuable information, concealed virtues, the fact that a crime has been committed) known privately by only one person or by so few that it is neither public property nor notorious. Moralists distinguish the following kinds of secrets:
(a) a natural secret, which is one that cannot be revealed without causing injury or annoyance to another, as when the revelation will harm a person in his reputation, honor, influence property. It is called natural for it arises from the very nature of the matter of the secret and not from any promise or contract.
(b) a promised secret, which is one that a person has promised, but only after he had already learned it, to guard inviolate. It makes no difference whether the promisor learned the secret from the promisee or from some other source;
(c) an entrusted or committed secret, which is one that a person promised (and before he learned it) to keep from others. The promise here is either implicit or explicit. An implicit promise of secrecy is one that is demanded by the confidential nature of communications between two parties (professional secret), as when physicians, lawyers, priests, parents, or friends are told of private matters on account of their position or relationship. An explicit promise is one that is given in express terms, as when A says to B: “I have a matter of great importance to tell you, but you must first promise that you will keep it secret”; and on B promising, A confides to him the secret.
2409. Sinfulness of Violating a. Secret.—A secret is the property of its owner, and to it he has a strict right; for if it is a good secret (such as an original idea or discovery), it is the product of his labor or at least a possession which he has lawfully come by; if it is an evil secret (such as a crime of which he has been guilty), it may not be made known without infringing on his right of reputation. It is no more lawful to violate the right to a secret than to violate the right to property, and, as there are three kinds of injuries to property, so there are three kinds of injuries to a secret.
(a) Thus, the right of possession is injured by those who by fraud or force or other illegal means deprive another of his secret (e.g., by secretly intercepting private letters, by making a person drunk in order to learn a secret).
(b) The right of use is injured by those who on acquiring knowledge of a secret guide themselves or others by it to the detriment of the owner’s rights.
(c) The right of disposition is injured by those who reveal a secret which they were obliged not to reveal.
2410. Prying Into Others’ Secrets.—To seek to discover the secrets of others is not lawful unless the following conditions are present:
(a) one must have a right to the knowledge. Hence, if there is question about a crime that has been committed or that is about to be committed, one has a right to investigate in order to prevent harm to public or private good; in war one may try to discover the plans of the enemy. But it is not lawful to pry into purely personal matters, to fish from others natural or confidential secrets which they are bound to keep, to steal from another the thoughts, plans, inventions, etc, which are his own;
(b) one must use only honest means to discover secrets to which one has a right (1504). Thus, it does not seem lawful generally to inebriate another in order to learn his secret, and it is certainly sinful to resort to lies or simulation or immorality.
2411. Reading Another’s Letters or Papers.—When is it lawful to read the letters or other papers of another person?
(a) This is lawful when the writings are not intended to be secret to anyone, as when a circular is meant for public use, when greetings are written on a postcard which all may read, and when a letter is left open and thrown away or otherwise abandoned. But a sealed letter, or one left open in a private room, or one lost in a public place, is secret. If a letter or manuscript has been torn up by its owner and thrown away on the street or other public place, it does not seem lawful to piece the fragments together and read the writing, for, though the paper has been abandoned, the owner by destroying it has indicated his will to keep the contents secret.
(b) It is also lawful to read the writing of others that are not secret as regards oneself, as when one has received a just permission from the writer to peruse a letter written by him, or when one may presume such permission on account of friendship with the writer, or when rule or lawful custom gives the superior of an institution the right to inspect the correspondence of his subjects. Exception must be made for exempted matter for which there is no permission, such as letters containing conscience matters and letters directed to higher religious superiors (see Canon 611).
(c) It is also lawful to read the writings of others that are meant to be secret, if one has a right to know what is in them: for in such a case the owner would be unreasonable if he wished to exclude one from the knowledge. Thus, the public authority (e.g., in time of war) has the right to open and read letters and private papers, when this is necessary for the common good; parents and heads of boarding schools may examine the correspondence of their subjects, though parents should respect conscience matter and others should not read family secrets; private individuals have the natural right, as a measure of self-defense, to read another’s letter, when there is a prudent reason for thinking that it contains something gravely and unjustly harmful to themselves (such as conspiracy, a trap, calumny).
2412. Lawfulness of Utilizing Knowledge of Secret.—One is said to use the knowledge obtained from a secret when one guides one’s conduct by the knowledge, doing or omitting what one would not otherwise do or omit. Is this use of a secret lawful?
(a) If there was a promise not to use the secret, such use is unlawful (see 2414). Breach of promise is then, in case of a merely promised secret, an act of infidelity at least, and in case of an entrusted secret an act of injustice. Thus, when one consults a professional person, there is a tacit understanding that the knowledge communicated will not be used against one’s interests or without one’s consent, and hence a lawyer would be unjust if, on learning in the course of work for a client that the latter’s business was not prosperous, he gave word of this to one of the client’s creditors.
(b) If there was no promise not to use the secret, the use of it is nevertheless unjust, if it infringes a strict right (e.g., to make money from a secret process on which another has a patent, to get knowledge of another’s information and plans through reading his letters and thereby to prevent him from securing a vacant position), or if it is equivalent to unjust revelation of a secret. The use is uneharitable if it harms another person without necessity (e.g., to take away one’s trade from a deserving merchant solely because one has learned that on one occasion he was accidentally intoxicated).
(c) If there was no promise to avoid use and no harm will be done by use, it is lawful to use a secret for a non-necessary good (e.g., to raise the price on one’s property when one accidentally learns through overhearing a secret conversation that the property is worth the higher price), and it is obligatory to use it for a necessary good (e.g., to assist a neighbor when one is told under secret that he is in dire need of one’s charitable help). Even though harm will result to another by use of the secret, use is not sinful if it infringes no right and could be sacrificed only at great inconvenience to oneself, as when one has discovered by one’s own industry some important truth in an art or science which another had previously discovered but had neglected to make his own by exclusive right, or when one learns under secret that another person is one’s enemy and has to be watched and avoided.
2413. The Sin Committed by Stealing or Unduly Using the Secret of Another.—(a) From its nature (cases of mere fidelity excepted) the sin is mortal, as being a violation of commutative justice or of charity. Injury to property rights, whether in goods or in knowledge, is violation of a strict right (see 1890, 1894). The sin is aggravated by the greater import of the secret or by the greater damages or displeasure caused.
(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter the sin may become venial, as when one thoughtlessly reads another person’s letters, or opens correspondence without authority, feeling morally sure that there is nothing confidential in it, or makes use of an unimportant secret without permission.
2414. The Obligation of Keeping a Secret.—(a) The natural secret obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for violation of it offends charity and justice by saddening and harming a neighbor. The sin may become venial on account of lightness of matter, as when little sadness or harm is caused.
(b) The promised secret obliges ordinarily under light sin only; for as a rule the promisor intends to obligate himself in virtue of fidelity alone (1888), and the obligation of fidelity, as said above (see 2407), is not grave. But exceptionally the obligation may be grave, as when the promisor intended to bind himself in virtue of justice and under grave sin, or when the secret is natural as well as promised.
(c) The entrusted secret obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for there is a duty of commutative and of legal justice to keep it, on account of the rights of contract and of the common good that are involved. The violator of an entrusted secret injures private good by disregard for contract, and he injures public good by weakening confidence in officials or professional persons to whom others must go for advice or assistance. Violation of a committed secret may be only a venial sin on account of the lightness of the matter. Thus, some think it is not a serious injustice to reveal a secret to one very discreet person, if the person whose secret is made known is not very much opposed to this and no other damage will result (see 2065).
2415. Comparison of Secrets as Regards Binding Force.—(a) The promised secret obliges less than the natural or the entrusted, as was said in the previous paragraph. (b) The natural secret obliges less _per se_ than the entrusted secret, for the safeguarding of the latter is agreed to in an onerous contract, while no engagement is made to keep the former. (c) Some entrusted secrets are more sacred than others. Thus, a secret confided from necessity is more binding than one confided without necessity; a secret one has sworn to keep is more obligatory than a secret one has given one’s word of honor to keep; a professional secret is more imperious than a private secret; a state secret is far more important than any secret of private individuals. The most inviolable of all secrets is that of the confessional, because its violation is always a sacrilege.
2416. Cases Wherein It Is Not Necessary to Keep a Secret.—(a) If there has been no obligation from the time the secret was learned, it is not necessary to keep it. Thus, if a merely promised secret was accepted under compulsion and revelation will be advantageous and not harmful, it does not seem necessary to keep the secret.
(b) If the obligation of the secret has ceased, it is not necessary to be silent. Examples are cases in which secrecy was promised only for a certain space of time, or in which a matter formerly secret has become public, or in which the owner of the secret wishes it to be divulged, or in which he has not kept faith with the possessor of the secret, provided of course that in these cases no injury or unnecessary harm is done by making known the secret. Similarly, if the recipient of the secret cannot keep it without grave harm (e.g., death) to himself, he is not bound by it, unless charity (see 1165, 1236) or justice calls for the contrary. Commutative justice would demand silence (though many make exception for a most grave reason, regarding a promise to the contrary as prodigal) if there had been an express contract to guard the secret at all risks; legal justice would demand it, if the safety of the republic were involved.
2417. Cases Wherein It Is Not Lawful to Keep a Secret.—(a) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the common good, it may not be kept, for legal justice requires that private good be subordinated to public safety. The violation of secrets is a harm to the public good and a greater harm than ordinary evils against the community (such as the escape of a guilty person); but it is a less harm than serious evils against the people (such as menace to public health, sedition, or treason). The possessor of a natural or promised secret must make it known at the command of lawful authority, as in court; but the superior has no right to question about entrusted secrets of a necessary kind, and this is usually recognized by positive law in the protection extended to professional communications.
(b) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good of the owner of the secret, distinction is made between a non-entrusted and an entrusted secret. In the former case the secret may not be kept, for charity bids one to help a neighbor escape a greater evil, and the owner of the secret would be unreasonable if he were opposed to its revelation (see 501 sqq.). In the latter case, some are of the opinion that the secret should be kept, if it is professional (since the public good then takes precedence over the private good of the owner of the secret), but this is denied by others. Example: Titus knows that Balbus is about to marry with a secret impediment that will nullify the marriage, but he cannot persuade Balbus to disclose this impediment to the pastor.
(c) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good of a third party (i.e., one other than the owner of the secret), distinction is made between cases, according as injury is or is not done by the owner of the secret to the third party. If no injury is done the third party, the secret should be kept (e.g., if one knows in confidence that Sempronius has made an invention which will supersede an invention made by Claudius, one is not at liberty to make this known to the latter, for Sempronius has done no injury to Claudius). If, however, injury is done the third party by the owner of the secret when the secret is kept, one should not keep the secret; for charity requires that one help an innocent person to escape from harm, even if this has to be done at the expense of harm to the guilty cause of the harm. Examples: If one knows as a secret that A, B and C have conspired to murder D tomorrow night, and one cannot otherwise prevent the murder, one should if possible break the secret, at least by sending warning to D that his life is in danger tomorrow night. If a doctor knows that a man who is about to contract marriage is syphilitic and pretends that he is sound, and if the doctor cannot persuade this man to make the facts known to the intended wife, the doctor himself should give notice to the woman, according to some authorities, unless the laws of the country forbid such use of professional knowledge.
2418. What should the possessor of an entrusted secret do, if from the secret he knows that the one who entrusted it is guilty of a crime for which an innocent third person is about to be convicted and sentenced?
(a) If the guilty party is responsible for the plight of the innocent party (e.g., because he falsely accused him or threw suspicion on him), natural law would require the possessor of the secret to make known the true state of affairs; for the guilty party is then the unjust cause of damage and is bound to accuse himself (see 1763). Revelation of the true culprit would not be necessary, however, if there was some other way of saving the innocent person.
(b) If the guilty person is not responsible for the difficulty in which the innocent person finds himself, not having used any means to bring the latter into suspicion, some believe that the secret should be kept, since the guilty person has then the right to keep his secret and therefore has also the right that his confidants keep it (see 1968). But others, while granting that the guilty person is not obliged to accuse himself, deny that the confidant is not obliged to accuse him; for the right of the guilty that his secret be kept and the right of the innocent that he be not deprived of life or liberty are in conflict and unequal, and he who prefers the former right does an injury to the innocent person (see 288).
2419. The previous question was concerned with an innocent third party. If the holder of the secret is also the accused, it seems he is not obliged, unless perhaps when he agreed to it, to prefer the inviolability of the secret to his own justification; for the acceptance of a secret does not mean that one binds oneself to grave hardship for its preservation (see 2418). The thing to do would be to warn the guilty person to escape in time, and then to exculpate oneself by making known the truth.
2420. Lawfulness of Revealing a Secret Learned by Stealth or Force.—Is it lawful, in order to avert some great evil, to use or reveal against the interests or wishes of its owner a secret which one has learned by stealth (e.g., by spying, eavesdropping, wiretapping, unauthorized inspection of papers) or by force? Various answers are given to this question, but to us the following seems the best:
(a) if the stealth or force would not be unjust here and now, because the owner of the secret has a duty to disclose it (e.g., on account of the public good, on account of the extreme need of a private person), or the other party has a right to seek after it (e.g., because he cannot otherwise defend himself against the unjust vexation of the owner of the secret), the answer is in the affirmative; for in such a case there is only applied the principle of lawful occupation or of lawful self-defense (see 1920 sqq., 1819). But if the stealth or force is excessive in its manner or productive of unnecessary harm, it is sinful and induces the duty of restitution, nor is there any right to make such use or such revelation of a secret as is sinful in itself (e.g., on account of calumnies, scandals, disorders);
(b) if the stealth or force would be unjust here and now, the answer is in the negative; for in such a case there is real theft of a secret, a person’s most intimate possession, and a continuation of the original injury by the use of the stolen property against its owner, or at least an unlawful conversion of property. Hence, if there is no grave or proportionate reason for the use of the secret, or if other and simpler methods can be employed, the secret may not be used. Those who play the detective ostensibly for other reasons but really for purposes of blackmail or other personal advantage, are therefore in the same class as thieves and are bound to restitution; their sin is _per se_ mortal, for secrets are usually esteemed more highly than money, and it would be seriously detrimental to the public weal if the practice of using secrets unlawfully obtained (e.g., by secretly taking down privileged communications or state secrets) were permissible.
2421. The Virtues of Affability and Liberality.—These two virtues, though they are not so important as those that preceded, are still most useful to human life (see 2143). Affability (friendliness, politeness) is a virtue which inclines a person to show himself in serious matters properly agreeable to others in order thus to fulfill a duty to society.
(a) Affability has for its object to be agreeable to others, that is, in looks, manner, words and deeds to treat them with kindness and consideration, and so to give them pleasure. Affability is more than mere civility, which avoids rudeness and observes necessary proprieties, but does not manifest a gracious spirit. The gentleman, according to Cardinal Newman (“Idea of a University,” Discourse viii, 10), is one who does not inflict pain and whose great concern is to make others at their ease and at home. The true gentleman is considerate for all his company, guards against unseasonable allusions or topics, is seldom prominent in conversation and never wearisome, makes light of his own favors, never speaks of himself except when compelled, avoids personalities and insinuations of evil, and is indulgent towards opponents.
(b) Affability is as agreeable as is becoming, or proper; that is, it observes the golden mean, attending to moderation and circumstances, suiting its deportment to the time, place, occasion, and persons and observing the recognized laws of etiquette for social, official, business, religious, domestic and other relations. Indeed, there are times when affability should not be shown, as when it is necessary to display severity and displeasure, or even to sadden others, for the sake of some higher good (II Cor., vii. 8, 9).
(c) Its purpose is to fulfill a social duty. Without affability the ways of life are made rougher and more difficult for all, and therefore, since man is a social being, it becomes obligatory that each one should so conduct himself towards others as to avoid the displeasing and to cultivate the pleasing. Thus, affability is less than friendship (see 1110), since it does not include special benevolence and is shown to friend and foe alike; but it is more than polish, for it consists not merely in external good manners but chiefly in an internal sense of responsibility to society and of deference to its requirements. Affability is at its best, however, when prompted by friendship and Christian charity. A modicum of courtesy, if accompanied by sincerity and goodness of heart, is more appreciated than profuse compliment and ceremony behind which there is little genuineness or little affection.
(d) Affability regulates conduct in serious matters, for the regulation of amusements or recreations pertain chiefly to modesty and falls under temperance rather than justice. Aristotle calls the virtue directive of games _eutrapelia_, which may also be called reasonable relaxation, urbanity, or pleasantness.
2422. Offices of Affability.—All, and especially the clergy, should practise courtesy, imitating St. Paul, who became all things to all men, in order to gain all to Christ (I Cor., ix. 22), and following his advice to be without offense to Jew or Gentile or to the Church of God (I Cor., x. 32). The offices of affability can be reduced to the negative and the positive, as follows: (a) the negative offices are the avoidance of excess (adulation) and defect (surliness); (b) the positive offices are the observance on special occasions of the appropriate forms and usages and on all occasions the exercise of a gentle and thoughtful regard for the feelings of others.
2423. The Sins against Affability.—(a) Adulation is the vice of those who in the effort to please others go beyond what is proper, of the complaisant man who aims to gratify by merely conventional or extravagant compliments, and of the flatterer who seeks to win favors for himself by expressions of fulsome admiration. Adulation is shown by exaggerated debasement of self (servility, obsequiousness), as well as by exaggerated exaltation of others (toadyism). The sin of adulation is not grave from its nature, being only an excessive will to please; but circumstances sometimes make it grave, such as its matter (e.g., when one compliments another’s sins, Is., v. 20), its effect (e.g., when the person flattered will be made proud), or its purpose (e.g., when the flatterer means to seduce the other person, Prov., xxvii. 6). Like to adulation in its exaggeration, but unlike it in manner, is the display of friendliness by offensive familiarity or boisterous conduct.
(b) Surliness is the sin of those who are ungracious in their manners, not because of hate or anger, but because of a desire to be unpleasant and to make others yield to themselves. The surly man is always ready to contradict or argue, he is hard to please, sensitive, sour in visage, gruff in words, and much given to complaint or sullen silence. Surliness is _per se_ worse than adulation but not a mortal sin; for it is farther removed from affability than adulation, but does not necessarily inflict a severe wound on charity. But the smooth palaverer is usually a more dangerous character than the morose man (Ps. cxl. 5). Like to surliness is the boorishness of those who from cynicism or laziness despise refinement, or from greed neglect proper manners at table. But entirely different from surliness is that dignity which can be reserved without being distant or hard of approach, and that seriousness which can be grave or silent without being ungracious.
2424. Liberality.—Liberality is a virtue that moderates the love of riches and inclines one in ordinary affairs to bestow one’s own goods upon others willingly, when and as right reason may dictate.
(a) It moderates the love of riches; that is, it makes one value and esteem money at its true worth. In this respect it pertains at least improperly to temperance inasmuch as the love of money is a passion. Liberality is thus distinguished from mercy and beneficence. These virtues are open-handed from charity, and give because another is in need or is loved; liberality, on the contrary, may be without charity and its bounty may be shown even to those who are not in need or who are not liked, for it is free in using money precisely because it does not prize external things excessively.
(b) It inclines one to bestow one’s own possessions, or freely to communicate them. In this respect liberality is assigned to justice, since its object is external things as owed by a certain moral debt to others. Since liberality consists primarily in a generous inclination, even the poor may have this virtue; in fact, the poor oftentimes, being less wedded to money, are far more disposed to liberality than the rich.
(c) It functions in ordinary affairs, for there is a special virtue of magnificence that makes wealthy men spend money lavishly in enterprise of the greatest moment.
(d) The beneficiary of liberality is another, for no special virtue is needed to make one use money freely for one’s own needs or comfort.
(e) Liberality bestows gladly, but according to right reason, for there is no merit in unwilling gifts, and no virtue in gifts bestowed unsuitably as to time, place, purpose, person, quantity, quality, etc. Liberality, then, is not inconsistent with prudence about temporal affairs, that is, with economy which adapts expenditures to income, with thrift which puts something by for the future, and with frugality which spares unnecessary expenses on self, especially in the matter of luxuries (see 1681 sqq.).
2425. The Importance of Liberality.—(a) Liberality is not the greatest virtue. It is less than temperance, for temperance regulates the passions in reference to the body, while liberality regulates them in reference to externals; it is less than fortitude and justice, which serve the common good, whereas liberality regards individuals; it is less than the virtues that are concerned with divine things, for liberality has to do directly with temporals.
(b) Liberality is one of the most useful of virtues since it disposes one to use money well in the service of God and humanity, and gives one an influence that can be employed for good (Ecclus., xxxi. 28). According to Aristotle, the virtues that chiefly attract fame are first bravery, next justice, and then liberality. Moreover, this virtue of generosity is one of the surest indexes of internal religion and charity, as being the natural expression of devotion and benevolence (see 2185, 1211), while miserliness is a sign of coldness towards God and man.
2426. Vice of Avarice.—The vice which is opposed to liberality by defect in giving is avarice, which, properly speaking or as distinguished from theft and robbery, is an immoderate desire, love or delight entertained in respect to external corporal goods, such as lands or money.
(a) The Absolute Malice of Avarice.—This sin is _per se_ venial, since it is only an excess in the love of a thing that is in itself indifferent and lawful; but it becomes mortal if the affection for money is so great that one is prepared to sacrifice grave obligations for its sake (e.g., to stay away from church rather than contribute to religion or the suffering poor). It is not merely carnal, since not concerned with bodily pleasure; nor merely spiritual, since riches are not a spiritual object; hence, it stands midway between spiritual and carnal vices.
(b) The Comparative Malice of Avarice.—In regard to deformity, avarice is not worse than other sins, but rather the contrary. The less the good to which a vice is opposed, the less the deprivation caused by the vice; and hence since external goods, to whose proper esteem avarice is opposed, are less important than divine or human goods, it follows that avarice is not so sinful as irreligion, homicide, theft, etc. In regard to shamefulness, however, avarice is worse than other sins. The less valuable the created good that a vice pursues, the more disgraceful the vice; and hence since the miser sets his heart on external things, which are the lowest of all goods, preferring them to goods of body and of soul (e.g., to health, education) and even to divine goods, he is rightly regarded as more contemptible than other sinners. Some forms of avarice, too, are more despicable than others. Thus, in some persons avarice shows itself in their fear to consume or expend for their own necessary uses (parsimony, penuriousness); in others it shows itself by an unwillingness to give to others (stinginess, niggardliness), or a willingness to live at the expense of others (sponging); finally, the most disgusting form of avarice is seen in those who cannot bear to part with their possessions either for their own sake or for the sake of others, and find their happiness in mere possession (miserliness). In regard to influence, avarice has a pre-eminence among sins that causes it to be numbered among the seven capital vices. A capital vice is one of the chief sources of evil attraction that produces other sins, and it is clear that immoderate love of riches is one of the most prolific of sins. All are drawn to happiness, and money seems to secure the requisites for happiness (Ecclus., x. 16); hence we see that for the sake of holding to money men become hard of heart (Matt., xxiii. 14; Luke, xvi. 21), for the sake of acquiring it they become carnal and restless in mind (Ecclus., xiv. 9; Matt., xiii. 22) and have recourse to deeds of violence (III Kings, xxi. 2), of deception (Acts, xxiv. 26), of perjury (Matt., xxviii. 12 sqq.), of fraud (Luke, xvi. 4 sqq.), and of treachery (Matt., xxvi. 15). Avarice is at the same time one of the most dangerous of sins, for it will lead a man to sell even his own soul (Ecclus., X. 10) and to commit any enormity (I Tim., vi. 9), and one of the most incurable, for the miser never has enough (Prov., xxx. 15, 16) and is always able to make believe that his avarice is prudence or some other virtue (Wis., xv. 12).
2427. Vice of Prodigality.—The vice opposed to liberality by excess in giving is prodigality, which is an insufficient regard for temporal things and an extravagant bestowal of them on others.
(a) It is an insufficient care for temporal things: that is, as the miser loves money too much, so the prodigal esteems it too little; as the miser is over-anxious to get and keep money, so the prodigal is careless about earning or saving.
(b) It is an extravagant bestowal of temporal things; that is, the prodigal gives more than he should, or else the circumstances do not call for his gift, as when he gives when or where or to whom he should not give.
2428. The Sinfulness of Prodigality.—(a) From its nature it is venial. The prodigal is not the absolute owner of his goods, but a steward who is held to administer them according to reason. But his sin is not grave, since it does not injure others and the goods of which he deprives himself are of the lowest kind.
(b) From its circumstances it may be mortal. Thus, it is made mortal on account of the purpose (e.g., extravagant presents made with a view to seduction or bribery), or the consequences (e.g., wastefulness which makes one unable to pay debts or assist a relative who is in grave need), or the special obligation of devoting superfluities to charity, as when one squanders the excess revenues of a benefice (see 1252).
2429. Comparison of Avarice and Prodigality.—(a) They are associable, for the same person may be both avaricious and prodigal, though in different respects (e.g., some persons are spendthrifts in giving money away, and are thus forced to be grasping to get money and ready to obtain it by any means, foul or fair). (b) They are unequal in malice. Prodigality is less sinful than avarice, because it is less removed from liberality, less harmful to self and others, and less difficult to cure. It is said that prodigality is the vice of youth, avarice the vice of old age.
2430. The Virtue of Equity.—The virtues that have been so far treated in the present Article are forms of particular justice, and they have the status of adjuncts or potential parts. We shall conclude the list of virtues grouped with justice by discussing equity, which belongs to general (legal) justice and has the rank of a subjective part (see above, 1635, 1636, 1745, 1701, 1704).
2431. Definition of Equity.—In law, equity is any court system of extraordinary justice in which the standard is natural honesty as declared by the conscience of the judge or by a body of rules and procedures that supplement or override the usual rules and procedures where these are too narrow or limited. Thus, in England and in the United States courts of equity are those that take care of defined special cases for which there is no remedy in the usual or common law courts (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, Sec.348). But as here taken equity is a moral virtue, and is of two kinds, particular equity which pertains to particular justice (natural equity) and general equity which belongs to legal justice (legal equity).
(a) Natural equity is a moral virtue that inclines one not to insist unnecessarily on one’s strict or legal rights when to do so will be unpleasant or burdensome to others. It is exemplified in the acts of an employer who freely grants a bonus to deserving employees in addition to the wage promised, and of a creditor who grants an extension of time to a hard-pressed debtor. This virtue partakes of both charity and justice; of charity, since it tempers justice with mercy; of justice, since it is really identical with the virtue of affability or friendliness mentioned above (2421). Its obligation as an act of justice is not grave, since the debt is not of a rigorous kind.
(b) Legal equity is a moral virtue that inclines one to justice beyond the common laws, or it is a correction of the law in that wherein the law by reason of its universality is manifestly deficient. The law is said to be deficient here when its application in a particular case would be prejudicial to the supreme purpose of law (i.e., to the common good or to equal justice). Some precepts of the natural law (e.g., the prohibitions against lying and adultery) cannot be deficient in this way and need no supervising equity. But other precepts of natural law, according to some (e.g., the command that a deposit be returned to the depositor), and also precepts of positive law are found to be unsuitable in exceptional cases. The reason for this defect in a good law lies in the nature of the case; for these laws must be made in view of what happens in the majority of cases, and accordingly they are couched in general terms and permit of exceptions which the lawgiver himself would allow (see on Epieikeia, 411 sqq).
2432. The Greatness of Legal Equity.—(a) It is a distinct virtue, since it inclines the will to do good and avoid iniquity in a matter of special difficulty. It is not a transgression of law, since it upholds the spirit when the letter departs from the spirit, and prizes the lawgiver’s intention to do what is just and right above the lawgiver’s words.
(b) It is a subjective part of common justice, since all that is contained in the concept of justice belongs to equity. Thus, it differs from the potential and integral parts of justice so far treated in Articles 5 and 6.
(c) It pertains to the species, not of particular, but of general or legal justice; for equity extends to all the virtues and is concerned with the debt owed to the common good. Thus, _per se_ its obligation is grave (see 1721).
(d) It is the higher part of legal justice. Just as prudence has two parts—good judgment (_synesis_), which settles ordinary cases of morals according to the usual rules of conduct, and acute judgment (_gnome_), which passes on moral problems that are out of the ordinary run—so legal justice has two acts, a lower which applies the law to usual cases, and a higher (equity) which applies more remote principles (viz., that the common good be not injured, nor injustice done) where the immediate principles of the law are clearly inadequate. Thus, if a madman demands from a depositary the return of his revolver in order to commit murder, the letter of the law would uphold the madman, but equity would decide against him; if the enemy are attacking a city and one cannot repel them except by disregarding an ordinance of the city, the law would forbid one to transgress the ordinance, while equity would command one to transgress it.
(e) Equity is, therefore, the noblest act of strict justice. For legal justice is preferred to particular justice (1703, 1715), and equity is the superior act of legal justice. In will and intention the common good and justice must take precedence over laws and statutes at all times; but in act the supreme ends of law are served, except in extraordinary cases, by obedience to law.
2433. The Complements of Justice.—To each of the various virtues correspond certain complements, namely, Gifts of the Holy Ghost, Fruits of the Holy Ghost, and Beatitudes (see 159).
(a) The Gift that corresponds to justice is piety, for, like justice, piety is exercised towards another, and moreover piety is the completion of the virtue of religion, the highest development of justice. This Gift is defined as “an infused habit that renders the soul well disposed towards God as its kind Father, and makes it quickly responsive to the Holy Spirit when He moves it to acts of filial affection towards God.” As the virtue of piety is shown to earthly fathers, so the Gift of Piety is shown to the Father in heaven: “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba, Father” (Rom., viii. 15). Religion honors God as Lord, piety as Father; filial fear reveres His majesty, piety His lovingkindness. And as a child tenderly loves all that belongs to a good father, so piety makes the soul rejoice and be glad in the things of God, in the Saints, the Scriptures, the practices of religion, and the like.
(b) The Beatitudes assigned here are the fourth (Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill), which agrees with justice, and the fifth (Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy), which is suitable for piety inasmuch as one who finds his love and joy in God as Father will be compassionate to the suffering creatures of God. Like justice, both of these Beatitudes are exercised in reference to the neighbor (see 164).
(c) The Fruits that seem most appropriate here are good will and kindness, which find a sweet joy in purposing and performing services for others. Like justice, these acts have reference to others (163); like piety, they see in their neighbors the children of the same heavenly Father. Thus, justice when alone is guided by prudence; it pays what is due to God as Lord, to man as neighbor; it acts perhaps with pain, but from a sense of duty. But when justice is supernaturally perfected, it is the Spirit of Piety which guides, and which makes one to see in God one’s Father and in man the child of God; even that which is not owed is given from mercy, and there is a hunger and thirst for justice; and in the payment of duty to others there is at last a joy found in the very difficulty itself.
2434. The Commandments of Justice.—The various precepts regarding justice are contained in the Decalogue. For justice consists in the fulfillment of duties towards others whether they be superiors, equals or inferiors. The Ten Commandments sum up these duties of justice; the first three prescribe the duties owed to God, the fourth the duties owed to human superiors, and the other six the obligations which man has to his equals or to all fellowmen.
2435. The order of the Commandments is most appropriate, for their purpose is to form man to virtue and to lead him to perfection, which consists in the love of God and neighbor (see 1118, 1553 sqq.), and they therefore outline first the service that is owed to God (Commandments of the First Table) and next the service that is owed to man (Commandments of the Second Table).
(a) The Commandments of the First Table lay the foundation of the edifice of justice, for they teach us that our first duty is to render to God the things that are God’s. We must avoid, therefore, the excess of superstition (Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me) and the defect of irreligiousness (Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord Thy God in vain); we must practise the virtue of religion (Remember thou keep holy the Sabbath Day).
(b) The Commandments of the Second Table begin with the duties owed to those to whom we are most bound after God, namely, parents, country, superiors (Honor thy father and thy mother). Next follow prohibitions against injuries done to any neighbor by deeds or words, whether the harm be to his person (Thou shalt not kill), or to those who are as one person with him (Thou shalt not commit adultery), or to a neighbor’s external corporal goods (Thou shalt not steal), or to his external incorporeal goods of fame and honor (Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor). Finally, there are prohibitions against thoughts or desires injurious to the neighbor, mention being made specially of those internal sins that are most common on account of the utility (Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods) or the pleasure (Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife) they afford.
2436. We shall not give here any special treatment of the Decalogue. Rather we refer the reader to the excellent explanations that are contained in Part III of The Catechism of the Council of Trent. Moreover, each of the Commandments has been treated in the present work, chiefly in the Articles on justice, and supplementary matter can be drawn from some others of its articles. For the sake of convenience, however, we give here a list of references, showing the passages of this Moral Theology in which the Commandments of the Decalogue are explained.
(a) Thus, for the First Commandment read on superstition (2274 sqq.) for the prohibitory part, on faith, hope and charity (746 sqq.) for the perceptive part.
(b) For the Second Commandment read on irreligiousness (2299) for the prohibitory part; on oaths, adjuration and praise (2245 sqq.) for the preceptive part.
(c) For the Third Commandment as to its natural precept, read on the virtue of religion (2145 sqq.); as to its positive precept, read on positive laws (340 sqq., 352, 425) and on the first Commandment of the Church (see 2575 sqq.).
(d) For the Fourth Commandment read on the virtues of piety, reverence, obedience and gratitude (2344 sqq.). Other matter will be found under charity (1158 sqq., 1211 sqq.) and under the duties of particular states.
(e) For the Fifth Commandment read on homicide, suicide, and bodily injury (1816-1871). Other matter will be found in the Articles on charity (1579 sqq., 1193 sqq.) and on affability (2421 sqq.).
(f) For the Sixth Commandment read on injustice (1719 sqq.), on restitution (1803), and on the virtue of temperance (2461 sqq.).
(g) For the Seventh Commandment read on commutative and distributive justice (1745 sqq.), on restitution (1751 sqq.), on injuries to property (1872-1938), on fraud (2121 sqq.), on liberality (2424 sqq.).
(h) For the Eighth Commandment read on judicial injustice (1939 sqq.), on unjust words (2009 Sqq.), and on truthfulness (2385 sqq.).
(i) For the Ninth and Tenth Commandments read on internal sins (230 sqq.), and on the malice of the internal act of sin (89-93).