CHAPTER V
The fighting round 174 Metre Hill—Capture of 174 Metre Hill and evacuation of Connecting Ridge—Fortifying 203 Metre Hill—Defence and capture of Extinct Volcano.
We had to work absolutely under the enemy’s very nose, mostly at night, although we took the opportunity of working in the daytime whenever the enemy’s fire slackened a little.
It was a good thing that the 5th Regiment had learnt something about trench-making, so that the officers, and even the non-commissioned officers, knew exactly how to go to work without any instruction from sapper specialists, of whom we did not possess a single man.
General Kondratenko did not propose recapturing the advanced hills, as they were not exceptionally important positions, and it would have cost us dearly to hold on to them.
After August 15, things were fairly quiet on our side, but bullets, and even shell, rather frequently passed over the quarters of the regimental staff. We had, therefore, to move them farther back, to a small river running along the road from the town towards 203 Metre Hill, and as a large mess tent would have been visible from a great distance, we decided not to pitch one.
The Japanese had not got off lightly in their attacks on the advanced hills, and their losses must have been reckoned in thousands. They lost particularly heavily in storming Height 426, where they stumbled blindly upon the wire entanglements and made repeated attacks. There were piles of dead heaped up round these entanglements. The fact must be noted that we were driven out of these positions by gun fire, and not by the Japanese infantry.
Events here made it clear to every one what preponderance in artillery really means. The side that silences the enemy’s guns can capture his positions without particularly hard fighting, for, having once got the enemy’s fire under control, one can choose a point of attack, concentrate the whole of one’s artillery on it, and then take it by storm with comparatively small numbers. For this, however, a numerous, well-trained, and efficient artillery is essential. To win a battle with badly trained or inefficient artillery is now a matter of extreme difficulty. I will not venture to lay down the exact proportion of guns necessary per 1,000 infantry, but there must be, at any rate, not less than 6 guns per 1,000 (i.e.one battery to each complete battalion).
What an error we committed in posting our artillery on the crests of the hills! The Japanese punished us very severely for the mistake, but it was too late then to change our dispositions.
The Japanese batteries were completely concealed, and fired on our skirmishers as deliberately as if they were at practice on their artillery ranges. They had a lot of work in front of them yet, of course,as we could still hold on to those positions we had spent some time in fortifying, and the 5th Regiment had yet many trying moments to live through.
Much had to be done on 203 Metre Hill in order to enable our troops to hold out under a veritably hellish fire, with which our gunners were powerless to cope.
From the capture of the advanced hills until the morning of August 19 we worked on our positions almost without molestation, the enemy devoting all his attention to 174 Metre Hill (See Map II.). Being convinced that the next serious attack would be made on that hill, we did all in our power to put it into a good state of defence. The left flank was covered by a wire entanglement, the front was strengthened by a 3-foot revetment, and the right flank had a double line of trenches, the upper tier of which was blinded.
On the top of the hill solid shelters were built for the gunners and a round trench was made, with a considerable number of blinded traverses, which were not, however, very solidly constructed.
The summit of the hill on the left flank (which we called the Connecting Ridge) was lined with trenches. On the reverse slopes of the hill a magazine, very solidly made, was constructed for gun and rifle ammunition, and cover was also provided there, sufficient for a whole reserve company. In rear of the hill (174 Metre Hill) there were four field mortars, and on the crest, for long-range firing, two long naval guns (I do not remember their exact calibre, but I think it was 150 mm.) with steel shields, in a well-constructed battery, and behind the crestfour field quick-firers. On the saddle between 174 Metre Hill and Connecting Ridge were Lieutenant Tsvietkov’s two quick-firers.
The garrison of 174 Metre Hill consisted of the 5th and 9th Companies of the 5th Regiment (about 300 men), while the 6th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Companies of the same, and one company of the 24th Regiment were on Connecting Ridge.
There were on Namako Yama at this time: on the left flank, the 1st Company of the 28th Regiment under Major Sakatski, the 11th Company of the 13th Regiment, the 5th and 6th Companies of the Kuang-tung Battalion, and the 12th Company of the 13th Regiment. It must be admitted that the trenches here were not sufficiently strong to afford much protection against the Japanese Shimose and shrapnel, and heavy losses were expected. But what could be done? We had neither the time nor the tools necessary to deal with that rocky soil, and thus to improve matters.
A battery had been placed on the top of 174 Metre Hill, instead of an infantry redoubt. This battery was in position before the 5th Regiment occupied the hill. I wanted to convert it into a redoubt, but my senior officers refused to sanction the proposal, as, in General Bieli’s[61]opinion, there was no other position for long-range guns. How much time and trouble we spent on completing this battery, while the real defenders had to crowd into the small unfinished trenches! I may add that the guns posted in this battery had a large area of dead ground, and drew on themselves the fire of the Japanese heavyartillery, which considerably interfered with our work. I was nearly killed by a shell bursting near me, and escaped by a miracle with no greater hurt than a blow in the side from a large clod of earth.
On the fall of the advanced positions the garrison of 174 Metre Hill had to live in the trenches, whereas before they had been encamped on the reverse slope of the hill. Field kitchens had been well built in a ravine, and others on the reverse slope.
The men lived in large field tents, and the officers in an improvised barrack, built of planks.
Strenuous efforts had been made to construct a road leading from the top of the hill, and an enormous amount of energy had likewise been expended in making roads to the principal hills—203 Metre, Namako Yama, and Akasaka Yama. To this end we had been working hard ever since the arrival of the 5th Regiment at 174 Metre Hill, at which time there existed only one small path over 203 Metre Hill.
CONSTRUCTING THE ROAD ON THE REVERSE SLOPE OF 203 METRE HILL.p. 116]
CONSTRUCTING THE ROAD ON THE REVERSE SLOPE OF 203 METRE HILL.p. 116]
CONSTRUCTING THE ROAD ON THE REVERSE SLOPE OF 203 METRE HILL.
p. 116]
By its fire, and by the posting of a detachment to prevent Height 426 from being outflanked from the left, 174 Metre Hill was a source of considerable annoyance to the Japanese, so, in attacking the advanced hills, they did not forget it.
On August 14,[62]at 4.15 a.m., the enemy opened a tremendous fire on 174 Metre Hill, and kept it up till 5 o’clock in the evening. On this day CaptainAndreiev, commanding the artillery on the hill, was wounded by four splinters.
At 1.15 a.m. on August 15 the enemy advanced on 174 Metre Hill from the front and from the left flank. Firing continued till 3.15 a.m., when the Japanese retreated, but a heavy bombardment broke out again at 4.30 a.m. and continued till 9 o’clock.
This bombardment was renewed at 4 p.m., continuing till 7 p.m. As a result some of our splinter-proofs were destroyed and also part of our trenches.
On August 16 the Japanese did not fire at all, possibly through want of ammunition, we ourselves taking advantage of the occasion to rebuild our trenches. About 9 p.m. desultory rifle fire broke out under the hill, and the enemy’s skirmishing line appeared about 1,200 paces away, while behind, in complete silence, marched the storming columns. The defenders of the hills threw down their digging tools, stood to their posts, and opened fire in volleys.
The storming columns moved away, now to the right, now to the left, and finally took cover in the defile on the left. This was at about 11 p.m., and our men sat in the trenches all night expecting another attack. We expended 12,000 rounds of ammunition.
On August 17 and 18 our men rebuilt the trenches under heavy rifle fire.
On the 17th the trenches were completed to the required profile, but a heavy bombardment was then opened on the hill. Our guns tried to answer the fire from the hills, but could not locate the batteries that were destroying them, and the Japanese soldiers only showed themselves when out of range. Ourfield guns were therefore put under cover, and I still regret that it was impossible to put those 150-mm. guns under cover as well.
On August 18 the firing upon the hill increased considerably in volume, and our trenches and splinter-proofs began to suffer severely. Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski, who was commandant of the hill, reported that he expected an attack, so I moved our reserves to 203 Metre Hill.
At night fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place round the base of the hill between the Japanese and our patrols who were forming the outpost line—a sure sign of a coming attack.
On the night of August 18–19 the Japanese moved in great strength up to 174 Metre Hill and lay down behind the crests of the nearest hillocks. Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski had the whole garrison on the alert, and opened fire as soon as the columns showed themselves over the crests beyond. The enemy made several attempts to come to close quarters, but without avail. On the alarm sounding, star-rockets were fired from 203 Metre and Division Hills, and our search-lights came into play for the first time. The scene was a terrible, but, at the same time, an exhilarating one. Discovered by the beams of light, the Japanese hastily retired over the crest, leaving a great number of dead in front of 174 Metre Hill. After several attempts they ceased their attacks, and the rest of the night passed in petty encounters and outpost skirmishes.
Early on the morning of August 19, just as day was breaking, I was awakened by a fearful cannonade. Running out of my room, I saw a pall of smokefrom bursting shrapnel hanging over 174 Metre Hill. In order to find out what was happening, I galloped over to Akasaka Yama. However, when I got there, I was no better off than before, so I went to the left flank of Namako Yama. A dense skirmishing line was advancing on the right of 174 Metre Hill, and lines of skirmishers and columns of troops were moving towards the centre, occasionally taking cover in the valleys and then again appearing on the ridges. The rattle of rifle fire from our companies on Connecting Ridge could be heard on the left flank. The main attack was delivered against the left of 174 Metre Hill, but it was not within my field of view. The lines advanced so skilfully that our guns were unable to range on them, though they suffered heavily from rifle fire. Orderlies with reports were galloping away from 174 Metre Hill.
In order to meet them, I again returned to Akasaka Yama, where Colonel Irman joined me.
Wishing to be at the centre of the hills attacked, and within easy reach of orderlies, we changed our position to a hillock situated between Namako Yama and Connecting Ridge. We also thought that this would be a favourable point for making observations, but, as a matter of fact, it was rather the reverse, because all shell falling “over” landed in this very locality. We posted the reserve (the 7th Company of the 28th Regiment) behind the left flank of Namako Yama.
From 203 Metre Hill we sent a telephone message to the officer commanding the artillery, directing him to concentrate every available gun on the slopes in front of 174 Metre Hill.
In a quarter of an hour our guns boomed forth, and shells of every size began to fall on the ground indicated by us. The Japanese gun fire smothered 174 Metre Hill, and a continuous stream of wounded flowed back towards 203 Metre Hill, where the chief dressing station was situated. This fierce bombardment continued until about four o’clock. We had lost heavily. The whole of the rear of the hill attacked was literally strewn with shell. I was rather badly hit in the left side by a stone thrown up by a bursting shell.
Seeing that the right flank of Connecting Ridge was the most probable point of attack (there was a good deal of dead ground from our guns in front of it), and that a very heavy artillery fire was now being directed there, I sent the 7th Company of the 28th Regiment, under Major Frantz, to stand in reserve behind it.
About four o’clock the firing reached its zenith. The Japanese advanced to the attack, not in columns but in large groups, but they failed to get up to the trenches. Hundreds of them were mown down, and it seemed to me that the attack had failed everywhere. What was our surprise, when we received a report from Major Astafiev, commanding the 10th Company,[63]that his half-company had been wiped out, save ten men, and that the Japanese had occupied his empty trenches during the attack. The remaining ten men, however, had not retreated (they were separated from the captured trench by a cliff), but had stuck to their trench. I then and theremade a mental vow that the deeds of these heroes should eventually be put on record in letters of gold as a perpetual memorial to the 10th Company, and I now redeem my pledge.
The trench occupied by the Japanese was under the cliff, and it was a very difficult matter to climb down into it. As we had no further reserves available, I sent to 203 Metre Hill for two half-companies (2nd and 4th of our regiment), hoping to drive the Japanese out of the trench with these men. I also sent to General Kondratenko for reinforcements.
Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski reported from 174 Metre Hill that the Japanese had run up one by one, had established themselves within a few paces of the trenches, and were throwing stones at our riflemen, who returned the missiles.
At about six o’clock we collected two companies of the 13th Regiment, and made an attack on about 100 Japanese then in the trenches of the 10th Company. The companies quickly reached the top of the cliff, but got no farther, as it was a big drop down below. The Japanese artillery, noticing them, at once opened a heavy fire, and as it thus became impossible to remain there in the open the companies retreated again into the valley.
At about seven o’clock General Kondratenko joined us, and four companies of the 13th Regiment arrived, the 2nd, 6th, 7th, and 9th, under the command of the battalion commanders Majors Goosakovski and Gavreelov.
We decided that the Japanese must be driven out of the 10th Company’s trenches, and, with that object in view, I reinforced these men, who had alreadyresisted several attacks, with one more company. The attack was repeated, but with the same result (it was a big jump down, right on to the bayonets of the Japanese, who were invisible from the top, while the guns from the heights beyond mowed down the attackers). This time half of the men lodged themselves behind stones on the top, and I now felt sure that the Japanese would not take the hill, as it would be very difficult for them to climb up the cliff. In order to minimize our losses from gun fire, I decided on a night attack, and sent one company, under Major Goosakovski, to carry it out.
I ordered back half a company of the 5th Regiment to its original position.
It transpired that the 7th Company of the 28th Regiment was not in its correct place, having for some reason retired behind 174 Metre Hill. I did not see when Major Frantz carried out this movement.
All this time the firing and bombardment on 174 Metre Hill continued, and our forces dwindled away rapidly.
Reinforcements being demanded, a Scout Detachment under Captain Osmanov, which had only just come up, was sent there. This detachment, with its commander at its head, steadily and quietly ascended the hill, five men excepted, who tailed off at the foot of the hill, evidently afraid to go on. I did not order them to ascend the hill, knowing from experience that the presence of a few cowards may unsettle the very bravest company.
The stream of wounded from the hill increased, and many of these poor sufferers expired while being carried across the shell-strewn ground. We sawone wounded man, who was being carried by two of our clerks, killed by a shell falling right on top of him. One of his bearers was killed too, but the other escaped as by a miracle. A large group of wounded now went past me, and behind them an officer on a stretcher. He was a very young gunner, and he kept waving his sword in a frenzy and muttering something. I do not remember what he said, as my attention was attracted by another stretcher, on which was an officer whom I thought I knew.
When the stretcher came close, I recognized in the wounded man Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski, who had been commandant of the hill. He was covered with blood and dust. A bullet had shattered his lower jaw and tongue, and another had struck his hand. He could not speak from loss of blood.
In his absence things might go badly on the hill.
This seasoned warrior had always shown extraordinary energy combined with method. He was nicknamed “General Fock” in the regiment, which for some reason displeased the real general, so, instead of commanding a regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski was given the command of the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment. General Fock never recognized the great spirit animating this man, which showed up so prominently in the defence of 174 Metre Hill. The old Colonel was indeed a far finer soldier than many of the younger ones.
He fearlessly walked about the hill, encouraging the men and directing their fire, closely following the movements of the enemy, and then, bringing up his small reserve just at the right moment, he scattered the thick columns of attackers like chaff before thewind by a few well-directed volleys. When the men wanted to take him to the dressing station, he said: “Leave me alone, my lads; I want to die with you.” With a heavy heart I accompanied the stretcher, fearing that a stray bullet or shell might end the career of this magnificent old soldier. But, thank God! he got safely across the pass to 203 Metre Hill, which meant that he was out of harm’s way. In his place I appointed Captain Bielozerov, commanding the 9th Company of the 5th Regiment, one of the bravest of our officers.
Towards evening more reinforcements were called for from 174 Metre Hill. The defenders were so worn out that they could not repair the damage done, which was considerable. The upper battery was destroyed, all the field guns were dismounted, and the gun-pits reduced to ruins. Nearly all the splinter-proofs in the trenches were destroyed, as well as half of the parapet. The whole of the overhead cover against shrapnel was also wrecked by shell fire.
It is difficult to defend such places without casemated works. On a hill commanded from all sides what can riflemen do against heavy artillery, and the high-explosive shell of field guns? During this day the 5th and 9th Companies of the 5th Regiment lost half their strength.
Gun fire slackened. The stream of wounded also ceased, and we breathed more freely. Our party on the central hillock was joined by some reserve officers, and eventually we even had something to eat.
Meat, bread, and hot tea were supplied to the men in the lines, and the field kitchen on the other sideof 174 Metre Hill, which had escaped untouched, got to work.
General Kondratenko brought up two more companies to the reserve and sent two companies of the 13th Regiment to the hill to work at the trenches.
We laughed at the Japanese who had taken the 10th Company’s trench, and must by now be feeling like rats in a trap. The half of the 1st Company of the 13th Regiment who had been left there, and the ten men of the 10th Company, prevented them from spreading along the trench, while in front their road was barred by those standing on the hill, so that it appeared inevitable that they must all be killed that night.
Meanwhile night had already fallen. The usual night firing had started between the outposts at the foot of the hills, and the resulting noise would cover the advance of our attacking companies. I sent to ask why the attack had not commenced, and was kept waiting for an answer for a very long time. The night was very dark. Everything was quiet, till now and again the enemy’s bullets, like birds of the night, hummed high overhead, or our star-rockets, strange hissing monsters, like fiery snakes shot up into the sky and burst into a thousand dazzling stars, brilliantly illuminating the dark hills and valleys.
“The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.” This proverb was exemplified in us and in our men. How many times have we not been witnesses of the truth of it! how many times have not the Japanese taken advantage of the utter exhaustion of our troops, fallen upon them when they lay asleep, and capturedimportant points in our position (as at Ta-ku Shan, Miortvaia Sopka,[64]and other places)!
We realize now what it means to defend a fortress lacking a main line of defence and having an insufficient number of permanently fortified positions. Now I can clearly see that open field works, even though prepared for some time in advance, and with trenches strengthened with glacis parapets (as Glinka-Yarnchevski proposed at one time), will not give the defenders facilities for sufficient rest; and rest is a very important factor.
We were so tired that day—a fact not to be wondered at—that we lay down where we were and went to sleep. Heavy rifle firing brought us to our feet again. Star-rockets shot into the air and lit up the place, and caused the firing to die down once more. We received word from those on the hill that they had been firing on the Japanese, who had destroyed some of the wire entanglements. There were not many of them, but they had nevertheless caused a good deal of damage, and then had crouched down near the line of wires. It was unfortunate that they had succeeded to such an extent. I sent orders for the damage to be repaired as far as possible, but I knew our men on the hill were handicapped owing to lack of barbed wire.
This barbed wire was literally worth its weight in gold, and I was always delighted when we succeeded in getting some for the defence of this or that point, but there was great need of it everywhere.
There were several of these alarms during the night, but all this time Major Goosakovski’s attack on the Japanese failed to come off.
However, I received a note at last, saying that he had decided to attack at daybreak.
Having quietly thought the matter out, I came to the conclusion that the Japanese might be left in the trench. These 100 men could not climb up and take the hill, which was defended by a whole company, neither could they be reinforced, as any reinforcements would be annihilated before they reached them. I told Colonel Irman, who was sitting near me, what I thought, and as he quite agreed with me, I sent an order cancelling the attack, and withdrew the companies, except the one behind the rocks, to a more sheltered spot between 174 Metre Hill and Connecting Ridge. One of these companies I placed in reserve behind 174 Metre Hill, so that there were now three companies in the reserve,i.e.at the immediate disposal of the officer in command on the hill. The two companies which had arrived in the evening I assigned to the general reserve. There were a few hours left till dawn, of which we took advantage to get some sleep, repairing to Namako Yama, so as not to be disturbed by the groans of the badly wounded men as they were being carried along the road.
Our bearers (bandsmen, regimental clerks, and volunteers from the town) sought them out during the night in the ravines, trenches, and ruined blindages,[65]and carried them to 203 Metre Hill.
Before the sun had risen, the enemy’s guns began their work of destruction, the worst of it being that they did it without receiving any punishment in return.
Little by little, rifle firing broke out. When it was quite light, the companies on Connecting Ridge noticed a Japanese battery coming into action at very close range. They opened fire in volleys, and the battery retired with heavy loss. Second-Lieutenant Bitzouk, who was for the second time wounded in the leg, was chiefly responsible for the destruction of this battery.
After this battery had retired, the infantry commenced their attack, and towards seven o’clock there was very heavy rifle firing.
All the company commanders on Connecting Ridge were placedhors de combat, and the three companies were commanded by Acting Ensign Agapov. I called for volunteers from the staff for the command of these companies, and in response to my call Lieutenant Vaseeliev and Second-Lieutenant Galileiev at once stepped forward.
At 8 a.m. General Kondratenko arrived, and found that everything was satisfactory. But the firing and bombardment had not slackened.
About 11 a.m. it was reported from the hill that the enemy was attacking from the left flank, and that Acting Ensign Shishkin had been killed.
I immediately telephoned to the officer commanding the artillery to again concentrate his fire on the valley in front of 174 Metre Hill, and soon our shells were streaming in the required direction. But still the Japanese guns vomited death.
A report now came in from the troops on the hill that their trenches were absolutely destroyed. They asked for not less than one company to reinforce them, as there were very few of the original defenders left. I myself saw that their last reserves had been used, and a long line of wounded streamed down from the hill, amongst whom was the new commandant, Captain Bielozerov. When brought to my vicinity, he was in a fearful condition; a bullet had struck him on the right side of the chest and passed right through, his shirt being soaked with blood. He passed quite close to me and whispered to me: “Send up a company at once. Put Second-Lieutenant Ivanov in command.”
Second-Lieutenant Ivanov was one of my bravest officers. When volunteers were called for to collect the wounded on Height 426, he said he would go with twenty-five men who had also volunteered under Lieutenant Alalikin of the battleshipPoltava. When they reached the Japanese outpost line, they saw that it was impossible for the whole detachment to get through, whereupon Second-Lieutenant Ivanov crawled through the enemy’s lines alone and found a wounded artillery non-commissioned officer, whom he hoisted upon his shoulder and brought back. On his way back he met Serpukov, a lance-corporal of the 9th Company, who had got through safely, and between them they carried the wounded man to their detachment, and thence to 174 Metre Hill.
I immediately sent an order to Second-Lieutenant Ivanov to consider himself in command on the hill.
The loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Leesaevski and Captain Bielozerov was irreparable. The latter wasa real hero. On August 20 there was a moment on 174 Metre Hill when the sections of the 28th and 13th Regiments[66]on the left flank wavered and turned their backs. Captain Bielozerov rushed in amongst the fugitives, and with a few impassioned words, pointing out to them the shame they would bring on their regiments, made them return to their posts. Captain Bielozerov was wounded when he sprang out of the trench to see where the enemy was and what he was doing.
It was only possible to hold the hill at the price of heavy losses, but we decided that it was worth it. Hence I resolved to go myself to the hill, and to send up our last reserves.
At this moment E. P. Balashov, the medical officer in charge of the hospital, rode up with his assistant, M. Tordan, a French subject, and accompanied by General Fock. These unexpected arrivals put new spirit into us.
We were all struck with the bravery and coolness of E. P. Balashov, who was a great favourite in the regiment. Bullets were whistling by in sufficient numbers to try the nerves of any man who had not previously been under fire, in spite of which our civilian general[67]and his companion did not appear to experience the slightest sensation of fear.
General Fock did not fail to give us his opinion on the position of affairs, and he declared that the hillmustbe held anyhow till nightfall. This was alreadyquite obvious to all of us. It is a very nasty thing to retreat by day under the fire of an enemy who is only a few paces off. But General Kondratenko expressed the wish to hold the hill for an indefinite length of time, notwithstanding the fact that it would be more than difficult to remain there under a hail of large and small shells without any cover from their murderous effect.
About twelve o’clock a rifleman ran down from the hill with a note from Second-Lieutenant Ivanov. He demanded immediate reinforcements, and as many as possible, saying that both officers and men were beginning to waver; hence it was obviously necessary to send up help at once.
I knew that Second-Lieutenant Ivanov would not ask for reinforcements without good reason. I reported this to General Kondratenko (we had one company left in the reserve), and it was decided to send the required reinforcements. But General Fock heard the order given, and fired up at our “inexperience.”
“What does this mean?” said he. “You want to hold on until nightfall, and yet you send up your last reserve?”
“It is absolutely necessary,” I answered.
“It is not at all necessary,” declared General Fock.
“All right, Nicholai Alexandrovitch,” said General Kondratenko, turning to me; “we will wait a little longer.”
I saw that General Fock’s assurance had overruled General Kondratenko’s judgment, and I had not the moral courage myself to contradict him and insist on the despatch of the last company, the more so, asColonel Irman, my immediate superior, did not give me any support.
About half an hour passed since the reinforcements had been asked for. Balashov and M. Tordan departed saying that they had had quite enough of it, and General Fock also rode off. Meanwhile the struggle grew fiercer and fiercer, and now the first signs of wavering became evident.
I noticed three riflemen running away from the hill, and three men without rifles behind them. I drew General Kondratenko’s attention to them, and he evidently realized his mistake, for he said to me: “Ah! now it is too late!” Then behind the second group of three men there quickly followed about twenty others, and soon an entire company poured down the hill after them.
On the hill itself men were running in all directions, like ants whose hill has been disturbed, but a group of about fifty men rushed into the upper battery, stood upon the breastwork, and fired straight down on the enemy below. In front of this group, holding his naked sword in his hand, I saw our Acting Ensign Shchenakin, and my heart swelled with pride for the 5th Regiment. All these men belonged to the 5th Regiment, and they had not lost hope of holding the hill, although every one else had fled.
At this moment the enemy opened a hellish fire on this group of heroes, wreathing the hill in clouds of smoke; the Japanese, by the way, never thought twice about firing over the heads of their own men. I did not see what was the end, for we all—General Kondratenko, Colonel Irman, and myself—galloped off to stop the retreat, and, though the task was notan easy one, we nevertheless succeeded. I placed the reserve near our central hill, and the troops who had retreated occupied a position in touch with this reserve, from Namako Yama to Connecting Ridge. A telephone message was sent off at once, ordering the artillery to direct as many guns as possible on 174 Metre Hill.
The yellow-caps had already shown themselves on the crest and opened a fairly heavy, though not very accurate, fire on us.
At this moment the crest of the hill was swept by such a terrific storm of our shells, that everything living was destroyed in a few seconds, and the Japanese did not dare to show themselves even after the firing had ceased.
It is a very difficult matter to hold ordinary field trenches against siege artillery placed at short range.
With the fall of 174 Metre Hill we saw that it was impossible to hold on to Connecting Ridge, which had, therefore, to be evacuated. General Kondratenko gave the order to do so, and then went home, as he was utterly worn out and could hardly stand, Colonel Irman going away with him.
Taking advantage of the fact that the Japanese did not dare to show themselves on 174 Metre Hill, I quietly withdrew the companies from Connecting Ridge, and posted them for the time being behind Namako Yama and Division Hill.
On August 19 and 20 the 5th Company lost 62 killed and wounded, about half its then strength. The 9th lost 120 men, and had only 48 left in the ranks. Our companies were the last to retreat.
Our losses during the defence of 174 Metre Hillamounted to 1,000 men, of whom about one-third were killed.
Considering that this loss was incurred chiefly on 174 Metre Hill and Connecting Ridge, where only four companies (800 men at the most) could act at a time, the loss of 1,000 men at one point will give some idea of the volume of fire developed at this spot by the Japanese.
If we had decided to retake the hill, it would not have been a difficult matter, but it would have cost us more than 500 men a day to hold it, as we should not have been able to reconstruct the trenches to keep pace with the amount of damage done day after day; my regiment would only have sufficed for four days, since, including the details from the 28th Regiment, our strength was no more than 1,800 men.
As is evident from the foregoing narrative, when necessity arose, units from other regiments were sent to me, but they were often required for other positions of the defensive line.
Besides 1,000 casualties, we lost 2 long 150-mm. guns, 4 field guns, 2 machine guns, and 4 field mortars. However, two of these were recaptured by us during the final attacks at the foot of 174 Metre Hill.
With the fall of 174 Metre Hill it became immediately necessary to strengthen the trenches on Division Hill, Namako Yama, Akasaka Yama, and 203 Metre Hill.
These trenches were far from complete, except those on 203 Metre Hill, where they were made with splinter-proofs and light cover from shrapnel shell, and were furnished with wire entanglements.
But our experience on 174 Metre Hill had taughtus how weak our earth-works were in comparison with the destructive power of the enemy’s shells, and so it was evidently necessary to strengthen considerably all the fortifications on 203 Metre Hill.
All this should have been done earlier, but want of tools and men had prevented us during the defence from working at any but the advanced positions. 203 Metre Hill was an exception, as, being one of the most important points if notthemost important, on the defensive line, it had received my special attention.
We had to set to work again night and day. This is what I proposed to do: to throw the four trenches on Namako Yama into one long trench the whole length of the hill; to make several communication trenches back to the rear of the hill, where splinter-proofs were to be built and tents erected for those defending the hill; to build kitchens and establish a dressing station at the foot of the hill close to the battery of long 6-inch guns; to construct a magazine for small-arm ammunition, shell, and cartridges, and also make a dug-out for the commandant. I furthermore proposed to convert the trench on the top of Akasaka Yama into a redoubt, and to make several trenches in front of it along the hill; to strengthen all the splinter-proofs on 203 Metre Hill; and to place solid timber baulks to hold up the head-cover, so that the splinter-proofs would remain standing, even though the parapet was blown away.
We set to work on our task the first night after the capture of 174 Metre Hill.
The troops on the positions occupied by us were disposed as follows: On Division Hill, the 5th, 7th,and 11th Companies of the 5th Regiment, with the 2nd and 3rd Scout Detachments of the 5th Regiment and the 9th Company of the 27th Regiment, under Major Beedenko. On Namako Yama, two companies of Marines, under our own officers, Afanaisev and Siedelnitski, both companies under the command of Lieutenant Shcherbachev; the 7th Company of the 28th Regiment and the 2nd Scout Detachment of the same regiment, under Major Sokkatski; also one company of the 13th Regiment and the 9th Company of the 5th Regiment.[68]A section of Marines defended Extinct Volcano. On 203 Metre Hill, as before, there were the 2nd and 4th Companies of the 5th Regiment, and I had three companies of the 4th Reserve Battalion in reserve. All worked at night, and slept during the day.
We were very much stronger now that our defensive line was so much smaller, and I no longer feared sudden attacks. But the following regrettable incident again disturbed my peace of mind.
Early on the morning of August 23, I was awakened to hear a report that the Japanese had taken Extinct Volcano in the night.
EXTINCT VOLCANO: TAKEN FROM THE RIGHT FLANK OF NAMAKO YAMA.p. 136]
EXTINCT VOLCANO: TAKEN FROM THE RIGHT FLANK OF NAMAKO YAMA.p. 136]
EXTINCT VOLCANO: TAKEN FROM THE RIGHT FLANK OF NAMAKO YAMA.
p. 136]
I would not at first believe it, as the firing must have been heard, and the night had passed absolutely quietly.
When I said so to the orderly, he told me that there had been no firing, as the Marines had been caught asleep.
It turned out afterwards that they were not asleep, but were working, and had been taken by surprise because they had failed to put out outposts. ExtinctVolcano had two trenches on it—one near the foot, for a half-company, and the other on the crest, for a section. Three days before, I had sent half a company of Marines to this hill for work and defence.
Owing to their ignorance of outpost work, they had put out no standing sentries by night, but were content with a few sentries on the trenches themselves.
Noticing their negligence, a small body of Japanese had crept up to the drowsy sentries, surprised them, and sprung into the trench.
Our Marines only grasped the situation when the majority of them had already been killed. The remainder fled to the upper trench, where there was one sub-division of riflemen (I do not now remember to whom they belonged—possibly the 7th Company of the 28th Regiment, as they occupied the right flank of Namako Yama). The Japanese ran up behind them and burst into the trench at their very heels, thus taking Extinct Volcano without noise or firing.
Major Zimmermann—a hero in the true sense of the word—in command on Namako Yama, hearing what had happened, immediately organized a counter-attack, and when the men had somewhat recovered themselves, set them an example by rushing forward with drawn sword. The soldiers followed him to a man, and Extinct Volcano was retaken. Unfortunately, Major Zimmermann was wounded in the arm and breast, and had to relinquish his command.
Ten minutes after the recapture of the hill, the enemy’s artillery opened a terrific fire on it.
By this time I had reached the scene of action,having with me one of the reserve companies, which I ordered to remain on the site of the former bivouacs of the regimental staff, near the graves of Colonel Petrov and Major Schiller.
Reaching the top of Namako Yama, the nearest point to Extinct Volcano, I saw that the yellow-peaked caps were on its summit. This meant that the enemy’s fire had driven us off the hill, which proved, indeed, to be the case.
I sent a report to that effect.
At this moment Colonel Irman arrived with his adjutant, and told me that he had sent for three companies from the general reserve.
But at least an hour would pass before they could arrive, and in that time the enemy would be able to dig himself in, and it would be very difficult to drive him out again.
We therefore decided to attack the hill without delay, and with this object I ordered the 1st Scout Detachment to come to me immediately (it was stationed near Fort Yi-tzu Shan). Everything was quiet there, and I felt I could withdraw troops from that position without the fear of any hostile attacks.
Colonel Irman telephoned to the officer commanding the fortress artillery to open fire on the top of Extinct Volcano with as many guns as he could get to bear.
Our guns thundered out, and a hail of shell swept the top of the hill. In a moment the hill was wreathed in smoke, and the yellow-peaks disappeared.
In order to see what was happening on the reverse side of the hill, I went into a ravine in front ofthe left flank of Division Hill. Our cannonade continued.
Just as I reached my new point of observation, I had a very alarming experience. I heard the shriek of a heavy shell over my head, and a moment later it fell about 10 paces from me; the earth shook from the deafening reverberation of the explosion, and I was thrown heavily to the ground, covered with sand and lumps of clay. It was some time before I recovered from the shock and could continue my way.
This was due to one of our own 11-inch guns on the coast forts. It was laid on the hill occupied by the enemy, but the shell dropped near me—by no means the first instance of our coast-defence guns giving us an unpleasant surprise. An 11-inch shell once landed in the 6th Company’s trench on Division Hill. Luckily, there were no serious consequences from these mishaps.[69]
On reaching the left flank of Division Hill, I found that the valley was not visible to me. I shouted up to Division Hill, telling those there to inform me if there was anything to be seen behind Extinct Volcano, and soon received the answer that there were no hostile troops in the valley.
The Japanese, however, caught sight of me from their trenches and lost no time in firing at me, which was pleasant indeed. They even started shelling me with their field guns; they had, seemingly, an enormous supply of rifle and gun ammunition, and certainly used it freely.
When I returned to Colonel Irman, our scouts had already arrived, and we decided to attack without delay. The scouts, with one company from the reserve (the 5th of the 27th Regiment), were to advance directly on the hill, while one company from the garrison of Namako Yama moved from the flank. It was a hard climb up the high steep hill, and continued for some time without the enemy firing a shot, our guns meanwhile sweeping the summit. When, however, the scouts got close up, and likewise the company from Namako Yama, our guns ceased firing, upon which the yellow-peaks immediately again crowned the hill.
The companies rushed forward. They reached the parapet under a very heavy fire, but went no farther, and lay down near it among the hollows in the ground.
The opposing forces were so close to each other, that they could easily throw stones across. The yellow-peaks took cover behind the parapet, and our men began to throw stones, as there was no possibility of reaching them with bullets. The Japanese replied in like fashion, and this continued for some time.
We were quite accustomed to rifle and gun fire, and it did not have much effect on us now, but this stone-throwing produced a most childish impression; it was annoying to think that there was not one man sufficiently brave to show his comrades an example by mounting the parapet, and the whole procedure appeared futile to one anxiously awaiting an assault.
Eventually our men stopped throwing stones, and were evidently preparing for a bayonet charge.
Several men dashed forward—an officer and some non-commissioned officers.
“Now, God with you!” said I to myself. “At last they have pulled themselves together and are swarming over the parapet.”
The yellow-peaks showed for a moment over the crest of the parapet, then they were hidden by our fellows, and with a wild “Hurrah” our companies poured into the trench. Then all was silent.
“They’ve got it,” said Colonel Irman.
“Yes, we had it once before,” I answered, “but nothing came of it, as their artillery drove us off again. I reported Major Zimmermann’s success that time; but now we will wait and see.” I had scarcely finished speaking, when the Japanese began to sweep the top of the hill with fire from their heavy artillery.
We felt that nothing could be achieved until these cursed guns were destroyed. But, forced to husband their ammunition, our artillery hardly put up any fight against the hostile batteries.
Shells of every calibre literally covered the top of the hill, but our men did not come out of the trench. It seemed strange indeed, as there were no splinter-proofs in the small trench, and such a fire must destroy all the defenders.
Ten minutes passed and there was no sign of movement. Another ten minutes and no retreat.
At last the enemy’s artillery ceased fire.
“Now,” I thought to myself, “the hill is ours.” But a Japanese soldier with a flag suddenly appeared on the parapet.
“What’s the meaning of that? Surely our menare not all killed?” But it was practically so. The few that were left broke their way through to Namako Yama. And the Japanese stood on the parapet and waved his flag.
Just then reinforcements came in sight—a scout detachment of some regiment. At their head was Lieutenant Evstratov, a strongly built, tall, fair fellow with a reddish beard. The men marched quickly and joyously; but there were not more than eighty of them.
“How is it you are so few—they promised me three companies?”
“Here are the three companies, Colonel,” said the Lieutenant.
“Where?” I asked.
“Here,” and he pointed to his men. “These are worth more than three companies!”
We decided to add another small detachment that came up behind the scouts, and attack as before, sending yet another company from Namako Yama on the flank. We accordingly sent an orderly to Namako Yama with the necessary instructions. The men who had just arrived did not know the ground, so I took them on to the hill myself, and went with them until they could all see how and where they were to attack.
Our artillery again opened fire on Extinct Volcano, and we saw the man with the flag jump down from the parapet, while the summit of the volcano was wreathed in smoke from our bursting shells. We were evidently getting our revenge. After this I returned to Colonel Irman.
There were very few attackers, and we impatientlyawaited reinforcements, but none arrived, and already the scouts had nearly reached the top, and firing had commenced. The officer leapt on the parapet and fired at some one with his revolver. All his men followed him, and lay down on the glacis without jumping down into the trench. Obviously the Japanese were there.
No reinforcements had yet reached us. I could not stand it, and ran to a hill lying behind us to see if the companies were coming up, or if they had halted anywhere.
To reach this hill I had to run across a fairly broad ravine. As I went down into it, I heard the Japanese firing on the hill, and as I reached my point of observation I saw the reinforcing companies hurrying towards us.
I returned to Colonel Irman with the good news, but he soon put a damper on my spirits. “It’s no good now, our men are all killed by shell fire.” Looking towards the hill, I saw nothing but the dead bodies of our gallant comrades.
The reserve companies reached us completely tired out. Colonel Irman and I could not help acknowledging that it was now impossible to retake the hill.
Having come to this conclusion, Colonel Irman sent a report to that effect to General Kondratenko.
I heard afterwards that that splendid officer, Lieutenant Evstratov, was wounded by a fragment of shell and died in hospital.
Extinct Volcano remained in the hands of the Japanese, and the piles of bodies, both Russian and Japanese, served for the rest of the siege as a reproach to our gunners, who were not strong enough to preventthe enemy from coming into action at decisive ranges.
The defence of this hill was shorter than that of 174 Metre Hill; of course, there were reasons for this. In the first place, the top of the hill was ten times smaller than that of 174 Metre Hill, the trenches only accommodating one section; and, secondly, there was not a single splinter-proof on it, and the line of trenches was beyond our general line of defence, and had a certain amount of dead ground in front.
Our riflemen had no cover from artillery fire, and if they did not retreat, were destroyed to a man. But if we gave up this hill to the Japanese, we hoped that they would not occupy it, because our artillery could sweep them off, as theirs did our troops when we were in possession. However, it did not turn out so.
When we told our gunners to drive the Japanese from this hill, they answered that they had very few shell and must keep them for more important targets.
So the Japanese held our trenches unpunished, and repaired them, making communication trenches and cover from our bullets.
Colonel Irman gave me the companies that had come up at the finish for strengthening the defences on Namako Yama, and they were badly needed by me.
What an enormous influence one man, whether officer or private, can have on the issue of a battle!
In many battles I have noticed and studied the psychological effect produced on an ordinary man who is brought face to face with death.
The desire to escape from the danger threateninghim is so great, that he is scarcely able to exhibit the strength of will of even the average individual.
Overcome by this feeling, a man loses his power of weighing circumstances, and he either acts from force of habit, or else follows the example of his commander or his neighbour. (This is a well-known phenomenon, but it is brought home only to the man who has been among soldiers during a fight.) Now, supposing this neighbour loses his head and runs, there are very few who will not follow his example; the average man will take to his heels too, his neighbour follows him, and so on, until the whole detachment is retreating in disorder.
A disorderly retreat is always started by one man, and in most cases this man is physically weak and sometimes, though rarely, an obvious funk. Therefore it is essential to recruit soldiers from men who are physically strong, for almost every weak man will be a cause of retreat and, consequently, of defeat. A hundred picked men are preferable to two or three hundred weak ones, even though the latter are equally well trained.
I would add that men must learn how to husband their strength. On a long march fatigued soldiers are worse than useless. So I say that we must discard most of what our soldiers now carry in their knapsacks, and retain only the following articles: 1 shirt, 1 pair of trousers, 1 pair of putties, 1 pair of socks, a ball of lint, a butter-tin, some needles and thread, and sugar for two days. All the other things are absolutely superfluous. Have your supply columns perfect; but the soldier must go as light as possible, and must, moreover, look smart, so that an enemywill not dare to call him a “ragged beggar.”[70]Make a soldier so smart that even a sloven will become a rather fine-looking fellow. A smart outward appearance raises the spirits of the troops.
It is also indispensable to teach the infantry soldier field fortification thoroughly, so that he becomes the equal of a sapper and needs no supervision in war time. In the 5th Regiment, not only the non-commissioned officers, but the men also, could point out where trenches should be constructed, and of what depth and length they should be.
Our men blamed the sappers for making trenches with elbow rests, as they knew by experience what the loss of that width of earth meant along the firing line. They said that the sappers did it because they had not themselves been under shrapnel fire, and did not know how to take aim from behind cover.