CHAPTER VIII
Making good damages, and strengthening and supplementing the works on the various hills.
The following morning (September 24) the damage done to our trenches and batteries was thoroughly surveyed, and we at once eagerly set to work to renew those that had been ruined, and to complete those left untouched.
Several bomb-proofs had been shattered by heavy shell, while some had collapsed owing to the shells striking the parapet on which the baulks supporting the roofs rested.
The trenches themselves were so very shallow that one could not stand upright in the blindages. General Fock, who also came to the hill to inspect the works, was very much dissatisfied. He gave orders that the trenches should be deepened to 7 feet (the ground was solid rock), and the overhead cover of the blindages strengthened by a thickness of stone sufficient to render them proof against heavy shells (3½ feet stone and 14 inches earth); that the 6- and 8-inch beams holding the roofs should be supported on 8-inch uprights; that a bomb-proof should be made for the commandant and officers, and for the sergeant-major and the non-commissioned officers; that the battery on the rightflank should be made into a redoubt; that a redoubt should be hewn out of the rock on the left flank and supplied with an inner ditch, 3 feet deep, with vertical sides; and that an abattis of wire entanglements should be constructed in front of it, and bomb-proofs with iron roofs inside it.
Throughout this day wagons containing every kind of material made their way to 203 Metre Hill. Workmen swarmed on the hill like bees, but the enemy did not disturb us by a single shot.
I was glad to find that two sapper officers were placed under my orders—Major Gemmelmann, and Ensign Yermakov, a capable and practical man. I detailed the latter to supervise the work in progress on the top of 203 Metre Hill.
His idea was to resort to blasting, and I was in complete accord, as our digging tools were almost worthless in the hard rocky soil.
I had already drawn the trace of a redoubt for one company on Akasaka Yama, the soil of which was similar, and had put Major Mousious there with his company to make it.
I gave orders for the existing trenches on False Hill to be bent back so that the slopes of 203 Metre Hill could be swept by fire from the south-west. Everywhere work was being pushed forward at top speed.
Paralysed by their defeats, the Japanese showed no signs of life for three days. During these three days the hundred or so of Chinamen whom we employed were unable to collect all the bodies, and it was hardly possible to breathe on 203 Metre Hill from the overpowering stench. The bodies of theJapanese remained in the ravines near the hill until the very end of the siege.
I had succeeded in obtaining some hundreds of poods of barbed wire, and with this I hoped to be able to render 203 Metre Hill impregnable against all ordinary attacks. The work became interesting to the whole garrison, and especially so to the 5th Regiment, whose honour was bound up in the fate of that bloodstained height.
After the September attacks had failed, we had a fairly quiet time in my section of the defence, and my first thought was to give the companies occupying 203 Metre Hill every opportunity of resting.
We replaced them with others, and the defenders were quartered near the headquarters of the staff. O God! I shall never forget the sight they presented as they descended the hill. Emaciated, ragged, and so caked with dirt that it was impossible to see the colour of their faces, but in splendid spirits nevertheless. All the companies had lost at least two-thirds of their strength in killed and wounded. Colonel Irman and I took it in turns to compliment and praise them. There were only 70 of my men left. On my recommending some of them for St. George’s Crosses, I received the ironical reply from General Fock that “out of 70 men I had recommended half for rewards.” General Fock forgot, of course, that these 70 represented one-third of the original strength, and that there had been more than 200 of them originally[93]on 203 Metre Hill.
Seeing that the Japanese had become quite listless,we began to work openly by day. This made things much easier for us everywhere, and especially on Akasaka Yama and the left flank of Division Hill.
Almost the whole of the 27th Regiment was placed under my orders for the manning of our defensive positions and fighting line, which were, on the whole, very weak. As they did not come all together, but arrived by companies, they were posted on different hills, as were also companies of other regiments which were sent up at various times.
By General Kondratenko’s orders the 5th Regiment was distributed over all the hills, in order to render the defence more stubborn.
Leaving us in comparative peace, the Japanese began to bombard the town on September 24, and it became dangerous to walk about in it.
Our central forts also had begun to suffer from the enemy’s gun fire. We constantly saw big shells bursting near Forts Yi-tzu Shan and Ta-an-tzu Shan.
* * * * *
From the beginning of September it began to get cold at night, and we had to think of making winter arrangements for the troops. Again we had to collect material and carry it on to the position, but how could our horses do this work without fodder? It was not good for the men either to be without meat. We had had no beef from September 10, and were eating nothing but horse-flesh.
In the summer the men could be quartered in the actual fighting line; officers and men slept in the open air in their trenches, or in tents pitched in safe positions behind the trenches. But this was impossible in the winter. So, by my orders, warmbomb-proofs (of the type shown in Plate No. II.), designed by the company commanders themselves, were constructed in the trenches. We had also to make closed-in places for the company kitchens, and, lastly, we had to have baths, as the men were beginning to suffer greatly from vermin.
PLATE IITYPES OF TRENCHES WITH OVERHEAD COVER ON A VERY STEEP SLOPE IN ROCKY SOIL[p. 199
PLATE IITYPES OF TRENCHES WITH OVERHEAD COVER ON A VERY STEEP SLOPE IN ROCKY SOIL[p. 199
PLATE IITYPES OF TRENCHES WITH OVERHEAD COVER ON A VERY STEEP SLOPE IN ROCKY SOIL
[p. 199
We wanted an enormous number of sand-bags for completing the trenches, and barbed wire for making entanglements. Our regimental supplies of material and tools had, therefore, to be augmented, and we had also to hunt about for carpenters.
The gunners were appealed to for help to bring up everything needed on to the positions, and in response they gave us several dozen four-horsed wagons.
Thanks to the short rest and peace that reigned in our section, both officers and men somewhat recovered their spirits. On various pretexts officers began to collect at the staff headquarters and in the quarters of the officer commanding the western front.
Various rumours, exaggerated of course, were recounted, the probable intentions of the Japanese were discussed, and interesting anecdotes related; in a word, we were all in the best of spirits in spite of the meagreness of our table, which boasted little more than horse-flesh and horse-radish.
With what zest did we not devour that bitter root! There was plenty of vodka and wine to be had, but I hardly ever saw any one drunk.
The enemy now turned all his attention to our centre,[94]and the roar of gun and rifle fire rolled downto us continuously from that quarter. I often, during my tour of inspection round the positions, saw curling puffs of smoke from bursting shrapnel over the forts in the centre.
It was not by any means pleasant in the town. Shells fell not only on the houses, but on the hospitals. A shell bursting in the town wounded our Paymaster, Lieutenant Frost, in the face and head, Second-Lieutenant Bobirev in the head, Father Vasili slightly in the head, and Captain Felitzin also. I therefore ordered the horses to be picketed on the left flank, near the staff of the 28th Regiment, as it was unsafe to leave them in their old places on Red Hill. The advantage of the strong bomb-proofs which I had made for the reserves behind Red Hill, and on the right flank in front of the naval barracks, in the very heart of the town, was now apparent.
On October 1 we learnt that the enemy had brought up 11-inch howitzers. This was serious news for us. One could feel that 203 Metre Hill was practically safe against 6-inch projectiles, but 11-inch were a very different matter. I had thought that the enemy would never be able to take 203 Metre Hill and Akasaka Yama. What was to be done now?
Colonel Irman and I thought long and earnestly over this difficult question, but we could see only one solution—to delve deeper into the rock. We decided to do so, hoping that the accuracy of the 11-inch howitzers would not be very great, though I must acknowledge that I did not put much faith in this supposition. Report said that the 11-inch shells were coming from behind Feng-huang Shan, which wasonly 5 versts from our positions, and I knew what our long 10-inch guns could do at 10 versts.
That evening a large number of officers gathered in the staff headquarters, officers of all arms being present, among whom there was much discussion and talk about the 11-inch howitzers. Finally they comforted themselves with somebody’s remark that Port Arthur would not be taken by one 11-inch gun.
Thereupon some began to protest against such an argument. “Why do you think,” they said, “that the Japanese have only one 11-inch gun, and not a dozen?” “Because it would be a very difficult and long business to bring them up and put them in position; and besides, where would they get them from?” “Then where have they got the 700,000 men from, instead of the 350,000 we gave them credit for?” This question was unanswerable.
* * * * *
The Japanese had made no move for some time, but now they again began to show signs of activity. It was October 3; on 203 Metre Hill our men were sitting round the samovars,[95]which they had placed on the road, and were cleaning their clothes and mending their boots, which had suffered sadly on that stony ground. I went to the upper redoubt, where I found that good progress had been made, thanks to the successful blasting. Only a short time ago we had made the trace[96]of the redoubt, and now it was fully capable of defence. The drainage and water-supply systems on the top of the hill were nearing completion. Colonel Doubeedi, of theNaval Construction Department, who had at my request been detailed to supervise the construction of the fortifications in my section, procured for us many tools and much material. He had obtained a steam-engine and pipes for pumping up water, and promised that in a week there would be a tank on the hill with as much water as was needed; and, judging by the present rate of progress, this seemed very probable.
That night our sentries reported that great numbers of the enemy were working between Saddle Hill and Namako Yama, and when I came to look next morning I saw an unbroken line of trenches, revetted with sand-bags, stretching from Saddle Hill to Namako Yama. On a not far-distant hillock, lying to the west, I noticed a short length of trench, also revetted, and the enemy was apparently working at it from both sides. It was a sap!
From three points of the trench between Akasaka Yama and Saddle Hill the Japanese had begun to make passages for sapping operations. Hurrah! the enemy had had enough of direct attacks and was going to undertake regular siege works against our trenches.
I went from 203 Metre Hill to Akasaka Yama. Good progress had been made there, and now it was possible to live in the trenches, and a stubborn defence might be reckoned on. From Akasaka Yama I had to cross over to Division Hill. This had to be done as quickly as possible, as the Japanese always fired on men crossing in the open, and the need of a communication trench between those points was becoming very pressing. I was verytired after my tramp through the trenches, and by the time I reached the 7th Company on Division Hill I was panting for breath. All the enemy’s works against my section were to be clearly seen from here. Every hill and mound that were so familiar to me were crowned with Japanese trenches. They had closed in towards us considerably, and the approaches between the front and rear lines of trenches were plainly visible. Behind Extinct Volcano I saw a typical sap with traverses, leading straight up towards the left flank of Division Hill. Through my glasses I could actually see the men at work.
I explained the significance of these works to officers and men on all the hills, and ordered the former to call for volunteers and make sorties, to destroy the sap-heads and the men working in them; in this way I gave full scope to Russian enterprise, which I always encouraged in every way I could think of.
The capture of Namako Yama made intercommunication along the rear of our positions extremely difficult. Now we had to construct a regular network of communication trenches, entailing very heavy work. I was fortunate in having Major Gemmelmann, Ensign Yermakov, and Lieutenant Fetter with me to assist me with my field fortifications.
It was not necessary for me now to point out the position of each trench, for our officers fully understood the end and object of sappers’ work, and were themselves competent to undertake it.
The fearful effect of small hand grenades demonstratedto us the necessity of having a store or magazine of them, so Colonel Irman applied to General Kondratenko, who lost no time in giving the necessary orders.
Lieutenant Melik-Porsadanov was ordered to construct a melinite factory, and was given the necessary men for working it. In a few days we were able to test the efficiency of this factory. Before, however, we utilized its products, our gunners proposed that they should fire some of these small shell at the enemy from their mountain guns, using time fuzes. Some hundreds were immediately supplied to them, with instructions in their use. They were distributed among the gunners in the advanced positions.
From this time, in the evenings, we set to work to devise a means of replacing the slow-match in the grenades by some kind of firing mechanism. Our miners showed the highest inventive powers and thought out and tried several excellent designs. It is a pity that they took such a long time to make, as Bickford’s slow-match remained to the end of the siege practically the only method of ignition. The soldiers, as was natural, were all for having grenades that would burst on impact.
A grenade with a slow-match is a very imperfect weapon. One has only to put oneself in the place of a rifleman, almost face to face with the enemy, lighting the slow-match of the grenade in a wind. The match is blown out—he lights another; but the enemy is all the time climbing up closer and closer. At last the slow-match catches, the grenade is thrown amongst the enemy, in a second there is a fearfulexplosion, and the foe has disappeared. There is nothing left but a pall of black smoke, and over it, high into the air, fly scraps of clothing and portions of human bodies—arms, legs, and heads. That is roughly the effect of a 5-lb. pyroxylin bomb. Our men give a shout of “Hurrah!” and the survivors of the stupefied enemy fly headlong down the hill and hide in their trenches. But it sometimes happens that the slow-match goes out, or the bomb bursts after the enemy has passed it. For the future, before the outbreak of war, some kind of practical mechanism must be fitted to pyroxylin and melinite grenades.
On October 19 our gallant Colonel Irman rode into the staff quarters wounded in the thigh. I had told him times out of number not to expose himself in the trenches.
Whilst going from one trench to another on False Hill he had had a good lesson for the future! Thank God! the bullet did not touch the bone. He was a very brave man, our Colonel, but somewhat foolhardy, and as the officer commanding the whole of the western front of the defensive line he should have been more careful.
I was nearly always with him, and formerly it was most exceptional for me to be on one of the positions without him. But as time passed, it became evident that one of us must always be near the telephone at our headquarters, so that orders could be passed along without a moment’s delay.
The first section of the western front was mine, but as other sections under Colonel Irman’s command were as yet out of reach of the enemy’s firehe made his headquarters within the circle of my section, and when the enemy compelled me to move my headquarters to a less dangerous spot, I had them placed in line with the headquarters of the officer commanding the western front, which was altogether a better arrangement.
After the 27th Regiment had occupied Akasaka Yama and the companies of the 4th Reserve Battalion were distributed over various parts of the defensive line, they began to send sailors into the reserve. They were very fine men, these sailors, but where patience, forbearance, and knowledge of infantry tactics are essential, they should never be sent, as they are then worse than useless.
For instance, the left redoubt on 203 Metre Hill was occupied by some sailors. Tea-time came, and the sailors, under the very eyes of the enemy, left the redoubt one by one and descended the hill without even posting sentries. I do not remember what I wanted, but I had sent an orderly to the redoubt. A minute later he came hurrying back, fully understanding the danger of the situation, and reported: “There is no one at all in the redoubt, sir!” Of course I sent some men of the reserve there at once, and sent all the naval officers—who refused to believe that their men could have been capable of such folly—after the sailors.
I had a lot of trouble with the sailors. Sometimes they had no kettles, sometimes they had no warm clothing and had to be supplied from the regiment, at other times they were tired and wanted rest, and so on, and so on; but they were splendid fighters, especially if they were led by good officers.
However, now we had to consider what was to be done about the Japanese saps, gradually lengthening in our direction. After careful inspection we found that they had made the following: against 203 Metre Hill, parallels from the west and north; a long approach from beyond Namako Yama, right across the valley; against Division Hill at some distance from it, several separate parallels.
About two days after the construction of the parallels under 203 Metre Hill we noticed several sap-heads, the parapets of which were made entirely of sand-bags; apparently the rocky nature of the soil made it impossible to dig down deeply.
About two days later the approaches under 203 Metre Hill were plainly visible. There were five of them—two from the west and three from the north.
From the rear of Extinct Volcano one approach had been made towards the left flank of Division Hill. Thanks to the use of sand-bags made of straw the enemy got on fairly quickly. Sometimes more than a sagene (7 feet) was made in a night.[97]We carefully watched their progress.
Sorties on a small scale, organized by the commandants of the hills, were made to try to hinderthe work. We also decided to ask General Kondratenko from time to time to order all the howitzers in the fortress to concentrate their fire on those points where the enemy was making headway with his sapping operations. This would have been excellent if the fire of the howitzers had been more accurate, but we ourselves sometimes suffered from their bad shooting. We were particularly afraid of the large naval guns, whose shells frequently fell inconveniently near us. However, they caused the enemy, too, a good deal of annoyance. It was unfortunate that, owing to the scarcity of ammunition, they were not able to keep up a continuous fire. If work on the saps was noticed by day, we kept up a heavy rifle fire on the sap-heads. The bullets evidently penetrated the sand-bags, as the enemy stopped putting them up, and only began work again, with much caution, when firing ceased. In order to prevent them from working at night, I ordered supports to be made for the rifles, which were laid with the greatest care on the sap-heads, and all night firing was kept up from these rifles. On General Fock’s advice we clamped the rifles down with sods and earth so that they could not move out of position.[98]
As we could use our field guns with effect against the sap-heads on the left flank of Division Hill, I obtained one gun and placed it on the top of Division Hill, absolutely screened from the enemy’s view, and opened fire on the head of the sap. The third shot struck it fairly, and, scattering the sand-bags,opened up the trench inside. In about three days the excellent practice made by this gun compelled the enemy to stop working that sap altogether, and I felt in consequence considerably easier in my mind about Division Hill. But the sapping proceeded surely and steadily round 203 Metre Hill. Our sorties were the only effective means of checking the work.
I forgot to mention our successful sorties against the saps on the left flank of Division Hill. We had there our 1st Scout Detachment and the 3rd, 7th, and 12th Companies of the 5th Regiment. Our Scouts under Acting Ensign Elechevski, a fine officer of our regiment, made two very successful sorties, besides several rather fruitless ones. On each occasion the Japanese were annihilated by grenades and bayonet charges, and their earth-works demolished. After these sorties, and the excellent firing of my field gun, no further progress was made with that sap; but the firing from Extinct Volcano and Namako Yama gave us no rest. In order to secure the left flank of Division Hill, and to afford means of communication therewith, we had to dig trenches in rear and communication passages at least 2 versts in length. The work was carried out under Lieutenant Kostoushko (who was my orderly officer towards the latter end of the siege) with only a limited number of men. It was very heavy work. Owing to the carelessness and indifference to danger of our men never a day passed without some casualties.
During the first weeks of October the Japanese made themselves very strong opposite our centre(Fort Erh-lung, and West Pan-lung Redoubt, and the valley of the Lun-ho), and, as with us on 203 Metre Hill and Akasaka Yama, rifle firing there did not cease day or night, and Japanese shell from every kind of gun fell constantly round the positions.
When making my inspections, I often watched the enemy’s movements against our central positions from Division Hill. I had an excellent view of the ground in front of Forts Erh-lung and Sung-shu. On one occasion I observed something very interesting and instructive, which I will now describe.
While selecting a position for a field howitzer and one quick-firing gun on Division Hill, I went over to the extreme right flank and saw in front of me the following picture. Forts Erh-lung and Sung-shu were literally swept by a storm of shell, and from the ravines below great masses of Japanese infantry were climbing up towards the forts in question, and we could clearly see their lines of skirmishers on the open ground. This movement was apparently unnoticed from Forts Erh-lung and Sung-shu, but from Fort Yi-tzu Shan everything must have been visible quite plainly.
“Why,” I thought to myself, “does not Fort Yi-tzu Shan fire?” I asked the question by telephone, and was informed in reply that ammunition was scarce in the fort and had to be reserved exclusively for beating off assaults. I immediately gave orders for fire to be opened on the enemy advancing on Fort Erh-lung.
WATCHING A BOMBARDMENT OF FORT ERH-LUNG. COLONEL IRMAN IS SHOWN ON THE RIGHT IN A FUR CAP, AND GENERAL TRETYAKOV ON HIS RIGHT.p. 210]
WATCHING A BOMBARDMENT OF FORT ERH-LUNG. COLONEL IRMAN IS SHOWN ON THE RIGHT IN A FUR CAP, AND GENERAL TRETYAKOV ON HIS RIGHT.p. 210]
WATCHING A BOMBARDMENT OF FORT ERH-LUNG. COLONEL IRMAN IS SHOWN ON THE RIGHT IN A FUR CAP, AND GENERAL TRETYAKOV ON HIS RIGHT.
p. 210]
Fire was opened, and I had the pleasure of seeing that our shells compelled the Japanese skirmishers to take cover in the folds of the ground. After thisour firing ceased and the lines again came out and began climbing up towards the fort and the battery.
I gave orders for the firing to be renewed, but received the answer that all ammunition had been expended and more would not arrive before nightfall, even if sent for immediately; and this when the Japanese had already got almost up to the glacis and had begun digging themselves in right under the eyes of all our artillery.
Surely, under such circumstances, this was absolutely irrational. If they had only had some ammunition at Fort Yi-tzu Shan, the Japanese would have been swept away from the ground in front of Fort Erh-lung like dust before a broom, as there they were within short range of our guns. In reality, however, they were in an untenable position, facing as they were the heavy long-range guns in Fort Erh-lung, and being enfiladed from Fort Yi-tzu Shan, which was also well armed. In consequence of a similar economy in gun ammunition they had also been left in undisputed possession of Namako Yama and Extinct Volcano.
Report has it that great numbers of shell were taken after the surrender of the fortress, so why was the enemy allowed to remain, unmolested by artillery, in positions close up to our lines?
It is true that the heavy guns on Fort Ta-yang-ku North did on several occasions damage the Japanese trenches on Extinct Volcano, but a continuous fire should have been directed at this hill, so as to prevent the enemy from attacking the left flank of Division Hill and firing at our men in the communication trenches in rear.