fig 18IN RUHLEBEN CAMP. A SPECIMEN BOTH OF THE PRISONER-ARTIST'S WORK AND OF THE TYPES ABOUT HIM.
At Ruhleben there was a hospital which in spite of many representations was never in proper shape. In addition, there was in the camp a special barrack established by the prisoners themselves for the care of those who were so ill or so weak as to require special attention but who were not ill enough to be sent to the hospital. This barrack was for a long time in charge of a devoted gentleman, a prisoner, whose name I have unfortunately forgotten, but whose self-sacrifice deserves special mention.
I arranged with the camp authorities and the German authorities for permission to enter into a contract with Dr. Weiler. Under this contract Dr. Weiler, who had a sanatorium in the West of Berlin, received patients from Ruhleben. Those who were able paid for themselves, the poorer ones being paid for by the British Government. This sanatorium, occupied several villas. I had many disputes with Dr. Weiler, but finally managed to get this sanatorium in such condition that the prisoners who resided there were fairly well taken care of.
An arrangement was made between Great Britain and Germany by which civilians unfit for military service were sent to their respective countries, and just before I left I effected an arrangement by which all civilians over forty-five years old, with the exception of twenty who might be held by each country for military reasons, were to be released. I do not know whether this arrangement was actually carried out in full. With the lapse of time the mental condition of the older prisoners in Ruhleben had become quite alarming. Soldier prisoners, when they enter the army, are always in good physical condition and enter with the expectation of either being killed or wounded or taken prisoner, and have made their arrangements accordingly. But these unfortunate civilian prisoners were often men in delicate health, and all were in a constant state of great mental anxiety as to the fate of their business and their enterprises and their families. In 1916, not only Mr. Grafton Minot, who for some time had devoted himself exclusively to the Ruhleben prisoners, but also Mr. Ellis Dresel, a distinguished lawyer of Boston, who had joined the Embassy as a volunteer, took up the work. Mr. Dresel visited Ruhleben almost daily and by listening to the stories and complaints of the prisoners materially helped their mental condition.
The Germans collected all the soldier prisoners of Irish nationality in one camp at Limburg not far from Frankfurt a. M. These efforts were made to induce them to join the German army. The men were well treated and were often visited by Sir Roger Casement who, working with the German authorities, tried to get these Irishmen to desert their flag and join the Germans. A few weaklings were persuaded by Sir Roger who finally discontinued his visits, after obtaining about thirty recruits, because the remaining Irishmen chased him out of the camp.
I received information of the shooting of one prisoner, and although the camp authorities had told Dr. McCarthy that the investigation had been closed and the guard who did the shooting exonerated, nevertheless, when I visited the camp in order to investigate, I was told that I could not do so because the matter of the shooting was still under investigation. Nor was I allowed to speak to those prisoners who had been witnesses at the time of the shooting. I afterwards learned that another Irishman had been shot by a guard on the day before my visit, and the same obstacles to my investigation were drawn about this case.
The Irishmen did not bear confinement well, and at the time of my visit among them many of them were suffering from tuberculosis in the camp hospital. They seemed also peculiarly subject to mental breakdowns. Two devoted Catholic priests, Father Crotty and a Brother Warren from a religious house in Belgium, were doing wonderful work among these prisoners.
The sending out of the prisoners of war to work throughout Germany has had one very evil effect. It has made it to the financial advantage of certain farmers and manufacturers to have the war continued. The Prussian land owners or Junkers obtain four or five times as much for their agricultural products as they did before the war and have the work on their farms performed by prisoners of war to whom they are required to pay only six cents a day. When theTageblattcalled attention to this it was suppressed for several days.
At many of these so-called working camps our inspectors were refused admission on the ground that they might learn trade or war secrets. They succeeded, however, in having the men sent outside in order that they might inspect them and hear their complaints. There were in Germany about one hundred central camps and perhaps ten thousand or more so-called working camps, in summer time, throughout the country. Some of the British prisoners were put to work on the sewage farm of Berlin but we succeeded in getting them sent back to their parent camp.
The prisoners of war were often accused of various breaches of discipline and crimes. Members of the Embassy would attend these trials, and we endeavoured to see that the prisoners were properly represented. But the Germans often refused us an opportunity to see the prisoners before their trial, or even before their execution. The case of Captain Fryatt is in point.
Captain Fryatt who commanded a British merchant ship was captured and taken to the civilian camp at Ruhleben. In searching him the Germans claimed that he wore a watch presented to him for an attempt to ram a German submarine. They, therefore, took Fryatt from the Ruhleben camp and sent him to Bruges for trial. When I heard of this I immediately sent two formal notes to the German Foreign Office demanding the right to see Fryatt and hire counsel to represent him, inquiring what sort of counsel would be permitted to attend the trial and asking for postponement of the trial until these matters could be arranged. The German Foreign Office had informed me that they had backed up these requests and I believe them, but the answer of the German admiralty to my notes was to cause the trial to proceed the morning after the day on which my notes were delivered and to shoot Fryatt before noon of the same day.
As to the evidence regarding the watch, the British Foreign Office learned that, when captured, Captain Fryatt had neither a watch nor any letter to indicate that he had tried to ram a submarine!
This cruel and high-handed outrage caused great indignation in England, and even in certain circles in Germany; and the manner in which my request was treated was certainly a direct insult to the country which I represented. In conversation with me, Zimmermann and the Chancellor and von Jagow all expressed the greatest regret over this incident, which shows how little control the civilian branch of the government has over the military in time of war. Later on, when similar charges were made against another British sea captain, the Foreign Office, I think through the influence of the Emperor, was able to prevent a recurrence of the Fryatt outrage.
As I have said, many of the camp commanders in Germany were men, excellent and efficient and kind hearted, who did what they could for the prisoners. It is a pity that these men should bear the odium which attaches to Germany because of the general bad treatment of prisoners of war in the first days of the war, and because certain commanders of prison camps were not fitted for their positions.
The commander at the camp at Wittenberg was replaced, but the Germans have never acknowledged that bad conditions had existed in that camp. Shortly before we left Germany the war department seemed to gain more control of the prisoners of war situation, and on our representations at least one camp commander was permanently relieved. If examples had been made early in the war of the camp commanders who were not fit for their places and of those who had in any way mishandled prisoners of war, the German people as a whole would not have had to bear the burden of this odium. The many prisoners will return to their homes with a deep and bitter hatred of all things German.
The British Government took a great interest in the British prisoners in Germany. Nothing was omitted and every suggestion made by me was immediately acted on; while many most valuable hints were given me from London as to prisoners' affairs. Their Majesties, the King and Queen, showed a deep personal concern in the welfare of the unfortunate British in German hands; and this concern never flagged during the period of my stay in Berlin. Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Newton were continually working for the benefit of British prisoners.
At a time when the British prisoners were without proper clothing, the British Government sent me uniforms, overcoats, etc., and I hired a warehouse in Berlin as a distributing point; but, after some months, the German authorities refused to allow me to continue this method of distribution on the ground that it was the duty of Germany to provide the prisoners with clothes. But Germany was not performing this duty and the British prisoners had to suffer because of this German official woodenheadedness.
In the spring of 1916, quite characteristically, the Germans broke their "treaty" concerning visits to prisoners, and refused to permit us to speak to prisoners out of hearing. Von Jagow told me that this was because of the trouble made among Russian prisoners by the visits of Madam Sazonoff, but this had nothing to do with the arrangement between Great Britain and Germany.
I think that the Germans suspected that I had learned from fellow prisoners of the cruel and unnecessary shooting of two Irish prisoners at Limburg. It was not from prisoners, however, that I obtained this information. but from Germans who wrote to me.
In addition to the English and Japanese, I had the protection of the Serbian and Roumanian subjects and the protection of the interests of a very small country, the Republic of San Marino. Soon after the Serbians and Roumanians appeared in the prison camps of Germany we made reports on the condition and treatment of these prisoners, as well as reports concerning the British.
I was able to converse with some Serbians, in the first days of the war, in their native tongue, which, curiously enough, was Spanish. Immediately after the persecution of the Jews in Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella and other monarchs, a number of Spanish Jews emigrated to Serbia where they have remained ever since, keeping their old customs and speaking the old Spanish of the time of Cervantes.
The German authorities, in the most petty manner, often concealed from me the presence of British prisoners, especially civilians, in prison camps. For a long time I was not informed of the presence of British civilians in Sennelager and it was only by paying a surprise visit by motor to the camp at Brandenburg that I discovered a few British, the crew of a trawler, there. It was on information contained in an anonymous letter, evidently from the wife of some German officer, that I visited Brandenburg where the crew of this trawler, deprived of money, were without any of the little comforts or packages that mitigate life in a German prison camp.
At the commencement of the war for some days I was cut off from communication with the United States; but we soon established a chain of communication, at first through Italy and later by way of Denmark. At all times cables from Washington to Berlin, orvice versa, took, on the average, two days in transmission.
After the fall of Liège, von Jagow sent for me and asked me if I would transmit through the American Legation a proposition offering Belgium peace and indemnity if no further opposition were made to the passage of German troops through Belgium. As the proposition was a proposition for peace, I took the responsibility of forwarding it and sent the note of the German Government to our Minister at the Hague for transmission to our Minister in Belgium.
Dr. Van Dyke, our Minister at the Hague, refused to have anything to do with the transmission of this proposition and turned the German note over to the Holland Minister for Foreign Affairs, and through this channel the proposition reached the Belgian Government.
The State Department cabled me a message from the President to the Emperor which stated that the United States stood ready at any time to mediate between the warring powers, and directed me to present this proposition direct to the Emperor.
I, therefore, asked for an audience with the Emperor and received word from the chief Court Marshal that the Emperor would receive me at the palace in Berlin on the morning of August tenth. I drove in a motor into the courtyard of the palace and was there escorted to the door which opened on a flight of steps leading to a little garden about fifty yards square, directly on the embankment of the River Spree, which flows past the Royal Palace. As I went down the steps, the Empress and her only daughter, the Duchess of Brunswick, came up. Both stopped and shook hands with me, speaking a few words. I found the Emperor seated at a green iron table under a large canvas garden umbrella. Telegraph forms were scattered on the table in front of him and basking in the gravel were two small dachshunds. I explained to the Emperor the object of my visit and we had a general conversation about the war and the state of affairs. The Emperor took some of the large telegraph blanks and wrote out in pencil his reply to the President's offer, This reply, of course, I cabled immediately to the State Department.
For the President of theUnited States personally:10/VIII 14.1. H. R. H. Prince Henry was received by his Majesty King George V in London, who empowered him to transmit to me verbally, that England would remain neutral if war broke out on the Continent involving Germany and France, Austria and Russia. This message was telegraphed to me by my brother from London after his conversation with H. M. the King, and repeated verbally on the twenty-ninth of July.2. My Ambassador in London transmitted a message from Sir E. Grey to Berlin saying that only in case France was likely to be crushed England would interfere.3. On the thirtieth my Ambassador in London reported that Sir Edward Grey in course of a "private" conversation told him that if the conflict remained localized betweenRussia--not Serbia--andAustria, England would not move, but if we "mixed" in the fray she would take quick decisions and grave measures; i. e., if I left my ally Austria in the lurch to fight alone England would not touch me.4. This communication being directly counter to the King's message to me, I telegraphed to H. M. on the twenty-ninth or thirtieth, thanking him for kind messages through my brother and begging him to use all his power to keep France and Russia--his Allies--from making any war-like preparations calculated to disturb my work of mediation, stating that I was in constant communication with H. M. the Czar. In the evening the King kindly answered that he had ordered his Government to use every possible influence with his Allies to refrain from taking any provocative military measures. At the same time H. M. asked me if I would transmit to Vienna the British proposal that Austria was to take Belgrade and a few other Serbian towns and a strip of country as a "main-mise" to make sure that the Serbian promises on paper should be fulfilled in reality. This proposal was in the same moment telegraphed to me from Vienna for London, quite in conjunction with the British proposal; besides, I had telegraphed to H. M. the Czar the same as an idea of mine, before I received the two communications from Vienna and London, as both were of the same opinion.5. I immediately transmitted the telegramsvice versato Vienna and London. I felt that I was able to tide the question over and was happy at the peaceful outlook.6. While I was preparing a note to H. M. the Czar the next morning, to inform him that Vienna, London and Berlin were agreed about the treatment of affairs, I received the telephones from H. E. the Chancellor that in the night before the Czar had given the order to mobilize the whole of the Russian army, which was, of course, also meant against Germany; whereas up till then the southern armies had been mobilized against Austria.7. In a telegram from London my Ambassador informed me he understood the British Government would guarantee neutrality of France and wished to know whether Germany would refrain from attack. I telegraphed to H. M. the King personally that mobilization being already carried out could not be stopped, but if H. M. could guarantee with his armed forces the neutrality of France I would refrainfrom attacking her, leave her aloneand employ my troops elsewhere. H. M. answered that he thought my offer was based on a misunderstanding; and, as far as I can make out, Sir E. Grey never took my offer into serious consideration. He never answered it. Instead, he declared England had to defend Belgian neutrality, which had to be violated by Germany on strategical grounds, news having been received that France was already preparing to enter Belgium, and the King of Belgians having refused my petition for a free passage under guarantee of his country's freedom. I am most grateful for the President's message.WILLIAM, H. R.
For the President of theUnited States personally:
10/VIII 14.
1. H. R. H. Prince Henry was received by his Majesty King George V in London, who empowered him to transmit to me verbally, that England would remain neutral if war broke out on the Continent involving Germany and France, Austria and Russia. This message was telegraphed to me by my brother from London after his conversation with H. M. the King, and repeated verbally on the twenty-ninth of July.
2. My Ambassador in London transmitted a message from Sir E. Grey to Berlin saying that only in case France was likely to be crushed England would interfere.
3. On the thirtieth my Ambassador in London reported that Sir Edward Grey in course of a "private" conversation told him that if the conflict remained localized betweenRussia--not Serbia--andAustria, England would not move, but if we "mixed" in the fray she would take quick decisions and grave measures; i. e., if I left my ally Austria in the lurch to fight alone England would not touch me.
4. This communication being directly counter to the King's message to me, I telegraphed to H. M. on the twenty-ninth or thirtieth, thanking him for kind messages through my brother and begging him to use all his power to keep France and Russia--his Allies--from making any war-like preparations calculated to disturb my work of mediation, stating that I was in constant communication with H. M. the Czar. In the evening the King kindly answered that he had ordered his Government to use every possible influence with his Allies to refrain from taking any provocative military measures. At the same time H. M. asked me if I would transmit to Vienna the British proposal that Austria was to take Belgrade and a few other Serbian towns and a strip of country as a "main-mise" to make sure that the Serbian promises on paper should be fulfilled in reality. This proposal was in the same moment telegraphed to me from Vienna for London, quite in conjunction with the British proposal; besides, I had telegraphed to H. M. the Czar the same as an idea of mine, before I received the two communications from Vienna and London, as both were of the same opinion.
5. I immediately transmitted the telegramsvice versato Vienna and London. I felt that I was able to tide the question over and was happy at the peaceful outlook.
6. While I was preparing a note to H. M. the Czar the next morning, to inform him that Vienna, London and Berlin were agreed about the treatment of affairs, I received the telephones from H. E. the Chancellor that in the night before the Czar had given the order to mobilize the whole of the Russian army, which was, of course, also meant against Germany; whereas up till then the southern armies had been mobilized against Austria.
7. In a telegram from London my Ambassador informed me he understood the British Government would guarantee neutrality of France and wished to know whether Germany would refrain from attack. I telegraphed to H. M. the King personally that mobilization being already carried out could not be stopped, but if H. M. could guarantee with his armed forces the neutrality of France I would refrainfrom attacking her, leave her aloneand employ my troops elsewhere. H. M. answered that he thought my offer was based on a misunderstanding; and, as far as I can make out, Sir E. Grey never took my offer into serious consideration. He never answered it. Instead, he declared England had to defend Belgian neutrality, which had to be violated by Germany on strategical grounds, news having been received that France was already preparing to enter Belgium, and the King of Belgians having refused my petition for a free passage under guarantee of his country's freedom. I am most grateful for the President's message.
WILLIAM, H. R.
When the German Emperor in my presence indited his letter to President Wilson of August tenth, 1914, he asked that I cable it immediately to the State Department and that I simultaneously give it to the press. As I have already stated, I cabled the document immediately to the State Department at Washington, but I withheld it from publication.
My interview with the Emperor was in the morning. That afternoon a man holding a high position in Germany sent for me. I do not give his name because I do not wish to involve him in any way with the Emperor, so I shall not even indicate whether he is a royalty or an official. He said:
"You had an interview today with the Emperor. What happened?"
I told of the message given me for the President which was intended for publication by the Emperor. He said:
"I think you ought to show that message to me; you know the Emperor is a constitutional Emperor and there was once a great row about such a message."
I showed him the message, and when he had read it he said: "I think it would be inadvisable for us to have this message published, and in the interest of good feeling between Germany and America. If you cable it ask that publication be withheld."
I complied with his request and it is characteristic of the President's desire to preserve good relations that publication was withheld. Now, when the two countries are at war; when the whole world, and especially our own country, has an interest in knowing how this great calamity of universal war came to the earth, the time has come when this message should be given out and I have published it by permission.
This most interesting document in the first place clears up one issue never really obscure in the eyes of the world--the deliberate violation of the neutrality of Belgium, whose territory "had to be violated by Germany on strategical grounds." The very weak excuse is added that "news had been received that France was already preparing to enter Belgium,"--not even a pretense that there had ever been any actual violation of Belgium's frontier by the French prior to the German invasion of that unfortunate country. Of course the second excuse that the King of the Belgians had refused entrance to the Emperor's troops under guarantee of his country's freedom is even weaker than the first. It would indeed inaugurate a new era in the intercourse of nations if a small nation could only preserve its freedom by at all times, on request, granting free passage to the troops of a powerful neighbour on the march to attack an adjoining country.
And aside from the violation of Belgian neutrality, what would have become of England and of the world if the Prussian autocracy had been left free to defeat--one by one--the nations of the earth? First, the defeat of Russia and Serbia by Austria and Germany, the incorporation of a large part of Russia in the German Empire, German influence predominant in Russia and all the vast resources of that great Empire at the command of Germany. All the fleets in the world could uselessly blockade the German coasts if Germany possessed the limitless riches of the Empire of the Romanoffs.
fig 19ALLEGED DUM-DUM BULLETS, WHICH THE GERMANS DECLARED HAD BEEN FOUND IN LONGWY.
The German army drawing for reserves on the teeming populations of Russia and Siberia would never know defeat. And this is not idle conjecture, mere dreaming in the realm of possibilities, because the Russian revolution has shown us how weak and tottering in reality was the dreaded power of the Czar.
Russia, beaten and half digested, France would have been an easy prey, and England, even if then joining France in war, would have a far different problem to face if the V-boats were now sailing from Cherbourg and Calais and Brest and Bordeaux on the mission of piracy and murder, and then would come our turn and that of Latin America. The first attack would come not on us, but on South or Central America--at some point to which it would be as difficult for us to send troops to help our neighbor as it would be for Germany to attack.
Remember that in Southern Brazil nearly four hundred thousand Germans are sustained, as I found out, in their devotion to the Fatherland by annual grants of money for educational purposes from the Imperial treasury in Berlin.
It was not without reason that at this interview, when the Kaiser wrote this message to the President, he said that the coming in of England had changed the whole situation and would make the war a long one. The Kaiser talked rather despondently about the war. I tried to cheer him up by saying the German troops would soon enter Paris, but he answered, "The English change the whole situation--an obstinate nation--they will keep up the war. It cannot end soon."
It was the entry of England into the war, in defence of the rights of small nations, in defence of the guaranteed neutrality of Belgium, which saved the world from the harsh dominion of the conquest-hungry Prussians and therefore saved as well the two Americas and their protecting doctrine of President Monroe.
The document, which is dated August tenth, 1914, supersedes the statement made by the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech before the Reichstag on August fourth, 1914, in which he gave the then official account of the entrance into the war of the Central Empires. It will be noted that von Bethmann-Hollweg insisted that France began the war in the sentence reading: "There were bomb-throwing fliers, cavalry patrols, invading companies in the Reichsland (Alsace-Lorraine). Thereby France, although the condition of war had not yet been declared, had attacked our territory." But the Emperor makes no mention of this fact, of supreme importance if true, in his writing to President Wilson six days later.
Quite curiously, at this time there was a belief on the part of the Germans that Japan would declare war on the Allies and range herself on the side of the Central Powers. In fact on one night there was a friendly demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy, but these hopes were soon dispelled by the ultimatum of Japan sent on the sixteenth of August, and, finally, by the declaration of war on August twenty-third.
During the first days of the war the warring powers indulged in mutual recriminations as to the use of dumdum bullets and I was given several packages of cartridges containing bullets bored out at the top which the Germans said had been found in the French fortress of Longwy, with a request that I send an account of them to President Wilson and ask for his intervention in the matter. Very wisely President Wilson refused to do anything of the kind, as otherwise he would have been deluged with constant complaints from both sides as to the violations of the rules of war.
The cartridges given to me were in packages marked on the outside "Cartouches de Stand" and from this I took it that possibly these cartridges had been used on some shooting range near the fort and the bullets bored out in order that they might not go too far, if carelessly fired over the targets.
On August fifth, with our Naval Attaché, Commander Walter Gherardi, I called upon von Tirpitz, to learn from him which ports he considered safest for the ships to be sent from America with gold for stranded Americans. He recommended Rotterdam.
I also had a conversation on this day with Geheimrat Letze of the Foreign Office with reference to the proposition that English and German ships respectively should have a delay of until the fourteenth of August in which to leave the English or German ports in which they chanced to be.
The second week in August, my wife's sister and her husband, Count Sigray, arrived in Berlin. Count Sigray is a reserve officer of the Hungarian Hussars and was in Montana when the first rumours of war came. He and his wife immediately started for New York and sailed on the fourth of August. They landed in England, and as England had not yet declared war on Austria, they were able to proceed on their journey. With them were Count George Festetics and Count Cziraki, the former from the Austrian Embassy in London and the latter from that in Washington. They were all naturally very much excited about war and the events of their trip. The Hungarians as a people are quite like Americans. They have agreeable manners and are able to laugh in a natural way, something which seems to be a lost art in Prussia. Nearly all the members of Hungarian noble families speak English perfectly and model their clothes, sports and country life, as far as possible, after the English.
The thirteenth saw the departure of our first special train containing Americans bound for Holland. I saw the Americans off at the Charlottenburg station. They all departed in great spirits and very glad of an opportunity to leave Germany.
I had some negotiations about the purchase by America or Americans of the ships of the North German Lloyd, but nothing came of these negotiations. Trainloads of Americans continued to leave, but there seemed to be no end to the Americans coming into Berlin from all directions.
On August twenty-ninth, Count Szoegyeny, the Austrian Ambassador, left Berlin. He had been Ambassador there for twenty-two years and I suppose because of his advancing years the Austrian Government thought that he had outlived his usefulness. Quite a crowd of Germans and diplomats were at the station to witness the rather sad farewell. His successor was Prince Hohenlohe, married to a daughter of Archduke Frederick. She expressly waived her right to precedence as a royal highness, and agreed to take only the precedence given to her as the wife of the Ambassador, in order not to cause feeling in Berlin. Prince Hohenlohe, a rather easy-going man, who had been most popular in Russia and Austria, immediately made a favourable impression in Berlin and successfully occupied the difficult position of mediator between the governments of Berlin and Vienna.
On September fourth the Chancellor gave me a statement to give to the reporters in which he attacked England, claiming that England did not desire the friendship of Germany but was moved by commercial jealousy and a desire to crush her; that the efforts made for peace had failed because Russia, under all circumstances, was resolved upon war; and that Germany had entered Belgium in order to forestall the planned French advance. He also claimed that England, regardless of consequences to the white race, had excited Japan to a pillaging expedition, and claimed that Belgian girls and women had gouged out the eyes of the wounded; that officers had been invited to dinner and shot across the table; and Belgian women had cut the throats of soldiers quartered in their houses while they were asleep. The Chancellor concluded by saying, in this statement, that everyone knows that the German people is not capable of unnecessary cruelty or of any brutality.
We were fully occupied with taking care of the English prisoners and interests, the Americans, and negotiations relating to commercial questions, and to getting goods required in the United States out of Germany, when, on October seventh, a most unpleasant incident, and one which for some time caused the members of our Embassy to feel rather bitterly toward the German Foreign Office, took place.
A great number of British civilians, men and women, were stranded in Berlin. To many of these were paid sums of money in the form of small allowances on behalf of the British Government. In order to facilitate this work, we placed the clerks employed in this distribution in the building formerly occupied by the British Consul in Berlin. Of course, the great crowds of Americans resorting to our Embassy, when combined with the crowds of British, made it almost impossible even to enter the Embassy, and establishment of this outlying relief station materially helped this situation. I occupied it, and employed English men and English women in this relief work by the express permission of the Imperial Foreign Office, which I thought it wise to obtain in view of the fact that the Germans seemed daily to become more irritable and suspicious, especially after the Battle of the Marne.
On the night of October second, our Second Secretary, Harvey, went to this relief headquarters at about twelve o'clock at night, and was witness to a raid made by the Berlin police on this establishment of ours. The men and women working were arrested, and all books and papers which the police could get at were seized by them. The next morning I went around to the place and on talking with the criminal detectives in charge, was told by them that they had made the raid by the orders of the Foreign Office. When I spoke to the Foreign Office about this, they denied that they had given directions for the raid and made a sort of half apology. The raid was all the more unjustified because only the day before I had had a conversation with the Adjutant of the Berlin Kommandantur and told him that, although I had permission from the Foreign Office, I thought it would be better to dismiss the English employed and employ only Americans or Germans; and I sent round to my friend, Herr von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank, and asked him to recommend some German accountants to me.
The Kommandantur is the direct office of military control. When the Adjutant heard of the raid he was almost as indignant as I was, and on the tenth of October informed me that he had learned that the raid had been made on the joint orders of the Foreign Office and von Tirpitz's department.
The books and papers of an Embassy, including those relating to the affairs of foreign nations temporarily in the Embassy's care, are universally recognised in international law as not, subject to seizure, nor did the fact that I was carrying on this work outside the actual Embassy building have any bearing on this point so long as the building was directly under my control and, especially, as the only work carried on was work properly in my hands in my official capacity. The Foreign Office saw that they had made a mistake, but at Zimmermann's earnest request I agreed, as it were, to forget the incident. Later on, this precedent might have been used by our government had they desired to press the matter of the seizure of von Igel's papers. Von Igel, it will be remembered, was carrying on business of a private nature in a private office hired by him. Nevertheless, as he had been employed in some capacity in the German Embassy at Washington, Count von Bernstorff claimed immunity from seizure for the papers found in that office.
On August sixteenth the Kaiser left Berlin for the front. I wrote to his master of the household, saying that I should like an opportunity to be at the railway station to say good-bye to the Emperor, but was put off on various excuses. Thereafter the Emperor practically abandoned Berlin and lived either in Silesia, at Pless, or at some place near the Western front.
At first, following the precedent of the war of 1870, the more important members of the government followed the Kaiser to the front, even the Chancellor and the Minister of Foreign Affairs abandoning their offices in Berlin. Not long afterwards, when it was apparent that the war must be carried on on several fronts and that it was not going to be the matter of a few weeks which the Germans had first supposed, these officials returned to their offices in Berlin. In the meantime, however, much confusion had been caused by this rather ridiculous effort to follow the customs of the war of 1870.
When von Jagow, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was absent at the Great General Headquarters, the diplomats remaining behind conducted their negotiations with Zimmermann, who in turn had to transmit everything to the great general headquarters.
In August, there were apparently rumours afloat in countries outside of Germany that prominent Socialists at the outbreak of the war had been shot. The State Department cabled me to find out whether there was any truth in these rumours, with particular reference to Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg.
Liebknecht is a lawyer practicing in Berlin and so I telephoned him, asking him to come and see me. He did so, and of course, by his presence verified the fact that he had not been executed. He told me that the rumours as to the treatment of the Socialists were entirely unfounded and said that he had no objection to my cabling a statement that the Socialists were opposed to Czarismus and that he personally had confidence in the German army and the cause of the German people.
Many people confuse Liebknecht with his father, now dead. Liebknecht, the son, is a man of perhaps forty-three years, with dark bushy hair and moustache and wearing eye-glasses, a man of medium height and not at all of strong build. In the numerous interruptions made by him during the debates in the Reichstag, during the first year of the war, his voice sounded high and shrill. Of course, anyone who defies the heavy hand of autocracy must suffer from nervousness. We all knew that sooner or later autocracy would "get" Liebknecht, and its opportunity came when he appeared in citizen's clothes at an attempted mass-meeting at the Potsdamerplatz. For the offence of appearing out of uniform after being called and mobilized, and for alleged incitement of the people, he was condemned for a long term of imprisonment. One can but admire his courage. I believe that he earns his living by the practice of law before one of the minor courts. It is hard to say just whatrôlehe will play in the future. It is probable that when the Socialists settle down after the war and think things over, they will consider that the leadership of Scheidemann has been too conservative; that he submitted too readily to the powers of autocracy and too easily abandoned the program of the Socialists. In this case, Liebknecht perhaps will be made leader of the Socialists, and it is within the bounds of probability that Scheidemann and certain of his party may become Liberals rather than Socialists.
In the autumn of 1914, the rush of getting the Americans out of Germany was over. The care of the British civilians was on a business basis and there were comparatively few camps of prisoners of war. Absolutely tired by working every day and until twelve at night, I went to Munich for a two weeks' rest.
On February fourth, 1915, Germany announced that on February eighteenth the blockade of England through submarines would commence.
Some very peculiar and mysterious negotiations thereafter ensued. About February eighth, an American who was very intimate with the members of the General Staff came to me with a statement that Germany desired peace and was ready to open negotiations to that end. It was, however, to be made a condition of these peace negotiations that this particular American should go to Paris and to Petrograd and inform the governments there of the overwhelming strength of the German armies and of their positions, which knowledge, it was said, he had obtained by personally visiting both the fronts, it was further intimated that von Tirpitz himself was anxious that peace should be concluded, possibly because of his fear that the proposed blockade would not be successful.
Of course, I informed the State Department of these mysterious manoeuvres.
I was taken by back stairways to a mysterious meeting with von Tirpitz at night in his rooms in the Navy Department. When I was alone with him, however, he had nothing definite to say or to offer; if there was any opportunity at that time to make peace nothing came of it. It looked somewhat to me as if the whole idea had been to get this American to go to Paris and Petrograd, certify from his personal observation to the strength of the German armies and position, and thereby to assist in enticing one or both of these countries to desert the allied cause. All of this took place about ten days before the eighteenth of February, the time named for the announcement of the blockade of England.
Medals were struck having the head of von Tirpitz on one side and on the other the words "Gott strafe England," and a picture of a sort of Neptune assisted by a submarine rising from the sea to blockade the distant English coast.
The Ambassador is supposed to have the right to demand an audience with the Kaiser at any time, and as there were matters connected with the treatment of prisoners as well as this coming submarine warfare which I wished to take up with him, I had on various occasions asked for an audience with him; on each occasion my request had been refused on some excuse or other, and I was not even permitted to go to the railway station to bid him good-bye on one occasion when he left for the front.
When our Military Attaché, Major Langhorne, left in March, 1915, he had a farewell audience with the Kaiser and I then asked him to say to the Kaiser that I had not seen him for so long a time that I had forgotten what he looked like. Langhorne reported to me that he had given his message to the Kaiser and that the Kaiser said, "I have nothing against Mr. Gerard personally, but I will not see the Ambassador of a country which furnishes arms and ammunition to the enemies of Germany."
Before the departure of Langhorne, I had succeeded in getting Germany to agree that six American army officers might visit Germany as military observers. When they arrived, I presented them at the Foreign Office, etc., and they were taken on trips to the East and West fronts.
They were not allowed to see much, and their request to be attached to a particular unit was refused. Nearly everywhere they were subject to insulting remarks or treatment because of the shipment of munitions of war to the Allies from America; and finally after they had been subjected to deliberate insults at the hands of several German generals, Mackensen particularly distinguishing himself, the United States Government withdrew them from Germany.
Colonel (now General) Kuhn, however, who was of these observers, was appointed Military Attaché in place of Major Langhorne. Speaking German fluently and acting with great tact, he managed for a long time to keep sufficiently in the good graces of the Germans to be allowed to see something of the operations of the various fronts. There came a period in 1916 when he was no longer invited to go on the various excursions made by the foreign military attachés and finally Major Nicolai, the general intelligence officer of the Great General Headquarters, sent for him early in the autumn of 1916, and informed him that he could no longer go to any of the fronts. Colonel Kuhn answered that he was aware of this already. Major Nicolai said that he gave him this information by direct order of General Ludendorf, that General Ludendorf had stated that he did not believe America could do more damage to Germany than she had done if the two countries were actually at war, and that he considered that, practically, America and Germany were engaged in hostilities. On this being reported to Washington, Colonel Kuhn was quite naturally recalled.
I cannot praise too highly the patience and tact shown by Colonel Kuhn in dealing with the Germans. Although accused in the German newspapers of being a spy, and otherwise attacked, he kept his temper and observed all that he could for the benefit of his own country. As he had had an opportunity to observe the Russian-Japanese war, his experiences at that time, coupled with his experiences in Germany, make him, perhaps, our greatest American expert on modern war.
It was with the greatest pleasure that I heard from Secretary Baker that he had determined to promote Colonel Kuhn to the rank of General and make him head of our War College, where his teachings will prove of the greatest value to the armies of the United States.
Colonel House and his wife arrived to pay us a visit on March 19, 1915, and remained until the twenty-eighth. During this period the Colonel met all the principal members of the German Government and many men of influence and prominence in the world of affairs, such as Herr von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank, and Dr. Walter Rathenau, who succeeded his father as head of the Allgemeine Elektricitats Gesellschaft and hundreds of other corporations. The Colonel dined at the house of Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, and lunched with von Gwinner.
In April, negotiations were continued about the sinking of theWilliam P. Fry, an American boat loaded with food and destined for Ireland. The American Government on behalf of the owners of theWilliam P. Fryclaimed damages for the boat. Nothing was said about the cargo, but in the German answer it was stated that the cargo of theWilliam P. Fryconsisting of foodstuffs destined for an armed port of the enemy and, therefore, presumed to be destined for the armed forces of the enemy was, because of this, contraband. I spoke to von Jagow about this and told him that I thought that possibly this would seem to amount to a German justification of the British blockade of Germany. He said that this note had been drawn by Director Kriege who was their expert on international law, and that he would not interfere with Kriege's work. Of course, as a matter of fact, all foodstuffs shipped to Germany would have to be landed at some armed port, and, therefore, according to the contentions of Germany, these would be supposed to be destined to the armed forces of the enemy and become contraband of war.
At international law, it had always been recognised that private individuals and corporations have the right to sell arms and ammunitions of war to any belligerent and, in the Hague Convention held in 1907, this right was expressly ratified and confirmed. This same Director Kriege who represented Germany at this Hague Conference in 1907, in the debates on this point said: "The neutral boats which engage in such a trade, commit a violation of the duties of neutrality. However, according to a principle generally recognised, the State of which the boat flies the flag is not responsible for this violation. The neutral States are not called upon to forbid their subjects a commerce which, from the point of view of the belligerents, ought to be considered as unlawful." (Conférence International de la Paix, La Haye, 15 Juin-18 Octobre 1907. Vol. III, p. 859.)
During our trouble with General Huerta, arms and ammunition for Huerta's forces from Germany were landed from German ships in Mexico. During the Boer war the Germans, who openly sympathised with the Boers, nevertheless furnished to England great quantities of arms and munitions, expressly destined to be used against the Boers; and this, although it was manifest that there was no possibility whatever that the Boers could obtain arms and munitions from German sources during the war. For instance, the firm of Eberhardt in Dusseldorf furnished one hundred and nine cannon, complete, with wagons, caissons and munitions, etc., to the English which were expressly designed for use against the Boers.
At one time the Imperial Foreign Office sent me a formal note making reference to a paragraph in former Ambassador Andrew D. White's autobiography with reference to the alleged stoppage in a German port of a boat laden with arms and ammunition, for use against the Americans in Cuba during the Spanish War. Of course, former Ambassador White wrote without having the Embassy records at hand and those records show that the position he took at the time of this alleged stoppage was eminently correct.
The files show that he wrote the letter to the State Department in which he stated that knowledge came to him of the proposed sailing of this ship, but he did not protest because he had been advised by a Naval Attaché that the United States did not have the right to interfere. The Department of State wrote to him commending his action in not filing any protest and otherwise interfering.
It seemed as if the German Government expressly desired to stir up hatred against America on this issue in order to force the American Government through fear of either the German Government, or the German-American propagandists at home, to put an immediate embargo on the export of these supplies.
In the autumn of 1914 Zimmermann showed me a long list sent him by Bernstorff showing quantities of saddles, automobiles, motor trucks, tires, explosives, foodstuffs and so on, exported from America to the Allies and intimated that this traffic had reached such proportions that it should be stopped.
In February, 1915, in the officialCommuniquéof the day appeared the following statement: "Heavy artillery fire in certain sections of the West front, mostly with American ammunition;" and in April in the officialCommuniquésomething to this effect: "Captured French artillery officers say that they have great stores of American ammunition." I obtained through the State Department in Washington a statement from the French Ambassador certifying that up to that time, the end of April, 1915, no shells whatever of the French artillery had been furnished from America.
Nothing, however, would satisfy the Germans. They seemed determined that the export of every article, whether of food or munitions which might prove of use to the Allies in the war, should be stopped. Newspapers were filled with bitter attacks upon America and upon President Wilson, and with caricatures referring to the sale of munitions.
It never seemed to occur to the Germans that we could not violate the Hague Convention in order to change the rules of the game because one party, after the commencement of hostilities, found that the rule worked to his disadvantage. Nor did the Germans consider that America could not vary its international law with the changing fortunes of war and make one ruling when the Germans lost control of the sea and another ruling if they regained it.
From early in 1915 until I left Germany, I do not think I ever had a conversation with a German without his alluding to this question. Shortly before leaving Germany, in January, 1917, and after I had learned of the probability of the resumption of ruthless submarine war, at an evening party at the house of Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, a large German who turned out to be one of the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, planted himself some distance away from me and addressed me in German saying, "You are the American Ambassador and I want to tell you that the conduct of America in furnishing arms and ammunition to the enemies of Germany is stamped deep on the German heart, that we will never forget it and will some day have our revenge." He spoke in a voice so loud and slapped his chest so hard that everyone in the room stopped their conversation in order to hear. He wore on his breast the orders of the Black Eagle, the Red Eagle, the Elephant and the Seraphim, and when he struck all this menagerie the rattle alone was quite loud. I reminded him politely of the Hague Convention, of the fact that we could not change international law from time to time with the change in the situation of the war, and that Germany had furnished arms to England to use against the Boers. But he simply answered, "We care nothing for treaties," and my answer, "That is what they all say," was a retort too obvious to be omitted.
The German press continually published articles to the effect that the war would be finished if it were not for the shipment of supplies from America. All public opinion was with the German Government when the warning was issued on February fourth, 1915, stating that the blockade of England would commence on the eighteenth and warning neutral ships to keep out of the war zone. From then on we had constant cases and crises with reference to the sinking of American boats by the German submarine. There were the cases of theGulfflightand theCushingand theFalaba, an English boat sunk without warning on which Americans were killed. On May sixth, 1915, Director Kriege of the Foreign Office asked Mr. Jackson to call and see him, and told him that he would like to have the following three points brought to the attention of the American public: