After the failure of the sortie from Riga Count Steingell made up his mind to waste no more time in attempting to execute the official plan of operations, but to join Wittgenstein without delay. On October 5th he left Riga, and proceeded by forced marches up the right bank of the Düna. On the 15th he reached Druia, having marched over 180 miles in ten days.
On October 10th Wittgenstein’s first column of reinforcement, over 5000 strong, arrived at Sivokhino. On the same day the 9000 men of the second column reached Nevel, and on the 14th its junction with the main force was practically complete. Wittgenstein had now under his hand about 40,000 men, including 5000 cavalry and Cossacks, with 154 guns.
Wittgenstein distributed the militia battalions among the infantry, one to each regiment, and his staff issued special orders as to how these enthusiastic but raw troops were to act in battle. The effect was excellent; and though the men were imperfectly clothed and equipped, and almost untrained, they rapidly gained efficiency and cohesion.
The unfortunate effect of the elaborate and too minute Imperial plan of operations now became evident. Steingell had acted upon his own judgment in marching to reinforce Wittgenstein; but he felt himself obliged to act upon his master’s orders as far as possible, and so crossed the Düna at Druia to operate on the left bank. He was thus completely separated from Wittgenstein, and the latter could only endeavour to remedy the strategic defect by bridging the river nearer Polotsk. As he had no pontoons the operation was likely to prove a lengthy one. He ordered his chief of engineers, Colonel Count Sievers, to construct a bridge at Desna, detailing as his escort 4 battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry—2500 men and 4 guns.
So far as there was any concerted plan of operations on the part of the Russian commanders, it appears to have been that Wittgenstein was to attack Polotsk and Steingell to cut off St. Cyr’s retreat. It was clear that the French general might choose to hold Polotsk merely by a rear-guard, and destroy Steingell’s small force by concentrating upon him the bulk of his own army. To obviate this, Wittgenstein must attack Polotsk speedily and vigorously. Even so the outlook was not altogetherpromising. Polotsk was fortified; and St. Cyr was quite strong enough to hold it against the 37,000 men of whom Wittgenstein disposed after deducting Sievers’ detachment.
Wittgenstein distributed his numerically strong but rather incoherent force into three large divisions of all arms, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Generals Prince Iachvil and Berg and Major-General Beguichev, besides a flank detachment under Major-General Alexiev. On the 16th he began his march upon Polotsk, while Steingell was moving from Druia.
count
COUNT WITTGENSTEINCommander of the 1st Russian Army Corps in 1812
St. Cyr did not believe that he could hold his own unaided against the united Russian forces; but determined to defend Polotsk if Wittgenstein should dash his head against its entrenchments. He detached Corbineau with his cavalry brigade and three weak Bavarian battalions to observe Steingell, passed his trains, escorted by Doumerc and Castex, across to the left bank of the Düna and posted the rest of his forces in the entrenchments which he had caused to be thrown up. Polotsk itself was covered by a palisaded parapet. Across the western part of the town a second palisaded parapet had been carried from the Polota to the Düna, covering the two bridges of rafts which had been thrown across the river. On the western bank of the Polota, north-west of the town were three redoubts, and to the north the Roman Catholic cemetery had been entrenched. On the east of the Polota the exterior chain of defence was less complete. Three redoubts and an outlying battery were under construction, but not yet finished. Below the town batteries had been thrown up to flank the entrenchments on the western side. The passage of the Polota had been rendered as difficult as might be, and at the village of Struria above Polotsk the ground near the river had been flooded by damming up a brook.
Merle’s division held the entrenched western side of the town, and the first of the Polota redoubts. Wrede’sBavarians defended Nos. 2 and 3, the cemetery, Spas, and the line of the Polota. On the east side of the Polota stood Legrand, while Maison continued the line to the Düna. On the right flank were four squadrons of cavalry, all that St. Cyr had retained. Struria was occupied by a detachment of Bavarians.
On the 18th Steingell had not yet reached Desna; the bridge was scarcely commenced; and Wittgenstein decided to assault St. Cyr’s position. He rightly directed the weight of his attack upon the French right and right centre, where the entrenchments were still incomplete. Prince Iachvil was ordered to contain Merle and Wrede, while Berg and Beguichev assailed Legrand and Maison.
The French outposts were driven back by the advance of the Russians; but when Berg and Beguichev assailed the main French line they could make little headway. The combat swayed backward and forward; the Russian militia behaved with splendid bravery; but the French troops, aided by their entrenchments, everywhere held their ground; the single redoubt carried by the Russians could not be held in the face of the furious fire poured into it from the entrenchments before Polotsk. Wittgenstein apparently lost his head; and though he had at first, according to Russian authorities, merely intended a demonstration, he had by the evening employed nearly the whole of Berg’s and Beguichev’s divisions in vain attempts to force the French right.
second
SECOND BATTLE OF POLOTSKOctober 18th-19th, 1812
About 4 p.m., apparently on the hypothesis that St. Cyr had weakened his left to withstand the attack on his right, Wittgenstein ordered Iachvil to assault in earnest the western works. The attempt was hopeless, and could not for a moment have succeeded. Such advantage as the Russians gained was due to a rash counter-attack made by a Swiss regiment and a battalion of Croats. They suffered very heavily and were driven back upon the works, the Croats being mostly captured. But this was all that Iachvil could achieve, though his militiafought with fanatic fury. At nightfall St. Cyr’s position was practically intact; and the Russians had certainly lost far more heavily than the French. While the battle was proceeding, Steingell was approaching by the left bank of the Düna, but was only able to reach the Uchach, 7 or 8 miles west of Polotsk, by the evening of the 18th with his advance-guard. De Chambray criticises him for his slowness; but as he only crossed the Düna on the 16th, and then had nearly 50 miles of bad road to traverse in order to reach Polotsk, the stricture appears unjust. On the 19th Steingell informed Wittgenstein that he was at hand. The bridge at Desna was hardly commenced, and had St. Cyr been a little stronger the position of the Russians would have been even more serious than it was. Wittgenstein’s army had obviously been badly shaken by the fierce fighting of the day before; for he made no attempt to renew the attack until Steingell could join in from the south. This threw an awkward responsibility upon the commander of the weak Finland corps, and exposed him to the risk of destruction should St. Cyr decide to hold Polotsk only as atête de pontand concentrate a superior force on the left bank of the Düna. To the writer it seems that St. Cyr might have abandoned his outlying works, and left the inner and continuous line to be held by about 14,000 men, while with the remaining 14,000 (allowing for losses) he attacked and defeated Steingell, who had scarcely 10,000 actually in hand. This, however, he did not do; and as the precise strength of the entrenchments is a matter of doubt he was perhaps right. He detached one regiment from each of his divisions, and sent them under General Amey to reinforce Corbineau. A Cuirassier regiment was also directed to the Uchach. Steingell’s advance-guard, only four battalions under Colonel Turshaninov, naturally halted before this accumulation of force and waited for the main body, while Steingell apparently was listening for the sound of Wittgenstein’s guns before advancingon Polotsk. The French containing force took up a fairly strong position among woods and broken ground, and effectually checked the advance of the Finland corps. St. Cyr, however, made up his mind that he was not strong enough to contend at the same time with both Russian forces, and in the evening began to evacuate Polotsk. Iachvil noted the withdrawal of troops and opened fire on his front, the Russian centre and left taking up the ball. The Russians were too late to molest the evacuation of the outer works, but they pushed forward against the inner line round the town. The houses everywhere took fire, partly ignited by the Russian howitzers, partly, as it would seem, burned by the French to clear the front of some of their works, which would otherwise have been masked. The Russian infantry attacks were everywhere repulsed; and during the evening Legrand’s and Maison’s divisions and the Bavarians defiled through the town and crossed the bridge, covered by Merle’s Swiss and Croats. At midnight the Russians entered Polotsk; but the battle was far from its end. Merle and his gallant regiments disputed every inch of the streets with splendid valour, repeatedly repulsing the headlong charges of the Russian infantry. By 2.30 p.m. the whole French army was safe on the left bank of the Düna, and the bridges were destroyed. St. Cyr, as he directed the battle, was severely wounded in the foot, and disabled for the rest of the campaign. He had perhaps committed an error in not merely holding the inner works at Polotsk and thus concentrating a superior force on Steingell; but the steady and successful retreat did him much honour. It seems clear that he was throughout master of his operations; and that Wittgenstein could only press the withdrawal very slightly. The honours of the fighting rested chiefly with the gallant Swiss regiments of Merle’s division, whose conduct in the rear-guard was truly admirable.
St. Cyr being now for the moment in safety, reinforcedthe force facing Steingell with another French regiment and placed Wrede in command. At 4.30 a.m. on the 20th he fell unexpectedly upon Steingell, whose advance-guard, surprised in its bivouacs, was seized with a panic and dispersed. Buturlin says that 1800 men of 2 regiments of Chasseurs were captured, but as this would appear to be almost their whole strength, and they figure later as at least 2 battalions strong, this is doubtless an exaggeration. Steingell’s main body was not closely supporting the unlucky vanguard, and on its dispersal he hastily collected the remainder of his troops and retreated on Desna, where he crossed the Düna, while Wrede, having disposed of him, rejoined the main body of the French army. Besides St. Cyr, Legrand, the senior divisional commander, was wounded, and the temporary charge of the 2nd and 6th Corps devolved upon Merle. On the 21st he finally retreated from before Polotsk. Wittgenstein, hampered by lack of engineers and bridging material, could not establish a passage over the Düna until the 23rd. Only a detachment of cavalry under Colonel Rüdiger forded the river and skirmished with Merle’s outposts. To make the best of things Wittgenstein detached a division of all arms under General Sazonov to Desna to reinforce Steingell. The latter thereupon on the 23rd repassed the Düna, detached Major-General Vlastov with a force of 8 regular battalions, 1 militia battalion, 3 squadrons of Hussars, a regiment of Cossacks and 12 guns—about 5000 men in all—to observe Dünaburg, and with the rest of his force moved once more up the left bank of the river. On the same day Wittgenstein completed a bridge at Polotsk and began to cross. He had just been joined by two battalions of Novgorod militia, which he left with another militia battalion, 2 batteries, a detachment of regulars and some cavalry and Cossacks to garrison Polotsk.
Merle retreated from before Polotsk in 3 columns, Legrand’s division moving on Bechenkowiczi, Wrede,with the remains of the 6th Corps and Corbineau’s cavalry, on Glubokoië to cover the road to Vilna, the remainder of the 2nd Corps and Doumerc’s Cuirassiers on Chasniki by way of Uchach and Lepel.
Martinien’s lists, probably not quite complete, show 238 officers of the 3 “combatant” arms, almost all of the 2nd Corps, killed and wounded during the three days’ fighting round Polotsk. The French loss would therefore have been in the region of 5000. The number of unwounded prisoners was apparently about 1000. The French lost also 1 gun. The Russians only admit a loss of 3000 killed and wounded, but, seeing the character of the fighting, and that the French were acting on the defensive and covered by entrenchments, this estimate is certainly far too low. Probably, allowing for Steingell’s losses, 8000 would not be too low a figure. Among the wounded were Major-Generals Balk, Hammen and the Prince of Siberia; and Privy Councillor Bibikov and Chamberlain Mordvinov, who commanded militia battalions.
Marshal Victor cannot long have had Napoleon’s instructions in his hands when he was called upon to act upon them. On reaching Smolensk he cantoned his corps between that place and Orsha. His troops appear to have maintained good discipline; and a commencement was made of establishing order in the vicinity. Some officers, at least, succeeded in instilling confidence into the villagers and obtaining supplies by regular methods; and more might have been done had the 9th Corps remained longer in the district. Upon learning from St. Cyr of the large reinforcements which were joining Wittgenstein, Victor sent Dändels’ German division to Vitebsk, and four battalions to Bechenkowiczi to watch the line of the Düna. Then he heard of the abandonment of Polotsk; and it was clear that he must assist the overmatched army of St. Cyr. He accordingly directed Dändels upon Bechenkowiczi; and with the rest of his corps moved towards Chasniki.
The result of the operations about Polotsk therefore had been that the French had been forced to abandon the line of the Düna, and that to sustain them Napoleon’s sole powerful reserve had to be diverted to sustain the retreating 2nd and 6th Corps. Only the small force at Smolensk was now available to reinforce the retreating army of the centre; and there was hardly anything to oppose the advance of Chichagov on the Berezina. On October 25th Napoleon was 70 miles south-west of Moscow, just about to retreat on Smolensk, with the Grand Army of Russia on his left flank able to reach his goal before him. Wittgenstein was advancing from the Düna towards the Berezina, but was faced by an equal or superior force, and might be kept from the main line of communications. Chichagov was at Brest-Litovsk, ready to march on Minsk, with nothing in his front but feeble detachments.
Therefore, in the last days of October, the focus of operations became the Berezina near Borisov. Upon it were converging: (1) Napoleon, nearly 400 miles distant, with an equal or superior enemy attending him on the flank and able to reach Smolensk before him; (2) Wittgenstein, 90 miles away, with an equal French force in his front; (3) Chichagov, 262 miles distant, with hardly anything to oppose him. Schwarzenberg was in rear of Chichagov, and watched by a force at least able to seriously hamper any attempt at pursuit made by him. So the curtain rose upon the last act of the great tragedy, as from every side Napoleon’s armies and those of his enemies set their faces towards the Berezina, soon to acquire a terrible renown in the history of the world.
CHAPTER XII
THE FRENCH RETREAT. MALOYAROSLAVETZ TO ORSHA
OnOctober 26th the French retreat by the Moscow-Smolensk road definitely commenced. Napoleon with the Guard and 4th Corps moved back to Borovsk. Ney was directed by Vereia on Mozhaïsk, while Davout with the 1st Corps and the relics of the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Corps remained near Maloyaroslavetz until the evening. And, while Napoleon was retracing his steps, Kutuzov, also, was retreating upon Kaluga. He apparently feared that the French, having the road open, would move westward to Medyn and thence south-eastward upon Kaluga. This hypothesis is a direct reflection upon his action in abandoning his position outside Maloyaroslavetz. As matters stood, Kutuzov’s inference was not unreasonable; Poniatowski’s corps was actually on the march from Vereia to Medyn, and appeared to be the advance-guard of a turning movement. Miloradovich remained in observation on the original Russian position, and Platov continued to hover about Davout’s corps. TheCorps de Batailleretrograded to Gonsherevo, about 12 miles from Kaluga. Paskievich’s division was sent to bar the Medyn-Kaluga road at Adamovskoë, some miles to the westward. There he was joined by Ilovaïski IX and his Cossack detachment. Miloradovich was about to fall back on the Russian main body when it was discovered that Maloyaroslavetz was evacuated. Kutuzov was informed, and the advance-guard reoccupied the line of the Luzha.
Kutuzov appeared to have inferred that Napoleon’s intention was to retreat upon Smolensk—as, in fact, it was. He accordingly directed his main body upon Adamovskoë, evidently with the purpose of following on the flank of the French retreat, while Miloradovich was ordered to Medyn. The latter, however, disquieted by reports that the French army was moving from Borovsk by cross-roads upon Medyn, hesitated, delayed, and finally also moved to Adamovskoë. Kutuzov remained at the latter place during the 29th, endeavouring to envisage the situation, and finally appears to have decided that theGrande Arméewas retreating on Vitebsk. The conclusion was reasonable enough. The march of the French along the Borovsk-Mozhaïsk road might certainly indicate an intention to cross the Smolensk road at Mozhaïsk and take a route to the northward for Vitebsk—as Jomini considers that they should have done. Consequently upon the 30th Kutuzov marched northwards upon Mozhaïsk. Platov with his Cossacks and Paskievich’s division was to follow the French rear-guard. The advance-guard would move parallel with the French left flank, while theCorps de Bataillekept to the left of the advance-guard, generally at about a day’s march distance. On the 30th the main army had reached Kremenskoë, but by that day the French rear-guard had arrived at Mozhaïsk and all the corps were moving along the highway to Smolensk. Kutuzov and Miloradovich therefore turned to the westward, while Platov and Paskievich harassed Davout.
The result, therefore, was that the French army had at the outset gained a start upon their pursuers. Bennigsen says that he advised that the march should be directed from Adamovskoë on Yukhnov, thence by a broad road to Slavkovo. It seems clear that this direction would have been an excellent one. But Kutuzov knew that Napoleon was free to use the Medyn road, and indeed expected him to do so. He had, however, fallenback by Vereia, a direction which rather indicated an intention of retreating upon Vitebsk. If he had hoped by taking this route to deceive the Russians as to his line of march he had certainly succeeded.
From Mozhaïsk to Viasma the Moscow-Smolensk road proceeds generally in a shallow arc of a circle, often describing a very sinuous course. Miloradovich marched steadily to the south of it, gradually closing in, and moving much faster than the already dwindling and straggling French army with its immense trains. Still farther to the south and far to the rear the RussianCorps de Bataillehad turned in the right direction and was also marching for Viasma. The roads by which it was forced to proceed were wretched, but none the less the troops marched at a very creditable pace, covering some 74 miles in 4 days.
Meanwhile the Napoleonic host was making its way into and along the Moscow-Smolensk high-road. Junot’s corps being actually on it when the retreat from Maloyaroslavetz began of course led the way; behind it came in succession the Guard, the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Corps, and the 3rd, 4th, and 1stCorps d’Armée, while Poniatowski covered the left flank. At Vereia, on the 27th, Mortier rejoined, bringing with him his prisoner, Winzingerode. Napoleon treated the general with gross insolence and brutality, overwhelming him with abuse, and actually condemned him to death as a traitor because he was a German and therefore a subject of one of his vassals! It is difficult to say whether he was or was not in earnest. When he was enraged his manners were brutal beyond words; and at this time he had every cause for being exasperated. In any case, he gave way to the remonstrances of Berthier and Murat. His conduct was otherwise inexcusable. Winzingerode had entered the service of Russia previous to the formation of the Rhine Confederacy. After being kept in suspense for some days Winzingerode was sent in custody to France; but hewas rescued in Lithuania by Cossacks, as we shall have occasion to mention.
On the 28th Napoleon, at Mozhaïsk, received a report from Davout that he had as yet seen no enemies but Cossacks. He thereupon inferred that the main Russian army was marching to cut his line of retreat. Its natural objective would in that case be Viasma, and the Emperor decided to push for that place with all speed with the Guard.
peasants
ARMED RUSSIAN PEASANTS IN AMBUSH IN THE WOODS WAITING TO CUT OFF FRENCH STRAGGLERSFrom the picture by Verestchagin
On the evening of the 28th Davout was near Vereia. He reported that the Russians were already showing infantry—these were of course Paskievich’s division. He begged the Emperor to put a stop to the wholesale burning of villages by the corps ahead of him. Demoralisation was spreading fast, and the men were abandoning the ranks in crowds. The usual straggling array of march of the Napoleonic hosts was a bad preparation for a retreat in face of an enemy. The field of Borodino was crossed by the Guard at daybreak on the 29th. It still presented a fearful spectacle. Junot’s men had been unable to bury many even of the French dead; and the ground was strewn with rotting corpses mingled with the wreckage of the terrible struggle. The hospitals at Kolotskoï and elsewhere were mere charnel-houses in which the dead lay heaped with the living, amid pestilence, filth, and destitution. About 1500 unhappy creatures still remained, Junot having been unable to remove them. Napoleon issued an order that every private carriage or other non-military vehicle was to carry one or two. Its effect was simply to hasten the end of the unfortunate invalids, who were so much additional encumbrance to men already beginning to feel the pinch of want. They were abandoned by the drivers at the earliest opportunity: some apparently were murdered outright; not one, probably, lived to reach Smolensk. Food was becoming scarce. As far as Mozhaïsk the country was not entirely devastated, and the leading troops had been able to feed their horses;but there was nothing for the rear-guard, whose plight was rendered all the worse by the reckless destruction of shelter by the corps ahead of them. After Mozhaïsk the wasted countryside afforded little or no forage; the horses, already exhausted and over-worked, were reduced to such substitutes for fodder as thatch and autumn leaves, and died by hundreds every day. The destruction of the means of transport meant the loss of much of the already too scanty supply of food. When it was not lost outright it was pillaged by the stragglers and simply served to keep alive these useless beings, while better and braver men died of starvation. By November 3rd such supplies as had been brought were almost entirely exhausted; the only resource of the starving horde was the flesh of the horses which were continually breaking down. The officers, of course, and the head-quarters, were better provided; and some of the men had still remains of their plunder, but these were the exceptions.
The weather was still fine, but it was steadily growing colder, and the half-famished men, ill-clothed, ill-shod, weary with marching, obtained little rest in their chilly bivouacs, and became day by day less able to endure their trials. Those who left the line of march were commonly slaughtered or captured. Capture was often the same thing as lingering death. The peasants, naturally half barbarous, and maddened by the excesses of the invaders, showed little mercy. Sir Robert Wilson tells from his own knowledge how they burned and buried alive their prisoners. Sometimes they were massacred by the women. Even when their lives were spared they were often wholly or partially stripped, and the effect upon frames enfeebled by privation was generally fatal. It is useless to dwell in detail upon the hideous barbarities perpetrated, still less is it profitable to reprobate them. It must be said that if there be but too much testimony to the barbarity of the infuriated Russians, there is also plenty of evidence as to their frequent kindliness andhumanity. At their worst be it remembered that they were but retaliating for their own wrongs.
The mass of disbanded troops, which every day grew at the expense of those who remained faithful, consisted in the first place of men already weakened, who therefore fell out early and of course died. Then there were many who had not the spirit to bear up under their misery and wandered along in the crowd until they also fell and died. Lastly, there were large numbers who were simply deserters—often of the worst kind—men who left the ranks before they were disabled and subsisted by murder and robbery. They did more than anything to destroy the army. Some of the leaders of the faithful troops were aware of it. De Fezensac tells how he ordered that no mercy or consideration was to be shown them.
On the other hand, there were very many gallant soldiers of every rank who kept their ranks and did their duty to the bitter end. Russian eye-witnesses were full of admiration at the martial bearing of the scanty and ever dwindling battalions which, with eagles in their midst, moved doggedly on through the miserable horde of skulkers. The officers, with few exceptions, remained firm to their duty. Their intellectual and educational level was upon the whole naturally higher than that of their men, and general good conduct among them was to be expected. They were, too, generally better supplied with food and clothing, and exercised more judgment in providing themselves.
The extent to which demoralisation affected the strategic units of the army is difficult to decide; and the task is a somewhat invidious one. The 3rd Corps certainly appears to have kept the best order and discipline. It had taken a very small part in the demoralising sack of Moscow; but a great deal of its persistent good conduct must be attributed to the personal influence of its chief. The 1st Corps, on the other hand, seems to have crumbled early. Davout was not a very sympathetic personage,and perhaps the care which he had always taken of his men, and his firm discipline, really unfitted them to bear the strain of being in a condition of inferiority to the enemy. At any rate the early demoralisation of the 1st Corps is an established fact. The 4th Corps also rapidly disbanded, as did also, apparently, the 5th and 8th. Of the cavalry we hear little. The Guard took the lion’s share of whatever food and shelter was to be had; nevertheless its conduct was not relatively better than that of the 3rd Corps—perhaps not so good, since it never experienced the same trials.
march
Plan of the approximate positions of the French and Russian Main Armies on October 31st, to indicate the danger incurred by Napoleon’s extended order of march
Napoleon, with the Guard, reached Viasma on October 31st. The cold on this day was greater than it had hitherto been; and the Emperor donned a Polish dress of green, heavily furred, and a fur cap. At Viasma was General Evers’ column of drafts. There was also in the place a small magazine of bread, biscuit, flour, and rice. It was pillaged by the leading troops, and so great was the demoralisation that much of the town was destroyed, though thousands tramping painfully behind were thus deprived of shelter. On this day the Guard, the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Corps, and Junot’s Corps were about Viasma; Ney one march short of it; Eugène and Poniatowski about Gzhatsk, and Davout at Gridnevo. The line was nearly 70 miles long from front to rear. Miloradovich was near at hand with his cavalry, but his infantry could not arrive before the 3rd. Kutuzov also was marching for Viasma, but was still 60 miles distant.
Davout’s slow withdrawal was doubtless dictated by a desire to save as much as possible of the artillery and trains; but in the circumstances it was impossible to do much, and it would have been better to abandon at once everything that fell behind. Lack of shelter, inadequate food, and the steady harassing of Platov was rapidly breaking up the 1st Corps. It had already abandoned 20 guns and much of its trains; the roads were dotted with men and horses dead of fatigue.
Napoleon remained for 36 hours at Viasma, principally occupied with desk-work. He informed the generals in the rear of his retrograde march, representing it as a purely voluntary movement made to come into touch with his wings. From Baraguay d’Hilliers he learned that he had advanced to Selnia, and despatched orders for him to return to Smolensk. From Victor he became aware that the 9th Corps had been forced to support St. Cyr.
General Ilovaïski IV, temporarily commanding Winzingerode’s detachment, had reoccupied Moscow on October 23rd. He found there some 1500 sick and wounded whom Mortier had been unable to evacuate, and 42 mounted guns, of which 24 were French.
Ney’s corps reached Viasma on November 1st. Miloradovich continued to move parallel to the road, hastening the march of his infantry and anxious to strike a blow. At 11 a.m. on the 2nd Napoleon left for Semlevo. Davout in the evening arrived at a point about 9 miles from Viasma and a little more than 1 east of the village of Federovskoië. Eugène and Poniatowski were between Viasma and Federovskoië. Ney was to take over rear-guard duty as soon as Davout should pass Viasma. Napoleon was angry with the slowness of the latter; but the orders which he issued to hasten the march of the trains could not be executed owing to the deplorable state of the horses. The orders to prevent straggling were equally impossible of execution. None the less, Davout had certainly moved very slowly, and there was some excuse for the Emperor’s irritated remark that “the Prince of Eckmuhl keeps the Viceroy and Poniatowski waiting for every band of Cossacks that he sees.” In justice to Davout it must be said that the young and inexperienced Eugène appears often to have delayed him by his own lack of speed.
At 8 a.m. on the 3rd Miloradovich with Korff’s and Vassilchikov’s divisions reached Maximovo, a villagesome 2 miles from Federovskoië, and about 1 mile south of the high-road. Davout was passing through Federovskoië, his leading division—Gérard’s—being nearly abreast of Maximovo. The Hussars of Akhtyrka, supported by a brigade of dragoons, boldly charged the head of Gérard’s column, while the Russian horse artillery opened a brisk cannonade on his flank. The 2nd Corps could not come into action before ten; while Kutuzov was only just leaving Dubna, nearly 30 miles from Viasma.
Gérard’s division, attacked without warning, was checked in its march upon Viasma. Platov was close on Davout’s rear, and as soon as he heard the sound of Miloradovich’s cannonade he pressed home his advance, Paskievich marching straight upon Fedorovskoië, while Platov turned it on the left. Davout saw that there was not a moment to lose in clearing the way before the arrival of Miloradovich’s infantry, and hurried his divisions up at the double to support Gérard. Eugène turned back to his colleague’s support, while Poniatowski took up a position in advance of Viasma to support Eugène. Ney posted his corps to the right of the town, behind the Viasma river; he threw a bridge across it in order to facilitate the retirement of his colleagues’ trains. The river makes an acute angle a little south of the town, so that Ney had it both before and behind him; he threw a second bridge over it to assure his own retreat.
Miloradovich had available for the conflict the 2nd and 4th Army Corps, Paskievich’s division of the 7th and Platov’s Flying Corps, perhaps 30,000 or 32,000 combatants in all, with some 120 guns. The estimates of the French force vary. Davout may have had 20,000 infantry and artillery, Eugène perhaps 15,000, Ney probably 8000, Poniatowski about 3500. The remains of the corps cavalry and of the 1st and 3rd Reserve Corps probably could not muster 4000 mounted men. The artillery could still count over 300 guns, but the worn-out state of their teams rendered them incapable of manœuvring. The troops, with the exception of those of Ney, were demoralised.
viasma
BATTLE OF VIASMAPositions about 10 a.m.
Davout’s troops, ranged in dense battalion columns, attacked the Russian cavalry on the road and broke through, scattering the hostile squadrons, some of which had to retreat towards the north to join Platov. This appears to have occurred at about 10 a.m. Paskievich meanwhile had carried Federovskoië, and Platov was harassing the French on the right; while Prince Eugen’s division of the 2nd Corps formed across the road just as the Russian horsemen gave way and poured a heavy fire into the head of Davout’s column. The Marshal’s position was extremely critical. The Viceroy, however, was now close at hand with Broussier’s and Guilleminot’s divisions and the 5th Corps. He cannonaded the flank and rear of the 4th Division and attacked it with a cloud of skirmishers. Its commander believed that he could hold his own, but Miloradovich was of a different opinion, and, seeing the force which was coming from Viasma, he was probably correct. Eugen drew back into line with the rest of the Russian infantry on the south of the road, and Davout’s troops were able to defile past. But they had suffered considerably, and the disorder among them was increased by the cannonade beneath which they had to march. The trains streamed away to the north of the road to reach Viasma, while the 1st Corps inclined to the south to come into line with the 4th and 5th Corps. Eugène formed across the road with Poniatowski in support; but as Platov spread to the north he threw back his right wing. Davout’s troops were on Eugène’s right, nearly parallel with the line of the road. To support and steady them Ney advanced Razout’s division, while Ledru’s remained to check Uvarov, who was now coming up with Kutuzov’s advance-guard. Uvarov, however, who had only the bulk of Golitzin’s Cuirassiers under his command, could only confine himself to a desultory cannonade. The head of Kutuzov’s column reachedBykovo, 5 miles from Viasma, in the afternoon, but it had marched 22 miles already and could hardly engage that day.
Miloradovich, after Davout had passed, deployed his whole force across the road and marched forward, Eugen’s, Paskievich’s and Choglokov’s divisions in first line, the remaining two in reserve, Platov pushing forward on the right, Korff and Vassilchikov in reserve and on the left. The French generals, fearing that at any moment Kutuzov might debouch in their rear, held a conference on the road, and decided to retreat. The final withdrawal commenced at about 2 p.m. Eugène and Poniatowski succeeded in passing through the town in fair order; but Davout’s shaken troops fell back in confusion, hotly pressed by Paskievich and Choglokov. Ney covered the retreat of his colleague to the utmost of his power, and retired through Viasma, burning such of it as remained intact. The French bivouacked in the woods on the west of the town. The night proved bitterly cold.
The French losses are usually stated at 4000 killed and wounded. Those of the Russians may have amounted to 2500. Miloradovich captured 3 guns and about 2000 prisoners, besides some thousands of the disbanded mob. Among the prisoners was General Pelletier, commanding the artillery of the 5th Corps. The French writers attribute the defeat mainly to Davout’s error in inclining to his right as he fell back instead of his left, but it is doubtful whether this was more than a subsidiary cause.
On the 4th Kutuzov remained inactive at Bykovo. His troops may have needed rest, but it is extraordinary that he made no attempt to crush or at least to harass the weary, half-starved and beaten French army behind the Viasma. Perhaps he was imposed upon by Ney’s bold show in the rear, and the good order of the undemoralised 3rd Corps. It is perhaps difficult to judge him, since we can scarcely appreciate the vast influence exercised by the prestige of the Napoleonic army uponthe minds of its opponents everywhere save in Britain. But to say the least, he could and should have done much more.
Ney, early on the 4th, took up a strong position on the edge of the woods. Beurmann was detached to the right to observe Uvarov, whom he held in check during the day. Meanwhile the 1st, 4th and 5th Corps defiled on the road to Dorogobuzh. All were in the greatest disorder. The men were worn out with fatigue and appeared hopelessly discouraged, only the Royal Guard of Italy still marched in fair order. The number of stragglers, of whom the majority had thrown away their arms, was enormous. Ney was much impressed by the disorder of the 1st Corps, and his despatch upon the battle contained some bitter remarks upon it, as well as the haphazard conduct of the engagement.
The substitution of the 3rd Corps for the 1st rear-guard duty was another proof that Napoleon did not really understand the critical state of affairs. Ney was an ideal rear-guard leader, and the 3rd Corps was an intact and undiscouraged force, but it consisted of only two divisions (the Württemberg troops having been amalgamated with the other two) as against the five of the 1st.
At daybreak on the 5th the 3rd Corps withdrew in good order, but followed and impeded by at least 4000 disbanded men of the other corps. De Fezensac, in bivouac that night, ordered all able-bodied skulkers to be driven away by force from the fires. Near Semlevo there was an action with the leading troops of Miloradovich, but the 3rd Corps was not molested on the 6th. Kutuzov, had he pushed forward on the 4th, would certainly have destroyed Ney and probably Eugène also. The Russians were so strong in cavalry that they could always retard the French retreat by employing it vigorously to harass the moving columns. However this may be, Kutuzov on the 5th bent south-westward to Ielnia, while Miloradovich and Platov continued to follow andharass the French rear-guard. Many stragglers were slain or taken by the Cossacks and waggons were abandoned in numbers; but no impression was made upon Ney’s corps, which continued its march to Dorogobuzh and there took up a position.
Napoleon had intended to receive battle east of Dorogobuzh. His plan appears in his correspondence, and it can only be characterised as utterly impracticable. It assumed that the whole Russian Army was following on the main road, and also counted upon being able to ambuscade their advance-guard. Even had the army been less reduced and demoralised this would have been impossible, the Russians being so strong in cavalry. The plan was not executed; by the time that he had drawn it up Napoleon had probably read Ney’s despatch of the 4th, in which the marshal stated his conviction that only a part of the Russian army was at Viasma. Next day Ney reported that he had learned that Russian columns were passing him on the right; and Napoleon retreated with the Guard upon Mikalevka.
On the 6th and 7th the weather, which had hitherto been by day comparatively mild, changed for the worse, with violent gales and heavy snowstorms. After this the destruction of the army proceeded apace. The horses were the first to suffer; it was impossible to obtain any forage with the ground covered deep with snow. No provision had been made for rough-shoeing the horses, except by the Polish cavalry; and on the slippery surface of the trodden snow they fell in hundreds, to be preyed upon by the starving troops. Vehicles of every kind had to be abandoned; and each was instantly plundered by a group of wolfish stragglers, often to the accompaniment of murder. The number of disbanded men rapidly increased, and their lawlessness and savagery grew even more quickly. Had it been possible to maintain better discipline the state of the army might have been less intolerable. Terrible as the conditions were,they could have been somewhat ameliorated had there been a better sense of comradeship among the troops, which might have prevented so many of them from disbanding and degenerating into veritable wild beasts.
But in truth the misery was so great that the finest loyalty and steadiness could not greatly have alleviated it. Had there been a sufficiency of even the coarsest food, the troops might have withstood the cold. But almost the only resource remaining was the unwholesome flesh of the worn-down horses. Even the officers were often little better off as regards meat, though they could still procure small quantities of biscuit or flour. The troops as a whole were insufficiently clad and, above all, ill-shod; those who succeeded in obtaining a little food were often disabled by frost-bite or injuries to their ill-protected feet. In the hope of guarding against the deadly cold the men overloaded themselves with clothing of every kind and quality, often filthy rags torn from the dead and dying. In their fear of taking a fatal chill they never removed them even for necessary purposes, and dared not wash. In their ravening hunger they ate like wild beasts, tearing the raw or half-cooked horse-flesh with their teeth, and covering themselves and their wretched garments with blood and offal. Their appearance soon became indescribably hideous, and the result of their panic-born neglect was, of course, loathsome disease. Selfishness increased with misery; men thrust their weaker comrades from the bivouac fires, and fought for the wretched carrion on which they strove to maintain their existence; while those who fell were robbed and stripped by passers-by.
retreat
THE RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM MOSCOWFrom the painting by Adam
Amid all this misery and lack of self-respect there was much that redounds to the credit of human nature. Many soldiers added to their hardships by endeavouring to assist the women and children who followed the army. Officers who possessed private carriages gave them up to these unhappy fugitives; those attached to the head-quarters, which was better provided than the rest of the army, succeeded in saving many. Unhappily the most necessary requisite was food, and this the chivalrous protectors could not often give their charges. The hardy female followers could protect and provide for themselves to some extent, but too many of the officers’ wives or connections were utterly helpless, and their fate was a piteous one.
One of the most awful incidents of the retreat was the fate of the Russian prisoners, of whom some 2000—stragglers, convalescents, and civilians—were dragged with the army, under a guard made up of fragments and detachments of every nation. From the first the captives were treated with gross cruelty and neglect. The weakly ones who fell behind were done to death without mercy. Every night the survivors were huddled together, fireless, on the bare ground, without food save a little raw horse-flesh. Before long even this was not forthcoming, and the miserable prisoners, driven along and herded together like wild beasts by men who were losing the traces of humanity, perished amid horrible misery. Cannibalism is said to have raged among them. There is no darker stain on the escutcheon of Napoleon (who must be held ultimately responsible) than this treatment of men who were at any rate open enemies, and some of whom were not even combatants.
Day by day the number of men in the ranks dwindled. Every bivouac was the graveyard of hundreds of men and thousands of horses; the line of march resembled a long battlefield. The roads were strewn with dead or dying men and horses, abandoned guns and vehicles, and wreckage of every kind. Amid this streamed westward in wild confusion the endless procession of disbanded men and male and female camp-followers, accompanied by vehicles of all kinds, through which the troops still with the colours could scarcely force their way. Many men were already so weak that they could hardly stumblealong. Some became idiotic with privation and the spectacle of the misery about them. The plight of the troops in the ranks was no better; their devotion to duty only prolonged their sufferings. Ill-clad, starving, stricken with cold and disease, often half-blind from the effects of the glaring snow by day and the smoke of the fires at night, it is wonderful that they ever managed, as they did, to make some kind of fight. Their duties, when they had strength to carry them out, were confined to beating off the hovering Cossacks, and to destroying guns and waggons that would otherwise have been abandoned.
From Dorogobuzh Eugène’s corps was diverted towards Dukhovchina with the intention of directing it thence upon Vitebsk to relieve the pressure upon Victor by Wittgenstein. The result was its practical destruction.
On November 7th Eugen of Württemberg attacked Razout’s division before Dorogobuzh and after some obstinate fighting, partly owing to the indecision of its short-sighted commander, forced it to retreat through the town with a loss of several hundred men and 4 guns. Ney, who had hoped to delay Miloradovich for a day, was obliged to fall back towards Smolensk. Dorogobuzh was choked with disbanded men, who were ruthlessly murdered or stripped by the exasperated inhabitants. A watchmaker boasted of having killed 11 Frenchmen with a knife which he had concealed for the purpose! Miloradovich, however, was then obliged to draw off his infantry towards the south for the sake of food and shelter against the cold. He left the pursuit of Ney to Major-General Yurkovski with a brigade of dragoons and some Cossacks, while Platov followed Eugène towards Dukhovchina.
At Mikalevka Napoleon learned of Malet’s audacious conspiracy in Paris, and the tidings doubtless did not tend to relieve his mind. On the 8th Junot’s corps arrived at Smolensk; but the day before that ruined town hadbeen invaded by crowds of disbanded troops. Junot was not allowed to pass his corps into it, and cantoned it in villages on the Mstislavl road. Napoleon himself arrived on the 9th, only to be met by bad news from every side.
Victor was proving unable to hold back Wittgenstein. Baraguay d’Hilliers’ division, as has been related, had pushed out to Ielnia, and was retiring upon Smolensk, when on this day his rear-guard brigade, 2000 strong, under General Augereau, was surrounded in the village of Liakhova by Orlov-Denisov, with his own flying detachment and those of Davidov, Seslavin, and Figner. Augereau was without artillery, and not being supported by Baraguay d’Hilliers, who showed great irresolution, was forced to surrender. Baraguay d’Hilliers retreated hastily to Smolensk with the rest of his division, and was very properly ordered home for trial. Besides Augereau’s brigade several depôts or posts of troops were captured by the Russian advanced detachments. Kutuzov reached Chelkanovo on the Smolensk-Mstislavl road, about 25 miles from Smolensk, on the 12th. He had not marched very rapidly—some 120 miles in 9 days—but it is true that both roads and weather were terrible. The Russians were well clothed and fairly well fed; but many of the Russian troops were young, and the snowy bivouacs had disastrous effects upon their unformed constitutions.
On this same disastrous day, the 9th, Eugène’s corps, after 3 days’ struggling through the snow, reached the small river Vop, only 30 miles from Dorogobuzh. The Viceroy had already lost 1200 of his remaining horses and much of his artillery. He had sent on a detachment to bridge the stream, but materials were lacking, and the wretched soldiers were forced to wade. The Royal Guard led the way, with Eugène in their midst, with ice and water up to their waists, formed on the opposite bank and drove away Platov’s vanguard, which was alreadyacross. Platov himself was tormenting the rear-guard with his light artillery, and threatening the unhappy column in flank and rear. When Eugène had crossed an effort was made to bring over the artillery and baggage. The steep banks of the stream had been hurriedly made practicable for vehicles, but the inclines were quickly covered with ice; the ford was soon choked by guns and waggons sticking fast in the mud, and eventually all but the small proportion which crossed first had to be abandoned. There were terrible scenes on the bank when this became known. A turmoil of fighting, pillage and murder reigned. Many worn-out soldiers, struggling through the icy water, were overcome by the cold and drowned: many others died in the night. Broussier’s division covered the rear against Platov all night, and only crossed on the morning of the 10th, leaving behind them many sick and wounded, a vast quantity of baggage and some 60 guns. Hundreds of men, overcome by cold, threw away their arms. The bulk of the corps streamed along the road to Dukhovchina completely disorganised; only the Royal Guard and Broussier’s division still moved with some show of order. Dukhovchina was already occupied by Cossacks—the leading regiments of Winzingerode’s old detachment, now under Major-General Golénischev-Kutuzov. They, however, of course had to retire before the advance of the Royal Guard, and Eugène occupied the town. It had not yet been plundered, and the exhausted remnants of the 4th Corps were able to obtain food and a little rest. On the 12th Eugène set fire to Dukhovchina and retreated on Smolensk, where he arrived on the 13th, surrounded and harassed all the way by the indefatigable Cossacks. He had with the colours only 6000 or 7000 armed men, and 20 guns at most out of over 100.
Davout’s and Poniatowski’s[7]troops made their wayfrom Viasma to Smolensk with little opposition from the Russians, but disintegrating day by day under the influence of cold, fatigue and hunger. The Poles seem to have completely broken up, and only about 800 privates reached Smolensk. On the other hand, they saved a large proportion of their artillery, owing to their sensible precautions in rough-shoeing their horses.
Ney reached the Dnieper at Solovievo on the 19th. The approach to the bridge was choked for more than half a mile with abandoned guns and waggons; and before passing Ney ordered his men to fire them. In doing so they came upon some remnants of food supplies and some spirits. In the woods on both sides of the road were thousands of stragglers, largely wounded, whom the omnipresent Cossacks massacred and plundered under the very eyes of their comrades. In the evening the 3rd Corps passed the river and destroyed the bridge. It defended the passage against Yurkovski’s brigade, the Cossacks, and some supporting infantry, until the 12th, and then retreated on Smolensk, in weather so awful that even the Russian Löwenstern speaks of it as something exceptional. It was impossible to halt for fear of freezing, while the icebound road was fatal to hundreds of exhausted men. A terrible night in bivouac put the capstone on the sufferings of the devoted 3rd Corps. On the 4th it entered Smolensk—some 4000 men left of more than 11,000 who had marched from Moscow.
It is now necessary to turn aside to follow the fortunes of Napoleon’s wings. On October 29th Victor joined Merle at Chasniki, at the junction of the little river Lukomlia with the Ula, about 17 miles south-west of Bechenkowiczi. Dändels had already joined Legrand. Wittgenstein and Steingell united at Lepel on the same day and reached the Ula on the 30th. They were, however, owing to the detachment of Vlastov’s division, not more than 33,000 strong, while the 2nd and 9th Corps, even in the absence of Corbineau, mustered 36,000infantry and 4000 cavalry. Victor therefore decided to attack, and sent to call in Dändels and Legrand. Owing to misunderstandings, however, neither Legrand nor the cavalry of the 9th Corps arrived, and Victor hesitated to attack. Wittgenstein drove Victor’s advance troops over the Lukomlia, and brought a mass of artillery into action, which gained the advantage over the French guns. After a long cannonade the action died away, and before dawn on November 1st Victor retreated upon Sienno, about 25 miles east of Chasniki. He had suffered no reverse, and, indeed, had hardly engaged his troops. He may have thought, as De Chambray says, that it would be better to temporise until he was reinforced by Napoleon. Wittgenstein did not pursue, but moved Harpe’s division towards Bechenkowiczi to observe Victor’s movements. The latter, after remaining for two days at Sienno, turned south-westward to Chereia, about 20 miles north of the Smolensk-Minsk road at Bobr. Whether this move was due to his fear for the highway cannot be determined, but the result was disastrous. On November 7th Harpe attacked Vitebsk, which was now uncovered. The small garrison, under General Pouget, was either killed or captured.
On October 29th, Chichagov started from Brest-Litovsk for Minsk. To hold back Schwarzenberg he left with Sacken the divisions of Bulatov, Lieven, and Essen III, a total of about 27,000 combatants, with 96 guns. Under his own command were the 2 corps of Voïnov and Sabaniev, forming together theCorps de Batailleunder Langeron, and two advance-guards commanded by Lambert and Chaplitz—33,000 men with 180 guns. Chichagov sent orders to Ertel to advance from Mozyr to meet him. General Musin Pushkin was left with 4000 or 5000 men to guard the Volhynian frontier. The Admiral left Pruzhani on the 30th and reached Slonim on November 3rd. He might have moved more rapidly, but he explained to the Tzar that he hoped to drawSchwarzenberg upon him and be able to strike hard at him before marching upon Minsk. He waited about Slonim until November 8th in this expectation, then, feeling that further delay would be dangerous, started for Minsk. He had, in fact, waited too long already.
Schwarzenberg, having left Kosinski’s Poles to cover Warsaw and one of Durutte’s regiments to garrison that capital, concentrated the rest of his army at Bieloslok, and marched for Volkovisk, which he reached on November 8th, Chichagov being nearly 60 miles in advance with his way clear before him. On the 14th Schwarzenberg was at Slonim with his Austrians, while Reynier and Durutte were at Volkovisk. Sacken broke up from Brest-Litovsk on November 1st. He left Colonel Witte with 3 battalions and 2 newly joined Cossack regiments to cover his base, and marched for Volkovisk. Between him and his objective lay the extensive forest of Bielovezhi, which he had to skirt, but on November 12th he was nearing Volkovisk, throwing forward his right in order to interpose between Schwarzenberg and Reynier. The latter, fearing to be assailed in flank, fell back upon Volkovisk.
Volkovisk lies upon the right bank of the river Rossi, which flows northward to the Niemen. Hard by the town a rivulet entered the Rossi. Both were now frozen. North of the town are some low heights, and on these the bulk of Reynier’s army was posted; but his head-quarters were in Volkovisk itself.
Sacken decided that his best course was to vigorously attack Reynier, so as, at least, to bring back Schwarzenberg to his assistance. It was a bold but perilous resolve, since Sacken was not greatly superior even to Reynier in numbers, and might be taken in rear by the Austrians. In the night of the 14th-15th his advance-guard surprised Volkovisk, driving out its garrison and nearly capturing Reynier. The advance of the Russian column, however, was then checked by Durutte.
On the 15th Reynier took up a position behind thetown, his right, consisting of Saxons, resting on the wooded bank of the Rossi, Durutte in the centre, and more Saxons on the left. Sacken was drawn up south of the town, with Bulatov on the right, Essen in the centre, and Lieven on the left.
Early on the 15th Durutte retook Volkovisk. Sacken did not attempt to recover it. The day passed in desultory cannonading, except on Reynier’s left, where the Russian cavalry of Bulatov’s corps, under Melissino, endeavoured to take advantage of a movement of Saxon infantry to charge, but was handsomely repulsed by their horsemen.
Schwarzenberg, informed of Sacken’s advance, left Frimont with about 7000 men at Slonim, and returned towards Volkovisk with the remaining 18,000. On the 15th his advance-guard was already well on the way; but Sacken, misled by the false reports of some prisoners, decided to press home his attack upon Reynier. On the 16th he recaptured Volkovisk, and about midday developed a heavy attack upon Reynier’s left, when guns were heard on the road to Slonim nearly in rear of Sacken’s centre, and fugitives from the guards of baggage which had been sent there announced that Schwarzenberg was at hand. Sacken at once began to withdraw towards the left, first Lieven, then Essen, finally Bulatov. It was dark before even Essen began his march, and the army retreated safely to Svislozh on the Brest-Litovsk road.
He was hotly pursued by Schwarzenberg and Reynier, the latter following him on the main road, while Schwarzenberg threatened to turn his right, and interpose between him and the Bielovezhi Forest. During the next ten days there was constant rear-guard fighting, though never of a very severe description, as Sacken made his way back towards Brest-Litovsk. On the 25th he took up a position to cover that place, but his opponents were manifestly too strong for him, and on the 26th it was reoccupied by Reynier. The net result of Sacken’soperations was that he had drawn Schwarzenberg far away from the decisive point on the Berezina. On the 25th the Austrian general received a letter from Maret at Vilna, bidding him turn back to support Napoleon. This he at once did, but whatever he might or might not wish it was now far too late. On the 27th, when he set out to remeasure his steps, Napoleon was already crossing the Berezina, threatened by Chichagov and Wittgenstein. Sacken’s losses during his brief campaign had been heavy, though certainly they had not approached the figure of 10,000, at which the French estimated them. He had lost also a considerable part of his trains. The losses of his opponents were perhaps about 3000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. The importance of the strategic success of the Russians is not, however, to be expressed in terms of losses.
The remains of the central Napoleonic army were collected at Smolensk by November 13th. The leading troops had thus some five days’ rest from marching, but little alleviation of their misery. There had been some 1500 beef-cattle in the villages round the town, but most of these were swept up by the Cossacks who preceded the march of the main Russian army. In Smolensk itself there were considerable stores of flour, grain, and brandy—probably enough to supply the remains of the army for several days. There was also a certain quantity of biscuit, rice, and dried vegetables. The Guard as usual was unduly favoured. Napoleon ordered that it should have 15 days’ supplies issued to it, while the other unhappy corps were only to have six. Judging, however, from narratives of members of the Guard, it never received anything like the amount ordered. The men, hungry and improvident, seem to have largely gorged themselves on their rations; a good many sold them at exorbitant prices to others; in this way the survivors of Preising’s Bavarian horsemen were able to obtain a little food. Portable mills, which had by this time begun toarrive, were also issued. Even in their misery the soldiers made bitter jests at this provision for grinding flour which was not to be had. Shelter there was little. Eyewitnesses give grim accounts of the wretchedness within the walls. As corps after corps reached the town in their misery the hospitals were choked with sick and wounded, who were literally heaped into these dens of horror without provision of any kind. The cold was worse than it yet had been, and the men were frost-bitten by hundreds. It was fortunate for Napoleon that a thaw set in on the 14th. While in the town the troops had at any rate food enough for immediate needs, the troops of Junot and Zayonczek in the villages outside were left unprovided for, with the result that they pillaged such convoys as passed near them, and ate hundreds of serviceable horses.
The army received indeed considerable reinforcements at Smolensk. Baraguay d’Hilliers’ column was distributed among the corps as they arrived. The Vistula Legion was joined by its 3rd battalions, Ney’s corps by the 129th Regiment and that of Illyria. It is difficult to state the strength of the army on the 14th, but it may be perhaps estimated at nearly 60,000 men. The Guard still retained about 2500 badly mounted horsemen; all the other cavalry divisions did not muster more than 3000 mounted men between them. The remnant of the Cavalry Reserve—some 2000 sabres—was collected under the command of Latour-Maubourg. Much of the artillery, which had been so far dragged along, could no longer proceed, and 140 pieces were abandoned in Smolensk.
army
RUSSIAN GRENADIERS PURSUING THE FRENCH ARMYFrom the picture by Verestchagin
On the 13th the remains of Eugène’s corps poured in wild confusion into the town. An issue of rations was commenced, but the starving men broke from control and pillaged the magazines. Order was restored by desperate exertions, but there had been much damage and waste of precious food. Next day the 1st Corps flooded into Smolensk in a state as pitiable as thatof the 4th, and the disorder of this erstwhile best disciplined of the army corps could not be restrained. The storehouses were broken open amid frenzied scenes of disorder and violence; the miserable wretches murdered one another at the doors and in the streets. The provisions were pillaged, a great part of them being of course destroyed in the confusion. Nothing was left for Ney’s brave men, who were sacrificing themselves to save the rest of the army, except such remnants as they could obtain by searching for them.
Kutuzov meanwhile was advancing with a slowness and caution which exasperated the more eager of his subordinates and caused some of them to mutter angrily about treachery. On the 14th he marched 13 miles from Chelkanovo to Jurovo, and halted for a day. It may well be, as Clausewitz reasonably remarks, that his firmness was shaken by the deteriorating condition of his own army, which was suffering severely from the cold, and perishing in bivouac at an alarming rate, though, of course, less rapidly than theGrande Armée, since the soldiers were fairly well fed. This, however, would probably have impelled a younger and more energetic man to deal a deadly blow at his opponents before his own force melted away. Kutuzov, however, was undoubtedly too old and infirm for the present crisis. Moreover, it is clear that the Russian scouts greatly overrated the French numbers largely because the stragglers were frequently mistaken for fighting men. A good many of them still possessed weapons. Miloradovich left Choglokov’s division to watch Ney before Smolensk, and himself with the bulk of his force moved round the town to join his commander-in-chief, while Platov moved past it on the north. On the 16th Kutuzov moved on to Chilova, 4½ miles south-east of Krasnoï, and there halted.
On the 13th Napoleon directed Junot, with the 8th Corps and the remnant of the dismounted cavalry, andZayonczek, with the 5th Corps, upon Krasnoï. Generals Eblé and Jomini had already been sent forward with detachments of sappers to repair bridges and facilitate the march. But already the disbanded troops had drawn ahead of the organised bodies and were streaming along the highway, pillaging convoys and spreading disorder everywhere. There were small magazines of food at Krasnoï, Liadi, Tolochin, and other places, and a larger one at Orsha. The situation was thus in one sense less unfavourable than before. Unfortunately, however, the Russian army at Chilova was within easy reach of the high-road; and now Napoleon, as though his evil-genius ever directed him in 1812 to do the wrong thing, moved the remains of his army along its front with a day’s interval between its corps!
Claparède’s Poles, escorting the treasure and head-quarters baggage, and the little left of the reserve artillery, followed Junot. On the 14th Napoleon left Smolensk with the Guard and Latour-Maubourg. Eugène was to leave on the 15th, Davout on the 16th, Ney on the 17th, after destroying the ramparts. Davout was to reinforce Ney with one of his divisions.
On the 14th Count Ozharovski’s flying column entered Krasnoï, and began to destroy the stores collected there, but was driven out by Claparède’s division, and withdrew to Uvarova, on the Lossmina, 2 miles to the south-east. Early on the 15th Miloradovich, with the 2nd and 7th Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, reached Riavka, a little way west of Korythnia, just as Napoleon and the Guard were passing. He opened with his artillery, but did not venture to attack the infantry of the Guard, though the opportunity was surely worth seizing. He moved down into the road when the last closed bodies had passed, and picked up 11 abandoned guns and 2000 stragglers. He then moved along the road to Merlino, and took position across it with his front covered by a rivulet, flowing as usual in a difficult gully. Napoleonreached Krasnoï in safety, and the Guard camped about the little town.
Though a thaw was setting in this brought little relief to the sufferings of theGrande Armée. Snow fell heavily, and the fatigue of tramping through it was enormous, while the damp foggy weather told almost as heavily upon the men as the bitter cold of previous days. The horses appear to have completely broken down, when after some kind of rest they had to resume the road. The artillery of the Guard, the best appointed of the army, took 22 hours to cover the first 13 miles out of Smolensk, and on reaching Krasnoï 12 of the 24 horse guns had to be abandoned. Half of Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry remnant were dismounted in 2 days, while divisions abandoned and destroyed their reserve parks wholesale, being utterly unable to get them through the broken country west of Smolensk. The ravine of the Lossmina, east of Krasnoï, was one of the most fatal to the trains; guns, waggons and vehicles of every kind were literally heaped together to the east of it, where the road passed through a defile.
Eugène left Smolensk on the 15th, but it was difficult to get the worn-down troops and their fatal incubus of non-combatants away from the town, and the 4th Corps by evening had only reached Lubna, about 7 or 8 miles on the road to Krasnoï. On the 16th it continued its march, harassed all the way by clouds of Cossacks. On the afternoon of the 16th it found its way barred by Miloradovich, Kutuzov on the same day reaching Chilova. Napoleon appears at last to have awakened to the necessity of uniting his scattered columns, and remained at Krasnoï in order to allow the 4th, 1st and 3rd Corps to close up. Davout on this day left Smolensk with 4 divisions, and Zayonczek arrived at Dubrovna. The shattered relics of theGrande Arméewere thus scattered on a line of 60 miles. Even if the Poles and Junot be discounted, owing to their small numbers, the mainforce was spread over 30 miles of road, while Kutuzov, with his whole army, seriously reduced but in fine heart and fair condition, lay close to its head.
Miloradovich, at Merlino, had the 2nd Corps, under Prince Dolgoruki, drawn up across the road, while Raievski lay parallel with it on the south. Uvarov’s cavalry were in reserve. The relics of the 4th Corps totalled only some 6000 combatants and a few guns, besides about 1200 armed stragglers, whom Guilleminot succeeded in collecting and forming. These latter, however, were quickly repulsed, and driven behind the remains of the 4th Corps, which, with Broussier’s division on the left, Phillipon’s (formerly Delzons’) in the centre and Pino’s on the right, steadily awaited destruction, cheering defiantly in answer to the heavy cannonade of the Russians. Eugène, of course, rejected with disdain Miloradovich’s proposal of surrender, and moved forward. Paskievich’s extreme flank brigade was for a moment disordered by Broussier’s gallant advance, but the attack was speedily repulsed, and only darkness saved the survivors of the 4th Corps. Leaving Broussier to cover the rear, Eugène filed the other divisions to the right and reached Krasnoï early on the 17th. He had only about 4000 men left. The last guns had been captured, and Broussier’s division almost annihilated.
On the 16th, before daylight, Roguet’s division of the Young Guard had expelled Ozharovski’s detachment from the villages which it occupied to the south of Krasnoï. Roguet, of course, could not pursue his slight success, as the whole Russian army was now nearing Krasnoï, but its effect was to render Kutuzov more than ever cautious and circumspect.
The arrival of Eugène convinced Napoleon that if Davout and Ney were to be saved he must make a stand in order to allow them to close up upon him. The 4th Corps was incapable of taking any part in the action, and he ordered it to defile on the road to Orsha. Theinfantry of the Guard was drawn up to the south of Krasnoï, Claparède’s division in the town, Laborde in the centre, Roguet on the left near the Lossmina ravine. The Old Guard, the cavalry, and Latour-Maubourg’s few remaining mounted troopers, with 30 guns were to move back towards Smolensk to meet Davout. Napoleon’s total strength amounted to less than 18,000 men, of whom 2500 were cavalry in miserable condition; while only the light artillery of the Young Guard could manœuvre away from the road.
Davout had left Smolensk on the 16th, and his leading division bivouacked for the night about 2 miles past Korythnia. There the Marshal learnt of Eugène’s disaster. Sending off messengers to warn Ney that he must hasten his march, he broke up at 3 a.m.
Kutuzov on his side had made up his mind to attack. Prince Golitzin, with the 3rd Corps and the 2nd Cuirassier division, was to attack the Guard in front. Miloradovich, strengthened by Korff’s cavalry, was to take position about Larionovo, a little east of the Lossmina, and let Davout go by; but was then to fall vigorously upon his rear, and incline to the left to support Golitzin. Tormazov with the 5th, 6th and 8th Corps, and the 1st Cuirassier Division, was to move to the left and bar Napoleon’s line of retreat. Ostermann and Vassilchikov were some distance to the rear, but could easily come up during the day. Exclusive of Platov, who was north of the Dnieper, and the various flying columns, Kutuzov probably disposed of nearly 70,000 regulars, with about 450 well-horsed cannon.