“Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible. * * *”* * * * * *“The object of this attack is to acquire as great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible.” (C-62)
“Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible. * * *”
* * * * * *
“The object of this attack is to acquire as great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible.” (C-62)
That document is signed by Hitler himself. It is addressed to the Supreme Commander of the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Goering. On 15 October 1939, a supplementary order was issued from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It was signed by Keitel in his familiar red pencil signature, and was addressed to Raeder, Goering, and the General Staff of the Army. It declared, in part:
“It must be the object of the Army’s preparations, therefore, to occupy—on receipt of a special order—the territory of Holland, in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas line.” (C-62)
“It must be the object of the Army’s preparations, therefore, to occupy—on receipt of a special order—the territory of Holland, in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas line.” (C-62)
The second paragraph deals with the taking possession of the West-Frisian islands.
It is clear that from that moment the decision to violate the neutrality of these three countries had been made. All that remained was to work out the details, to wait until the weather became favorable, and in the meantime, to give no hint that Germany’s word was about to be broken again. Otherwise, these small countries might have had some chance of combining with themselves and their neighbors.
Another Keitel directive, again sent to the Supreme Commandersof the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, gives details of how the attack is to be carried out. The following are pertinent passages:
“Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended against Holland may be carried out without a special order which the general attack will start.“The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be anticipated ahead of time.”* * * * * *“Wherever there is no resistance, the entry should carry the character of a peaceful occupation.”* * * * * *“At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian islands situated just off the coast, for the present without Texel, is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.”“The 7th Airborne Division will be committed for the airborne operation only after the possession of bridges across the Albert Canal” (in Belgium) “has been assured.” (440-PS)
“Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended against Holland may be carried out without a special order which the general attack will start.
“The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be anticipated ahead of time.”
* * * * * *
“Wherever there is no resistance, the entry should carry the character of a peaceful occupation.”
* * * * * *
“At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian islands situated just off the coast, for the present without Texel, is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.”
“The 7th Airborne Division will be committed for the airborne operation only after the possession of bridges across the Albert Canal” (in Belgium) “has been assured.” (440-PS)
In addition to Belgium and Holland, the document, in paragraph (5) and (6)(b) mentions Luxembourg. The signature of Keitel is typed. It is authenticated by a staff officer.
A later order of 28 November 1939, over the signature of Keitel, in the usual red pencil, is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Airforce. It states that if a quick breakthrough should fail north of Liege, other machinery for carrying out the attack will be used. Paragraph 2 shows clearly that the Netherlands is to be violated. It speaks of “The occupation of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing harbor, or of some other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea and air warfare,” and “bTaking of one or more Maas crossings between Namur and Dinant * * *.” (C-10)
From November until March of 1940 the High Command and the Fuehrer were waiting for favorable weather before A-Day, as they called it. That referred to the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. The successive postponements are shown in a series of orders which range in date from 7 November 1939 until 9 May 1940, and which are all signed either by Keitel or by Jodl. (C-72)
On 10 January 1940, a German airplane made a forced landing in Belgium. The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in possession, but they were only partially successful. Among the papers which were captured is an order to the Commander of the Second Army Group, Air Force Group—Luftflotte—the Second Air Force Fleet, clearly for offensive action against France, Holland, and Belgium. It deals with the dispositionof the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army covers the Liege-Antwerp Line. Then it deals with the disposition of the Dutch Army. The German Western Army is accordingly directing its attack between the North Sea and the Moselle, with the strongest possible air-force support, through the Belgo-Luxembourg region. The rest consists of operational details as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium and in Holland. (TC-58)
The nature of the Army’s planning is shown in the 1 February 1940 entry in Jodl’s diary, which reads in part as follows:
“1. Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town.“2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force.” (1809-PS)
“1. Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town.
“2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force.” (1809-PS)
The entry for 2 February 1940 states that “landings can be made in the centre of The Hague.” On 26 February Jodl wrote: “Fuehrer raises the question whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case ‘Yellow.’ ” On 3 March, he recorded the answer: “Fuehrer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before case ‘Yellow’, with a few days’ interval.” And on May 8, two days before the invasion, Jodl made this entry:
“Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.” (1809-PS)
“Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.” (1809-PS)
In other words, the Germans objected because the Dutch were actually making some preparation to resist their endeavor. Furthermore, the Dutch armies, according to the Germans’ own intelligence reports, were still adhering properly to their neutrality.
At 4:30 a. m. on 10 May, the months of planning bore fruit, and Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg were violently invaded with all the fury of modern warfare. No warning was given by Germany and no complaint was made by Germany of any breaches of neutrality before this action was taken.
After the invasion of each of the three countries was a fait accompli, the German Ambassador called upon representatives of the three Governments some hours later and handed them documents which were similar in each case, and which are described as memoranda or ultimatums. An account of what happened in Belgium is contained in an official Belgian report:
“From 4:30 information was received which left no shadowof doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the east. At five o’clock came news of the bombing of two Netherlands aerodromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier, the landing of German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the bombing of the Jemelle station.”* * * * * *“At 8:30 the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak” [Belgian Foreign Minister] “stopped him ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I will speak first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the Belgian Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army has just attacked our country. This is the second time in twenty-five years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by her on October 13th, 1937, and renewed spontaneously at the beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by Germany, for which there is no justification whatever, will deeply shock the conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend herself. Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be vanquished’.”* * * * * *“The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought: ‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to make the following declaration: In order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have been making preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Government of the Reich is compelled to ensure the neutrality of the three countries mentioned by means of arms. For this purpose, the Government of the Reich will bring up an armed force of the greatest size, so that resistance of any kind will be useless. The Government of the Reich guarantees Belgium’s European and colonial territory, as well as her dynasty, on condition that no resistance is offered. Should there be any resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of her country and loss of her independence. It is therefore, in the interests of Belgium that the population be called upon to cease all resistance andthat the authorities be given the necessary instructions to make contact with the German Military Command.”* * * * * *“In the middle of this communication, M. Spaak, who had by his side the Secretary-General of the Department, interrupted the Ambassador: ‘Hand me the document’, he said. ‘I should like to spare you so painful a task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to pointing out that he had already replied by the protest he had just made. * * *” (TC-58)
“From 4:30 information was received which left no shadowof doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the east. At five o’clock came news of the bombing of two Netherlands aerodromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier, the landing of German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the bombing of the Jemelle station.”
* * * * * *
“At 8:30 the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak” [Belgian Foreign Minister] “stopped him ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I will speak first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the Belgian Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army has just attacked our country. This is the second time in twenty-five years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by her on October 13th, 1937, and renewed spontaneously at the beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by Germany, for which there is no justification whatever, will deeply shock the conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend herself. Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be vanquished’.”
* * * * * *
“The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought: ‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to make the following declaration: In order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have been making preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Government of the Reich is compelled to ensure the neutrality of the three countries mentioned by means of arms. For this purpose, the Government of the Reich will bring up an armed force of the greatest size, so that resistance of any kind will be useless. The Government of the Reich guarantees Belgium’s European and colonial territory, as well as her dynasty, on condition that no resistance is offered. Should there be any resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of her country and loss of her independence. It is therefore, in the interests of Belgium that the population be called upon to cease all resistance andthat the authorities be given the necessary instructions to make contact with the German Military Command.”
* * * * * *
“In the middle of this communication, M. Spaak, who had by his side the Secretary-General of the Department, interrupted the Ambassador: ‘Hand me the document’, he said. ‘I should like to spare you so painful a task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to pointing out that he had already replied by the protest he had just made. * * *” (TC-58)
The so-called ultimatum, which was delivered some hours after the invasion had started, read in part as follows:
“The Reich Government has for a long time had no doubts as to what was the chief aim of the British and French war policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to other countries, and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and mercenary troops for England and France.“The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last minute action which upset the project. Germany has furnished documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.“Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the retreat in flight of the British troops from Norway was still going on, the English Prime Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation in Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go ahead with the transfer of the full weight of her navy to the Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of prestige before their own people and before the world, and partly to make it appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of war against Germany.“In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another purpose. It was nothing but a diversion manoeuvre in grand style, to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of England and France is thecarefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr.“Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and Holland, it being of course understood that these two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England and France would maintain the strictest neutrality.“Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.” (TC-57)
“The Reich Government has for a long time had no doubts as to what was the chief aim of the British and French war policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to other countries, and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and mercenary troops for England and France.
“The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last minute action which upset the project. Germany has furnished documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.
“Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the retreat in flight of the British troops from Norway was still going on, the English Prime Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation in Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go ahead with the transfer of the full weight of her navy to the Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of prestige before their own people and before the world, and partly to make it appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of war against Germany.
“In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another purpose. It was nothing but a diversion manoeuvre in grand style, to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of England and France is thecarefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr.
“Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and Holland, it being of course understood that these two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England and France would maintain the strictest neutrality.
“Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.” (TC-57)
The so-called ultimatum goes on to complain of the hostile expressions in the Belgian and the Netherlands Press, and to allege attempts by the British Intelligence to bring a revolution into Germany with the assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands. Reference is made to military preparation of the two countries, and it is pointed out that Belgium has fortified the Belgian frontier. A complaint was made in regard to Holland, that British aircraft had flown over the Netherlands country. Other charges were made against the neutrality of these two countries, although no instances were given (TC-57). The document continued:
“In this struggle for existence forced upon the German people by England and France, the Reich Government is not disposed to await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow them to carry the war over Belgium and the Netherlands into German territory. It has therefore now issued the command to German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military means at the disposal of the Reich.” (TC-57)
“In this struggle for existence forced upon the German people by England and France, the Reich Government is not disposed to await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow them to carry the war over Belgium and the Netherlands into German territory. It has therefore now issued the command to German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military means at the disposal of the Reich.” (TC-57)
It is unnecessary, in view of the documents previously adverted to, to emphasize the falsity of that statement. It is now known that for months preparations had been made to violate the neutrality of these three countries. This document is merely saying, “The orders to do so have now been issued.”
A similar document, similar in terms altogether, was handed to the representatives of the Netherlands Government; and a memorandum was sent to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed with it a copy of the document handed to the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands. The second paragraph of the latter declared:
“In defense against the imminent attack, the German troops have now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two countries * * *”. (TC-60)
“In defense against the imminent attack, the German troops have now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two countries * * *”. (TC-60)
The protest of the Belgium Government against the crime which was committed against her is contained inTC-59.
A.Treaties and Assurances Breached.
The invasions of Greece and of Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took place in the early hours of the morning of 6 April 1941, constituted direct breaches of The Hague Convention of 1899 on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. In the case of Yugoslavia, the invasion further constituted a breach of an express assurance by the Nazis.The assurance was originally given in a German Foreign Office release made in Berlin on 28 April 1938 (2719-PS), but was subsequently repeated by Hitler himself on 6 October 1939 in a speech he made in the Reichstag. The German Foreign Office release on 28 April 1938 reads, in part:
“Berlin, 28 April 1938. The State Secretary of the German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives.“As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich, we have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us as final and inviolable. On this point the following special declarations have been made:”* * * * * *“3. Yugoslavia.“The Yugoslav Government have been informed by authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on 3 April, the Fuehrer and Chancellor stated that, in regard to the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military protection for them.” (2719-PS)
“Berlin, 28 April 1938. The State Secretary of the German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives.
“As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich, we have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us as final and inviolable. On this point the following special declarations have been made:”
* * * * * *
“3. Yugoslavia.
“The Yugoslav Government have been informed by authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on 3 April, the Fuehrer and Chancellor stated that, in regard to the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military protection for them.” (2719-PS)
In a speech made on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on 1 June 1939, Hitler declared:
“The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of the tragic confusion of the world war. The German soldier then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural and economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’s present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and at the same time on that account we derive from it the hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer.“In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange of views which, and of this I am convinced, in this sense can only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to Yugoslavia, now that, owing to historical events, we have become neighbors with commonboundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-wracked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work.” (TC-92)
“The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of the tragic confusion of the world war. The German soldier then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural and economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’s present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and at the same time on that account we derive from it the hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer.
“In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange of views which, and of this I am convinced, in this sense can only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to Yugoslavia, now that, owing to historical events, we have become neighbors with commonboundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-wracked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work.” (TC-92)
As is now known this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already decided upon the European war. It occurred a week after the Reichschancellery conference recorded in the Schmundt note (L-79). The reference to “nerve-wracked continent” might perhaps be attributed to the war of nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months. The German Assurance to Yugoslavia on 6 October 1939 was in these terms:
“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one, and that we only desire to live in peace and friendship with her.” (TC-43)
“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one, and that we only desire to live in peace and friendship with her.” (TC-43)
B.Planning for Invasion: Collaboration with Italy and Bulgaria.
Despite the obligation of Germany, under the Convention of 1899, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and under the foregoing Assurance which I have read, the fate of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as is now known, been sealed ever since the meeting between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano at Obersalzberg, 12 and 13 August 1939 (TC-77). The effect of the meeting was that Hitler and Ribbentrop, only two months after the dinner to the Prince Regent, were seeking to persuade Italy to make war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Germany was to commence hostilities against Poland, which Hitler had decided to do in the very near future. Ciano while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia, and while himself anxious to secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general European war. Thus, despite all the persuasion which Hitler and Ribbentrop exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi conspirators to reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in fact Italy maintained its position and did not enter the war when Germany invaded Poland, and since the Germans themselves were not yet ready to strike in the Balkans. If was apparently for this reason that on 6 October, through Hitler’s speech, the Nazis repeated the assurance they had made in April 1938. It is a matter of history that after the defeat of the Allied Armies in May and June 1940, the Italian Government declared war on France and that subsequently, at three o’clock in the morning on 28 October1940, the Italian Minister at Athens presented the Greek Government with a 3 hour ultimatum, upon the expiration of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece.
This event was reported by the British Minister at Athens in these words:
“The president of the council has assured himself an outstanding place in Greek history and, whatever the future may bring, his foresight in quietly preparing his country for war and his courage in rejecting without demur the Italian ultimatum when delivered in the small hours of that October morning, will surely obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated and this reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation.”
“The president of the council has assured himself an outstanding place in Greek history and, whatever the future may bring, his foresight in quietly preparing his country for war and his courage in rejecting without demur the Italian ultimatum when delivered in the small hours of that October morning, will surely obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated and this reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation.”
A letter from Hitler to Mussolini, which is undated but which—this is clear from the contents—must have been written shortly after the Italian invasion of Greece on 28 November [transcriber note: October] 1940, contained these sentiments:
“Jugoslavia must become disinterested, if possible however from our point of view interested in cooperating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without assurances from Jugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans.“Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore, any threatening move towards Jugoslavia would be useless, since the impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March is well known to the Serbian general staff. Therefore, Jugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means and other ways.” (2762-PS)
“Jugoslavia must become disinterested, if possible however from our point of view interested in cooperating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without assurances from Jugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans.
“Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore, any threatening move towards Jugoslavia would be useless, since the impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March is well known to the Serbian general staff. Therefore, Jugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means and other ways.” (2762-PS)
It was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive in the Spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the north. It was an integral part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be induced to cooperate in them or at least to maintain a disinterested attitude towards the liquidation of the other Balkan States. These facts are disclosed in a “Top Secret Directive” issued from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by Jodl, and dated 12 November 1940. This order reads, in part:
“Directive No. 18.“The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines.* * *” (444-PS)
“Directive No. 18.
“The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines.* * *” (444-PS)
After sections dealing with operations against Gibraltar and an offensive against Egypt, the order continues:
“Balkans“The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Rumanian oil area.“In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.“So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.“The commander-in-chief of the Air Forcewill make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.” (444-PS)
“Balkans
“The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Rumanian oil area.
“In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.
“So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.
“The commander-in-chief of the Air Forcewill make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.” (444-PS)
The positions of the Italian invading forces in Greece in December 1940 may be summarized in the words in which the British Minister reported to Foreign Secretary Eden:
“The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the highest, and our own naval and land successes at Tarento and in the Western Desert have done much to maintain it. With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not unworthy of the ancient tradition of their country and that they, like their distant forbears, are prepared to fight against odds to maintain their freedom.”
“The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the highest, and our own naval and land successes at Tarento and in the Western Desert have done much to maintain it. With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not unworthy of the ancient tradition of their country and that they, like their distant forbears, are prepared to fight against odds to maintain their freedom.”
In fact, the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that Hitler came to the rescue with the order for the German attack on Greece.
This Directive of 13 December 1940, which is Top Secret Directive number 20, dealing with OperationMarita, bears adistribution list which shows that copies went to the Commander of the Navy (Raeder), to the Commander of the Air Force (Goering), to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Keitel), and to the Command Staff (Jodl). The first two paragraphs state:
“The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavour be foiled to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.“My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months. (b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send the task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (OperationMarita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.” (1541-PS)
“The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavour be foiled to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.
“My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months. (b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send the task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (OperationMarita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.” (1541-PS)
The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and paragraph 4 deals with the operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states:
“The Military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff. The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported step by step by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Rumania.“Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.” (1541-PS)
“The Military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff. The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported step by step by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Rumania.
“Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.” (1541-PS)
Another “Top Secret Directive” carries the plan a little farther. It deals with decisive action in support of the Italian forces in Tripoli and in Albania. The first short paragraph reads:
“The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations demands for strategical political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.” (448-PS)
“The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations demands for strategical political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.” (448-PS)
Paragraph three, after dealing with the forces to be transferred to Albania, sets out what the duties of the German forces will be:
“a.To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there.“b.To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:“To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation.“To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s Army.” (448-PS)
“a.To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there.
“b.To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:
“To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation.
“To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s Army.” (448-PS)
That directive was signed by Hitler, and, as shown on the original, was initialed by both Keitel and Jodl. A copy went to Raeder, and the copy sent to Foreign Intelligence presumably reached Ribbentrop.
A conference took place on 19 and 20 January between Keitel and the Italian General, Guzzoni. This was followed by a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, at which Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present. In the speech which the Fuehrer made on 20 January 1941, after the conference with the Italians, he declared:
“* * * The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose:“a.An operation against Greece.“b.Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey.“c.Safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.“Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.“Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.” (C-134)
“* * * The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose:
“a.An operation against Greece.
“b.Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey.
“c.Safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.
“Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.
“Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.” (C-134)
At a conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians, on 8 February, the following plans were discussed: